#### Lecture 3a: Mediation

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#### Introduction to Mediation

- Mediation is concerned with the study of intervening or mediating variables that transmit the influence of an experimental intervention
- Begin with a treatment Z<sub>i</sub> on outcome Y<sub>i</sub>
- Does X<sub>i</sub> induce a change in mediating variable M<sub>i</sub>?
- Does the induced change in M<sub>i</sub> lead to a change in Y<sub>i</sub>?
- This is not as straightforward to determine as it may first appear



# Example: Local Government Representation in India

- Bhavnani (2009) studies local government representation in India
- Before 2002, a randomly selected portion of local council seats were reserved for women
- In 2002 the reservations were lifted, but constituencies where women held reserved seats in 1997 were still more likely to elect women representatives in 2002. Why?
  - 1. Reservations create/select a cohort of female incumbents whose experience in office makes them more appealing to voters
  - 2. Reservations give voters an opportunity to change their views about women and learn that women make capable representatives
  - 3. Female representatives increase voter participation, and a surge of new voters might continue to improve the chances of electing a woman after reservations expire
- Concludes evidence mostly for first hypothesis based on selection
  - But the key point is that each hypothesis posits a different mediator that is influenced by reservations



# Regression-Based Approaches to Mediation

- Regression-based analyses typically rely on some form of three-equation system like the following:
  - 1.  $M_i = \alpha_1 + aZ_i + e_{1i}$
  - 2.  $Y_i=\alpha_2+bZ_i+e_{2i}$
  - 3.  $Y_i = \alpha_3 + dZ_i + bM_i + e_{3i}$
- e<sub>xi</sub> are unboserved disturbances representing cumulative effect of missing variables, Z<sub>i</sub> randomly assigned, M<sub>i</sub> a pretreatement covariate Substitute equation (1) in (3) and compare to (2):
  - $Y_i = \alpha_3 + (d+ab) Z_i + (\alpha_1 + e_{1i}) M_i + e_{3i}$
  - Total effect of Z<sub>i</sub> onY<sub>i</sub> is c=d+ab
  - Consists of direct effect d and mediated effect ab
- But what if coefficients vary from observation to observation (i.e. treatment effect not constant)?
  - E[a<sub>i</sub>b<sub>i</sub>]=E[a<sub>i</sub>]E[b<sub>i</sub>]+cov(a<sub>i</sub>,b<sub>i</sub>)
  - So we cannot just estimate E [ai] and E [bi] separately and multiply them together to get this product



### Regression-Based Approaches to Mediation

- What if we assumed constant treatment effects?
- Random assignment of  $Z_i$  means (1) and (2) can be estimated without bias (E  $\perp$  e<sub>1i</sub> , e<sub>2i</sub> )
- But what about  $Y_i = \alpha_3 + dZ_i + bM_i + e_{3i}$ ?
- Mi isn't randomly assigned!
- Mi could be systematically related to unmeasured causes of Y<sub>i</sub> and correlated with e<sub>3i</sub>
- Can you think of an unmeasured cause of Y<sub>i</sub> that is correlated with e<sub>3i</sub> in the Bhavnani case?



### Regression-Based Approaches to Mediation

- In Bhavnani: Z<sub>i</sub> is previous reservation, Y<sub>i</sub> the election of female representative in 2002, M<sub>i</sub> the number of women candidates running for office in 2002 (H1)
- Factors other than randomly assigned reservations cause women candidates to run for office
- One idea: What if some districts were more egalitarian than others?
- Female candidates more likely to run in districts that are more egalitarian
- This unmeasured disturbance would be correlated with e<sub>3i</sub>, the unmeasured factors that affect the election of a woman in 2002



#### The Direction of the Bias

- Assume  $M_i = \alpha_1 + a Z_i + e_{1i}$  and  $Y_i = \alpha_3 + dZ_i + bM_i + e_{3i}$
- As the sample size grows to infinity (Gerber and Green 2009):

$$\hat{b}_{N\to\infty} = b + \frac{\mathsf{cov}(e_{1i},e_{3i})}{\mathsf{var}(e_{1i})} \text{ and } \hat{d}_{N\to\infty} = b + a \frac{\mathsf{cov}(e_{1i},e_{3i})}{\mathsf{var}(e_{1i})}$$

- cov ( $e_{1i}$ ) > 0 is likely: Even controlling for  $Z_i$ , if women were more likely to run for office in 2002 in district i, they were more likely to win there (because of egalitarianism)
- · Bias thus inflates the estimate of b and deflates the estimate of d
  - Exactly the bias that researchers look for find for mediation
  - Could add covariates so cov (e<sub>1i</sub>) = 0
- To reinforce these points, we will do a quick detour to a Monte Carlo experiment that illustrates these points more clearly



## Mediation and Potential Outcomes

- Define  $M_i(z)$  as the potential value of  $M_i$  when  $Z_i = z$
- Define  $Y_i$  (m, z) as potential outcome when  $M_i = m$  and  $Z_i = z$
- Y<sub>i</sub> (M<sub>i</sub> (1), 1) thus expresses potential outcome when Z<sub>i</sub> = 1 and M<sub>i</sub> takes on potential outcome that occurs when Z<sub>i</sub> = 1
- Total effect of Z<sub>i</sub> on Y<sub>i</sub> is Y<sub>i</sub>(M<sub>i</sub>(1),1) Y<sub>i</sub>(M<sub>i</sub>(0),0)
- What is the direct effect of Z<sub>i</sub> on Y<sub>i</sub> controlling for M<sub>i</sub>?
  - There is more than one definition
  - Y<sub>i</sub>(Mi(0),1)- Y<sub>i</sub>(M<sub>i</sub>(0),0) is direct effect of Z<sub>i</sub> on Y<sub>i</sub> holding m constant at M<sub>i</sub> (0)
  - Y<sub>i</sub>(M<sub>i</sub>(1),1)- Y<sub>i</sub>(M<sub>i</sub>(1),0) is direct effect of Z<sub>i</sub> on Y<sub>i</sub> holding m constant at M<sub>i</sub> (1)
  - Yi (M<sub>i</sub> (0), 1) and Yi (M<sub>i</sub> (1), 0) are complex potential outcomes, so named because they are purely imaginary and never occur empirically



## Mediation and Potential Outcomes

- What is the indirect effect of Z<sub>i</sub> on Y<sub>i</sub> through M<sub>i</sub>?
  - This is the effect on Y<sub>i</sub> of changing from Mi (0) to Mi (1) while holding Z<sub>i</sub> constant
  - So again, depending on Z<sub>i</sub>, we get two definitions of the indirect effect
  - $Y_i(M_i(1),1)-Y_i(M_i(0),1)$  (if  $Z_i = 1$ ) and  $Y_i(M_i(1),0)-Y_i(M_i(0),0)$  (if  $Z_i = 0$ )
  - Again Y<sub>i</sub> (M<sub>i</sub> (0), 1) and Y<sub>i</sub> (M<sub>i</sub> (1), 0) are the earlier complex potential outcomes
- Each of these four equations involve a term that is fundamentally unobservable
- True even if we assume that both indirect effects are equal
- There is thus a fundamental limitation on what we can learn from an experiment while manipulating only Z<sub>i</sub> without making further assumptions



### Ruling Out Mediators

- What if the sharp null hypothesis M<sub>i</sub> (0) = M<sub>i</sub> (1) is true?
- $Y_i(M_i(1),1)=Y_i(M_i(0),1)$  (if  $Z_i=1$ ) and  $Y_i(M_i(1),0)=Y_i(M_i(0),0)$  (if  $Z_i=0$ )
- Then both indirect effects equal 0. Experiments may indicate when mediation does not occur, but sometimes difficult to do in practice:
  - Need tight estimate around 0
  - Need sharp null to be true, not just ATE=0
- Although sharp null cannot be proven, we can cite evidence suggesting whether this conjecture is a reasonable approximation
- We thus learn something useful about mediation when discovering a lack of causal relationship between Z<sub>i</sub> and proposed mediator
- Conversely, if  $Z_i$  and  $M_i$  have a strong relationship, we cannot rule out  $M_i$  as a possible mediator



### Manipulating the Mediators

- A fundamental problem is that M<sub>i</sub> is not independently manipulated via random intervention
- Could we manipulate M<sub>i</sub> as well to build the case for mediation?
  - In principle, yes, but difficult in practical situations
- Example: Yi is scurvy, Zi is lemon, Mi is vitamin C
  - We want indirect effect Y<sub>i</sub> (M<sub>i</sub> (1), 0) Y<sub>i</sub> (M<sub>i</sub> (0), 0)
  - M<sub>i</sub> (1) is vitamin C level of lemon, we feed pills without lemons
  - Still not perfect: Vitamin C in lemons consumed differently from pills, pills might have other effects on Y<sub>i</sub>
- Manipulations of Mi are therefore instructive, but ability to provide empirical estimates inevitably requires additional assumptions
- In the Bhavnani example, possible Mi are number of female incumbents, voters' sense of whether it is appropriate or desirable to have women representatives, and turnout rate in local elections



### Implicit Mediation

- Consider a treatment Z<sub>i</sub> that contains multiple elements inside it
- Rather than manipulating Mi, change the treatment to isolate the particular elements of Z<sub>i</sub> (i.e. Z<sup>1</sup>,Z<sup>2</sup>,Z<sup>3</sup>) whose attributes affect M<sub>i</sub> along the way
- Focus is not on demonstrating how a Z<sub>i</sub>-induced change in M<sub>i</sub>
   changes Y<sub>i</sub>, but on the effect of different isolated treatments
   on Y<sub>i</sub>
- In particular, no attempt to estimate the effects of observed changes in M<sub>i</sub> at all



## **Example: Conditional Cash**Transfers

- Interest in conditional cash transfers on poor to keep children in school and attend health clinics
- Field experiments find improved educational outcomes for children in developing countries from these transfers (Baird, McIntosh, and Ozler 2009)
- What could the causal mechanism be?
  - 1. Cash subsidies allow greater investment in children's welfare
  - 2. Imposed conditions improve children's welfare
- Baird, McIntosh and Ozler (2009) designed experiment with three groups
  - Control group with no subsidy, instructions, or conditions
  - · One treatment group gets cash without conditions
  - Another treatment group gets cash with conditions
  - Finding: Null hypothesis of no difference between treatment groups cannot be rejected



### Benefits of Implicit Mediation

- 1. Simple: Never strays from the unbiased statistical framework of comparing randomly assigned groups
- 2. By adding and subtracting elements from treatment, this approach lends itself to exploration and discovery of new treatments
  - Facilitates the process of testing basic propositions about what works by providing clues about the active elements that cause a treatment to work particularly well
- 3. Can gauge treatment effects on a wide array of outcome variables
  - Allows manipulation checks for establishing the empirical relationship between intended and actual treatments
  - Example: Does discussion in the classroom improve performance? Check if treatment increases discussion



#### Voter Turnout Example

- Gerber, Green, and Larimer (2008) interested in the effect of communication on turnout
- U.S. has voters files, anyone know what they are?
- 180,000 Michigan households in experiment
- 100,000 in control group (no postcards), other groups 20,000 each
- · Civic duty: "It's your civic duty to vote"
- Hawthorne: "It's your civic duty to vote, we're doing a study and will check public records"
- Self: "You should vote, here's your recent voting record"
- · Neighbors: "You should vote, here's your neighbors' voting records and your own"



#### Results

	Control	Civic	Hawthorne	Self	Neighbors
Pct Voting	29.7%	31.5%	32.2%	34.5%	37.8%
N	191,243	38,218	38,204	38,218	38,201

Anyone here know how Gerber followed up on this study?



### Summary

- We are often curious about the mechanisms by which an experimental treatment transmits its influence
- Adding mediators as right-hand variables to determine this is a flawed strategy that generally provides bias in favor of mediation
  - Main issue here is that the mediator is not experimentally manipulated
- In theory we could manipulate mediators experimentally, but this is difficult for two reasons
  - 1. We never observe complex potential outcomes
  - 2. Manipulation of mediators directly is often impractical
- However, two lines of inquiry seem promising:
  - 1. We can rule out mediators easier than we can find them
  - 2. We can implicity manipulate mediators

