# Noémie Pinardon-Touati

#### **CONTACT**

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#### **EDUCATION**

#### HEC Paris, FRANCE

2017 - Present

PhD in Finance

Advisor: Johan Hombert

# Paris School of Economics, FRANCE

2015 - 2016

MPhil in Economics (M2). Highest Honors (17.14/20).

# Université Paris-Saclay (Polytechnique, ENSAE & HEC), FRANCE

2014 - 2016

MPhil in Economics. Highest Honors (18.47/20).

# HEC Paris, FRANCE

2011 - 2015

MSc in Management (3.73/4.0). Major in Quantitative Economics & Finance.

#### RESEARCH INTERESTS

Corporate finance, banking, political economy, behavioral economics.

#### REFERENCES

# Johan Hombert

**Denis Gromb** 

Associate Professor of Finance **HEC Paris** 

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## **Adrien Matray**

# Assistant Professor of Economics

Paris Dauphine, CNRS, CEPR

Princeton University, Bendheim Center for Finance

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Anne-Laure Delatte

Professor of Economics

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# WORKING PAPERS

Private Credit Under Political Influence: Evidence from France, with Anne-Laure Delatte (CNRS, CEPII) and Adrien Matray (Princeton University)

Presentations: EFA 2019, Sciences Po Paris, Paris School of Economics, HEC Paris brownbag, Lille University, Barcelona University.

**Abstract:** Formally independent private banks change their supply of credit to the corporate sector for the constituencies of contested political incumbents in order to improve their reelection prospects.

In return, politicians grant such banks access to the profitable market for loans to local public entities among their constituencies. We examine French credit registry data for 2007-2017 and find that credit granted to the private sector increases by 9%-14% in the year during which a powerful incumbent faces a contested election. In line with politicians returning the favor, banks that grant more credit to private firms in election years gain market share in the local public entity debt market after the election is held. Thus we establish that, if politicians can control the allocation of rents, then formal independence does not ensure the private sector's effective independence from politically motivated distortions.

#### WORK IN PROGRESS

Do disagreements between managers and bankers have real effects? Evidence from the French Mediation program, with Aymeric Bellon (Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania) and Louis-Marie Harpedanne (Banque de France)

Does Government Debt Crowd Out Corporate Borrowing? A Bank-Lending Channel

Involving firms in the development agenda: Evidence from India's CSR regulation, with Cécile Delcuvellerie (Bocconi University)

## RELEVANT WORK EXPERIENCE

Junior Economist, Macro-Finance team, CEPII	2017 - 2019
Research Assistant to Prof. Adrien Matray (Princeton University).	2017 - 2018
Economist, Antitrust and competition economics consulting, MAPP Economics.	Jan-June 2017
Research Assistant, Economics Department, OECD.	March-Jul 2015
Intern, French Directorate-General of the Treasury	Apr-Jul 2014
Intern, Equity research, Goldman Sachs UK.	$Jun ext{-}Dec$ 2013

# **GRANTS AND HONORS**

HEC Foundation scholarship	2017 - 2021
HEC Excellency scholarship	2017 - 2021
HEC Paris Dean's List	2012 and 2013

## TEACHING EXPERIENCE

Lecturer, Financial Markets (graduate), HEC Paris	2019
Teaching Assistant, Financial Economics (graduate), HEC Paris	2018

#### LANGUAGE AND IT SKILLS

Languages	French (native), English (fluent), Spanish, Portuguese and German (advanced).
Software & Tools	Stata, SAS, R, Matlab, Python.

#### EXTRA-CURRICULAR

**Mountaineering:** Rock climbing (6b/5.10d), mountaineering (D), ice climbing (5) and ski-mountaineering (4.3). Several 500+ km treks across the Alps.

Boxing: French and English boxing in French University tournaments.