



NuCypher


Derek Pierre, Business Development Lead

Thales eSecurity, 20 Nov 2018

NuCypher Overview

- Use cryptography to build the tools & infrastructure to preserve data privacy
- Privacy-preserving solutions for distributed applications
 - ▶ Proxy Re-encryption (PRE)
 - ★ Secure data-sharing and access control of encrypted data
 - ▶ Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE)
 - ★ Perform arbitrary operations on encrypted data
- Blockchain & Private Deployments


Public Key Encryption (PKE)



Limitations

- Decryption required before sharing
- Not scalable
- Complex access revocation


Public Key Encryption (PKE)



Limitations


- Decryption required before sharing
- Not scalable
- Complex access revocation

What is proxy re-encryption (PRE)



Solution

Proxy Re-encryption + Key Management




Advantages

- Data not decrypted to facilitate sharing
- Scalable and performant
- Access revocation through re-encryption key deletion
- Secure use of data storage providers



Centralized KMS using PRE

Encryption




Centralized KMS using PRE

Access delegation




Centralized KMS using PRE

Decryption



Decentralized KMS using PRE

Using threshold split-key re-encryption (Umbral)



NuCypher PRE Properties

- Unidirectional
- Single hop
- Non-interactive


KEM/DEM Approach

- Umbral KEM for threshold re-encryption
- ECIES for key encapsulation
- DEM can be any AE (ChaCha20-Poly1305)

Verification of Correctness


- Verification through non-interactive ZK proof
- Incentive layer via NU staking token
- Re-encryption validated by challenge protocol

KMS Network: Data Sharing + PKE




- Single node has access to data
- Single node can deny to do work

KMS Network: Data Sharing + PKE + Shamir Secret Sharing




- Nodes can collude to gain access to data

KMS Network: Data Sharing + PRE



- Single node collusion with receiver possible
- Single node can deny to do work

KMS Network: Data Sharing + Threshold PRE (Umbral)



- Collusion now requires m nodes + receiver

Decentralized KMS: Token

Purpose


- Splitting trust across re-encryption nodes
 - ▶ More tokens = more trust, more work, and more compensation
- Proof of Stake for minting new coins according to the mining schedule
- Security deposit at stake against malicious behavior of nodes

Data Sharing Policies

- Time-based
- Conditional on payment
 - ▶ “Grant access once paid, continue granting while paying”
- Smart contract (public) method


Decentralized re-encryption nodes (Ursulas) relied on to apply conditions without having the ability to decrypt data

Blockchain & Smart Contract Agnostic




Use Cases

Multi-tenant, Multi-source Encrypted Data Lake




Use Cases

Scalable, Secure IOT Updates




Use Cases

Encrypted file sharing




Use Cases

Encrypted multi-user chats




Use Cases

Decentralized access-controlled content



Early Users



Competing Technology

Data Masking and Tokenization

- Less secure for data with underlying patterns
- Reduce the value of data by obfuscating it

Public Key Encryption

- Data must be decrypted before it is shared
- Not Scalable

Multi-Party Computation

- Interactive protocol
- Slow Performance

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

- Slow Performance
 - ▶ NuCypher has developed a GPU-accelerated FHE library: nuFHE

Fully Homomorphic Encryption

nuFHE library

- GitHub: <https://github.com/nucypher/nufhe>
- GPU implementation of fully homomorphic encryption
- Uses either FFT or integer NTT
- Achieved 100x performance over TFHE benchmarks

Platform	Library	Performance (ms/bit)	
		Binary Gate	MUX Gate
Single Core/Single GPU - FFT	TFHE (CPU)	13	26
	nuFHE	0.13	0.22
	Speedup	100.9	117.7
Single Core/Single GPU - NTT	cuFHE	0.35	N/A
	nuFHE	0.35	0.67
	Speedup	1.0	-

FHE Proof of Concept

Sputnik

- GitHub: <https://github.com/nucypher/sputnik>
- Assembly language and interpreter for FHE that uses nuFHE
- Commits a merkle root of computation to the blockchain for proof of logic flow
- Used to execute first homomorphic smart contract at ETHBerlin 2018



ETHBerlin
@ETHBerlin

Follow



PLEASE give a round of applause to
Sputnik!!! They are the first winners of our
open track!! They designed A byte code
assembly type language! YAAAAAASSSSS
GUYS #ETHBerlin

Investors

>\$15M in Venture Funding

POLYCHAIN
CAPITAL



compound



F33 F33
FIBIG
CAPITAL

Satoshi•Fund



AMINO Capital

semantic
capital

BASE



1kx

CoinFund



Blockchain Partners Korea

FIRST MATTER

Team

Founders



MacLane Wilkison
Co-founder and CEO



Michael Egorov, PhD
Co-founder and CTO

Advisors



Prof. Dave Evans



Prof. Giuseppe Ateniese
Stevens Inst. of Technology



John Bantleman
Rainstor



Tony Bishop
Equinix

Employees



David Nuñez, PhD
Cryptographer



John Pacific (tux)
Engineer



Justin Myles Holmes
Engineer



Sergey Zotov
Engineer



Kieran Prasch
Engineer



Bogdan Opanchuk, PhD
Engineer



Ryan Caruso
Community



Derek Pierre
Business Developer



Arjun Hassard
Product & Partnerships



Keaton Bruce
Engineer



Eva Evergreen
Engineer

More Information



NuCypher

Website: <https://www.nucypher.com>

Whitepaper: <https://www.nucypher.com/whitepapers/english.pdf>

Proxy Re-encryption Network: <https://github.com/nucypher/nucypher>

Umbral Reference Implementation: <https://github.com/nucypher/pyUmbral>


nuFHE: <https://github.com/nucypher/nufhe>

Discord: <https://discord.gg/7rmXa3S>

E-mail: derek@nucypher.com

E-mail: hello@nucypher.com

Appendix: Umbral Flow Diagram




- Reference implementation: <https://github.com/nucypher/pyUmbra>
 - Documentation: <https://github.com/nucypher/umbra-doc>

Appendix: Umbral – Threshold Proxy Re-encryption

- “Umbral” is Spanish for “threshold”
- PRE properties: Unidirectional, single-hop, non-interactive
- Follows a KEM/DEM approach:
 - ▶ UmbralKEM provides the threshold re-encryption capability
 - ▶ Uses ECIES for key encapsulation with ZK proofs of correctness for verifiability on prime order curves (such as secp256k1)
 - ▶ DEM can be any authenticated encryption (currently ChaCha20-Poly1305)
- IND-PRE-CCA security
- Key splitting is analogous to Shamir Secret Sharing
- Verification of re-encryption correctness through Non-Interactive ZK Proofs
- Reference implementation: <https://github.com/nucypher/pyUmbral>
- Documentation: <https://github.com/nucypher/umbral-doc>

Appendix: Security Audits



Least Authority
Freedom Matters

Appendix: Fully Homomorphic Encryption

