

Unpacking the Housing Affordability Crisis: Structural Drivers and Policy Pathways in New Zealand

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Contents

| | |
|---|-----------|
| Abstract | 2 |
| Introduction | 3 |
| Findings and Analysis | 5 |
| Discussion | 11 |
| Recommendations | 12 |
| Reducing Speculative Investment | 12 |
| Securing Bank Deposits | 13 |
| Promoting Renting as a Viable Option | 13 |
| Aligning Supply with Demand | 14 |
| Increasing Supply Speed | 15 |
| Conclusion | 15 |
| Appendices | 16 |
| Appendix 1. Plan Summary | 16 |
| Appendix 2. Examples of Implementations of Similar Policies Worldwide | 18 |
| References | 19 |

Abstract

This paper analyzes the structural causes of New Zealand's housing affordability crisis, which has made homeownership increasingly inaccessible, particularly in Auckland (the world's seventh least affordable city). While demand is partly driven by demographic shifts and cultural preferences for homeownership, the root causes lie in speculative investment, distorted fiscal incentives, and supply constraints. Historical tax advantages, low interest rates, and restrictive urban planning have inflated prices and diverted capital away from productive sectors. The paper argues that the crisis is not a simple shortage but a systemic market failure. It proposes an integrated policy framework to restore balance: taxing capital gains, securing bank deposits to limit moral hazard, reforming tenancy laws to make renting viable, relaxing density regulations, and streamlining building approvals. Together, these fiscal, regulatory, and urban policies could reduce volatility, reorient incentives toward social efficiency, and rebuild affordability for future generations.

Introduction

Since 1990, successive housing booms have pushed New Zealand property prices to levels increasingly out of reach for many aspiring first-time buyers. While existing homeowners have benefited from rising equity, newcomers face a market where the cost of ownership absorbs a disproportionate share of household income. In economic terms, this violates the equimarginal principle, which states that rational agents allocate their limited resources across different needs to maximize overall satisfaction. When housing consumes nearly all disposable income, individuals can no longer balance spending efficiently across other essential goods and services, making homeownership economically unsustainable for many Kiwis.

A housing market is deemed “unaffordable” when the median house price is more than three times the median annual household income. None of the eight largest cities in New Zealand meets this criterion. Moreover, although this trend is national, it is particularly powerful in Auckland, where the house-price-to-income multiple is nine, ranking it as the seventh least affordable city in the world, above London and Toronto (Demographia, 2019).



House-price-to-income multiple in Auckland and New Zealand

Figure 1: House-price-to-income multiple in Auckland and New Zealand

As a result, the homeownership rate is plunging to levels unseen since the 1950s, as an increasing number of Kiwis are excluded from the housing market.

This paper will provide a holistic analysis of the current housing crisis. First, it will explore the reasons for this crisis and how the economy influences the trends in housing. Then, it will suggest a plan to alleviate the situation.



Homeownership rate. Source: Stats NZ

Figure 2: Home ownership rate. Source: Stats NZ.

Findings and Analysis

A hundred years ago, the government intervened to provide Kiwis with affordable first mortgages. The ‘Kiwi Dream’ was born. Today, it is still rooted in society and renting is regarded as a second option reserved for those who “did not make it”. Consequently, the demand for houses is high, especially as families tend to become smaller, leading to an increase in the number of households.

However, this “organic” demand is not the main reason for the price rise. Indeed, while the housing affordability index skyrocketed in the 2000s for buyers, it remained stable for renters. These data refute the idea of a housing shortage, in favour of a systemic problem that involves all the primary agents of the macroeconomy. In fact, New Zealand’s housing market has become a significant investment target for Kiwis and foreigners, creating a speculative bubble, powered by technology-enabled globalization.



Housing affordability index (1000 is the base index for renters in 2003).
Source: MBIE

Figure 3: Housing affordability index. Source: MBIE.

This behaviour stems from both historical events and policy choices. Following the 1987 New Zealand Stock Exchange crash, many Kiwis lost confidence in financial markets and began viewing property as a safer, more tangible investment. Over time, this preference became self-reinforcing: homeowners grew attached to their properties and reluctant to sell, even when doing so might not be financially optimal — a tendency explained by the endowment effect, which describes individuals’ inclination to overvalue assets they already own. Government policy further amplified this dynamic through tax incentives such as deductible mortgage interest and the near absence of an enforceable capital gains tax. At the same time, a persistently low Official Cash Rate (OCR) has kept borrowing costs down, fuelling demand and pushing prices even higher.

Initially, these incentives were intended to promote homeownership for everyone. They have proved perverse as they have generated a surge in demand, increasing prices and excluding middle-class prospective buyers, favouring investors and wealthy people. Furthermore, they led people to borrow aggressively and take huge risks. In parallel, banks tend to invest heavily in mortgages instead of businesses that create growth and wealth (Z. Humbert-Labeaumaz, 2020).



Figure 4: Overview of the New Zealand housing market. Buyers have been divided between investors (firms that are trying to maximize profit) and households (that want to maximize utility). Also, firms include banks, investors and developers

In a well-functioning market, high prices act as a signal for firms to increase production — what Adam Smith described as the operation of the “invisible hand.” Over time, supply typically expands to meet demand, restoring equilibrium and easing prices. In New Zealand’s housing market, however, this self-correcting mechanism failed: firms were unable to move up the supply curve, for reasons linked to deeper structural constraints that will be examined now.

The primary constraint is land scarcity: the fact that land cannot be “created” drives high prices, which cannot be reversed solely by the market. Nevertheless, strict urban rules impede the efficient use of existing land (as reflected by Auckland’s extremely low density). These rules were created to improve the quality of life in the cities, but they have the perverse effect of preventing people from living in these very cities. They force inhabitants to settle further, generating pollution and adverse social effects (e.g. stress, less family time and limited access to amenities). Inner-city homeowners could, in principle, support reforms to relax zoning and density regulations. However, they benefit directly from the resulting high property values and quality of life. With little incentive to accept change, many adopt a “*Not In My Backyard*” (NIMBY) stance — opposing developments that could alter their neighbourhoods or reduce their property value. This resistance reinforces existing inequalities by preventing the housing supply from adjusting where it is most needed.



Figure 5: Density of cities with population close to Auckland.

Another key issue lies in the structure of New Zealand’s construction sector. Most building companies are small and operate independently rather than as part of vertically integrated supply chains. This fragmentation limits their ability to scale production efficiently or absorb cost fluctuations, resulting in a low price elasticity of supply: the industry cannot increase output quickly even when prices rise. Also, development lead times take between 2 and 10 years because of regulatory complexities (New Zealand Productivity Commission, 2012). To worsen the situation, some developers prefer to bank on empty lands, slowing down supply even more.

Furthermore, the construction businesses do not allocate their resources effectively, creating a massive mismatch between demand and supply. In 2013, 70% of households had fewer than two members, while 70% of new houses offered four or more bedrooms. Building large standalone houses is, in fact, more profitable for developers because of density-related regulations. As a result, prices increase from unnecessary competition between couples without children and families.



Figure 7: Housing supply vs demand between 2006 and 2013. Source: Stats NZ.

Overall, the market has failed to provide a socially optimal distribution of houses. Individual incentives led to an irrational outcome for the group: a speculative bubble that makes housing unaffordable for locals and induces a chain of displacements (ripple effect) associated with a set of undesirable social consequences. The government should intervene appropriately to support households with low incomes that are *de facto* excluded from the market and prevent this bubble from growing further. Indeed, as it grows, it becomes more speculative, prompting people to take more risks with debts, which makes the recession more painful when the bubble eventually bursts.

Discussion

New Zealand’s housing affordability crisis reflects the interaction of economic, cultural, and institutional forces that have evolved over several decades. The simultaneous rise of speculative demand, favourable tax treatment, and credit availability has turned housing into a financial asset rather than a social necessity. This dynamic, reinforced by cultural expectations of homeownership as a marker of success, has amplified price volatility and widened social divides between existing homeowners and those excluded from the market.

On the supply side, the system has failed to adjust to rising demand. Land scarcity, restrictive planning regulations, and the fragmented nature of the construction sector have limited the responsiveness of housing supply. Even when prices increased, production failed to accelerate due to high entry barriers and long development lead times. As a result, the self-correcting mechanisms expected in a market economy have broken down, allowing imbalances to persist.

The consequences extend beyond housing. Rising property prices have concentrated wealth in the hands of homeowners and investors, fuelling intergenerational inequality and economic fragility. This has created a feedback loop: as households increasingly perceive property as the safest form of investment, capital flows further into housing rather than productive sectors, weakening long-term growth potential. The housing crisis therefore represents not only a market failure but a deeper structural imbalance within New Zealand’s economic and social model, where speculation, policy distortion, and inequality reinforce one another over time.

Recommendations

In response to the crisis, the government launched its Kiwi Build programme in 2018, aiming to build 100,000 “affordable” homes to match demand. As discussed above, the main issue is not a shortage of houses but a set of investment-friendly incentives and an inelastic supply. Moreover, even though Kiwi Build homes are generally in the lower quartile of the market prices in Auckland, they are closer to the median elsewhere, which is far from being affordable (Ninness, 2019).

It would be more relevant to reduce the demand first and then boost the supply towards an equilibrium, where locals of all socioeconomic statuses have access to affordable housing. This section presents a plan to redress the crisis, following this strategy. A comprehensive summary is available for convenience in Appendix 1. The design of this plan has considered the effectiveness of the policies overseas (see Appendix 2) as well as other available data.

Reducing Speculative Investment

The government’s priority should be to reduce incentives for speculators. Subsequently, they will likely look to sell and demand and supply will begin to rebalance.

An obvious fiscal policy would be to tax capital gains on every house sale, regardless of the owner’s initial intent, except for owner-occupiers. However, the government should be cautious with its implementation. Indeed, brutally taxing capital gains reduces supply by discouraging people from selling (Aregger, Brown, & Rossi, 2013). On the other hand, if such a policy were to be carefully planned and advertised, the “fear of missing out” would rush current investors into selling. Prospect speculators would also walk away, to the benefits of owner-occupiers.

Moreover, an educational campaign could explain that diversified investments are safer and potentially more profitable. In this respect, purchasing a house is not ideal, especially in unaffordable cities like Auckland, due to the opportunity cost of giving up other investment options.

Finally, one could argue that raising the OCR would be a relevant solution to limit borrowers’ access to finance. However, the Consumer Price Index in New Zealand is equal to 1.7%, which is already below the 2% target (Reserve Bank of New Zealand, 2019). A contractionary monetary policy would further hurt inflation and, therefore, wages and employment.



Figure 8: NZ inflation between 2000 and 2019. Source: Stats NZ.

Securing Bank Deposits

Given the current banks' dependency on mortgages, a drop in house prices would significantly increase the risk of bank failure, similar to the situation during the 2008 crisis. Under the current law, the Reserve Bank can theoretically shut down a failing bank and force a recapitalization by zeroing all its depositors' accounts. Realistically, the government will probably bail out the bank to prevent a ripple effect on the whole economy.

As a result, the New Zealand property market can be considered "too big to fail." Because so much of the financial system depends on mortgage lending, a major drop in house prices would threaten banks' stability and, by extension, the wider economy. This creates a moral hazard: investors and banks continue to take excessive risks in the housing market because they expect that, if things go wrong, the government—and ultimately taxpayers—will intervene to protect them. To break this cycle, the government should establish a deposit insurance scheme requiring banks and depositors to pay a small premium to guarantee deposits. Such a system would protect savers without shielding banks from the consequences of their own risk-taking. In Europe, for example, deposits are insured up to 100,000 € per account.

Promoting Renting as a Viable Option

The contrast between France and New Zealand regarding renting is striking:

| | France | New Zealand |
|------------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Minimum lease duration | Three years | - |
| Tenant notice | 30 to 60 days | 21 days (if periodic) |
| Landlord notice | Must wait for the end of the lease | 42 to 90 days (if periodic) |

French regulations enable flexibility for tenants, avoiding the anxiety characterizing New Zealand’s system. Otherwise, the quality of French rental properties is excellent due to draconian rules and the systematic use of bonds to perform minor repairs between tenancies. In New Zealand, the overall quality of rental houses is poor because tenants lack incentives to maintain them properly, and most landlords view them merely as speculative investments.

After addressing the speculative issue, New Zealand could benefit from implementing a policy that bridges the gap with the French model. This policy would encourage landlords to think carefully before purchasing additional properties, although renting would still remain a relatively low-risk, stable investment option for those seeking steady returns. Also, tenants (including low-income and unemployed people) would stay longer in a place they could call “home”, increasing their involvement in the community.

Aligning Supply with Demand

Once demand is down to a sustainable level, the government should focus on supply. The priority should be to align supply with demand by improving the allocation of current resources.

Loosening density regulations should remove the incentive to build oversized houses and allow for meeting people’s needs. Moreover, coupled with well-designed urban planning (e.g. “walkable neighbourhoods” with green areas), it would have other positive outcomes regarding pollution and inhabitants’ well-being. It is also advisable to adopt a preventive Keynesian approach to help smooth the business cycle and sustain long-term stability in the housing market. In practical terms, this means using public investment (particularly in infrastructure and construction projects) to offset downturns in private sector activity. Because housing supply policies often depend on large-scale infrastructure such as roads, utilities, and public transport, maintaining steady government investment would ensure that supply continues to expand even when demand temporarily weakens. In periods of growth, this approach would also help prevent overheating by planning infrastructure in advance rather than reacting to market imbalances once they occur.

To overcome the expected resistance from current inner-city homeowners, the government may increase rates to include externalities, such as pollution and the well-being of outer-city homeowners. The rational decision may then change to be in favour of higher density if the tax to pay outmatches the willingness to accept the new policy.

Increasing Supply Speed

The last item on the agenda is to address supply speed in the building sector to absorb variations in demand better.

First, the government should dramatically simplify regulations to reduce the time needed to obtain the required permits to build a house. Also, creating negative incentives on land banking (i.e. taxing vacant land) would make this capital more productive. In Pittsburgh, for example, land taxation has proved crucial in the city's economic development, as it stimulated building activity while avoiding rate increases.

At this stage, the government should also use ambitious programmes, like Kiwi Build, to encourage Kiwi construction companies to gather and combine their effort. They could achieve economies of scale at several levels (typically labour and technical levels) by spreading fixed costs over a larger number of goods. These new large vertically integrated firms would then have excess capacity, allowing them to be highly reactive and competitive in the long term.

Conclusion

New Zealand's housing crisis arises from an unsustainable mix of speculative demand, policy distortion, and limited supply responsiveness. Addressing it demands coordinated fiscal, regulatory, and cultural reform aimed at restoring affordability and economic balance. Short-term corrections may reduce household wealth, but the long-term gains, regarding greater equity, resilience, and social well-being, justify decisive action. Sustainable growth depends on treating housing not as a speculative asset but as essential infrastructure for the nation's future prosperity.

Appendices

Appendix 1. Plan Summary

| # | Policy | Agent | Expected behaviour | Potential unintended consequence | Risks mitigation plan |
|---|---------------------------------|------------------------------|---|---|--|
| 1 | Taxing capital gains | Investors | Sell and change investment strategy | Lock-in and refuse to sell, continue investing if the tax is not dissuasive | Plan and advertise, perform educational campaigns |
| 2 | Setting up 'Deposit Insurance' | Banks, Investors, Households | Reduce speculation and inconsiderate risks | - | - |
| 3 | Reinforcing tenancy regulations | Investors, Households | Reduce speculative purchases, increase demand in rentals, improve rental houses quality | Shortage of rental properties (less attractive for investors) | Reinforce maintenance expectations and retain bond if required |
| 4 | Loosening density regulations | Developers | Provide homes that meet kiwis' needs | Resistance from inner-city homeowners, pollution and a decrease in overall well-being | Threaten to increase rates, invest in urban planning |

| # | Policy | Agent | Expected behaviour | Potential unin- tended conse- quence | Risks mitigation plan |
|----------------|--|--|---|---|---|
| 5 | Simplifying permits procedures | Developers | Build houses faster | Natural hazard (e.g. earth- quakes, storms), pollution | Perform a Cost- Benefit Analysis |
| 6 | Taxing vacant land | Developers | Stop land banking, build houses faster | Inefficiency due to the high cost of building | See #5 and #7 |
| 7 | Undertaking develop- ment pro- grammes | Developers | Team up to create strong con- struction firms | Monopolistic market (low likelihood) | Favour competi- tion, ask for a minimum number of candi- dates, assign projects to different firms |
| Overall | | Investors, Develop- ers, House- holds, Rest of the world | Balance demand and supply | Drop house prices, bank failure | See #2 |

Appendix 2. Examples of Implementations of Similar Policies Worldwide

| Policy | Places |
|---------------------------------|--|
| Taxing capital gains | France, Switzerland (Aregger, Brown, & Rossi, 2013), Germany |
| Setting up ‘Deposit Insurance’ | Europe |
| Reinforcing tenancy regulations | France, Germany (Bruce, 2017) |
| Loosening density regulations | USA (Han & Sun, 2019) |
| Simplifying permits procedures | Sweden, Japan (Malyshev, 2006) |
| Taxing vacant land | Brazil, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Mexico, Philippines, United Kingdom (Haas & Kopanyi, 2017), USA (Seattle, Hawaii, Pittsburgh (Oates & Schwab, 1997)) |
| Development programmes | France (Chomard, 2017) |

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