




NuCypher

<presenter name(s), role(s)>

<event name>, <dd MMM yyyy>


Public Key Encryption (PKE)



Limitations

- Decryption required before sharing
- Not scalable
- Complex access revocation


Public Key Encryption (PKE)



Limitations


- Decryption required before sharing
- Not scalable
- Complex access revocation

What is proxy re-encryption (PRE)




Solution

Proxy re-encryption + Key Management





Centralized KMS using PRE

Encryption



Centralized KMS using PRE

Access delegation




Centralized KMS using PRE

Decryption



Decentralized Key Management


Using threshold split-key re-encryption (Umbral)



Umbral: Threshold Proxy Re-encryption


- “Umbral” is Spanish for “threshold”
- PRE properties: Unidirectional, single-hop, non-interactive
- It follows a KEM/DEM approach:
 - ▶ UmbralKEM provides the threshold re-encryption capability
 - ▶ Uses ECIES for key encapsulation with zero knowledge proofs of correctness for verifiability on prime order curves (such as secp256k1)
 - ▶ The DEM can be any authenticated encryption (currently ChaCha20-Poly1305)
- IND-PRE-CCA security
- Key splitting is analogous to Shamir Secret Sharing
- Verification of re-encryption correctness through Non-Interactive ZK Proofs
- Reference implementation: <https://github.com/nucypher/pyUmbral/>
- Documentation (WIP): <https://github.com/nucypher/umbral-doc>

Network: Data Sharing + PKE




- Single node has access to data
- Single node can deny to do work

Network: Data Sharing + PKE + Shamir Secret Sharing




- Nodes can collude to gain access to data

Network: Data Sharing + PRE



- Single node collusion with receiver possible
- Single node can deny to do work.

Network: Data Sharing + Threshold PRE (Umbral)



- Collusion now requires m nodes + receiver

Data Sharing Policies

- Time-based
- Conditional on payment
 - ▶ “grant access once paid, continue granting while paying”
- Smart contract (public) method

Decentralized proxies (Ursulas) are trusted to apply conditions without decrypting data

NU Token

Purpose


- Splitting trust between re-encryption nodes (more tokens = more trust and more work)
- Proof of Stake for minting new coins according to the mining schedule
- Security deposit to be at stake against malicious behavior of nodes

Demo




Use Cases

Encrypted file sharing




Use Cases

Encrypted multi-user chats




Use Cases

Decentralized Access-Controlled Content



1. Encrypt → 2. Conditional Re-Encrypt → 3. Decrypt

Early Users



Competing Technology

Data Masking and Tokenization

- Less secure for data with underlying patterns
- Reduce the value of data by obfuscating it

Multi-Party Computation

- Slow Performance

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

- Slow Performance
 - ▶ NuCypher is investing efforts in this area

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

nuFHE Library

- GitHub: <https://github.com/nucypher/nufhe>
- GPU implementation of fully homomorphic encryption
- Uses either FFT or integer NTT
- Achieved 100x performance over TFHE benchmarks

Platform	Library	Performance (ms/bit)	
		Binary Gate	MUX Gate
Single Core/Single GPU - FFT	TFHE (CPU)	13	26
	nuFHE	0.13	0.22
	Speedup	100.9	117.7
Single Core/Single GPU - NTT	cuFHE	0.35	N/A
	nuFHE	0.35	0.67
	Speedup	1.0	-

More Information



Website: <https://nucypher.com>

Github: <https://github.com/nucypher/>

PyUmbra: <https://github.com/nucypher/pyUmbra/>

GoUmbra: <https://github.com/nucypher/goUmbra/>

Mocknet: <https://github.com/nucypher/mock-net/>


Discord: <https://discord.gg/7rmXa3S>

Whitepaper: <https://www.nucypher.com/whitepapers/english.pdf>

E-mail: <email>@nucypher.com


E-mail: hello@nucypher.com

Appendix: Umbral Flow Diagram



- Reference implementation: <https://github.com/nucypher/pyUmbra/>
 - Documentation: <https://github.com/nucypher/umbra-doc>

Appendix: Security Audits



Least Authority
Freedom Matters

Appendix: NU Token Metrics

Mining

Mining reward:

$$\kappa = \left(0.5 + 0.5 \frac{\min(T_i, T_1)}{T_1} \right) \quad (1)$$

$$T_{i,\text{initial}} \geq T_{\min}, \quad (2)$$

$$\delta s_{i,t} = \kappa \frac{l_i}{\sum l_j} \frac{\ln 2}{T_{1/2}} (S_{\max} - S_{t-1}). \quad (3)$$


(4)

Results into:

$$\text{reward} \propto 2^{\frac{t}{T_{1/2}}}$$


Appendix: NU Token Metrics

Graph of daily mining compensation



Appendix: NU Token Metrics

Relocking mining rewards



Appendix: Team

Founders



MacLane Wilkison
Co-founder and CEO



Michael Egorov, PhD
Co-founder and CTO

Advisors



Prof. Dave Evans



Prof. Giuseppe Ateniese
Stevens Inst. of Technology



John Bantleman
Rainstor



David Nuñez, PhD
Cryptographer



John Pacific (tux)
Engineer



Justin Myles Holmes
Engineer



Sergey Zотов
Engineer



Kieran Prasch
Engineer



Bogdan Opanchuk, PhD
Engineer



Ryan Caruso
Community



Derek Pierre
Business Development



Arjun Hassard
Product & Partnerships



Tony Bishop
Equinix