Sommer (2009, 65) cites McBride's "nominal realism" framework as "one of the most thorough and sensitive discussions of this topic,"[27] but goes further than McBride in entirely denying any presencing function of the *šēm*. For Sommer (2009, 65), the *šēm* is completely secularized, which stands in stark contrast to its pre-D use, and thus supports his position regarding D and Dtr's rejection of the fluidity model: "As Deuteronomy 26.2 reminds us, it is the *shem* that is located there. Unlike Psalm 76, Deuteronomy 26 does not put God and the *shem* in the same place or allow them to overlap. In short, the author of Deuteronomy has put the *shem* where others thought God Himself to be."

Concern can be raised with the conclusions Sommer draws from the differences between earlier usage of the *šēm* and those of D and Dtr. As the discussion in previous chapters has demonstrated, loci of agency were not necessarily isometric with the self, and particularly for imagined unseen agents (like deities) whose partibility was bound only by the limits of imagination and the dynamics of counter-intuitiveness. For Sommer, the deity's body and self are the only vehicles of their presence, but just as the self could be parted from the body, other loci of agency could be parted from the body *and* the self.[28] The location of the deity's "self" in the heavens in no way indicates that a known vehicle of divine agency cannot be presencing that agency on earth. That is, after all, one of the primary functions of the partibility and communicability of divine agency. Deuteronomy also appeals in several places to the prototypical language of divine presencing in referring to the temple. Ian Wilson (1995, 152–59, 192–97), in his own critique of Name Theology, highlights multiple ways in which Deuteronomy actually strengthens the sense of the divine presence over and against the earlier narratives (see also Knafl 2014, 99–109, 184–87). For instance, *lipnê YHWH*, "before YHWH," is used frequently in Deuteronomy in reference to events occurring

[27] Sommer cites Richter's criticisms of the notion of "nominal realism," which is the framework McBride uses to develop his notion of divine presencing via the name (190, n. 101), and levels a lengthier critique at her work (based primarily on McBride's arguments) on pages 218–19, note 47.

[28] Sommer briefly considers the notion of the presencing of the name in relation to the Amarna Letters, which refer to the placement of the name of the Egyptian Pharaoh in Jerusalem. Sommer (2009, 66) asserts, "The phrase *šakan šumšu* (precisely cognate to the Hebrew לשכן את שמו) does not mean that Abdi-Ḫeba thought that Pharaoh was physically present in Jerusalem; rather, Abdi-Ḫeba acknowledges Pharaoh's claim over the city." This constitutes a bit of a straw man, though, as the partibility and presencing capabilities of deities were considerably more dynamic than those of human beings, and in the case of the Hebrew Bible, the *šēm* was being implanted within a literary tradition that already had an active tradition of divine presencing. Additionally, Abdi-Ḫeba's own presence may not have been understood to be reified by the name, but some sense of his agency or authority would have been there.