### SDNRacer

Concurrency Analysis for SDNs



Ahmed El-Hassany

Jeremie Miserez
Pavol Bielik
Laurent Vanbever
Martin Vechev



http://sdnracer.ethz.ch

### SDNRacer

Finds violations in SDN controllers:


**Race Freedom** 

**Update Isolation** 


**Packet Coherence** 

Violations of these properties can cause serious bugs in the network.


### SDN Overview



### SDN Overview



# Example SDN App: Load-Balancer





#### Controller

```
if dst == server:
  rep = rep[idx] idx = (idx+1)%2
  install_path(src, rep)
  install_path(rep, src)
  packet_out(pkt,in sw)
```



#### Controller

if dst == server:

Round-Robin Server Selection

```
rep = rep[idx] idx = (idx+1)%2
```

```
install_path(src, rep)
```

install\_path(rep, src)

packet\_out(pkt,in sw)



#### Controller

```
if dst == server:
  rep = rep[idx] idx = (idx+1)%2


install_path(src, rep) 1. Find the shortest Path.
2. Write a flow entry on
  each switch on the path.
packet_out(pkt,in sw)
```





#### Controller


```
if dst == server:
  rep = rep[idx] idx = (idx+1)%2
  install_path(src, rep)
  install_path(rep, src)
  packet out(pkt,in sw)
Send the p
```


Send the packet back to the dataplane.








































#### Recorded Event Trace: Can **Read(S2, pkt)** 1 Host Send (pkt, dst=srv) l-balancer happen before 2 Read(S1, pkt) 3 PktIn(S1, pkt) Write(S2, src=H1, out R1)? 4 Write(S1, src=H1, out S2) (5) Write(S2, src=H1, out R1) Write(S2, src=H1, out R1) 6 Write(S1, dst=H1, out Internet) 7 Write(S2, dst=H1, out S1) 8 PktOut(\$1, pkt, \$2) Internet PRead(S2, pkt) S1 *S2* Replica#1 src H1 out R1 src H1 out S2 *S3* dst H1 out S1 dst H1 out I 9 Read(S2, pkt) Replica#2

















# SDNRacer detected this real bug in Floodlight's Load Balancer.




# Key Observation

The cause of this bug is **interference** on the Flow Table caused by **concurrent** writes by the controller and reads triggered by packets in the network.



### SDNRacer



### **Detecting concurrency violations**



Precise notion of interference



Checks for high-level properties



Implementation and evaluation


### Data Races in SDN

**Data Race:** two *unordered* events accessing the Flow Table where one is a write.

- Flow tables are memory locations.
- The controller generate writes events.
- Packets trigger read events.

### Formalizing Asynchrony in SDN

Need to identify *causality* between events.



#### Happens-Before for SDN

A switch may send a PktIn message after reading it

Read(s1, pkt) 
$$\rightarrow$$
 PktIn(s1, pkt)

A controller may issue Write after PktIn

```
PktIn(s1, pkt) →write(s1, match predicate, out S2)
```

Pktln(s1, pkt) →write(s2, match predicate, out R1)

## HB-relation example


#### **Events Trace:**

- 1 Host Send (pkt, dst=srv)
- 2 Read(S1, pkt)
- 3 PktIn(S1, pkt)
- 4 Write(S1, src=H1, out S2)
- PRead(S2, pkt)
- 6 Write(S1, dst=H1, out Internet)
- 7 Write(S2, dst=H1, out S1)
- 8 PktOut(\$1, pkt, \$2)
- 5 Write(S2, src=H1, out R1)
- (10) PktIn(S2, pkt)

## HB-relation example

## Events Trace: 1 Host Send (pkt, dst=srv) 2 Read(S1, pkt)

- 3 PktIn(S1, pkt)
- Write(S1, src=H1, out S2)
- PRead(S2, pkt)
- 6 Write(S1, dst=H1, out Internet)
- 7 Write(S2, dst=H1, out S1)
- 8 PktOut(S1, pkt, S2)
- 5 Write(S2, src=H1, out R1)
- (10) PktIn(S2, pkt)



## Analysis Results

For Floodlight Load Balancer

703,864 Races



## Analysis Results

For Floodlight Load Balancer

703,864 Races

Too imprecise!!!



# How can we reduce the number of reports?


## HB-relation example

# Events Trace: 1 Host Send (pkt, dst=srv) 2 Read(S1, pkt)


Write(S1, src=H1, out S2)
PRead(S2, pkt)

3 Pktln(S1, pkt)

- 6 Write(S1, dst=H1, out Internet)
- 7 Write(S2, dst=H1, out S1)
- 8 PktOut(S1, pkt, S2)
- 5 Write(S2, src=H1, out R1)
- (10) PktIn(S2, pkt)



## HB-relation example



## Non-Interfering Events

#### **Events Trace:**

- 1 Host Send (pkt, dst=srv)
- 2 Read(S1, pkt)
- 3 PktIn(S1, pkt)
- 4 Write(S1, src=H1, out S2)
- 9 Read(S2, pkt)
- 6 Write(S1, dst=H1, out Internet)
- 7 Write(\$2, dst=H1, out \$1)
- 8 PktOut(S1, pkt, S2)
- 5 Write(S2, src=H1, out R1)
- (10) PktIn(S2, pkt)



Write(S2, dst=H1, out S1)

Event match predicate true for packets with source H1.

Event match predicate true for packets with destination H1.

## Non-Interfering Events

Read (s1, dst=X)

Write(s1, dst=Y, output port 1)

Write(s1, dst=Z, output port 2)



#### Events with the same net effect

Write(s1, dst=X, output port 1)

Write(s1, dst=X, output port 1)



#### SDNRacer



Detecting concurrency violations



#### Precise notion of interference




Checks for high-level properties



Implementation and evaluation

#### Capture interference at the Flow Table

**Observation:** Flow Table can be seen as a high-level ADT with operations:



A packet is matched against entry in the flow table.

#### add(e<sub>add</sub>, no overlap)

Add a new entry to the flow table.


#### mod(e<sub>mod</sub>, strict)

A mod operation modifies existing entries in the flow table.

#### del(e<sub>del</sub>, strict)

A del operation deletes all entries that match the entry in the flow table.

#### Capture interference at the Flow Table



Capture high-level interference via commutativity: Two operations commute if reordering them have the same effect on the the network state.

#### Commutativity Spec of Flow Table ADT

```
\neg (e_{read} \neq none \land e_{read} = e_{add})
                                                                                                                                                                            if add <_{\pi} read
\varphi_{add(e_{add}, no\_overlap)}^{read(pkt)/e_{read}}
                                               := \neg (pkt.h \subseteq e_{add}.m \land (e_{read} = none))
                                                                                                                                                                            if read <_{\pi} add
                                                        \forall (e_{read}.p \leq e_{add}.p \land e_{read}.a \neq e_{add}.a)))
                                              := \neg(e_{read} \neq none \land e_{read} \overset{strict}{\subseteq} e_{mod} \land e_{read}.a = e_{mod}.a)
       \varphi^{read(pkt)/e_{read}}_{mod(e_{mod}, strict)}
                                                                                                                                                                            if mod <_{\pi} read
                                                     \neg(e_{read} \neq none \land pkt.h \subseteq e_{mod}.m \land e_{read}.a \neq e_{mod}.a)
                                                                                                                                                                            if read <_{\pi} mod
                                             := \frac{\neg(pkt.h \subseteq e_{del}.m)}{\neg(e_{read} \neq none \land deletes(e_{del}, e_{read}, strict))}
         \varphi_{del(e_{del}, strict)}^{read(pkt)/e_{read}}
                                                                                                                                                                            if del <_{\pi} read
                                                                                                                                                                            if read <_{\pi} del
\varphi_{mod(e_{mod}, strict_{mod})}^{del(e_{del}, strict_{del})}
                                              := \frac{\neg(deletes(e_{del}, e_{mod}, true))}{\neg(e_{del}.m \cap e_{mod}.m \neq \emptyset)}
                                                                                                                                                                            if strict_{mod}
                                                                                                                                                                            otherwise
  [add(e_{add}, no\_overlap)]
                                               := \neg(deletes(e_{del}, e_{add}, strict) \lor (no\_overlap \land e_{add} \cap e_{del} \neq \emptyset))
\varphi_{del(e_{del}, strict)}
                                                    \neg (e_1.m \cap e_2.m \neq \emptyset \land e_1.a \neq e_2.a)
                                                                                                                                                                            if \neg strict_1 \land \neg strict_2
         \varphi_{mod(e_1, strict_1)}^{mod(e_1, strict_1)}
                                               := \neg (e_1.m = e_2.m \land e_1.p = e_2.p \land e_1.a \neq e_2.a)
                                                                                                                                                                            if strict_1 \wedge strict_2
                                                     \neg((e_1 \stackrel{strict_2}{\subseteq} e_2 \lor e_2 \stackrel{strict_1}{\subseteq} e_1) \land e_1.a \neq e_2.a)
                                                                                                                                                                            otherwise
  add(e_{add}, no\_overlap)
                                                                                                                                                                            if \neg no\_overlap
                                               := \neg(e_{add} \subseteq e_{mod} \land e_{add}.a \neq e_{mod}.a)
\varphi_{mod(e_{mod}, strict)}
                                                                                                                                                                            otherwise
                                                    \neg(e_{add} \cap e_{mod} \neq \emptyset)
                                              := \frac{\neg(e_1.m \cap e_2.m \neq \emptyset \land e_1.p = e_2.p)}{\neg(e_1.m = e_2.m \land e_1.p = e_2.p \land e_1.a \neq e_2.a)}
    add(e_1, no\_overlap_1)
                                                                                                                                                                            if no\_overlap_1 \lor no\_overlap_2
  \varphi_{add(e_2, no\_overlap_2)}
                                                                                                                                                                            otherwise
```

Figure 3: Commutativity specification of an OpenFlow switch. Two read or two del operations always commute.

#### Commutativity Specification of SDN


```
\varphi_{add(e_{add}, no\_overlap)}^{read(pkt)/e_{read}} = \neg(e_{read} \neq none \land e_{read} = e_{add})  if add <_{\pi} read if read <_{\pi} add = \neg(pkt.h \subseteq e_{add}.m \land (e_{read} = none)  if read <_{\pi} add \vee(e_{read}.p \leq e_{add}.p \land e_{read}.a \neq e_{add}.a))) if mod <_{\pi} read if mod <_
```

```
\varphi_{add(e_1, no\_overlap_2)}^{add(e_1, no\_overlap_2)} := \neg^{(e_1.m \cap e_2.m \neq \emptyset \land e_1.p = e_2.p)}
```


```
\varphi_{mod(e_1, strict_1)}^{mod(e_1, strict_1)} = \neg(e_1.m \cap e_2.m \neq \emptyset \land e_1.a \neq e_2.a)  if \neg strict_1 \land \neg strict_2 if strict_1 \land strict_2 otherwise \varphi_{mod(e_{add}, no\_overlap)}^{add(e_{add}, no\_overlap)} = \neg(e_1.m \cap e_2.m \neq \emptyset \land e_1.a \neq e_2.a)  if \neg strict_1 \land \neg strict_2 otherwise \varphi_{mod(e_{mod}, strict)}^{add(e_{add}, no\_overlap)} := \neg(e_{add} \subseteq e_{mod} \land e_{add}.a \neq e_{mod}.a)  if \neg no\_overlap otherwise \varphi_{nod(e_{nod}, strict)}^{add(e_1, no\_overlap_1)} := \neg(e_1.m \cap e_2.m \neq \emptyset \land e_1.p = e_2.p)  if no\_overlap_1 \lor no\_overlap_2 otherwise
```

Figure 3: Commutativity specification of an OpenFlow switch. Two read or two del operations always commute.


## Without Commutativity




## Without Commutativity



## Using Commutativity



## Using Commutativity



## Effect of Commutativity

For Floodlight Load Balancer

703,864 Races





## Effect of Commutativity

For Floodlight Load Balancer

703,864 Races



What about the remaining 18,706 races???



#### Infeasible races

Write(S1, pkt, out Replica 1)



#### Infeasible races

Write(S1, pkt, out Replica 1)





#### Infeasible races

Write(S1, pkt, out Replica 1)



Read(S1, pkt)



#### Time-Based Filter

Add HB edges between events that are cannot be be reordered due physical limits of the network.



#### Overall reduction

For Floodlight Load Balancer

703,864 Races



Commutativity filter

18,706 Races



Time-based filter

2214 (0.31%) Remaining



Can we leverage the race detector to check for high-level properties?



#### SDNRacer



Detecting concurrency violations



Precise notion of interference





Checks for high-level properties



Implementation and evaluation

## Network Update

A set of write events that together reflects high-level network-wide policy change.



#### **Events Trace:**

- 1 Host Send (pkt, dst=srv)
- 2 Read(S1, pkt)
- 3 PktIn(S1, pkt)
- 4 Write(S1, src=H1, out S2)
- 9 Read(S2, pkt)
- 6 Write(S1, dst=H1, out Internet)
- Write(S2, dst=H1, out S1)
- 8 PktOut(S1, pkt, S2)
- 5 Write(S2, src=H1, out R1)
- (10) PktIn(S2, pkt)
- (11) Write(S2, src=H1, out S1)
- (12) Write(S1, src=H1, out S3)

#### **Events Trace:**

- 1 Host Send (pkt, dst=srv)
- 2 Read(S1, pkt)
- 3 PktIn(S1, pkt)
- Write(\$1, src=H1, out \$2)
- 9 Read(S2, pkt)
- 6 Write(\$1, dst=H1, out Internet)
- 7 Write(S2, dst=H1, out S1)
- 8 PktOut(S1, pkt, S2)
- 5 Write(S2, src=H1, out R1)
- (10) Pktln(S2, pkt)
- (11) Write(S2, src=H1, out S1)
- (12) Write(S1, src=H1, out S3)

#### Update #1

Send Traffic from H1

to Replica#1

- 4 Write(S1, src=H1, out S2)
- 5 Write(S2, src=H1, out R1)
- 6 Write(S1, dst=H1, out I)
- Write(S2, dst=H1, out S1)

#### **Events Trace:**

- 1 Host Send (pkt, dst=srv)
- 2 Read(S1, pkt)
- 3 PktIn(S1, pkt)
- Write(\$1, src=H1, out \$2)
- 9 Read(S2, pkt)
- 6 Write(S1, dst=H1, out Internet)
- 7 Write(S2, dst=H1, out S1)
- 8 PktOut(S1, pkt, S2)
- 5 Write(S2, src=H1, out R1)
- 10 Pktln(S2, pkt)
- (11) Write(S2, src=H1, out S1)
- (12) Write(\$1, src=H1, out \$3)

#### Update #1

Send Traffic from H1
to Replica#1

- 4 Write(S1, src=H1, out S2)
- 5 Write(S2, src=H1, out R1)
- 6 Write(S1, dst=H1, out I)
- Write(S2, dst=H1, out S1)

## Update #2 Send Traffic from H1 to Replica#2

- Write(S2, src=H1, out S1)
- **12** Write(\$1, src=H1, out \$3)

#### Network Update Isolation Property

Network updates are isolated if they are serializable.



#### Network Update Isolation

**SDNRacer** checks if there are **no** data races between write events of different update sets.



#### **Events Trace:**


- 1 Host Send (pkt, dst=srv)
- 2 Read(S1, pkt)
- 3 PktIn(S1, pkt)
- Write(\$1, src=H1, out \$2)
- PRead(S2, pkt)
- 6 Write(S1, dst=H1, out Internet)
- 7 Write(S2, dst=H1, out S1)
- 8 PktOut(S1, pkt, S2)
- 5 Write(S2, src=H1, out R1)
- 10 Pktln(S2, pkt)
- 11) Write(S2, src=H1, out S1)
- (12) Write(\$1, src=H1, out \$3)

# Update #1 Send Traffic from H1 to Replica#1 Write(S1, src=H1, out S2) Write(S2, src=H1, out S1) Write(S2, src=H1, out S3)

Write(S2, dst=H1, out S1)


Write(S1, dst=H1, out I)

## Network Update Example



#### Packet Coherence Property

A **packet** is coherent if it is processed entirely using one consistent global network configuration.




### Packet Coherence Example


#### **Events Trace:**

- 1) Host Send (pkt, dst=srv)
- 2 Read(S1, pkt)
- 3 PktIn(S1, pkt)
- Write(S1, src=H1, out S2)
- 9 Read(S2, pkt)
- 6 Write(S1, dst=H1, out Internet)
- Write(S2, dst=H1, out S1)
- 8 PktOut(S1, pkt, S2)
- 5 Write(S2, src=H1, out R1)
- PktIn(S2, pkt)
- 11) Write(S2, src=H1, out S1)
- (12) Write(S1, src=H1, out S3)

# Update #1 Send Traffic from H1 to Replica#1



# Update #2 Send Traffic from H1 to Replica#2




### Packet Coherence Example


#### **Events Trace:**

- 1 Host Send (pkt, dst=srv)
- 2 Read(S1, pkt)
- 3 PktIn(S1, pkt)
- 4 Write(S1, src=H1, out S2)
- 9 Read(S2, pkt)
- 6 Write(S1, dst=H1, out Internet)
- Write(S2, dst=H1, out S1)
- 8 PktOut(S1, pkt, S2)
- 5 Write(S2, src=H1, out R1)
- PktIn(S2, pkt)
- 11) Write(S2, src=H1, out S1)
- (12) Write(S1, src=H1, out S3)

# Update #1 Send Traffic from H1 to Replica#1



# Update #2 Send Traffic from H1 to Replica#2



#### Packet Coherence Check

- 1. Take note of the first version the packet sees.
- 2. Check at every switch if the read operations triggered by the packet races with write operations from different version than originally observed.

#### SDNRacer: Guarantees

- **SDNRacer** checks are more general than other tools which take a snapshot of the network.
- **SDNRacer** guarantees that the properties will hold for all possible reordering of the given trace.

Benefit: Fewer traces to explore

#### SDNRacer



Detecting concurrency violations



Precise notion of interference



Checks for high-level properties





Implementation and evaluation

## Implementation

- Instrumentation of SDN troubleshooting system (STS) [SIGCOMM'14].
- Concurrency analyzer that implements happens-before rules, commutativity specification and speculative timebased filter.
- Property Checker for network update isolation and packet coherence violations.
- Around 3,000 of Python code

http://sdnracer.ethz.ch

#### Evaluation: Controllers

Tested with off-the-shelf controllers:







## Evaluation: Applications

We tested **SDNRacer** with five different applications shipped with each controller:

- MAC-learning
- Forwarding
- Circuit Pusher
- Admission Control
- Load Balancer

## Experimental Setup

- Three different network topologies: Single Switch, Two switches, and Binary Tree.
- Run every controller and every application, if possible, with randomly generated input.
- We collected 29 traces.

**SDNRacer** filters more than **90%** of all races in **89%** of examined traces.


### Detected Bugs

SDNRacer detected two update isolation violations


Violation #1: Floodlight Load Balancer distributes flows inconsistently

Violation #2: POX forwarding module deletes rules installed by other modules

In 90% of the studied traces SDNRacer can analyze the traces in less than 30 seconds.



# In 90% of the cases SDNRacer can analyze the traces in less than 30 seconds.



#### Conclusion

## Happens-Before Model for SDN

Captures asynchrony of SDN

# Flow Table Commutativity Spec

Captures Interference

#### **Concurrency Analysis**

- Race Freedom
- Network Update Isolation
- Packet Coherence

### Implementation and Evaluation

 Found bugs in existing apps: ONOS, POX, Floodlight

http://sdnracer.ethz.ch