

CSE 565 Computer Security

Fall 2018

Lecture 2: Symmetric Encryption I

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Cryptographic Tools

- Cryptographic tools are essential in designing secure solutions and their understanding is crucial to correct usage
- We'll look at these **types of cryptographic tools**
 - symmetric encryption
 - hash functions and message authentication codes
 - public-key encryption
 - digital signatures and certificates
 - pseudo-random number generators
- The most basic problem of cryptography
 - ensure security of communication over insecure media

Goals of Cryptography

- **Security goals**
 - confidentiality
 - data integrity
- **Basic encryption terminology**
 - plaintext
 - ciphertext
 - cryptographic key
 - encryption
 - decryption
 - cryptanalysis

Symmetric Encryption

- **Symmetric (or secret-key) encryption** means that the same key is used both for encryption and decryption
- The key must remain secret at both ends
- Such algorithms are:
 - normally very fast
 - can be used as primitives in more complex cryptographic protocols
 - the key often has a short lifetime

Symmetric Encryption Formally

- More formally, a **computationally secure symmetric key encryption scheme** is defined as:
 - a **private-key encryption scheme** consists of polynomial-time algorithms (Gen, Enc, Dec) such that
 1. Gen: on input the security parameter n , outputs key k
 2. Enc: on input a key k and a message $m \in \{0, 1\}^*$, outputs ciphertext c
 3. Dec: on input a key k and ciphertext c , outputs plaintext m
 - we write $k \leftarrow \text{Gen}(1^n)$, $c \leftarrow \text{Enc}_k(m)$, and $m := \text{Dec}_k(c)$
 - this notation means that Gen and Enc are probabilistic and Dec is deterministic

Symmetric Encryption

- The above definition allows us to encrypt messages of any length
- In practice, there are Two types of symmetric key algorithms:
 - **block ciphers**
 - the key has a fixed size
 - prior to encryption, the message is partitioned into blocks
 - each block is encrypted and decrypted separately
 - **stream ciphers**
 - the message is processed as a stream
 - pseudo-random generator is used to produce a long key stream from a short key

Attacks Against Symmetric Encryption

- Encryption and decryption algorithms are assumed to be known to the adversary
- **Types of attacks**
 - **ciphertext only attack:** adversary knows a number of ciphertexts
 - **known plaintext attack:** adversary knows some pairs of ciphertexts and corresponding plaintexts
 - **chosen plaintext attack:** adversary knows ciphertexts for messages of its choice
 - **chosen ciphertext attack:** adversary knows plaintexts for ciphertexts of its choice
- We want a general-purpose algorithm to **sustain all types of attacks**

Security Against Chosen-Plaintext Attacks

- In **chosen-plaintext attack** (CPA), adversary \mathcal{A} is allowed to ask for encryptions of messages of its choice
 - it is active and adaptive
- \mathcal{A} is given **black-box access to encryption oracle** and can query it on different messages
 - notation $\mathcal{A}^{\mathcal{O}(\cdot)}$ means \mathcal{A} has oracle access to algorithm \mathcal{O}
- \mathcal{A} is asked to distinguish between encryptions of messages of its choice

CPA Security

- **CPA indistinguishability experiment** $\text{PrivK}_{\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{E}}^{\text{cpa}}(n)$
 1. random key k is generated by $\text{Gen}(1^n)$
 2. \mathcal{A} is given 1^n and ability to query $\text{Enc}_k(\cdot)$, and chooses two messages m_0, m_1 of the same length
 3. random bit $b \leftarrow \{0, 1\}$ is chosen, **challenge** ciphertext $c \leftarrow \text{Enc}_k(m_b)$ is computed and given to \mathcal{A}
 4. \mathcal{A} can use $\text{Enc}_k(\cdot)$ and eventually outputs bit b'
 5. experiment outputs 1 if $b' = b$ (\mathcal{A} wins) and 0 otherwise
- $\mathcal{E} = (\text{Gen}, \text{Enc}, \text{Dec})$ has **indistinguishable encryptions under the chosen-plaintext attack (CPA-secure)** if for all PPT \mathcal{A}

$$\Pr[\text{PrivK}_{\mathcal{A}, \mathcal{E}}^{\text{cpa}}(n) = 1] \leq \frac{1}{2} + \text{negl}(n)$$

Block Ciphers

- The algorithm maps an n -bit plaintext block to an n -bit ciphertext block
- Most modern block ciphers are product ciphers
 - we sequentially apply more than one operation to the message
- Often a sequence of permutations and substitutions is used
- A common design for an algorithm is to proceed in iterations
 - one iteration is called a round
 - each round consists of similar operations
 - i th round key k_i is derived from the secret key k using a fixed, public algorithm


Design Principles of Block Ciphers

- **Confusion-diffusion paradigm**
 - split a block into small chunks
 - define a permutation on each chunk separately (confusion)
 - mix outputs from different chunks by rearranging bits (diffusion)
 - repeat to strengthen the result

Design Principles of Block Ciphers

- **Substitution-permutation networks**
 - since a permutation on a block can be specified as a lookup table, this is called **substitution**
 - instead of having substitutions defined by the key, such functions are fixed and applied to messages and keys
 - mixing algorithm is called **mixing permutation**

Design Principles of Block Ciphers



- For this type of algorithm to be reversible, each operation needs to be invertible


Design Principles of Block Ciphers

- Let's denote one iteration or round by function g
- The initial state s_0 is the message m itself
- In round i :
 - g 's input is round key k_i and state s_{i-1}
 - g 's output is state s_i
- The ciphertext c is the final state s_{Nr} , where Nr is the number of rounds
- **Decryption** algorithm applies g^{-1} iteratively
 - the order of round keys is reversed
 - set $s_{Nr} = c$, compute $s_{i-1} = g^{-1}(k_i, s_i)$

Design Principles of Block Ciphers

- Another way to realize confusion-diffusion paradigm is through **Feistel network**
 - in Feistel network **each state is divided into halves** of the same length: L_i and R_i
 - **in one round:**
 - $L_i = R_{i-1}$
 - $R_i = L_{i-1} \oplus f(k_i, R_{i-1})$

Design Principles of Block Ciphers



- Are there any advantages over the previous design?
 - operations no longer need to be reversible, as the inverse of the algorithm is not used!
 - reverse one round's computation as $R_{i-1} = L_i$ and $L_{i-1} = R_i \oplus f(k_i, R_{i-1})$

Design Principles of Block Ciphers

- In both types of networks, the **substitution and permutation algorithms must be carefully designed**
 - choosing random substitution/permutation strategies leads to significantly weaker ciphers
 - each bit difference in S-box input creates at least 2-bit difference in its output
 - mixing permutation ensures that difference in one S-box propagates to at least 2 S-boxes in next round

Block Ciphers


- **Larger key size** means greater security
 - for n -bit keys, brute force search takes $2^n/2$ time on average
- **More rounds** often provide better protection
 - the number of rounds must be large enough for proper mixing
- **Larger block size** offers increased security
 - security of a cipher also depends on the block length

Data Encryption Standard (DES)

- In 1973 National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) published a solicitation for cryptosystems
- DES was developed by IBM and adopted as a standard in 1977
- It was expected to be used as a standard for 10–15 years
- Was replaced only in 2001 with AES (Advanced Encryption Standard)
- **DES characteristics:**
 - key size is 56 bits
 - block size is 64 bits
 - number of rounds is 16


DES

- DES uses **Feistel network**
 - Feistel network is used in many block ciphers such as DES, RC5, etc.
 - not used in AES
 - in DES, each L_i and R_i is 32 bits long; k_i is 48 bits long



DES


- DES has a fixed **initial permutation** IP prior to 16 rounds of encryption
- The inverse permutation IP^{-1} is applied at the end



DES

- **The f function** $f(k_i, R_{i-1})$
 1. first expands R_{i-1} from 32 to 48 bits (k_i is 48 bits long)
 2. XORs expanded R_{i-1} with k_i
 3. applies substitution to the result using S-boxes
 4. and finally permutes the value

DES f Function



DES

- There are 8 **S-boxes**
 - S-boxes are the only non-linear elements in DES design
 - they are crucial for the security of the cipher
- **Example:** S_1

14	4	13	1	2	15	11	8	3	10	6	12	5	9	0	7
0	15	7	4	14	2	13	1	10	6	12	11	9	5	3	8
4	1	14	8	13	6	2	11	15	12	9	7	3	10	5	0
15	12	8	2	4	9	1	7	5	11	3	14	10	0	6	13

- input to each S-box is 6 bits $b_1b_2b_3b_4b_5b_6$
- row = b_1b_6 , column = $b_2b_3b_4b_5$
- output is 4 bits

DES


- **More about S-boxes..**

- a modified version of IBM's proposal was accepted as the standard
- some of the design choices of S-boxes weren't public, which triggered criticism
- in late 1980s – early 1990s differential cryptanalysis techniques were discovered
- it was then revealed that DES S-boxes were designed to prevent such attacks
- such cryptanalysis techniques were known almost 20 years before they were discovered by others

DES Key Schedule

- **Key computation** consists of:

- circular shift
- permutation
- contraction



DES

- **Why does decryption work?**
 - round function g is invertible
 - compute $L_{i-1} = R_i \oplus f(k_i, L_i)$
 - compute $R_{i-1} = L_i$
 - in the beginning apply IP and at the end apply IP^{-1}
 - round keys k_{16}, \dots, k_1 and the f function are computed as before

DES Weak Keys

- The master key k is used to generate 16 round keys
- Some keys result in the **same round key to be generated in more than one round**
 - this reduces complexity of the cipher
- Solution: **check for weak keys at key generation**
- DES has 4 weak keys:
 - 00000000 00000000
 - 00000000 FFFFFFFF
 - FFFFFFFF 00000000
 - FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF

Attacks on DES

- **Brute force attack:** try all possible 2^{56} keys
 - time-consuming, but no storage requirements
- **Differential cryptanalysis:** traces the difference of two messages through each round of the algorithm
 - was discovered in early 90s
 - not effective against DES
- **Linear cryptanalysis:** tries to find linear approximations to describe DES transformations
 - was discovered in 1993
 - has no practical implication

Brute Force Search Attacks on DES

- It was conjectured in 1970s that a cracker machine could be built for \$20 million
- In 1990s RSA Laboratories called several **DES challenges**
 - **Challenge II-2** was solved in 1998 by Electronic Frontier Foundation
 - a DES Cracker machine was built for less than \$250,000 and found the key was in 56 hours
 - **Challenge III** was solved in 1999 by the DES Cracker in cooperation with a worldwide network of 100,000 computers
 - the key was found in 22 hours 15 minutes
 - <http://www.distributed.net/des>

Increasing Security of DES

- DES uses a 56-bit key and this raised concerns
- One proposed solution is **double DES**
 - apply DES twice by using two different keys k_1 and k_2
 - encryption $c = E_{k_2}(E_{k_1}(m))$
 - decryption $m = D_{k_1}(D_{k_2}(c))$
- The resulting key is $2 \cdot 56 = 112$ bits, so it should be more secure, right?
 - an attack called **meet-in-the-middle** discovers keys k_1 and k_2 with 2^{56} computation and storage
 - better, but not substantially than regular DES

Triple DES

- **Triple DES with two keys k_1 and k_2 :**
 - encryption $c = E_{k_1}(D_{k_2}(E_{k_1}(m)))$
 - decryption $m = D_{k_1}(E_{k_2}(D_{k_1}(c)))$
 - key space is $2 \cdot 56 = 112$ bits
- **Triple DES with three keys k_1, k_2 , and k_3 :**
 - encryption $c = E_{k_3}(D_{k_2}(E_{k_1}(m)))$
 - decryption $m = D_{k_1}(E_{k_2}(D_{k_3}(c)))$
 - key space is $3 \cdot 56 = 168$ bits
- There is **no known practical attack** against either version
- Can be made backward compatible by setting $k_1 = k_2$ or $k_3 = k_2$

Summary of Attacks on DES

- **DES**
 - **best attack: brute force search**
 - 2^{55} work on average
 - no other requirements
- **Double DES**
 - **best attack: meet-in-the-middle**
 - requires 2 plaintext-ciphertext pairs
 - requires 2^{56} space and about 2^{56} work
- **Triple DES**
 - **best practical attack: brute force search**