

Notes of the Meeting of the Secretary-General with H.E. Mr. Mevlüt Cavusoğlu,  
Crans-Montana, Switzerland/ 6 July 2017, 1 p.m.

**Present:**

The Secretary-General	Mr. Cavusoğlu
Mr. Eide	Mr. Özügergin
Ms. Spehar	Mr. Gün
Ms. Hett	Mr. Başçeri
Ms. Richardson	
Ms. Warne-Smith	
Mr. Schuster, Note Taker	

**Key points raised:**

- The Secretary-General and Mr. Cavusoğlu exchanged views on the issues being negotiated in the chapter of security and guarantees. Mr. Cavusoğlu presented confidential information about a possible way forward on these issues.

**Follow-up action:**

None.

**Summary of the Discussion:**

1. The Secretary-General inquired what Turkey's red lines were, taking into account the previous days in the talks.
2. Mr. Cavusoğlu stated that for Turkey the concept of zero troops and zero guarantees was a non-starter. Since they had hoped to reach a settlement, Turkey had shown some flexibility. He could now see some improvements in the talks that he had not seen before, in particular on the part of the Greeks and the Greek Cypriots. He could have shown even more flexibility but could not do so for two reasons. The Greek Cypriots were leaking information to the media, including the Turkish proposal submitted earlier in the week. In addition, there had been no development at the intercommunal talks on table 2.
3. As a further constructive contribution, Turkey would provide a non-paper. This contained very sensitive elements, some of which met the terminology of Mr. Eide. And there could possibly be further steps, which were not outlined in the document. Mr. Eide noted that the sensitivity was well-understood.
4. Mr. Cavusoğlu stated that the Treaty of Guarantee was a taboo subject among the Turks and the Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish Cypriots had vital security concerns. It was therefore extremely difficult to make any change in Turkey's position on the matter. Despite this, they had showed flexibility. Turkey had demonstrated a positive attitude towards the solution of the Cyprus problem for a long time. With respect to the non-paper, he trusted that the UN would remain confidentiality. Any leakage would destroy everything.
5. What Turkey could accept was the renaming of the Treaty of Guarantee into the Treaty of Implementation, with four signatories. During the initial period, this would include a right to unilateral action if concerted actions by all parties were not possible. If the political imp

economic aspects of the settlement proved successful, there could be a review on a mutually accepted date. The Turkish Cypriots had indicated that for them this could happen only after the three full electoral cycles of the presidency and parliament. However, if the settlement was implemented successfully, a review could be conducted even earlier.

6. With respect to troop reductions, there would be a significant withdrawal of troops upon the entry into force of the settlement. There could also be further reductions, to be reviewed on an annual basis in line with progress made on the implementation of the settlement. An efficient implementation might accelerate further withdrawals.
7. The Treaty of Alliance could be constructed as a new treaty but should contain a clause that provided for the permanent presence of Turkish troops. Zero troops was a red line for Turkey. The treaty could also be renamed a pact of friendship, along with the proposal made by Mr. Kotzias.
8. He noted that the offers in the non-paper were only valid if agreement was reached on all elements, in particular to the satisfaction of the Turkish Cypriots in the following areas: political equality (including rotational presidency and effective participation); equivalent treatment of Greek and Turkish nationals on the island (labor, persons, capital); outstanding issues in the property chapter, to ensure clear majority of Turkish Cypriot property ownership in the Turkish Cypriot constituent state. Any agreement between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots would suffice for Turkey. There were also other issues, including final agreement on federal competences and ensuring legal certainty under EU law. This should be achieved by making the necessary changes in primary law. He knew that this was not easy but the EU and Turkish Cypriots experts were now meeting on the issue. There should be no possibility for the settlement to be challenged in EU courts.
9. With respect to the unilateral right of intervention, they needed to first see that agreement had been reached between the two sides on all issues, including territory. Monitoring the implementation of the settlement was also crucial. There should be mechanisms to give the necessary assurances to the Turkish Cypriots. In addition, a certain number of Turkish troops would have to remain. In such circumstances, they might consider showing even more flexibility as regards the right to intervention. However, they first had to see that the Cypriots agreed on all chapters. This was not a matter for only the two sides. As guarantor powers, they had certain responsibilities.
10. The Secretary-General inquired whether this meant that Turkey could accept the immediate replacement of the Treaty of Guarantee with the Treaty of Implementation and abolish the unilateral right of intervention.
11. Mr. Cavusoglu stated that this was not the case. However, if all issues had been solved as he had described he would be able to speak to Ankara to obtain further flexibility. He had meant what he said in this regard. For now, this should remain confidential.

Matthias Schuster  
OSASG  
12 July 2017