Without a strong reflective framework for experimentation or investigation, we will intuitively reach into our experiential repertoire for the closest conceptual match. If we witness boulders careening down a mountainside, but we are unfamiliar with the responsible phenomena, we may revise existing agent concepts (e.g., "an animal climbing") to produce novel agent concepts, such as an enormous or enormously powerful animal climbing on a cliff (Bertolotti and Magnani 2010, 254). Similar inferences drawn from the many and varied experiences of early humans within their cognitive ecologies likely contributed to the initial production of a variety of novel agents.

The third insight is what I refer to as body-agency partibility. As a result of the Eurocentric reification of the mind as the locus of cognition, this is generally referred to as "mind/body dualism" in the cognitive sciences, but this is an imprecise and infelicitous term that is too often equated with Cartesian duality.[6] In short, the sensitivity of our minds to mental agents in the world around us does not necessarily posit a body. This again is thought to be a byproduct of the universal experiences of human infancy. Around the end of the first year of life, infants begin to intuitively perceive that thoughts and motivations are different from *things*, that people have different mental attitudes, and that those mental attitudes can be hidden and can differ from bodily states and behaviors (Kinzler and Spelke 2007; Boyer and Barrett 2016). The result is the perception that psychological agents are "in here," while physical objects—including the body—are "out there" (Wellman 2014, 266). These intuitions remain into and throughout adulthood (Forstmann and Burgmer 2015) and interact with sociocultural frameworks and influences to result in the production and propagation of a variety of entities associated with cognition (e.g., "mind"), emotion (e.g., "heart"), animacy (e.g., "spirit," "life force"), and selfhood (e.g., "soul," "Ego").[7] As children begin to be able to engage in contemplation and imagination about the nature of these loci of agency—unobservable as they are—they also contemplate and imagine their constraints, and particularly the degree to which they are and are not confined to the body, and most importantly, their continued existence after death (Bering and Bjorklund 2004; Astuti and Harris 2008).

The fourth insight is humanity's "symbolic faculty," or our ability to symbolically structure knowledge about ourselves and the world around us. This faculty is widely thought to have begun developing before the isolation of *Homo sapiens sapiens* (modern humans), and it has been observed in some non-human animals, but its development in modern humans was accelerated well beyond other animals by the development of human language (Gamble 2007, 87–110;

[6] The Cartesian echoes of this terminology are frequently lamented and often distort discussion of these findings (Hodge 2008).

[7] Cohen and Barrett 2011, 114–17; Johnson 1990; Roazzi, Nyhof, and Johnson 2013; Weisman, Dweck, and Markman 2017.