Nicolas Pastrian

Department of Economics, Social Studies,
Applied Mathematics, and Statistics (ESOMAS)
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EMPLOYMENT

ESOMAS Department, University of Turin, Italy
Postdoctoral Research Fellow   Since 2024

EDUCATION

University of Pittsburgh
Ph.D. in Economics   2024

Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile
M.A. in Economics   2015
B.A. in Economics and Business   2014

RESEARCH FIELDS

Microeconomic Theory, Mechanism Design, Market Design, Information Economics, Political Economy

WORKING PAPERS

Product Line Design with Frictions   [link]

Full Surplus Extraction and Consideration Sets (R&R Economic Theory)   [link]

RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile
Research Assistant
- Professor Nicolás Figueroa   2015 - 2018
- Professor Martín Besfamille   2016 - 2018

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

University of Pittsburgh
Instructor
- Economic Modeling Skills   Fall 2023 & Spring 2024
- Intermediate Microeconomics   Summer 2023
- Game Theory   Summer 2021 & Summer 2022

Teaching Assistant
- Healthcare Economics (eMBA)   Summer 2024
- Intermediate Microeconomics   Spring 2021, Fall 2023, Spring 2024
- Advanced Microeconomic Theory II (Ph.D.)   Spring 2023
- Introduction to Microeconomic Theory   Spring 2020, Fall 2020, Fall 2022
- Advanced Microeconomic Theory I (Ph.D.)   Fall 2019

Universidad Adolfo Ibañez, School of Engineering
Lecturer   Spring 2018
- Principles of Economics, Microeconomics

Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile
Teaching Assistant   Fall 2013 - Spring 2017
- Graduate Courses: Microeconomic Theory II, Macroeconomic Theory I
- Undergraduate Courses: Microeconomics I, Microeconomics II, Macroeconomics I, Topics on Applied Microeconomics, Principles of Microeconomics, Principles of Economics

RESEARCH ABSTRACTS

Product Line Design with Frictions   [link]
We study a monopolist's product line design problem with search frictions. Consumers only evaluate a random subset of price-quality pairs in the menu, limiting the monopolist's ability to perfectly match contracts to consumer types. This creates a tradeoff faced when expanding the product line between extracting more rents from different consumer types and increased search costs. We show that when consumers are limited to seeing a single random contract out of the menu, then the optimal menu for the monopolist always contains a single offer. When consumers observe more than one offer, we show that a balanced menu with two contracts that are seen by a consumer with the same probability is never optimal. The monopolist rather has an incentive to "bias" the menu so that one of the offers is observed more often. Using an unbalanced menu has an impact on the quality provided to low valuation consumers, either reinforcing or reducing the distortions generated by asymmetric information. We discuss the consequences on quality provision, as well as the welfare effects of these distortions.

Full Surplus Extraction and Consideration Sets (R&R at Economic Theory)   [link]
We analyze the surplus extraction problem in a mechanism design setting with consideration sets. We study a bounded rationality version of a general mechanism design environment with correlation in which the agent evaluates only a subset of types as possible deviations. We call these subsets the agent's consideration sets. We identify the inverse consideration sets as the key elements that determine whether full extraction is feasible in this setting and characterize the conditions beliefs need to satisfy to guarantee full surplus extraction. These conditions require the beliefs of each type to be separated from the beliefs of types in his inverse consideration set only. This relaxes the independence condition in Crémer and McLean (1988), which remains sufficient in our setting. Finally, we discuss some applications and limitations of our model.

WORK IN PROGRESS

Regional Disparities in State Capacity and Voting for Decentralization Reforms (with Martín Besfamille and Amedeo Piolatto)

Reforming Auctions with Behavioral Bidders

SEMINARS & CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS

2025:   ESOMAS Internal Seminar (Turin, Italy), IIOC (Philadelphia, USA)

2023:   Pennsylvania Economic Theory Conference (poster), 34th Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory, SECHI 2023 (Chile), Pitt Theory Brownbag

2022:   Pitt Theory Brownbag, 1st Symposium of Graduate Students at Universidad Central de Chile, Pitt Economics Medley (poster), 36th Annual Conference of Pennsylvania Economic Association, INFORMS Revenue Management and Pricing Conference, ACM Conference on Economics & Computation (poster), 33rd Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory

2021:   Pitt Theory Brownbag, Pennsylvania Economic Theory Conference (poster), 32nd Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory (poster), Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile Economics Alumni Workshop

2020:   Pitt Theory Brownbag

FELLOWSHIPS, AWARDS & GRANTS

Social Science Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship, University of Pittsburgh	Fall 2021-Spring 2022
Becas Chile Scholarship, CONICYT/ANID (Chile)	Fall 2020-Fall 2022
Summer Fellowship, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh	Summer 2020
Reuben Slesinger Fellowship, University of Pittsburgh	Fall 2018-Spring 2019

OTHERS

Language: Spanish (native), English (fluent)
Techinical Skills: LaTeX, Matlab, Julia, Python, R, Stata, Mathematica, Power BI (basic), SQL (basic), SAS (basic)
Citizenship: Chile
Member of the EAAMO-Bridges (formerly MD4SG) Inequality Working Group   Since Sep 2021

REFERENCES

Luca Rigotti
Chair and Professor of Economics
Department of Economics
University of Pittsburgh
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Aniko Öry
Associate Professor of Economics
Tepper School of Business
Carnegie Mellon University
aoery@andrew.cmu.edu

Richard Van Weelden
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Katherine Wolfe (teaching reference)
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Last update: May 16, 2025