


Derek Pierre, Biz Dev

ETH UofT, 08 Mar 2019


NuCypher Overview

- Use cryptography to build the tools & infrastructure to preserve data privacy
- Privacy-preserving solutions for distributed applications
 - ▶ Proxy Re-encryption (PRE)
 - ★ Secure data-sharing and access control of encrypted data
 - ▶ Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE)
 - ★ Perform arbitrary operations on encrypted data
- Blockchain & Private Deployments

Public Key Encryption (PKE)




Public Key Encryption (PKE)




- Decryption required before sharing
- Not scalable
- Complex access revocation

What is proxy re-encryption (PRE)



Solution

Proxy re-encryption + Key Management




Advantages

- Data not decrypted to facilitate sharing
- Scalable and performant
- Access revocation through re-encryption key deletion
- Secure use of data storage providers



Centralized KMS using PRE

Encryption




Centralized KMS using PRE

Access delegation




Centralized KMS using PRE

Decryption




Decentralized Key Management using PRE

Using threshold split-key re-encryption (Umbral)




KMS Network: Data Sharing + PKE




- Single node has access to data
- Single node can deny to do work

KMS Network: Data Sharing + PKE + Shamir Secret Sharing




- Nodes can collude to gain access to data

KMS Network: Data Sharing + PRE



- Single node collusion with receiver possible
- Single node can deny to do work

KMS Network: Data Sharing + Threshold PRE (Umbral)



- Collusion now requires m nodes + receiver

NU Token

Purpose

- Splitting trust across re-encryption nodes
 - ▶ More tokens = more trust, more work, and more compensation
- Proof of Stake for minting new coins according to the mining schedule
- Security deposit at stake against malicious behavior of nodes


Data Sharing Policies

- Time-based
- Conditional on payment
 - ▶ “Grant access once paid, continue granting while paying”
- Smart contract (public) method

Decentralized re-encryption nodes (Ursulas) relied on to apply conditions without having the ability to decrypt data

Use Cases


Encrypted file sharing



1. Encrypt → 2. Re-Encrypt → 3. Decrypt

Use Cases


Encrypted multi-user chats



1. Encrypt → 2. Re-Encrypt → 3. Decrypt


Use Cases

Decentralized access-controlled content



1. Encrypt → 2. Conditional Re-Encrypt → 3. Decrypt


Early Users



NuCypher Characters

- Alice – data owner
- Bob – data recipient
- Enrico – data source
- Ursula – proxy node


Alice & Bob



Enrico




Ursula



Heartbeat Demo


http://docs.nucypher.com/en/latest/demos/heartbeat_demo.html



Character Control Demo

Non-Python Usage

<https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=om0tew-Z4gE>



```
Activities Terminator
Fri Feb 15 11:35
jmyles@lurkambo ~/projects/nucypher
jmyles@lurkambo ~/projects/nucypher 90x24
version 0.1.0-alpha.12
the Authority.
Fetching seednode localhost:10151 TLS certificate
Saved TLS certificate for GhostWhite Swords Linen Crossbones: /tmp/nucypher-temp-certs-Bm1
h0y88/0x1b536Ed5d6E6dCF8E051eb03d0A264c096d5AFB2.pem
Remembering GhostWhite Swords Linen Crossbones (0x1b536Ed5d6E6dCF8E051eb03d0A264c096d5AFB2), popping 0 listeners.
Starting Learning Loop.
Starting Alice Character Control...
Alice Verifying Key 02792e0d08952d1cc6d9676ad854109a660b1a8ea2415362cd2ab73e4b329671360
Site starting on 8151
Starting factory <twisted.web.server.Site object at 0x7f6129a1a9b0>
Finished learning about all seednodes.
jmyles@lurkambo ~/projects/nucypher 47x12
the Encryptor.
036a8da677ca4625d6e7ba0aec48913201df526a06ed0c6
aefa8da858a4996c761
Starting Enrico Character Control...
Enrico Verifying Key 027596921014f445bcb995e0b1
fb70875cad357746a7e8d7608347a6f099031bae
Site starting on 8151
jmyles@lurkambo ~/projects/nucypher 91x24
version 0.1.0-alpha.12
the BUIDler.
Fetching seednode localhost:10151 TLS certificate
Saved TLS certificate for GhostWhite Swords Linen Crossbones: /tmp/nucypher-temp-certs-hgdo
3ma3/0x1b536Ed5d6E6dCF8E051eb03d0A264c096d5AFB2.pem
Remembering GhostWhite Swords Linen Crossbones (0x1b536Ed5d6E6dCF8E051eb03d0A264c096d5AFB2), popping 0 listeners.
Starting Learning Loop.
Starting Bob Character Control...
Bob Verifying Key 031c00e76baeeefbcsf1653d226dad0731f0978130c9c69cecf5a6b2e23f1362b
Bob Encrypting Key 03fe3742536fc5ea0956e60825723b1a2798f35c146b472301d14cb7b8abd22f
Site starting on 11151
jmyles@lurkambo ~/projects/nucypher 91x24
the Untrusted Re-Encryption Proxy.
WARNING: Running in development mode
WARNING: Running in Federated node
Starting Learning Loop.
Starting datastore /tmp/nucypher-tmp-tld5xvt/ursula
THIS IS YOU: Ursula: (Ursula)-GhostWhite Swords Linen Crossbones (0x1b536Ed5d6E6dCF8E051eb03d0A264c096d5AFB2)
Connecting to TEMPORARY DOMAIN
Running Ursula (Ursula)-GhostWhite Swords Linen Crossbones (0x1b536Ed5d6E6dCF8E051eb03d0A264c096d5AFB2) on 127.0.0.1:10151
```

Competing Technology

Data Masking and Tokenization

- Less secure for data with underlying patterns
- Reduce the value of data by obfuscating it

Public Key Encryption

- Data must be decrypted before it is shared
- Not Scalable

Multi-Party Computation

- Interactive protocol
- Slow Performance

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

- Slow Performance
 - ▶ NuCypher has developed a GPU-accelerated FHE library: nuFHE

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

nuFHE library

- **GitHub:** <https://nucypher.dev/nufhe>
- GPU implementation of fully homomorphic encryption
- Uses either FFT or integer NTT
- Achieved 100x performance over TFHE benchmarks

Platform	Library	Performance (ms/bit)	
		Binary Gate	MUX Gate
Single Core/Single GPU - FFT	TFHE (CPU)	13	26
	nuFHE	0.13	0.22
	Speedup	100.9	117.7
Single Core/Single GPU - NTT	cuFHE	0.35	N/A
	nuFHE	0.35	0.67
	Speedup	1.0	-

FHE Proof of Concept

Sputnik

- **GitHub:** <https://nucypher.dev/sputnik>
- Assembly language and interpreter for FHE that uses nuFHE
- Commits a merkle root of computation to the blockchain for proof of logic flow
- Used to execute first homomorphic smart contract at ETHBerlin 2018



ETHBerlin

@ETHBerlin

Follow



PLEASE give a round of applause to
Sputnik!!! They are the first winners of our
open track!! They designed A byte code
assembly type language!YAAAAASSSS
GUYS #ETHBerlin

More Information



Website: <https://www.nucypher.com>

Development Guide: <https://docs.nucypher.com>

Proxy Re-encryption Network: <https://nucypher.dev/nucypher>


nuFHE: <https://nucypher.dev/nufhe>

Hackathon Information: <https://nucypher.dev/hackathon>

Discord: <http://discord.nucypher.com>

E-mail: derek@nucypher.com

Appendix: Umbral Flow Diagram




- Reference implementation: <https://nucypher.dev/pyUmbral>
- Documentation: <https://nucypher.dev/umbral-doc>

Appendix: Umbral – Threshold Proxy Re-encryption

- “Umbral” is Spanish for “threshold”
- PRE properties: Unidirectional, single-hop, non-interactive
- Follows a KEM/DEM approach:
 - ▶ UmbralKEM provides the threshold re-encryption capability
 - ▶ Uses ECIES for key encapsulation with ZK proofs of correctness for verifiability on prime order curves (such as secp256k1)
 - ▶ DEM can be any authenticated encryption (currently ChaCha20-Poly1305)
- IND-PRE-CCA security
- Key splitting is analogous to Shamir Secret Sharing
- Verification of re-encryption correctness through Non-Interactive ZK Proofs
- Reference implementation: <https://github.com/nucypher/pyUmbral>
- Documentation: <https://github.com/nucypher/umbral-doc>

Appendix: Security Audits



**Least
Authority**
Freedom Matters

Appendix: Fully Homomorphic Encryption

