simultaneously in several *bodies*" (Sommer 2009, 12, emphasis added). Loumonth's body was not identified as Abbey's body, but the constituent element of her personhood that had been implanted in him reified Abbey's *presence* for her father, even if not her *body*. Sommer (2009, 2) defines body as "*something located in a particular place at a particular time, whatever its shape or substance*" (emphasis in original), and the goal of this definition seems to me to be to extend the category over cultic objects made of wood and stone.[10] Without endorsing a definition, I believe most English speakers associate the body with an agent's primary visible locus of self, *whatever that may constitute*. At the same time, however, the cognitive research indicates presence can be reified through partible aspects of personhood that are not necessarily identified as an individual's body.[11] I think Sommer's choice to use this term may have contributed in part to his drawing of such clear and firm lines of distinction between the fluidity model and its rejection by the P and D strata.[12]

Notions about loci of agency departing the body, entering other bodies, and existing autonomously are also widespread and have been the subject of a great deal of cognitive and anthropological research (Pyysiäinen 2009, 57–94). In societies where the biological dimension of personhood is less important than other relational dimensions, the person in reflective reasoning is constituted more by material and social relationships, is less restrained by the container of the body, and is less socially diminished in death. A classic example of such societies is that of Melanesia, as discussed by Marilyn Strathern in her important work, *The Gender of the Gift* (1988).[13] As with all societies, Melanesian societies hold both dividual and individual conceptualizations of the person in tension, with priority emerging situationally (Hemer 2013, 92–93). Practices and beliefs related to the body are quite variable, but in broad terms, the body is conceptualized as the observable embodiment of the relationships with the food, the people, and the

[10] Others have criticized Sommer's definition as too broad (Knafl 2014, 72; Smith 2016, 13–14; Wilson 2021, 14–18), but they also appeal to definitions to draw lines of demarcation.

[11] One may argue that the heart is a part of a deceased person's body, but if their heart reifies their presence as a vehicle of agency after transplantation into another person's body, the partibility and permeability of the self is overlapping with Sommer's fragmentation framework. If the rest of the deceased person's body also still reifies their presence—for instance, if one still visits their grave in order to be in their presence—then their presence can at least be perceived to be reified simultaneously in different "bodies."

[12] This will be discussed in more detail in chapter 5.

[13] Melanesian persons, she states, "are as dividually as they are individually conceived. They contain a generalized sociality within. Indeed, persons are frequently constructed as the plural and composite site of the relationships that produce them" (Strathern 1988, 13; cf. Mosko 2010).