of Romans states, "for we determine that a person is justified by faith without the works of the law" (*logizometha gar dikaiousthai pistei anthrōpon xōris ergōn nomou*), while the author of James asserts, "you see that a person is justified by works and not by faith alone" (*horate hoti ex ergōn dikaioutai anthrōpos kai ouk ek pisteōs monon*). James 2:21–22 also directly challenges the example of Abraham evoked by Paul in Rom 4:2–3. While Martin Luther dismissed James as an "epistle of straw" (*strohene Epistel*) in the introduction to his 1522 translation of the Bible, subsequent Protestant readers have largely reconciled the two texts not by altering them, but by imposing a new interpretive lens that flips the relationship of faith and works and rereads works as the fruits or the manifestation of faith. According to this reading, the author of James and the author of Romans are actually in perfect agreement, and the second chapter of James is just explaining that one's justification is still achieved by faith alone and only *manifested to others* through works. Readers of the biblical texts are not as confined as we frequently assume to the readings that we find most likely. In chapter 5 I will suggest that a passage in Exodus was composed precisely to provide an alternative interpretive lens for other problematic passages that scholars still have not managed to resolve to widespread satisfaction.

In addition to being confined to the minds of hearers, readers, and viewers, cognitive linguistics suggests that meaning is conceptual, or based on concepts, which can be described as "a person's idea of what something in the world is like" (Dirven and Verspoor 2004, 13). Concepts are not coextensive with linguistic expressions; they are the semantic structures conventionally indexed by those expressions. To facilitate the more efficient and consistent construal of conceptual content, our minds create and deploy basic metaphorical frameworks called "image schemas" (Hampe 2005; Mandler and Cánovas 2014). These are "abstract, preconceptual structures that emerge from our recurrent experiences of the world" (Kövecses 2020, 9). They serve to give structure to more developed or abstract concepts. A very basic example is the UP-DOWN schema, which is used to map abstract concepts against a vertical spatial relationship.[31] This schema may derive intuitively from the upright stance and gait of healthy and abled humans. It appears to be nearly universal, and a vast array of abstractions is intuitively mapped against it to produce what are called conceptual metaphors (Kövecses 2020; Nyord 2009, 6–23).[32]

The following are common English-language examples based on the UP-DOWN schema:[33]

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[31] I follow the convention here of putting the names of image schemas and conceptual metaphors in small caps.

[32] Sometimes the terms *image schema* and *conceptual metaphor* are conflated (cf. Lakoff 1987b, 219–22).

[33] The examples here are drawn primarily from Saeed 2003, 347.