

Nicolas Pastrian

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EDUCATION	Ph.D. in Economics, University of Pittsburgh M.A. in Economics, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile B.A. in Economics and Business, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile	2024 (expected) 2015 2014
RESEARCH INTEREST	Microeconomic Theory, Mechanism Design, Market Design, Industrial Organization, Behavioral and Experimental Economics, Information Economics	
TEACHING INTEREST	Microeconomic Theory, Game Theory, Industrial Organization, Behavioral Economics	
JOB MARKET PAPER	<i>Product Line Design with Frictions</i>	
WORKING PAPERS	<i>Full Surplus Extraction and Consideration Sets</i>	
WORK IN PROGRESS	<i>Reforming Auctions with Behavioral Bidders</i> <i>Regional Disparities in State Capacity and Voting for Decentralization Reforms</i> (with Martin Besfamille and Amedeo Piolatto)	
RESEARCH EXPERIENCE	Research Assistant Martín Besfamille, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile Nicolás Figueroa, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile	2016-2018 2016-2018
TEACHING EXPERIENCE	Instructor, University of Pittsburgh Economic Modeling Skill Intermediate Microeconomics Game Theory Teaching Assistant, University of Pittsburgh Advanced Microeconomic Theory II (Ph.D.) Intermediate Microeconomics Introduction to Microeconomic Theory Advanced Microeconomic Theory I (Ph.D.) Instructor, Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez (Chile) Principles of Economics, Microeconomics Teaching Assistant, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile <i>Graduate:</i> Microeconomic Theory II, Macroeconomic Theory I	Fall 2023 Summer 2023 Summer 2021, Summer 2022 Spring 2023 Spring 2021 Spring 2020, Fall 2020, Fall 2022 Fall 2019 2018 2013-2017

Undergraduate: Microeconomics I, Microeconomics II, Macroeconomics I, Topics on Applied Microeconomics, Principles of Microeconomics, Principles of Economics

PRESENTATIONS	2023: Pennsylvania Economic Theory Conference (poster), 34th Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory, SECHI 2023 (Chile), Pitt Theory Brownbag	
	2022: Pitt Theory Brownbag, 1st Symposium of Graduate Students at Universidad Central de Chile, Pitt Economics Medley (poster), 36th Annual Conference of Pennsylvania Economic Association, INFORMS Revenue Management and Pricing Conference, ACM Conference on Economics & Computation (poster), 33rd Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory	
	2021: Pitt Theory Brownbag, Pennsylvania Economic Theory Conference (poster), 32nd Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory (poster), Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile Economics Alumni Workshop	
	2020: Pitt Theory Brownbag	
FELLOWSHIPS & AWARDS	Social Science Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship, University of Pittsburgh	2021-2022
	Becas Chile grant, Government of Chile	2020-2022
	Summer Fellowship, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh	2020
	Reuben Slesinger Fellowship, University of Pittsburgh	2018-2019
OTHERS	Language: Spanish (native), English (fluent)	
	Programming: \LaTeX , Matlab, Julia, Python, R, Stata, Mathematica, SQL (basic), SAS (basic)	
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REFERENCES	Luca Rigotti (co-chair) Department of Economics University of Pittsburgh luca@pitt.edu	Richard Van Weelden (co-chair) Department of Economics University of Pittsburgh rmv22@pitt.edu
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Product Line Design with Frictions (Job Market Paper)

We study a monopolist's product line design problem with search frictions. Consumers only evaluate a random subset of price-quality pairs in the menu, limiting the monopolist's ability to perfectly match contracts to consumer types. This creates a tradeoff faced when expanding the product line between extracting more rents from different consumer types and increased search costs. We show that when consumers are limited to seeing a single random contract out of the menu, then the optimal menu for the monopolist always contains a single offer. When consumers observe more than one offer, we show that a balanced menu with two contracts that are seen by a consumer with the same probability is never optimal. The monopolist rather has an incentive to "bias" the menu so that one of the offers is observed more often. Using an unbalanced menu has an impact on the quality provided to low valuation consumers, either reinforcing or reducing the distortions generated by asymmetric information. We discuss the consequences on quality provision, as well as the welfare effects of these distortions.

Full Surplus Extraction and Consideration Sets

We analyze the surplus extraction problem in a mechanism design setting with consideration sets. We study a bounded rationality version of a general mechanism design environment with correlation in which the agent evaluates only a subset of types as possible deviations. We call these subsets the agent's consideration sets. We identify the inverse consideration sets as the key elements that determine whether full extraction is feasible in this setting and characterize the conditions beliefs need to satisfy to guarantee full surplus extraction. These conditions require the beliefs of each type to be separated from the beliefs of types in his inverse consideration set only. This relaxes the independence condition in Crémer and McLean (1988), which remains sufficient in our setting. Finally, we discuss some applications and limitations of our model.