

# From Retail to the Cloud: Strategic Reinvention and Competitive Advantage at Amazon

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## Abstract

This paper examines Amazon's strategic evolution from an online retailer into a global technology and information ecosystem. Using VRIO, SWOT, and financial analysis, it explores how Amazon leveraged data, cloud infrastructure, and platform integration to build a sustainable competitive advantage beyond retail. The analysis identifies Amazon's shift toward a dual differentiation strategy, combining broad differentiation in consumer-facing platforms with focused differentiation in enterprise services, enabled by innovations such as AWS, Prime, and recommendation systems, underpinned by large-scale data utilization. However, it highlights critical strategic challenges, including continued reliance on legacy revenue streams, strategic misalignment with Whole Foods' premium positioning, and intensifying competitive pressure in the cloud sector. Recommendations focus on integrating open-source software, expanding Prime penetration internationally, and divesting Whole Foods to refocus on higher-margin digital businesses. The paper concludes that Amazon's long-term success will depend on disciplined strategic alignment, continuous innovation, and sustained leadership in the global data-driven ecosystem.

## Introduction

Amazon's strategic transformation from an online bookstore into a global technology ecosystem constitutes one of the most significant corporate evolutions in contemporary business history. Founded in 1994 by Jeff Bezos, the company has expanded into e-commerce, logistics, digital entertainment, cloud computing, and artificial intelligence. It now operates at scale across multiple industries, supported by a distinctive organizational culture that integrates customer obsession, data-centric decision-making, and systematic innovation.

This paper examines how Amazon has sustained competitive advantage across such diverse business domains and how its strategic logic has evolved over time. Drawing on internal and external analytical frameworks, this analysis explores the mechanisms through which Amazon integrates and redeploys resources, captures economies of scope and scale, and continuously renews its value proposition. It also identifies emerging tensions stemming from the strategic trade-offs between expansion and focus, and centralized governance and organizational adaptability, which increasingly shape the firm's long-term trajectory.

## Findings and Analysis

### Strategic Position and Evolution

At first glance, Amazon's industry scope may appear excessively broad. How can a company that began as an online bookstore now produce films, manufacture devices, and provide cloud computing services? A comparative VRIO analysis between Amazon and a traditional retailer such as Walmart, together with the Business Model Canvas (see Appendix 1), demonstrates that defining Amazon solely as a retail company is analytically insufficient and conceptually misleading. The firm's competitive advantage and core business model extend well beyond retail activities, with value creation increasingly driven by data, platform orchestration, and ecosystem control rather than product exchange alone.

| Core competency      | V   | R   | I   | O   | Retail-specific? |
|----------------------|-----|-----|-----|-----|------------------|
| <b>Amazon</b>        |     |     |     |     |                  |
| Product catalogue    | Yes | No  |     |     | Yes              |
| Distribution network | Yes | Yes | No  |     | Yes              |
| Brand image          | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No               |

| Core competency                                     | V   | R   | I   | O   | Retail-specific? |
|---|-----|-----|-----|-----|------------------|
| Global partner-ships<br>(Amazon Associates Program) | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No               |
| Big Data (curation and usage)                       | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No               |
| <b>Walmart</b>                                      |     |     |     |     |                  |
| Product catalogue                                   | Yes | No  |     |     | Yes              |
| Inventory management                                | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes              |
| Brand image   | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | No               |
| Bargaining power                                    | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes | Yes              |

Since opening its platform to third-party merchants in 2000, Amazon has effectively operated in the **information business**, where large-scale data generation and processing constitute core strategic capabilities. It leverages its vast data ecosystem to anticipate customer needs and ensure immediate access to desired products (see Appendix 2). In parallel, it monetizes these capabilities by providing infrastructure, analytics, and scalable computing services through Amazon Web Services (AWS) and related platforms, thereby realizing economies of scope that extend beyond retail transactions. Further evidence supporting Amazon’s post-retail identity is presented in Appendix 3.

Today, Amazon’s principal competitors are not traditional retailers but technology and data-driven firms such as Google and IBM, which also dominate the Big Data and cloud computing markets. Amazon’s distinct advantage lies in the scale and quality of its **first-hand consumer data** (Rao, 2014), enabling predictive insights rooted in direct transactional and behavioural signals that remain difficult for rivals to replicate at comparable scale.

Amazon has consistently acted as a disruptor across industries including publishing, logistics, and entertainment. Through a blue ocean strategy, the company systematically creates new market spaces by redefining value propositions rather than competing along established industry dimensions. Its scale and cross-market integration position Amazon among a small set of global firms exhibiting oligopolistic characteristics.



Figure 1: Timeline illustrating Amazon's transition beyond a retail-only business model.

Amazon's overarching competitive strategy combines cost efficiency with differentiation. Technology underpins operational excellence and cost control, while differentiation drives customer loyalty and ecosystem expansion. Broad differentiation characterizes its retail and digital platforms through seamless user experience, extensive selection, and rapid delivery, whereas focused differentiation defines its enterprise-facing services, including cloud computing, targeted advertising, and e-commerce infrastructure.

The acquisition of Whole Foods marked a strategic departure from Amazon's historical pattern of investing in physical assets primarily to support its online operations (e.g., warehouses, Kindle, Dash button). This move signaled a deliberate shift toward integrating digital capabilities into physical retail environments, further extending Amazon's strategic scope.

## Financial and Operational Performance

Amazon's financial performance demonstrates long-term strategic coherence and remarkable resilience. Revenues have grown steadily over time, even through periods of global economic downturn, reflecting the company's diversified portfolio and organizational adaptability, rather than reliance on a single revenue engine.



Figure 2: Amazon's annual net revenues. Source: <https://www.statista.com/statistics/266282/annual-net-revenue-of-amazoncom/>

Profit margins, however, only began to improve materially after Amazon shifted its focus toward leveraging data-driven services such as **Amazon Web Services (AWS)**, **Prime**, and **Kindle**, which collectively underpinned profitability through 2011. Subsequent periods of heavy investment and execution setbacks temporarily eroded margins. However, these expenditures ultimately laid the foundation for sustained growth. Today, revenue continues to expand at a double-digit rate, and net profit margins have reached their highest levels since 2004.

Liquidity and solvency indicators further underscore the company's strong financial position. Working capital has nearly tripled to approximately USD 7 billion, while the long-term debt-to-capital ratio has declined to around 35% (see Appendix 4), indicating substantial financial flexibility and capacity to sustain large-scale investment.



Figure 3: Amazon’s net profit margin (2002-2018), showing profit margins largely within the retail industry range (approximately 0.5%-5%) despite the company’s scale and technological capabilities (Ross, 2019). Source: <https://www.statista.com/statistics/266282/annual-net-revenue-of-amazoncom/>

Operationally, Amazon outperforms competitors across **customer service** (Rao, 2014), **product variety** (Gupta & Rodriguez, 2019), and **distribution capabilities**, maintaining one of the most advanced logistics networks globally. Nonetheless, several strategic vulnerabilities persist. Revenue derived from new product lines remains limited, leaving the firm reliant on established offerings (see Appendix 5), an atypical profile for an organization strongly associated with continuous innovation. The acquisition of Whole Foods also raises strategic concerns: the brand’s premium positioning contrasts with Amazon’s historically mass-market orientation, creating potential brand dilution and strategic misalignment depending on the degree to which Whole Foods’ differentiated positioning is preserved or diminished (Gupta & Rodriguez, 2019).

Finally, while Amazon benefited from an early-mover advantage in the cloud services industry, this lead has progressively narrowed as competitors close the technological and scale gap. In such a dynamic environment, sustained advantage may prove elusive. Amazon’s continued success will therefore depend on its ability to continually innovate and generate successive waves of temporary, technology-based differentiation without eroding margin discipline or operational focus.



Figure 4: Market share of primary cloud service providers, indicating the progressive narrowing of Amazon's lead as competitors expand. Source: <https://www.parkmycloud.com/blog/aws-vs-azure-vs-google-cloud-market-share/>



## Discussion

Amazon's evolution illustrates the paradox of scale in the digital economy: the same mechanisms that enabled its rise now generate strategic complexity. The company's success stems from its ability to translate data into value, integrating retail, logistics, and cloud computing within a single ecosystem. This integration creates significant economies of scope and network effects, while simultaneously increasing organizational interdependence and risk concentration. Dependence on AWS for profitability exposes Amazon to technological convergence and competitive pressure from Microsoft and Google, whose accelerating innovation cycles continue to narrow the cloud infrastructure gap.

The company's diversification strategy has produced both synergies and tensions. Its ventures into physical retail through Whole Foods and into media production through Amazon Studios demonstrate an ambition to extend control across multiple stages of the value chain. However, these moves complicate strategic focus and risk brand dilution. The central challenge lies in maintaining coherence between the digital core (data, cloud services, and customer experience) and peripheral operations.

Operationally, Amazon exhibits exceptional ability in logistics and automation, achieving a scale few firms can match. Yet the organization's culture of relentless reinvestment and low margins limits organizational slack in an environment of increasing regulatory, social, and labor scrutiny. The company's continued dominance will depend less on expansion and more on governance, balancing innovation with accountability and ensuring that growth aligns with social, ethical, and environmental expectations.

Ultimately, Amazon's case reflects the broader dynamics of platform capitalism: power derived from data, economies of scale, and user ecosystems can be both a source of competitive advantage and a vulnerability. Sustaining leadership under these conditions requires the capacity to adapt strategically without undermining the trust and legitimacy that underpin its global ecosystem.

## Recommendations

Amazon’s strategic customers are:

- **Prime subscribers** (who spend approximately four times more than non-Prime customers).
- **AWS customers** (who face switching costs due to vendor lock-in and whose expenditure on AWS scales exponentially with usage and firm growth).

The recommendations below aim to strengthen loyalty among these strategic customer segments and prioritize higher-profit-margin activities to address the issues identified in the analysis.

### Embracing open-source software (OSS)

Software developers and tech companies are highly sensitive to ethics and governance norms. Amazon’s reputation is therefore negatively affected when it commercializes proprietary, closed-source variants of widely adopted OSS projects (Campbell, 2019). The company should instead embed and support these projects as first-class components within AWS.

With the rise of containerization and the DevOps culture, Amazon would benefit from acquiring Docker, a pioneer and industry world-leader whose ecosystem influence exceeds its current profitability (Vaughan-Nichols, 2019). Despite its estimated 83% market share (Sysdig, 2018) and USD 1.3 billion valuation (Shieber, 2018), Docker has struggled to convert adoption into sustained profits. Amazon has the financial capacity to absorb this acquisition, which would reinforce AWS’s infrastructure dominance while reducing reputational fragility vis-à-vis the OSS community by capitalizing on Docker’s image.

Moreover, focusing on assembling a coherent, interoperable service stack from OSS building blocks would constitute a significant competitive advantage over competitors still trying to replicate AWS’s baseline capabilities. The table below outlines OSS projects that Amazon could potentially integrate.

| Project name  | Description                  |
|---------------|------------------------------|
| Elasticsearch | Cloud-ready search engine    |
| Hazelcast     | Distributed cache            |
| Datadog       | Cloud application monitoring |

## **Penetrating underperforming markets**

Most Prime services are only available in the US. As a result, about 95% of Prime’s subscribers are US-based (Gupta & Rodriguez, 2019), while only around 3% of non-US customers hold a Prime subscription. If Amazon achieved comparable penetration rates internationally using its existing customer base, revenues (excluding AWS and Whole Foods) would increase by an estimated 32% (see Appendix 6). Enhancing Prime’s value proposition outside the US would likely also expand the total customer base.

Executing this recommendation would require investment in fulfilment infrastructure in strategic regions (e.g., Australasia, Southeast Asia) to reduce shipping times and approach the two-day delivery standard. The projected USD 61 billion revenue upside should offset the associated capital expenditures (e.g., approximately USD 100 million per warehouse (Coombs, 2017)).

## **Divesting Whole Foods**

As established earlier, the acquisition of Whole Foods did not align with Amazon’s core strategic logic. Moreover, assuming Whole Foods’ net income remains at historical averages, it would require approximately 33 years for this investment to break even (see Appendix 7), a horizon incompatible with Amazon’s innovation-driven investment agenda. Amazon should therefore divest Whole Foods.

Such divestment would also clarify Amazon’s strategic positioning, signalling that traditional retailers are platform partners rather than direct competitors. As a result, Amazon would incentivize retailers to adopt its infrastructure and marketplace services to sell their products, reinforcing ecosystem participation while reducing capital intensity and avoiding further strategic dilution.

## Summary

This figure and table provide a timeline of the recommendations, associated milestones, and expected benefits.



Figure 5: Key milestones underpinning the recommended strategic actions.

| Action   | Resource implications   | Expected benefit(s)   |
|--|---|---|
| Integrate Datadog and Hazelcast into AWS                       | Realigning incentives to prioritize OSS integration   | Improved credibility within the tech community                            |
| Launch marketing campaign around the importance of OSS for AWS | Reframing existing campaigns to foreground OSS alignment  | Improved credibility within the tech community                            |
| Acquire Docker Inc.  | Investing approximately \$1B (covered by working capital)   | Improved credibility within the tech community and a more robust platform |
| Deploy warehouses* to enable Prime globally                    | Deploying capital into fulfilment infrastructure (warehouses and operations), with costs covered by expected benefits | Higher Prime penetration and associated revenue uplift (up to 30%)        |
| Divest Whole Foods   | Finding a buyer   | Capital gains and strategy refocusing                                     |

\* Alibaba's presence in China, along with Chinese regulatory pressures, may significantly inhibit Amazon's ability to penetrate this market. Consequently, Amazon should target more accessible Southeast Asian countries first.

## Conclusion

Amazon's dominance in the global digital economy has been built on the strength of its integrated ecosystem, data-driven strategy, and operational efficiency. However, its growing dependence on AWS for profitability and the dilution of strategic focus through ventures such as Whole Foods expose the company to emerging risks. To sustain its competitive advantage, Amazon must consolidate around its technological core, where data, automation, and platform integration generate the greatest long-term value. Strengthening its position in open-source software would reinforce credibility within the developer community, while expanding global Prime subscriptions would extend network effects beyond its U.S. base. Divesting from non-core, low-synergy businesses would restore strategic clarity and reduce capital intensity, preserving investment capacity. In the coming years, Amazon's success will depend on its ability to channel innovation toward coherent, high-margin opportunities that preserve both profitability and strategic focus.

# Appendices

## Appendix 1. Amazon's business model canvas

### Value Proposition

- World leader in cloud infrastructure
- Offer the ability to purchase a wide range of products with minimal friction
- Provide other companies with access to Amazon's infrastructure and data

### Customer Relationships

- Facilitate and speed up the purchase process (fast checkout, fast delivery)
- Cultivate perceived intimacy despite platform scale
- Create a 360-degree customer profile to enhance customer service
- Provide recommendations and reviews
- Offer the largest product selection

### Channels

- Websites
- AWS
- Conferences
- Physical stores
- Internet of Things (e.g. Echo)

### Customer Segments

- Mass-consumption market
- Developers
- Readers
- TV shows enthusiasts
- Companies

### Key Activities

- Platform as a Service
- Software development
- Distribution
- Customer service
- Automation
- Innovation

**Key Resources**

- Platform
- Brand
- Third-party merchants
- Global presence
- Data
- Patented algorithms

**Key Partners**

- Sellers
- Content providers
- Amazon Associates Program
- Acquisitions

**Revenue Streams**

- Sales from the website
- Prime subscriptions
- Advertising network
- AWS
- Hardware (Kindle, Echo)
- Amazon Associates Program

**Cost Structure**

- Fixed costs
  - Data centres
  - Marketing
  - Warehouses
  - Employees
  - R&D
  - Content generation
- Variable costs
  - Shipping costs
  - Commissions
  - Customer service

## Appendix 2. Place of Big Data in Amazon’s operations

Big Data refers to the growth and availability of large volumes of data that traditional databases cannot analyze. The Big Data process includes five components: collect, store, organize, analyze and share (Rao, 2014). The end goal is to extract valuable information (e.g. recommendations, patterns of behaviours) from the gathered data. Information is at the heart of Amazon’s business since its inception, even before it was called “Big Data”. One of its first usages was the recommendation system, but today it is also used to:

- Help customers find what they want readily
- Make the platform more intimate and less intimidating
- Mitigate risks (e.g. theft)
- Create precise customer groups (e.g. for targeted marketing campaigns)
- Improve customer support
- Create new sources of income by providing data-related services to other companies

This data provides Amazon with in-depth knowledge about its customers, aiding personnel in their day-to-day activities and enabling the company to make sound decisions.



### Appendix 3. Amazon is no longer a retail-only business

The following figures and tables provide evidence to support the fact that Amazon is no longer a retail-only business.

#### Net profit margin (1999-2004)



Figure 6: Amazon's net profit margin during its early growth phase (1999-2004).  
Source: <https://www.statista.com/statistics/266282/annual-net-revenue-of-amazoncom/>.

## Evolution of market share on Amazon's website



Figure 7: Evolution of market share across Amazon's online marketplace.  
Source: <https://ir.aboutamazon.com/annual-reports?c=97664&p=irol-reportsannual>.

## AWS impact on Amazon's financial results

### *Sales*

|      | AWS          | Other         | Total   |
|------|--------------|---------------|---------|
| 2016 | 12,219 (9%)  | 123,768 (91%) | 135,987 |
| 2017 | 17,459 (10%) | 160,407 (90%) | 177,866 |
| 2018 | 25,655 (11%) | 207,232 (89%) | 232,887 |



Figure 8: Contribution of Amazon Web Services (AWS) to Amazon's total net sales (USD millions). Source: <https://ir.aboutamazon.com/annual-reports?c=97664&p=irol-reportsannual>

*Operating income*

|      | AWS                  | Other             | Total  |
|------|----------------------|-------------------|--------|
| 2016 | 3,108 (74%)          | 1,078 (26%)       | 4,186  |
| 2017 | 4,331 (105%)         | <b>-225 (-5%)</b> | 4,106  |
| 2018 | 7,296 ( <b>59%</b> ) | 5,125 (41%)       | 12,421 |



Figure 9: Contribution of Amazon Web Services (AWS) to Amazon's total operating income (USD millions). Source: <https://ir.aboutamazon.com/annual-reports?c=97664&p=irol-reportsannual>

#### Appendix 4. Amazon's investment capacity

|  | 2017         | 2018         | YTY evolution |
|--|--------------|--------------|---------------|
| Current assets                         | 60,197       | 75,101       | +25%          |
| Current liabilities                    | 57,883       | 68,391       | +18%          |
| Long-term debt                         | 24,743       | 23,495       | -5%           |
| Total stockholder's equity             | 27,709       | 43,549       | +57%          |
| <b>Working capital</b>                 | <b>2,314</b> | <b>6,710</b> | <b>+190%</b>  |
| <b>Long-term debt-to-capital ratio</b> | <b>47%</b>   | <b>35%</b>   | <b>-26%</b>   |

The working capital represents the internal funds available to pay current liabilities and finance potential investments without borrowing or raising additional funds. The long-term debt-to-capital ratio indicates the percentage of capital investment funded by creditors and bondholders. Source: <https://ir.aboutamazon.com/annual-reports?c=97664&p=irol-reportsannual>

## Appendix 5. Amazon's revenue breakdown by product

|                                  | Revenues 2018<br>(in millions of \$) | Revenue share | Launch year |
|----------------------------------|--------------------------------------|---------------|-------------|
| Amazon website                   | 122,987                              | 53%           | 1995        |
| Third-party<br>merchants         | 42,745                               | 18%           | 2000        |
| AWS                              | 25,655                               | 11%           | 2002        |
| Physical stores<br>(Whole Foods) | 17,224                               | 7%            | 2017        |
| Amazon Prime                     | 14,168                               | 6%            | 2005        |
| Other                            | 10,108                               | 4%            | -           |
| <b>Total</b>                     | <b>232,887</b>                       | <b>100%</b>   |             |

Legacy product lines account for the majority of revenue generation. Source: <https://ir.aboutamazon.com/annual-reports?c=97664&p=irol-reportsannual>

## Appendix 6. Projection of revenues with more non-US Prime subscribers

The following tables display Amazon's 2018 revenues (excluding AWS and Whole Foods) as well as the number of Prime subscribers for the US and the rest of the world (Sources: <https://ir.aboutamazon.com/annual-reports?c=97664&p=irol-reportsannual> and <https://marketingland.com/report-prime-members-now-represent-63-percent-amazons-us-customers-226573>)

|               | Net sales 2018 | Share      |
|---------------|----------------|------------|
| US            | 124,142        | <b>65%</b> |
| International | 65,866         | <b>35%</b> |
| Total         | 190,008        | 100%       |

|               | Prime | Non-prime | Total | % of prime |
|---------------|-------|-----------|-------|------------|
| US            | 95    | 56        | 151   | <b>63%</b> |
| International | 5     | 154       | 159   | <b>3%</b>  |
| Total         | 100   | 210       | 310   | 32%        |

Since Prime subscribers spend four times what non-Prime customers spend (Gupta & Rodriguez, 2019), it is then possible to calculate the average yearly purchase for each type of customer.

|               | Average purchase (non-prime) | Average purchase (prime) |
|---------------|------------------------------|--------------------------|
| US            | 284.86                       | 1,139.46                 |
| International | 378.09                       | 1,512.37                 |
| Total         | 311.49                       | 1,245.95                 |

If Amazon managed to achieve the same ratio of Prime subscribers (i.e. 63%) for non-US customers, the distribution of Prime customers would be as follows:

|               | Prime      | Non-prime | Total      | % of prime |
|---------------|------------|-----------|------------|------------|
| US            | 95         | 56        | 151        | 63%        |
| International | <b>100</b> | <b>59</b> | <b>159</b> | <b>63%</b> |
| Total         | 195        | 115       | 310        | 63%        |

Then, the 2018 revenues (in millions of \$, excluding AWS and Whole Foods) would be:

|               | Fictive net sales | Share      | Difference with actual value |             |
|---------------|-------------------|------------|------------------------------|-------------|
| US            | 124,142           | <b>49%</b> | +0                           | +0%         |
| International | 127,011           | <b>51%</b> | +61,145                      | <b>+93%</b> |
| Total         | 251,153           | 100%       | <b>+61,145</b>               | <b>+32%</b> |



## Appendix 7. Whole Foods' profitability analysis

The table below details Whole Foods' net income during the years before its acquisition.

|         | Net income |
|---------|------------|
| 2009    | 147        |
| 2010    | 246        |
| 2011    | 343        |
| 2012    | 466        |
| 2013    | 551        |
| 2014    | 579        |
| 2015    | 536        |
| 2016    | 507        |
| 2017    | 245        |
| Average | 402.22     |

With an acquisition value of **\$13.4B** (Gupta & Rodriguez, 2019), it would require approximately **33** years to recover the initial investment under historical earnings assumptions.

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