

smelled the scarf on occasion in order to generate that perception of presence, however fleeting. In that sense, he is “presencing” the former lover.

I also try in this book to avoid a number of rather colonizing terms that have become common in biblical scholarship. For instance, *ancient Near East* privileges a Western perspective, and even *Western* is itself a rather problematic dichotomy. Instead of the former, I use *ancient Southwest Asia*, and instead of the latter, I use *Eurocentric*. I use neither of these terms to refer to anything approximating a discrete and clearly delineable semantic category. As my discussion of prototype theory in the introduction will make clear, conceptual categories do not commonly form and are not commonly learned or used in reference to clear and consistent boundaries. Such boundaries are not inherent to most conceptual categories but form rather arbitrarily when a need for them arises, and these and the other conceptual categories I employ throughout this book are no different. I understand the terms ancient Southwest Asia and Eurocentric to focus on the exemplars of the categories and to extend outward to an ambiguous periphery where boundaries can be quite fuzzy, fluid, and debatable. In other words, the terms I use should not imply the assertion of any clear boundaries unless I indicate otherwise.

This is also true of my use of the rather loaded word *mind*. I use it to refer not just to the biological brain and associated structures, but to the collection of networks that facilitate thinking, moving, knowing, and our different senses. These are physical processes carried out through material channels, and in this sense the mind is not necessarily limited to the brain or even to the body. I thus adopt an “embodied mind” paradigm, which “insists that the mind is irreducible to the workings of any single organ or system” (Pitts-Taylor 2016, 44).¹ I will also frequently use it etically (that is, from an analytical perspective that is outside looking in) in reference to other groups’ conventionalized understandings of the various internal loci of cognition and emotion, which tend to accrete around the head, the chest, or even the abdomen. In other words, I will use the word mind to refer to a society’s reasoning about cognition and emotion, even if they explicitly identify those processes with, say, the heart (cf. Berendt and Tanita 2011).

Israel and Judah are also somewhat problematic designations. The data suggest Israel was the earlier of the two states, and that Israel and Judah existed separately (but with some manner of relationship) until the destruction of Israel in the late-eighth-century BCE. As Jerusalem and Judah grew in significance, their institutions seem to have appropriated Israel’s literature and history. By the Neo-Babylonian period (626–539 BCE), Judah was really the most salient

¹ Note that I use *embodied* not to refer to some process of incarnation, but to the fundamentally material nature of cognition and its constituent processes (Lakoff and Johnson 1999, Wilson 2002).