

The Security of NTP’s Datagram Protocol

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Abstract—For decades, the Network Time Protocol (NTP) has been used to synchronize computer clocks over untrusted network paths. This work takes a new look at the security of NTP’s datagram protocol. We argue that NTP’s datagram protocol in RFC5905 is both underspecified and flawed, which has led to vulnerabilities in NTP’s ‘reference implementation’. We then present three new attacks that remote attackers can use to maliciously alter a target’s time. We show that vulnerabilities arise because NTP’s symmetric mode and NTP’s client/server mode have conflicting security requirements that are not respected by the specifications. We use network scans to find millions of IPs that are vulnerable to our attacks. Finally, we move beyond identifying attacks by developing a cryptographic model and using it to prove the security of two improved client/server protocols for NTP.

I. INTRODUCTION

Millions of hosts [10], [20], [23], [29], [33] use the Network Time Protocol (NTP) [27] to synchronize their computer clocks to public Internet timeservers (using NTP’s client/server mode), or to neighboring peers (using NTP’s symmetric mode). Over the last few years, the security of NTP has come under new scrutiny. Along with significant attention paid to NTP’s role in UDP amplification attacks [10], [19], there is also a new focus on attacks on the NTP protocol itself, both in order to maliciously alter a target’s time (*timeshifting attacks*) or to prevent a target from synchronizing its clock (*denial of service (DoS) attacks*) [20], [41]. These attacks matter because the correctness of time underpins many other basic protocols and services. For instance, cryptographic protocols use timestamps to prevent replay attacks and limit the use of stale or compromised cryptographic material (*e.g.*, TLS [18], [36], HSTS [35], DNSSEC, RPKI [20], bitcoin [9], authentication protocols [18], [20]), while accurate time synchronization is a basic requirement for various distributed protocols. While the focus on attacks and patches has been useful, we believe that it is time to identify more robust solutions. We therefore make two high-level contributions:

1. Provably-secure protocol design. We develop a cryptographic model for attacks on NTP’s datagram protocol, and use it to prove the security for two backwards-compatible protocols for NTP’s client/server mode (Section VII). These protocols are different from those in RFC5905 [27]. Our model eschews the traditional focus on Man-in-The-Middle (MiTM) attacks (*aka.* ‘in-path attacks’). Indeed, the MiTM model is too strong for NTP, because an MiTM can always bias time synchronization by dropping or delaying packets [30], [31]. Instead, our model requires correct time synchronization in the face of two types of attackers:

Off-path attackers that can *spoof* IP packets (*i.e.*, send packets with a spoofed source IP) but *cannot* eavesdrop on its

target’s NTP traffic. This captures ‘remote’ attacks launched by arbitrary IPs on the Internet.

On-path attackers that can eavesdrop, inject, spoof, and replay packets, but *cannot* drop, delay, or tamper with legitimate traffic. This threat model is commonly used in failure and load tolerant attack systems. An on-path attacker eavesdrops on a copy of the target’s traffic, so it need not disrupt live network traffic or even operate at line rate. For this reason, on-path attacks are commonly seen in the wild, disrupting TCP [43], DNS [12], BitTorrent [43], or censoring web content [8].

Both client/server protocols prevent off-path attacks even when NTP is not cryptographically authenticated, and prevent on-path attacks when NTP is authenticated.

2. Root causes for vulnerabilities. We look for root causes for vulnerabilities in NTP’s client/server and symmetric peering datagram protocols, and identify two meta-issues. We find that the NTP standard in RFC5905 is both underspecified and flawed. We also find that vulnerabilities arise because client/server mode and symmetric mode have conflicting security requirements; meanwhile, RFC5905 suggests identical processing for incoming packets of both modes.

As part of this analysis, we identify several new attacks and demonstrate them against *ntpd* (NTP’s “reference implementation”). We present three off-path attacks on client/server mode that can be used to maliciously shift time on a target client. One of our attacks is among the strongest timeshifting attacks on NTP that has been identified thus far (Section IV-A). This *Zero-Origin Timestamp Attack* (CVE-2015-8138) follows from RFC5905, succeeds from off-path against NTP clients operating in default mode, requires no assumptions on the client’s configuration, and has been part of *ntpd* for last seven years (since *ntpd* v4.2.6 was released in December 2009). Our other attacks leverage information leakage from NTP’s control query interface, as specified in RFC1305 [25] and a new IETF Internet draft [26] (Section IV-BV). We also show how flaws in the specification of symmetric mode in RFC5905 allow for off- and on-path attacks that prevent time synchronization (Section VIII).

Measurements. Finally, we use IPv4 scans to identify millions of IPs that are vulnerable to our attacks (Section VI).

Disclosure. The research presented here was done against *ntpd* v4.2.8p6, which was the latest version of *ntpd* until April 25, 2016. Since that date, two new versions of *ntpd* have been released: *ntpd* v4.2.8p7 (April 26, 2016), and *ntpd* v4.2.8p8 (June 2, 2016). Our disclosure timeline is detailed in Section XI. While some of our attacks have been patched in new releases, others remain exploitable. We summarize these

v4		IHL		TOS		Total length				IP header
IPID						x DF		MF	Frag Offset	
TTL		Proto = 17				Checksum				
Source IP										
Destination IP										
Source Port = 123						Destination Port = 123				UDP header
Length						Checksum				
LI		v	Mode4		Stratum		Poll		Precision	NTP data
Root Delay										
Root Dispersion										
Reference ID										
Reference Time										
Origin Timestamp										
Receive Timestamp										
Transmit Timestamp										

Fig. 1. NTP mode 4 server response packet. (Client queries have the same format, but with mode field set to 3. Symmetric mode uses mode 1 or 2. Broadcast mode uses mode 5).

issues in Section XI, and provide recommendations for the way forward in Sections VII-E, VIII-D, X.

II. NTP BACKGROUND

NTP’s default mode of operation is a hierarchical *client/server* mode. In this mode, timing queries are solicited by clients from a set of servers; the set of servers queried by each client is typically static and configured manually. *Stratum* i systems act as servers that provide time to stratum $i + 1$ systems, for $i = 1, \dots, 15$. Stratum 1 servers are at the root of the NTP hierarchy. Stratum 0 and stratum 16 indicate failure to synchronize. Client/server packets are not authenticated by default, but a Message Authentication Code (MAC) can optionally be appended to the packet. NTP operates in several additional modes. In *broadcast mode*, a set of clients listen to a server that broadcasts timing information. Broadcast mode is out of our scope, see [21], [31], [39] instead. In *symmetric mode*, peers exchange timing information (Section VIII). There is also an *interleaved mode* for more accurate timestamping (Section IV-B).

NTP’s client/server protocol consists of periodic two-message *exchange*. The client sends the server a *mode 3* NTP query, and the server responds with a *mode 4* NTP response. Each exchange provides a *timing sample*, which uses the four timestamps in Table I. All four timestamps are 64 bits long, where the first 32 bits are seconds elapsed since January 1, 1970, and the last 32 bits are fractional seconds. T_1 , T_2 , and T_3 are fields in *mode 4* server response shown in Figure 1. The delay δ is an important NTP parameter [27] that measures the round trip time between the client and the server:

$$\delta = (T_4 - T_1) - (T_3 - T_2) \quad (1)$$

If there are symmetric delays on the forward and reverse network paths, then the difference between the server and client clock is $T_2 - (T_1 + \frac{\delta}{2})$ for the mode 3 query, and $T_3 - (T_4 - \frac{\delta}{2})$ for the mode 4 response. Averaging these gives the *offset* θ :

$$\theta = \frac{1}{2} ((T_2 - T_1) + (T_3 - T_4)) \quad (2)$$

A client does *not* immediately update its clock with the offset θ upon receipt of a mode 4 response packet. Instead, the

TABLE I. TIMESTAMPS INDUCED BY THE MODE 4 RESPONSE PACKET.

T_1 : Origin timestamp.	Client’s local time when sending query.
T_2 : Receive timestamp.	Server’s local time when receiving query.
T_3 : Transmit timestamp.	Server’s local time when sending response.
T_4 : Destination timestamp.	Client’s local time when receiving response.

client collects several timing samples from each server by completing exchanges at infrequent *polling intervals* (on the order of seconds or minutes). The length of the polling interval is determined by an adaptive randomized *poll process* [27, Sec. 13]. The poll p is a field on the NTP packet, where [27] allows $p \in \{4, 5, \dots, 17\}$, which corresponds to a polling interval of about 2^p (i.e., 16 seconds to 36 hours).

Once the client has enough timing samples from a server, it computes the jitter ψ . First, it finds the offset value θ^* corresponding to the sample of lowest delay δ^* from the eight most recent samples, and then takes jitter ψ as

$$\psi^2 = \frac{1}{i-1} \sum_i (\theta_i - \theta^*)^2 \quad (3)$$

(The sum is taken over up to eight of the most recent samples.) A client considers updating its clock if it obtains a stream of (typically at least four) timing samples with low jitter.¹ The client enforces this via following test:

TEST11: Check that the *root distance* Λ does not exceed $\text{MAXDIST} = 1.5$ seconds. Λ is proportional² to:

$$\Lambda \propto \psi + (\delta^* + \Delta)/2 + E + 2^\rho \quad (4)$$

The root delay Δ , root dispersion E and precision ρ are taken from fields in the server’s mode 4 response packet (Figure 1). Precision ρ represents the quality of the system’s local clock; $\rho = 12$ implies precision of $2^{-12} = 244\mu\text{s}$.

After each exchange, the client chooses a *single* server to which it synchronizes its local clock. This decision is made adaptively by a set of *selection*, *cluster*, *combine* and *clock discipline* algorithms [27, Sec. 10-12]. Importantly, these algorithms can also decide *not* to update the client’s clock; in this case, the clock runs without input from NTP.

Implementation vs. Specification. RFC5905 [27] specifies NTP version 4, and its “reference implementation” is ntpd [40]. David Mills, the inventor of NTP, explains [28] the “relationship between the published standard and the reference implementation” as follows: “It is tempting to construct a standard from first principles, submit it for formal verification, then tell somebody to build it. Of the four generations of NTP, it did not work that way. Both the standard and the reference implementation were evolved from an earlier version... Along the way, many minor tweaks were needed in both the specification and implementation...” For this reason, we consider both the specification in RFC5905 and the ntpd implementation. This approach also make sense because RFC5905 is known to be incomplete. RFC5905 does not include, for example, a specification of mode 6 control queries that were specified in

¹A single mode 4 server response packet is sufficient to set the time on a SNTP (“simple NTP”) client, but a stream of self-consistent packets is required on a full NTP client.

²The exact definition of Λ differs slightly between RFC5905 [27, Appendix A.5.5.2] and the latest version of ntpd.

RFC1305 [25] (the NTP version 3 standard from 1992 that was obsoleted by RFC5905 [27]), even though control queries continue to be supported by ntpd, and are currently being added back into the specification with a new draft [26].

III. THE CLIENT/SERVER PROTOCOL IN RFC5905

We now argue that the client/server datagram protocol in RFC5905 is both underspecified and flawed. RFC5905 mentions the client/server protocol in two places, in its main body (Section 8) and in a large pseudo-code listing (Appendix A). Because the two mentions are somewhat contradictory, we begin with an overview of the components of NTP’s datagram protocol, and then present its specification in Appendix A of RFC5905, and in the prose of Section 8 of RFC5905.

A. Components of NTP’s datagram protocol.

NTP uses the *origin timestamp* field of the NTP packet to prevent off- and on-path attacks. (Recall that an off-path attacker can spoof IP packets but cannot eavesdrop on its target’s NTP traffic, while an on-path attacker can eavesdrop, inject, spoof, and replay packets, but cannot drop, delay, or tamper with legitimate traffic.) Whenever a client queries its server, the client records the query’s sending time T_1 in a local *state variable* [27] named “xmt”. The client then sends T_1 in the *transmit timestamp* of its mode 3 query (Figure 1). Upon receipt of the query, the server learns T_1 and copies it into the *origin timestamp* field of its mode 4 response (Figure 1). When the client receives the mode 4 response, it performs TEST2:

TEST2: The client checks that the origin timestamp T_1 on the mode 4 server response, matches the client’s time upon sending the mode 3 query, as recorded in the client’s local state variable xmt.

The origin timestamp is therefore a nonce that the client must check (with TEST2) before it accepts a response.³ An off-path attacker cannot see this nonce (because it cannot observe the exchange between client and server), and thus has difficulty spoofing a valid server response. The origin timestamp thus is analogous to source port randomization in TCP/UDP, sequence number randomization in TCP, and transaction ID randomization in DNS. When NTP packets are cryptographically authenticated with a MAC, this nonce also provides some replay protection: even an on-path attacker cannot replay a packet from an earlier polling interval because its origin timestamp is stale.

NTP also has additional mechanisms to prevent replays within the same polling interval. These mechanisms are used because an NTP client continuously listens to network traffic, even when it has no outstanding (*i.e.*, unanswered) queries to its servers. The client uses the following test to reject duplicates of the server’s response packet:

TEST1: The client checks that the transmit timestamp T_3 field of the mode 4 server response is *different* from the value in the client’s org state variable. The client’s org state variable records the transmit timestamp field from the server’s previous mode 4 response to the client.

³Note that ntpd does not randomize the UDP source port to create an additional nonce; instead, all NTP packets have UDP source port 123.

```

1  receive()
2      if (pkt.T3 == 0 or      # fail test3
3          pkt.T3 == org): # fail test1
4          return
5
6      synch = True
7      if !broadcast:
8          if pkt.T1 == 0: # fail test3
9              synch = False
10             elif pkt.T1 != xmt: # fail test2
11                 synch = False
12
13     org = pkt.T3
14     rec = pkt.time_received
15     if (synch):
16         process(pkt)

```

Fig. 2. Pseudocode for the receive function, RFC5905 Appendix A.5.1.

The following deals with duplicates of the client’s query:

Clear xmt: If a server response passes TEST2, the client sets its local xmt state variable to zero.

Suppose the server receives two identical client queries, and sends responses to both. If the client cleared xmt upon receipt of the first server response, the second server response packet will be rejected (by TEST2) because its origin timestamp is non-zero. At this point, the reader might worry that an off-path attacker might inject a spoofed packet with origin timestamp set to zero. Fortunately, TEST3 should catch this:

TEST3: Reject any response packet with origin, receive, or transmit timestamp T_1, T_2, T_3 set to zero.

B. Query replay vulnerability in Appendix A of RFC5905.

Pseudocode from Appendix A of RFC5905 is shown in Figure 2. This pseudocode handles the processing of received packets of *any* mode, including server mode packets (mode 4), broadcast mode packets (mode 5), and symmetric mode packets (mode 1 or 2, see Section VIII). Importantly, this pseudocode requires a host to always listen to and process incoming packets. This follows because some NTP modes (*e.g.*, broadcast) process unsolicited packets from a timeserver, and all modes being processed by the same codepath. We shall see that this single codepath creates various security problems.

On-path query replay vulnerability. The pseudocode in Appendix A of RFC5905, shown above in Figure 2, is vulnerable to replays of the client’s query. This follows because (1) the client is always listening for responses, and (2) the xmt variable is *not* cleared when a response passes TEST2. Suppose a client query is replayed to the server. Then, the server will send two responses, each with valid origin timestamp field (passing TEST2) and each with a different transmit timestamp field (passing TEST1). The client will therefore accept both responses. Our experiments indicate that replays of the client query can harm the accuracy of time synchronization; see Appendix B.

C. Zero-Origin timestamp vulnerability in RFC5905 prose.

Meanwhile, we find the following in Section 8 of RFC5905:

Before the `xmt` and `org` state variables are updated, two sanity checks are performed in order to protect against duplicate, bogus, or replayed packets. In the exchange above, a packet is duplicate or replay if the transmit timestamp `t3` in the packet matches the `org` state variable `T3`. A packet is bogus if the origin timestamp `t1` in the packet does not match the `xmt` state variable `T1`. In either of these cases, the state variables are updated, then the packet is discarded. To protect against replay of the last transmitted packet, the `xmt` state variable is set to zero immediately after a successful bogus check.

This text describes `TEST1` and `TEST2`, but what does it mean to update the state variables? Comparing this to the pseudocode in Appendix A of RFC5905 (Figure 2 lines 13-14) suggests that this means updating `org` and `rec` upon receipt of any packet (including a bogus one failing `TEST2`), but not the `xmt` state variable.⁴ Next, notice that the quoted text does not mention `TEST3`, which rejects packets with a zero origin timestamp. Thus, we could realize the quoted text as pseudocode by deleting lines 8-9 of Figure 2. Finally, notice that the quote suggests clearing `xmt` if a received packet passes `TEST2`. Thus, we could add the following after line 11 of Figure 2 (with lines 8-9 deleted):

```
else: xmt = 0
```

However, if `xmt` is cleared but `TEST3` is not applied, we have the following vulnerability:

Zero-Origin Timestamp Attack. The zero-Origin timestamp vulnerability allows an off-path attacker to hijack an unauthenticated client/server association and shift time on the client.

The attacker sends its target client a mode 4 response packet, spoofed with the source IP address of the target's server.⁵ The spoofed packet has its origin timestamp T_1 set to zero, and its other timestamps T_2, T_3 set to bogus values designed to convince the client to shift its time. The target will accept the spoofed packet as long as it does not have an outstanding query to its server. Why? If a client has already received a valid response from its server, the valid response would have cleared the client's `xmt` variable to zero. The spoofed zero-Origin packet is then subjected to `TEST2`, and its origin timestamp (which is set to zero) will be compared to the `xmt` variable (which is also zero). `TEST3` is never applied, and so the spoofed zero-Origin packet will be accepted.

Suppose that the attacker wants to convince the client to change its clock by x years. How should the attacker set the

timestamps on its spoofed packet? The origin timestamp is set to $T_1 = 0$ and the transmit timestamp T_3 is set to the bogus time $\text{now} + x$. The destination timestamp T_4 (not in the packet) is $T_4 = \text{now} + d$, where d is the latency between the moment when the attacker sent its spoofed packet and the moment the client received it. Now, the attacker needs to choose the receive timestamp T_2 so that the spoofed packet passes `TEST11` (Section II). To do this, T_2 must be chosen so that delay δ is small. Per equation (1), if the attacker wants delay $\delta = d$, then T_2 should be:

$$\begin{aligned} T_2 &= \delta + T_3 - (T_4 - T_1) \\ &= d + \text{now} + x - (\text{now} + d + 0) = x \end{aligned}$$

The offset is therefore $\theta = x - \frac{d}{2}$. If the attacker sends the client a stream of spoofed packets with timestamps set as described above, their jitter ϕ is given by the small variance in d (since x is a constant value). Thus, if the attacker sets root delay Δ , root dispersion E and precision ρ on its spoofed packets to be tiny values, the packet will pass `TEST11` and be accepted.

D. Summary.

Finally, we note that Section 8 of RFC5905 also has the following text:

Note that the on-wire protocol as described resists replay of a server response packet. However, it does not resist replay of the client request packet, which would result in a server reply packet with new values of `T2` and `T3` and result in incorrect offset and delay. This vulnerability can be avoided by setting the `xmt` state variable to zero after computing the offset and delay.

The above suggests that setting `xmt = 0` is optional. This is consistent with the pseudocode in the RFC's Appendix A, and thus implies the query-replay vulnerability, rather than the zero-Origin vulnerability. Either way, the RFC's protocol description is quite ambiguous. These ambiguities likely explain why we could execute our zero-Origin timestamp attack against the current version of `ntpd` (Section IV-A).

IV. THE CLIENT/SERVER PROTOCOL IN NTPD

We present several `ntpd` vulnerabilities that stem from ambiguities in RFC5905. Figure 3 is a (simplified) description⁶ of the code used for the datagram protocol in `ntpd` v4.2.8p6 (the most recent release as of mid-April 2016).

Our attacks assume that client/server connections are unauthenticated, which is the default in `ntpd` and is the most common configuration in the wild (Section VI-B). Section IV-A presents our *Zero-Origin Timestamp vulnerability* (CVE-2015-8138) that allows an off-path attacker to completely hijack an unauthenticated association between a client and its server, shifting time on the client. Section IV-B presents our *Interleaved Pivot vulnerability* (CVE-2016-1548), an extremely low-rate off-path denial-of-service attack. Importantly, both vulnerabilities affect `ntpd` clients operating in default mode, are performed from off-path, and require no special assumptions about the client's configuration. Both have been present in `ntpd` for seven years, since the first release of `ntpd` v4.2.6 in

⁴Indeed, suppose we did update the `xmt` variable even after receipt of a bogus packet that fails `TEST2`, with the bogus origin timestamp in the received packet. In this case, we would be vulnerable to a *chosen-origin-timestamp attack*, where an attacker injects a first packet with an origin timestamp of the attacker's choosing. The injected packet fails `TEST2` and is dropped, but its origin timestamp gets written to the target's local `xmt` variable. Then, the attacker injects another packet with this same origin timestamp, which passes `TEST2` and is accepted by the target.

⁵As observed by [20], hosts respond to unauthenticated mode 3 queries from arbitrary IP addresses by default. The mode 4 response (Figure 1) has a *reference ID* field that reveals the IPv4 address of the responding host's time server. Thus, our off-path attacker sends its target a (legitimate) mode 3 query, and receives in response a mode 4 packet, and learns the target's server from its reference ID. Moreover, if the attacker's shenanigans cause the target to synchronize to a different server, the attacker can just learn the IP of the new server by sending the target a new mode 3 query. The attacker can then spoof packets from the new server as well.

⁶Note that the actual `ntpd` code swaps the names of the `xmt` and `org` state variables; we have chosen the description that is consistent with the RFCs.

December 2009. In Section V we combine the interleaved pivot vulnerability with information-leaking NTP control queries and obtain a new off-path timeshifting attack.

```

1 def receive( pkt ):
2     if pkt.T3 == 0:
3         flash |= test3 # fail test3
4     elif pkt.T3 == org
5         flash |= test1 # fail test1
6         return
7     elif broadcast == True:
8         ; # skip further tests
9     elif interleave == False:
10        if pkt.T1 == 0:
11            xmt = 0
12            elif (xmt == 0 or pkt.T1 != xmt):
13                flash |= test2 # fail test2
14                if (rec != 0 and pkt.T1 == rec):
15                    interleave = True
16                return
17            else:
18                xmt = 0 # pass test2, clear xmt
19        elif (pkt.T1 == 0 or pkt.T2 == 0):
20            flash |= test3 # fail test3
21        elif (rec != 0 and rec != pkt.T1):
22            flash |= test2
23            return # fail interleave test2
24
25    if interleave == False:
26        rec = pk.receive_time()
27    org = pkt.T3
28
29    if flash == True:
30        return
31    else
32        process( pkt )
33 return

```

Fig. 3. Simplified implementation of the datagram protocol from ntpd v4.2.8p6. The packet will not be processed if the `flash` variable is set. `interleave` variable is set when the host is in interleaved mode. Line 16 was introduced at ntpd v4.2.8p4 and 10-11 at ntpd v4.2.8p5.

A. Zero-Origin timestamp vulnerability.

The zero-Origin timestamp vulnerability allows an off-path attacker to completely hijack an unauthenticated client/server association and shift the client’s time.

Injecting Origin packets from off-path. In this attack, the attacker sends a spoofed mode 4 response packet to the target client. The spoofed packet has its origin timestamp T_1 set to zero, and its other timestamps T_2, T_3 set to bogus values designed to convince the client to shift its time, and its source IP set to that of the target’s server. (The off-path attacker learns the server’s IP via the reference ID, per footnote 5.) Now, consider how the client processes the received spoofed zero-Origin timestamp packet:

(1) For ntpd v4.2.8p5 or v4.2.8p6, a spoofed zero-Origin packet will always be accepted, because it passes through lines 10-11, which skip TEST2 altogether. While the addition of lines 10-11 may seem strange, we suspect that they were added to handle the initialization of NTP’s symmetric mode, which shares the same code path as client/server mode. Further discussion is in Section VIII-C.

(2) For ntpd v4.2.6 to v4.2.8p4, lines 10-11 of Figure 3 were absent. Thus, the target will accept the spoofed packet

when it does not have an outstanding query to the server. Why? When the client does not have an outstanding query to its server, its `xmt` variable is cleared to zero. Thus, when the spoofed zero-Origin packet is subjected to TEST2 (line 12), its origin timestamp (which is zero) will be compared to the `xmt` variable (which is also zero) and be accepted. The vulnerability arises because Figure 3 fails to apply TEST3, which rejects packets with zero origin timestamp.⁷

Thus, an off-path attacker can send the client a quick burst of self-consistent zero-Origin packets with a bogus time, and cause the client to shift its time. The spoofed zero-Origin packets are always accepted in case (1), and usually accepted in case (2) because the client is unlikely to have outstanding query to its server. (In case (2), this follows because the server is queried so infrequently—NTP’s polling intervals are at least 16 seconds long, but often are up to 15 minutes long.) After accepting the burst of zero-Origin packets, the target immediately shifts its time; in fact, the target shifts its time more quickly than it would under normal conditions, when legitimate responses arrive from the server at the (very slow) NTP polling rate (Section II).

Experiment. On April 29, 2016, we performed a zero-Origin timestamp attack on an ntpd v4.2.8p6 client. The target client uses the `-g` option on an operating system that restarts ntpd when it quits.⁸ The target is configured to take time from a single server. The target starts and completes 15 timing exchanges with its server, averaging about one exchange per minute. We then attack, sending the target a spoofed zero-Origin timestamp packet every second for ten seconds; these spoofed packets have T_3 as October 22, 1985 and T_2 as August 1, 2006. (This choice of T_2 sets $\delta \approx \psi \approx 0$, so we pass TEST11; see Section II.) The client panics⁹ and restarts after the ninth spoofed packet. It then receives the tenth spoofed packet *before* it queries its server, and per the *reboot bug* in Appendix A, immediately shifts to 1985. (Our attack would still work even without this bug.) Eventually, the attacker decides to check if the attack has been successful by sending a mode 3 query to the target. By checking the transmit timestamp of mode 4 response, the attacker realizes the target is in 1985. Then, the attacker sets $T_2 = 0$ on his spoofed packets to maintain the client in 1985. (This is necessary because the client’s T_4 is now October 22, 1985, so maintaining $\delta \approx 0$ so we pass TEST11 requires $T_2 = 0$.) The attacker continues pelting the target with spoofed packets at a higher rate (≈ 1 packet/second) than that of the legitimate server response packets (≈ 1 packet/minute). The legitimate packets look like outliers (due, in part, to TEST11, Section II) and the target

⁷TEST3 is applied in the fifth clause in Figure 3, but a client will not enter this clause unless it is in interleaved mode.

⁸–g is the default ntpd configuration on many OSes including CoreOS Alpha (1032.1.0), Debian 8.2.0, Arch Linux 2016.05.01, etc.

sticks to the attacker’s bogus time.

B. Interleaved pivot vulnerability.

We next consider a vulnerability introduced by NTP’s interleaved mode, which is designed to allow for more accurate time synchronization.

What is interleaved mode? Recall that NTP uses timestamps on the packets to determine the offset θ between the client and the server. Because these timestamps must be written to the packet *before* the packet is sent out on the network, there is a delay between the time when the packet is ‘formed’ and the time when the packet is sent. This delay is supposed to introduce small errors in the offset. Interleaved mode eliminates this delay by spreading the computation of the offset (equation (2)) over *two* exchanges, rather than just one. In interleaved mode, hosts record timestamps for the moment that they actually transmit packet onto the network, and send them in the packet transmitted in the subsequent polling interval. Interleaved mode is not mentioned in RFC5905 [27], but is implemented in ntpd. Mills [28] indicates that interleaved mode is intended for use on top of the broadcast or symmetric modes only.

We will exploit the following issues: (1) Interleaved mode shares the same code path as the client/server code (Figure 3). (2) Interleaved mode *changes* the meanings of the values stored in the timestamp fields of an NTP packet. Importantly, the origin timestamp field of the mode 4 server response now contains T_4 from the previous exchange (rather than T_1 from the current exchange). Thus, the usual TEST2 no longer works; instead, there is ‘interleaved TEST2’ comparing the packet’s origin timestamp to the `rec` variable, which stores T_4 from the previous exchange. (Line 21 in Figure 3.) (3) A host *automatically switches* into interleaved mode when it detects that the host on the other side of the association is in interleaved mode. (Line 15 in Figure 3.)

Interleaved mode as a low rate DoS vector. The implementation of interleaved mode in ntpd introduces a low rate denial-of-service attack. The vulnerability is introduced in line 14 of Figure 3. Namely, if a server response packet fails the usual TEST2, the client subjects the packet to ‘interleaved TEST2’. If the packet passes, the client sets the `interleave` variable and enters interleaved mode. Importantly, a client cannot escape from interleaved mode—there is no code path to clear the `interleave` variable.

Thus, an off-path attacker can inject a spoofed server response packet that passes ‘interleaved TEST2’ because its origin timestamp equals T_4 from the previous exchange. But how can the attacker learn T_4 ? It turns out that whenever an

ntpd client updates its clock, it sets its reference time to be T_4 from the most recent exchange with the server to which it synchronized. This T_4 is sent out with every subsequent packet in the *reference timestamp* field. Thus, to learn T_4 , the off-path attacker first sends the client a regular mode 3 query, and learns the reference time from the client’s response. If the target updated its clock in the previous exchange, the reference time will be T_4 from the previous exchange. The target will then react to the spoofed packet by switching into interleaved mode (Line 14 of Figure 3). All subsequent legitimate server responses are rejected because they fail ‘interleaved TEST2’.

The attack leads to a DoS for *each one* of the target’s servers. The attack works by repeating the process of (1) sending a timing query to the target to learn the IP of the server that the target synchronizes to, and its T_4 timestamp, and then (2) pivoting the target into interleaved mode for that server by sending a spoofed interleaved pivot packet. Thus, whenever the target synchronizes to a new server, the attacker will detect this (in step (1)) and DoS that new server as well (in step (2)). (This process is similar to [20, Sec V.C].)

Timeshifting attacks. Section V discusses how ntpd’s control query interface can be leveraged to turn the interleaved pivot vulnerability into a full hijack of client/server communications from off-path. Section VI-E finds 700K vulnerable IPs.

V. LEAKY CONTROL QUERIES

Thus far, we have implicitly assumed that the timestamps stored in a target’s state variables (`xmt`, `org`, `rec`) are difficult for an attacker to obtain from off-path. However, we now show how they can be learned from off-path via control queries.

Interestingly, the control queries we use are not mentioned at all in the latest NTP specification in RFC5905 [27]. However, they are specified in detail in Appendix B of the obsolete RFC1305 [25] from 1992, and are also specified in a new IETF Internet draft [26]. They have been part of ntpd since at least 1999.¹⁰ NTP’s UDP-based control queries are notorious as a vector for DDos amplification attacks [10], [19]. These DoS attacks exploit the *length* of the UDP packets sent in response to NTP’s mode 7 `monlist` control query, and sometimes also NTP’s mode 6 `rv` control query. Here, however, we will exploit the *contents* of some other control queries for our attacks.

The leaky control queries. We found control queries that reveal the values stored in the `xmt` and `rec` state variables. First, launch the `as` control query to learn the association ID that a target uses for its server(s). (Association ID is a randomly assigned number that the client uses internally to identify each server [25].) Then, the query `rv assocID org` reveals the value stored in `xmt` (i.e., expected origin timestamp T_1 for that server). Moreover, `rv assocID rec` reveals the value in `rec` (i.e., the destination timestamp T_4 for the target’s last exchange with its server).

Off-path timeshifting via leaky origin timestamp (CVE-2015-8139). If an attacker could continuously query its target for its expected origin timestamp (i.e., the `xmt` state variable),

⁹NTP has a *panic threshold* of 1000 seconds (16 mins). If the client gets a time shift that exceeds the panic threshold, the client quits. Thus, at first glance, it seems that the worst an attacker can do is alter the client’s clock by 16 minutes. However, as noted in [20], this panic behavior can be exploited. Modern *NIX operating systems are replacing traditional init systems with process supervisors, such as systemd, which can be configured to automatically restart any daemons that quit. (This behavior is the default in CoreOS and Arch Linux. It is likely to become the default behavior in other systems as they migrate legacy init scripts to systemd.) This is useful because many operating systems run ntpd with the `-g` option by default, which allows clients to ignore the panic threshold upon reboot.

¹⁰https://github.com/ntpsec/ntpsec/blob/PRE_NT_991015/ntp/ntp.c

then all bets are off. The off-path attacker could spoof bogus packets that pass TEST2 and shift time on the target.

Off-path time-shifting attack via interleaved pivot (CVE-2016-1548). What about an off-path attacker that could continuously query for `rec`? This attacker can parley the interleaved pivot vulnerability into a timeshifting attack (rather than just a DoS attack). An off-path attacker can first pivot the client to interleaved mode, and then use its knowledge of `rec` to inject a stream of self-consistent spoofed packets that pass ‘interleaved TEST2’. We have preformed this attack on `ntpd v4.2.8p6`.

Recommendation: Block control queries! By default, `ntpd` allows the client to answer control queries sent by any IP in the Internet. However, in response to `monlist`-based NTP DDoS amplification attacks, best practices recommend configuring `ntpd` with the `noquery` parameter [40]. While `noquery` should block all control queries, we suspect that `monlist` packets are filtered by middleboxes, rather than by the `noquery` option, and thus many “patched” systems remain vulnerable to our attacks. Indeed, the `openNTPproject`’s IPv4 scan during the week of July 23, 2016 found 705,183 unique IPs responding to `monlist`. Meanwhile, during the same week we found a staggering 3,964,718 IPs responding to the `as` query.¹¹ The control queries we exploit likely remain out of firewall blacklists because (1) they are undocumented in RFC5905 and (2) are thus far unexploited. As such, we suggest that either (1) `noquery` be used, or (2) firewalls block *all* mode 6 and mode 7 NTP packets from unwanted IPs.

VI. MEASURING THE ATTACK SURFACE

We use network measurements to determine the number of IPs in the wild that are vulnerable to our off-path attacks.

A. Methodology.

We start with `Zmap` [14] to scan the entire IPv4 address space (from July 27 - July 29, 2016) using NTP’s `as` control query and obtain responses from 3,964,718 unique IPs. The scan was broken up into 254 shards, each completing in 2-3 minutes and containing 14,575,000 IPs. At the completion of each shard, we run a script that sends each responding IP the following sequence of queries:

```
rv 'associd'
rv 'associd' org
rv 'associd' rec
rv
mode 3 NTPv4 query
```

These queries check for leaky origin and destination timestamps, per Section V, and also solicit a regular NTP mode 4 response packet. Our scan did not modify the internal state of any of the queried systems. We used RFC5905-compliant mode 3 NTP queries, and RFC1305-compliant mode 6 control packets identical to those produced by the standard NTP control query program `ntpq`.

We obtained a response to at least one of the control queries from 3,822,681 (96.4%) of the IPs responding to our `as` scan. We obtained mode 4 responses from 3,274,501 (82.6%) of

TABLE II. HOSTS LEAKING ORIGIN TIMESTAMPS, VULNERABLE TO CVE-2015-8139.

Total	unauthenticated	Stratum 2-15	good timekeepers
3,759,832	3,681,790	2,974,574	2,484,775

TABLE III. HOSTS LEAKING ZERO-ORIGIN TIMESTAMP. (UNDERESTIMATES HOSTS VULNERABLE TO CVE-2015-8138.)

Total	unauthenticated	Stratum 2-15	good timekeepers
1,269,265	1,249,212	892,672	691,902

the responding IPs. Once the entire scan completed on July 29, 2016, we identify all the stratum 1 servers (from the `rv` and mode 4 response packets), and send each the NTP control query `peers` using `ntpq`; we obtained responses from 3,586 (76.6%) IPs out of a total of 4,683 IPs queried. (We do this to check if any stratum 1 servers have symmetric peering associations, since those that do could be vulnerable to our attacks.)

B. State of crypto.

The general wisdom suggests that NTP client/server communications are typically not cryptographically authenticated; this follows because (1) NTP uses pre-shared symmetric keys for its MAC, which makes key distribution cumbersome [4], and (2) NTP’s Autokey [15] protocol for public-key authentication is widely considered to be broken [34]. We can use the results of our scan to empirically validate the general wisdom, since the `as` command also reveals a host’s ‘authentication status’ with each of its servers or peers. Of 3,964,718 IPs that responded to the `as` command, we find merely 78,828 (2.0%) IPs that have *all* their associations authenticated. Meanwhile, 3,870,933 (97.6%) IPs have *all* their associations unauthenticated. We find 93,785 (2.4%) IPs have at least one association authenticated. For these hosts, off-path attacks are more difficult but not infeasible (especially if *most* of the client’s associations are unauthenticated, or if the authenticated associations provide bad time, *etc.*).

C. Leaky origin timestamps (CVE-2015-8139).

Out of the 3,964,718 IPs responding to `as`, a staggering 3,759,832 (94.8%) IPs leaked their origin timestamp to us. (This is a significantly larger number than the 705,183 IPs that responded to a `monlist` scan of the IPv4 space by the `openNTPproject` during the same week, suggesting that many systems that have been ‘patched’ against NTP DDoS amplification [10], [19] remain vulnerable to our leaky-origin timestamp attack.)

But how many of these leaky hosts are vulnerable to off-path timeshifting attacks described in Section V? Our results are summarized in Table II. First, we find that only 78,042 (2.1%) of the IPs that leak `org` to us have authenticated *all* associations with their servers, leaving them out of the attackable pool. Next, we note that stratum 1 hosts are not usually vulnerable to this attack, since they don’t take time from any server. The only exception to this is the stratum 1 servers that have symmetric peering associations. Combining data from `rv` and mode 3 responses, we find the stratum of the remaining 3,681,790 (97.9%) leaky IPs. We combine this information with the output of the `peers` command, which reveals the ‘type of association’ each host uses with its servers

¹¹To avoid being blacklisted, we refrained from sending `monlist` queries.

TABLE IV. HOSTS LEAKING `rec` AND ZERO-ORIGIN TIMESTAMP. (UNDERESTIMATES HOSTS VULNERABLE TO THE INTERLEAVED PIVOT TIME-SHIFTING ATTACK CVE-2016-1548.)

Total	unauthenticated	Stratum 2-15	good timekeepers
1,267,628	1,247,656	893,979	691,393

and peers. Of the 4,608 (0.1%) stratum 1 servers, *none* have symmetric peering associations. Thus, we do not find *any* vulnerable stratum 1 servers.

On the other hand, we do have a large number of 2,974,574 (80.8%) stratum 2-15 IPs that leak their origin timestamp and have at least one unauthenticated server. These are all vulnerable to our attack. We do not count 601,043 (16.3%) IPs that have either (1) stratum 0 or 16 (unsynchronized), OR (2) conflicting stratum in `rv` and mode 3 responses. Finally, we check if these 3M vulnerable IPs are ‘functional’ or are just misconfigured or broken systems. To do this, we use data from the mode 3 scan to find out the quality of their timekeeping. We found that 2,484,775 (83.5%) of these leaky IPs are good timekeepers—their absolute offset value were less than 0.1 sec.¹² Of these, we find 490,032 (19.7%) IPs with stratum 2. These are good targets for attack, so that the impact of the attack trickles down the NTP stratum hierarchy.

D. Zero-Origin timestamp vulnerability (CVE-2015-8138).

The zero-Origin timestamp vulnerability was introduced seven years ago in `ntpd` v4.2.6 (Dec 2009), where line 18 of Figure 3 was added to clear `xmt` after a packet passes `TEST2`.¹³ Thus, one way to bound the attack surface for the zero-Origin timestamp vulnerability is to consider all our origin-timestamp leaking hosts, and find the ones that leak a timestamp of zero. Importantly, this is just a subset of the vulnerable systems, since a system does not need to leak its origin timestamp in order to be vulnerable to the zero-Origin timestamp attack (Section IV-A).

Of 3,759,832 (94.8%) origin-leaking IPs, we find 1,269,265 (33.8%) IPs that leaked zero as their origin timestamp, as summarized in Table III. Again, we exclude hosts that cryptographically authenticate *all* of their associations, leaving 1,249,212 (98.4%) IPs. Of these, 892,672 (71.5%) have stratum between 2-15. Here also we exclude the 325,584 (26%) IPs with (1) stratum 0 or 16, OR (2) conflicting stratum in `rv` and mode 3 responses. Of 758,787 (85%) potentially vulnerable IPs that also responded to our mode 3 queries, we find 691,902 (91.2%) IPs that are good timekeepers. We reiterate, however, that this is likely an underestimate of the attack surface, since the zero-Origin vulnerability does not require the exploitation of leaky control queries.

E. Interleaved pivot vulnerability (CVE-2016-1548).

The interleaved pivot DoS vulnerability (Section IV-B) was introduced in the same version as the zero-Origin timestamp vulnerability. Thus, the IPs described in Section VI-D are also vulnerable to this attack.

Next, we check which IPs are vulnerable to the interleaved pivot *timeshifting attacks* (Section V). These hosts must (1) leak the `rec` state variable and (2) use a version of `ntpd` later than 4.2.6. Leaks of `rec` are also surprisingly prevalent: 3,724,465 IPs leaked `rec` (93.9% of the 4M that responded to `as`). These could be vulnerable if they are using `ntpd` versions post v4.2.6. We cannot identify the versions of all of these hosts, but we do know that hosts that also leak zero as their expected origin timestamp are using versions post v4.2.6. We find 1,267,265 (34%) such IPs. We scrutinize them in Table IV, and find almost 700K interesting targets.

VII. SECURING NTP’S CLIENT/SERVER PROTOCOLS

We have shown how RFC5905 (Section III) and `ntpd` (Section IV) introduce vulnerabilities when they combine the `TESTs` from Section III-A. Now, we move beyond just identifying attacks and actually prove security for modified client/server datagram protocols for NTP. To do this, we first develop a cryptographic model for security against off- and on-path NTP attacks. We then propose a new secure client/server protocol for NTP that only modifies client behavior, is backwards-compatible with today’s NTP servers, and preserves the semantics of the timestamps on NTP packets. We also describe a backwards-compatible client/server protocol used by the `chronyd` [1] and `openNTPD` [3] implementations; this protocol breaks the semantics of the timestamps on NTP packets. Finally, we use our model to prove security of both protocols against off- and on-path attacks.

A. Security model.

Our model, which is detailed in Appendix C, is inspired by prior cryptographic work that designs synchronous protocols with guaranteed packet delivery [5], [17]. However, unlike these earlier models, we consciously omit modeling the more powerful man-in-the-middle who can drop, modify, or delay packets. While ours is a weaker threat model than the traditional “man-in-the-middle” (MiTM), no protocol can prevent an MiTM from denying service by dropping or corrupting NTP traffic. Moreover, an MiTM can bias NTP’s timing samples by delaying packets [28], [30]. Thus, we assume instead that the network delivers all packets sent between the ℓ honest parties $\mathcal{P}_1, \dots, \mathcal{P}_\ell$. We also assume that the network does not validate the source IP in the packets it transmits, so that the adversary can *spoof* packets. Honest parties experience a delay ϱ before their packets are delivered, but the adversary can win every race condition.

The network orchestrates execution of several NTP exchanges (akin to the ‘environment’ in the universal composability framework [7]) through the use of a *transcript* that stipulates (1) which parties engage in two-message client/server exchanges with each other, (2) when they engage in each exchange, and (3) the times t_c and t_s on the local clocks of the client and server respectively during each exchange. We require security over *all* possible transcripts. This means, as a corollary, that the adversary can choose the optimal transcript for her to attack, including having control over the local clocks of *all* honest parties. An on-path attacker can see every packet sent between honest parties, while an off-path attacker can only see the packet’s IP header. Clients update their local state which includes (1) the set of servers they are willing to query,

¹²We compute the offset θ using equation (2), with T_1, T_2, T_3 from the packet timestamps on the mode 4 response and T_4 from the frame arrival time of the mode 4 response.

¹³See Line 1094 in `ntp_proto.c` in <https://github.com/ntp-project/ntp/commit/fb8fa5f6330a7583ec74fba2dfb76b6f2bdd246>.


```

def client_receive_mode4( pkt ):

    server = find_server(pkt.srcIP)

    if (server.auth == True and
        pkt.MAC is invalid):
        return # bad MAC

    if pkt.T1 != server.xmt:
        return # fail test2

    server.xmt = randbits(64) # clear xmt
    server.org = pkt.T3 # update state variables
    server.rec = pkt.receive_time()
    process(pkt)
    return

```

Fig. 4. Pseudocode for processing a response. We also require that the `xmt` variable be initialized as a randomly-chosen 64-bit value, *i.e.*, `server.xmt = randbits(64)`, when `ntpd` first boots up.

(2) the state variables (*e.g.*, xmt_j , org_j , rec_j) for each server P_j , and (3) timing samples from their k most recent exchanges with each server. Then:

Definition VII.1 (Soundness (Informal)). NTP is (k, ϵ) -sound on transcript ts if for all *resource-bounded* attackers \mathcal{A} and all parties P_i who do not query \mathcal{A} as an NTP server, P_i has k consecutive timing samples from one of its trusted servers that have been modified by the adversary with probability ϵ . The probability is over the randomness of all parties.

We parameterize by k because NTP has mechanisms that prevent synchronization until a host has a stream of *consistent* timing samples from a server or peer. TEST11, for example, does this by requiring jitter $\psi < 1.5$ seconds (Section II). Consider, for instance, an attacker that wishes to shift time on a client by 1 hour (3600 seconds). If this attacker successfully injected just one packet with the bogus time, TEST11 would fail because the jitter (equation (3)) would be at least $\psi > \sqrt{\frac{1}{8-1}} 3600 \gg 1.5$ seconds; on the other hand, if he successfully injected eight packets with the same bogus time, $\psi \approx 0$ and he would easily pass TEST11. But how should we parameterize k ? One idea is $k = 8$, because TEST11 depends on the jitter ψ which is computed over at most eight consecutive timing samples (Section 3). $k = 8$ is also consistent with pseudocode in Appendix A.5.2 of RFC 5905; this pseudocode describes the algorithm used for clock updates and includes the comment “select the best from the latest eight delay/offset samples”. This may be too optimistic though, because we have observed that `ntpd` v4.2.6 requires only $k = 4$ before it updates its clock upon reboot. `ntpd` v4.2.8p6 requires only one sample upon reboot but this is a bug; see Appendix A. Thus, we consider $k \in \{1, 4, 8\}$.

B. Two secure client/server datagram protocols.

We now discuss two secure client/server protocols for NTP. These protocols are fully backwards-compatible with today’s stateless NTP servers, whose behavior can be summarized as:

Stateless server algorithm. Today’s NTP servers are stateless, and so do not keep `org` or `xmt` state variables for their clients. Instead, upon receipt of client’s mode 3 query, a server immediately sends a mode 4 response packet with (1) origin timestamp field equal to the transmit timestamp field on the query, (2) receive timestamp field set to the time that the server

```

def client_transmit_mode3_e32( precision ):

    r = randbits(precision)
    sleep for r*(2**(- precision)) seconds

    # fuzz LSB of xmt
    fuzz = randbits(32 - precision)
    server.xmt = now ^ fuzz

    # form the packet
    pkt.T1 = server.org
    pkt.T2 = server.rec
    pkt.T3 = server.xmt
    ... # fill in other fields

    if server.auth == True:
        MAC(pkt) #append MAC

    send(pkt)
    return

```

Fig. 5. Pseudocode for sending a query where the sub-second granularity of the expected origin timestamp is randomized (for 32 bits of randomness). This function is run when the polling algorithm signals that it is time to query server. If `server.auth` is set, then communication is authenticated with a MAC.

```

def client_transmit_mode3_e64( precision ):

    # store the origin timestamp locally
    server.localxmt = now

    # form the packet
    server.xmt = randbits(64) #64-bit nonce
    pkt.T1 = server.org
    pkt.T2 = server.rec
    pkt.T3 = server.xmt
    ... # fill in other fields

    if server.auth == True:
        MAC(pkt) #append MAC

    send(pkt)
    return

```

Fig. 6. Pseudocode for sending a query where the entire expected origin timestamp is randomized (for 64 bits of randomness).

received the query, and (3) transmit timestamp field to the time the server sent its response.

These two protocols only modify client behavior. In both protocols, clients use the algorithm in Figure 4 to process received packets. We also require that, upon reboot, the client initializes its `xmt` values for each server to a random 64-bit value. To allow for seamless integration into the current implementation of `ntpd`, the client continues to listen to mode 4 response packets even when it does not have an outstanding query. However, this receive algorithm has several features that differ from RFC5905 (Figure 2) and `ntpd` (Figure 3). First, when a packet passes TEST2, we clear `xmt` by setting it to a random 64-bit value, rather than to zero. Second, TEST2 alone provides replay protection, and we get rid of TEST1 and TEST3. (TEST3 is not required because of how `xmt` is cleared. Getting rid of TEST3 is also consistent with the implementation in `ntpd` versions later than v4.2.6.)

Next, Figure 5 and Figure 6 provide two different approaches a client can use to send mode 3 queries.

We present a new approach in Figure 5, which randomizes the 32 least-significant bits of the expected origin timestamp in the mode 4 response packet, while preserving its semantics. How? Recall that the first 32 bits of the origin timestamp are seconds, and the last 32 bits are subseconds (or fractional seconds). First, a client with a clock of precision ρ put a $(32 - \rho)$ -




Fig. 7. Success probability of off-path attacker per Theorem VII.1: (Top) When the 32-bit sub-second granularity of the expected origin timestamp is randomized per the pseudocode in Figures 4.5. (Bottom) When the entire 64-bit granularity of the expected origin timestamp is randomized per the pseudocode in Figures 4.6. k is the minimum number of consistent timing samples needed for a clock update and $\tau \in \{56, 1350, 9540\}$ is the number of polling intervals attacked. We assume one server ($s = 1$) and latencies of at most $\varrho = 1$ second.

bit random value in the $(32 - \rho)$ lowest order bits. Next, we obtain the remaining ρ bits of entropy by randomizing the packet's sending time. When the polling algorithm indicates that a query should be sent, the client sleeps for a random (subsecond) period in $[0, 2^{-\rho}]$ seconds, and then constructs the mode 3 query packet. All randomization is done with a cryptographic random number generator (RNG).¹⁴ We therefore obtain 32 bits of entropy in the expected origin timestamp, while still preserving its semantics—the mode 4 packet's origin timestamp field (Figure 1) still contains T_1 and can still be used to compute delay δ and offset θ (per equations (1),(2) in Section II).

Meanwhile, the (chronyd¹⁵ and openNTPD¹⁶) approach in Figure 6, simply sets the origin timestamp expected in the mode 4 response packet to be a 64-bit nonce. While this approach provides significantly more entropy, its main drawback is that the mode 4 packet's origin timestamp field (Figure 1) can no longer serve as T_1 in computations of delay δ and offset θ . Instead, the client must additionally keep a different state variable `server.localxmt` that stores T_1 , and use that variable when computing delay δ and offset θ .¹⁷

C. Security analysis: Unauthenticated NTP & off-path attacks.

We now discuss the security guarantees for the protocols described in Section VII. We start by considering off-path attacks. At a high level, the protocols in Section VII thwart off-path attackers due to the unpredictability of the origin timestamp. Preventing off-path attacks is the best we can hope for when NTP is unauthenticated, since on-path attackers can trivially spoof unauthenticated server responses.

¹⁴Randomization of the $32 - \rho$ low order bits of the timestamp is already required by RFC5905 [27, Sec. 6]. Meanwhile, the pseudocode in Appendix A of RFC5905 has a comment that says “While not shown here, the reference implementation randomizes the poll interval by a small factor.” The current ntpd implementation randomizes the polling interval by 2^{p-4} seconds when poll $p > 4$. By contrast, we require the entire *subsecond* granularity of expected origin timestamp to be randomized using a cryptographic RNG. ntpd preforms randomization in both cases using a weak RNG `ntp_random()`.

¹⁵https://github.com/mlchvar/chrony/blob/master/ntp_core.c#L908

¹⁶<https://github.com/philpenock/openntpd/blob/master/client.c#L174>

¹⁷Also, this approach cannot be used in symmetric mode. See footnote 20.




Fig. 8. Success probability of on-path attacker per Theorem VII.2: (Top) When the 32-bit sub-second granularity of the expected origin timestamp is randomized per the pseudocode in Figures 4.5; in this case we overestimate the number of legitimate client queries that have identical 32 high-order bits of origin timestamp as $\gamma = 100$. (Bottom) When the entire 64-bit granularity of the expected origin timestamp is randomized per the pseudocode in Figures 4.6. k is the minimum number of consistent timing samples needed for a clock update and $\tau \in \{56, 1350, 9540\}$ is the number of polling intervals attacked. We assume one server ($s = 1$), latencies of at most $\varrho = 1$ second, MAC of length $2n = 128$ bits and maximum poll value $p = 17$.

We assume that honest parties can send and receive packets at rate at most R bits per second (bps). The network imposes latencies of $\leq \varrho$ for packets sent by any honest party. The polling interval is 2^p , where RFC5905 constrains $p \leq 17$.

Theorem VII.1. *Suppose NTP is unauthenticated. Let offA be an off-path attacker, and let ts be any transcript that involves ℓ honest parties, a maximum of τ exchanges involving any single client-server pair, and a maximum of s trusted servers per client. Then, NTP is $(k, \epsilon_{\text{offA}})$ -sound on transcript ts with*

$$\epsilon_{\text{offA}} = \text{Adv}(\text{RNG}) + (k + 1)s\tau \cdot \left[\frac{2^{-32}kR\varrho}{360} \right]^k \quad (5)$$

if the sub-second granularity of the expected origin timestamp in mode 4 response packet is randomized,¹⁸ or

$$\epsilon_{\text{offA}} = \text{Adv}(\text{RNG}) + (k + 1)s\tau \cdot \left[\frac{2^{p-64}kR}{720} \right]^k \quad (6)$$

if the entire expected origin timestamp is randomly chosen. Here, $\text{Adv}(\text{RNG})$ denotes the maximum advantage that any attacker with offA 's resource constraints has of distinguishing a pseudorandom number generator from a random oracle.

Thus, Figure 7 plots ϵ_{offA} versus the bandwidth R at honest parties for $k \in \{1, 4, 8\}$ and different values of τ , where τ is the number of polling intervals for which the adversary launches his attack. We do this both for the protocol that randomizes the sub-second granularity of the expected origin timestamp for 32 bits of entropy (Figure 7(top)) and the protocol that randomizes the entire expected origin timestamp for 64 bits of entropy (Figure 7(bottom)). Since hosts typically use a minimum poll value $p_{\min} = 6$, the values $\tau = (9450, 1350, 56)$ in Figure 8 correspond to attacking one (week, day, hour) of $2^{p_{\min}} = 64$ second polling intervals. We also assume one server $s = 1$, overestimate network latencies as $\varrho = 1$ second, overestimate poll p in equation (6) as $p = 17$. We assume a good RNG so $\text{Adv}(\text{RNG})$ is negligible.

$k = 4$ is sufficient with 32-bits of randomness. Recall that k is the minimum number of consistent timing samples

needed for a clock update. Figure 7(top) indicates that $k = 4$ suffices when the protocol randomizes the 32-bit sub-second granularity of the expected origin timestamp. Even if an off-path adversary attacks for a week, his success probability remains less than 0.1% as long as $k = 4$ and the target accepts packets at bandwidth $R = 5$ Gbps or less. When the adversary attacks for an hour, the target's bandwidth must be $R \approx 19$ Gbps for a 0.1% success probability. To put this in context, endhosts typically send < 10 NTP packets per minute, and even the large stratum 1 timeservers operated by NIST process queries at an average rate of 21 Gbps [37]. Therefore, it seems unlikely that an attacker could attack for hours or days without being detected. If more security is needed, we could take $k = 8$, which requires a bandwidth of $R \approx 40$ Gbps for a one-hour attack with success probability of 0.1%. Meanwhile, Figure 7(top) suggests that 32-bits of randomness do not suffice to limit off-path attacks when $k = 1$. This should provide further motivation for fixing the ntpd v4.2.8p6 bug that allows $k = 1$ upon reboot. (See Appendix A).

$k = 1$ is sufficient with 64-bits of randomness. Meanwhile, Figure 8 (bottom) indicates that $k = 1$ suffices when all 64 bits of the expected origin timestamp are randomized. Even if an off-path adversary attacks for a week, his success rate remains less than 0.1% as long as the target's bandwidth is limited to $R = 5$ Gbps. Moreover, when $k = 4$, attacking for a week at 100 Gbps only yields a success probability of 10^{-17} .

D. Security analysis: Authenticated NTP & on-path attacks.

The protocols in Section VII thwart on-path attackers when NTP packets are authenticated with a secure MAC.

Theorem VII.2. *Suppose NTP is authenticated with MAC of length $2n$. Let onA be an on-path attacker, and let ts be any transcript that involves ℓ honest parties, a maximum of s trusted servers per client and a maximum of τ exchanges involving any single client-server pair that replicate any t_c value (up to the second) at most γ times. Then, NTP is (k, ϵ_{onA}) -sound on transcript ts with*

$$\epsilon_{onA} \leq Adv(RNG) + (k + 1)s\tau(kQ)^k, \quad (7)$$

where

$$Q = \max \left\{ q_E + \frac{R\varrho \cdot Adv(EU-CMA)}{360 + n}, \frac{2^{p-64}R\varrho}{720 + 2n} \right\}. \quad (8)$$

Here, $Adv(EU-CMA)$ denotes the maximum probability that an adversary with onA 's resource constraints can forge a MAC of length $2n$ under a chosen-message attack. Additionally, $q_E = 2^{-32}\gamma$ if the 32-bit sub-second granularity of the expected origin timestamp is randomized, and $q_E = 2^{-64}\tau$ if the entire 64-bit timestamp is randomized.

To argue about security, we assume a good MAC (like GMAC [24]) so that $Adv(EU-CMA) \approx 2^{-128}$. We overestimate $p = 17$ in equation (8) and $\varrho = 1$ second and plot ϵ_{onA} versus R for one server ($s = 1$) and different choices of τ in Figure 8.

With 32-bits of randomness, $k = 4$ is sufficient. Suppose the 32-bits sub-second granularity of the expected origin timestamp is randomized. When R is small, Figure 8(top) indicates that the on-path attacker's success rate is dominated by the first

term inside the maximum in equation (8). This corresponds to a successful replay attack, because the client has sent multiple queries with the same expected origin timestamp. Meanwhile, when R is large, second term in the maximum in equation (8) dominates. This corresponds to a successful replay attack, because the client 'cleared' x_{mt} to a random 64-bit value that matches an origin timestamp in an earlier query. Again, the attacker's success probability is disconcertingly high when $k = 1$.¹⁹ On the other hand, excellent security guarantees are obtained for $k = 4$, so it is safer to have $k \geq 4$.

With 64-bits of randomness, $k = 4$ is sufficient. Suppose now that the entire 64-bits of the expected origin timestamp are randomized. Now the second term in the maximum in equation (8) always dominates. This again corresponds to a successful replay attack, because the client 'cleared' x_{mt} to a random 64-bit value that matches an origin timestamp in an earlier query.

E. Recommendations for client/server mode.

We have analyzed the security of a new backwards-compatible client/server protocol that guarantees 32-bits of randomness in the expected origin timestamp (Figures 4,5) while preserving the semantics of the origin timestamp field of the NTP mode 4 packet. We have also analyzed the backwards-compatible client/server protocol implemented in chronyd and openNTPD, which simply replaces the expected origin timestamp field with a 64-bit nonce. Depending on requirements, we recommend adoption of either of these protocols. In all cases, randomization should be accomplished using a cryptographic RNG, rather than the weak `ntp_random()` function [2]. (Note: RFC5905's 'MAC' is MD5(key||message), which is not a provably-secure MAC [6]. Packets should also be authenticated with a secure MAC, as recommended in a new IETF draft [22].) NTP should strictly impose $k = 4$ or $k = 8$ as the minimum number of consistent timing samples required before a clock update. ntpd should be patched for the bug that allows for $k = 1$ upon reboot (see Appendix A).

VIII. FLAWS IN SYMMETRIC MODE

Some of the vulnerabilities in NTP's client/server mode (mode 3/4) follow because it shares the same code path as NTP's symmetric mode (mode 1/2). Therefore, we now consider the security of NTP's symmetric mode. We identify several flaws in its specification in RFC5905 (including several off-path denial-of-service (DoS) attacks on unauthenticated symmetric mode, and several on-path DoS attacks on authenticated symmetric mode), explain how these flaws harm client/server mode, and conclude with recommendations.

A. Background: Symmetric mode.

In symmetric mode, two peers Alice and Bob can give (or take) time to (or from) each other via either ephemeral *symmetric passive* (mode 2) or persistent *symmetric active* (mode 1) packets. The symmetric active/passive association


¹⁹The poor results for $k = 1$ and 32-bits of randomization follow because our model allows the 32 high-order bits of the expected origin timestamp to repeat in at most γ different queries. It might be tempting to dismiss this by assuming $\gamma = 0$, but basing security on this is not a good idea. For example, a system might always boot up thinking that it is January 1, 1970.

Symmetric mode has two additional quirks. First, each peer uses its own polling algorithm to decide when to respond to its peer. As such, Bob will not immediately respond to Alice upon receipt of her packet. (This is in contrast to the client/server mode, where servers immediately respond to queries; see Section VII.) Second, both peers perform TEST2 (and other tests) on the *same* volley of packets, and use the *same* packet timestamps to obtain timing samples.

In both RFC5905 and ntpd, a host processes (mode 1 and 2) symmetric mode packets it receives using the same code used to process (mode 4) server response packets. Another look at this code in Appendix A of RFC5905 (Figure 2) shows that the `org` state variable is updated even when a received packet *fails* TEST2. ntpd prior to v4.2.8p4 does this as well (Lines 16 and 27 in Figure 3). But should a bogus packet really be allowed to update the client's state? We now explain why there is no easy answer to this question.

1) *Packet drop leads to persistent failure.* In Figure 9 Alice’s second packet to Bob is dropped. After Alice’s packet is dropped, Bob’s org_b state variable still stores the (now stale) time T_1 . Bob uses T_1 as the origin timestamp of the packet he now sends to Alice. Alice drops this packet because its origin timestamp T_1 does not match her $\text{xmt}_a = T_5$ variable. Now this ‘bogus’ packet also does *not* update Alice’s org_a variable. Next, Alice sends a new packet to Bob at time T_9 , using the (now stale) value $\text{org}_a = T_3$ as the new packet’s origin timestamp. Now Bob drops the packet, because its origin timestamp T_3 does not match $\text{xmt}_b = T_7$. This continues indefinitely, so all future packets fail TEST2.

In Figure 10 Alice was a symmetric peer with Bob. Bob was a symmetric peer with Alice, and also a client to an external server. Alice had a clock synchronization event that caused her to set her polling interval to 64 seconds. Meanwhile, Bob’s polling interval was 128 seconds. Next, Alice sent Bob a packet with the correct origin timestamp T_0 expected by



What if bogus packets do update `org`? The reader might now conclude that bogus packets *should* update `org`, as is required by Appendix A of RFC5905. However, this leads to two denial-of-service attacks:

1) *On-path denial-of-service for authenticated symmetric mode.* Suppose that `org` can be updated by bogus packets that pass cryptographic validation (of the MAC) but fail `TEST2`. Consider an on-path attacker (who does not have the ability to drop/modify/delay packets) who attacks an *authenticated* symmetric association. (Note that symmetric active/passive associations are authenticated by default.) We show that this




Fig. 10. Alice (left) exchanges symmetric mode packets with Bob (right). Alice sends two consecutive packets to Bob due to unsynchronized polling intervals. The first packet passes TEST2, but all subsequent packets fail TEST2 on both peers, leading to persistent failure.




Fig. 11. Alice (left) exchanges symmetric mode packets with Bob (center). Attacker (right) is *on-path* for authenticated NTP and *off-path* for unauthenticated NTP. For the on-path authenticated DoS attack, the attacker's packet (timestamps T_7 , T_8 , T_9) is a replay of a stale packet sent from Alice to Bob. For the off-path unauthenticated DoS attack, the attacker's packet is spoofed.

on-path attacker can parlay his ability to replay packets into the ability to (effectively) drop packets.

To do this, the on-path attacker replays any stale packet from Alice to Bob (1) after Alice sends Bob a legitimate packet but (2) before Bob sends his response as per Figure 11. If these polling intervals are not synchronized, the attacker has plenty of time (*i.e.*, seconds or minutes) to perform this replay. The stale replayed packet overwrites Bob's org_b variable to T_9 . Thus, Bob responds to Alice with a packet whose origin timestamp is equal to the (stale) transmit timestamp T_9 from the stale replayed packet. This stale origin timestamp T_9 fails TEST2 at Alice. The attacker can repeat this replay each time Alice sends Bob a packet, thus preventing Alice from ever synchronizing to Bob.

Note also this attacker need not be 'on-path' forever. Indeed, once the attacker gets his hands on a single state packet sent from Alice to Bob, he can move off-path, and keep launching this attack forever by replaying this stale packet.

2) *Off-path denial-of-service for unauthenticated symmetric mode.* Suppose org can be updated by bogus packets that fail TEST2. We show how an off-path attacker can launch an identical attack on *unauthenticated* symmetric mode by spoofing (rather than replaying) a packet from Alice. This is a serious threat, since active/active symmetric associations are not cryptographically-authenticated by default.

We performed this attack on two ntpd v4.2.8p2 hosts Alice and Bob. (We use v4.2.8p2 because this implementation lets bogus packets update org .) Both Alice and Bob are preconfigured to be each other's symmetric active peer. Additionally, Bob is also preconfigured in client/server mode with four other servers. Upon restarting ntpd on both hosts, Bob gets synchronized to one of its servers in the very first exchange (per the reboot bug, see Appendix A). Alice sends symmetric active mode packets to Bob and gets back symmetric active response packets from Bob. After four exchanges with Bob, Alice synchronizes to Bob and indicates this by putting Bob's IP address in the *reference ID* of her fifth packet. After two more exchanges, the off-path attack begins.

In symmetric mode, the time between a packet and its response is often up to several seconds (62 seconds in this experiment), giving our off-path attacker plenty of time to inject packets. So the attacker sends Bob a symmetric mode packet spoofed to look like it came from Alice; this query is sent after Alice sends her legitimate query to Bob, and before Bob sends his reply (per Figure 11). Bob updates $org_b = T_9$ from attacker's bogus packet. Now Bob sends the response to Alice with origin timestamp T_9 corresponding to org_b . This packet fails TEST2 at Alice. The attacker continues to inject spoofed packets to Bob for the next 16 exchanges between Alice and Bob. Bob's responses fail TEST2 at Alice and so Alice never updates her clock.

Summary. Thus, we are between a rock and a hard place. Should bogus packets update org or not? Our recommendations are in Section VIII-D.

C. Problems with initialization.

Consider what happens if Alice reboots and sends Bob a packet initializing their association. Alice has no timing information, so this 'initialization packet' has $T_1 = T_2 = 0$ (as in the first packet in Figure 9). If Bob did not reboot, he has $xmt \neq 0$. Now, if Bob performed TEST2 on the initialization packet, it would be dropped (because $T_1 \neq xmt$). Also, it would be dropped if Bob performed TEST3 (because $T_1 = T_2 = 0$). Thus, if the protocol is to tolerate a reboot, initialization packet cannot be subject to TEST2 or TEST3.

Denial-of-service via initialization packets. We use the fact that TEST2 cannot be performed on initialization packets, to perform DoS attacks identical to those in Section VIII-B. We can perform on-path DoS attacks on authenticated symmetric associations by replaying initialization packets (instead of replaying stale packets). Off-path DoS attacks on unauthenticated symmetric mode can also be accomplished by spoofing initialization packets (rather than spoofing arbitrary packets); notice that spoofing initialization packets is trivial because they do not contain any unpredictable information. Importantly, both of these DoS attacks exist *regardless* whether bogus packets update org or not (Section VIII-B).

Impact on client/server mode. The initialization of symmetric mode requires that TEST2 and TEST3 are not performed on a received packet with a zero-origin timestamp. However, this is at odds with the security of client/server mode. Unfortunately, however, client/server and symmetric modes share the same code path. ntpd deals with symmetric mode initialization

using Lines 10-11 in Figure 3, which clears `xmt` and skips `TEST2` if a received packet has a zero-origin timestamp. These lines of code, however, create the zero-Origin timestamp vulnerability in client/server mode (Section IV-A). Meanwhile, RFC5905 Appendix A deals with this by not performing `TEST3` (Figure 2). However, because `TEST3` is not performed, the `xmt` variable cannot be cleared, creating the query-replay vulnerability (Section III-B).

D. Symmetric Mode: Choose your poison!

Many problems in symmetric mode occur because both peers update their state variables (`org`, `xmt`) and collect timing samples ($(\theta_i, \delta_i, \psi_i)$) from the *same* volley of packets. Per the discussion in Section VIII-B, we cannot see how to fix this while maintaining a single volley of packets between peers. One drastic suggestion is to require *two* distinct volleys, where each peer is a server in one volley, and is a client in the other (using one of the protocols from Section VII-B). However, this is not backwards compatible, as both peers involved in association must simultaneously make this change.

Thus, an (unsatisfying) band-aid solution could involve (1) preventing the persistent failure problem of Section VIII-B by allowing packets failing `TEST2` to update `org`. However, this enables off-path DoS attacks. To prevent these, we suggest (2) mandatory cryptographic authentication in symmetric mode (for both active/active and active/passive). Even so, symmetric peers that use cryptographic authentication are still vulnerable to DoS attacks, so we also suggest (3) monitoring to detect excessive number of bogus packets (Section VIII-B). (4) Monitoring should also be used to detect excessive number of initialization packets, since these also lead to DoS (Section VIII-C). Finally, (5) symmetric peers should ensure that they run `TEST2` against an origin timestamp that contains 32 bits of randomness. This can be done with a receive function as in Figure 4 and a sending function in Figure 5.²⁰

Patching the code in Figure 3. The code in Figure 3 handles client/server mode and symmetric mode in the same code path. As discussed in Section X, this is undesirable. However, if we insist on continuing to handle these modes in the same code path, then we suggest the following patch, which we believe represents the lesser of all evils.

- 1) Our zero-Origin timestamp attack is extremely strong, and thus is a priority for patching. To do this, Lines 10-11 of Figure 3 must be eliminated, and also `xmt` should be cleared to a random 64-bit value, as is done in Figure 4. `TEST1` and `TEST3` are not needed.
- 2) The ‘transient failure to persistent failure’ issue that affects symmetric mode is very problematic (Section VIII-B), because it completely prevents synchronization in symmetric mode. Thus, this issue should also be patched. To do this, the `return` on Line 16 of Figure 3 should be removed, so that packets failing `TEST2` can update the `org` state variables.
- 3) The removal of Lines 10-11 means that initialization packets for symmetric mode will fail `TEST2`. This

is unfortunate, but there is not much we can do about it. The one upside is that because we patched the ‘transient failure to persistent failure’ issue, this failure will be transient.

- 4) The transmit function should be modified to ensure 32 bits of randomness in the expected origin timestamp, by sleeping for a random (subsecond) period in $[0, 2^\rho]$ before sending a packet, and putting a $32 - \rho$ random nonce in lowest bits of the expected origin timestamp, as in Figure 5. Randomness should come from a cryptographic RNG.

Note, however, that even with this patch, the code is still vulnerable to the DoS attacks using bogus packets (Section VIII-B) or initialization packets (Section VIII-C). Thus, we suggest that `ntpd` require (1) symmetric passive *and* active mode to be authenticated by default and (2) monitoring to detect excessive of initialization packets and/or bogus packets.

IX. RELATED WORK

Secure protocols. Our provably-secure client/server protocols complement recent efforts to cryptographically secure NTP and its ‘cousin’ PTP (Precision Time Protocol) [31]. Our interest is in securing the core datagram protocol used by NTP, which was last described in David Mill’s book [28]. To the best of our knowledge, the security of the core NTP datagram protocol has never previously been analyzed. Meanwhile, our analysis assumes that parties correctly distribute cryptographic keys and use a secure MAC. A complementary stream of works propose protocols for distributing keys and performing the MAC, beginning with the Autokey protocol in RFC5906 [15], which was broken by Rottger [34], which was followed by NTS [38], ANTP [11], and other works including [16], [32].

Attacks. Our analysis of the NTP specification is motivated, in part, by discovery of over 30 `ntpd` CVEs over the last year (June 2015-July 2016) [41]. These implementation flaws allow remote code execution, denial of service attacks, and timeshifting attacks. Earlier, Selvi [35], [36] demonstrated man-in-the-middle timeshifting attacks on ‘simple NTP (SNTP)’ (rather than full-fledged NTP). Even earlier, work [9], [18], [28] considered the impact of timeshifting on the correctness of other protocols. The recent academic work [20] also attacks NTP, but our attacks are stronger. [20] presented attacks that are on-path (weaker than our off-path attacks), or off-path denial-of-service attacks (weaker than our time-shifting attacks), or off-path time-shifting attacks that needed special client/server configurations (our Zero-Origin Timestamp attack works in default mode). Also, our measurements find millions of vulnerable clients, while [20] finds thousands. Finally, while NTP’s broadcast mode is outside our scope, its security was recently considered by [21].

Measurement. Our measurement work is related to studies that measure the NTP ecosystem (in past decades) [29], [33], the use of NTP for DDoS amplification attacks [10], the performance of NIST’s stratum 1 timeservers [37], and network latency [13]. Our attack surface measurements are in the same spirit as those in [20], [21], but we use a new set of NTP control queries. We also provide updated measurements on the presence of cryptographically-authenticated NTP associations.

²⁰ Because both peers update their state variables and collect timing samples from the same volley of packets, symmetric mode must preserve the semantics of the origin timestamp. Thus, in symmetric mode we cannot replace the origin timestamp with a random 64-bit nonce per Figure 6.

X. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS

We have identified root causes for vulnerabilities in the NTP specifications, leading to several implementation flaws. We have further proposed both solutions and a security model for analyzing our solutions. The flaws we found in RFC5905 can be used to exploit NTP’s most widely used client/server mode (Section III) and NTP’s symmetric mode (Section VIII). We also showed how NTP’s control query specification can be exploited to completely hijack client/server communications (Section V). We demonstrate our attacks on the ntpd implementation (Section IV,V,VIII), and use an IPv4 scan to identify millions of vulnerable IPs (Section VI).

Many vulnerabilities follow because the same codepath is used to handle packets from all of NTP’s different modes. As such, we suggest different codepaths for different modes. This is feasible, since a packet’s mode is trivially determined by its *mode* field (Figure 1). The one exception is interleaved mode, so we suggest that interleaved mode be assigned a distinguishing value in the NTP packet.

We note that our off-path attacks on NTP’s client/server mode (Section IV) are amongst the strongest that have been identified to date. In particular, our zero-Origin timestamp attack (which follows from RFC5905, and is still present in ntpd v4.2.8p8) can be launched from off-path, affects ntpd clients operating in default mode, requires no special assumptions about the target client’s configuration, and can be used to maliciously shift the target’s time.

We have also presented a framework for evaluating the security of NTP’s client/server datagram protocol (Section VII-A), and proposed a new backwards-compatible client/server protocol (Section VII-B) which randomizes the expected origin timestamp to prevent (1) off-path spoofing attacks on unauthenticated NTP and (2) on-path replay attacks on cryptographically authenticated NTP. We also review the client/server protocol used by chronyd and openNTPD. We analyze both protocols in our framework (Section VII-C,VII-D), and identify an additional (somewhat unexpected) security requirement: NTP should strictly impose $k = 4$ or $k = 8$ as the minimum number of consistent timing samples required before a clock update. This observation is especially important since we also find a bug in ntpd that allows for $k = 1$ upon reboot (see Appendix A). We also give detailed recommendations for securing the client/server mode (Section VII-E) and symmetric mode (Section VIII-D). Finally, we suggest the firewalls and ntpd clients block *all* incoming NTP control queries from unwanted IPs, rather than just the notorious `monlist` query exploited in DDoS amplification attacks (Section V).

XI. DISCLOSURE AND SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS

This research was done against ntpd v4.2.8p6, which was the latest version of ntpd until April 25, 2016. Since that date, two new versions of ntpd have been released: ntpd v4.2.8p7 (April 26, 2016), and ntpd v4.2.8p8 (June 2, 2016). We summarize our disclosure timeline and the impact of our research results on new releases of ntpd as follows:

Zero-Origin timestamp vulnerability (CVE-2015-8138, Section IV-A). This vulnerability was disclosed in October 2015 (prior to ntpd v4.2.8p4) but unfortunately still exists

in v4.2.8p8. (This is because since Lines 10-11 of Figure 3 are still present in ntpd v4.2.8p8, likely in order to process initialization packets in symmetric mode, see Sections VIII-C.)

Interleaved pivot vulnerability (CVE-2016-1548, Section IV-B). Following disclosure of this vulnerability in November 2015, ntpd v4.2.8p7 was patched so that clients do not automatically switch into interleaved mode by default. Now, clients do this only if the option ‘`xleave`’ is set with a `peer`, `server` or `broadcast` configuration command.

Leaky control queries (CVE-2015-8139, Section V). This vulnerability was first disclosed in October 2015, but is still present in v4.2.8p8 and in a new Internet draft [26]. We plan to work with the authors of [26] to add a security implications section to this draft.

Bogus packets in symmetric mode (Section VIII-B). ntpd v4.2.8p7 and v4.2.8p8 allow bogus packets (that fail TEST2) to update the `org` state variables.²¹ Thus, the ‘transient failure to persistent failure’ from Section VIII-B is no longer present, but the two denial of service vulnerabilities in Section VIII-B are present. This issue was disclosed on June 7, 2016.

DoS via initialization packets in symmetric mode (Section VIII-C). This was first disclosed on June 7, 2016. These flaws are still present in v4.2.8p8.

Reboot bug (Appendix A). We first disclosed this issue in August 2015, and provided a full analysis on June 7, 2016. This bug is still present in v4.2.8p8.

Origin timestamp randomization (Section VII). Cryptographic randomization of the origin timestamp has not yet been incorporated into ntpd.

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²¹This change was probably done in response to NTP Bug2952 reported by Michael Tatarinov and made public on April 26, 2016 (concurrently with our work). The bug report states only that “symmetric active/passive mode is broken” [42].

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APPENDIX

A. Reboot bug

Our experiments show that, upon reboot, an ntpd v4.2.8p6 client updates its local clock from the very first response packet it receives from *any* of its preconfigured servers. We now argue that this is a security vulnerability.

What does the RFC say? When describing the algorithm used for clock updates, the pseudocode in Appendix A.5.2 of RFC5905 has a comment that states “select the best from the latest eight delay/offset samples”. Also, a client configured with multiple servers is supposed to choose the ‘best’ server from which it will take time. Section 5 says: “The selection algorithm uses Byzantine fault detection principles to discard the presumably incorrect candidates called “falsetickers” from the incident population, leaving only good candidates called “truechimers”.” We argue that this bug disables Byzantine fault tolerance upon reboot.

Experiment. We set up an ntpd v4.2.8p6 client preconfigured with five pool servers. Upon reboot, the client sends server Alice a mode 3 query with *reference id* ‘INITIALIZATION’ (indicating that it is unsynchronized) and *reference time* ‘NONE’ (expected behavior upon reboot). Another such query is made to Bob. Bob’s response arrives first, followed by the response from Alice. Next the client sends a query to server Carol. The *reference id* field in this new query is Bob’s IP, and the *reference time* is set to a time *before* the response was received from Alice. We therefore see that the client updates his clock upon receipt of his first response packet (from Bob), without considering the contributions of servers Alice, Carol, Dave and Frank.

Implications. Thus, on reboot, Byzantine fault tolerance is disabled, and the client is at risk of taking time from bad timekeepers. This issue becomes even more serious when the panic threshold is disabled upon reboot when a client is configured with `-g` option. (This is the default on many OSes, see footnotes 9-8.) Thus, if a bad timekeeper’s response arrives first, a `-g` client will immediately accept huge, potentially bogus, update to its clock.

```

2965 dtemp = (peer->delay + peer->rootdelay) / 2
2966         + LOGTOD(peer->precision)
2967         + LOGTOD(sys_precision)
2968         + clock_phi * (current_time - peer->update)
2969         + peer->rootdisp
2970         + peer->jitter;

```

Fig. 12. Lines 2965-2970 in ntpd v4.2.7p385

```

2933 dtemp = (peer->delay + peer->rootdelay) / 2 + peer->disp
2934         + peer->rootdisp + clock_phi * (current_time - pe
2935         + peer->jitter;

```

Fig. 13. Lines 2933-2935 in ntpd v4.2.7p384

Worse yet, an off-path attacker can exploit this, along with other bugs, in order to perform a low-rate time-shifting attack. The attacker first learns the IP of one of the target’s preconfigured servers, using the trick per footnote 5. Then, the off-path attacker sends some ‘packet-of-death’ that crashes ntpd. If the OS reboots ntpd, then the target restarts with the panic threshold disabled. The attacker now injects a single spoofed server response with (1) zero origin timestamp (per Section IV-A), (2) the legitimate server as the source IP, and (3) some huge (incorrect) time offset. The client accepts the response even before it queries its legitimate servers, and adjusts its clock to the attacker’s bogus time. The low rate of this attack—it requires only three packets—also means it could be sprayed across the Internet.

Recommendation. An NTP client should be compliant to the RFC specifications even upon reboot, and adjust its clock only after multiple successful exchanges with each of its timeservers.

Where is the bug introduced? The bug is introduced in ntpd v4.2.7p385 (released August 18, 2013) and exists in all the following versions, upto and including ntpd v4.2.8p7 (released April 26, 2016). The definition for *Root distance* (λ) in the variable *dtemp* in file *ntp_proto.c* was changed between ntpd v4.2.7p384 (Figure 13) and ntpd v4.2.7p385 (Figure 12). This change (Lines 2966-2967 in Figure 12) introduced the bug. However, this change violates compliance with the definition of *Root distance* in RFC5905 which defines it as in Figure 13.

Tested Versions. ntpd v4.2.7p384, ntpd v4.2.7p385, ntpd v4.2.8p6, ntpd v4.2.8p7, ntpd v4.2.8p8. This part of code remains the same in all the versions beginning ntpd v4.2.8p385.

Patch: Replacing code in Figure 12 with that in Figure 13 mitigates the bug. We successfully patched ntpd v4.2.8p7 (lines 3447-3453). To confirm, we ran the experiment with the patched version of ntpd v4.2.8p7 with the same setup as above. The test client updates its local clock after obtaining four timing samples from its servers.

B. On-path query replay attack

Replays of the client’s query are a problem because they harm the accuracy of time synchronization. We demonstrate this with an on-path query replay attack on a target host in our lab. We were able to degrade the accuracy of the target’s time synchronization from 4×10^{-5} seconds (on average) to 2.7 seconds (on average). We show the client’s offset (*i.e.*, the distance between the client’s clock and the server’s clock per



Fig. 14. Query replay attack on modified version of ntpd v4.2.8p2. Time synchronization on the attacked client degrades by 10^5 .

equation (2)) under normal and attack conditions in Figure 14; the attacked client’s accuracy is 5 orders of magnitude worse.

Experiment. We modified the source code for ntpd v4.2.8p2 to make it vulnerable to client query replays. Specifically, we deleted the line of code that cleared *xmt* when a response passed TEST2. We then preconfigured our modified ntpd client with one server. Every time the client sent a query to its server, our on-path attacker captured the query, and replayed it to the server once per second, until the client sent a new query. We repeated this for every query sent by the client. The resulting offset in Figure 14 was computed per equation (2) with T_1, T_2, T_3 taken from the NTP packet timestamps on server responses sent in response to real client queries (not replayed queries) and T_4 taken from the response packet’s arrival time at the client. We repeat this experiment on the same client and server machine but without a replay attack.

Why does accuracy degrade? This follows because the replayed queries cause the server to respond with a stale origin timestamp T_1 . Suppose that t seconds elapse since the client’s most recent query. If the attacker now replays the client’s query, the packet timestamps in the server’s response will be such that $T_2 - T_1 \approx t$ seconds and $T_4 \approx T_3$ seconds, resulting in a timing sample with offset $\theta \approx \frac{t}{2}$ seconds per equation (2). As t grows during the polling interval, the offset in the timing sample grows as well. Thus, when the client uses these sampled offsets to set its clock, it miscalculates the discrepancy between its local clock and that of the server, resulting in the inaccuracies in Figure 14. Thus, this query replay attack has similar effect to a delay attack [30].

C. Security analysis

In this appendix, we provide our formal security model and prove that the protocols in Section VII-B are secure against off-path attackers when NTP is unauthenticated and against on-path attackers when NTP is authenticated.

D. Model

Our model focuses on the description of an honest party called the *network* \mathcal{N} that delivers packets and orchestrates the execution of several NTP exchanges akin to the environment in a UC protocol [7].

Parties. We suppose there are ℓ honest parties $\mathcal{P}_1, \dots, \mathcal{P}_\ell$, where \mathcal{P}_i denotes the IP address of the i^{th} party, who collectively perform many pairwise client/server exchanges. A single party \mathcal{P}_i may act in both the client and server roles in different exchanges. There is also single attacker $\mathcal{A} = \mathcal{P}_0$ who may also

have honest client/server exchanges, but has other goals and powers as well. Parties send packets through a *network* \mathcal{N} .

Packets. We model a packet as a tuple of the form (h, m, t) , where $h = (\text{IP_src}, \text{IP_dst})$ contains the source and destination IPs, t is a MAC tag optionally appended to the packet, and m contains the remaining fields of the packet that are authenticated by the MAC tag.

Packet delivery. The *network* \mathcal{N} maintains a counter **step** to orchestrate the flow of communication. Informally, one may think of **step** as the wall-clock time from \mathcal{N} 's point of view. During each step of the **step** counter, each honest party may receive, process, or transmit one packet.

We require that honest parties have sufficient time to process every packet received; put another way, attacks that flood an honest party with packets in order to deny service are out of scope. Formally, we model this property by (1) restricting \mathcal{N} to deliver at most one packet per **step** of the counter to each party, and (2) incrementing the counter in integer multiples of L/R , where R denotes an upper bound on the bandwidth (bps) of honest parties when ingesting NTP packets of length L bits. Here, $L = 720$ bits for unauthenticated NTP packets and $L = 720 + 2n$ bits for NTP packets authenticated with a MAC of length $2n$.

The network imposes a constant latency ϱ on packet delivery. Specifically, if \mathcal{N} receives a packet from an honest party when the counter is **step**, \mathcal{N} holds the packet in a queue and assigns a value **deliver** = **step** + ϱ to the packet. When **step** == **deliver**, the packet is transmitted. We stress that the attacker \mathcal{A} does *not* have the power to modify, delay, or drop packets between honest parties.

Race conditions. Unlike the honest parties, attacker \mathcal{A} may specify the **deliver** value for all packets she sends. However, as per constraint (1) above, this value must be distinct from the **deliver** values of all other packets in \mathcal{N} 's queue destined for IP_dst .

This power allows \mathcal{A} to win all race conditions.²² As such, our model allows attacker \mathcal{A} to send an honest party up to $2\varrho \frac{R}{L}$ packets in the duration of an NTP exchange, since \mathcal{A} can request the delivery of one packet for each **step** of the counter, while the two messages in an NTP exchange are each subject to a longer delay ϱ .

Additionally, this power also encapsulates the real-world uncertainty in packet delivery. So far, our model assumes that all packets encounter a constant delay. In reality, we often have at most a rough upper-bound on network latency, and we want for NTP's security guarantee to hold for any distribution of packet latency times that fit within this bound. Rather than formalizing a network latency distribution within our model, we opt for the simpler approach of letting attacker \mathcal{A} "speed up" packet arrivals using its power to determine **deliver** for its packets.

Transcripts. A *transcript* is a list of NTP client/server exchanges, formally written as a set of tuples

$$(\text{start}, i, t_c, j, t_s)$$

each indicating that an exchange between client \mathcal{P}_i with local time t_c and server \mathcal{P}_j with local time t_s starts at step **start** of the step counter. We stress that $\mathcal{A} = \mathcal{P}_0$ may legitimately engage in NTP exchanges in the transcript specification.

Network \mathcal{N} enforces execution of the transcript by informing parties that they should begin a client/server exchange. When \mathcal{N} 's counter is **step** == **start** for tuple $(\text{start}, i, t_c, j, t_s)$ in the transcript **ts**, \mathcal{N} sends a 'go message' (client, i, t_c) to \mathcal{P}_i , after which an honest party \mathcal{P}_i immediately sets her local clock to t_c , runs the protocol in Figure 5 or Figure 6 resulting in a mode 3 query packet $((\mathcal{P}_i, \mathcal{P}_j), m, t)$ to \mathcal{P}_j through \mathcal{N} . After a delay of ϱ , \mathcal{N} sends a 'go message' (server, i, t_s) to the \mathcal{P}_j and also delivers the \mathcal{P}_i 's query packet, and honest \mathcal{P}_j responds assuming that her local clock is set to time t_s .

The transcript must be consistent with our "no flooding" rule that limits each party to receiving 1 packet (plus perhaps a 'go message') per **step**. As a consequence, two exchanges involving the same client cannot have the same **start** counter. Additionally, a party cannot simultaneously be a server at counter **start** and a client at counter **start** + ϱ .

Interacting with the network. The network \mathcal{N} starts by receiving **ts** and then choosing and dispersing secret keys for each pair of parties $\{\text{sk}_{i,j} : i, j \in \{0, 1, \dots, \ell\}\}$. The honest parties \mathcal{P}_i receive these keys and initialize their xmt_j state variables for every other party $j \neq i$. The game then begins with \mathcal{N} in control and the counter **step** initialized to 0.

If \mathcal{N} 's counter **step** equals either (1) the **start** value of a tuple in the transcript **ts** or (2) the **deliver** value of a packet in its queue, then \mathcal{N} delivers the appropriate packet or 'go message' and cedes control to the honest party. The honest party starts computing when it receives the packet or 'go message'.

Once an honest party finishes its computation and possibly transmits a new packet $((\text{IP_src}, \text{IP_dst}), m, t)$ to \mathcal{N} , the honest party cedes control back to \mathcal{N} . Next, the network \mathcal{N} instantly reveals $[(\text{IP_src}, \text{IP_dst}), \mathcal{L}(m, t)]$ to the attacker, where \mathcal{L} is a *leakage function*. \mathcal{N} then cedes control to \mathcal{A} , who may perform arbitrary computations and optionally transmit a packet of its own. When \mathcal{N} regains control, it increments **step** and repeats the process. This model implicitly forbids \mathcal{A} from dropping, modifying, or further delaying packets; instead, every packet is delivered intact to IP_dst after delay ϱ .

Leakage. The *leakage function* \mathcal{L} models the information available to an on-path or off-path attacker. Specifically, \mathcal{L} equals the identity function for an on-path attacker (i.e., m and t are revealed perfectly) and the zero function for an off-path attacker (i.e., m and t are perfectly hidden).

Spoofing. Network \mathcal{N} never validates IP_src in a transmitted packet. This allows attacker \mathcal{A} to send packets with a spoofed source IP IP_src . Meanwhile, honest parties always use their true IP_src . Additionally, if \mathcal{A} spoofs a query packet on behalf of a client \mathcal{P}_i , we observe that \mathcal{N} lacks a timestamp t_s^* to deliver to the honest server \mathcal{P}_j along with the query packet. We choose t_s^* as follows: if \mathcal{A} 's spoofed packet occurs during an honest NTP transaction between parties i and j , then \mathcal{N} sends the same timestamp that the honest transaction uses;

²²We remark that this capability is unrealistically powerful for an off-path attacker, who cannot observe honest packet transmissions.

otherwise, \mathcal{A} may choose t_s^* arbitrarily and inform \mathcal{N} of its choice.

1) *Soundness guarantee.*: Without an attacker, the results of honest parties' NTP exchanges are completely defined by the transcript. Formally, clients update their local *state* which includes the set of servers they are willing to query, the state variables (i.e., xmt_j and org_j) used in exchanges with each server \mathcal{P}_j , and the resulting set of validated timing samples (including delay δ , offset θ , jitter ψ , dispersion ϵ per the equations in Section II). $k\text{-state}_i(\text{ts}, \text{step})$ is the state of party \mathcal{P}_i during an execution of the transcript ts while \mathcal{N} 's counter is step , and contains the results of the k most recent exchanges with each server.

\mathcal{A} 's objective is to tamper with k consecutive timing samples that some honest client \mathcal{P}_i stores in its state corresponding to interactions with a single server \mathcal{P}_j .²³ Hence, we let $k\text{-state}_i^{\mathcal{A}}(\text{ts}, \text{step})$ denote the state of party \mathcal{P}_i during a game where the attacker \mathcal{A} is present. Of course, if \mathcal{P}_i voluntarily chooses to query \mathcal{A} as its server, then \mathcal{A} can significantly influence \mathcal{P}_i 's state. The soundness guarantee effectively states that \mathcal{A} can do no more than this.

However, there is one type of modification that we cannot hope to rule out. Consider the effect of \mathcal{A} "preplaying" honest packets: that is, submitting a packet that is identical to one in \mathcal{N} 's queue but with an earlier arrival time. This action is very likely to affect the state of honest parties, albeit in a bounded manner. It may reduce delay measurements δ from their upper bound of 2ρ , but never increase them. Similarly, each offset θ may increase or decrease by at most ρ . Finally, jitter ψ may be altered slightly, likely by far less than the bound accepted by TEST11. Due to their limited, unavoidable effects, we consciously opt to ignore preplay attacks in the following soundness definition to simplify our discussion.

Definition A.1 (Soundness). NTP is (k, ϵ) -sound on transcript ts if for all *resource-bounded* attackers \mathcal{A} who never preplay packets from honest parties, and for all parties \mathcal{P}_i who do not query \mathcal{A} as an NTP server,

$$\Pr[\exists \text{ step s.t. } k\text{-state}_i^{\mathcal{A}}(\text{ts}, \text{step}) \neq k\text{-state}_i(\text{ts}, \text{step})] < \epsilon.$$

This inequality must hold for *all* k components of the state. The probability is taken over the randomness of all parties and \mathcal{N} 's choice of shared secret keys.

E. Soundness against off-path attackers.

We now prove Theorem VII.1 of Section VII-C, which states that the protocols in Section VII-B are sound against an off-path attacker $\text{off}\mathcal{A}$. Theorem VII.1 follows largely from the entropy E present in the origin timestamp. We do not require NTP packets to be authenticated.

The theorem holds as long as randomness is produced from a cryptographically-strong random number generator (RNG), and that, upon reboot, honest parties initialize their xmt_j

variables for each server to a 64-bit number generated by their RNG.

Let $\text{off}\mathcal{A}$ be any off-path attacker, and let ts be any transcript that involves ℓ honest parties, a maximum of τ exchanges involving any single client-server pair, and a maximum of s trusted servers per client.

Let i^* be any client who does not query $\text{off}\mathcal{A}$ as server. We say that the protocol described in Figure 4, 5 randomizes the sub-second granularity of the expected origin timestamp, while the protocol in Figure 4, 6 randomizes the entire expected origin timestamp.

We use a sequence of games to prove that $\text{off}\mathcal{A}$ tampers the state of \mathcal{P}_{i^*} with probability at most $\epsilon_{\text{off}\mathcal{A}}$.

Game G_0 . This is the real interaction of $\text{off}\mathcal{A}$ with the honest parties $\mathcal{P}_1, \dots, \mathcal{P}_\ell$ and the network \mathcal{N} . For ease of notation, we denote the probability that $\text{off}\mathcal{A}$ breaks the soundness of game G_0 by $\Pr_{\text{off}\mathcal{A}}^0$.

Game G_1 . This game is identical to G_0 , except that \mathcal{P}_{i^*} 's pseudorandom number generator is replaced with a truly random number generator. By definition, the probability that anybody (in particular $\text{off}\mathcal{A}$) notices this change is at most $\text{Adv}(\text{RNG})$. Hence, $\Pr_{\text{off}\mathcal{A}}^0 - \Pr_{\text{off}\mathcal{A}}^1 \leq \text{Adv}(\text{RNG})$.

Game G_2 . This game is identical to G_1 , except that we abort the execution if $\text{off}\mathcal{A}$ sends a spoofed packet (i.e., one for which $\text{off}\mathcal{A}$ claims an IP_src different than her own) involving client \mathcal{P}_{i^*} and some server \mathcal{P}_j such that the spoofed packet's origin timestamp matches \mathcal{P}_{i^*} 's state variable xmt_j . Importantly, $\text{off}\mathcal{A}$ has no chance of winning game G_2 (that is, $\Pr_{\text{off}\mathcal{A}}^2 = 0$) because its spoofed packets always fail TEST2. In order to demonstrate that any client \mathcal{P}_{i^*} distrusting $\text{off}\mathcal{A}$ properly refuses all of the attacker's spoofed packets while also accepting all of the honest servers' packets (i.e., computes the desired value $k\text{-state}_i(\text{ts}, \text{step})$ at all steps), it only remains to prove that the probabilities of winning G_1 and G_2 are close.

There are two conditions that cause Game G_2 's abort condition to trigger:

- Client \mathcal{P}_{i^*} is engaged in an NTP exchange with server \mathcal{P}_j at the moment the spoofed packet is received, and the spoofed packet's origin timestamp matches that of the transmit timestamp in honest client's query.
- Client \mathcal{P}_{i^*} is *not* engaged in an NTP exchange with server \mathcal{P}_j at the moment the spoofed packet is received, and the spoofed packet's origin timestamp matches the client's randomly-chosen xmt_j value.²⁴

In the first case, we know that the client's choice of the origin timestamp expected in the mode 4 response packet (i.e., pkt.T3 in Figure 5) ensures that xmt_j has $E = 32$ bits of entropy if the sub-second granularity of the timestamp comes from \mathcal{P}_i 's RNG or $E = 64$ bits of entropy if the entire origin timestamp is randomly chosen (i.e., pkt.T3 in Figure 6). When targeting a particular server \mathcal{P}_j , $\text{off}\mathcal{A}$ can send $\frac{R\rho}{360}$ packets to each honest party during an NTP exchange

²³Note that the definition 'NTP exchanges should not fail' does not hold because exchanges may fail even without an attacker. As one example, consider a client who initiates two exchanges with the same server in rapid succession, i.e., the client's second query is sent before she receives a response to the first query. Then TEST2 will fail for the server's first response.

²⁴Recall that \mathcal{A} may choose the server's response time t_s^* arbitrarily in this case, which would have immense power if \mathcal{A} could get the spoofed client to accept the response packet.

between the target client \mathcal{P}_{i^*} and the server \mathcal{P}_j , each of which influences \mathcal{P}_{i^*} 's state with probability at most 2^{-E} where E is the number of bits of entropy in the origin timestamp. Hence, $\text{off}\mathcal{A}$'s ability to impact \mathcal{P}_{i^*} 's state during the NTP exchange is at most $Q_d = 2^{-E} \frac{R\varrho}{360}$.

In the second case, $\text{off}\mathcal{A}$ can send $T = 2^p R/720$ packets to each party in the interval between two successive exchanges (where p corresponds to the polling interval). Each packet succeeds in altering \mathcal{P}_{i^*} 's state with probability $Q_b = 2^{-64}$ because xmt_j has 64 bits of entropy.

Finally, Lemma A.1 below states that $\text{off}\mathcal{A}$ can influence the state of k consecutive exchanges between client \mathcal{P}_{i^*} and server \mathcal{P}_j with probability at most $(k+1) \cdot (kQ)^k$, where $Q = \max\{Q_d, TQ_b\}$. Additionally, there are τ possible locations for this run of k successes to start, and s possible servers whose state may be attacked. In total, we find that:

$$\Pr_{\text{off}\mathcal{A}}^1 - \Pr_{\text{off}\mathcal{A}}^2 \leq (k+1)s\tau \cdot (kQ)^k$$

In practice, we claim that $Q_d > TQ_b$ if entropy $E = 32$:

$$2^{-32} \cdot \frac{R\varrho}{360} > 2^{-64} \cdot 2^p \frac{R}{720}$$

$$2^{33}\varrho > 2^p$$

With the maximum poll value $p = 17$ permitted by NTP [27], this reduces to the claim that $\varrho > 2^{-16} \approx 10^{-5}$ seconds, which is the time required for light to travel about 3 miles. So, our inequality is reasonable unless the client and server are physically co-located but still using a large polling value. Conversely, we claim $TQ_b > Q_d$ if entropy $E = 64$: this claim reduces to the statement that $2^p > 2\varrho$, which holds since RFC5905 constrains poll $p \geq 4$ while network delays δ do not exceed 16 seconds in practice.

All that remains is to prove the following combinatorial statement relating the probabilities of success during and between exchanges.

Lemma A.1. *Let Q_d denote the probability that an attacker \mathcal{A} successfully impacts the state of client \mathcal{P}_{i^*} during an NTP exchange, Q_b denote the probability that each packet by \mathcal{A} in between NTP exchanges impacts \mathcal{P}_{i^*} 's state, and let $T = 2^p \cdot \frac{R}{720}$ denote the number of packets that \mathcal{A} may send to each party in between NTP exchanges. Then, the probability that \mathcal{A} impacts k state observations in a row, beginning with a specified exchange, is at most $(k+1) \cdot (kQ)^k$, where $Q = \max\{Q_d, TQ_b\}$.*

Proof: \mathcal{A} may compromise a total of k states either during or between exchanges. Let $c \in \{0, 1, \dots, k\}$ denote the number of consecutive NTP exchanges (with a specified starting point) that \mathcal{A} plans to compromise; clearly, she may do so with probability Q_d^c . Additionally, \mathcal{A} must also inject a total of $k - c$ state measurements over the course of $c + 1$ intervals between these NTP exchanges. Here, each packet is an independent Bernoulli random variable that successfully impact's the client's state with success probability Q_b . The total number of between-exchange successes (i.e., the sum of the $(c+1)T$ Bernoullis) is distributed as a binomial random variable, hence the probability of $k - c$ total successes is at most $\binom{(c+1)T}{k-c} \cdot Q_b^{k-c}$.

In total, \mathcal{A} succeeds at compromising c NTP exchanges and successfully injecting state $k - c$ times in between these exchanges with probability at most

$$\binom{(c+1)T}{k-c} Q_d^c Q_b^{k-c} \leq (kQ)^k,$$

where the inequality follows from the bound $\binom{x}{y} \leq x^y$. The lemma then follows by summing the probabilities of success for the $k+1$ choices of c . ■

F. Soundness against on-path attackers.

We now prove Theorem VII.2 of Section VII-D, which states the protocols in Section VII-B are sound against an on-path attacker $\text{on}\mathcal{A}$ as long as NTP packets are authenticated, randomness is produced from a cryptographically-strong RNG, and honest parties initialize their xmt_j variables for each server to a 64-bit number generated by their RNG upon reboot. For the protocol described in Figure 4, 5, which randomizes the 32-bit sub-second granularity of the expected origin timestamp, we also require that the second-level granularity of the client's local time t_c isn't replicated too often within NTP queries.

We suppose NTP is authenticated with MAC of length $2n$. Let $\text{on}\mathcal{A}$ be any on-path attacker, and let ts be any transcript involving a maximum of s trusted servers per client and a maximum of τ exchanges involving any single client-server pair that replicate any t_c value (up to the second) at most γ times. Let i^* be a client who does not query $\text{on}\mathcal{A}$ as server.

As before, we use a sequence of games to prove that $\text{on}\mathcal{A}$ tampers the state of \mathcal{P}_{i^*} with probability at most $\epsilon_{\text{on}\mathcal{A}}$. We start by reusing games G_0 and G_1 from the proof of Theorem VII.1 above. It is straightforward to validate that the reduction between those games continues to hold against an on-path attacker. We now build a new sequence of games that (1) reflects $\text{on}\mathcal{A}$'s ability to view the contents of honest parties' messages and (2) utilizes the MAC tag to limit $\text{on}\mathcal{A}$'s spoofing capacity.

Foreshadowing the end of the proof, we will use Lemma A.1 to arrive at the final bound. As such, our analysis simply describes the impact of each game on the probability of success during an NTP exchange (Q_d) and between NTP exchanges (Q_b).

Game G'_2 . This game is identical to G_1 , except that the network \mathcal{N} is additionally instructed to drop all the packets sent by $\text{on}\mathcal{A}$ that are simply 'preplays' of packets sent between honest parties; i.e., spoofed packets sent by $\text{on}\mathcal{A}$ that are identical to existing packets in \mathcal{N} 's queue such that $\text{on}\mathcal{A}$'s packet will be delivered first.

Recall that our definition of soundness is agnostic to preplay attacks. Hence, forbidding them has no effect on the adversary's success probability, i.e., $\Pr_{\text{on}\mathcal{A}}^1 = \Pr_{\text{on}\mathcal{A}}^{2'}$.

Game G'_3 . This game is identical to G'_2 , except that we abort the execution if the client \mathcal{P}_{i^*} sends two different queries to the same server with identical origin timestamps. We stress that this constraint is independent of $\text{on}\mathcal{A}$'s behavior.

Consider a single NTP exchange between client \mathcal{P}_{i^*} and server \mathcal{P}_j where the client's clock begins at t_c . \mathcal{P}_{i^*} 's origin timestamp replicates a previous choice with probability at most $q_{32} = 2^{-32}\gamma$ if only the sub-second granularity is randomized or $q_{64} = 2^{-64}\tau$ if the entire expected origin timestamp is randomized. If the honest client repeats an origin timestamp, then $\text{on}\mathcal{A}$ may trivially attack an NTP exchange by replaying (an already-MAC'd) responses from previous exchanges.

Hence, the transformation from game G'_2 to game G'_3 affects Q_d by at most q_E . We remark that $\text{on}\mathcal{A}$ only requires 1 packet to perform this attack, so the resulting probability is independent of the bandwidth R .

Game G'_4 . This game is identical to G'_3 , except that the network \mathcal{N} is instructed to drop all of $\text{on}\mathcal{A}$'s 'replayed' packets, *i.e.*, packets sent by $\text{on}\mathcal{A}$ that are identical to prior packets sent between honest parties and (1) have already been delivered or (2) are in \mathcal{N} 's queue for delivery before $\text{on}\mathcal{A}$'s packet. These replayed packets will have valid MAC tags but stale origin timestamps.

Consider what happens when a response packet from server \mathcal{P}_j is replayed to target \mathcal{P}_{i^*} , or when a query packet from target \mathcal{P}_{i^*} is replayed to server \mathcal{P}_j and elicits \mathcal{P}_j 's legitimate response packet. If \mathcal{P}_{i^*} and \mathcal{P}_j are currently engaged in an NTP exchange, then \mathcal{P}_{i^*} 's state variable xmt_j is set to an origin timestamp that is distinct from the one in the replay packet, so the replayed packet definitely fails TEST2 by the constraint imposed by Game G'_3 . On the other hand, if \mathcal{P}_{i^*} and \mathcal{P}_j are between exchanges, then xmt_j is set to a randomized value with 64 bits of entropy. Hence, the transformation from game G'_3 to game G'_4 affects Q_b by at most 2^{-64} .

Game G'_5 . This game is identical to G'_4 , except that the network \mathcal{N} consciously corrupts all MAC tags in $\text{off}\mathcal{A}$'s spoofed packets that aren't replays or preplays, so they never verify. We note that $\text{on}\mathcal{A}$ has no chance of winning game G'_5 (that is, $\text{Pr}_{\text{on}\mathcal{A}}^{5'} = 0$, and thus $Q_d = Q_b = 0$ for game G'_5) because all of the packets she sends are rejected by their recipients for having invalid tags. Hence, $\text{on}\mathcal{A}$ cannot get any honest party to read its spoofed packets, much less change their state as a result of them. Additionally, we claim that the Game $G'_4 \rightarrow G'_5$ transformation affects Q_d by $\frac{R\varrho}{360+n} \cdot \text{Adv}(\text{EU-CMA})$ and Q_b by $2^{-64} \cdot \text{Adv}(\text{EU-CMA})$.

To prove the claim, we replace the tags of all $\text{on}\mathcal{A}$'s packets toward server \mathcal{P}_j or client \mathcal{P}_{i^*} that aren't replays or preplays with an invalid tag \perp . We do this one packet at a time, starting with the final packet and working our way back up to the first one. By a simple hybrid argument, we see that each change has an impact with probability at most $\text{Adv}(\text{EU-CMA})$.

During an exchange, a single forged MAC permits the attacker to respond to a query with timing data of her own choosing, and a simple union bound gives the bound on Q_d stated above. In between exchanges, a forged message must also include the origin timestamp matching \mathcal{P}_{i^*} 's randomly-chosen xmt_j or else the packet will fail TEST2, yielding the bound on Q_b .

Putting it all together. Game G_1 additively impacts $\epsilon_{\text{on}\mathcal{A}}$, and Game G'_2 has no effect. Games G'_3 , G'_4 , and G'_5 all depend

on k , and they detail the combined vulnerability of NTP to an on-path attacker during and between exchanges:

$$Q_d \leq q_E + \frac{R\varrho}{360+n} \cdot \text{Adv}(\text{EU-CMA})$$

$$Q_b \leq 2^{-64} \cdot [1 + \text{Adv}(\text{EU-CMA})] \approx 2^{-64},$$

where the final approximation follows from the fact that $1 + \text{Adv}(\text{EU-CMA}) \approx 1$ for any reasonable MAC. Lemma A.1 then bounds the probability that $\text{on}\mathcal{A}$ affects a particular client-server state k times in a row beginning from a specified starting point, and (as before) multiplying this value by the $s\tau$ possible starting points yields the bound in Theorem VII.2.