

Note of the Meeting of the Secretary-General with H.E. Mr. Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu  
Crans-Montana, Switzerland, 6 July 2017, 4.30 p.m.

**Present:**

Mr. Fide	Mr. Çavuşoğlu
Ms. Spchar	Mr. Özügergin
Ms. Hett	Mr. Gün
Ms. Richardson	Mr. Başçeri
Ms. Warne-Smith	
Mr. Schuster, Note Taker	

**Key points raised:**

- The Secretary-General and Mr. Çavuşoğlu exchanged views on the issues being negotiated in the chapter of security and guarantees. In particular, the discussed the issue of guarantees as well as presence of troops. Mr. Çavuşoğlu reiterated the need to see progress in table 2. He also repeated that the Turkish Prime Minister had been ready to attend the conference to make the necessary decisions.

**Follow-up action:**

None.

**Summary of the Discussion:**

1. The Secretary-General stated that he contemplated possible solutions to the situation. He wanted to discuss with Mr. Çavuşoğlu how to persuade the Greek Cypriots that a very positive development in the security and guarantees chapter could only be obtained through substantial concessions in the other four chapters. If he was successful, he would be in a position to table a non-proposal. If that failed, they would be in a difficult position. At the same, it also did not make sense to continue with the conference any longer. However, if they reached some sort of an agreement, he would invite the prime ministers to New York. If they remained too far apart, this would not be possible.
2. Mr. Çavuşoğlu stated that his impression was that it was impossible for the Greek Cypriots and Mr. Anastasiades to strike a deal unless they obtained everything, in particular with respect to their demands for zero troops and zero guarantees. That morning, he had shared with the Secretary-General his proposals, hinting where they could be more flexible. However, if there was a now an insistence on no troops whatsoever then this would be impossible for the Turks and Turkish Cypriots to accept.
3. As regards the right to intervention, after successful implementation and with the appropriate mechanism in place, Turkey could be more flexible. It was true that this was chicken and egg situation but they had to move at this point. There were many question marks as to whether the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots would be able to agree on all the sensitive issues. According to Mr. Kotzias, the prime ministers had to decide on troop levels. He said that he would be able to take a decision on behalf of his President and Prime Minister: this would only take a phone call. The question was now whether they could get to that stage.

4. The Secretary-General inquired whether a long term review of the troop presence would be acceptable to Turkey. Mr. Cavusoğlu stated that he was not in a position to answer that question. However, he could tell him that the Turkish Cypriots would never accept that because they would not feel safe.
5. The Secretary-General inquired whether the troops could be possibly be replaced with something else, for instance with a police presence. Mr. Cavusoğlu stated that such an approach could possibly work in the framework of the guarantees, but not with regard to troops. A police presence could not replace the presence of troops.
6. The Secretary-General inquired whether Turkey would consider a reduction of troops to the level considered in the Treaty of Alliance. Mr. Cavusoğlu stated that the Treaty of Alliance had provided for 650 Turkish troops. They had accepted this figure in 2004. However, the times had changed. Given the trends in and outside Cyprus (Syria, energy, terrorism), the number of troops had to be more than that in particular if there was a Turkish base. ||
7. The Secretary-General stated that he would attempt to see what the Greek Cypriots were willing to concede in order to address the Turkish and Turkish Cypriot concerns. Depending on how the discussion evolved he would present some ideas. As for a meeting of the prime ministers, that decision was with the parties not with him. The UN was just the facilitator of the talks.
8. Mr. Cavusoğlu stated that since there had been no new proposals, the Secretary-General should tell the participants whether it was useful to involve the prime ministers. The Secretary-General stated that he could give his assessment on where he would see progress on the details and make relevant suggestions. Otherwise, there was no need to continue in this format.
9. Mr. Cavusoğlu stated that neither his President nor the Prime Minister were prepared to let the Conference continue further. The Turkish Prime Minister had been ready to attend the conference; however, Mr. Kotzias had convinced the Greek Prime Minister not to come, which was the reason that the British Prime Minister also did not want to attend. The following day, he was expected to be at the G20 summit in Hamburg. His President would speak with the British Prime Minister there. But that day, they had to take a decision.
10. Mr. Cavusoğlu stated that in the previous ten days, both Greece and the Greek Cypriots had given the impression that the only problem was the chapter of security and guarantees. This was not the only problem. The Secretary-General stated that he did not believe that either. Hence, he had proposed a package deal.
11. Mr. Cavusoğlu noted that they had worked sincerely on the issue of guarantees. He also noted with concern the proposed drilling activities. The Secretary-General noted that exploratory drilling was one issue, actual extraction another. Mr. Cavusoğlu agreed that these two scenarios were different.