




NuCypher


<presenter name(s), role(s)>

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
Public Key Encryption (PKE)



Public Key Encryption (PKE)




What is proxy re-encryption (PRE)




Solution

Proxy re-encryption + Key Management





Centralized KMS using PRE

Encryption



Centralized KMS using PRE

Access delegation




Centralized KMS using PRE

Decryption



Decentralized Key Management


Using threshold split-key re-encryption (Umbral)



Umbral: Threshold Proxy Re-encryption


- “Umbral” is Spanish for “threshold”
- PRE properties: Unidirectional, single-hop, non-interactive
- Follows a KEM/DEM approach:
 - ▶ UmbralKEM provides the threshold re-encryption capability
 - ▶ Uses ECIES for key encapsulation with ZK proofs of correctness for verifiability on prime order curves (such as secp256k1)
 - ▶ DEM can be any authenticated encryption (currently ChaCha20-Poly1305)
- IND-PRE-CCA security
- Key splitting is analogous to Shamir Secret Sharing
- Verification of re-encryption correctness through Non-Interactive ZK Proofs
- Reference implementation: <https://github.com/nucypher/pyUmbral>
- Documentation: <https://github.com/nucypher/umbral-doc>

KMS Network: Data Sharing + PKE




- Single node has access to data
- Single node can deny to do work

KMS Network: Data Sharing + PKE + Shamir Secret Sharing




- Nodes can collude to gain access to data

KMS Network: Data Sharing + PRE



- Single node collusion with receiver possible
- Single node can deny to do work

KMS Network: Data Sharing + Threshold PRE (Umbral)



- Collusion now requires m nodes + receiver

NU Token

Purpose

- Splitting trust across re-encryption nodes
 - ▶ More tokens = more trust, more work, and more compensation
- Proof of Stake for minting new coins according to the mining schedule
- Security deposit at stake against malicious behavior of nodes

Data Sharing Policies

- Time-based
- Conditional on payment
 - ▶ “Grant access once paid, continue granting while paying”
- Smart contract (public) method


Decentralized re-encryption nodes (Ursulas) relied on to apply conditions without having the ability to decrypt data

Demo



Use Cases


Encrypted file sharing



1. Encrypt → 2. Re-Encrypt ➔ 3. Decrypt


Use Cases

Encrypted multi-user chats




Use Cases

Decentralized access-controlled content



1. Encrypt
2. Conditional Re-Encrypt
3. Decrypt

Early Users



Competing Technology

Data Masking and Tokenization

- Less secure for data with underlying patterns
- Reduce the value of data by obfuscating it

Public Key Encryption

- Data must be decrypted before it is shared
- Not Scalable

Multi-Party Computation

- Interactive protocol
- Slow Performance

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

- Slow Performance
 - ▶ NuCypher has developed a GPU-accelerated FHE library: nuFHE

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

nuFHE library

- GitHub: <https://nucypher.dev/nufhe>
- GPU implementation of fully homomorphic encryption
- Uses either FFT or integer NTT
- Achieved 100x performance over TFHE benchmarks

Platform	Library	Performance (ms/bit)	
		Binary Gate	MUX Gate
Single Core/Single GPU - FFT	TFHE (CPU)	13	26
	nuFHE	0.13	0.22
	Speedup	100.9	117.7
Single Core/Single GPU - NTT	cuFHE	0.35	N/A
	nuFHE	0.35	0.67
	Speedup	1.0	-

FHE Proof of Concept

Sputnik

- GitHub: <https://nucypher.dev/sputnik>
- Assembly language and interpreter for FHE that uses nuFHE
- Commits a merkle root of computation to the blockchain for proof of logic flow
- Used to execute first homomorphic smart contract at ETHBerlin 2018



ETHBerlin
@ETHBerlin

Follow



PLEASE give a round of applause to
Sputnik!!! They are the first winners of our
open track!! They designed A byte code
assembly type language! YAAAAAASSSSS
GUYS #ETHBerlin

More Information



NuCypher

Website: <https://www.nucypher.com>

Whitepaper: <https://www.nucypher.com/whitepapers/english.pdf>

Proxy Re-encryption Network: <https://nucypher.dev/nucypher>

Umbral Reference Implementation: <https://nucypher.dev/pyUmbral>


nuFHE: <https://nucypher.dev/nufhe>

Discord: <http://discord.nucypher.com>

E-mail: <email_prefix>@nucypher.com


E-mail: hello@nucypher.com

Appendix: Umbral Flow Diagram



- Reference implementation: <https://nucypher.dev/pyUmbra>
 - Documentation: <https://nucypher.dev/umbra-doc>

Appendix: Security Audits



Least Authority
Freedom Matters

Appendix: NU Token Metrics

Mining

Mining & Staking Economics: <https://nucypher.dev/mining-paper>

Mining reward:

$$\kappa = \left(0.5 + 0.5 \frac{\min(T_i, T_1)}{T_1} \right)$$

$$T_{i,\text{initial}} \geq T_{\min}$$


$$\delta S_{i,t} = \kappa \frac{l_i}{\sum l_j} \frac{\ln 2}{T_{1/2}} (S_{\max} - S_{t-1})$$

Results into:

$$\text{reward} \propto 2^{\frac{t}{T_{1/2}}}$$


Appendix: NU Token Metrics

Graph of daily mining compensation



Appendix: NU Token Metrics

Relocking mining rewards



Appendix: Team



MacLane Wilkison
Co-founder and CEO



Michael Egorov, PhD
Co-founder and CTO



David Nuñez, PhD
Cryptographer



John Pacific (tux)
Engineer



Justin Myles Holmes
Engineer



Sergey Zotov
Engineer



Kieran Prasch
Engineer



Bogdan Opanchuk, PhD
Engineer



Ryan Caruso
Community



Derek Pierre
Biz Dev



Arjun Hassard
Product



Ravital Solomon
Cryptographer



Damon Ciarelli
Engineer

Advisors



Prof. Dave Evans
University of Virginia



Prof. Giuseppe Ateniese
Stevens Inst. of Technology



John Bantleman
Rainstor



Tony Bishop
Equinix