

Nicolas Pastrian

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EDUCATION

University of Pittsburgh

Ph.D. Candidate in Economics

Expected Graduation: May 2024

Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile

M.A. in Economics

Dec 2015

B.A. in Economics and Business

Dec 2014

RESEARCH INTEREST

Microeconomic Theory, Mechanism Design, Market Design, Industrial Organization, Public Economics, Behavioral and Experimental Economics

TEACHING INTEREST

Microeconomic Theory, Game Theory, Industrial Organization, Public Economics, Behavioral Economics

WORKING PAPERS

Product Line Design with Frictions (Job Market Paper) [\[link\]](#)

Full Surplus Extraction and Consideration Sets (submitted) [\[link\]](#)

RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile

Research Assistant

- Professor Nicolás Figueroa
- Professor Martín Besfamille

Sep 2015 - Jul 2018

Sep 2016 - Jul 2018

TEACHING EXPERIENCE

University of Pittsburgh

Instructor

- Economic Modeling Skills
- Intermediate Microeconomics
- Game Theory

Fall 2023 & Spring 2024

Summer 2023

Summer 2021 & Summer 2022

Teaching Assistant

- Intermediate Microeconomics
- Advanced Microeconomic Theory II (Ph.D.)
- Introduction to Microeconomic Theory
- Advanced Microeconomic Theory I (Ph.D.)

Spring 2021, Fall 2023, Spring 2024

Spring 2023

Spring 2020, Fall 2020, Fall 2022

Fall 2019

Universidad Adolfo Ibáñez, School of Engineering

Lecturer

Mar 2018 - Jul 2018

- Principles of Economics, Microeconomics

Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile

Teaching Assistant

Aug 2013 - Dec 2017

- Graduate Courses: Microeconomic Theory II, Macroeconomic Theory I
- Undergraduate Courses: Microeconomics I, Microeconomics II, Macroeconomics I, Topics on Applied Microeconomics, Principles of Microeconomics, Principles of Economics

RESEARCH ABSTRACTS

Product Line Design with Frictions (Job Market Paper) [\[link\]](#)

We study a monopolist's product line design problem with search frictions. Consumers only evaluate a random subset of price-quality pairs in the menu, limiting the monopolist's ability to perfectly match contracts to consumer types. This creates a tradeoff faced when expanding the product line between extracting more rents from different consumer types and increased search costs. We show that when consumers are limited to seeing a single random contract out of the menu, then the optimal menu for the monopolist always contains a single offer. When consumers observe more than one offer, we show that a balanced menu with two contracts that are seen by a consumer with the same probability is never optimal. The monopolist rather has an incentive to "bias" the menu so that one of the offers is observed more often. Using an unbalanced menu has an impact on the quality provided to low valuation consumers, either reinforcing or reducing the distortions generated by asymmetric information. We discuss the consequences on quality provision, as well as the welfare effects of these distortions.

Full Surplus Extraction and Consideration Sets (submitted) [\[link\]](#)

We analyze the surplus extraction problem in a mechanism design setting with consideration sets. We study a bounded rationality version of a general mechanism design environment with correlation in which the agent evaluates only a subset of types as possible deviations. We call these subsets the agent's consideration sets. We identify the inverse consideration sets as the key elements that determine whether full extraction is feasible in this setting and characterize the conditions beliefs need to satisfy to guarantee full surplus extraction. These conditions require the beliefs of each type to be separated from the beliefs of types in his inverse consideration set only. This relaxes the independence condition in Crémer and McLean (1988), which remains sufficient in our setting. Finally, we discuss some applications and limitations of our model.

WORK IN PROGRESS

Regional Disparities in State Capacity and Voting for Decentralization Reforms (with Martín Besfamille and Amedeo Piolatto)

Reforming Auctions with Behavioral Bidders

SEMINARS & CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS

- 2023:** Pennsylvania Economic Theory Conference (poster), 34th Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory, SECHI 2023 (Chile), Pitt Theory Brownbag
- 2022:** Pitt Theory Brownbag, 1st Symposium of Graduate Students at Universidad Central de Chile, Pitt Economics Medley (poster), 36th Annual Conference of Pennsylvania Economic Association, INFORMS Revenue Management and Pricing Conference, ACM Conference on Economics & Computation (poster), 33rd Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory
- 2021:** Pitt Theory Brownbag, Pennsylvania Economic Theory Conference (poster), 32nd Stony Brook International Conference on Game Theory (poster), Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile Economics Alumni Workshop
- 2020:** Pitt Theory Brownbag

FELLOWSHIPS, AWARDS & GRANTS

Social Science Doctoral Dissertation Fellowship, University of Pittsburgh	Fall 2021-Spring 2022
Becas Chile grant, Government of Chile	Fall 2020-Fall 2022
Summer Fellowship, Department of Economics, University of Pittsburgh	Summer 2020
Reuben Slesinger Fellowship, University of Pittsburgh	Fall 2018-Spring 2019

OTHERS

Language: Spanish (native), English (fluent)

Technical Skills: \LaTeX , Matlab, Julia, Python, R, Stata, Mathematica, SQL (basic), SAS (basic)

Citizenship: Chile (F-1 Visa)

REFERENCES

Luca Rigotti (co-chair)
Professor of Economics and Director of Graduate Studies
Department of Economics
University of Pittsburgh
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Richard Van Weelden (co-chair)
Professor of Economics
Department of Economics
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Aniko Öry
Associate Professor of Economics
Tepper School of Business
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Katherine Wolfe (teaching reference)
Director of Undergraduate Studies
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PLACEMENT OFFICERS

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