Online	learning
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
Note Title 2/12/2013 Each expert recieves a payoff. Payoff ( expert i, round t) = Vite [0,1] Maximize total pay-ff. Differences from online matching: - Pick before Viit's are revealed - Only local constraint. what is OPT? - Sy optimal choice on hindsight. What does 007 207 hower of picks best expert in each round - What is the worst scenario for ALA? ■ Deturninistic & 2 expents. ALG → 1. · Answer: V, =0, V2=1. · Randomitted: ALL -> 1 W/p, 2Wq. say p=q · Ans:- again v,=0 v2=1, ELACH]= P.S. · Randomized & n exput. All -> p, Pz, -. Pn ! E(ALh) S n on=1. Con regent this

OPT is too powerful!

Redefine. OPT = max { I to Vit } optimal single expert on hindsight.


OPT can't change its choice for early smil Let  $W_i = \sum_{t=p}^{T} V_{i,t}$ . OPT = max  $\{w_i\}$ Snapoth approx. to max

Profbosed  $\Phi(W_1, --- W_n) := \frac{1}{\lambda} \log \sum_{i} e^{\lambda} w_i$ on properties Lemma - O(W) > OPT boof of 1 log mix etwi = 1 log-e 20pt = 1 X.OM = 077. Lem 2: -  $\phi \leq OPT + logn$ .  $\sum_{i} e^{\lambda w_{i}} \leq \sum_{i} e^{\lambda OPT} = ne^{\lambda OPT}$ : log (Zie2vi) & logn +xopT .. 0 ≤ = logn + OPT Lem3! - 30; = /2 = 1 Xe2wi Note:  $\sum_{i} \frac{\partial e}{\partial w_{i}} = \frac{\sum_{i} e^{\lambda w_{i}}}{\sum_{i} \lambda w_{i}} = 1$ 



Theorems: E[ALG] Z OPT - 1/0gn - AT Regret = OPT- E[ALG] < 10gn + AT Proof = E[ALA] = Eta & V&(WEA), VE) 7 The p(we) - 4 (we) - 2 | Villa From Thom L,  $\not = \phi(\vec{\omega}) - \phi(\vec{\sigma}) - \lambda^{T}$ 7, OPT - 1 log n - 2T - ' φ(δ) = 1 log Σ; e° = 1 log n Pick > to minimize regret. Regort 2 1/2 logn + 2T. Set flogn = 2T ive 2= logn

Regret = 2/T logn From at Theorem 2: Say  $||w_1 - w_0||_{\infty} \le 1$ . => flog Zie 2 wi - flog Zie 2 woi < > + Z; e Noi. Dw.



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Boosting: Weak -> Strong.
x = "fraining set". + xex, know f(x)
                        D = uniform
Ada-Boost!
       = Experts.
     Run MWV algo, Let Dt be the distrantion over X used by MWU
  - Use WL to find he set ir [he(n)=fa)

***Dt 7 [+8

- + xex Vx,t = 1] { he (n) + fan}
     n managed to fool he => bigger weight
   Repeat Ttimes.
Strong-Leamon: - h(x) = sign { } to he(x) {
                         Majority. of hts.
  OPT = max { It Vx,t } = max { Ex 11(kx6) -
E[ALB] = IT Pr [Vn,t] = IT Pr [hem +ffn)
          \leq \sum_{t=1}^{T} \left(\frac{1}{2} - \delta\right) = \left(\frac{1}{2} - \delta\right)^{T}
 $ - ALh S 2T+ 1/00m
 ₱ ≤ (= 8) T + 2T + = logn
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Suppose has + f(x). for en x's. Them for 7 T t's, he(x) +f(x) i.e # 5 x: Wx7 T/2 } = en 1. 09 (Exexx) 7 1 log [en. e2]  $= \frac{1}{\lambda} \log n + \frac{\log \varepsilon}{\lambda} + \frac{T}{2}$ .'. log € · ≤ (2-8)>T or  $\log \frac{1}{4}$   $\gg (8-\lambda)\pi$  $\lambda = \frac{5}{2}$ = 82 T = 4/09/2/2 Application. Playing a Zero-Sum game. Game between 2 players, Max & Min. Max has n strategies, i =1.n. Min has m strategies j=1-m. If Max plays i, & min plays i, then Min has to pay Max dis dollars.

Example? Rock, Paper, Scissors.  Min  R P S
$N_{nx}$ $\begin{cases} R & 0 &   -1 &   +1 \\ P &   & 0 &   -1 &   & = \\ S &   & -1 &   & 1 &   & 0 \end{cases}$
Randonited Strategies: - Max plays i w.p.p:  Min plays i w.p.p.s.
$E[payment] = \sum_{i,j} p_i q_j a_{ij} = p^T + q$ Max's problem. Max Min $\{p^T + q_i\} = \bigwedge_{max}^*$
Max Miy & Z. P. ais }  "Min knows max's strategy a optimizes  accordingly"
Min's problem: Min Max SpTAq? = 1 min
Min Max { I; Pisais}
Max Knows min's strategy & optimizes.
Limma: Vmin > Vmax

	Use experts algo. to find optimal strategy: - Experts = Strategies
سے	- Experts = Strategies
-	Repeat t=1T - Max picks a distribution Pr over strategies
	- Max proks a distribution PE over strategies
	- Min picks j= arg-min { \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \
	- Strategy/Expert i gets Vi,t = aije
	ALh = ZTZ Pit aijt
	Since Max Min S E. P. aij 2 = 1 max
	Since Max Min { \( \xi \), Pi aij = \( \lambda \) max  + t \( \xi \), Pit aij \( \xi \) \( \xi \). ALL \( \xi \). \( \xi \). \( \xi \).
	C Zi Kit odst = 1 max
	OPT = max { \sum_{t=1}^{T} dist} = T max { \sum_{t=1}^{T} \frac{1}{2} aist}
	i) ter
	prob. Listribution over
	) - 1 '
	Since Min Max { \( \sum_{j=1}^{m} q_{j} \) \( d_{ij} \) \( \sum_{min}^{k} \)
	OPT > T/min
	T lizara
	OPT-ALL & STlogn
· .	Thmin - Thmar < I Tlogn
	Thmin - Thmax < IT logn  Thmin - Thmax < IT logn  Thmin - Amax < Iwan > 0  This art of the second of
	1. Imin I max IT as Too .D

