



Codebook
(Appendix A of V-Dem Project Description)
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Overview

This codebook provides a comprehensive listing of the disaggregated indicators of democracy that we aim to collect as part of the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project. It also serves as an appendix to Coppedge *et al* (2011) and to the V-Dem Project Description (to be posted at www.v-dem.net).

Sections. Indicators of democracy are divided into twelve sections: (1) Elections, (2) Parties, (3) Direct democracy, (4) The executive, (5) The legislature, (6) Deliberation, (7) The judiciary, (8) Civil liberty, (9) Sovereignty, (10) civil society organizations, (11) The media, and (12) Political equality. In addition, a post-survey questionnaire (13) is answered by all coders and V-Dem staff after other sections have been completed.

The sections are based on areas of country-expert expertise and not intended as recognizable components or conceptions of democracy. Each section is designed to function as an independent survey module in the questionnaire.

Surveys. A set of questions assigned to a single coder is referred to as a *survey*. This typically consists of a section of the questionnaire, or several sections, as discussed below, according to a coder's distinctive expertise.

Clusters of sections. Clusters are groupings of sections that rely upon a similar expert knowledge base as indicated by the pilot phase coding of V-Dem. We have four clusters.

1. Elections
Parties
Direct democracy
2. Executive
Legislature
Deliberation
3. Judiciary
Civil liberty
Sovereignty
4. Civil society
Media
Political equality

These clusters are suggestions, not requirements. It is left to the regional managers (RMs), in consultation with the coders, to decide who is most appropriate for which sections of the questionnaire and how many sections a single coder is assigned to.

Coding. Each indicator is classified according to its source:

- (A) Coding by extant sources.** This sort of coding is based on extant sources, probably gathered by RAs who are directed by a project manager (PM). Note that some type (A) data is included in V-Dem primarily for the purpose of measurement validation and might not be employed to construct aggregated concepts. Those (A) indicators that need to be collected prior to the coding (B) or (C) indicators are listed as **(A*)**. Those (A) indicators that have already been collected, or whose collection is relatively simple (because they can be integrated from some extant dataset), are listed as **(A-)**. Those (A) indicators that, pending sufficient funding, will be collected later are listed as **(A+)**.
- (B) Coding by Country Research Assistants (CRAs).** This is typically a graduate student or recent graduate who knows a lot about a particular country. These questions are factual in nature. Those (B) indicators that will be collected later – pending sufficient funding – are listed as **(B+)**.
- (C) Coding by Country Experts (CEs).** This is typically a graduate student, professor, or professional with deep knowledge of a country and perhaps of a particular institution. V-Dem is committed to make sure that 3/5, or 60 percent of CEs are nationals of the country they are coding, and preferably resident nationals.
- (D) Composite coding.** This refers to indicators that are composed of (A), (B), or (C) indicators in an aggregated form. This may be accomplished by adding a denominator (e.g., per capita), by creating a cumulative scale (Total number of...), or by creating larger concepts (e.g., components or principles of democracy).

A count of indicators across these categories is summarized below (as of March 29, 2011).

	A*	A	A-	A+	B	B+	C	D	Total
1 Elections	2	12	6	6	10	0	38	7	81
2 Parties	0	0	13	0	0	0	15	0	28
3 Direct Demo	0	0	0	0	29	0	0	0	29
4 Executive	5	0	24	4	11	0	28	0	72
5 Legislature	3	0	10	1	14	1	14	0	43
6 Deliberation	0	0	0	0	0	0	7	0	7
7 Judiciary	0	0	37	10	0	0	13	0	60
8 Civil Liberties	0	0	0	0	0	0	26	5	31
9 Sovereignty	0	0	0	0	0	0	5	0	5
10 CSOs	0	0	0	0	0	0	11	0	11
11 Media	0	0	0	0	0	0	11	0	11
12 Equality	0	1	0	10	0	0	7	0	18
13 PostQuest	0	20	0	0	23	0	23	0	66
Total	10	33	90	31	87	1	198	12	462

Without Post-Q	10	13	90	31	64	1	175	12	396
WoutPQ: A*ABCD									275
WoutPQ & A*ABC only									263

Title. Each indicator is given a title that is brief, descriptive, and unique.

v1 tag. This is the 10-digit tag for indicators in the pilot phase and covering only 12 countries: Albania, Burma, Egypt, Ghana, Japan, Mexico, Russia, South Africa, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, and Yemen. Most indicators are new, and hence do not have a prior tag. Those that do have a v1 tag may have changed considerably from their version in the pilot study. No v1 tags will be used after February 2012, as all variables will be assigned a new v2 label. We will maintain a list showing how v1 and v2 labels are matched up: v1 only, v2 only, identical in v1 and v2, substantially equivalent, and similar but not comparable.

v2 tag. This is the 10-digit tag for each indicator in the current version of V-Dem.

CCP tag. The tag assigned by CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Key terms. All key terms appear in the Glossary, situated at the end of this document, unless they are specific to a single section (in which case they need only appear in the Introduction to that section or in the clarifications for particular questions).

Key terms highlighted in turquoise (like [this](#)) are programmed so as to allow the coder to see its definition in a bubble when the cursor is placed above it (mouse-over), or to click through to the section of the Glossary that defines it (hyper-text).

Project manager (PM). The team member(s) primarily responsible for the development and implementation (data collection) of an indicator. GOT

Answer type.

- (1) *Multiple-selection:* where a coder can select more than one answer.
- (2) *Multiple-input:* a multi-part question, i.e., one question that one answers for several instances. For example, rating how democratic multiple countries are on the same 0-100 scale (Post-Survey Questionnaire).

Sources. Citations for all type (A) indicators are listed in this codebook; complete references are in the References section. Other sources, used for (B) or (C) coding and specific to particular countries, are recorded in the V-Dem database. The source for all (D) coding is V-Dem since these indicators are created from other V-Dem indicators.

Source Abbreviations.

CCP = Comparative Constitutions Project (Elkins et al. 2012)

CLEA = Constituency-Level Elections Archive (Kollman et al. 2011)

DPI = Database for Political Institutions (Beck et al. 2000)

IDEA = International IDEA (<http://www.idea.int/>)

IFES = International Foundation for Electoral Systems (<http://www.ifes.org/>)

IPU = Inter-Parliamentary Union (<http://www.ipu.org/>)

NELDA = National Elections Across Democracy and Autocracy (Hyde, Marinov 2012)

Coverage. Data coverage for (A) indicators – those collected from other sources (not our own coding) – is listed. If this is not known precisely (because the data has not yet been collected) an estimate is given.

Ordering. These comments relate to the ordering of questions when the coding of one indicator depends upon the coding of other indicators (i.e., whenever there is some alteration of the serial ordering of questions as listed in this document).

CCP ordering. The ordering of questions in the CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Key terms and their Stata analogs

Title (“variable label”)

v1 tag (“variable tag”)

v2 tag (“variable tag”)

Question (“notes”)

0 (“value key”): *No* (“value label”)

1 (“value key”): *Yes* (“value label”)

1 Elections

1.1 Elections introduction (B)(C)

V2 tag: v2elintro

PM: Staffan I. Lindberg

Among national elections we distinguish elections to: (i) the lower or unicameral chamber of the legislature (including constituent assemblies when they perform the function of legislatures), (ii) the upper chamber of the legislature, and (iii) the presidency.

For present purposes an executive who is elected by a legislature is considered a *prime minister*, not a president. In order to be considered a *president*, an executive must, under ordinary circumstances, be chosen directly by the electorate (perhaps mediated by an electoral college).

1.2 Non-election specific coding introduction (B)(C)

V2 tag: v2elintro1

The following questions are not election-specific and should be coded for every year from 1900 (or when applicable) to the present.

1.3 Electoral regime (C)

v2 tag: v2elelcreg

PM: Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: At this time, are regularly scheduled national elections on course, as stipulated by election law or well-established precedent; and if not, what was the initial immediate cause of the current suspension or postponement of the electoral regime?

Clarification: Using the “specific date” window, please code the dates of the interruption of the electoral regime as precisely as possible. Thus, if a military coup interrupted the electoral regime on June 5, 1910 until elections were restored on October 10, 1912, you should code “1” for June 5, 1910 and all of 1911, then “7” for October 10, 1912.

- 0: There has been no provision for elections at all in the country’s history, so elections cannot be said to have been interrupted.
- 1: A military coup initiated the current interruption of the electoral regime.
- 2: A civilian coup initiated the current interruption of the electoral regime.
- 3: A civil war initiated the current interruption of the electoral regime.
- 4: Another type of domestic violence initiated the current interruption of the electoral regime.

- 5: An invasion by foreign powers initiated the current interruption of the electoral regime.
- 6: Some other event initiated the current interruption of the electoral regime.
- 7: Elections are on course, as stipulated by election law or well-established precedent.

1.4 Candidate restriction by ethnicity, race, religion, or language (B)

v2 tag: v2elrstrct

PM: Pamela Paxton

Question: Is the eligibility of candidates for national executive or legislative office formally restricted (by constitution or statute) by ethnicity, race, religion, or language?

- 0: Yes, there are such statutory restrictions.
- 1: No, but law requires that candidates must renounce (or hide) their ethnic, racial, religious, or linguistic identity.
- 2: No, there are no such restrictions.

1.5 Disclosure of campaign donations (C)

v1 tag: el07donate

v2 tag: v2eldonate

PM: Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: Are there disclosure requirements for donations to national election campaigns?

- 0: No. There are no disclosure requirements.
- 1: Not really. There are some, possibly partial, disclosure requirements in place but they are not observed or enforced most of the time.
- 2: Ambiguous. There are disclosure requirements in place, but it is unclear to what extent they are observed or enforced.
- 3: Mostly. The disclosure requirements may not be fully comprehensive (some donations not covered), but most existing arrangements are observed and enforced.
- 4: Yes. There are comprehensive requirements and they are observed and enforced almost all the time.

1.6 Public campaign finance (C)

v1 tag: el08pubfin

v2 tag: v2elpubfin

PM: Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: Is significant public financing available for parties' and/or candidates' campaigns for national office?

- 0: No. Public financing is not available.
- 1: Little. There is public financing but it is so small or so restricted that it plays a minor role in most parties' campaigns.
- 2: Ambiguous. There is some public financing available but it is unclear whether it plays a significant role for parties.
- 3: Partly. Public financing plays a significant role in the campaigns of many parties.
- 4: Yes. Public financing funds a significant share of expenditures by all, or nearly all parties.

1.7 Minimum voting age (A+)

PM: Pamela Paxton

Question: What is the minimum age at which citizens are allowed to vote in national elections?
[numeric]

Sources: Paxton et al. (2003); CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Coverage: Expect near full coverage, 1950-; some coverage 1900-1950.

1.8 Compulsory voting (B)

v2 tag: v2elcomvot

PM: Pamela Paxton

Question: Is voting compulsory (for those eligible to vote) in national elections?

- 0: No.
- 1: Yes. But there are no sanctions or sanctions are not enforced.
- 2: Yes. Sanctions exist and are enforced, but they impose minimal costs upon the offending voter.
- 3: Yes. Sanctions exist, they are enforced, and they impose considerable costs upon the offending voter.

1.9 Right to vote restricted (A+)

v2 tag: v2elvotrst

PM: Pamela Paxton

Question: Is the right to vote in national elections denied to any of the following categories of citizens?

Clarification: Check all that apply. Note that this question applies to citizens only. Note also that we are interested in legal (de jure) restrictions, not restrictions that may be operative in practice (de facto).

- 0: Women.
- 1: One or more **social groups**.
- 2: Convicts or ex-convicts.
- 3: Illiterates.

Answer type: Multiple-selection.

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012); Paxton et al. (2003); Paxton, Green, and Hughes (2008); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU).

Coverage: Expect near full coverage, 1950-; some coverage 1900-1950.

1.10 Adult citizens with right to vote % (A)

v2 tag: v2eladltvt

PM: Pamela Paxton

Question: What percentage (%) of adult citizens (as defined by statute) has the legal right to vote in national elections?

[numeric]

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012); Paxton et al. (2003).

Coverage: Expect near full coverage, 1950-; some coverage 1900-1950.

1.11 Resident noncitizens who cannot vote (C)

v1 tag: el01noncit

v2 tag: v2elnoncit

PM: Pamela Paxton

Question: What percentage (%) of the people *residing* in the country (or colony) does not enjoy the legal right to vote in national elections because they are not full citizens?

Clarification: This question focuses on people whose exclusion from suffrage stems from their immigrant status or lack of recognition as citizens by a colonial power. An example of the first sort would be Kuwait, where about half of the population consists of non-nationals, who are thereby excluded from the suffrage. An example of the second sort would be French

West Africa, where (until the late 1950s) only a small portion of permanent residents were allowed to vote.

[range]

1.12 Female suffrage restricted (A-)

v2 tag: v2elfemrst

PM: Pamela Paxton

Question: Are women eligible to vote in national elections?

- 0: No female suffrage. No women are allowed to vote.
- 1: Restricted female suffrage. Some women are allowed to vote.
- 2: Universal female suffrage. All women are allowed to vote.

Sources: Paxton et al. (2003); Paxton, Green, and Hughes (2008).

Coverage: Comprehensive, 1900-.

1.13 EMB autonomy (C)

v1 tag: el05embaut

v2 tag: v2elembaut

PM: Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: Does the Election Management Body (EMB) have autonomy from government to apply election laws and administrative rules impartially in national elections?

Clarification: The EMB refers to whatever body (or bodies) is charged with administering national elections.

- 0: No. The EMB is controlled by the incumbent government, the military, or other *de facto* ruling body.
- 1: Somewhat. The EMB has some autonomy on some issues but on critical issues that influence the outcome of elections, the EMB is partial to the *de facto* ruling body.
- 2: Ambiguous. The EMB has some autonomy but is also partial, and it is unclear to what extent this influences the outcome of the election.
- 3: Almost. The EMB has autonomy and acts impartially almost all the time. It may be influenced by the *de facto* ruling body in some minor ways that do not influence the outcome of elections.
- 4: Yes. The EMB is autonomous and impartially applies elections laws and administrative rules.

1.14 EMB capacity (C)

v1 tag: el06embcap

v2 tag: v2elembcap

PM: Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: Does the Election Management Body (EMB) have sufficient staff and resources to administer a well-run national election?

Clarification: The EMB refers to whatever body (or bodies) is charged with administering national elections.

- 0: No. There are glaring deficits in staff, financial, or other resources affecting the organization across the territory.
- 1: Not really. Deficits are not glaring but they nonetheless seriously compromised the organization of administratively well-run elections in many parts of the country.
- 2: Ambiguous. There might be serious deficiencies compromising the organization of the election but it could also be a product of human errors and co-incidence or other factors outside the control of the EMB.
- 3: Mostly. There are partial deficits in resources but these are neither serious nor widespread.
- 4: Yes. The EMB has adequate staff and other resources to administer a well-run election.

1.15 Elections introduction (B)(C)

v2 tag: v2elintro2

The following questions pertain to specific national elections. The date of each election is pre-coded. In cases where more than one election is held on the same day(s), the questions in this section are for all elections taking place on that date.

1.16 Elections NELDA id-number1 (A-)

v2tag: v2elNELDA (Provisionally included as the text field in v2eltype.)

PM: Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: What is the NELDA-type unique identifier for each election date, type, and round?

Source: NELDA (Hyde, Marinov 2012).

1.17 Election type (A*)

v2tag: v2eltype

PM: Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: What type of election was held on this date? Choose all that apply.

Clarification: Whenever possible, specify the exact date of each election. If the election unfolds across more than one day, enter the date for the first day. If the precise date is unavailable, enter the first of the month; if the month is unknown, enter January 1. Multiple-round elections (e.g., two-round elections) are counted separately. (More than one election in a single year can be accommodated.)

- 0: Legislative; lower, sole, or both chambers, first or only round.
- 1: Legislative, lower, sole, or both chambers, second round.
- 2: Legislative, upper chamber only, first or only round.
- 3: Legislative, upper chamber only, second round.
- 4: Constituent Assembly, first or only round.
- 5: Constituent Assembly, second round.
- 6: Presidential, first or only round.
- 7: Presidential, second round.
- 8: Metropolitan or supranational legislative, first or only round.
- 9: Metropolitan or supranational legislative, second round.

Sources: NELDA (Hyde, Marinov 2012); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); IFES; IDEA; Polity IV (Marshall, Jaggers 2007); *Keesings Records*; *CIA Factbook*; *Wikipedia*.

Coverage: 1900-2011.

1.18 Elections multiparty (C)

v1 tag: el11multpar

v2 tag: v2elmulpar

PM: Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: Was this national election multiparty?

- 0: No. No-party or single-party and there is no meaningful competition (includes situations where a few parties are legal but they are all *de facto* controlled by the dominant party).
- 1: Not really. No-party or single-party (defined as above) but multiple candidates from the same party and/or independents contest legislative seats or the presidency.
- 2: Constrained. At least one real opposition party is allowed to contest but competition is highly constrained – legally or informally.

- 3: Almost. Elections are multiparty in principle but either one main opposition party is prevented (*de jure* or *de facto*) from contesting, or conditions such as civil unrest (excluding natural disasters) prevent competition in a portion of the territory.
- 4: Yes. Elections are multiparty, even though a few marginal parties may not be permitted to contest (e.g. far-right/left extremist parties, anti-democratic religious or ethnic parties).

1.19 Election voter registry (C)

v1 tag: el16rgstry

v2 tag: v2elrgstry

PM: Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: In this national election, was there a reasonably accurate voter registry in place and was it used?

- 0: No. There was no registry, or the registry was not used.
- 1: No. There was a registry but it was fundamentally flawed (meaning 20% or more of eligible voters could have been disenfranchised or the outcome could have been affected significantly by double-voting and impersonation).
- 2: Uncertain. There was a registry but it is unclear whether potential flaws in the registry had much impact on electoral outcomes.
- 3: Yes, somewhat. The registry was imperfect but less than 10% of eligible voters may have been disenfranchised, and double-voting and impersonation could not have affected the results significantly.
- 4: Yes. The voter registry was reasonably accurate (less than 1% of voters were affected by any flaws) and it was applied in a reasonable fashion.

1.20 Election male suffrage in practice (C)

v2 tag: v2elmalsuf

PM: Pamela Paxton

Question: In this national election, what percentage (%) of male citizens who were legally entitled to vote was prevented from doing so?

Clarification: Legal voting rights can be compromised by a number of issues (for example intimidation, insecurity, prohibitive laws or practices, impersonation, or by social/religious norms and practices). Do *not* consider registration practices that place the burden on the voter to take action to register ahead of the election.

[range]

1.21 Election female suffrage in practice (C)

v2 tag: v2elfemsuf

PM: Pamela Paxton

Question: In this national election, what percentage (%) of female citizens who were legally entitled to vote was prevented from doing so?

Clarification: Legal voting rights can be compromised by a number of issues (for example intimidation, insecurity, prohibitive laws or practices, impersonation, or by social/religious norms and practices). Do *not* consider registration practices that place the burden on the voter to take action to register ahead of the election.

[range]

1.22 Election suffrage in practice (D)

v1 tag: el03citnvp

v2 tag: v2elsufrag

PM: Pamela Paxton

Question: In this national election, what percentage (%) of citizens who were legally entitled to vote was prevented from doing so?

Clarification: Calculated from the two previous indicators.

[numeric]

1.23 Election vote buying (C)

v2 tag: v2elvotbuy

PM: Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: In this national election, was there evidence of vote and/or turnout buying?

Clarification: Vote and turnout buying refers to the distribution of money or gifts to individuals, families, or small groups in order to influence their decision to vote/not vote or whom to vote for. It does not include legislation targeted at specific constituencies, i.e., “porkbarrel” legislation.

- 1: Yes. There was systematic, widespread, and almost nationwide vote/turnout buying by almost all parties and candidates.
- 2: Yes, some. There were non-systematic but rather common vote-buying efforts, even if only in some parts of the country or by one or a few parties.

- 3: Restricted. Money and/or personal gifts were distributed by parties or candidates but these offerings were more about meeting an 'entry-ticket' expectation and less about actual vote choice or turnout, even if a smaller number of individuals may also be persuaded.
- 4: Almost none. There was limited use of money and personal gifts, or these attempts were limited to a few small areas of the country. In all, they probably affected less than a few percent of voters.
- 5: None. There was no evidence of vote/turnout buying.

1.24 Election other voting irregularities (C)

v1 tag: el17irreg

v2 tag: v2elirreg

PM: Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: In this national election, was there evidence of other *intentional* irregularities by incumbent and/or opposition parties, and/or vote fraud?

Clarification: Examples include use of double IDs, intentional lack of voting materials, ballot-stuffing, misreporting of votes, and false collation of votes.

This question does *not* refer to lack of access to registration, harassment of opposition parties, manipulations of the voter registry or vote-buying (dealt with in previous questions).

- 0: Yes. There were systematic and almost nationwide other irregularities.
- 1: Yes, some. There were non-systematic, but rather common other irregularities, even if only in some parts of the country.
- 2: Sporadic. There were a limited number of sporadic other irregularities, and it is not clear whether they were intentional or disfavored particular groups.
- 3: Almost none. There were only a limited number of irregularities, and many were probably unintentional or did not disfavor particular groups' access to participation.
- 4: None. There was no evidence of intentional other irregularities. Unintentional irregularities resulting from human error and/or natural conditions may still have occurred.

1.25 Election government intimidation (C)

v1 tag: el12intim

v2 tag: v2elintim

PM: Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: In this national election, were opposition candidates/parties/campaign workers subjected to repression, intimidation, violence, or harassment *by the government, the ruling party, or their agents*?

Clarification: Other types of clearly distinguishable civil violence, even if politically motivated, during the election period should *not* be factored in when scoring this indicator (it is dealt with separately).

- 0: Yes. The repression and intimidation by the government or its agents was so strong that the entire period was quiet.
- 1: Yes, frequent: There was systematic, frequent and violent harassment and intimidation of the opposition by the government or its agents during the election period.
- 2: Yes, some. There was periodic, not systematic, but possibly centrally coordinated – harassment and intimidation of the opposition by the government or its agents.
- 3: Restrained. There were sporadic instances of violent harassment and intimidation by the government or its agents, in at least one part of the country, and directed at only one or two local branches of opposition groups.
- 4: None. There was no harassment or intimidation of opposition by the government or its agents, during the election campaign period and polling day.

1.26 Election other electoral violence (C)

v1 tag: el20peace

v2 tag: v2elpeace

PM: Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: In this national election, was the campaign period, election day, and post-election process free from other types (*not by the government, the ruling party, or their agents*) of violence related to the conduct of the election and the campaigns (but not conducted by the government and its agents)?

- 0: No. There was widespread violence between civilians occurring throughout the election period, or in an intense period of more than a week and in large swaths of the country. It resulted in a large number of deaths or displaced refugees.
- 1: Not really. There were significant levels of violence but not throughout the election period or beyond limited parts of the country. A few people may have died as a result, and some people may have been forced to move temporarily.
- 2: Somewhat. There were some outbursts of limited violence for a day or two, and only in a small part of the country. The number of injured and otherwise affected was relatively small.

- 3: Almost. There were only a few instances of isolated violent acts, involving only a few people; no one died and very few were injured.
- 4: Peaceful. No election-related violence between civilians occurred.

1.27 Election boycotts (C)

v1 tag: el18boycot

v2 tag: v2elboycot

PM: Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: In this national election, did any registered opposition candidates or parties boycott?

Clarification: A boycott is a deliberate and public refusal to participate in an election by a candidate or party who is eligible to participate.

- 0: Total. All opposition parties and candidates boycotted the election.
- 1: Significant. Some but not all opposition parties or candidates boycotted but they constituted a major opposition force.
- 2: Ambiguous. Some but not all opposition parties or candidates boycotted but it is unclear whether they would have constituted a major electoral force.
- 3: Minor. A few opposition parties or candidates boycotted and they were relatively insignificant ones.
- 4: Nonexistent. No parties or candidates boycotted the elections.

1.28 Election free campaign media (C)

v1 tag: me08frcamp

v2 tag: v2elfrcamp

PM: Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: Do parties or candidates receive either free or publicly financed access to national broadcast media during national election periods?

- 0: Either no parties or only the governing party receives free access.
- 1: Some parties in addition to the governing party receive free access.
- 2: All parties receive free access.

1.29 Election paid campaign advertisements (C)

v2 tag: v2elpdcamp

PM: Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: Are parties or candidates able to run paid campaign ads on national broadcast media during national election periods?

- 0: Not at all.
- 1: It is permitted but regulated in ways that, in practice, favor the government and its allies.
- 2: It is permitted without limit.
- 3: It is permitted but regulated in ways that, in practice, foster fair competition.

1.30 Election paid interest group media (C)

v1 tag: me10paidig

v2 tag: v2elpaidig

PM: Holli Semetko

Question: Are interest groups and individuals able to run paid campaign ads on national broadcast media during national election periods?

- 0: Not at all.
- 1: It is permitted but regulated in ways that, in practice, favor groups allied with the government.
- 2: It is permitted without limit.
- 3: It is permitted but regulated in ways that, in practice, foster representation of diverse perspectives.

1.31 Election domestic election monitors (B)

v2 tag: v2eldommon

PM: Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: In this national election, were election monitors from all parties and independent domestic election monitors allowed to monitor the vote at polling stations across the country?

- 0: No
- 1: Yes

1.32 Election international monitors (A-)

v2 tag: v2elintmon

PM: Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: In this national election, were independent international election monitors allowed to monitor the vote at polling stations across the country?

0: No

1: Yes

Sources: NELDA (Hyde, Marinov 2012).

Coverage: 1950-2010

1.33 Election free and fair (C)

v1 tag: el09frfair

v2 tag: v2elfrfair

PM: Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: Taking all aspects of the pre-election period, election day, and the post-election process into account, would you consider this national election to be free and fair?

Clarification: The only thing that should *not* be considered in coding this is the extent of suffrage (by law). Thus, a free and fair election may occur even if the law excludes significant groups (an issue measured separately).

- 0: No, not at all. The elections were fundamentally flawed and the official results had little if anything to do with the 'will of the people' (i.e., who became president; or who won the legislative majority).
- 1: Not really. While the elections allowed for some competition, the irregularities in the end affected the outcome of the election (i.e., who became president; or who won the legislative majority).
- 2: Ambiguous. There was substantial competition and freedom of participation but there were also significant irregularities. It is hard to determine whether the irregularities affected the outcome or not (as defined above).
- 3: Yes, somewhat. There were deficiencies and some degree of fraud and irregularities but these did not in the end affect the outcome (as defined above).
- 4: Yes. There was some amount of human error and logistical restrictions but these were largely unintentional and without significant consequences.

1.34 Election VAP turnout (A-)

V2 tag: v2elvaptrn

PM: Pamela Paxton

Question: In this national election, what percentage (%) of the adult voting-age population cast a vote according to official results?

[numeric]

Sources: IDEA.

Coverage: 1945-.

1.35 Election turnout (A)

V2 tag: v2eltrnout

PM: Pamela Paxton

Question: In this national election, what percentage (%) of all registered voters cast a vote according to official results?

[numeric]

Sources: IDEA; Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); NELDA (Hyde, Marinov 2012).

Coverage: 1945-.

1.36 Election executive turnover nominal (B)

v2 tag: v2eltvrexn

PM: Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: Which offices (if any) experienced turnover as a result of this national election?

Clarification: Choose all that apply.

- 0: A new president took office. S/he is a member of the same party as the previous president.
- 1: A new president took office. S/he is a member of a different party than the previous president.
- 2: A new prime minister took office. S/he is a member of the same party as the previous prime minister.
- 3: A new prime minister took office. S/he is a member of a different party than the previous prime minister.
- 4: No change in personnel or party control occurred in the presidency or the prime minister's office.

1.37 Election executive turnover ordinal (B)

v1 tag: el13tvrex

v2 tag: v2eltvrexo

PM: Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: Was there turnover in the executive office as a result of this national election?

Clarification: Turnover in the executive can occur in presidential, semi-presidential, as well as parliamentary systems. Turnover does not only refer to the individual person holding office but also to that person's party.

Skip this question if this is a legislative election and the political system is presidential (separate powers).

- 0: No. The executive(s) - a president or prime minister - retained his/her position. In semi-presidential regimes, both the president and the prime minister retained their offices.
- 1: Half. The president is a different individual than before the election but from the same party that was in power before the election. In parliamentary systems the prime minister changes as an effect of a changes in the ruling coalition or changes in party leadership. In semi-presidential regimes, this code applies when the elections result in co-habitation *after* a period when one party has held both offices.
- 2: Yes. The ruling party's candidate lost the presidential elections. In parliamentary systems the ruling party or coalition of parties lost and the new prime minister is from a different party or from a new coalition. In semi-presidential regimes, this code applies when one party holds *both* the office of the president and the office of the prime minister *after* a period of co-habitation, or if the holders of both offices change in terms of person and party in the same election.

1.38 Election losers accept results (C)

v1 tag: el19accept

v2 tag: v2elaccept

PM: Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: Did losing parties and candidates accept the result of this national election within three months?

- 0: None. None of the losing parties or candidates accepted the results the election, or all opposition was banned.
- 1: A few. Some but not all losing parties or candidates accepted the results but those who constituted the main opposition force did not.
- 2: Some. Some but not all opposition parties or candidates accepted the results but it is unclear whether they constituted a major opposition force or were relatively insignificant.

- 3: Most. Many but not all opposition parties or candidates accepted the results and those who did not had little electoral support.
- 4: All. All parties and candidates accepted the results.

1.39 Election assume office (C)

v2 tag: v2elasmoff

PM: Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: Following this national election, did winners assume office according to prescribed constitutional rules and norms?

- 0: No. The official winner of the election was prevented from assuming office by *unconstitutional* means.
- 1: Partially. The official winner/winning party or largest vote-getter was forced at least in part by unconstitutional means to share power, or delay assuming power for more than 6 months.
- 2: Yes. Constitutional rules and norms were followed and the official winner/winning party or largest vote-getter assumed office accordingly (or continued in office).

1.40 Effective number of cabinet parties (B)

v1 tag: ex05mpcab

v2 tag: v2elnbpr

PM: Allen Hicken

Question: In the first cabinet after this national election, how many political parties were represented in the cabinet?

- 0: Parties are not allowed.
- 1: One party.
- 2: Two parties.
- 3: Three parties.
- 4: Four or more parties.

1.41 Election women in the cabinet (B)

v2 tag: v2elwomcab

PMs: Pamela Paxton

Question: In the first cabinet after this national election, what percentage (%) of the ministers was female?

Clarification: A “minister” is defined as a person with a specific set of duties (a portfolio). It excludes ministers without portfolio and no specific responsibilities. Please provide an estimate if you do not know the exact figure.

Skip this question if the political system is presidential (separate powers) and this is a legislative election.

[range]

1.42 Presidential elections introduction (A)

The following questions pertain to specific presidential elections. A presidential election is defined as the direct election of an executive by the populace (perhaps with the mediation of an electoral college).

1.43 Presidential elections cumulative (D)

PM: Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: How many presidential elections (including the current election) have been held since 1900?

Clarification: This counts the cumulative number of presidential elections, regardless of any constitutional or unconstitutional changes and interruptions that may have taken place. Do not code if there is no office of the presidency. However, if there is a presidency, and no elections have ever occurred, this should be recorded as 0.

[numeric]

Sources: V-Dem.

Coverage: 1900-2011.

1.44 Presidential elections consecutive (D)

PM: Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: How many consecutive presidential elections (including the current election) have been held since 1900?

Clarification: This counts the consecutive number of presidential elections since the last unconstitutional change of government or democratic breakdown, or 1900 (whichever is more recent). Do not code if there is no office of the presidency.

[numeric]

Sources: V-Dem.

Coverage: 1900-2011.

1.45 Presidential election vote share of largest vote-getter (A)

v2 tag: v2elvotlrg

PM: Allen Hicken

Question: In this presidential election, what percentage (%) of the vote was received by the winning candidate in the first round?

[numeric]

Sources: Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010).

Coverage: Incomplete, constrained by the availability of vote share data. 80% coverage is the goal, 1900-.

1.46 Presidential election vote share of second-largest vote-getter (A)

v2 tag: v2elvotsml

PM: Allen Hicken

Question: In this presidential election, what percentage (%) of the vote was received by the second most successful candidate in the first round?

[numeric]

Sources: Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010).

Coverage: Incomplete, constrained by the availability of vote share data. 80% coverage is the goal, 1900-.

1.47 Presidential effective number of electoral parties/executive (A+)

v2 tag: v2elnmelpr

PM: Allen Hicken

Question: In this presidential election, what was the effective number of parties by share of votes?

Clarification: The effective number of electoral parties in a country's party system at the national level for the specified election year. This is calculated at the national level following Laakso and Taagepera's (1979) specification for popular presidential elections.

[numeric]

Sources: CLEA (Kollman et al. 2011).

Coverage: Incomplete, constrained by the availability of vote share data. 70% coverage is the goal, 1900-.

1.48 Lower chamber election introduction (A)(B)

V2 tag: *v2elintro3*

The following questions pertain to specific lower chamber or unicameral legislative elections. The dates of these elections have been pre-coded.

1.49 Lower chamber election cumulative (D)

PM: Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: How many lower chamber or unicameral legislative elections (including the current election) have been held since 1900?

Clarification: This counts the cumulative number of elections to the lower chamber or unicameral legislature, regardless of any constitutional or unconstitutional changes and interruptions that may have taken place. Do not code if there is no legislature. However, if there is a legislature and no elections to that body have ever occurred, this should be coded as 0.

[numeric]

Sources: V-Dem.

Coverage: 1900-2011.

1.50 Lower chamber election consecutive (D)

PM: Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: How many consecutive lower chamber or unicameral legislative elections (including the current election) have been held since 1900?

Clarification: This counts the consecutive number of lower chamber or unicameral legislative elections since the last unconstitutional change of government or democratic breakdown, or 1900 (whichever is more recent). Do not code if there is no legislature.

[numeric]

Sources: V-Dem.

Coverage: 1900-2011.

1.51 Lower chamber electoral system (A)

v2 tag: *v2elloelsy*

PM: Allen Hicken

Question: What was the electoral system used in this election for the lower or unicameral chamber of the legislature?

Clarification: Further information on the following electoral system types can be found in Reynolds/Reilly, *The New International IDEA Handbook* (2005), chapter two and Annex B (Glossary of Terms) – downloadable, free of charge, at www.idea.int/publications/esd/.

- 0: First-past-the-post (FPP, aka plurality) in single-member constituencies. The candidate with the most votes wins the seat.
- 1: Two-round system in single-member constituencies. Like FPP except that a threshold – usually 50%+1 – is required to avoid a runoff between the two top vote-getters.
- 2: Alternative vote in single-member districts. Voters rank-order their preferences for the candidates who compete for a single seat. If any candidate receives an absolute majority of first preferences, s/he is elected. If not, then the least successful candidates (based on first-preferences) are eliminated and their votes reallocated to the second-preferences. This process is repeated until a candidate reaches 50% +1 of the votes.
- 3: Block vote in multi-member districts. Electors have as many votes as there are seats within that district and can rank-order them (within or across parties) as they please.
- 4: Party block vote in multi-member districts. Voters cast a vote for a single party (but not for individual candidates within the party's list). The party with the most votes (i.e., a plurality) wins all the seats in that district.
- 5: Parallel (SMD/PR). Some seats are in single-member districts (allocated by FPP or two-round electoral rules) and other seats are in multimember districts (allocated by some form of PR). These districts are overlapping, meaning that each elector votes twice: once in the single-member district race and once in the multi-member district race. Results are independent.
- 6: Mixed-member proportional (SMD with PR compensatory seats). Some seats are in single-member districts (allocated by FPP or two-round electoral rules) and other seats are in multimember districts (allocated by some form of PR). These districts are overlapping, meaning that each elector votes twice: once in the single-member district race and once in the multi-member district race. Results are not independent. Specifically, the multimember seats are used to rectify disproportionalities achieved in the single-member district election – by adding seats, as necessary. This means that the representation of parties in the legislature is determined entirely by the PR ballot. It also means that the result of an MMP election is similar to the result of a PR election: parties achieve representation according to their nationwide vote share (on the PR ballot).
- 7: List PR with small multi-member districts (mean district size < 7). Each party presents a list of candidates for election within a district. Electors vote for a party, and parties receive seats in (rough) proportion to their overall share of the vote. Mean district size is less than seven.

- 8: List PR with large multi-member districts (mean district size >7). Each party presents a list of candidates for election within a district. Electors vote for a party, and parties receive seats in (rough) proportion to their overall share of the vote. Mean district size is greater than seven.
- 9: Single-transferable vote (STV) in multi-member districts. Electors rank-order candidates nominated for a district. Candidates that surpass a specified quota of first-preference votes are elected. The remaining seats are chosen by reallocating the votes of the least successful candidates to elector's second- (or third-) preferences until the specified quota is reached. This process is repeated until all seats for that district are filled.
- 10: Single non-transferable vote (SNTV) in multi-member districts. Each elector chooses a single candidate. The candidates with the most votes (a plurality) win. (The number of winners is of course determined by the size of the district.)
- 11: Limited vote in multi-member districts. Electors have more than one vote but fewer votes than the number of seats in the district. The candidates with the most votes (a plurality) win. (The number of winners is of course determined by the size of the district.)
- 12: Borda Count in single- or multi-member districts. Electors use numbers to mark preferences among candidates and each preference is assigned a value. For example, in a ten-candidate field a first preference is worth one, a second preference is worth .9, and so forth. These are summed and the candidate(s) with the highest total(s) is/are elected.

Sources: Golder (2006); CLEA (Kollman et al. 2011); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); IFES; Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); various.

Coverage: Expect near full coverage, 1900-.

1.52 Lower chamber election district magnitude (A+)

PM: Allen Hicken

Question: For this election, what was the average district magnitude for seats in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

[numeric]

Sources: Golder (2006); CLEA (Kollman et al. 2011); various.

Coverage: Expect some coverage, 1950-.

1.53 Lower chamber election statutory threshold (B)

v2 tag: v2elthresh

PM: Allen Hicken

Question: For this election, what was the statutory threshold (% share of votes) that a party needed to obtain in order to gain representation in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

Clarification: If there is no statutory threshold, enter 0. (Some thresholds are applied at regional levels. Nonetheless, they are usually consistent across regions.)

[range]

1.54 Lower chamber election vote share of largest vote-getter (A)

v2 tag: v2ellovtlg

PM: Allen Hicken

Question: In this election to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, what percentage (%) of the vote was received by the largest party in the first/only round?

[numeric]

Sources: Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010).

Coverage: Incomplete, constrained by the availability of vote share data. 80% coverage is the goal, 1900-.

1.55 Lower chamber election vote share of second-largest vote-getter (A)

v2 tag: v2ellovtsm

PM: Allen Hicken

Question: In this election to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, what percentage (%) of the vote was received by the second largest party in the first/only round?

[numeric]

Sources: Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010).

Coverage: Incomplete, constrained by the availability of vote share data. 80% coverage is the goal, 1900-.

1.56 Lower chamber election seats won by largest party (A)

v2 tag: v2ellostlg

PM: Allen Hicken

Question: In this election to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, how many seats were obtained by the largest party?

Clarification: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats.

[numeric]

Sources: Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010).

Coverage: Expect near full coverage, 1900-.

1.57 Lower chamber election seats (A)

v2 tag: v2elloseat

PM: Allen Hicken

Question: In this election, how many seats were there in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

Clarification: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats.

[numeric]

Sources: Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010).

Coverage: Expect near full coverage, 1900-.

1.58 Lower chamber election seat share won by largest party (A-)

v2 tag: v2ellostsl

PM: Allen Hicken

Question: In this election, what percentage (%) of the total seats in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature was obtained by the largest party?

Clarification: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats.

[numeric]

Sources: Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010).

Coverage: Expect near full coverage, 1900-.

1.59 Lower chamber election seats won by second largest party (A)

v2 tag: v2ellostsm

PM: Allen Hicken

Question: In this election, how many seats in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature were obtained by the next-largest party?

Clarification: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats.

[numeric]

Sources: Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010).

Coverage: Expect near full coverage, 1900-.

1.60 Lower chamber election seat share won by second largest party (A-)

PM: Allen Hicken

v2 tag: v2elllostss

Question: In this election, what percentage (%) of the total seats in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature was obtained by the next-largest party?

Clarification: Does not include appointed (nonelected) seats.

[numeric]

Sources: Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010).

Coverage: Expect near full coverage, 1900-.

1.61 Lower chamber election turnover (B)

v1 tag: el14tvrlg

v2 tag: v2eltvrig

PM: Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: Did control of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature change as a result of this election, according to official results?

- 0: No. The majority party or ruling coalition includes the same or substantially the same parties, even if some minor parties (holding less than 10% of the seats in the legislature) left or joined the coalition.
- 1: Half. A minority party who was not in control of the chamber before the elections assumed the leading position in the legislature but is dependent on other parties for support. Or, a post-election ruling coalition includes some old parties and some new parties and the new parties represent more than 10% of the seats in the legislature.
- 2: Yes. The incumbent party or coalition lost its majority or plurality-dominant position in the legislature and a different party or coalition assumes the majority position.

1.62 Lower chamber effective number of electoral parties (A+)

v2 tag: v2ellonmpe

PM: Allen Hicken

Question: In this election to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, what was the effective number of parties by share of votes?

Clarification: The effective number of electoral parties in a country's party system at the national level for the specified election year. This is calculated at the national level following Laakso and Taagepera's (1979) specification for elections to the lower or unicameral chamber of the legislature.

[numeric]

Sources: CLEA (Kollman et al. 2011).

Coverage: Incomplete, constrained by the availability of vote share data. 70% coverage is the goal, 1900-.

1.63 Lower chamber effective number of legislative parties (A)

v2tag: v2ellonmpl

PM: Allen Hicken

Question: After this election, what was the effective number of parties as measured by share of seats in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

[numeric]

Sources: CLEA (Kollman et al. 2011).

Coverage: Expect near full coverage, 1900-.

1.64 Upper chamber elections introduction (A)

The following questions pertain to specific upper chamber legislative elections. In a bicameral legislature, the lower and upper chambers are distinguished by the number of representatives, with the upper chamber containing a smaller membership than the lower chamber.

1.65 Upper chamber elections cumulative (D)

PM: Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: How many upper chamber legislative elections (including the current election) have been held since 1900?

Clarification: This counts the cumulative number of elections to the upper chamber of the legislature, regardless of any constitutional or unconstitutional changes and interruptions that may have taken place. Do not code if there is no upper chamber, i.e., if the legislature is unicameral or there is no legislature. However, if there is an upper chamber and no elections to that body have ever occurred, this should be coded as 0.

[numeric]

Sources: V-Dem.

Coverage: 1900-2011.

1.66 Upper chamber elections consecutive (D)

PM: Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: How many consecutive upper chamber legislative elections (including the current election) have been held since 1900?

Clarification: This counts the consecutive number of upper chamber legislative elections since the last unconstitutional change of government or democratic breakdown, or 1900 (whichever is more recent). Do not code if there is no upper chamber, i.e., if the legislature is unicameral or if there is no legislature.

[numeric]

Sources: V-Dem.

Coverage: 1900-2011.

1.67 Elections comments (A)(B)(C)

v1 tag: el15comcom

v2 tag: v2elcomcom

PM: Staffan I. Lindberg

Question: Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on electoral competition.

[text]

1.68 Introduction subnational elections and offices (C)

v2elintro4

PM: Kelly McMann

This section of the survey asks a small number of questions about *subnational* elections and offices. You will be instructed to identify two subnational levels, referred to as “regional government” and “local government”.

Questions in this section should be answered for every year, rather than for specific elections.

1.69 Regional government (C)

v2 tag: v2elreggov

PM: Kelly McMann

Question: Is there a regional government?

Clarification: Regional government is typically the second-highest level of government, just below the national government. There are many names for units at this level; some common ones are regions, provinces, states, departments, and cantons.

Countries with more than two subnational levels may have multiple levels that fit the definition of regional government. If this is the case, for all questions about regional government please code the regional level that, in practice, has the most responsibilities (e.g. making laws, providing primary, education, maintaining roads, policing, etc.) and resources to carry out those responsibilities.

Some countries are so small that, now or in earlier time periods, they have only local government and not regional government. If this is the case, please code this question as “0” for the appropriate time period.

If you have questions about identifying the regional government for your country, please send an email inquiry to your Regional manager (RM) or to V-Dem (using the email contact designated for your country).

0: No.

1: Yes.

Ordering: If coded “0” for entire period, skip the following questions focused on regional government.

1.70 Regional government name (C)

v2 tag: v2elregnam

PM: Kelly McMann

Question: What is the term(s) for the regional government units?

Clarification: If different types of units exist at this single level of regional government use multiple terms such as “provinces and federal city.” If the language of politics in your country is not English, please use whatever language is commonly used. For example, in Germany regional units are called “Länder.”

[text]

1.71 Regional government elected (C)

v2 tag: v2elsrgel

PM: Kelly McMann

Question: At the regional level, are government offices elected in practice?

Clarification: “Government offices” here refers to a regional executive and a regional assembly, *not* a judiciary and *not* minor bureaucrats. An *executive* is a single individual (or a very small group) (e.g., a governor). An *assembly* is a larger body of officials, who may be divided into two chambers.

“Elected” refers to offices that are directly elected by citizens or indirectly elected by a regional elected assembly. All other methods of obtaining office – including appointment by higher or lower levels of government – are considered to be *non-elected*.

In classifying a position as elected one is making no judgments about the freeness/fairness of the election or the relative extent of suffrage. One is simply indicating that there is an election and that the winner of that election (however conducted) generally takes office.

- 0: Generally, offices at the regional level are not elected.
- 1: Generally, the regional executive is elected but not the assembly.
- 2: Generally, the regional assembly is elected but not the executive.
- 3: Generally, the regional executive is elected and there is no assembly.
- 4: Generally, the regional assembly is elected and there is no executive.
- 5: Generally, the regional executive and assembly are elected.

1.72 Regional offices relative power (C)

v2 tag: v2elrgpwr

PM: Kelly McMann

Question: How would you characterize the relative power, in practice, of elected and non-elected offices at the regional level?

Clarification: We are concerned with the relative power of regional offices *to each other*, not the power of regional offices relative to higher or lower levels of government.

Please consider only major offices, such as the executive, assembly, and judiciary, *not* those of minor bureaucrats. (A body of government officials, such as an assembly or judiciary, counts as one office.)

An office is “subordinate” if its officeholders can be chosen and removed by another office or if its decisions can be blocked or modified by another office, but it cannot similarly constrain the other office.

- 0: All or nearly all elected offices are subordinate to non-elected offices at the regional level.
- 1: Some elected offices are subordinate to non-elected offices at the regional level.
- 2: Elected and non-elected offices are approximately equal in power at the regional level.
- 3: Most non-elected offices are subordinate to elected offices at the regional level.

4: All or nearly all non-elected offices are subordinate to elected offices at the regional level.

1.73 Local government (C)

v2 tag: v2ellocgov

PM: Kelly McMann

Question: Is there a local government?

Clarification: Local government refers to the level of government below the regional government. There are many names for units at this level; some common ones are counties, communes, cities, municipalities, towns, rural municipalities, and villages.

Countries with more than two subnational levels may have multiple levels that fit the definition of local government. If this is the case, please code the local level that, in practice, has the most responsibilities (e.g. making laws, providing primary, education, maintaining roads, policing, etc.) and resources to carry out those responsibilities.

0: No.

1: Yes.

Ordering: If coded “0” for entire period, skip the following questions focused on local government.

1.74 Local government name (C)

v2 tag: v2ellocnam

PM: Kelly McMann

Question: What is the term(s) for the local government units?

Clarification: If different types of units exist at this single level of local government, use multiple terms. For example, different terms may be needed for rural and urban units.

If the language of politics in your country is not English, please use whatever language is commonly used. For example, in Mexico local units are called “Municipios.”

[text]

1.75 Local government elected (C)

v2 tag: v2ellocelc

PM: Kelly McMann

Question: At the local level, are government offices elected in practice?

Clarification: “Government offices” here refers to a local executive and a local assembly, *not* a judiciary and *not* minor bureaucrats. An *executive* is a single individual (or a very small group) (e.g., a mayor). An *assembly* is a larger body of officials.

“Elected” refers to offices that are directly elected by citizens or indirectly elected by a local elected assembly. All other methods of obtaining office – including appointment by a higher level of government – are considered to be *non-elected*.

In classifying a position as elected one is making no judgments about the freeness/fairness of the election or the relative extent of suffrage. One is simply indicating that there is an election and that the winner of that election (however conducted) generally takes office.

- 0: Generally, offices at the local level are not elected.
- 1: Generally, the local executive is elected but not the assembly.
- 2: Generally, the local assembly is elected but not the executive.
- 3: Generally, the local executive is elected and there is no assembly.
- 4: Generally, the local assembly is elected and there is no executive.
- 5: Generally, the local executive and assembly are elected.

1.76 Local offices relative power (C)

v2 tag: v2ellocpwr

PM: Kelly McMann

Question: How would you characterize the relative power, in practice, of elected and non-elected offices at the local level?

Clarification: We are concerned with the relative power of local offices *to each other*, not the power of local offices relative to higher levels of government.

Please consider only major offices, such as the executive, assembly, and judiciary, *not* those of minor bureaucrats. (A body of government officials, such as an assembly or judiciary, counts as one office.)

An office is “subordinate” if its officeholders can be chosen and removed by another office or if its decisions can be blocked or modified by another office, but it cannot similarly constrain the other office.

- 0: All or nearly all elected offices are subordinate to non-elected offices at the local level.
- 1: Some elected offices are subordinate to non-elected offices at the local level.
- 2: Elected and non-elected offices are approximately equal in power at the local level.
- 3: Most non-elected offices are subordinate to elected offices at the local level.
- 4: All or nearly all non-elected offices are subordinate to elected offices at the local level.

Ordering: Skip if previous question coded as “0”

1.77 Subnational elections free and fair (C)

v2 tag: v2elffelr

PM: Kelly McMann

Question: Taking all aspects of the pre-election period, election day, and the post-election process into account, would you consider subnational elections (regional and local, as previously identified) to be free and fair on average?

Clarification: This question refers to subnational levels that have elected offices and elections. It does not refer to subnational levels without elected offices and elections. If there were no subnational elections in any of the years covered in this survey, choose option 5.

“Free and fair” refers to all aspects of the election process *except* the extent of suffrage (by law). Thus, a free and fair election may occur even if the law excludes significant groups (we measure that issue separately).

- 0: No, not at all. The elections were fundamentally flawed and the official results had little if anything to do with the 'will of the people' (who won office).
- 1: Not really. While the elections allowed for some competition, the irregularities in the end affected the outcome of the elections (who won office).
- 2: Ambiguous. There was substantial competition and freedom of participation but there were also significant irregularities. It is hard to determine whether the irregularities affected the outcome or not (who won office).
- 3: Yes, somewhat. There were deficiencies and some degree of fraud and irregularities but these did not in the end affect the outcome (who won office).
- 4: Yes. There was some amount of human error and logistical restrictions but these were largely unintentional and without significant consequences.
- 5: Does not apply. There were no subnational elections.

Ordering: If option 5 is selected, skip to Comments subnational elections.

1.78 Subnational election unevenness (C)

v1 tag: el40snless

v2 tag: v2elsnlsff

PM: Kelly McMann

Question: Does the freeness and fairness of subnational elections vary across different areas of the country?

Clarification: Subnational elections refer to elections to regional or local offices, as specified above.

- 0: No. Subnational elections in most or all areas of the country are equally free and fair (or, alternatively, equally not free and not fair).
- 1: Somewhat. Subnational elections in some areas of the country are somewhat more free and fair (or, alternatively, somewhat less free and fair) than subnational elections in other areas of the country.
- 2: Yes. Subnational elections in some areas of the country are significantly more free and fair (or, alternatively, significantly less free and fair) than subnational elections in other areas of the country.

Ordering: If answer is “0”, skip remaining questions in this section.

1.79 Subnational election area less free and fair name (C)

v1 tag: el40snless

v2 tag: v2elsnless

PM: Kelly McMann

Question: In which areas of the country are subnational elections significantly *less* free and fair than the country average for subnational elections?

Clarification: If providing names of all the relevant territorial units is not possible, use broad categories (for example, “the North”).

[text]

1.80 Subnational election area less free and fair pop (C)

v1 tag: el41snlpop

v2 tag: v2elsnlpop

PM: Kelly McMann

Question: What percentage (%) of the total population of the country lives in the areas you designated as having elections that are significantly *less* free and fair?

[range]

1.81 Subnational election area less free and fair characteristics (C)

v2 tag: v2elsnlfc

PM: Kelly McMann

Question: How would you describe the areas of the country in which elections are significantly less free and fair?

Clarification: Choose all that apply.

- 0: Rural.
- 1: Urban.
- 2: Areas that are less economically developed.
- 3: Areas that are more economically developed.
- 4: Inside the capital city.
- 5: Outside the capital city.
- 6: North.
- 7: South.
- 8: West.
- 9: East.
- 10: Areas of civil unrest (including areas where insurgent groups are active).
- 11: Areas where illicit activity is widespread.
- 12: Areas that are very sparsely populated.
- 13: Areas that are remote (difficult to reach by available transportation, for example).
- 14: Areas where there are indigenous populations.
- 15: Areas where the national ruling party or group is strong.
- 16: Areas where the national ruling party or group is weak.
- 17: Areas that were subject to a longer period of foreign rule.
- 18: Areas that were subject to a shorter period of foreign rule.
- 19: Areas that were recently subject to foreign rule.
- 20: Areas that have not recently been subject to foreign rule.
- 21: None of the above.

1.82 Subnational election area more free and fair name (C)

v1 tag: el43snmpop

v2 tag: v2elsnmore

PM: Kelly McMann

Question: In which areas of the country are subnational elections significantly *more* free and fair than the country average for subnational elections?

Clarification: If providing names of all the relevant territorial units is not possible, use broad categories (for example, “the North”).

[text]

1.83 Subnational election area more free and fair % (C)

v1 tag: el41snlpop

v2 tag: v2elsnmpop

PM: Kelly McMann

Question: What percentage (%) of the total population of the country lives in the areas you designated as having elections that are significantly *more* free and fair?

[range]

1.84 Subnational election area more free and fair characteristics (C)

v2 tag: v2elsnmrfc

PM: Kelly McMann

Question: How would you describe the areas of the country in which elections are significantly *more* free and fair?

Clarification: Choose all that apply.

- 0: Rural.
- 1: Urban.
- 2: Areas that are less economically developed.
- 3: Areas that are more economically developed.
- 4: Inside the capital city.
- 5: Outside the capital city.
- 6: North.
- 7: South.
- 8: West.
- 9: East.
- 10: Areas of civil unrest (including areas where insurgent groups are active).
- 11: Areas where illicit activity is widespread.

- 12: Areas that are very sparsely populated.
- 13: Areas that are remote (difficult to reach by available transportation, for example).
- 14: Areas where there are indigenous populations.
- 15: Areas where the national ruling party or group is strong.
- 16: Areas where the national ruling party or group is weak.
- 17: Areas that were subject to a longer period of foreign rule.
- 18: Areas that were subject to a shorter period of foreign rule.
- 19: Areas that were recently subject to foreign rule.
- 20: Areas that have not recently been subject to foreign rule.
- 21: None of the above.

1.85 Comments subnational elections

v1 tag: el44comsn

v2 tag: v2elcomsn

PM: Kelly McMann

Question: Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on subnational elections and offices.

[text]

2 Political Parties

2.1 Parties introduction (C)

PM: Allen Hicken

A “political party” refers to an organization that nominates candidates for public office. A party may refer to a longstanding coalition such as the CDU/CSU in Germany if that coalition functions in most respects like a single party.

Sometimes, the identity of a party is obscured by name changes. However, if the party/coalition changes names but retains key personnel and is still run by and for the same constituency then it should be considered the same organization.

Unless stated otherwise the following questions pertain to parties that compete for seats in the national legislature or for the presidency.

Most of the questions in the following section ask you to generalize across parties in a particular country (and at a particular point in time). We realize that practices vary from party to party; these are, after all, highly diverse organizations. However, for our purposes it is important to consider what the most common practices are.

In answering these questions it is sometimes important to distinguish between formal rules (as stipulated by statute, legislative rules, the constitution, or common law precedent) and actual practice (what happens on the ground). In order to clarify the *de jure/de facto* distinction, we employ the terms “by law...” and “in practice...” Please pay close attention to these cues wherever you see them. And if there is no clarification of the issue, assume that the question is referring to practices rather than formal rules.

2.2 Party ban (C)

v2 tag: v2psparban

PM: Allen Hicken

Question: Are any parties banned?

Clarification: This does not apply to parties that are barred from competing for failing to meet registration requirements or support thresholds.

- 0: Yes. All parties except the state-sponsored party (and closely allied parties) are banned.
- 1: Yes. Elections are non-partisan or there are no officially recognized parties.
- 2: Yes. Many parties are banned.
- 3: Yes. But only a few parties are banned.
- 4: No. No parties are officially banned.

2.3 Party ban target (C)

v2 tag: v2psbantar

PM: Allen Hicken

Question: If any parties are banned, what label best describes these parties?

Clarification: Choose all that apply.

- 0: Ethnic party.
- 1: Religious party.
- 2: Regional/local party.
- 3: Leftist extremist party.
- 4: Rightist extremist party.

5: Other.

Answer type: Multiple-selection.

Ordering: See instruction embedded in question.

2.4 Barriers to parties (C)

v1 tag: ps10bars

v2 tag: v2psbars

PM: Allen Hicken

Question: How restrictive are the barriers to forming a party?

Clarification: Barriers include legal requirements such as requirements for membership or financial deposits, as well as harassment.

- 0: Parties are not allowed.
- 1: It is impossible, or virtually impossible, for parties not affiliated with the government to form (legally).
- 2: There are significant obstacles (e.g. party leaders face high levels of regular political harassment by authorities).
- 3: There are modest barriers (e.g. party leaders face occasional political harassment by authorities).
- 4: There are no substantial barriers.

2.5 Opposition parties autonomy (C)

v2 tag: v2psoppaut

PM: Allen Hicken

Question: Are opposition parties independent and autonomous of the ruling regime?

Clarification: An opposition party is any party that is not part of the government, i.e., that has no control over the executive.

- 0: Opposition parties are not allowed.
- 1: There are no autonomous, independent opposition parties. Opposition parties are either selected or co-opted by the ruling regime.
- 2: At least some opposition parties are autonomous and independent of the ruling regime.
- 3: Most significant opposition parties are autonomous and independent of the ruling regime.

4: All opposition parties are autonomous and independent of the ruling regime.

Ordering: Answer only if previous question is coded 1-4.

2.6 Party organizations (C)

v1 tag: ps01orgs

v2 tag: v2psorgs

PM: Allen Hicken

Question: How many political parties for national-level office have permanent organizations?

Clarification: A permanent organization connotes a substantial number of personnel who are responsible for carrying out party activities outside of the election season?

- 0: No parties.
- 1: Fewer than half of the parties.
- 2: About half of the parties.
- 3: More than half of the parties.
- 4: All parties.

2.7 Party branches (C)

v2 tag: v2psprbrch

PM: Allen Hicken

Question: How many parties have permanent local party branches?

- 0: None.
- 1: Fewer than half.
- 2: About half.
- 3: More than half.
- 4: All.

2.8 Party linkages (C)

v2 tag: v2psprlnks

PM: Allen Hicken

Question: Among the major parties, what is the main or most common form of linkage to their constituents?

Clarification: A party-constituent linkage refers to the sort of “good” that the party offers in exchange for political support and participation in party activities.

- 0: Clientelistic. Constituents are rewarded with goods, cash, and/or jobs.
- 1: Mixed clientelistic and local collective.
- 2: Local collective. Constituents are rewarded with local collective goods, e.g., wells, toilets, markets, roads, bridges, and local development.
- 3: Mixed local collective and policy/programmatic.
- 4: Policy/programmatic. Constituents respond to a party’s positions on national policies, general party programs, and visions for society.

2.9 Distinct party platforms (C)

v1 tag: ps02plats

v2 tag: v2psplats

PM: Allen Hicken

Question: How many political parties with representation in the national legislature or presidency have publicly available party platforms (manifestos) that are publicized and relatively distinct from one another?

Clarification: In order to be counted in the affirmative, parties must have platforms that are both distinct (either in terms of content or generalized ideology) and publicly disseminated.

This question is *not* intended to measure how much the public actually knows about these platforms or whether they are important in structuring policymaking.

- 0: None, or nearly none.
- 1: Fewer than half.
- 2: About half.
- 3: More than half.
- 4: All, or nearly all.

2.10 Candidate selection—national/local (C)

v2 tag: v2pscnslnl

PM: Allen Hicken

Question: How centralized is legislative candidate selection within the parties?

Clarification: The power to select candidates for national legislative elections is often divided between local/municipal party actors, regional/state-level party organizations, and national

party leaders. One level usually dominates the selection process, while sometimes candidate selection is the outcome of bargaining between the different levels of party organization.

- 0: National legislative candidates are selected exclusively by national party leaders.
- 1: National legislative candidate selection is dominated by national party leaders but with some limited influence from local or state level organizations.
- 2: National legislative candidates are chosen through bargaining across different levels of party organization.
- 3: National legislative candidates are chosen by regional or state-level organizations, perhaps with some input from local party organizations or constituency groups.
- 4: National legislative candidates are chosen by a small cadre of local or municipal level actors.
- 5: National legislative candidates are chosen by constituency groups or direct primaries.

2.11 Legislative party cohesion (C)

v1 tag: ps03cohesv

v2 tag: v2pscohesv

PM: Allen Hicken

Question: Is it normal for members of the legislature to vote with other members of their party on important bills?

- 0: Not really. Many members are elected as independents and party discipline is very weak.
- 1: More often than not. Members are more likely to vote with their parties than against them, but defections are common.
- 2: Mostly. Members vote with their parties most of the time.
- 3: Yes, absolutely. Members vote with their parties almost all the time.

2.12 Party switching (C)

v2 tag: v2psswitch

PM: Allen Hicken

Question: Roughly what percentage (%) of the members of the national legislature changes or abandons their party in between elections?

Clarification: Do not include official party splits (when one party divides into two or more parties) or dissolutions (when a party formally dissolves).

[range]

Chad: please work on titles for each of the following indicators so they are short, descriptive, and unique WILL UPDATE WITH ALLEN'S NEW TITLES

2.13 Party system nationalization Cox Inflation Score (A-)

v2 tag: v2pscoxinf

PM: Allen Hicken

Question: A measure of party linkage across a country's electoral constituencies that builds on the economic principle of inflation. Here inflation refers to the discrepancy that occurs in party linkage as parties are aggregated from the constituency-level to the national-level party system. This measure was developed by Cox (1999).

[numeric]

Sources: CLEA (Kollman et al. 2011)

Coverage: Coverage will incomplete, both across time and space. Calculation is contingent on getting election data at the district level. 50% of country year elections would be a reasonable aim.

2.14 Party system nationalization Moenius and Kasuya Inflation Score (A-)

v2 tag: v2psmkinf

PM: Allen Hicken

Question: A measure of party linkage across a country's electoral constituencies that builds on the economic principle of inflation. Here inflation refers to the discrepancy that occurs in party linkage as parties are aggregated from the constituency-level to the national-level party system. This measure corresponds with Moenius and Kasuya's (2004) variable *I*.

[numeric]

Sources: CLEA (Kollman et al. 2011)

Coverage: Coverage will incomplete, both across time and space. Calculation is contingent on getting election data at the district level. 50% of country year elections would be a reasonable aim.

2.15 Party system nationalization Moenius and Kasuya Weighted Inflation Score (A-)

PM: Allen Hicken

v2 tag: v2psmkinfw

Question: A measure of party linkage across a country's electoral constituencies that builds on the economic principle of inflation. Here inflation refers to the discrepancy that occurs in party linkage as parties are aggregated from the constituency-level to the national-level

party system. This measure corresponds with Moenius and Kasuya's (2004) weighted inflation variable I_w , which accounts for variation in district size.

[numeric]

Sources: CLEA (Kollman et al. 2011)

Coverage: Coverage will incomplete, both across time and space. Calculation is contingent on getting election data at the district level. 50% of country year elections would be a reasonable aim.

2.16 Party system nationalization Moenius and Kasuya Inflation and Dispersion Score (A-)

PM: Allen Hicken

v2 tag: v2pskminfd

Question: A measure of party linkage across a country's electoral constituencies that builds on the economic principle of inflation. Here inflation refers to the discrepancy that occurs in party linkage as parties are aggregated from the constituency-level to the national-level party system. This measure also account for a dispersion, which "refers to the extent to which the contribution of each district's party system to the size of the national-level party system varies across districts" (Kasuya & Moenius, 2008).

[numeric]

Sources: CLEA (Kollman et al. 2011)

Coverage: Coverage will incomplete, both across time and space. Calculation is contingent on getting election data at the district level. 50% of country year elections would be a reasonable aim.

2.17 Party system nationalization Score (A-)

PM: Allen Hicken

v2 tag: v2pspsnat

Question: A measure of the nationalization of a party, based on the Gini coefficient of inequality in vote shares across constituencies (Jones & Mainwaring, 2003). The Stata program INEQDEC0 was used to create the Gini coefficient (Jenkins, 1999). We do not calculate this value for parties that received less than a five percent share of the national vote in an election.

[numeric]

Sources: CLEA (Kollman et al. 2011)

Coverage: Coverage will be incomplete, both across time and space. Calculation is contingent on getting election data at the district level. 50% of country year elections would be a reasonable aim.

2.18 Party system nationalization Standardized (A-)

PM: Allen Hicken

v2 tag: v2pspsnts

Question: A measure of the nationalization of a party, based on the Gini coefficient of inequality in vote shares across constituencies (Jones & Mainwaring, 2003). For this measure, the Party Nationalization Score (PNS) is standardized to account for variation in the number of territorial units across countries (Bochsler, 2006). The Stata program INEQDECO was used to create the Gini coefficient (Jenkins, 1999). We do not calculate this value for parties that received less than a five percentage share of the national vote in an election.

[numeric]

Sources: CLEA (Kollman et al. 2011)

Coverage: Coverage will be incomplete, both across time and space. Calculation is contingent on getting election data at the district level. 50% of country year elections would be a reasonable aim.

2.19 Party system nationalization Weighted Score (A-)

PM: Allen Hicken

v2 tag: v2pspsntw

Question: A measure of the nationalization of a party, based on the Gini coefficient of inequality in vote shares across constituencies (Jones & Mainwaring, 2003). For this measure, the Party Nationalization Score (PNS) is weighted by the party's share of the national valid vote. The Stata program INEQDECO was used to create the Gini coefficient (Jenkins, 1999).

[numeric]

Sources: CLEA (Kollman et al. 2011)

Coverage: Coverage will be incomplete, both across time and space. Calculation is contingent on getting election data at the district level. 50% of country year elections would be a reasonable aim.

2.20 Party system nationalization Score standardized and weighted (A-)

PM: Allen Hicken

v2 tag: v2pspsntsw

Question: A measure of the nationalization of a party that standardizes for the number of territorial units in a country and also weights for the size of the territorial units (Bochsler, 2010).

[numeric]

Sources: CLEA (Kollman et al. 2011)

Coverage: Coverage will incomplete, both across time and space. Calculation is contingent on getting election data at the district level. 50% of country year elections would be a reasonable aim.

2.21 Party system nationalization Score (A-)

PM: Allen Hicken

v2 tag: v2pspsnatb

Question: A summary expression of the level of nationalization of a party system (Jones & Mainwaring, 2003) Following Jones and Mainwaring (2003), parties that received less than a five percentage share of the vote at the national level are excluded from this analysis.

[numeric]

Sources: CLEA (Kollman et al. 2011)

Coverage: Coverage will incomplete, both across time and space. Calculation is contingent on getting election data at the district level. 50% of country year elections would be a reasonable aim.

2.22 Party system nationalization standardized Score (A-)

PM: Allen Hicken

v2 tag: v2psprnats

Question: A summary expression of the level of nationalization of a party system that is standardized to account for variation in the number of territorial units across countries (Bochsler, 2006). Following Jones and Mainwaring (2003), parties that received less than a five percentage share of the vote at the national level are excluded from this analysis.

[numeric]

Sources: CLEA (Kollman et al. 2011)

Coverage: Coverage will be incomplete, both across time and space. Calculation is contingent on getting election data at the district level. 50% of country year elections would be a reasonable aim.

2.23 Party system nationalization weighted Score (A-)

PM: Allen Hicken

v2 tag: v2psprnatw

Question: A summary expression of the level of nationalization of a party system that is weighted to account for variation in the number of territorial units across countries (Bochsler, 2010).

[numeric]

Sources: CLEA (Kollman et al. 2011)

Coverage: Coverage will be incomplete, both across time and space. Calculation is contingent on getting election data at the district level. 50% of country year elections would be a reasonable aim.

2.24 Party system nationalization Standardized and weighted Score (A-)

PM: Allen Hicken

v2 tag: v2pspsntsw

Question: A summary expression of the level of the nationalization of a party system that standardizes for the number of territorial units and also weights for the size of the territorial units (Bochsler, 2010).

[numeric]

Sources: CLEA (Kollman et al. 2011)

Coverage: Coverage will be incomplete, both across time and space. Calculation is contingent on getting election data at the district level. 50% of country year elections would be a reasonable aim.

2.25 Party system nationalization local entrant measure (A-)

PM: Allen Hicken

v2 tag: v2pssnalc

Question: A measure of party system nationalization based on parties' entry decisions (Lago & Montero, 2010). This measure accounts for the differential size of territorial units, the variance in party supply across districts, and party votes shares. It varies between 0 and 1.

[numeric]

Sources: CLEA (Kollman et al. 2011)

Coverage: Coverage will be incomplete, both across time and space. Calculation is contingent on getting election data at the district level. 50% of country year elections would be a reasonable aim.

2.26 Party competition across regions (C)

v2 tag: v2pscomprg

PM: Allen Hicken

Question: Which of the following best describes the nature of electoral support for major parties (those gaining over 10% of the vote)?

- 0: Most major parties are competitive in only one or two regions of the country, i.e., their support is heavily concentrated in a few areas.
- 1: Most major parties are competitive in some regions of the country, but not in others.
- 2: Most major parties are competitive in most regions of the country.

2.27 National party control (C)

v2 tag: v2psnatpar

PM: Allen Hicken

Question: How unified is party control of the national government?

Clarification: With respect to the executive, consider only those offices that have effective power over policymaking. (If there is a monarch or president with very little policymaking power, this office should not be considered.) With respect to bicameral legislatures, consider only the chamber, or chambers, that have effective policymaking power. (If the upper chamber is inactive or clearly subordinate, consider only the lower chamber.)

- 0: Unified party control. A single party controls the executive and legislative branches of the national government. (This is true almost by definition in a parliamentary system where a single party has a majority of seats.)
- 1: Unified coalition control. A single multi-party coalition controls the executive and legislative branches of the national government. (This is true almost by definition in a parliamentary system where a single coalition gathers together a majority of seats.)
- 2: Divided party control. (A) Different parties or individuals (unconnected to parties) control the executive and the legislature or (B) Executive power is divided between a president/monarch and a prime minister, each of which belongs to different parties; or between a non-partisan monarch and a prime minister.

2.28 Subnational party control (C)

v2 tag: v2pssunpar

PM: Allen Hicken

Question: Does a single party control important policymaking bodies across subnational units (regional and local governments)?

- 0: In almost all subnational units (at least 90%), a single party controls all or virtually all policymaking bodies.
- 1: In most subnational units (66%-90%), a single party controls all or virtually all policymaking bodies.
- 2: In few subnational units (less than 66%), a single party controls all or virtually all policymaking bodies.

2.29 Parties comments (C)

v1 tag: ps11commnt

v2 tag: v2pscommnt

PM: Allen Hicken

Question: Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on political parties.

[text]

3 Direct Democracy

3.1 Direct democracy introduction (B)

PM: David Altman

This set of questions focuses on direct democracy. Three mechanisms of direct democracy are scrutinized: (a) initiatives, (b) referendums, and (c) plebiscites.

By *initiatives* we understand those measures placed on the ballot through a citizen petition process, not by the legislature or the executive. They may concern either the proposal of a new law or a constitutional amendment.

By *referendums* we understand those measures placed on the ballot through a citizen petition process, not by the legislature or the executive. They may concern either the rejection of a recently approved law or a bill discussed in parliament.

By *plebiscites* (also called *authorities' referendums*) we understand those measures placed on the ballot by the legislature or the executive (or both). Please pay close attention to the particular type of popular vote under consideration. (We do not consider recall elections.)

In coding these questions it is sometimes important to distinguish between formal rules (as stipulated by statute, legislative rules, the constitution, or common law precedent) and actual practice. In order to clarify the *de jure/de facto* distinction, we employ the terms “by law...” and “in practice...” Please pay close attention to these cues wherever you see them.

3.2 Initiatives permitted (B)

v1 tag: dd01legci

v2 tag: v2ddlegci

PM: David Altman

Question: Is there legal provision for initiatives?

Clarification: These are measures placed on the ballot through a citizen petition process, not by the legislature or the executive. They may concern either a new law or a constitutional amendment.

- 0: Not allowed.
- 1: Constitutionally allowed but never utilized.
- 2: Allowed but with intervening institutional veto.
- 3: Allowed but non-binding.
- 4: Allowed and binding.

Ordering: If no legal provision exists (option 0), skip to question 3.12 Referendums permitted [v2ddlegrf].

3.3 Initiatives level (B)

v1 tag: dd02levci

v2 tag: v2ddlevci

PM: David Altman

Question: At what level(s) of government can initiatives be held?

- 0: Only at the national level.
- 1: Only at a subnational level.
- 2: At both national and subnational levels.

Programming: The next two indicators are clustered

Cluster 1

v2tag: v2ddc1

Clarification: If the requirement is stated in terms of a raw number of registered voters, answer the first question and skip the second. If it is stated in terms of a percentage (%) of registered voters, skip the first question and answer the second.

3.4 Initiatives signatures (B)

v1 tag: dd03sigci

v2 tag: v2ddsigcin

PM: David Altman

Question: How many signatures are required in order to place an initiative on the ballot?
[numeric]

3.5 Initiatives signatures % (B)

v1 tag: dd03sigci

v2 tag: v2ddsigcip

PM: David Altman

Question: How many signatures – expressed as the percentage (%) of registered voters – are required in order to place an initiative on the ballot?
[range]

3.6 Initiatives signature-gathering time limit (B)

v1 tag: dd04gathci

v2 tag: v2ddgrtlci

PM: David Altman

Question: Is there a limit on the time allowed for signature gathering prior to placing an initiative on the ballot?

0: No.

1: Yes.

3.7 Initiatives signature-gathering period (B)

v1 tag: dd04gathci

v2 tag: v2ddgrgpci

PM: David Altman

Question: If you answered yes to the previous question, how long is the period allowed for gathering signatures (expressed as a number of days)?

[numeric]

Ordering: Answer only if answered 1 for previous question.

3.8 Initiatives participation threshold (B)

v1 tag: dd08bindci

v2 tag: v2ddbndci

PM: David Altman

Question: Must some threshold of participation be reached in order for an initiative to be binding?

Clarification: Specify the required turnout as a percentage (%) of registered voters. Enter 0 if there is no threshold.

[range]

3.9 Initiatives approval threshold (B)

v1 tag: dd07threci

v2 tag: v2ddthreci

PM: David Altman

Question: Must some threshold of approval – among registered voters – be reached in order for an initiative to be binding?

Clarification: Express your answer as a percentage of registered voters. Enter 0 if there is no threshold.

[range]

3.10 Initiatives administrative threshold (B)

v2 tag: v2dddistsci

PM: David Altman

Question: Must a majority across subnational districts (e.g., state, cantons, provinces) be attained in order for an initiative to be approved?

- 0: No.
- 1: Yes - at least half of subnational districts.
- 2: Yes - more than half of subnational districts.

3.11 Initiatives super majority (B)

v2 tag: v2ddspmjci

PM: David Altman

Question: What percentage (%) of the vote is regarded as sufficient, by law, for the approval of an initiative?

Clarification: For 2/3, enter 66%.

[range]

3.12 Referendums permitted (B)

v2 tag: v2ddlegrf

PM: David Altman

Question: Is there legal provision for referendums?

Clarification: These are measures placed on the ballot through a citizen petition process, not by the legislature or the executive. They may concern either the rejection of a recently approved law or a bill discussed in parliament. (They do not include recall elections.)

- 0: Not allowed.
- 1: Constitutionally allowed but never utilized.
- 2: Allowed but with intervening institutional veto.
- 3: Allowed but non-binding.
- 4: Allowed and binding.

Ordering: If no legal provision exists (option 0), skip to question 3.22 Plebiscite permitted [v2ddlegpl].

3.13 Referendums level (B)

v2 tag: v2ddlevrf

PM: David Altman

Question: At what level(s) of government can referendums be held?

- 0: Only at the national level.

- 1: Only at a subnational level.
- 2: At both national and subnational levels.

3.14 Referendums signatures (B)

v2 tag: v2ddsigrfn

PM: David Altman

Question: How many signatures are required in order to place a referendum on the ballot?

Clarification: If the law treats this as a percentage (%) of registered voters, please leave this question blank and answer the next question instead.

[numeric]

3.15 Referendums signatures % (B)

v2 tag: v2ddsigrfp

PM: David Altman

Question: How many signatures – expressed as the percentage (%) of registered voters – are required in order to place a referendum on the ballot?

Clarification: If the law treats this as a raw number of registered voters, please leave this question blank and answer the previous question instead.

[range]

Programming: The next two indicators are clustered.

Cluster question 2

v2tag: v2ddc2

Clarification: Answer the second question only if you answer Yes to the first question. If your answer was No on the first question, skip to the next question.

3.16 Referendums signature-gathering limit (B)

v2 tag: v2ddgtrlf

PM: David Altman

Question: Is there a limit on the time allowed for signature gathering prior to placing a referendum on the ballot?

0: No.

1: Yes.

3.17 Referendums signature-gathering period (B)

v2 tag: v2ddgrgprf

PM: David Altman

Question: If you answered yes to the previous question, how long is period allowed for gathering signatures (expressed as a number of days)?

[numeric]

Ordering: Answer if previous question is coded 1.

3.18 Referendums participation threshold (B)

v2 tag: v2ddbndrf

PM: David Altman

Question: Must some threshold of participation be reached in order for the referendum to be binding?

Clarification: Specify the required turnout as a percentage of registered voters. Enter 0 if there is no threshold.

[range]

3.19 Referendums approval threshold (B)

v2 tag: v2ddthrerf

PM: David Altman

Question: Must some threshold of approval – among registered voters – be reached in order for a referendum to be binding?

Clarification: Express your answer as a percentage of registered voters. Enter 0 if there is no threshold.

[range]

3.20 Referendums administrative threshold (B)

v2 tag: v2dddistrf

PM: David Altman

Question: Must a majority across subnational districts (cantons, provinces, states) be reached in order for a referendum to be approved?

- 0: No.
- 1: Yes - at least half of subnational districts.
- 2: Yes - more than half of subnational districts.

3.21 Referendums super majority (B)

v2 tag: v2ddspmjrf

PM: David Altman

Question: What percentage (%) of the vote is regarded as sufficient, by law, for the approval of a referendum?

Clarification: For 2/3, enter 66%.

[range]

3.22 Plebiscite permitted (B)

v1 tag: dd12legpb

v2 tag: v2ddlegpl

PM: David Altman

Question: Is there legal provision for plebiscites?

Clarification: These are measures placed on the ballot by the legislature or the executive (or both).

- 0: Not allowed.
- 1: Constitutionally allowed but never utilized.
- 2: Allowed but with intervening institutional veto.
- 3: Allowed but non-binding.
- 4: Allowed and binding.

Ordering: If no legal provision exists (option 0), skip to question 3.28 Occurrence of any type of popular vote this year [v2ddvoteyr].

3.23 Plebiscite level (B)

v1 tag: dd13levpb

v2 tag: v2ddlevpl

PM: David Altman

Question: At what level(s) of government can plebiscites be held?

- 0: Only at the national level.
- 1: Only at a subnational level.
- 2: At both national and subnational levels.

3.24 Plebiscite participation threshold (B)

v1 tag: dd16bindpb

v2 tag: v2ddbndpl

PM: David Altman

Question: Must some threshold of participation be reached in order for a plebiscite to be binding?

Clarification: Specify the required turnout as a percentage of registered voters. Enter 0 if there is no threshold.

[range]

3.25 Plebiscite approval threshold (B)

v1 tag: dd15threpb

v2 tag: v2ddthrepl

PM: David Altman

Question: Must some threshold of approval – among registered voters – be reached in order for a plebiscite to be binding?

Clarification: Express your answer as a percentage of registered voters. Enter 0 if there is no threshold.

[range]

3.26 Plebiscite administrative threshold (B)

v2 tag: v2dddistspl

PM: David Altman

Question: Must a majority across subnational districts (e.g., cantons, provinces, states) be attained in order for a plebiscite to be approved?

- 0: No.

- 1: Yes - at least half of subnational districts.
- 2: Yes - more than half of subnational districts.

3.27 Plebiscite super majority (B)

v2 tag: v2ddspmlpl

PM: David Altman

Question: What percentage (%) of the vote is regarded as sufficient, by law, for the approval of a plebiscite?

Clarification: For 2/3, enter 66%.

[range]

3.28 Occurrence of any type of popular vote this year (B)

v2 tag: v2ddvoteyr

PM: David Altman

Question: Was there some sort of direct democracy election (initiative, referendum, and/or plebiscite) this year?

- 0: No.
- 1: Yes, there was just one.
- 2: Yes, there was more than one.

3.29 Occurrence of any type of popular vote this year credible (B)

v2 tag: v2ddvotcrd

PM: David Altman

Question: If you answered yes to the previous question, was the official result of the vote (its success or failure) credible?

- 0: Not credible.
- 1: Credible.

Ordering: Answer only if previous question coded 1 or 2.

3.30 Direct democracy comments (B)

v1 tag: dd28commnt

v2 tag: v2ddcommnt

PM: David Altman

Question: Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on direct democracy.

[text]

4 The Executive

4.1 Executive introduction (B)(C)

V2 tag: v2exintro1

PM: Jan Teorell

In this section, we distinguish between the head of state (HOS) and the head of government (HOG). The *head of state* is an individual or collective body that serves as the chief public representative of the country. Sometimes, this is a largely ceremonial role, e.g., a monarch who reigns but does not rule or a president whose powers are strictly circumscribed.

The *head of government* is the chief officer(s) of the executive branch of government, typically presiding over a cabinet. In a parliamentary system, this is usually the prime minister. In a presidential system, this is usually the president, who then serves as both head of state and head of government. In a typical semi-presidential system, the president serves as head of state and the prime minister serves as head of government.

These definitions are grounded in the *functions* that each office performs, as described above. Titles can be confusing. Do not assume, for example, that simply because an individual holds the title of “president” s/he is serving as the chief public representative of the country.

Likewise, it may be that the *effective* head of state/head of government is someone other than the *official* head of state/head of government. In this instance, the following questions apply to the person who effectively wields this power. In some socialist systems, for example, the official head of state was a person within the state bureaucracy, but in practice the chief public representative of the country was the chairman of the communist party. It is the latter who is the “effective” head of state, and hence should be the focus of your answers. The same applies if the head of state/head of government is so old, sick or perhaps mentally disabled that s/he cannot perform his/her functions, which are instead performed by someone else. It is the latter person who is the effective head of state/head of government.

If you are considering a semisovereign territory, such as a colony, an annexed territory or a member of the British Commonwealth, please answer the following questions with respect to the head of state and (if separate) the head of government who is located in the territory in question. Thus, in a typical British colony the governor-general - not the King/Queen of England - would be understood as the head of state. Likewise, in a British colony the local prime minister in the colony - not the prime minister in London - would be understood as the head of government.

In order to mitigate potential misunderstandings, the identities of the head of state and head of government for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Thus, when conducting your coding make sure to pay close attention to the names of these individuals, which you can see by clicking on the year grid for a particular year in the first question of this section, “HOS name.” This is your key to what we mean by “head of state” or “head of government.”

Note also that when the two functions are fused in the same office, we ask you to code only the head of state section of the survey. Any precoded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the precoded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives. If you feel strongly that the precoded information is wrong, please rate your confidence in the preloaded information and then consult your Regional Manager. You will have to rate confidence in all the available years in order to proceed to the next question. In order to avoid spending time on short-lived executives, we have included only executives who held office for at least 100 days.

4.2 HOS/HOG interregnum (A+)

PM: Jan Teorell

Question: Is the country in a transitional period in which one or more executives (the head of state or the head of government) stay in office for fewer than 100 days?

Clarification: Enter the specific dates for the beginning of such an interregnum (1) and for the beginning of the next period with executives lasting at least 100 days (0).

[Y/N]

4.3 HOS name (A*)

v1 tag: ex03namhos

v2 tag: v2exnamhos

PM: Jan Teorell

Question: What is the name of the head of state?

Clarification: If the head of state is a collective body, provide the name of the person exercising the most effective power within this body, or, if no such person exists, enter the expression “collective body.” If multiple Heads of State were appointed in a given year, please answer this question with respect to each one of them; also make sure you enter the specific date of appointment and *reappointment* for each one of them. Once again, the identities of the head of state for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any precoded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the

precoded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives.

[text]

Sources: Henisz (2000; 2002); Lentz (1994; 1999); worldstatesmen.org.

Coverage: worldstatesmen.org, Lentz and Henisz provide lists of HOSs and HOGs, with more or less global coverage, worldstatesmen.org including pre-independence and semi-sovereign territories, Lentz from 1900-1992, and Henisz from 1800-2000.

4.4 HOS title (A*)

v1 tag: ex02tithos

v2 tag: v2extithos

PM: Jan Teorell

Question: What is the title of the head of state?

Clarification: If the head of state and the head of government are the same person or body, this and the following questions refer to both. Please provide a literal translation of the title in English, with the title in the native language, or a transcription thereof, within parentheses. If the head of state is a collective body, provide the title of the person exercising the most effective power over this body, or, if no such person exists, enter the expression “collective body.” If multiple Heads of State with different titles were appointed any given year, please answer this question with respect to each one of them; also make sure you enter the specific date of appointment for each one of them. Once again, the identities of the head of state for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any precoded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the precoded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives.

[text]

Sources: Lentz (1994; 1999); Henisz (2000; 2002).

Coverage: worldstatesmen.org, Lentz, and Henisz provide lists of HOSs and HOGs, with more or less global coverage, worldstatesmen.org including pre-independence and semi-sovereign territories, Lentz from 1900-1992, and Henisz from 1800-2000.

4.5 HOS age (A+)

v2: v2exnamhos

PM: Jan Teorell

Question: In what year was the head of state born?

[date – year only]

Sources: worldstatesman.org.

Coverage: More or less global coverage, including pre-independence and semi-sovereign territories.

4.6 HOS female (A-)

PM: Jan Teorell, Pamela Paxton

v2 tag: v2exfemhos

Question: What is the gender of the head of state?

Clarification: If the head of state is a collective body, provide the gender of the person executing the most effective power over this body, or, if no such person exists, answer if any persons in the body are female.

0: Male

1: Female

Sources: worldstatesman.org; Melander (2005); Paxton and Hughes (2007).

Coverage: More or less global coverage, including pre-independence and semi-sovereign territories.

4.7 HOS disadvantaged social group (B)

v2 tag: v2exdighos

PMs: Pamela Paxton, Jan Teorell

Question: Is the **head of state** a member of a disadvantaged **social group**?

Clarification: If the head of state is a collective body, answer for the person executing the most effective power over this body, or, if no such person exists, answer if any persons in the body are members of a disadvantaged identity group. Disadvantage refers to socioeconomic disadvantage. Specifically, in order to be considered disadvantaged members of a social group must have an average income that is significantly below the median national income.

0: No, the head of state is not a member of a disadvantaged social group.

1: Yes, the head of state is a member of a disadvantaged social group.

4.8 HOS party (A+)

v2: v2exparhos

PM: Jan Teorell

Question: What is the name of the political party to which the head of state belongs?

[text]

Sources: Henisz (2000; 2002).

Coverage: Henisz provide the names of the HOSs political party with pretty much global coverage from 1800-2000. Probably NO COVERAGE for colonies before independence or other semi-sovereign territories.

4.9 HOS appointment by law (A-)

CCP tag: HOSELECT

v2 tag: v2expathsl

PM: Jan Teorell

Question: How is the Head of State selected?

Clarification: If the Head of State is selected by the legislature, please selected "Elected by Elite Group."

- 1: Heredity/Royal Selection
- 2: Elected by Citizens
- 3: Elected by Elite Group
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section
- 97: Unable to Determine
- 98: Not Specified
- 99: Not Applicable

Source: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), var v89; cf. IAEP, questions 4. 1 and 8a, 1-4.

Coverage: The CCP (Elkins et al. 2012) has more or less global overage from 1789 to present, but needs to be extended to countries without written constitution; the IAEP also has wide coverage but only from 1972 through 2005. Probably NO COVERAGE for colonies before independence or other semi-sovereign territories.

CCP ordering: Asked only if EXECNUM is answered 3, or if HOSHOG is answered 1, or if HOSHOG is answered 3, or if HOSHOG is answered 4, or if HOSHOG is answered 96, or if HOSHOG is answered 97.

4.10 HOS appointment by other (A-)

CCP tag: HOSELCTR

v2 tag: v2exothhsl

PM: Jan Teorell

Question: Who are the electors for the Head of State?

Clarification: Please provide any details about the process of election by electors in the comments section.

1: [text]

99: Not Applicable

Source: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), var v91; cf. IAEP, questions 4. 1 and 8a, 1-4.

Coverage: The CCP (Elkins et al. 2012) has more or less global coverage from 1789 to present, but needs to be extended to countries without written constitution; the IAEP also has wide coverage but only from 1972 through 2005. Probably NO COVERAGE for colonies before independence or other semi-sovereign territories.

CCP ordering: Asked only if HOSELECT is answered 3.

4.11 HOS appointment in practice (B)

v1 tag: ex05pathhs

v2 tag: v2expathhs

PM: Jan Teorell

Question: How did the **head of state** reach office?

Clarification: If several bodies were involved in the appointment process, select the one that exerted the most critical impact on the decision. However, in the next question we ask separately about whether the approval of the legislature was necessary. Response category 7 should only be selected if the head of state is directly elected, not if he or she was appointed by the legislature after an election.

- 0: Through the threat of or application of force, such as a coup or rebellion.
- 1: Appointed by a foreign power.
- 2: Appointed by the ruling party (in a one-party system).
- 3: Appointed by a royal council.
- 4: Through hereditary succession.
- 5: Appointed by the military.
- 6: Appointed by the legislature.
- 7: Directly through a **popular election** (regardless of the extension of the suffrage).
- 8: Other.

Ordering: If you select 0 or 8, proceed to the next question [v2exothhs]. If you select 1-5, skip to question “HOS selection by legislature in practice [v2exaphos]”. If you selected 6-7, skip to question “HOS removal by legislature in practice” [v2exremhsp].

4.12 HOS other appointing body in practice (B)

v1 tag: ex06othhs

v2 tag: v2exothhs

PM: Jan Teorell

Question: Describe the “other” body/appointment procedure for the **head of state**.

[text]

Ordering: Answer this question only for those years you selected 0 or 8 on the previous question.

4.13 HOS selection by legislature in practice (B)

v1 tag: ex07aphos

v2 tag: v2exaphos

PM: Jan Teorell

Question: Was approval of the legislature necessary for the appointment of the **head of state**?

Clarification: By “approval” we mean both explicit approval, such as through a vote of confidence, and tacit approval, such as a practice stating that the head of state has to have majority support (or should not be opposed by the majority) in the legislature even though no vote is taken on his/her appointment. We are *not* concerned with certification of electoral college votes (as in the US, Mexico).

0: No.

1: Yes.

Ordering: Answer this question only for those years you selected 1-5 on question v2exaphhs.

4.14 HOS removal regulated by law (A-)

CCP tag: HOSDISS

v2 tag: v2exremhsl

PM: Jan Teorell

Question: Are there provisions for dismissing the Head of State?

Clarification: When referring to dismissal, we mean the active removal of a public official, so do not answer yes to this question if the constitution only refers to death/incapacitation or expiration of term of office.

- 1: Yes
- 2: No
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section
- 97: Unable to Determine
- 99: Not Applicable

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v96; cf. IAEP, questions 4. 1 and 8. 1; 8a. 1-4.

Coverage: The CCP (Elkins et al. 2012) has more or less global coverage from 1789 to present, but needs to be extended to countries without written constitution; the IAEP also has wide coverage but only from 1972 through 2005. Probably NO COVERAGE for colonies before independence or other semi-sovereign territories.

CCP ordering: Asked only if EXECNUM is answered 3, or if HOSHOG is answered 1, or if HOSHOG is answered 3, or if HOSHOG is answered 4, or if HOSHOG is answered 96, or if HOSHOG is answered 97.

4.15 HOS removal grounds by law (A-)

v2 tag: v2exremhsg

PM: Jan Teorell

Question: Under what grounds can the Head of State be dismissed?

Clarification: You should select the "general dissatisfaction" option if the constitution refers to a loss of confidence or support for the Head of State.

- 1: General dissatisfaction with the leadership (i.e., dismissal is fairly unrestricted) [CCP tag: HOSDCOND_1]
- 2: Crimes and other issues of conduct [CCP tag: HOSDCOND_2]
- 3: Treason [CCP tag: HOSDCOND_3]
- 4: Violations of the constitution [CCP tag: HOSDCOND_4]
- 5: Incapacitated [CCP tag: HOSDCOND_5]
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law [CCP tag: HOSDCOND_90]
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section [CCP tag: HOSDCOND_96]
- 97: Unable to Determine [CCP tag: HOSDCOND_97]
- 98: Not Specified [CCP tag: HOSDCOND_98]

Answer type: Multiple-selection.

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v97; cf. IAEP, questions 4. 1 and 8. 1; 8a. 1-4.

CCP ordering: Asked only if HOSDISS is answered 1.

4.16 HOS removal body by law (A-)

v2 tag: v2exremhsb

PM: Jan Teorell

Question: Who can approve a dismissal of the Head of State?

Clarification: If both chambers must act, then please select "Both Chambers of the Legislature are required." If either chamber can act, then please select both the "First Chamber of the Legislature" and the "Second Chamber of the Legislature."

- 1: Head of Government [CCP tag: HOSADISS_1]
- 2: First (or only) chamber of the Legislature [CCP tag: HOSADISS_2]
- 3: Second Chamber of the Legislature [CCP tag: HOSADISS_3]
- 4: Both Chambers of the Legislature are required [CCP tag: HOSADISS_4]
- 5: Public (e.g., recall) [CCP tag: HOSADISS_5]
- 6: Public Prosecutor [CCP tag: HOSADISS_6]
- 7: Court [CCP tag: HOSADISS_7]
- 8: Constitutional Council or Constitutional Court [CCP tag: HOSADISS_8]
- 9: The Government/Cabinet [CCP tag: HOSADISS_9]
- 10: No approval needed [CCP tag: HOSADISS_10]
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law [CCP tag: HOSADISS_90]
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section [CCP tag: HOSADISS_96]
- 97: Unable to Determine [CCP tag: HOSADISS_97]
- 98: Not Specified [CCP tag: HOSADISS_98]

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v104 (also see v105-107 on proportion of vote needed by legislature); cf. IAEP, questions 4. 1 and 8. 1; 8a. 1-4.

CCP ordering: Asked only if HOSDISS is answered 1.

4.17 HOS removal by legislature in practice (C)

v1 tag: ex08remhos

v2 tag: v2exremhsp

PM: Jan Teorell

Question: If the legislature, or either chamber of the legislature, took actions to remove the **head of state** from office, would it be likely to succeed even without having to level accusations of unlawful activity *and* without the involvement of any other agency?

Clarification: The question refers to whether the legislature (or either of its chambers) is considered to hold this power of removal in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. Moreover, the question refers to removal other than through an impeachment process.

- 0: No, under no circumstances.
- 1: No, unlikely, but there is a chance it would happen.
- 2: Yes, probably, but there is a chance it would fail.
- 3: Yes, most likely.

4.18 HOS removal by other in practice (C)

v2 tag: v2exrmhsol

PM: Jan Teorell

Question: Which of the following bodies would be likely to succeed in removing the **head of state** if it took actions (short of military force) to do so?

Clarification: The question refers to whether any of these bodies are considered to hold this power of removal in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not.

Choose all that apply.

- 0: None.
- 1: A foreign power.
- 2: The ruling party or party leadership body (in a one-party system).
- 3: A royal council.
- 4: The military.
- 5: A religious body.
- 6: A tribal or ethnic council.
- 7: Other.

Answer type: Multiple-selection.

Ordering: If you select 7, proceed to the next question [v2exrmhsnl]. If you select 0-4, skip to question “HOS control over” [v2extlhs].

4.19 HOS other body removes in practice (C)

v2 tag: v2exrmhsnl

PM: Jan Teorell

Question: Which other body or bodies has the capacity to remove the **head of state** from office?

[text]

Ordering: Answer this question only for those years you answered “other” (7) to the previous question v2exrmhsol.

4.20 HOS term length by law (A-)

CCP tag: HOSTERM

v2 tag: v2exfxtmhs

PM: Jan Teorell

Question: What is the maximum term length of the Head of State, in years?

Clarification: Please answer "0" if the term length is not specified, and answer "100" if there is no term length or the term length is the life of the office holder. For constitutional monarchies, please type "100".

1: [numeric]

99: Not Applicable

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v92.

CCP ordering: Asked only if EXECNUM is answered 3, or if HOSHOG is answered 1, or if HOSHOG is answered 3, or if HOSHOG is answered 4, or if HOSHOG is answered 96, or if HOSHOG is answered 97

4.21 HOS term limit by law (A-)

CCP tag: HOSTERML

v2 tag: v2exnyrhsl

PM: Jan Teorell

Question: What restrictions are in place regarding the number of terms the Head of State may serve?

Clarification: For this question, no limit means the constitution specifies there is no limit on the number of terms and not specified means the constitution does not specify whether or not there is a limit.

- 1: Only one term permitted, total
- 2: Only two terms permitted, total
- 3: No successive terms permitted, but multiple non-successive terms permitted
- 4: Only two successive terms permitted, but multiple non-successive terms permitted
- 5: Explicitly no term limits
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section
- 97: Unable to Determine
- 98: Not Specified
- 99: Not Applicable

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v93.

Ordering: Answer this question only for those years you answered “yes” (1) to the previous question.

CCP ordering: Asked only if EXECNUM is answered 3, or if HOSHOG is answered 1, or if HOSHOG is answered 3, or if HOSHOG is answered 4, or if HOSHOG is answered 96, or if HOSHOG is answered 97.

4.22 HOS control over (C)

v2 tag: v2exctlhs

PM: Jan Teorell

Question: In practice, from which of the following bodies must the **head of state** customarily seek approval prior to making important decisions on domestic policy?

- 0: None.
- 1: A foreign power.
- 2: The ruling party or party leadership body (in a one-party system).
- 3: A royal council.
- 4: The military.
- 5: A religious body.
- 6: A tribal or ethnic council.
- 7: Other.

Answer type: Multiple-selection.

Ordering: If you select 7, proceed to the next question [v2exctlhos]. If you select 0-6, skip to question “HOS dissolution in practice” [v2exdfdshs].

4.23 HOS other body controls (C)

v2 tag: v2exctlhos

PM: Jan Teorell

Question: From which kind of body or bodies does the **head of state** need approval for its actions?

[text]

Ordering: Answer this question only for those years you answered “other” (7) to the previous question [v2exctlhs].

4.24 HOS dissolution in practice (C)

v1 tag: ex12dfdshs

v2 tag: v2exdfdshs

PM: Jan Teorell

Question: If the **head of state** took actions to dissolve the legislature, would he/she be likely to succeed?

Clarification: The question refers to whether the head of state is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not.

0: No.

1: Yes, but not at his/her own discretion, only when prompted to as a response to specific events (for example, after a certain number of votes of no confidence, or after a certain number of failed attempts to form a cabinet).

2: Yes, at his/her own discretion, but with restrictions (for example, by frequency, such as "once a year", by time point within term, such as "not within the last sixth months of the head of state's term", and by the requirement that the head of state must then himself/herself stand for election).

3: Yes, at his/her own discretion and without restrictions.

4.25 HOS appoints cabinet in practice (C)

v1 tag: ex13dfcbhs

v2 tag: v2exdfcbhs

PM: Jan Teorell

Question: In practice, does the **head of state** have the power to appoint – or is the approval of the head of state necessary for the appointment of – cabinet ministers?

Clarification: The question refers to whether the head of state is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not.

0: No.

1: Yes, but only with respect to the head of the cabinet, and only with the tacit consent or explicit confirmation by the legislature.

2: Yes, but only with the tacit consent or explicit confirmation by the legislature.

3: Yes, without any need for confirmation by the legislature, but only with respect to the head of the cabinet.

4: Yes, without any need for confirmation by the legislature.

4.26 HOS veto power in practice (C)

v1 tag: ex15dfvths

v2 tag: v2exdfvths

PM: Jan Teorell

Question: If the **head of state** took actions to veto a piece of legislation, would he/she be likely to succeed?

Clarification: By "veto", we mean either a partial veto (concerning any parts of a bill) or package vetoes (concerning whole bills). The question refers to whether the head of state is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not.

0: No.

1: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by a simple majority vote (a vote of more than half of those voting).

2: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by an absolute majority vote (a vote of more than half of the members of the legislature).

3: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by a qualified/extraordinary majority vote (a super-majority – e.g., 2/3 or 3/4 – of those voting).

4: Yes, with no possibility of override.

4.27 HOS dismisses ministers in practice (C)

v1 tag: ex14dfdmhs

v2 tag: v2exdfdmhs

PM: Jan Teorell

Question: If the **head of state** took actions to dismiss cabinet ministers, would he/she be likely to succeed?

Clarification: The question refers to whether the head of state is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not, and regardless of possible political repercussions (e.g., vote of no confidence).

0: No.

- 1: Yes, but not at his/her own discretion, only when prompted to as a response to specific events (for example, after a vote of no confidence taken by the legislature).
- 2: Yes, at his/her own discretion, but with restrictions (for example, only provided the head of state proposes an alternative minister who would need the legislature's approval, i. e., so called "constructive dismissal").
- 3: Yes, at his/her own discretion and without restrictions.

4.28 HOS proposes legislation in practice (C)

v1 tag: ex16dfpphs

v2 tag: v2exdfpphs

PM: Jan Teorell

Question: Does the **head of state** have the capacity, in practice, to propose legislation?

Clarification: By "propose legislation", we mean the introduction of legislative bills. The question refers to whether the head of state is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not.

- 0: Yes, in all policy areas, including some exclusive domains (where neither the legislature nor other bodies may initiate bills).
- 1: Yes, in all policy areas, but this power is shared with the legislature and perhaps with other bodies.
- 2: No. The head of state cannot propose legislation.

4.29 HOS comments (B)(C)

v1 tag: ex20commhs

v2 tag: v2excommhs

PM: Jan Teorell

Question: Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on the **head of state**.

[text]

4.30 HOS = HOG (A*)

v1 tag: ex01hoshog

v2 tag: v2exhoshog

PM: Jan Teorell

Question: Is the **head of state** (HOS) also **head of government** (HOG)?

Clarification: Note that this question only pertains to whether the head of state and the head of government are the same person or body, regardless of the relative powers of the two. Thus, in a constitutional monarchy, for example, the head of state and head of government are not the same even though the head of state may lack any real political power. If multiple head of states/head of governments were appointed in any year, please answer this question with respect to all of them by checking or unchecking the specific dates. Once again, the identities of the head of government for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any precoded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the precoded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives.

0: No

1: Yes

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v83-v87; Lentz (1994; 1999); Henisz (2000; 2002).

Coverage: The CCP (Elkins et al. 2012) has more or less global overage from 1789 to present, but needs to be extended to countries without written constitution; Lentz and Henisz provide lists of HOSs and HOGs, the former from 1900-1992, the latter from 1800-2000; they could also be cross-checked with, e.g., worldstatesmen.org, Schemmel (rulers.org), Siaroff (2003); Cranenburgh (2008).

Ordering: If HOS=HOG (answer is “yes”) for all years: skip to “Introduction to entire executive.” (v2exintro3)

4.31 HOG introduction (B)(C)

V2 tag: v2exintro2

PM: Jan Teorell

This section of the survey pertains to the **head of government** (HOG).

Answer questions in this section only for years in which the **head of government** is not identical to the **head of state**, as indicated by a zero (0) in the year grid of the previous question.

If the effective head of government is someone other than the official head of government, or there is no official head of government, the questions apply to the effective head of government. In some socialist systems, for example, the official head of government could be a person within the state bureaucracy, but in practice the chief public representative of the country is the chairman of the communist party. We then want you to code only that “effective” head of government (and, if that is also the head of state, you can skip this section). The same applies if the official head of government is so old, sick or perhaps mentally disabled that s/he cannot perform his/her functions, which are instead performed by someone else.

Once again, the identities of the head of government for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Thus, when conducting your coding make sure to pay close attention to the names of these individuals, which you can see by clicking on the year grid for a particular year in the first question of this section, “HOG name.” This is your key to what we mean by “head of government.” Any precoded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the precoded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives. If you feel strongly that the precoded information is wrong, please rate your confidence in the preloaded information and then consult your Regional Manager. You will have to rate confidence in all the available years in order to proceed to the next question. In order to avoid spending time on short-lived executives, we have included only executives who held office for at least 100 days.

4.32 HOG name (A*)

v1 tag: ex22namhog

v2 tag: v2exnamhog

PM: Jan Teorell

Question: What is the name of the head of government?

Clarification: If the head of government is a collective body, provide the name of the person executing the most effective power over this body, or, if no such person exists, enter the expression “collective body.” If multiple heads of government were appointed any given year, please answer this question with respect to each one of them; also make sure you enter the specific date of appointment and *reappointment* for each one of them. Once again, the identities of the head of government for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any precoded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the precoded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives.

[text]

Sources: worldstatesmen.org; Henisz (2000; 2002); Lentz (1994; 1999).

Coverage: worldstatesman.org, Lentz and Henisz provide lists of HOSs and HOGs, with more or less global coverage, worldstatesman.org including pre-independence and semi-sovereign territories, Lentz from 1900-1992, and Henisz from 1800-2000.

4.33 Title of HOG (A*)

v1 tag: ex21tithog

v2tag: v2extithog

PM: Jan Teorell

Question: What is the title of the **head of government** (HOG)?

Clarification: Please provide a literal translation of the title in English, with the title in the native language, or a transcription thereof, within parentheses. If the head of government is a collective body, provide the title of the person exercising the most effective power over this body, or, if no such person exists, the name of the entire body. If multiple heads of government with different titles were appointed any given year, please answer this question with respect to all of them; also make sure you enter the specific date of appointment for each one of them. Once again, the identities of the head of government for each country have been pre-coded for as many years as possible. Any precoded years contain an orange triangle. This means that either the score or text and/or specific date have already been entered, so we are asking you only to add your confidence in the precoded rating; we do not want you to change the rating, as we need all the Country Experts to answer the subsequent questions for the same executives.

[text]

Sources: worldstatesmen.org; Henisz (2000; 2002); Lentz (1994; 1999).

Coverage: worldstatesman.org, Lentz and Henisz provide lists of HOSs and HOGs, with more or less global coverage, worldstatesman.org including pre-independence and semi-sovereign territories, Lentz from 1900-1992, and Henisz from 1800-2000.

4.34 HOG age (A+)

v2: v2exagehog

PM: Jan Teorell

Question: In what year was the head of government born?

[date-year only]

Sources: worldstatesman.org.

Coverage: More or less global coverage, including pre-independence and semi-sovereign territories.

4.35 HOG female (A-)

PMs: Jan Teorell, Pamela Paxton

v2 tag: v2exfemhog

Question: What is the gender of the head of government?

Clarification: If the head of government is a collective body, provide the gender of the person executing the most effective power over this body, or, if no such person exists, answer if any persons in the body are female.

0: Male

1: Female

Sources: worldstatesman.org; cf. Melander 2005; Paxton and Hughes 2007.

Coverage: More or less global coverage, including pre-independence and semi-sovereign territories.

4.36 HOG disadvantaged social group (B)

v2 tag: v2exdighog

PMs: Jan Teorell, Pamela Paxton

Question: Is the **head of government** a member of a disadvantaged **social group**?

Clarification: If the head of government is a collective body, answer for the person executing the most effective power over this body, or, if no such person exists, answer if any persons in the body are members of a disadvantaged social group. Disadvantage refers to socioeconomic disadvantage. Specifically, in order to be considered disadvantaged members of a social group must have an average income that is significantly below the median national income.

0: No, the head of government is not a member of a disadvantaged social group

1: Yes, the head of government is a member of a disadvantaged social group

4.37 HOG party (A+)

v2: v2expothog

PM: Jan Teorell

Question: What is the name of the political party to which the head of government belongs?

[text]

Sources: Henisz (2000; 2002); DPI (Beck et al. 2000).

Coverage: Henisz provide the names of the HOGs political party with pretty much global coverage from 1800-2000. Probably no coverage however for colonies before independence or other semi-sovereign territories.

4.38 HOG appointment by law (A-)

CCP tag: HOGSELECT

v2 tag: v2expathgl

PM: Jan Teorell

Question: How is the Head of Government selected?

Clarification: If the Head of Government is selected by the legislature alone, please select "Elected by Elite Group." If there is more than one body who is involved in the selection process for the Head of Government and one of them happens to be the legislature, please select "Appointed."

- 1: Heredity/Royal Selection
- 2: Elected by Citizens
- 3: Elected by Elite Group
- 4: Appointed
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section
- 97: Unable to Determine
- 98: Not Specified
- 99: Not Applicable

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v122.

CCP ordering: Asked only if EXECNUM is answered 3, or if HOSHOG is answered 2.

4.39 HOG nomination by law (A-)

v2 tag: v2exnmghl

PM: Jan Teorell

Question: Who nominates the Head of Government for Appointment?

Clarification: If both chambers must act, then please select "Both Chambers of the Legislature are required." If either chamber can act, then please select both the "First Chamber of the Legislature" and the "Second Chamber of the Legislature."

- 1: Head of State [CCP tag: HOGNOM_1]
- 2: First (or only) chamber of the Legislature [CCP tag: HOGNOM_2]
- 3: Second Chamber of the Legislature [CCP tag: HOGNOM_3]
- 4: Both Chambers of the Legislature are required [CCP tag: HOGNOM_4]
- 5: Parliamentary Majority [CCP tag: HOGNOM_5]
- 90: left explicitly to non-constitutional law [CCP tag: HOGNOM_90]
- 96: other, please specify in the comments section [CCP tag: HOGNOM_96]
- 97: Unable to Determine [CCP tag: HOGNOM_97]
- 98: Not Specified [CCP tag: HOGNOM_98]

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v124.

CCP ordering: Asked only if HOGELECT is answered 3, or if HOGELECT is answered 25.

4.40 HOG approval by law (A-)

v2 tag: v2exaphgl

PM: Jan Teorell

Question: Who approves the nomination of the Head of Government?

Clarification: If both chambers must act, then please select "Both Chambers of the Legislature are required." If either chamber can act, then please select both the "First Chamber of the Legislature" and the "Second Chamber of the Legislature."

- 1: Head of State [CCP tag: HOGAPP_1]
- 2: First (or only) chamber of the Legislature [CCP tag: HOGAPP_2]
- 3: Second Chamber of the Legislature [CCP tag: HOGAPP_3]
- 4: Both Chambers of the Legislature are required [CCP tag: HOGAPP_4]
- 5: Parliamentary Majority [CCP tag: HOGAPP_5]
- 6: No formal approval process specified, but appointer is directed to act on the advice of party/legislative majority [CCP tag: HOGAPP_6]
- 7: No formal approval process specified, but appointer is directed to act on the basis of election results [CCP tag: HOGAPP_7]
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law [CCP tag: HOGAPP_90]
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section [CCP tag: HOGAPP_96]
- 97: Unable to Determine [CCP tag: HOGAPP_97]
- 98: Not Specified [CCP tag: HOGAPP_98]

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v125.

CCP ordering: Asked only if HOGSELECT is answered 3.

4.41 HOG appointment in practice (B)

v1 tag: ex24pathhg

v2 tag: v2expathhg

PM: Jan Teorell

Question: How did the **head of government** gain access to office?

Clarification: If several bodies were involved in the appointment process, select the one that exerted the most critical impact on the decision. However, in the next question we ask separately about whether the approval of the legislature was necessary. Response category 8 should only be selected if the head of government is directly elected, not if he or she was appointed by the legislature after an election.

- 0: Through the threat of or application of force, such as a coup or rebellion.
- 1: Appointed by a foreign power.
- 2: Appointed by the ruling party (in a one-party system).
- 3: Appointed by a royal council.
- 4: Through hereditary succession.
- 5: Appointed by the military.
- 6: Appointed by the head of state.
- 7: Appointed by the legislature.
- 8: Directly through a **popular election** (regardless of the extension of the suffrage).
- 9: Other.

Ordering: If you select 0 or 9, proceed to the next question [v2exothhgl]. If you selected 1-6, skip to question “HOG selection by legislature in practice” [v2exaphogp]. If you selected 7-8, skip to question “HOG removal by legislature in practice” [v2exremhog].

4.42 HOG other appointing body in practice (B)

v1 tag: ex25othhg

v2 tag: v2exothhgl

PM: Jan Teorell

Question: Describe the body/appointment procedure:

[text]

Ordering: Answer this question only for those years you selected 0 or 9 on the previous question [v2expathhg].

4.43 HOG selection by legislature in practice (B)

v1 tag: ex26aphog

v2 tag: v2exaphogp

PM: Jan Teorell

Question: Was the approval of the legislature necessary for the appointment of the head of government?

Clarification: By "approval" we mean both explicit approval, such as through a vote of confidence, and tacit approval, such as a practice stating that the head of government has to have majority support in the legislature although no vote is taken on his/her appointment.

0: No

1: Yes

Ordering: Answer this question only if you selected 1-6 on question v2expathhg.

4.44 HOG removal regulated by law (A-)

CCP tag: HOGDISS

v2 tag: v2exremhgl

PM: Jan Teorell

Question: Are there provisions for dismissing the Head of Government?

Clarification: For all questions referring to the dismissal of the Head of Government, we are referring to normal dismissal procedures as well as vote of confidence procedures. We are not referring to events such as death, incapacitation, or expiration of term.

1: Yes

2: No

96: Other, please specify in the comments section

97: Unable to Determine

99: Not Applicable

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v131.

4.45 HOG removal grounds by law (A-)

PM: Jan Teorell

v2 tag: v2exremhgg

Question: Under what grounds can the Head of Government be dismissed?

Clarification: You should select the "general dissatisfaction" option if the constitution refers to a loss of confidence or support for the Head of Government.

- 1: General dissatisfaction or no confidence with the leadership (I.e., dismissal is fairly unrestricted) [CCP tag: HOGDCOND_1]
- 2: Crimes and other issues of conduct, only [CCP tag: HOGDCOND_2]
- 3: Treason [CCP tag: HOGDCOND_3]
- 4: Violations of the constitution [CCP tag: HOGDCOND_4]
- 5: Incapacitated [CCP tag: HOGDCOND_5]
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law [CCP tag: HOGDCOND_90]
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section [CCP tag: HOGDCOND_96]
- 97: Unable to Determine [CCP tag: HOGDCOND_97]
- 98: Not Specified [CCP tag: HOGDCOND_98]

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v132.

CCP ordering: Asked only if HOGDISS is answered 1.

4.46 HOG removal body by law (A-)

v2 tag: v2exremhgb

PM: Jan Teorell

Question: Who can approve a dismissal of the Head of Government?

Clarification: If both chambers must act, then please select "Both Chambers of the Legislature are required." If either chamber can act, then please select both the "First Chamber of the Legislature" and the "Second Chamber of the Legislature."

- 1: Head of State [CCP tag: HOGADISS_1]
- 2: First (or only) chamber of the Legislature [CCP tag: HOGADISS_2]
- 3: Second Chamber of the Legislature [CCP tag: HOGADISS_3]
- 4: Both Chambers of the Legislature are required [CCP tag: HOGADISS_4]
- 5: Public (e.g., recall) [CCP tag: HOGADISS_5]
- 6: Public Prosecutor [CCP tag: HOGADISS_6]
- 7: Court [CCP tag: HOGADISS_7]
- 8: Constitutional Council or Constitutional Court [CCP tag: HOGADISS_8]

90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law [CCP tag: HOGADISS_90]

96: Other, please specify in the comments section [CCP tag: HOGADISS_96]

97: Unable to Determine [CCP tag: HOGADISS_97]

98: Not Specified [CCP tag: HOGADISS_98]

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v133.

CCP ordering: Asked only if HOGDISS is answered 1.

4.47 HOG removal by legislature in practice (C)

v1 tag: ex27remhog

v2 tag: v2exremhog

PM: Jan Teorell

Question: If the legislature, or either chamber of the legislature, took actions to remove the **head of government** from office, would it be likely to succeed even without having to level accusations of unlawful activity *and* without the involvement of any other agency?

Clarification: The question refers to whether the legislature (or either of its chambers) is considered to hold this power of removal in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not. Moreover, the question refers to removal other than through an impeachment process.

0: No, under no circumstances.

1: No, unlikely, but there is a chance it would happen.

2: Yes, probably, but there is a chance it would fail.

3: Yes, most likely.

4.48 HOG removal by other in practice (C)

v2 tag: v2exrmhgnp

PM: Jan Teorell

Question: Which of the following bodies would be likely to succeed in removing the **head of government** if it took actions (short of military force) to do so?

Clarification: The question refers to whether any of these bodies are considered to hold this power of removal in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not.

Choose all that apply.

0: None.

- 1: A foreign power.
- 2: The ruling party or party leadership body (in a one-party system).
- 3: A royal council.
- 4: The military.
- 5: The head of state.
- 6: A religious body.
- 7: A tribal or ethnic council.
- 8: Other.

Answer type: Multiple-selection.

Ordering: If you select 8, proceed to the next question [v2exrmhgop]. If you select 0-7, skip to question "HOG control over" [v2exctlhg].

4.49 HOG other body remove HOG in practice (C)

v2 tag: v2exrmhgop

PM: Jan Teorell

Question: Which other body or bodies has the capacity to remove the **head of government** from office?

[text]

Ordering: Answer this question only for those years you answered "other" (8) to the previous question [v2exrmhgnp].

4.50 HOG term length by law (A-)

v2 tag: v2exfxtmhg

PM: Jan Teorell

CCP tag: HOGTERM

Question: What is the maximum term length of the Head of Government?

Clarification: Please answer "0" if the term length is not specified, and answer "100" if the term length is explicitly unlimited or is the life of the office holder.

1: [text]

99: Not Applicable

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v126.

CCP ordering: Asked only if EXECNUM is answered 3, or if HOSHOG is answered 2.

4.51 HOG term limit by law (A-)

CCP tag: HOGTERML

v2 tag: v2exnyrhgl

PM: Jan Teorell

Question: What restrictions are in place regarding the number of terms the Head of Government may serve?

Clarification: For this question, no limit means the constitution specifies there is no limit on the number of terms and not specified means the constitution does not specify whether or not there is a limit.

- 1: Only one term permitted, total
- 2: Only two terms permitted, total
- 3: No successive terms permitted, but multiple non-successive terms permitted
- 4: Only two successive terms permitted, but multiple non-successive terms permitted
- 5: No term limits
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section
- 97: Unable to Determine
- 98: Not Specified
- 99: Not Applicable

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v127.

CCP ordering: Asked only if EXECNUM is answered 3, or if HOSHOG is answered 2.

4.52 HOG control over (C)

v2 tag: v2exctlhg

PM: Jan Teorell

Question: In practice, from which of the following bodies does the **head of government** need approval for its actions?

Clarification: Choose all that apply.

- 0: None.
- 1: A foreign power.
- 2: The ruling party or party leadership body (in a one-party system).

- 3: A royal council.
- 4: The military.
- 5: The head of state.
- 6: A religious body.
- 7: A tribal or ethnic council.
- 8: Other.

Answer type: Multiple-selection.

Ordering: If you select 8, proceed to the next question [v2exctlhog]. If you select 0-7, skip to question “HOG dissolution in practice” [v2exdjdshg].

4.53 HOG other body controls (C)

v2 tag: v2exctlhog

PM: Jan Teorell

Question: From which kind of body or bodies does the **head of government** need approval for its actions?

[text]

Ordering: Answer this question only for those years you answered “other” (8) to the previous question [v2exctlhg].

4.54 HOG dissolution in practice (C)

v1 tag: ex31dfdshg

v2 tag: v2exdjdshg

PM: Jan Teorell

Question: If the **head of government** took actions to dissolve the legislature, would he/she be likely to succeed?

Clarification: The question refers to whether the head of government is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not.

- 0: No.
- 1: Yes, but not at his/her own discretion, only when prompted to as a response to specific events (for example, after a certain number of votes of no confidence, or after a certain number of failed attempts to form a cabinet).
- 2: Yes, at his/her own discretion, but with restrictions (for example, by frequency, such as "once a year", by time point within term, such as "not within the last sixth months of

the head of government's term", and by the requirement that the head of government must then himself/herself stand for election).

3: Yes, at his/her own discretion and without restrictions.

4.55 HOG appoints cabinet in practice (C)

v1 tag: ex32dfcbhg

v2 tag: v2exdjcbhg

PM: Jan Teorell

Question: In practice, does the **head of government** have the power to appoint – or is the approval of the **head of government** necessary for the appointment of – cabinet ministers?

Clarification: The question refers to whether the head of government is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not.

0: No.

1: Yes, but only with the tacit consent or explicit confirmation by the legislature.

2: Yes, without any need for confirmation by the legislature.

4.56 HOG dismisses ministers in practice (C)

v1 tag: ex33dfdmhg

v2 tag: v2exdfdshg

PM: Jan Teorell

Question: If the **head of government** took actions to dismiss cabinet ministers, would he/she be likely to succeed?

Clarification: The question refers to whether the head of government is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not, and regardless of possible political repercussions (e.g., vote of no confidence).

0: No.

1: Yes, but not at his/her own discretion, only when prompted to as a response to specific events (for example, after a vote of no confidence taken by the legislature).

2: Yes, at his/her own discretion, but with restrictions (for example, only provided the head of government proposes an alternative minister who would need the legislature's approval, i.e., so called "constructive dismissal").

3: Yes, at his/her own discretion and without restrictions.

4.57 HOG veto power in practice (C)

v1 tag: ex15dfvths

v2 tag: v2exdfvthg

PM: Jan Teorell

Question: If the **head of government** took actions to veto a piece of legislation, would he/she be likely to succeed?

Clarification: By "veto", we mean either a partial veto (concerning any parts of a bill) or package vetoes (concerning whole bills). The question refers to whether the head of government is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not.

- 0: No.
- 1: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by a simple majority vote (a vote of more than half of those voting).
- 2: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by an absolute majority vote (a vote of more than half of the members of the legislature).
- 3: Yes, but the legislature can override the veto by a qualified/extraordinary majority vote (a super-majority – e.g., 2/3 or 3/4 – of those voting).
- 4: Yes, with no possibility of override.

4.58 HOG proposes legislation in practice (C)

v1 tag: ex35dfpphg

v2 tag: v2exdfpphg

PM: Jan Teorell

Question: Does the **head of government** have the capacity, in practice, to propose legislation?

Clarification: By "propose legislation", we mean the introduction of legislative bills. The question refers to whether the head of government is considered to hold this power in practice, regardless of whether this is regulated by law and whether this power has been exercised or not.

- 0: Yes, in all policy areas, including some exclusive domains (where neither the legislature nor other bodies may initiate bills).
- 1: Yes, in all policy areas, but this power is shared with the legislature and perhaps with other bodies.
- 2: No. The head of government cannot propose legislation.

4.59 HOG comments (B)(C)

v2 tag: v2excommhg

PM: Jan Teorell

Question: Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on the **head of government**.

[text]

4.60 Executive as a whole introduction (B)(C)

v2 tag: v2exintro3

This final section of the survey pertains to the executive, considered as a whole.

Some questions refer to “members of the executive,” i.e., the head of state, the head of government, and cabinet ministers. If you feel that the answer to a question varies across these offices, your answer should reflect the average (arithmetic mean) across these offices.

Other questions refer to lower-level members of the executive branch. This will be clarified as we proceed.

4.61 Executive respects constitution (C)

v1 tag: ex17rpcths

v2 tag: v2exrescon

PM: Jan Teorell

Question: Do members of the executive (the head of state, the head of government, and cabinet ministers) respect the constitution?

- 0: Members of the executive violate the constitution whenever they want to, without legal consequences.
- 1: Members of the executive violate most provisions of the constitution without legal consequences, but still must respect certain provisions.
- 2: Somewhere in between (1) and (3). Members of the executive would face legal consequences for violating most provisions of the constitution, but can disregard some provisions without any legal consequences.
- 3: Members of the executive rarely violate the constitution, and when it happens they face legal charges.
- 4: Members of the executive never violate the constitution.

4.62 Executive bribery and corrupt exchanges (C)

v2 tag: v2exbribe

PM: Jan Teorell

Question: How routinely do members of the executive (the head of state, the head of government, and cabinet ministers), or their agents, grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements?

- 0: It is routine and expected.
- 1: It happens more often than not in dealings with the executive.
- 2: It happens but is unpredictable: those dealing with the executive find it hard to predict when an inducement will be necessary.
- 3: It happens occasionally but is not expected.
- 4: It never, or hardly ever, happens.

4.63 Executive embezzlement and theft (C)

v2 tag: v2exembezz

PM: Jan Teorell

Question: How often do members of the executive (the head of state, the head of government, and cabinet ministers), or their agents, steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?

- 0: Constantly. Members of the executive act as though all public resources were their personal or family property.
- 1: Often. Members of the executive are responsible stewards of selected public resources but treat the rest like personal property.
- 2: About half the time. Members of the executive are about as likely to be responsible stewards of selected public resources as they are to treat them like personal property.
- 3: Occasionally. Members of the executive are responsible stewards of most public resources but treat selected others like personal property.
- 4: Never, or hardly ever. Members of the executive are almost always responsible stewards of public resources and keep them separate from personal or family property.

4.64 Public sector corrupt exchanges (C)

v2 tag: v2excrptps

PM: Jan Teorell

Question: How routinely do public sector employees grant favors in exchange for bribes, kickbacks, or other material inducements?

Clarification: When responding to this question, we would like to you think about a typical person employed by the public sector, excluding the military. If you think there are large discrepancies between branches of the public sector, between the national/federal and subnational/state level, or between the core bureaucracy and employees working with public service delivery, please try to average them out before stating your response.

- 0: Extremely common. Most public sector employees are systematically involved in petty but corrupt exchanges almost all the time.
- 1: Common. Such petty but corrupt exchanges occur regularly involving a majority of public employees.
- 2: Sometimes. About half or less than half of public sector employees engage in such exchanges for petty gains at times.
- 3: Scattered. A small minority of public sector employees engage in petty corruption from time to time.
- 4: No. Never, or hardly ever.

4.65 Public sector theft (C)

v2 tag: v2exthttps

PM: Jan Teorell

Question: How often do public sector employees steal, embezzle, or misappropriate public funds or other state resources for personal or family use?

Clarification: When responding to this question, we would like to you think about a typical person employed by the public sector, excluding the military. If you think there are large discrepancies between branches of the public sector, between the national/federal and subnational/state level, or between the core bureaucracy and employees working with public service delivery, please try to average them out before stating your response.

- 0: Constantly. Public sector employees act as though all public resources were their personal or family property.
- 1: Often. Public sector employees are responsible stewards of selected public resources but treat the rest like personal property.
- 2: About half the time. Public sector employees are about as likely to be responsible stewards of selected public resources as they are to treat them like personal property.
- 3: Occasionally. Public sector employees are responsible stewards of most public resources but treat selected others like personal property.
- 4: Never, or hardly ever. Public sector employees are almost always responsible stewards of public resources and keep them separate from personal or family property.

4.66 Cabinet regulated by law (A-)

CCP tag: CABINET

v2 tag: v2excablaw

PM: Jan Teorell

Question: Does the constitution mention the executive cabinet/ministers?

Clarification: By cabinet, we are referring to the government's ministers who are responsible for particular substantive areas.

1: Yes

2: No

96: Other, please specify in the comments section

97: Unable to Determine

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v163.

4.67 Cabinet appointment by law (A-)

PM: Jan Teorell

v2 tag: v2excabapl

Question: Who nominates/appoints the cabinet/ministers?

Clarification: If both chambers must act, then please select "Both Chambers of the Legislature are required." If either chamber can act, then please select both the "First Chamber of the Legislature" and the "Second Chamber of the Legislature."

1: Head of State (use this choice for single executive systems) [CCP tag: CABAPPT_1]

2: Head of Government [CCP tag: CABAPPT_2]

3: First (or only) Chamber of the Legislature [CCP tag: CABAPPT_3]

4: Second Chamber of the Legislature [CCP tag: CABAPPT_4]

5: Both Chambers of the Legislature are required [CCP tag: CABAPPT_5]

90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law [CCP tag: CABAPPT_90]

96: Other, please specify in the comments section [CCP tag: CABAPPT_96]

97: Unable to Determine [CCP tag: CABAPPT_97]

98: Not Specified [CCP tag: CABAPPT_98]

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v164.

CCP ordering: Asked only if CABINET is answered 1.

4.68 Cabinet approval by law (A-)

PM: Jan Teorell

v2 tag: v2excabprl

Question: Who approves the cabinet/ministers?

Clarification: If the person or group who is responsible for appointing the cabinet/ministers must consult or be advised by another group in their selection, please select one of the "Appointer is directed..." options, rather than choosing that group as the approving body. If both chambers must act, then please select "Both Chambers of the Legislature are required." If either chamber can act, then please select both the "First Chamber of the Legislature" and the "Second Chamber of the Legislature."

- 1: Head of State (use this choice for single executive systems) [CCP tag: CABAPPR_1]
- 2: Head of Government [CCP tag: CABAPPR_2]
- 3: First (or only) Chamber of the Legislature [CCP tag: CABAPPR_3]
- 4: Second Chamber of the Legislature [CCP tag: CABAPPR_4]
- 5: Both Chambers of the Legislature are required [CCP tag: CABAPPR_5]
- 6: Appointer is directed to act on the advice of majority party, legislature, or executive [CCP tag: CABAPPR_6]
- 7: Appointer is directed to act on the basis of election results [CCP tag: CABAPPR_7]
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law [CCP tag: CABAPPR_90]
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section [CCP tag: CABAPPR_96]
- 97: Unable to Determine [CCP tag: CABAPPR_97]
- 98: Not Specified [CCP tag: CABAPPR_98]

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v165.

CCP ordering: Asked only if CABINET is answered 1.

4.69 Cabinet dismissal by law (A-)

v2 tag: v2excabdsl

PM: Jan Teorell

Question: Who has the authority to dismiss the cabinet/ministers?

- 1: Head of State (use this choice for single executive systems) [CCP tag: CABDISS_1]
- 2: Head of Government [CCP tag: CABDISS_2]
- 3: First (or only) Chamber of the Legislature [CCP tag: CABDISS_3]

- 4: Second Chamber of the Legislature [CCP tag: CABDISS_4]
- 5: Both Chambers of the Legislature acting separately [CCP tag: CABDISS_5]
- 6: Both Chambers of the Legislature in a joint session [CCP tag: CABDISS_6]
- 7: By Public Recall [CCP tag: CABDISS_7]
- 8: Public Prosecutor [CCP tag: CABDISS_8]
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law [CCP tag: CABDISS_90]
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section [CCP tag: CABDISS_96]
- 97: Unable to Determine [CCP tag: CABDISS_97]
- 98: Not Specified [CCP tag: CABDISS_98]

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v167.

CCP ordering: Asked only if CABINET is answered 1.

4.70 Veto legislation by law (A-)

CCP tag: LEGAPP

v2 tag: v2exvetolw

PM: Jan Teorell

Question: Who has the power to approve/reject legislation once it has been passed by the legislature (not including reviews for constitutionality)?

Clarification: If the constitution allows a body to ask for reconsideration or request a second reading, please make a note in the comments, but do not select that body below.

- 1: Head of State (use this choice for single executive systems)
- 2: Head of Government
- 3: Both Head of State and Head of Government
- 4: The Government/Cabinet
- 5: Legislation does not require approval
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section
- 97: Unable to Determine
- 98: Not Specified
- 99: Not Applicable

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v270 (also see v271-275 on details and override); IAEF question 4. 2.

CCP ordering: Asked only if LEGISL is answered 1.

4.71 Propose legislation by law (A-)

v2 tag: v2exprlegl

PM: Jan Teorell

Question: Who does the constitution specify can initiate general legislation?

Clarification: Note any restrictions on how the particular offices can initiate legislation.

- 1: Head of State (use this choice for single executive systems) [CCP tag: LEG_IN_1]
- 2: Head of Government [CCP tag: LEG_IN_2]
- 3: The Government/Cabinet [CCP tag: LEG_IN_3]
- 4: Political Party [CCP tag: LEG_IN_4]
- 5: Member of First (or only) Chamber of the Legislature [CCP tag: LEG_IN_5]
- 6: Member of Second Chamber of the Legislature [CCP tag: LEG_IN_6]
- 7: Public [CCP tag: LEG_IN_7]
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section [CCP tag: LEG_IN_96]
- 97: Unable to Determine [CCP tag: LEG_IN_97]
- 98: Not Specified [CCP tag: LEG_IN_98]

Answer type: Multiple-selection.

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v263; IAEP question 3. B 2; but only either or.

CCP ordering: Asked only if LEGISL is answered 1.

4.72 Dissolution of legislature by law (A-)

CCP tag: LEGDISS

v2 tag: v2exdisolel

PM: Jan Teorell

Question: Who, if anybody, can dismiss the legislature?

Clarification: If constitution expressly prohibits any actor from dissolving or adjourning the legislature, please answer "other with comment".

- 1: Head of State (use this choice for single executive systems)
- 2: Head of Government
- 3: Either Head of State or Head of Government

- 4: The Government/Cabinet
- 5: The Legislature itself
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section
- 97: Unable to Determine
- 98: Not Specified
- 99: Not Applicable

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v255; IAEP, questions 4. 1; but only either or.

CCP ordering: Asked only if LEGISL is answered 1.

4.73 Entire executive comments (B)(C)

v2 tag: v2excomex

PM: Jan Teorell

Question: Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on the entire executive.

[text]

5 The Legislature

5.1 Legislature introduction (B)(C)

V2 tag: v2lgintro1

PMs: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

The following questions pertain to the legislature, an assembly of deputies or representatives with powers to consider, pass, amend, or repeal laws.

If there is no legislature in the country you are coding for some period of years, do not code any questions for those years.

If you are considering a semi-sovereign territory such as a colony please answer this question with respect to the legislature that is seated within the territory in question (such as the local legislative assembly in a British colony, not the Parliament in London).

A **popular election** need not involve universal suffrage; indeed, suffrage may be highly restricted.

A “direct election” can include seats reserved for special groups (e.g., ethnic groups or women) so long as these members are chosen by popular election.

Frequently, it is important to distinguish between formal rules (as stipulated by statute, legislative rules, the constitution, or common law precedent) and actual practice (what happens on the ground). In order to clarify the de jure/de facto distinction, we employ the terms “by law...” and “in practice...” Please pay close attention to these cues. Note that sometimes we ask different coders to code different aspects of a question. So, you might get a question about the de facto state of affairs, but another source might provide the answer to the de jure state of affairs.

5.2 Legislature bicameral (A*)

v1 tag: lg01bicam

v2tag: v2lgbicam

CCP tag: HOUSENUM

PMs: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: How many chambers does the legislature contain?

- 0: 0
- 1: 1
- 2: 2
- 3: Other. (96 in CCP) Please specify in the comments section
- 4: (97 in CCP) Unable to determine
- 5: (98 in CCP) Not specified
- 6: (99 in CCP) Not applicable

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v191.

Coverage: Comprehensive.

Ordering: If (1) is chosen, questions pertaining to the upper chamber and the one question entitled Dominant chamber (v2lgdomchm) do not apply.

5.3 Legislature dominant chamber (C)

v2 tag: v2lgdomchm

PMs: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: If the legislature is bicameral, which chamber is dominant?

- 0: The lower chamber is clearly dominant.
- 1: The lower chamber is somewhat more powerful on most issues.
- 2: They are roughly co-equal in power.

3: The upper chamber is somewhat more powerful on most issues.

4: The upper chamber is clearly dominant.

5.4 Legislature supermajority (A-)

CCP tag: LEGSUPR

v2 tag: v2lgspmaj

PMs: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: Is a supermajority needed for passing any legislation?

Clarification: Mark "Yes" if there are any types of legislation that require a supermajority, but this does not include economic legislation or any legislative approval powers (i.e. impeachment, declaration of war, etc.).

1: Yes

96: Other, please specify in the comments section

97: Unable to Determine

98: Not Specified

99: Not Applicable

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v264.

Coverage: Comprehensive.

CCP ordering: Asked only if LEGISL is answered.

5.5 Legislature super-majority types (A-)

CCP tag: LEGSUPRW

v2 tag: v2lgspmjl

PMs: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: What types of legislation require a supermajority?

Clarification: This question refers exclusively to legislation, not other acts performed by the legislature, like declaring war, impeaching members of government, etc.

1: [text]

99: Not Applicable

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v265.

Coverage: Comprehensive.

CCP ordering: Asked only if LEGSUPR is answered 1.

5.6 Legislature questions officials by law (A-)

v1 tag: lg05questlo

v2 tag: v2lgqstexl

CCP tag: INTEEXEC

PMs: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: Does the legislature have the power to interpellate members of the executive branch, or similarly, is the executive responsible for reporting its activities to the legislature on a regular basis?

- 1: Legislature can call executive to report as it sees fit
- 2: Executive must report to legislature at regular intervals
- 3: Both
- 4: Neither
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section
- 97: Unable to Determine
- 99: Not Applicable

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v261.

Coverage: Comprehensive.

CCP ordering: Asked only if LEGISL is answered 1.

5.7 Legislature questions officials in practice (C)

v2 tag: v2lgqstexp

PMs: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: In practice, does the legislature routinely question executive branch officials?

Clarification: By "question" we mean, for example, the power of summons through which the head of state or head of government could be forced to explain its policies or testify.

- 0: No - never or very rarely.
- 1: Yes - routinely.

5.8 Legislature investigates by law (A-)

v1 tag: lg06investlo

v2 tag: v2lginvstl

CCP tag: INVEXE

PMs: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: Does the legislature have the power to investigate the activities of the executive branch?

Clarification: Please answer "no" if the constitution explicitly denies the subject of the question and "not specified" if the subject of the question is not mentioned in the constitution.

1: Yes

2: No

96: Other, please specify in the comments section

97: Unable to Determine

98: Not Specified

99: Not Applicable

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v262.

Coverage: Comprehensive.

5.9 Legislature investigates in practice (C)

v1 tag: lg07otovst

v2 tag: v2lginvstp

PMs: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: If the executive were engaged in unconstitutional, illegal, or unethical activity, how likely is it that a legislative body (perhaps a whole chamber, perhaps a committee, whether aligned with government or opposition) would conduct an investigation that would result in a decision or report that is unfavorable to the executive?

0: Extremely unlikely.

1: Unlikely.

2: As likely as not.

3: Likely.

4: Certain or nearly certain.

5.10 Executive oversight (C)

v1 tag: lg07otovst

v2 tag: v2lgotovst

PMs: Jan Teorell

Question: If executive branch officials were engaged in unconstitutional, illegal, or unethical activity, how likely is it that a body *other than the legislature*, such as a comptroller general, general prosecutor, or ombudsman, would question or investigate them and issue an unfavorable decision or report?

- 0: Extremely unlikely.
- 1: Unlikely.
- 2: Very uncertain.
- 3: Likely.
- 4: Certain or nearly certain.

5.11 Legislature corrupt activities (C)

v2 tag: v2lgcrrpt

PMs: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: Do members of the legislature abuse their position for financial gain?

Clarification: This includes any of the following: (a) accepting bribes, (b) helping to obtain government contracts for firms that the legislator (or his/her family/friends/political supporters) own, (c) doing favors for firms in exchange for the opportunity of employment after leaving the legislature, (d) stealing money from the state or from campaign donations for personal use.

Please make your best estimate, based upon what is known or suspected to be true.

- 0: Never, or hardly ever.
- 1: Very occasionally. There may be a few legislators who engage in these activities but the vast majority do not.
- 2: Sometimes. Some legislators probably engage in these activities.
- 3: Often. Many legislators probably engage in these activities.
- 4: Commonly. Most legislators probably engage in these activities.

5.12 Legislature opposition parties (C)

v2 tag: v2lgoppart

PMs: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: Are opposition parties (those not in the ruling party or coalition) able to exercise oversight and investigatory functions against the wishes of the governing party or coalition?

- 0: No, not at all.
- 1: Occasionally.
- 2: Yes, for the most part.

5.13 Legislature controls resources (C)

v2 tag: v2lgfunds

PMs: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: In practice, does the legislature control the resources that finance its own internal operations and the perquisites of its members?

- 0: No. The benefits legislators receive or the finances needed for the legislature's operation depend on remaining in good standing with an outside authority, such as the executive.
- 1: Yes.

5.14 Legislature amends constitution (B)

v1 tag: lg09amend (refers only to the lower/unicameral chamber)

v2 tag: v2lgamend

PMs: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: By law, can the legislature (including both chambers of the legislature) change the constitution without the involvement of any other body?

- 0: No.
- 1: Yes.

5.15 Legislature approval of treaties by law (B)

v2 tag: v2lgtreaty

PMs: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: By law, is the approval of the legislature necessary to ratify treaties with foreign countries?

- 0: No.
- 1: Yes.

5.16 Legislature declares war by law (B)

v1 tag: lg10decwarlo

v2 tag: v2lgwarlaw

PMs: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: By law, is the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature necessary to declare war?

0: No.

1: Yes.

5.17 Legislature amnesties (B)

v1 tag: lg11pardonlo

v2 tag: v2lgamnsty

PMs: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: By law, does the legislature have the power to grant amnesty or pardon?

0: No.

1: Yes.

5.18 Legislature immunity in practice (A-)

CCP tag: IMMUNITY

v2 tag: v2lgimmune

PMs: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: Does the constitution provide for immunity for the members of the legislature under some conditions?

Clarification: Absolute immunity means immunity from all types of legal process. Limited immunity means immunity only for certain types of actions. Please note in the comments section if there are any time restrictions for immunity or if immunity can be waived.

1: Absolute Immunity

2: Limited Immunity

3: No Immunity

90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law

96: Other, please specify in the comments section

97: Unable to Determine

98: Not Specified

99: Not Applicable

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v260.

5.19 Representation of disadvantaged social groups (C)

v1 tag: lg19ethnic

v2 tag: v2lgdsadlo

PM: Pamela Paxton

Question: Considering all disadvantaged **social groups** in the country, how well represented are these groups, as a whole, in the national legislature?

Clarification: Disadvantage refers to socioeconomic disadvantage. Specifically, in order to be considered disadvantaged members of a social group must have an average income that is significantly below the median national income.

- 0: There are no disadvantaged social groups.
- 1: They have no representation at all.
- 2: They are highly under-represented relative to their proportion of the general population.
- 3: They are slightly under-represented relative to their proportion of the general population.
- 4: They are represented roughly equal relative to their proportion of the general population.
- 5: They are over-represented relative to their proportion of the general population.

5.20 Introduction lower chamber (B)(C)

V2 tag: v2lgintro2

PMs: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

The following questions pertain to the lower or unicameral chamber of the legislature. The lower chamber in a bicameral legislature, sometimes also called the "second chamber," is typically the more numerous chamber and also more directly representative of the general population.

If there is no legislature in the country you are coding for some period of years, do not code any questions for those years.

If you are considering a semi-sovereign territory, such as a colony, please answer these questions with respect to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature that is seated within the territory in question (such as the lower chamber of a local legislative assembly in a British colony, not the House of Commons in London).

Country experts will find the name (proper noun) of the lower chamber of the legislature in the first question (following this page). To see the name, click on any year in the grid. All subsequent questions in this section pertain to that body.

5.21 Lower chamber legislature name (A*)

v1 tag: lg02namelo

v2 tag: v2lgnamelo

PMs: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: What is the name of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

Clarification: Please provide an as accurate as possible literal translation of the name of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature in English, with the name in the native language, or a transcription thereof, within parentheses.

[text]

5.22 Lower chamber elected (B)

v1 tag: lg03electlo

v2 tag: v2lgello

PMs: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: What percentage of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature is directly elected in **popular elections**?

Clarification: Direct election includes seats reserved for special groups (e.g., ethnic groups or women) so long as these members are chosen by popular election. Exceptions to the norm of direct election include members who are appointed, e.g., by an executive, the military, or a theocratic body. Thus, if 10% of a lower chamber is appointed in some fashion the correct answer to this question would be 90%.

We are *not* concerned with non-voting members or with members of the legislature who do not possess the powers of most legislators.

[range]

5.23 Lower chamber quota for social groups (B)

v1 tag: lg21qumin

v2 tag: v2lgqumin

PM: Pamela Paxton

Question: Is there a national-level quota for any social groups in the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

Clarification: These quotas are sometimes informally known as “minority quotas.” Do not record gender quotas here (as gender is not part of what we mean by a social group). Also, do not include special rules that benefit parties defined by social group but do not guarantee seats for these groups. For example, do not count a rule exempting parties from threshold requirements. Code “yes” only if the groups covered by the quota have full voting rights in the legislature.

0: No national level quota for any social group.

1: Yes, there are reserved seats for at least one social group.

5.24 Lower chamber female legislators (A-)

v2 tag: v2lgfemleg

PM: Pamela Paxton

Question: What percentage (%) of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature is female?

[range]

Sources: Paxton, Green, Hughes (2008).

Coverage: Comprehensive, 1900-.

5.25 Lower chamber gender quota (B)

v1 tag: lg15qugen

v2 tag: v2lgqugen

PM: Pamela Paxton

Question: Is there a national-level gender quota for the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

Clarification: National-level quotas either reserve some seats for women in the legislature (as a whole or per district) or mandate through statutory law that all political parties must nominate a certain percentage of female candidates or candidates considered for nomination. A sanction for noncompliance imposes a penalty on a party that fails to meet the quota provisions. Examples of sanctions for noncompliance include rejection of the party list, loss of public campaign funds, or other financial penalties. Weak sanctions are those that parties may be able to ignore, such as a very weak financial penalty. Strong sanctions provide strong deterrents for noncompliance. An example of a strong sanction would be the rejection of a party’s list. Code “yes” if quotas apply to any seats.

0: No national level gender quota

1: Yes, a statutory gender quota for all parties without sanctions for noncompliance

2: Yes, statutory gender quota for all parties with weak sanctions for noncompliance

3: Yes, statutory gender quota for all parties with strong sanctions for noncompliance

4: Yes, there are reserved seats in the legislature for women.

Ordering: If you answer 1, 2, or 3, proceed to the next question [v2lgqugens]. If you answer 0, skip to question [v2lglegllo].

5.26 Lower chamber gender quota placement mandate (B)

v1 tag: lg16qugens

v2 tag: v2lgqugens

PM: Pamela Paxton

Question: Does the national-level quota for the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature contain a placement mandate?

Clarification: A placement mandate is a rule concerning rank order on the party list, usually to ensure that women are placed in electable positions on the party list. An example would a rule stating that no more than three of the top five candidates can be of the same gender.

0: No.

1: Yes.

Ordering: Only answer this question if you answered 1-3 on the previous question [v2lgqugen].

5.27 Lower chamber gender quota threshold (B)

PM: Pamela Paxton

v2 tag: v2lgqugent

Question: What is the threshold of the quota for the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature?

Clarification: A quota is the minimum threshold, understood as a percentage (%) of the total seats in the legislature.

[range]

Ordering: Only answer this question if you answered 1-4 on question [v2lgqugen].

5.28 Lower chamber party gender quotas (A+)

v1 tag: lg17pqgen

v2 tag: v2lgpqgen

PM: Pamela Paxton

Question: Please list any party-level gender quotas for the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature. Please record: (1) the official name of any party with a voluntary gender quota, (2) the threshold (percent) of the quota (e.g., 30% women), (3) whether the quota includes a placement mandate, (4) whether the party quota is stated but remains unrealized or has been implemented in practice.

Clarification: We are interested in quotas that are voluntarily imposed by individual political parties. Some parties in a country may have a party gender quota while others do not.

Quotas vary in their threshold, or percentage legislated. One country might legislate 10% women while another legislates 30% women. Or a country may increase its quota threshold from 33% to 40%.

A placement mandate is a rule concerning rank order on the party list, usually to ensure that women are placed in electable positions on the party list. An example would a rule stating that no more than three of the top five candidates can be of the same gender.

Do not code “yes” for internal party rules promoting women’s presence or leadership within the party. Code “yes” only in the presence of candidate quotas.

- 1: Name of party.
- 2: Quota [range].
- 3: Placement mandate: yes/no.
4. Implemented in practice: yes/no.

5.29 Lower chamber legislates by law (B)

v1 tag: lg04legislo

v2 tag: v2lglegllo

PMs: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: By law, is the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature necessary to pass legislation?

- 0: No.
- 1: Yes.

5.30 Lower chamber legislates in practice (C)

v2 tag: v2lglegplo

PMs: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: In practice, is the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature required to pass legislation?

- 0: No. Legislation is routinely passed without the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature.
- 1: Yes, usually. Legislation is usually passed with the approval of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature, but occasionally the legislature is by-passed.
- 2: Yes, always. Legislation of any consequence is always approved by the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature.

5.31 Lower chamber regular sessions (A-)

v1 tag: lg13seshlo

v2 tag: v2lgsseshlo

CCP tag: SESSION

PMs: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: For how long are legislators in session during each year?

Clarification: Report the number of months per year. Answer "0" if not specified.

1: [text]

99: Not Applicable

Source: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012). v296.

CCP ordering: Asked only if LEGISL is answered 1)

5.32 Lower chamber committees (C)

v1 tag: lg14commslo

v2 tag: v2lgcomslo

PMs: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: Does the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature have a functioning committee system?

0: No, there are no committees.

1: Yes, but there are only special (not permanent) committees.

2: Yes, there are permanent committees, but they are not very significant in affecting the course of policy.

3: Yes, there are permanent committees that have strong influence on the course of policymaking.

5.33 Lower chamber members serve in government (C)

v2 tag: v2lgsrvlo

PMs: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: In practice, are members of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature able to serve simultaneously as ministers in the government?

0: No.

1: Yes.

5.34 Lower chamber introduces bills (B)

v2 tag: v2lgintblo

PMs: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: By law, does the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature have the ability to introduce bills in all policy jurisdictions?

0: No, there are policy areas in which the lower (or unicameral) chamber cannot introduce bills.

1: Yes.

5.35 Lower chamber staff (C)

v2 tag: v2lgstafflo

PMs: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: Does each member of the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature have at least one staff member with policy expertise?

0: No.

1: Yes.

5.36 Lower chamber term limits (A-)

CCP tag: LHTRMLIM

v2 tag: v2lgrmlup

PMs: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: What restrictions are in place regarding the number of terms members of the first (or only) chamber may serve?

Clarification: For this question, no limit means the constitution specifies there is no limit on the number of terms and not specified means the constitution does not specify whether or not there is a limit. "Eligible for re-election" should be coded as "no term limits."

- 1: Only one term permitted, total
- 2: Only two terms permitted, total
- 3: No successive terms permitted, but multiple non-successive terms permitted
- 4: Only two successive terms permitted, but multiple non-successive terms permitted
- 5: No term limits
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section
- 97: Unable to Determine
- 98: Not Specified
- 99: Not Applicable

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v223.

Coverage: Comprehensive.

CCP ordering: Asked only if HOUSENUM is answered 2, or if HOUSENUM is answered 3.

5.37 Upper chamber introduction (B)(C)

V2 tag: v2lgintro3

PMs: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

The following questions pertain to the upper chamber of the legislature (if bicameral). The upper chamber in a bicameral legislature, often called the "senate" or sometimes the "first chamber," typically means the less numerous chamber that is also less directly representative of the general population.

If you are considering a semi-sovereign territory, such as a colony, please answer these questions with respect to the upper chamber of the legislature that is seated within the territory in question (such as the senate or upper chamber of a local legislative assembly in a British colony, not the House of Lords in London).

5.38 Upper chamber name (A*)

v1 tag: lg22nameup

v2tag: v2lgnameup

PMs: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: What is the name of the upper chamber of the legislature?

Clarification: Please provide an as accurate as possible literal translation of the name of the upper chamber of the legislature in English, with the name in the native language, or a transcription thereof, within parentheses.

[text]

Ordering: If this indicator is uncoded (for all years), all questions about the upper chamber of the legislature should be skipped.

5.39 Upper chamber exists (A*)

V2 tag: v2lgupext

PMs: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: Did an upper chamber of the legislature exist in any year from 1900 to the present?

Clarification: We have entered this answer for you so all you need to do is to submit. If you think the coding is wrong, please contact your Regional Manager.

0: No.

1: Yes.

Ordering: If this indicator is coded 0, all questions about the upper chamber of the legislature should be skipped (up to the Comments question).

5.40 Upper chamber elected (B)

v1 tag: lg23electup

v2 tag: v2lgelecup

PMs: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: What percentage of the upper chamber of the legislature is directly elected in popular elections?

Clarification: Exceptions to the norm of direct election include members who are appointed, e.g., by an executive, the military, or a theocratic body. Thus, if 10% of a upper chamber is appointed in some fashion the correct answer to this question would be 90%.

[range]

5.41 Upper chamber legislates by law (B)

v1 tag: lg24legisup

v2 tag: v2lgleglup

PMs: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: By law, is the approval of the upper chamber of the legislature necessary to pass legislation?

0: No.

1: Yes.

5.42 Upper chamber legislates in practice (C)

v2 tag: v2lglegpup

PMs: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: In practice, is the approval of the upper chamber of the legislature required to pass legislation?

0: No. Legislation is routinely passed without the approval of the upper chamber of the legislature.

1: Yes, usually. Legislation is usually passed with the approval of the upper chamber of the legislature, but occasionally the legislature is by-passed.

2: Yes, always. Legislation of any consequence is always approved by the upper chamber of the legislature.

5.43 Upper chamber introduces bills (B+)

v2 tag: v2lgintbup

PMs: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: By law, does the upper chamber of the legislature have the ability to introduce bills in all policy jurisdictions?

0: No, there are policy areas in which the upper chamber cannot introduce bills.

1: Yes.

5.44 Upper chamber term limits (A-)

CCP tag: UHTRMLIM

v2 tag: v2lguchatrmлим

PMs: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: What restrictions are in place regarding the number of terms members of the second chamber may serve?

Clarification: For this question, no limit means the constitution specifies there is no limit on the number of terms and not specified means the constitution does not specify whether or not there is a limit.

- 1: Only one term permitted, total
- 2: Only two terms permitted, total
- 3: No successive terms permitted, but multiple non-successive terms permitted
- 4: Only two successive terms permitted, but multiple non-successive terms permitted
- 5: No term limits
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section
- 97: Unable to Determine
- 98: Not Specified
- 99: Not Applicable

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), v252.

Coverage: Comprehensive.

CCP ordering: Asked only if HOUSENUM is answered 3.

5.45 Legislature comments (B)(C)

v1 tag: lg32commnt

v2 tag: v2lgcommnt

PMs: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Question: Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on the legislature.

[text]

6 Deliberation

6.1 Deliberation introduction (C)

v2 tag: v2dlintro

PMs: Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

The following questions address the deliberative or non-deliberative nature of a country's politics, with particular focus on elite levels. Some of these questions focus on the quality of discourse and others focus on public policies.

6.2 Reasoned justification (C)

v1 tag: dl01reason

v2 tag: v2dlreason

PMs: Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

Question: When important policy changes are being considered, i.e. before a decision has been made, to what extent do political elites give public and reasoned justifications for their positions?

Clarification: Because discourse varies greatly from person to person, base your answer on the style that is most typical of prominent national political leaders.

- 0: No justification. Elites almost always only dictate that something should or should not be done, but no reasoning about justification is given. For example, “We must cut spending.”
- 1: Inferior justification. Elites tend to give reasons why someone should or should not be for doing or not doing something, but the reasons tend to be illogical or false, although they may appeal to many voters. For example, “We must cut spending. The state is inefficient.” [The inference is incomplete because addressing inefficiencies would not necessarily reduce spending and it might undermine essential services.]
- 2: Qualified justification. Elites tend to offer a single simple reason justifying why the proposed policies contribute to or detract from an outcome. For example, “We must cut spending because taxpayers cannot afford to pay for current programs.”
- 3: Sophisticated justification. Elites tend to offer more than one or more complex, nuanced and complete justification. For example, “We must cut spending because taxpayers cannot afford to pay for current government programs. Raising taxes would hurt economic growth, and deficit spending would lead to inflation.”

6.3 Common good (C)

v1 tag: dl02common

v2 tag: v2dlcommon

PMs: Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

Question: When important policy changes are being considered, to what extent do political elites justify their positions in terms of the common good?

Clarification: Because discourse varies greatly from person to person, base your answer on the style that is most typical of prominent national political leaders.

- 0: Little or no justification in terms of the common good is usually offered.
- 1: Specific business, geographic, group, party, or constituency interests are for the most part offered as justifications.

- 2: Justifications are for the most part a mix of specific interests and the common good and it is impossible to say which justification is more common than the other.
- 3: Justifications are based on a mixture of references to constituency/party/group interests and on appeals to the common good.
- 4: Justifications are for the most part almost always based on explicit statements of the common good for society, understood either as the greatest good for the greatest number or as helping the least advantaged in a society.

6.4 Respect counterarguments (C)

v1 tag: dl04countr

v2 tag: v2dlcountr

PMs: Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

Question: When important policy changes are being considered, to what extent do political elites acknowledge and respect counterarguments?

Clarification: Because discourse varies greatly from person to person, base your answer on the style that is most typical of prominent national political leaders.

- 0: Counterarguments are not allowed or if articulated, punished.
- 1: Counterarguments are allowed at least from some parties, but almost always are ignored.
- 2: Elites tend to acknowledge counterarguments but then explicitly degrade them by making a negative statement about them or the individuals and groups that propose them.
- 3: Elites tend to acknowledge counterarguments without making explicit negative or positive statements about them.
- 4: Elites almost always acknowledge counterarguments and explicitly value them, even if they ultimately reject them for the most part.
- 5: Elites almost always acknowledge counterarguments and explicitly value them, and frequently also even accept them and change their position.

6.5 Range of consultation (C)

v1 tag: dl05conslt

v2 tag: v2dlconslt

PMs: Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

Question: When important policy changes are being considered, how wide is the range of consultation *at elite levels*?

Clarification: Because practices vary greatly from policy to policy, base your answer on the style that is most typical of policymaking.

- 0: No consultation. The leader or a very small group (e.g. military council) makes authoritative decisions on their own.
- 1: Very little and narrow. Consultation with only a narrow circle of loyal party/ruling elites.
- 2: Consultation includes the former plus a larger group that is loyal to the government, such as the ruling party's or parties' local executives and/or women, youth and other branches.
- 3: Consultation includes the former plus leaders of other parties.
- 4: Consultation includes the former plus a select range of society/labor/business representatives.
- 5: Consultation engages elites from essentially all parts of the political spectrum and all politically relevant sectors of society and business.

6.6 Engaged society (C)

v1 tag: dl06engage

v2 tag: v2dlengage

PMs: Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

Question: When important policy changes are being considered, how wide and how independent are public deliberations?

Clarification: This question refers to deliberation as manifested in discussion, debate, and other public forums such as popular media.

- 0: Public deliberation is never, or almost never allowed.
- 1: Some limited public deliberations are allowed but the public below the elite levels is almost always either unaware of major policy debates or unable to take part in them.
- 2: Public deliberation is not repressed but nevertheless infrequent and non-elite actors are typically controlled and/or constrained by the elites.
- 3: Public deliberation is actively encouraged and some autonomous non-elite groups participate, but it is confined to a small slice of specialized groups that tends to be the same across issue-areas.
- 4: Public deliberation is actively encouraged and a relatively broad segment of non-elite groups often participate and vary with different issue-areas.

- 5: Large numbers of non-elite groups as well as ordinary people tend to discuss major policies among themselves, in the media, in associations or neighborhoods, or in the streets. Grass-roots deliberation is common and unconstrained.

6.7 Particularistic or public goods (C)

v2 tag: v2dlencmps

PMs: Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

Question: Considering the profile of social and infrastructural spending in the national budget, how “particularistic” or “public goods” are most expenditures?

Clarification: Particularistic spending is narrowly targeted on a specific corporation, sector, **social group**, region, party, or set of constituents. Such spending may be referred to as “pork,” “clientelistic,” or “private goods.”

Public-goods spending is intended to benefit all communities within a society, though it may be means-tested so as to target poor, needy, or otherwise underprivileged constituents. The key point is that all who satisfy the means-test are allowed to receive the benefit.

Your answer should consider the entire budget of social and infrastructural spending. We are interested in the relative value of particularistic and public-goods spending, not the number of bills or programs that fall into either category.

- 0: Almost all of the social and infrastructure expenditures are particularistic.
- 1: Most social and infrastructure expenditures are particularistic, but a significant portion (e.g. $\frac{1}{4}$ or $\frac{1}{3}$) is public-goods.
- 2: Social and infrastructure expenditures are evenly divided between particularistic and public-goods programs.
- 3: Most social and infrastructure expenditures are public-goods but a significant portion (e.g., $\frac{1}{4}$ or $\frac{1}{3}$) is particularistic.
- 4: Almost all social and infrastructure expenditures are public-goods in character. Only a small portion is particularistic.

6.8 Means-tested v. universalistic policy (C)

v2 tag: v2dlunivl

PMs: Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

Question: How many welfare programs are means-tested and how many benefit all (or virtually all) members of the polity?

Clarification: A means-tested program targets poor, needy, or otherwise underprivileged constituents. Cash-transfer programs are normally means-tested.

A universal (non-means tested) program potentially benefits everyone. This includes free education, national health care schemes, and retirement programs. Granted, some may benefit more than others from these programs (e.g., when people with higher salaries get higher unemployment benefits). The key point is that practically everyone is a beneficiary, or potential beneficiary.

The purpose of this question is not to gauge the size of the welfare state but rather its quality. So, your answer should be based on whatever programs exist.

- 0: There are no, or extremely limited, welfare state policies (education, health, retirement, unemployment, poverty programs).
- 1: Almost all of the welfare state policies are means-tested.
- 2: Most welfare state policies means-tested, but a significant portion (e.g. $\frac{1}{4}$ or $\frac{1}{3}$) is universalistic and potentially benefits everyone in the population.
- 3: The welfare state policies are roughly evenly divided between means-tested and universalistic.
- 4: Most welfare state policies are universalistic, but a significant portion (e.g., $\frac{1}{4}$ or $\frac{1}{3}$) are means-tested.
- 5: Almost all welfare state policies are universal in character. Only a small portion is means-tested.

6.9 Deliberation comments (C)

v1 tag: dl07commnt

v2 tag: v2dlcommnt

PMs: Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

Question: Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on deliberation.

[text]

7 The Judiciary

7.1 Judiciary introduction (A)(C)

v2 tag: v2juintro

PM: Jeffrey Staton

This set of questions pertains to the judiciary. Before you proceed, we would like to clarify several general points. First, some questions below refer to the judiciary in general, whereas others ask for specific evaluations of particular courts or types of courts. Unless prompted to do otherwise, please consider the judiciary as a whole. This includes all courts in the judicial system, both general jurisdiction courts and more specialized courts. It also includes courts at every level. However, with potentially one exception, it excludes specialized courts that are located outside the judiciary, e.g. an immigration court that lies inside the executive branch. The one potential exception is the peak constitutional court of the country. Please include this court in your considerations, even though it will be located outside of the judiciary in some countries. If the country you are coding is a federal state, please focus only on the federal judiciary and the federal government.

Two of the questions about the judiciary (“v2juhcind” and “v2juhccomp”) concern **high courts**. To review briefly, by “high court” we are asking you to consider the country’s constitutional court, if one exists. If there is no constitutional court, please consider the high court to be the highest **ordinary court** in the state.

If you are considering a **semisovereign territory**, such as a colony, please answer this question with respect to the government or judicial bodies seated within the territory in question (e.g., the governor-general and his local administration in a British colony or a Commonwealth country), not abroad (e.g., the King/Queen or government of England).

In coding the following questions it is sometimes important to distinguish between formal rules (as stipulated by statute, legislative rules, the constitution, or common law precedent) and actual practice (what happens “on the ground”). In order to clarify the de jure/de facto distinction, we employ the terms “by law...” and “in practice...” Please pay close attention to these cues wherever you see them.

7.2 Judicial reform (C)

v2 tag: v2jureform

PM: Jeffrey Staton

Question: Were the judiciary’s formal powers altered this year in ways that affect its ability to control the arbitrary use of state authority?

Clarification: Evidence of this kind of reform could include the creation or removal of various forms of constitutional review, new rules increasing or decreasing access to the judiciary, changes in available judicial remedies, and any other formal institution (procedural or otherwise) that influences the ability of courts to control the arbitrary use of power.

- 0: The judiciary’s ability to control arbitrary power was *reduced* via institutional reform.
- 1: There was no change to the judiciary’s ability to control arbitrary power via institutional review.
- 2: The judiciary’s ability to control arbitrary power was *enhanced* via institutional reform.

7.3 Judicial purges (C)

v2 tag: v2jupurge

PM: Jeffrey Staton

Question: Judges are sometimes removed from their posts for cause, as when there is strong evidence of corruption; however, some judges are removed arbitrarily, typically for political reasons. With this distinction in mind, please describe the removal of judges that occurred this calendar year.

Clarification: The second and third response categories permit you to distinguish among limited arbitrary removals (i.e., when only a few judges are targeted) by the political importance of the removal. For example, you may consider the arbitrary removal of a few high court judges as more important than the arbitrary removal of a few lower court judges.

- 0: There was a massive, arbitrary purge of the judiciary.
- 1: There were limited but very important arbitrary removals.
- 2: There were limited arbitrary removals.
- 3: Judges were removed from office, but there is no evidence that the removals were arbitrary.
- 4: Judges were not removed from their posts.

7.4 Government attacks on judiciary (C)

v2 tag: v2jupoatck

PM: Jeffrey Staton

Question: How often did the government attack the judiciary's integrity in public?

Clarification: Attacks on the judiciary's integrity can include claims that it is corrupt, incompetent or that decisions were politically motivated. These attacks can manifest in various ways including, but not limited to prepared statements reported by the media, press conferences, interviews, and stump speeches.

- 0: Attacks were carried out on a daily or weekly basis.
- 1: Attacks were common and carried out in nearly every month of the year.
- 2: Attacks occurred more than once.
- 3: There were attacks, but they were rare.
- 4: There were no attacks on the judiciary's integrity.

7.5 Court packing (C)

v2 tag: v2jupack

PM: Jeffrey Staton

Question: The size of the judiciary is sometimes increased for very good reasons, as when judges are added to manage an increasing caseload; however, sometimes judges are added purely for political reasons. With this distinction in mind, please describe any increases in the size of the judiciary that occurred this calendar year.

Clarification: The second and third response categories permit you to distinguish among limited court packing efforts (i.e. when relatively few judgeships are added) by the political importance of the packing. For example, you may consider the packing of the high court to be more important than the packing of a lower court.

- 0: There was a massive, politically motivated increase in the number of judgeships across the entire judiciary.
- 1: There was a limited, politically motivated increase in the number of judgeships on very important courts.
- 2: There was a limited, politically motivated increase in the number of judgeships.
- 3: Judgeships were added to the judiciary, but there is no evidence that the increase was politically motivated; or there was no increase.
- 4: There was no increase.

7.6 Judicial accountability (C)

v2 tag: v2juaccnt

PM: Jeffrey Staton

Question: When judges are found responsible for serious misconduct, how often are they removed from their posts or otherwise disciplined?

- 0: Never.
- 1: Seldom.
- 2: About half of the time.
- 3: Usually.
- 4: Always.

7.7 Judicial corruption decision (C)

v2 tag: v2jucorrdc

PM: Jeffrey Staton

Question: How often do individuals or businesses make undocumented extra payments or bribes in order to speed up or delay the process or to obtain a favorable judicial decision?

- 0: Never.

- 1: Not usually.
- 2: About half of the time.
- 3: Usually.
- 4: Always.

7.8 High court name (C)

v1 tag: ju01hcname

v2 tag: v2juhcname

PM: Jeffrey Staton

Question: Please enter the name of the high court.

Clarification: As accurately as possible, please provide a literal translation of the name of the court in English, followed by the name in the native language, or a transcription transliteration thereof, within parentheses.

[text]

7.9 High court independence (C)

v1 tag: ju02hcind

v2 tag: v2juhcind

PM: Jeffrey Staton

Question: When the high court in the judicial system is ruling in cases that are salient to the government, how often would you say that it makes decisions that merely reflect government wishes regardless of its sincere view of the legal record?

Clarification: We are seeking to identify autonomous judicial decision-making and its absence. Decisions certainly can reflect government wishes without “merely reflecting” those wishes, i.e. a court can be autonomous when its decisions support the government’s position. This is because a court can be fairly persuaded that the government’s position is meritorious. By “merely reflect the wishes of the government” we mean that the court’s own view of the record, its sincere evaluation of the record, is irrelevant to the outcome. The court simply adopts the government’s position regardless of its sincere view of the record.

- 0: Always.
- 1: Usually.
- 2: About half of the time.
- 3: Seldom.
- 4: Never.

7.10 Lower court independence (C)

v1 tag: ju03ncind

v2 tag: v2juncind

PM: Jeffrey Staton

Question: When judges *not* on the high court are ruling in cases that are salient to the government, how often would you say that their decisions merely reflect government wishes regardless of their sincere view of the legal record?

- 0: Always.
- 1: Usually.
- 2: About half of the time.
- 3: Seldom.
- 4: Never.

7.11 Compliance with high court (C)

v1 tag: ju04hccomp

v2 tag: v2juhccomp

PM: Jeffrey Staton

Question: How often would you say the government complies with important decisions of the high court with which it disagrees?

- 0: Never.
- 1: Seldom.
- 2: About half of the time.
- 3: Usually.
- 4: Always.

7.12 Compliance with judiciary (C)

v1 tag: ju05comp

v2 tag: v2jucomp

PM: Jeffrey Staton

Question: How often would you say the government complies with important decisions by other courts with which it disagrees?

Clarification: We are looking for a summary judgment for the entire judiciary, excluding the **high court**. You should consider judges on both **ordinary courts** and **specialized courts**.

- 0: Never.
- 1: Seldom.
- 2: About half of the time.
- 3: Usually.
- 4: Always.

7.13 Judicial review (C)

v1 tag: ju06review

v2 tag: v2jureview

PM: Jeffrey Staton

Question: Does any court in the judiciary have the legal authority to invalidate governmental policies (e.g. statutes, regulations, decrees, administrative actions) on the grounds that they violate a constitutional provision?

- 0: No.
- 1: Yes.

7.14 Case selection (A+)

PM: Jeffrey Staton

Question: What kind of high court are you considering?

- 1: Supreme court
- 2: Constitutional court
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section
- 97: Unable to Determine

Sources: V-Dem coding of constitutional texts in CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Coverage: 1900-2010

7.15 Court name (A+)

PM: Jeffrey Staton

Question: What is the proper name (in English) of the court you have selected?

- 1: [text]

99: Not Applicable

Sources: V-Dem coding of constitutional texts in CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Coverage: 1900-2010

7.16 Concrete or abstract review (A+)

PM: Jeffrey Staton

Question: What type of constitutional review is the court you have selected empowered to carry out?

Clarification: Concrete review involves constitutional interpretation in the presence of a real case or legal controversy. For example, consider a presidential system in which the legislature passes a law granting the president wide discretion to manage national parks via the regulations of an environmental agency. Imagine that this agency makes it illegal to carry firearms on park property. A week after the regulation becomes effective, a hunter is arrested and fined for carrying a rifle in a national park. In his defense, he argues that a) the regulation violates a constitutional right to bear arms and b) that congress violated the constitution by delegating law making power to the executive. When a court evaluates the law (and regulation) in this context, it is engaging in concrete constitutional review. In contrast, abstract review does not require a real case or controversy. Instead, judges can evaluate a policy with respect to the constitution on the basis of a merely hypothetical situation. Continuing the example from above, suppose that after the law granting the president discretion to regulate the national parks is passed but prior to the agency enacting the regulation, a group of legislators ask a court to declare the statute an unconstitutional delegation of law making power to the president. When a court evaluates this argument, it does so absent a real controversy. No person has been directly harmed here. Indeed, the president has not even attempted to use this new power to do anything. When a court evaluates the law in this context, it is carrying out abstract constitutional review.

1: Concrete

2: Abstract

3: Concrete and abstract

90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law

96: Other, please specify in the comments section

97: Unable to determine

Sources: V-Dem coding of constitutional texts in CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Coverage: 1900-2010

7.17 Fixed number of judges at all (A+)

PM: Jeffrey Staton

Question: Does the constitution require a specific size for the court you have selected?

- 1: Yes, the constitution fixes the entire size of the court
- 2: No, however, it does require that the court be no smaller than a particular number
- 90: No, size is explicitly left to non-constitutional law
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section
- 97: Unable to determine

Sources: V-Dem coding of constitutional texts in CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Coverage: 1900-2010

7.18 Number of judges (A+)

PM: Jeffrey Staton

Question: What is the constitutional requirement identified in v4a?

[Numeric]

Sources: V-Dem coding of constitutional texts in CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Coverage: 1900-2010

CCP ordering: Answer only if answer to v4a is “(1)” or “(2).”

7.19 Fixed budgetary requirement (A+)

PM: Jeffrey Staton

Question: Does the constitution require that a fixed portion of the federal budget be allocated to the judiciary?

- 1: Yes
- 2: No
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section
- 97: Unable to determine

Sources: V-Dem coding of constitutional texts in CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Coverage: 1900-2010

7.20 Nature of budgetary requirement (A+)

PM: Jeffrey Staton

Question: What proportion of the federal budget does the constitution require be allocated to the judiciary?

1: [Numeric]

Sources: V-Dem coding of constitutional texts in CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Coverage: 1900-2010

CCP ordering: Answer only if answer to v5a is "(1)"

7.21 Is CJ appointment process different? (A+)

PM: Jeffrey Staton

Question: Is the Chief Justice of the court appointed via a different process than regular members?

1: Yes

2: No

90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law

96: Other, please specify in the comments section

97: Unable to determine

Sources: V-Dem coding of constitutional texts in CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Coverage: 1900-2010

7.22 Is CJ removal process different? (A+)

PM: Jeffrey Staton

Question: Is the Chief Justice of the court removed via a different process than regular members?

1: Yes

2: No

90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law

96: Other, please specify in the comments section

97: Unable to determine

Sources: V-Dem coding of constitutional texts in CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Coverage: 1900-2010

7.23 Type of courts (A+)

CCP tag: LEVJUD

PM: Jeffrey Staton

Question: Does the court system provide for any of the following?

Clarification: By ordinary courts, we mean non-specialized courts. For example, the Supreme Court, Appellate Courts, and District Courts in the United States. By contrast, specialized courts include the constitutional court, military courts, and administrative courts.

- 1: Supreme or top court only [CCP tag: LEVJUD -1]
- 2: Supreme court and other courts to be determined by law [CCP tag: LEVJUD -2]
- 3: Supreme court and specific other courts, such as provincial or city courts [CCP tag: LEVJUD -3]
- 4: Other courts mentioned, but no supreme court [CCP tag: LEVJUD -4]
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section [CCP tag: LEVJUD -96]
- 97: Unable to Determine [CCP tag: LEVJUD -97]
- 98: Not Specified [CCP tag: LEVJUD -98]

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Coverage: 1900-2010

7.24 Specialized courts (A-)

CCP tag: JUDCRTS

v2 tag: v02juspeclrts

PM: Jeffrey Staton

Question: For which of the following specialized courts does the constitution contain provisions?

Clarification: If religious courts, labor courts, tax courts, military courts, courts charged with hearing cases against public officials, or courts of amparo are mentioned, please list any special provisions for these courts in the comments section.

- 1: Administrative courts [CCP tag: JUDCRTS-1]
- 2: Constitutional court [CCP tag: JUDCRTS-2]
- 3: Courts of amparo [CCP tag: JUDCRTS-3]
- 4: Military courts [CCP tag: JUDCRTS-4]

5: Courts charged with hearing cases against holders of public offices [CCP tag: JUDCRTS-5]

6: Tax courts [CCP tag: JUDCRTS-6]

7: Labor courts [CCP tag: JUDCRTS-7]

8: Religious courts [CCP tag: JUDCRTS-8]

9: Special court [CCP tag: JUDCRTS-9]

96: Other, please specify in the comments section [CCP tag: JUDCRTS-96]

97: Unable to Determine [CCP tag: JUDCRTS-97]

98: Not Specified [CCP tag: JUDCRTS-98]

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Coverage: 1900-2010

7.25 Supreme court name (A-)

CCP tag: SUPNAME

v2 tag: v2jdsprmcrtm

PM: Jeffrey Staton

Question: What name is given to the highest ordinary court?

1: [text]

99: Not Applicable

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Coverage: 1900-2010

CCP ordering: This question asked only if LEVJUD is answered 1, or if LEVJUD is answered 2, or if LEVJUD is answered 3.

7.26 Chief justice (CJ) highest ordinary court (A-)

CCP tag: HOCCJ

v2 tag: v2jdcjhordcrt

PM: Jeffrey Staton

Question: Is the selection process specified for the chief justice or the other justices of the Highest Ordinary Court?

1: Chief Justice only

2: Regular Justices only

- 3: Both with same procedure
- 4: Both with different procedures for each
- 5: Neither
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section
- 97: Unable to Determine
- 99: Not Applicable

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Coverage: 1900-2010

CCP ordering: This question asked only if LEVJUD is answered 1, or if LEVJUD is answered 2, or if LEVJUD is answered 3.

7.27 CJ nomination (A-)

CCP tag: CHIEFNOM

v2 tag: v2jdcjnom

PM: Jeffrey Staton

Question: Who is involved in the nomination of the Chief Justice of the Highest Ordinary Court?

- 1: Head of State (use this choice for single executive systems) [CCP tag: CHIEFNOM-1]
- 2: Head of Government [CCP tag: CHIEFNOM-2]
- 3: The Government/Cabinet [CCP tag: CHIEFNOM-3]
- 4: First (or unicameral) Chamber of the Legislature [CCP tag: CHIEFNOM-4]
- 5: Second Chamber of the Legislature [CCP tag: CHIEFNOM-5]
- 6: Judicial Council/Commission [CCP tag: CHIEFNOM-6]
- 7: Judiciary (other than judicial council/commission) [CCP tag: CHIEFNOM-7]
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law [CCP tag: CHIEFNOM-90]
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section [CCP tag: CHIEFNOM-96]
- 97: Unable to Determine [CCP tag: CHIEFNOM-97]
- 98: Not Specified [CCP tag: CHIEFNOM-98]

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Coverage: 1900-2010

CCP ordering: This question is asked only if HOCCJ is answered 1, or if HOCCJ is answered 4.

7.28 CJ approval (A-)

CCP tag: CHIEFAP

v2 tag: v2jdcjapprvl

PM: Jeffrey Staton

Question: Who is involved in the approval of nominations for the Chief Justice of the Highest Ordinary Court?

- 1: Head of State (use this choice for single executive systems) [CCP tag: CHIEFAP-1]
- 2: Head of Government [CCP tag: CHIEFAP-2]
- 3: The Government/Cabinet [CCP tag: CHIEFAP-3]
- 4: First (or unicameral) Chamber of the Legislature [CCP tag: CHIEFAP-4]
- 5: Second Chamber of the Legislature [CCP tag: CHIEFAP-5]
- 6: Judicial Council/Commission [CCP tag: CHIEFAP-6]
- 7: Judiciary (other than judicial council/commission) [CCP tag: CHIEFAP-7]
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law [CCP tag: CHIEFAP-90]
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section [CCP tag: CHIEFAP-96]
- 97: Unable to Determine [CCP tag: CHIEFAP-97]
- 98: Not Specified [CCP tag: CHIEFAP-98]

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Coverage: 1900-2010

CCP ordering: This question is asked only if HOCCJ is answered 1, or if HOCCJ is answered 4.

7.29 CJ term (A-)

CCP tag: CHFTERM

v2 tag: v2jdcjapprvl

PM: Jeffrey Staton

Question: What is the maximum term length for the Chief Justice of the Highest Ordinary Court?

Clarification: Please answer "0" if the term length is not specified, and answer "100" if there is no term length or the term length is the life of the office holder.

- 1: [text]
- 99: Not Applicable

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Coverage: 1900-2010

CCP ordering: This question is asked only if HOCCJ is answered 1, or if HOCCJ is answered 4.

7.30 CJ restrictions (A-)

CCP tag: CHFTRMNM

PM: Jeffrey Staton

v2 tag: v2jdcjrstrct

Question: What restrictions are in place regarding the number of terms for the Chief Justice of the Highest Ordinary Court?

- 1: Only one term permitted, total
- 2: Only two terms permitted, total
- 3: No successive terms permitted, but multiple non-successive terms permitted
- 4: Only two successive terms permitted, but multiple non-successive terms permitted
- 5: No term limits
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section
- 97: Unable to Determine
- 98: Not Specified
- 99: Not Applicable

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Coverage: 1900-2010

CCP ordering: This question is asked only if HOCCJ is answered 1, or if HOCCJ is answered 4.

7.31 Highest ordinary court judge nominations (A-)

CCP tag: SUPNOM

v2 tag: v2jdhordjnom

PM: Jeffrey Staton

Question: Who is involved in the nomination of judges to the highest ordinary court?

Clarification: By judicial council/commission, we are referring to an independent body that is composed of experts in law who are important in the selection process for judges.

- 1: Head of State (use this choice for single executive systems) [CCP tag: SUPNOM-1]

- 2: Head of Government [CCP tag: SUPNOM-2]
- 3: The Government/Cabinet [CCP tag: SUPNOM-3]
- 4: First (or unicameral) Chamber of the Legislature [CCP tag: SUPNOM-4]
- 5: Second Chamber of the Legislature [CCP tag: SUPNOM-5]
- 6: Judicial Council/Commission [CCP tag: SUPNOM-6]
- 7: Judiciary (other than judicial council/commission) [CCP tag: SUPNOM-7]
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law [CCP tag: SUPNOM-90]
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section [CCP tag: SUPNOM-96]
- 97: Unable to Determine [CCP tag: SUPNOM-97]
- 98: Not Specified [CCP tag: SUPNOM-98]

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Coverage: 1900-2010

CCP ordering: This question is asked only if HOCCJ is answered 2, or if HOCCJ is answered 3, or if HOCCJ is answered 4.

7.32 Highest ordinary court approval (A-)

CCP tag: SUPAP

v2 tag: v2jdhordaprvi

PM: Jeffrey Staton

Question: Who is involved in the approval of nominations to the highest ordinary court?

- 1: Head of State (use this choice for single executive systems) [CCP tag: SUPAP-1]
- 2: Head of Government [CCP tag: SUPAP-2]
- 3: The Government/Cabinet [CCP tag: SUPAP-3]
- 4: First (or unicameral) Chamber of the Legislature [CCP tag: SUPAP-4]
- 5: Second Chamber of the Legislature [CCP tag: SUPAP-5]
- 6: Judicial Council/Commission [CCP tag: SUPAP-6]
- 7: Judiciary (other than judicial council/commission) [CCP tag: SUPAP-7]
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law [CCP tag: SUPAP-90]
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section [CCP tag: SUPAP-96]
- 97: Unable to Determine [CCP tag: SUPAP-97]
- 98: Not Specified [CCP tag: SUPAP-98]

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Coverage: 1900-2010

CCP ordering: This question is asked only if HOCCJ is answered 2, or if HOCCJ is answered 3, or if HOCCJ is answered 4.

7.33 Highest ordinary court terms (A-)

CCP tag: SUPTERM

v2 tag: v2jdhordtrm

PM: Jeffrey Staton

Question: What is the maximum term length for judges for the highest ordinary court?

Clarification: Please answer "0" if the term length is not specified, and answer "100" if there is no term length or the term length is the life of the office holder.

1: [text]

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Coverage: 1900-2010

CCP ordering: This question is asked only if HOCCJ is answered 2, or if HOCCJ is answered 3, or if HOCCJ is answered 4.

7.34 Highest ordinary court restrictions (A-)

CCP tag: SUPTERMM

PM: Jeffrey Staton

v2 tem: v2jdhordstrct

Question: What restrictions are in place regarding the number of terms of members of the highest ordinary court may serve?

Clarification: For this question, no limit means the constitution specifies there is no limit on the number of terms and not specified.

1: Only one term permitted, total

2: Only two terms permitted, total

3: No successive terms permitted, but multiple non-successive terms permitted

4: Only two successive terms permitted, but multiple non-successive terms permitted

5: No term limits

90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law

96: Other, please specify in the comments section

97: Unable to Determine

98: Not Specified

99: Not Applicable

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Coverage: 1900-2010

CCP ordering: This question is asked only if HOCCJ is answered 2, or if HOCCJ is answered 3, or if HOCCJ is answered 4.

7.35 Ordinary court name (A-)

CCP tag: ORDNAME

v2 tag: v2jdordname

PM: Jeffrey Staton

Question: What name is given to the ordinary courts?

Clarification: Please list the name in the order given in the constitution.

1: [text]

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Coverage: 1900-2010

CCP ordering: This question is asked only if LEVJUD is answered 2, or if LEVJUD is answered 3.

7.36 Nomination of ordinary judges (A-)

CCP tag: ORDNUM

v2 tag: v2jdordnum

PM: Jeffrey Staton

Question: Who is involved in the nomination of judges to ordinary courts?

1: Head of State (use this choice for single executive systems) [CCP tag: ORDNUM-1]

2: Head of Government [CCP tag: ORDNUM-2]

3: The Government/Cabinet [CCP tag: ORDNUM-3]

4: First (or unicameral) Chamber of the Legislature [CCP tag: ORDNUM-4]

5: Second Chamber of the Legislature [CCP tag: ORDNUM-5]

6: Judicial Council/Commission [CCP tag: ORDNUM-6]

7: Judiciary (other than judicial council/commission) [CCP tag: ORDNUM-7]

90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law [CCP tag: ORDNUM-90]

96: Other, please specify in the comments section [CCP tag: ORDNUM-96]

97: Unable to Determine [CCP tag: ORDNUM-97]

98: Not Specified [CCP tag: ORDNUM-98]

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Coverage: 1900-2010

CCP ordering: This question is asked only if LEVJUD is answered 2, or if LEVJUD is answered 3.

7.37 Approval of ordinary court nominations (A-)

CCP tag: ORNAP

v2 tag: v2jdordnomaprvi

PM: Jeffrey Staton

Question: Who is involved in the approval of nominations to ordinary courts?

1: Head of State (use this choice for single executive systems) [CCP tag: ORDAP-1]

2: Head of Government [CCP tag: ORDAP-2]

3: The Government/Cabinet [CCP tag: ORDAP-3]

4: First (or unicameral) Chamber of the Legislature [CCP tag: ORDAP-4]

5: Second Chamber of the Legislature [CCP tag: ORDAP-5]

6: Judicial Council/Commission [CCP tag: ORDAP-6]

7: Judiciary (other than judicial council/commission) [CCP tag: ORDAP-7]

90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law [CCP tag: ORDAP-90]

96: Other, please specify in the comments section [CCP tag: ORDAP-96]

97: Unable to Determine [CCP tag: ORDAP-97]

98: Not Specified [CCP tag: ORDAP-98]

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Coverage: 1900-2010

CCP ordering: This question is asked only if LEVJUD is answered 2, or if LEVJUD is answered 3.

7.38 Constitutional court nominations (A-)

CCP tag: CONNOM

v2 tag: v2jdconnom

PM: Jeffrey Staton

Question: Who is involved in the nomination of judges to the constitutional court?

- 1: Head of State (use this choice for single executive systems) [CCP tag: CONNOM-1]
- 2: Head of Government [CCP tag: CONNOM-2]
- 3: The Government/Cabinet [CCP tag: CONNOM-3]
- 4: First (or unicameral) Chamber of the Legislature [CCP tag: CONNOM-4]
- 5: Second Chamber of the Legislature [CCP tag: CONNOM-5]
- 6: Judicial Council/Commission [CCP tag: CONNOM-6]
- 7: Judiciary (other than judicial council/commission) [CCP tag: CONNOM-7]
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law [CCP tag: CONNOM-90]
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section [CCP tag: CONNOM-96]
- 97: Unable to Determine [CCP tag: CONNOM-97]
- 98: Not Specified [CCP tag: CONNOM-98]

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Coverage: 1900-2010

CCP ordering: This question is asked only if JUDCRTS is answered 2.

7.39 Approval of constitutional court nominations (A-)

CCP tag: CONAP

v2 tag: v2jdconnomarpvl

PM: Jeffrey Staton

Question: Who is involved in the approval of judges to the constitutional court?

- 1: Head of State (use this choice for single executive systems) [CCP tag: CONAP-1]
- 2: Head of Government [CCP tag: CONAP-2]
- 3: The Government/Cabinet [CCP tag: CONAP-3]
- 4: First (or unicameral) Chamber of the Legislature [CCP tag: CONAP-4]
- 5: Second Chamber of the Legislature [CCP tag: CONAP-5]
- 6: Judicial Council/Commission [CCP tag: CONAP-6]
- 7: Judiciary (other than judicial council/commission) [CCP tag: CONAP-7]
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law [CCP tag: CONAP-90]
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section [CCP tag: CONAP-96]

97: Unable to Determine [CCP tag: CONAP-97]

98: Not Specified [CCP tag: CONAP-98]

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Coverage: 1900-2010

CCP ordering: This question is asked only if JUDCRTS is answered 2.

7.40 Special procedures for removing constitutional judges (A-)

CCP tag: CONREM

PM: Jeffrey Staton

v2 tag: v2jdspeconrem

Question: Does the constitution mention any special procedures for removing members of the constitutional court?

1: Yes

2: No

96: Other, please specify in the comments section

97: Unable to Determine

99: Not Applicable

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Coverage: 1900-2010

CCP ordering: This question is asked only if JUDCRTS is answered 2.

7.41 Procedures from removing constitutional judges (A-)

CCP tag: CONREMP

v2 tag: v2jdconrem

PM: Jeffrey Staton

Question: What are the details of the process for removing members on the constitutional court?

1: [text]

99: Not Applicable

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Coverage: 1900-2010

CCP ordering: This question is asked only if CONREM is answered 1.

7.42 Term for constitutional judges (A-)

CCP tag: CONTERM

v2 tag: v2jdcontrm

PM: Jeffrey Staton

Question: What is the maximum term length for judges for the constitutional court?

Clarification: Please answer 0 if the term length is not specified, and answer 100 if there is no term length or the term length is the life of the office holder.

1: [text]

99: Not Applicable

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Coverage: 1900-2010

CCP ordering: This question is asked only if JUDCRTS is answered 2.

7.43 Restrictions on constitutional judge terms (A-)

CCP tag: CONLIM

v2 tag: v2jdcontrmrstrct

PM: Jeffrey Staton

Question: What restrictions are in place regarding the number of terms judges on the Constitutional Court may serve?

Clarification: For this question, no limit means the constitution specifies there is no limit on the number of terms and not specified means the constitution does not specify whether or not there is a limit.

1: Only one term permitted, total

2: Only two terms permitted, total

3: No successive terms permitted, but multiple non-successive terms permitted

4: Only two successive terms permitted, but multiple non-successive terms permitted

5: No term limits

90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law

96: Other, please specify in the comments section

97: Unable to Determine

98: Not Specified

99: Not Applicable

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Coverage: 1900-2010

CCP ordering: This question is asked only if JUDCRTS is answered 2.

7.44 Constitutional review (A-)

CCP tag: INTERP

v2 tag: v2jdconrev

PM: Jeffrey Staton

Question: To whom does the constitution assign the responsibility for the interpretation of the constitution?

Clarification: If the constitutional court is mentioned in the constitution, you need to check it here regardless if they are explicitly given the power of interpretation. If both chambers must act, then please select "Both Chambers of the Legislature are required." If either chamber can act, then please select both the "First Chamber of the Legislature" and the "Second Chamber of the Legislature."

- 1: Any Ordinary Court [CCP tag: INTERP-1]
- 2: Constitutional Court/Council [CCP tag: INTERP-2]
- 3: Supreme Court Only [CCP tag: INTERP-3]
- 4: Special chamber of the Supreme Court [CCP tag: INTERP-4]
- 5: First (or unicameral) Chamber of the Legislature [CCP tag: INTERP-5]
- 6: Second Chamber of the Legislature [CCP tag: INTERP-6]
- 7: Both Chambers of the Legislature are required [CCP tag: INTERP-7]
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law [CCP tag: INTERP-90]
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section [CCP tag: INTERP-96]
- 97: Unable to Determine [CCP tag: INTERP-97]
- 98: Not Specified [CCP tag: INTERP-98]

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Coverage: 1900-2010

7.45 Standing - constitutional review (A-)

CCP tag: CHELLEG

v2 tag: v2jdstndconrev

PM: Jeffrey Staton

Question: Who has standing to initiate challenge to the constitutionality of legislation?

Clarification: If both chambers must act, then please select "Both Chambers of the Legislature are required." If either chamber can act, then please select both the "First Chamber of the Legislature" and the "Second Chamber of the Legislature."

- 1: Head of State (use this choice for single executive systems) [CCP tag: CHALLENG-1]
- 2: Head of Government [CCP tag: CHALLENG-2]
- 3: The Government/Cabinet [CCP tag: CHALLENG-3]
- 4: First (or unicameral) Chamber of the Legislature [CCP tag: CHALLENG-4]
- 5: Second Chamber of the Legislature [CCP tag: CHALLENG-5]
- 6: Both Chambers of the Legislature are required [CCP tag: CHALLENG-6]
- 7: Lawyers [CCP tag: CHALLENG-7]
- 8: Public (by complaint) [CCP tag: CHALLENG-8]
- 9: The Courts [CCP tag: CHALLENG-9]
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law [CCP tag: CHALLENG-90]
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section [CCP tag: CHALLENG-96]
- 97: Unable to Determine [CCP tag: CHALLENG-97]
- 98: Not Specified [CCP tag: CHALLENG-98]

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Coverage: 1900-2010

7.46 Type of constitutional review (A-)

CCP tag: CHALSTAG

v2 tag: v2jdconrevt

PM: Jeffrey Staton

Question: At what stage of the legislative process can bills be reviewed for constitutionality?

- 1: Pre-promulgation
- 2: Post-promulgation
- 3: Either
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section

97: Unable to Determine

98: Not Specified

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Coverage: 1900-2010

7.47 Effects of constitutional review (A-)

CCP tag: CHALUNCN

v2 tag: v2jdconrevefct

PM: Jeffrey Staton

Question: What is the effect of a determination of unconstitutionality?

1: Law is void [CCP tag: CHALUNCN-1]

2: Void for specific case, but law still exists [CCP tag: CHALUNCN-2]

3: Returned to legislature for revision/reconsideration [CCP tag: CHALUNCN-3]

90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law [CCP tag: CHALUNCN-90]

96: Other, please specify in the comments section [CCP tag: CHALUNCN-96]

97: Unable to Determine [CCP tag: CHALUNCN-97]

98: Not Specified [CCP tag: CHALUNCN-98]

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Coverage: 1900-2010

7.48 Amparo (A-)

CCP tag: AMPARO

v2 tag: v2jdamparo

PM: Jeffrey Staton

Question: Does the constitution provide for a right to petition for 'amparo'?

1: Yes

2: No

96: Other, please specify in the comments section

97: Unable to Determine

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Coverage: 1900-2010

7.49 Dismissal procedures (A-)

CCP tag: JREM

v2 tag: v2jdisprcd

PM: Jeffrey Staton

Question: Are there provisions for dismissing judges?

- 1: Yes
- 2: No
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section
- 97: Unable to Determine

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Coverage: 1900-2010

7.50 Dismissal rationale (A-)

CCP tag: JREMCON

v2 tag: v2jdisrtnl

PM: Jeffrey Staton

Question: Under what conditions can judges be dismissed?

- 1: General dissatisfaction (i.e. dismissal is fairly unrestricted) [CCP tag: JREMCON-1]
- 2: Crimes and other issues of conduct [CCP tag: JREMCON-2]
- 3: Treason [CCP tag: JREMCON-3]
- 4: Violations of the constitution [CCP tag: JREMCON-4]
- 5: Incapacitated [CCP tag: JREMCON-5]
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law [CCP tag: JREMCON-90]
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section [CCP tag: JREMCON-96]
- 97: Unable to Determine [CCP tag: JREMCON-97]
- 98: Not Specified [CCP tag: JREMCON-98]

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Coverage: 1900-2010

CCP ordering: This question is asked only if JREM is answered 1.

7.51 Dismissal proposal (A-)

CCP tag: JREMPRO

v2 tag: v2jdisprpsl

PM: Jeffrey Staton

Question: Who can propose the dismissal of judges?

Clarification: If both chambers must act, then please select "Both Chambers of the Legislature are required." If either chamber can act, then please select both the "First Chamber of the Legislature" and the "Second Chamber of the Legislature."

- 1: Head of State (use this choice for single executive systems) [CCP tag: JREMPRO-1]
- 2: Head of Government [CCP tag: JREMPRO-2]
- 3: The Government/Cabinet [CCP tag: JREMPRO-3]
- 4: First (or unicameral) Chamber of the Legislature [CCP tag: JREMPRO-4]
- 5: Second Chamber of the Legislature [CCP tag: JREMPRO-5]
- 6: Both Chambers of the Legislature are required [CCP tag: JREMPRO-6]
- 7: Public Prosecutor [CCP tag: JREMPRO-7]
- 8: Judicial Council [CCP tag: JREMPRO-8]
- 9: Public [CCP tag: JREMPRO-9]
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law [CCP tag: JREMPRO-90]
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section [CCP tag: JREMPRO-96]
- 97: Unable to Determine [CCP tag: JREMPRO-97]
- 98: Not Specified [CCP tag: JREMPRO-98]

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), variable name: JREMPRO.

Coverage: 1900-2010

CCP ordering: This question is asked only if JREM is answered 1.

7.52 Dismissal vote (A-)

CCP tag: JREMFIRP

v2 tag: v2jdisvote

PM: Jeffrey Staton

Question: What proportion of the vote is needed in the first (or unicameral) chamber to propose the dismissal of judges?

- 1: Plurality
- 2: Majority
- 3: 3/5 Majority
- 4: 2/3 Majority
- 5: 3/4 Majority
- 6: Unspecified supermajority
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section
- 97: Unable to Determine
- 98: Not Specified
- 99: Not Applicable

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Coverage: 1900-2010

CCP ordering: This question is asked only if JREMPRO is answered 4.

7.53 Dismissal vote 2 (A-)

CCP tag: JREMSECP

v2 tag: v2jdisvote2

PM: Jeffrey Staton

Question: What proportion of the vote is needed in the Second Chamber to propose the dismissal of judges?

- 1: Plurality
- 2: Majority
- 3: 3/5 Majority
- 4: 2/3 Majority
- 5: 3/4 Majority
- 6: Unspecified supermajority
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section
- 97: Unable to Determine
- 98: Not Specified
- 99: Not Applicable

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Coverage: 1900-2010

CCP ordering: This question is asked only if JREMPRO is answered 5.

7.54 Dismissal vote 3 (A-)

CCP tag: JREMBOTP

v2 tag: v2jdisvote3

PM: Jeffrey Staton

Question: What proportion of the vote is needed in Both Chambers to propose the dismissal of judges?

- 1: Plurality
- 2: Majority
- 3: 3/5 Majority
- 4: 2/3 Majority
- 5: 3/4 Majority
- 6: Unspecified supermajority
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section
- 97: Unable to Determine
- 98: Not Specified
- 99: Not Applicable

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Coverage: 1900-2010

CCP ordering: This question is asked only if JREMPRO is answered 6.

7.55 Dismissal approval (A-)

CCP tag: JREMAP

v2 tag: v2jdisaprvl

PM: Jeffrey Staton

Question: Who can approve the dismissal of judges?

Clarification: If both chambers must act, then please select "Both Chambers of the Legislature are required." If either chamber can act, then please select both the "First Chamber of the Legislature" and the "Second Chamber of the Legislature."

- 1: Head of State (use this choice for single executive systems) [CCP tag: JREMAP-1]

- 2: Head of Government [CCP tag: JREMAP-2]
- 3: The Government/Cabinet [CCP tag: JREMAP-3]
- 4: First (or unicameral) Chamber of the Legislature [CCP tag: JREMAP-4]
- 5: Second Chamber of the Legislature [CCP tag: JREMAP-5]
- 6: Both Chambers of the Legislature are required [CCP tag: JREMAP-6]
- 7: Public Prosecutor [CCP tag: JREMAP-7]
- 90: Left explicitly to non-constitutional law [CCP tag: JREMAP-90]
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section [CCP tag: JREMAP-96]
- 97: Unable to Determine [CCP tag: JREMAP-97]
- 98: Not Specified [CCP tag: JREMAP-98]

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Coverage: 1900-2010

CCP ordering: This question is asked only if JREM is answered 1.

7.56 Dismissal approval vote 1 (A-)

CCP tag: JREMFIRA

v2 tag: v2jdisaprvlv

PM: Jeffrey Staton

Question: What proportion of the vote is needed in the first (or unicameral) chamber to approve the dismissal of judges?

- 1: Plurality
- 2: Majority
- 3: 3/5 Majority
- 4: 2/3 Majority
- 5: 3/4 Majority
- 6: Unspecified supermajority
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section
- 97: Unable to Determine
- 98: Not Specified
- 99: Not Applicable

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Coverage: 1900-2010

CCP ordering: This question is asked only if JREMAP is answered 4.

7.57 Dismissal approval vote 2 (A-)

CCP tag: JREMSECA

v2 tag: v2jdisaprvlv2

PM: Jeffrey Staton

Question: What proportion of the vote is needed in the Second Chamber to approve the dismissal of judges?

- 1: Plurality
- 2: Majority
- 3: 3/5 Majority
- 4: 2/3 Majority
- 5: 3/4 Majority
- 6: Unspecified supermajority
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section
- 97: Unable to Determine
- 98: Not Specified
- 99: Not Applicable

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Coverage: 1900-2010

CCP ordering: This question is asked only if JREMAP is answered 5.

7.58 Dismissal approval vote 3 (A-)

CCP tag: JREMBOTA

v2 tag: v2jdisaprvlv3

PM: Jeffrey Staton

Question: What proportion of the vote is needed in Both Chambers to approve the dismissal of judges?

- 1: Plurality
- 2: Majority
- 3: 3/5 Majority

- 4: 2/3 Majority
- 5: 3/4 Majority
- 6: Unspecified supermajority
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section
- 97: Unable to Determine
- 98: Not Specified
- 99: Not Applicable

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Coverage: 1900-2010

CCP ordering: This question is asked only if JREMAP is answered 6.

7.59 Dismissal Details (A-)

CCP tag: JREMPROC

v2 tag: v2jdisdtls

PM: Jeffrey Staton

Question: What are the details of the process to remove judges?

- 1: [text]
- 99: Not Applicable

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Coverage: 1900-2010

CCP ordering: This question is asked only if JREM is answered 1.

7.60 Judicial salaries (A-)

CCP tag: JUDSAL

v2 tag: v2jdsal

PM: Jeffrey Staton

Question: Does the constitution explicitly state that judicial salaries are protected from governmental intervention?

- 1: Yes
- 2: No
- 96: Other, please specify in the comments section

97: Unable to Determine

Sources: CCP (Elkins et al. 2012).

Coverage: 1900-2010

7.61 Judiciary comments (C)

v1 tag: ju08commnt

v2 tag: v2jucommnt

PM: Jeffrey Staton

Question: Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on the judiciary.

[text]

8 Civil Liberty

8.1 Civil liberties introduction (C)

v2 tag: v2clintro

PM: Svend-Erik Skaaning

The following questions are focused on actual practices (*de facto*) rather than formal legal or constitutional rights (*de jure*).

8.2 Freedom of academic and cultural expression (C)

v1 tag: cl02acfree

v2 tag: v2clacfree

PM: Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Is there academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression related to political issues?

- 0: Not respected by public authorities. Censorship and intimidation are frequent. Academic activities and cultural expressions are severely restricted or controlled by the government.
- 1: Weakly respected by public authorities. Academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression are practiced occasionally, but direct criticism of the government is mostly met with repression.

- 2: Somewhat respected by public authorities. Academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression are practiced routinely, but strong criticism of the government is sometimes met with repression.
- 3: Mostly respected by public authorities. There are few limitations on academic freedom and freedom of cultural expression, and resulting sanctions tend to be infrequent and soft.
- 4: Fully respected by public authorities. There are no restrictions on academic freedom or cultural expression.

8.3 Freedom of religion (C)

v1 tag: cl03relig

v2 tag: v2clrelig

PM: Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Is there freedom of religion?

Clarification: This indicator specifies the extent to which individuals and groups have the right to choose a religion, change their religion, and practice that religion in private or in public as well as to proselytize peacefully without being subject to restrictions by public authorities.

- 0: Not respected by public authorities. Hardly any freedom of religion exists. Any kind of religious practice is outlawed or at least controlled by the government to the extent that religious leaders are appointed by and subjected to public authorities, who control the activities of religious communities in some detail.
- 1: Weakly respected by public authorities. Some elements of autonomous organized religious practices exist and are officially recognized. But significant religious communities are repressed, prohibited, or systematically disabled, voluntary conversions are restricted, and instances of discrimination or intimidation of individuals or groups due to their religion are common.
- 2: Somewhat respected by public authorities. Autonomous organized religious practices exist and are officially recognized. Yet, minor religious communities are repressed, prohibited, or systematically disabled, and/or instances of discrimination or intimidation of individuals or groups due to their religion occur occasionally.
- 3: Mostly respected by public authorities. There are minor restrictions on the freedom of religion, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases. Minority religions face denial of registration, hindrance of foreign missionaries from entering the country, restrictions against proselytizing, or hindrance to access to or construction of places of worship.
- 4: Fully respected by public authorities. The population enjoys the right to practice any religious belief they choose. Religious groups may organize, select, and train personnel; solicit and receive contributions; publish; and engage in consultations

without undue interference. If religious communities have to register, public authorities do not abuse the process to discriminate against a religion and do not constrain the right to worship before registration.

8.4 Freedom from torture (C)

v1 tag: cl05tort

v2 tag: v2cltort

PM: Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Is there freedom from torture?

Clarification: Torture refers to the purposeful inflicting of extreme pain, whether mental or physical, with an aim to extract information or intimidate victims, who are in a state of incarceration. Here, we are concerned with torture practiced by state officials or other agents of the state (e.g., police, security forces, prison guards, and paramilitary groups).

- 0: Not respected by public authorities. Torture is practiced systematically and is incited and approved by the leaders of government.
- 1: Weakly respected by public authorities. Torture is practiced frequently but is often not incited or approved by top leaders of government. At the same time, leaders of government are not actively working to prevent it.
- 2: Somewhat. Torture is practiced occasionally but is typically not approved by top leaders of government.
- 3: Mostly respected by public authorities. Torture is practiced in a few isolated cases but is not incited or approved by top government leaders.
- 4: Fully respected by public authorities. Torture is non-existent.

8.5 Freedom from political killings (C)

v1 tag: cl06kill

v2 tag: v2clkill

PM: Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Is there freedom from political killings?

Clarification: Political killings are killings by the state or its agents without due process of law for the purpose of eliminating political opponents. These killings are the result of deliberate use of lethal force by the police, security forces, prison officials, or other agents of the state (including paramilitary groups).

- 0: Not respected by public authorities. Political killings are practiced systematically and they are typically incited and approved by top leaders of government.

- 1: Weakly respected by public authorities. Political killings are practiced frequently and top leaders of government are not actively working to prevent them.
- 2: Somewhat respected by public authorities. Political killings are practiced occasionally but they are typically not incited and approved by top leaders of government.
- 3: Mostly respected by public authorities. Political killings are practiced in a few isolated cases but they are not incited or approved by top leaders of government.
- 4: Fully respected by public authorities. Political killings are non-existent.

8.6 Transparent laws with predictable enforcement (C)

v2 tag: v2cltrnslw

PM: Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Are the laws of the land clear, well-publicized, coherent (consistent with each other), relatively stable from year to year, and enforced in a predictable manner?

Clarification: This question focuses on the transparency and predictability of the laws of the land.

- 0: Transparency and predictability are almost non-existent. The laws of the land are created and/or enforced in completely arbitrary fashion.
- 1: Transparency and predictability are severely limited. The laws of the land are more often than not created and/or enforced in arbitrary fashion.
- 2: Transparency and predictability are somewhat limited. The laws of the land are mostly created in a non-arbitrary fashion but enforcement is rather arbitrary in some parts of the country.
- 3: Transparency and predictability are fairly strong. The laws of the land are usually created and enforced in a non-arbitrary fashion.
- 4: Transparency and predictability are very strong. The laws of the land are created and enforced in a non-arbitrary fashion.

8.7 Rigorous and impartial public administration (C)

v1 tag: cl08rspct

v2 tag: v2clrspct

PM: Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Are public officials rigorous and impartial in the performance of their duties?

Clarification: This question focuses on the extent to which public officials generally abide by the law and treat like cases alike, or conversely, the extent to which public administration is characterized by arbitrariness and biases (i.e., nepotism, cronyism, or discrimination).

The question covers the public officials that handle the cases of ordinary people. If no functioning public administration exists, the lowest score (0) applies.

- 0: The law is not respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is rampant.
- 1: The law is weakly respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is widespread.
- 2: The law is modestly respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is moderate.
- 3: The law is mostly respected by public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is limited.
- 4: The law is generally fully respected by the public officials. Arbitrary or biased administration of the law is very limited.

8.8 Freedom of foreign movement (C)

v1 tag: cl04move

v2 tag: v2clfmmove

PM: Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Is there freedom of foreign travel and emigration?

Clarification: This indicator specifies the extent to which citizens are able to travel freely to and from the country and to emigrate without being subject to restrictions by public authorities.

- 0: Not respected by public authorities. Citizens are rarely allowed to emigrate or travel out of the country. Transgressors (or their families) are severely punished. People discredited by the public authorities are routinely exiled or prohibited from traveling.
- 1: Weakly respected by public authorities. The public authorities systematically restrict the right to travel, especially for political opponents or particular **social groups**. This can take the form of general restrictions on the duration of stays abroad or delays/refusals of visas.
- 2: Somewhat respected by the public authorities. The right to travel for leading political opponents or particular **social groups** is occasionally restricted but ordinary citizens only met minor restrictions.
- 3: Mostly respected by public authorities. Limitations on freedom of movement and residence are not directed at political opponents but minor restrictions exist. For example, exit visas may be required and citizens may be prohibited from traveling outside the country when accompanied by other members of their family.
- 4: Fully respected by the government. The freedom of citizens to travel from and to the country, and to emigrate and repatriate, is not restricted by public authorities.

8.9 Freedom of domestic movement for men (C)

v1 tag: cl04move

v2 tag: v2cldmovem

PM: Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Do men enjoy freedom of movement within the country?

Clarification: This indicator specifies the extent to which all men are able to move freely, in daytime and nighttime, in public thoroughfares, across regions within a country, and to establish permanent residency where they wish. Note that restrictions in movement might be imposed by the state and/or by informal norms and practices. Such restrictions sometimes fall on rural residents, on specific **social groups**, or on dissidents.

This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* freedom of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal – and extremely low – freedom of movement.

Do *not* consider restrictions in movement that are placed on ordinary (non-political) criminals. Do not consider restrictions in movement that result from crime or unrest.

- 0: Virtually no men enjoy full freedom of movement (e.g., North Korea).
- 1: Some men enjoy full freedom of movement, but most do not (e.g., Apartheid South Africa).
- 2: Most men enjoy some freedom of movement but a sizeable minority does not. Alternatively all men enjoy partial freedom of movement.
- 3: Most men enjoy full freedom of movement but a small minority does not.
- 4: Virtually all men enjoy full freedom of movement.

8.10 Freedom of domestic movement for women (C)

v1 tag: cl04move

v2 tag: v2cldmovew

PMs: Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Do women enjoy freedom of movement within the country?

Clarification: This indicator specifies the extent to which all women are able to move freely, in daytime and nighttime, in public thoroughfares, across regions within a country, and to establish permanent residency where they wish. Note that restrictions in movement might be imposed by the state and/or by informal norms and practices. Such restrictions sometimes fall on rural residents, on specific **social groups**, or on dissidents.

This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* freedom of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal – and extremely low – freedom of movement.

Do *not* consider restrictions in movement that are placed on ordinary (non-political) criminals. Do not consider restrictions in movement that result from crime or unrest.

- 0: Virtually no women enjoy full freedom of movement (e.g., North Korea or Afghanistan under the Taliban).
- 1: Some women enjoy full freedom of movement, but most do not (e.g., Apartheid South Africa).
- 2: Most women enjoy some freedom of movement but a sizeable minority does not. Alternatively all women enjoy partial freedom of movement.
- 3: Most women enjoy full freedom of movement but a small minority does not.
- 4: Virtually all women enjoy full freedom of movement.

8.11 Freedom of domestic movement (D)

PMs: Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Do men and women enjoy freedom of movement and residence?

Clarification: Constructed as an average of the two previous indicators, focused on men and women respectively.

[numeric]

8.12 Freedom of discussion for men (C)

v2 tag: v2cldiscm

PMs: Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Are men able to openly discuss political issues in private homes and in public spaces?

Clarification: This indicator specifies the extent to which men are able to engage in private discussions, particularly on political issues, in private homes and public spaces (restaurants, public transportation, sports events, work etc.) without fear of harassment by other members of the polity or the public authorities. We are interested in restrictions by the government and its agents but also cultural restrictions or customary laws that are enforced by other members of the polity, sometimes in informal ways.

This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* freedom of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal – and extremely low – rights to freedom of discussion.

- 0: Not respected. Hardly any freedom of expression exists for men. Men are subject to immediate and harsh intervention and harassment for expression of political opinion.
- 1: Weakly respected. Expressions of political opinions by men are frequently exposed to intervention and harassment.
- 2: Somewhat respected. Expressions of political opinions by men are occasionally exposed to intervention and harassment.
- 3: Mostly respected. There are minor restraints on the freedom of expression in the private sphere, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases or only linked to soft sanctions. But as a rule there is no intervention or harassment if men make political statements.
- 4: Fully respected. Freedom of speech for men in their homes and in public spaces is not restricted.

8.13 Freedom of discussion for women (C)

v2 tag: v2cldiscw

PMs: Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Are women able to openly discuss political issues in private homes and in public spaces?

Clarification: This indicator specifies the extent to which women are able to engage in private discussions, particularly on political issues, in private homes and public spaces (restaurants, public transportation, sports events, work etc.) without fear of harassment by other members of the polity or the public authorities. We are interested in restrictions by the government and its agents but also cultural restrictions or customary laws that are enforced by other members of the polity, sometimes in informal ways.

This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* freedom of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal – and extremely low – rights to freedom of discussion.

- 0: Not respected. Hardly any freedom of expression exists for women. Women are subject to immediate and harsh intervention and harassment for expression of political opinion.
- 1: Weakly respected. Expressions of political opinions by women are frequently exposed to intervention and harassment.
- 2: Somewhat respected. Expressions of political opinions by women are occasionally exposed to intervention and harassment.
- 3: Mostly respected. There are minor restraints on the freedom of expression in the private sphere, predominantly limited to a few isolated cases or only linked to soft

sanctions. But as a rule there is no intervention or harassment if women make political statements.

- 4: Fully respected. Freedom of speech by women in their homes and in public spaces is not restricted.

8.14 Freedom of discussion (D)

PMs: Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Are men and women able to openly discuss political issues in private homes and in public spaces?

Clarification: An average (mean) of the previous two questions, pertaining to men and women respectively.

[numeric]

8.15 Freedom from forced labor for men (C)

v1 tag: cl07slave

v2 tag: v2clslavem

PM: Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Are adult men free from servitude and other kinds of forced labor?

Clarification: Involuntary servitude occurs when an adult is unable to quit a job s/he desires to leave – not by reason of economic necessity but rather by reason of employer's coercion. This includes labor camps but not work or service which forms part of normal civic obligations such as conscription or employment in command economies.

- 0: Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor is widespread and accepted (perhaps even organized) by the state.
- 1: Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor is substantial. Although officially opposed by the public authorities, the state is unwilling or unable to effectively contain the practice.
- 2: Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor exists but is not widespread and usually actively opposed by public authorities, or only tolerated in some particular areas or among particular social groups.
- 3: Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor is infrequent and only found in the criminal underground. It is actively and sincerely opposed by the public authorities.
- 4: Male servitude or other kinds of forced labor is virtually non-existent.

8.16 Freedom from forced labor for women (C)

v1 tag: cl07slave

v2 tag: v2clslavef

PMs: Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Are adult women free from servitude and other kinds of forced labor?

Clarification: Involuntary servitude occurs when an adult is unable to quit a job s/he desires to leave – not by reason of economic necessity but rather by reason of employer’s coercion. This includes labor camps but not work or service which forms part of normal civic obligations such as conscription or employment in command economies.

This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* freedom of men and women from forced labor. Thus, a country in which both men and women suffer the same conditions of servitude might be coded a (0) for women, even though there is equality across the sexes.

- 0: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor is widespread and accepted (perhaps even organized) by the state.
- 1: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor is substantial. Although officially opposed by the public authorities, the state is unwilling or unable to effectively contain the practice.
- 2: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor exists but is not widespread and usually actively opposed by public authorities, or only tolerated in some particular areas or among particular **social groups**.
- 3: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor is infrequent and only found in the criminal underground. It is actively and sincerely opposed by the public authorities.
- 4: Female servitude or other kinds of forced labor is virtually non-existent.

8.17 Freedom from forced labor (D)

PMs: Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Are adults (men and women) free from servitude and other kinds of forced labor?

Clarification: Constructed as an average (mean) of the two previous questions, pertaining to men and women respectively.

[numeric]

8.18 State ownership of economy (C)

v1 tag: cl10propty

v2 tag: v2clstown

PM: Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Does the state own or directly control important sectors of the economy?

Clarification: This question gauges the degree to which the state owns and controls capital (including land) in the industrial, agricultural, and service sectors.

It does *not* measure the extent of government revenue and expenditure as a share of total output; indeed, it is quite common for states with expansive fiscal policies to exercise little direct control (and virtually no ownership) over the economy.

- 0: Virtually all valuable capital belongs to the state or is directly controlled by the state. Private property may be officially prohibited.
- 1: Most valuable capital either belongs to the state or is directly controlled by the state.
- 2: Many sectors of the economy either belong to the state or are directly controlled by the state, but others remain relatively free of direct state control.
- 3: Some valuable capital either belongs to the state or is directly controlled by the state, but most remains free of direct state control.
- 4: Very little valuable capital belongs to the state or is directly controlled by the state.

8.19 Property rights for men (C)

v1 tag: cl10propty

v2 tag: v2clprptym

PM: Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Do men enjoy the right to private property?

Clarification: Private property includes the right to acquire, possess, inherit, and sell private property, including land. Limits on property rights may come from the state (which may legally limit rights or fail to enforce them); customary laws and practices; or religious or social norms. This question concerns the right to private property, not actual ownership of property.

This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* rights of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal – and very minimal – property rights.

- 0: Virtually no men enjoy private property rights of any kind.
- 1: Some men enjoy some private property rights, but most have none.
- 2: Many men enjoy many private property rights, but a smaller proportion enjoys few or none.
- 3: More than half of men enjoy most private property rights, yet a smaller share of men have much more restricted rights.

4: Most men enjoy most private property rights but a small minority does not.

5: Virtually all men enjoy all, or almost all property rights.

8.20 Property rights for women (C)

v1 tag: cl10propty

v2 tag: v2clprptyw

PMs: Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Do women enjoy the right to private property?

Clarification: Private property includes the right to acquire, possess, inherit, and sell private property, including land. Limits on property rights may come from the state (which may legally limit rights or fail to enforce them); customary laws and practices; or religious or social norms. This question concerns the right to private property, not actual ownership of property.

This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* rights of men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal – and very minimal – property rights.

0: Virtually no women enjoy private property rights of any kind.

1: Some women enjoy some private property rights, but most have none.

2: Many women enjoy many private property rights, but a smaller proportion enjoys few or none.

3: More than half of women enjoy most private property rights, yet a smaller share of women have much more restricted rights.

4: Most women enjoy most private property rights but a small minority does not.

5: Virtually all women enjoy all, or almost all, property rights.

8.21 Property rights (D)

PMs: Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Do men and women enjoy the right to private property?

Clarification: Average of previous two questions, focused on men and women respectively.

[numeric]

8.22 Access to justice for men (C)

v1 tag: cl09acjust

v2 tag: v2clacjstm

PM: Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Do men enjoy secure and effective access to justice?

Clarification: This question specifies the extent to which men can bring cases before the courts without risk to their personal safety, trials are fair, and men have effective ability to seek redress if public authorities violate their rights, including the rights to counsel, defense, and appeal.

This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* access to justice men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal – and extremely limited – access to justice.

- 0: Secure and effective access to justice for men is non-existent.
- 1: Secure and effective access to justice for men is usually not established or widely respected.
- 2: Secure and effective access to justice for men is inconsistently observed. Minor problems characterize most cases or occur rather unevenly across different parts of the country.
- 3: Secure and effective access to justice for men is usually observed.
- 4: Secure and effective access to justice for men is almost always observed.

8.23 Access to justice for women (C)

v1 tag: cl09acjust

v2 tag: v2clacjstw

PMs: Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Do women enjoy equal, secure, and effective access to justice?

Clarification: This question specifies the extent to which women can bring cases before the courts without risk to their personal safety, trials are fair, and women have effective ability to seek redress if public authorities violate their rights, including the rights to counsel, defense, and appeal.

This question does not ask you to assess the *relative* access to justice men and women. Thus, it is possible to assign the lowest possible score to a country even if men and women enjoy equal – and extremely limited – access to justice.

- 0: Secure and effective access to justice for women is non-existent.
- 1: Secure and effective access to justice for women is usually not established or widely respected.

- 2: Secure and effective access to justice for women is inconsistently observed. Minor problems characterize most cases or occur rather unevenly across different parts of the country.
- 3: Secure and effective access to justice for women is usually observed.
- 4: Secure and effective access to justice for women is almost always observed.

8.24 Access to justice (D)

PMs: Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Do men and women enjoy secure and effective access to justice?

Clarification: An average (mean) of the previous two questions, pertaining to men and women respectively.

[numeric]

8.25 Social class equality in respect for civil liberty (C)

v2 tag: v2clacjust

PM: Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Do poor people enjoy the same level of civil liberties as rich people do?

Clarification: This question specifies the extent to which the level of civil liberties is generally the same across socioeconomic groups so that people with a low social status are not treated worse than people with high social status. Here, civil liberties are understood to include access to justice, private property rights, freedom of movement, and freedom from forced labor.

- 0: Poor people enjoy much fewer civil liberties than rich people.
- 1: Poor people enjoy substantially fewer civil liberties than rich people.
- 2: Poor people enjoy moderately fewer civil liberties than rich people.
- 3: Poor people enjoy slightly fewer civil liberties than rich people.
- 4: Poor people enjoy the same level of civil liberties as rich people.

8.26 Social group equality in respect for civil liberties (C)

v2 tag: v2clsocgrp

PM: Svend-Erik Skaaning

Question: Do all **social groups**, as distinguished by language, ethnicity, religion, race, region, or caste, enjoy the same level of civil liberties, or are some groups generally in a more favorable position?

Clarification: Here, civil liberties are understood to include access to justice, private property rights, freedom of movement, and freedom from forced labor.

- 0: Members of some social groups enjoy much fewer civil liberties than the general population.
- 1: Members of some social groups enjoy substantially fewer civil liberties than the general population.
- 2: Members of some social groups enjoy moderately fewer civil liberties than the general population.
- 3: Members of some social groups enjoy slightly fewer civil liberties than the general population.
- 4: Members of all salient social groups enjoy the same level of civil liberties.

8.27 Regional unevenness in respect for civil liberties (C)

v2 tag: v2clrgunev

PM: Kelly McMann

Question: Does government respect for civil liberties vary across different areas of the country?

- 0: No. Government officials in most or all areas of the country equally respect (or, alternatively, equally do not respect) civil liberties.
- 1: Somewhat. Government officials in some areas of the country respect civil liberties somewhat more (or, alternatively, somewhat less) than government officials in other areas of the country.
- 2: Yes. Government officials in some areas of the country respect civil liberties significantly more (or, alternatively, significantly less) than government officials in other areas of the country.

Ordering: If answer is “0”, skip remaining civil liberties questions.

8.28 Stronger civil liberties population (C)

v1 tag: cl12snmpct

v2 tag: v2clsnpct

PM: Kelly McMann

Question: What percentage (%) of the total population of the country lives in the areas where government officials' respect for civil liberties is significantly *stronger* than the country average?

[range]

8.29 Stronger respect for civil liberties characteristics (C)

v2 tag: v2clrgstch

PM: Kelly McMann

Question: How would you describe the areas of the country where government officials' respect for civil liberties is significantly *stronger*?

Clarification: Choose all that apply.

- 0: Rural.
- 1: Urban.
- 2: Areas that are less economically developed.
- 3: Areas that are more economically developed.
- 4: Inside the capital city.
- 5: Outside the capital city.
- 6: North.
- 7: South.
- 8: West.
- 9: East.
- 10: Areas of civil unrest (including areas where insurgent groups are active).
- 11: Areas where illicit activity is widespread.
- 12: Areas that are very sparsely populated.
- 13: Areas that are remote (difficult to reach by available transportation, for example).
- 14: Areas where there are indigenous populations.
- 15: Areas where the national ruling party or group is strong.
- 16: Areas where the national ruling party or group is weak.
- 17: Areas that were subject to a longer period of foreign rule.
- 18: Areas that were subject to a shorter period of foreign rule.
- 19: Areas that were recently subject to foreign rule.
- 20: Areas that have not recently been subject to foreign rule.

21: None of the above.

8.30 Weaker civil liberties population (C)

v1 tag: cl14snlpct

v2 tag: v2clsnpct

PM: Kelly McMann

Question: What percentage (%) of the total population of the country lives in the areas where government officials' respect for civil liberties is significantly *weaker* than the country average?

[range]

8.31 Weaker civil liberties characteristics (C)

v2 tag: v2clrgwkch

PM: Kelly McMann

Question: How would you describe the areas of the country where government officials' respect for civil liberties is significantly *weaker*?

Clarification: Choose all that apply.

- 0: Rural.
- 1: Urban.
- 2: Areas that are less economically developed.
- 3: Areas that are more economically developed.
- 4: Inside the capital city.
- 5: Outside the capital city.
- 6: North.
- 7: South.
- 8: West.
- 9: East.
- 10: Areas of civil unrest (including areas where insurgent groups are active).
- 11: Areas where illicit activity is widespread.
- 12: Areas that are very sparsely populated.
- 13: Areas that are remote (difficult to reach by available transportation, for example).
- 14: Areas where there are indigenous populations.

- 15: Areas where the national ruling party or group is strong.
- 16: Areas where the national ruling party or group is weak.
- 17: Areas that were subject to a longer period of foreign rule.
- 18: Areas that were subject to a shorter period of foreign rule.
- 19: Areas that were recently subject to foreign rule.
- 20: Areas that have not recently been subject to foreign rule.
- 21: None of the above.

8.32 Civil liberties comments (C)

v1 tag: cl15commnt

v2 tag: v2clcommnt

PM: Pamela Paxton, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Kelly McMann

Question: Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on civil liberties.

[text]

9 Sovereignty

9.1 Sovereignty introduction (C)

v2 tag: v2svintro

PM: Michael Bernhard

This section addresses a number of issues concerning the sovereignty of the **state**. A state is political organization that organizes compulsory domination over a fixed territory on a continual basis.

With respect to state sovereignty, we are interested in measuring two distinct areas of sovereignty. The first is an attribute of states within the context of the international system. Here, we are interested in the state's autonomy from other actors in the system.

The second component of sovereignty concerns the relationship of the state to the population and territory over which it claims to rule. Here, we want to gauge the extent of recognition of the preeminent authority of the state over its claimed territory and population.

9.2 Domestic autonomy (C)

v1 tag: sv01domaut

v2 tag: v2svdomaut

PM: Michael Bernhard

Question: Is the **state** autonomous from the control of other states with respect to the conduct of domestic policy?

Clarification: The question of domestic autonomy does not include restrictions emanating from treaties (e.g., NATO), international organizations (e.g., the WTO), or confederations (e.g., the European Union) if these agreements are freely negotiated by the state and if the state is free to exit from that treaty, organization, or confederation. Nor does it include restrictions on policymaking emanating from international market forces and trans-national corporations.

- 0: Non-autonomous. National level authority is exercised by an external power, either by law or in practice. The most common examples of this are direct colonial rule and military occupation (e.g. quadripartite occupation of Germany in 1945). It also includes situations in which domestic actors provide de jure cover for de facto control by a foreign power (e.g. Vichy France). However, control of some part of the territory of a state by an enemy during war is not considered control by external actors if the sovereign government remains on scene and continues to wage conventional war (e.g., the USSR during WW II).
- 1: Semi-autonomous. An external political actor directly constrains the ability of domestic actors to rule, decides who can or cannot rule through formal rules or informal understandings, or precludes certain policies through explicit treaty provisions or well-understood rules of the game from which the subject state cannot withdraw. Examples include Soviet “satellite” states in Eastern Europe, and situations where colonial powers grant limited powers of national self-government to their possessions (e.g., protectorates and limited home government).
- 2: Autonomous. Domestic political actors exercise political authority free of the direct control of external political actors.

9.3 International autonomy (C)

v1 tag: sv02inlaut

v2 tag: v2svinlaut

PM: Michael Bernhard

Question: Is the **state** autonomous from the control of other states with respect to the conduct of its foreign policy?

- 0: Non-autonomous. Foreign policy is controlled by an external power, either de facto or de jure. The most common examples of this are colonial rule and military occupation (e.g. quadripartite occupation of Germany in 1945). Situations in which domestic actors provide de jure cover for de facto control by a foreign power should not be

construed as semi-autonomy (e.g. Vichy France). Governments in exile that control underground forces waging unconventional warfare are not considered as mitigating an occupation regime (e.g. countries under German occupation during WWII).

- 1: Semi-autonomous. An external political actor directly constrains the ability of domestic actors to pursue an independent foreign policy course in some important areas. This may be the product of explicit treaty provisions or well-understood rules of the game from which the subject state cannot withdraw. Examples would include Soviet strictures over rule in so-called “satellite” states in Eastern Europe, and explicitly negotiated postwar settlements (e.g. Austria following WWII).
- 2: Autonomous. Domestic political actors exercise foreign policy free of the direct control of external political actors. Direct control is meant to exclude the exercise of constraint or the impact of interdependence in the international system. Treaties in which states concede some part of that control to a supra- or international organization voluntarily, and from which there is a possibility of exit should not be interpreted as a violation of autonomy.

9.4 State authority over territory (C)

v1 tag: sv03stter

v2 tag: v2svstterr

PM: Michael Bernhard

Question: Over what percentage (%) of the territory does the **state** have effective control?

Clarification: With this question we seek to judge the extent of recognition of the preeminent authority of the state over its territory. We are not interested here in perfect control by the state, or whether it is relatively effective in comparison to other states, but an assessment of the areas over which it is hegemonic, e.g. where it is recognized as the preeminent authority and in a contest of wills it can assert its control over political forces that reject its authority. Several illustrative examples may help in this coding. During civil wars the claim of the state to rule is effectively neutralized by insurgent groups (e.g., the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka). There are also situations in which criminals or warlords exert control in contravention of state authority (e.g. opium growers in parts of Indochina). There are also cases of failed states where the central government cannot assert control over a share of its territory (e.g., contemporary Somalia). Here, we ask you to estimate the size of the territory that the state has effective control over, as a percentage (%) of the total territory that is officially part of the country.

By “officially part of the country” we refer to international law. In cases where international law is not entirely clear, we refer you to general understandings. For example, China claims sovereignty over Taiwan, but it remains under the control of its own government. For purposes of this question, Taiwan should not be considered a failure to control its territory by the government of the PRC.

[range]

9.5 State authority over population (C)

v1 tag: sv04stpop

v2 tag: v2svstpop

PM: Michael Bernhard

Question: Over what percentage (%) of the population does the state have effective control?

Clarification: With this question we seek to judge the extent of recognition of the preeminent authority of the state over the population. We are not interested here in perfect control by the state, or whether it is relatively effective in comparison to other states, but an assessment of the populations over which it is hegemonic, e.g. where it is recognized as the preeminent authority and in a contest of wills it can assert its control over political forces that reject its authority. Several illustrative examples may help in this coding. During civil wars the claim of the state to rule is effectively neutralized by insurgent groups (e.g., the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka). There are also situations in which criminals or warlords exert control in contravention of state authority (e.g. opium growers in parts of Indochina). There are also cases of failed states where the central government cannot assert control over a share of its territory (e.g., contemporary Somalia). Here, we ask you to estimate the population that the state has effective control over, as a percentage (%) of the total population.

By “population” we refer to international law. In cases where international law is not entirely clear, we refer you to general understandings. For example, China claims sovereignty over Taiwan, but it remains under the control of its own government. For purposes of this question, the existence of Taiwan should not be considered an example of the PRC’s failure to control its territory.

[range]

9.6 Sovereignty comments (C)

v2 tag: v2svcommnt

PM: Michael Bernhard

Question: Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on sovereignty.

[text]

10 Civil Society

10.1 CSOs introduction (C)

v2 tag: v2csintro

PM: Michael Bernhard

The following set of questions focus on *civil society organizations* (CSOs). These include interest groups, labor unions, religiously inspired organizations (if they are engaged in civic or political activities), social movements, professional associations, and classic non-governmental organizations (NGOs), but *not* businesses, political parties, government agencies, or religious organizations that are primarily focused on spiritual practices. A CSO must also be at least nominally independent of government and economic institutions.

10.2 CSO entry and exit (C)

v1 tag: cs01eeorgs

v2 tag: v2cseeorgs

PM: Michael Bernhard

Question: To what extent does the government achieve control over entry and exit by civil society organizations (CSOs) into public life?

- 0: Monopolistic control. The government exercises an explicit monopoly over CSOs. The only organizations allowed to engage in political activity such as endorsing parties or politicians, sponsoring public issues forums, organizing rallies or demonstrations, engaging in strikes, or publicly commenting on public officials and policies are government-sponsored organizations. The government actively represses those who attempt to defy its monopoly on political activity.
- 1: Substantial control. The government licenses all CSOs and uses political criteria to bar organizations that are likely to oppose the government. There are at least some citizen-based organizations that play a limited role in politics independent of the government. The government actively represses those who attempt to flout its political criteria and bars them from any political activity.
- 2: Moderate control. Whether the government ban on independent CSOs is partial or full, some prohibited organizations manage to play an active political role. Despite its ban on organizations of this sort, the government does not or cannot repress them, due to either its weakness or political expedience.
- 3: Minimal control. Whether or not the government licenses CSOs, there exist constitutional provisions that allow the government to ban organizations or movements that have a history of anti-democratic action in the past (e.g. the banning of neo-fascist or communist organizations in the Federal Republic of Germany). Such banning takes place under strict rule of law and conditions of judicial independence.

- 4: Unconstrained. Whether or not the government licenses CSOs, the government does not impede their formation and operation unless they are engaged in activities to violently overthrow the government.

10.3 CSO repression (C)

v1 tag: cs02reprss

v2 tag: v2csreprss

PM: Michael Bernhard

Question: Does the government attempt to repress civil society organizations (CSOs)?

- 0: No. Civil society organizations are free to organize, associate, strike, express themselves, and to criticize the government without fear of government sanctions or harassment.
- 1: Weakly. The government uses material sanctions (fines, firings, denial of social services) to deter oppositional CSOs from acting or expressing themselves. They may also use burdensome registration or incorporation procedures to slow the formation of new civil society organizations and sidetrack them from engagement. The government may also organize Government Organized Movements or NGOs (GONGOs) to crowd out independent organizations. One example would be Singapore in the post-Yew phase or Putin's Russia.
- 2: Moderately. In addition to material sanctions outlined in 3 below, the government also engages in minor legal harassment (detentions, short-term incarceration) to dissuade CSOs from acting or expressing themselves. The government may also restrict the scope of their actions through measures that restrict association of civil society organizations with each other or political parties, bar civil society organizations from taking certain actions, or block international contacts. Examples include post-Martial Law Poland, Brazil in the early 1980s, the late Franco period in Spain.
- 3: Substantially. In addition to the kinds of harassment outlined in 1 and 2 above below, the government also arrests, tries, and imprisons leaders of and participants in oppositional CSOs who have acted lawfully. Other sanctions include disruption of public gatherings and violent sanctions of activists (beatings, threats to families, destruction of valuable property). Examples include Mugabe's Zimbabwe, Poland under Martial Law, Serbia under Milosevic.
- 4: Severely. The government violently and actively pursues all real and even some imagined members of CSOs. They seek not only to deter the activity of such groups but to effectively liquidate them. Examples include Stalinist Russia, Nazi Germany, and Maoist China.

10.4 CSO consultation (C)

v1 tag: cs03consult

v2 tag: v2cscconsult

PM: Michael Bernhard

Question: Are major civil society organizations (CSOs) routinely consulted by policymakers on policies relevant to their members?

- 0: No. There is a high degree of insulation of the government from CSO input. The government may sometimes enlist or mobilize CSOs after policies are adopted to sell them to the public at large. But it does not often consult with them in formulating policies.
- 1: To some degree. CSOs are but one set of voices that policymakers sometimes take into account.
- 2: Yes. Important CSOs are recognized as stakeholders in important policy areas and given voice on such issues. This can be accomplished through formal corporatist arrangements or through less formal arrangements.

10.5 CSO structure (C)

v1 tag: cs04struc

v2 tag: v2csstruc

PM: Michael Bernhard

Question: Civil societies inevitably involve a mix of larger and smaller organizations. Please characterize the relative influence of large mass constituency civil society organizations (CSOs) versus smaller, more local, or narrowly construed CSOs.

- 0: The state does not allow autonomous CSOs.
- 1: Large encompassing organizations dominate. The government and CSOs are linked formally through a corporatist system of interest intermediation; or, due to historical circumstances, particular large CSOs are highly influential. The voice of such organizations is recognized by the government and is accorded special weight by policymakers.
- 2: Neither large encompassing nor small CSOs dominate. Influence is contingent on circumstances. Organizations, both large and small, contend with one another to have their voice considered by policymakers.
- 3: Small CSOs dominate. Many small organizations contend with one another to have their voices heard by policymakers.

10.6 CSO participatory environment (C)

v1 tag: cs05prtcpt

v2 tag: v2csprtcpt

PM: Michael Bernhard

Question: Which of these best describes the involvement of people in civil society organizations (CSOs)?

- 0: Most associations are state-sponsored, and although a large number of people may be active in them, their participation is not purely voluntary.
- 1: Voluntary CSOs exist but few people are active in them.
- 2: There are many diverse CSOs, but popular involvement is minimal.
- 3: There are many diverse CSOs and it is considered normal for people to be at least occasionally active in at least one of them.

10.7 CSO women's participation (C)

v1 tag: cs06gender

v2 tag: v2csgender

PM: Michael Bernhard

Question: Are women prevented from participating in civil society organizations (CSOs)?

Clarification: Please pay attention to both (A) whether women are prevented from participating in civil society organizations (CSOs) because of their gender and (B) whether CSOs pursuing women's interests are prevented from taking part in associational life.

- 0: Almost always.
- 1: Frequently.
- 2: About half the time.
- 3: Rarely.
- 4: Almost never.

10.8 CSO anti-system movements (C)

v2 tag: v2csantimv

PM: Michael Bernhard

Question: Among civil society organizations, are there anti-system opposition movements?

Clarification: An anti-system opposition movement is any movement – peaceful or armed – that is based in the country (not abroad) and is organized in opposition to the current

political system. That is, it aims to change the polity in fundamental ways, e.g., from democratic to autocratic (or vice-versa), from capitalist to communist (or vice-versa), from secular to fundamentalist (or vice-versa). This movement may be linked to a political party that competes in elections but it must also have a “movement” character, which is to say a mass base and an existence separate from normal electoral competition.

If there are several movements, please answer in a general way about the relationship of those movements to the regime.

- 0: No, or very minimal. Anti-system movements are practically nonexistent.
- 1: There is a only a low-level of anti-system movement activity but it does not pose much of a threat to the regime.
- 2: There is a modest level of anti-system movement activity, posing some threat to the regime.
- 3: There is a high level of anti-system movement activity, posing substantial threat to the regime.
- 4: There is a very high level of anti-system movement activity, posing a real and present threat to the regime.

10.9 CSO anti-system movement character (C)

v2 tag: v2csanmvch

PM: Michael Bernhard

Question: How would you characterize the anti-system movement(s) identified in the previous question?

Clarification: Check all that apply.

- 0: Works through legal channels, for the most part.
- 1: Participates in elections.
- 2: Works through a mix of legal and extra-legal channels.
- 3: Insurrectionary.
- 4: Democratic. Perceived by most disinterested observers as willing to play by the rules of the democratic game, willing to respect constitutional provisions or electoral outcomes, and willing to relinquish power (under democratic auspices).
- 5: Anti-democratic. Perceived by most disinterested observers as unwilling to play by the rules of the democratic game, not willing to respect constitutional provisions or electoral outcomes, and/or not willing to relinquish power (under democratic auspices).
- 6: Leftist, socialist, communist.

- 7: Rightist, conservative, party of order.
- 8: Ethnolinguistic, tribe, kinship, clan.
- 9: Separatist or autonomist.
- 10: Religious.
- 11: Paramilitary.
- 12: Heavily engaged in criminal activity, e.g., narcotics, bootlegging, illegal exploitation of natural resources, extortion, kidnapping.

Answer type: Multiple-selection.

10.10 Religious organization introduction (C)

v2 tag: v2csintro2

In this section, we ask two questions regarding religious organizations. These may be religiously inspired civil society organizations (CSOs) or organizations whose purpose is primarily spiritual.

10.11 Religious organization repression (C)

v2 tag: v2csrlgrep

PM: Michael Coppedge

Question: Does the government attempt to repress religious organizations?

- 0: Severely. The government violently and actively pursues all real and even some imagined members of religious organizations. It seeks not only to deter the activity of such groups but also to effectively liquidate them. Examples include Stalinist Russia and Maoist China.
- 1: Substantially. In addition to the kinds of harassment outlined in 2 and 3 below, the government also arrests, tries, and imprisons leaders of and participants in oppositional religious organizations who have acted lawfully. Other sanctions include disruption of public gatherings and violent sanctions of activists (beatings, threats to families, destruction of valuable property).
- 2: Moderately. In addition to material sanctions outlined in 3 below, the government also engages in minor legal harassment (detentions, short-term incarceration) to dissuade religious organizations from acting or expressing themselves. The government may also restrict the scope of their actions through measures that restrict association of religious civil society organizations with each other or political parties, bar religious civil society organizations from taking certain actions, or block international contacts.
- 3: Weakly. The government uses material sanctions (fines, firings, denial of social services) to deter oppositional religious organizations from acting or expressing themselves. They may also use burdensome registration or incorporation procedures

to slow the formation of new religious civil society organizations and sidetrack them from engagement. The government may also organize parallel religious organizations to crowd out independent religious organizations.

- 4: No. Religious civil society organizations are free to organize, associate, strike, express themselves, and to criticize the government without fear of government sanctions or harassment.

10.12 Religious organization consultation (C)

v2 tag: v2csrlgcon

PM: Michael Coppedge

Question: Are major religious organizations routinely consulted by policymakers on policies relevant to their members?

- 0: No. There is a high degree of insulation of the government from input from religious organizations. The government may sometimes enlist or mobilize religious organizations after policies are adopted to sell them to the public at large. But typically, it does not consult with them in formulating policies.
- 1: To some degree. Religious organizations are but one set of voices that policymakers sometimes take into account.
- 2: Yes. Important religious organizations are recognized as stakeholders in important policy areas and given voice on such issues. This can be accomplished through formal corporatist arrangements or through less formal arrangements.

10.13 Civil society comments (C)

v1 tag: cs06commnt

v2 tag: v2cscommnt

PM: Michael Bernhard

Question: Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on civil society.

[text]

11 The Media

11.1 Media introduction (B)(C)

V2 tag: v2meintro

PM: Holli Semetko

Two types of media are distinguished in this section: (1) print (newspapers and magazines) and broadcast (radio and television), and (2) online media.

We ask that you evaluate these categories as a whole. Thus, “the print and broadcast media” can provide a wide range of perspectives in a country even when individual publications or programs take a consistently narrow perspective.

11.2 Print/broadcast censorship effort (C)

v1 tag: me01ceneff

v2 tag: v2mecenefm

PM: Holli Semetko

Question: Does the government directly or indirectly attempt to censor the print or broadcast media?

Clarification: Indirect forms of censorship might include politically motivated awarding of broadcast frequencies, withdrawal of financial support, influence over printing facilities and distribution networks, selected distribution of advertising, onerous registration requirements, prohibitive tariffs, and bribery.

We are not concerned with censorship of non-political topics such as child pornography, statements offensive to a particular religion, or defamatory speech unless this sort of censorship is used as a pretext for censoring political speech.

- 0: Attempts to censor are direct and routine.
- 1: Attempts to censor are indirect but nevertheless routine.
- 2: Attempts to censor are direct but limited to especially sensitive issues.
- 3: Attempts to censor are indirect and limited to especially sensitive issues.
- 4: The government rarely attempts to censor major media in any way, and when such exceptional attempts are discovered, the responsible officials are usually punished.

11.3 Internet censorship effort (C)

v2 tag: v2mecenefi

PM: Holli Semetko

Question: Does the government attempt to censor information (text, audio, or visuals) on the Internet?

Clarification: Censorship attempts include Internet filtering (blocking access to certain websites or browsers), denial-of-service attacks, and partial or total Internet shutdowns. We are not concerned with censorship of topics such as child pornography, highly classified information such as military or intelligence secrets, statements offensive to a particular religion, or defamatory speech unless this sort of censorship is used as a pretext for censoring political information or opinions. We are also not concerned with the *extent* of internet access, unless there is absolutely no access at all (in which case the coding should be 0).

- 0: This country has no Internet access at all.
- 1: The government successfully blocks Internet access except to sites that are pro-government or devoid of political content.
- 2: The government attempts to block Internet access except to sites that are pro-government or devoid of political content, but many users are able to circumvent such controls.
- 3: The government allows Internet access, including to some sites that are critical of the government, but blocks selected sites that deal with especially politically sensitive issues.
- 4: The government allows Internet access that is unrestricted, with the exceptions mentioned above.

11.4 Print/broadcast media critical (C)

v1 tag: me02crit

v2 tag: v2mecrit

PM: Holli Semetko

Question: Of the major print and broadcast outlets, how many routinely criticize the government?

- 0: None.
- 1: Only a few marginal outlets.
- 2: Some important outlets routinely criticize the government but there are other important outlets that never do.
- 3: All major media outlets criticize the government at least occasionally.

11.5 Print/broadcast media perspectives (C)

v1 tag: me03range

v2 tag: v2merange

PM: Holli Semetko

Question: Do the major print and broadcast media represent a wide range of political perspectives?

- 0: The major media represent only the government's perspective.
- 1: The major media represent only the perspectives of the government and a government-approved, semi-official opposition party.
- 2: The major media represent a variety of political perspectives but they systematically ignore at least one political perspective that is important in this society.
- 3: All perspectives that are important in this society are represented in at least one of the major media.

11.6 Female journalists (C)

v2 tag: v2mefemjrn

PMs: Pamela Paxton, Holli Semetko

Question: Please estimate the percentage (%) of journalists in the print and broadcast media who are women.

[range]

11.7 Harassment of journalists (C)

v1 tag: me04harjrn

v2 tag: v2meharjrn

PM: Holli Semetko

Question: Are individual journalists harassed - i.e., threatened with libel, arrested, imprisoned, beaten, or killed -- by governmental or powerful nongovernmental actors while engaged in legitimate journalistic activities?

- 0: No journalists dare to engage in journalistic activities that would offend powerful actors because harassment or worse would be certain to occur.
- 1: Some journalists occasionally offend powerful actors but they are almost always harassed or worse and eventually are forced to stop.
- 2: Some journalists who offend powerful actors are forced to stop but others manage to continue practicing journalism freely for long periods of time.
- 3: It is rare for any journalist to be harassed for offending powerful actors, and if this were to happen, those responsible for the harassment would be identified and punished.
- 4: Journalists are never harassed by governmental or powerful nongovernmental actors while engaged in legitimate journalistic activities.

11.8 Media self-censorship (C)

v1 tag: me05slfcen

v2 tag: v2meslfcen

PM: Holli Semetko

Question: Is there self-censorship among journalists when reporting on issues that the government considers politically sensitive?

- 0: Self-censorship is complete and thorough.
- 1: Self-censorship is common but incomplete.
- 2: There is self-censorship on a few highly sensitive political issues but not on moderately sensitive issues.
- 3: There is little or no self-censorship among journalists.

11.9 Media access (C)

v1 tag: me06access

v2 tag: v2meaccess

PM: Holli Semetko

Question: Approximately what percentage (%) of the population has access to any print or broadcast media that are sometimes critical of the national government?

[range]

11.10 Media bias (C)

v1 tag: me07bias

v2 tag: v2mebias

PM: Holli Semetko

Question: Is there media bias against opposition parties or candidates?

Clarification: We ask you to take particular care in rating the year-to-year variation on this question if media bias tends to increase or decrease in election years. Coverage can be considered “more or less impartial” when the media as a whole present a mix of positive and negative coverage of each party or candidate.

- 0: The print and broadcast media cover only the official party or candidates, or have no political coverage, or there are no opposition parties or candidates to cover.
- 1: The print and broadcast media cover more than just the official party or candidates but all the opposition parties or candidates receive only negative coverage.

- 2: The print and broadcast media cover some opposition parties or candidates more or less impartially, but they give only negative or no coverage to at least one newsworthy party or candidate.
- 3: The print and broadcast media cover opposition parties or candidates more or less impartially, but they give an exaggerated *amount* of coverage to the governing party or candidates.
- 4: The print and broadcast media cover all newsworthy parties and candidates more or less impartially and in proportion to their newsworthiness.

11.11 Media corrupt (C)

v2 tag: v2mecorrpt

PM: Holli Semetko

Question: Do journalists, publishers, or broadcasters accept payments in exchange for altering news coverage?

- 0: The media are so closely directed by the government that any such payments would be either unnecessary to ensure pro-government coverage or ineffective in producing anti-government coverage.
- 1: Journalists, publishers, and broadcasters routinely alter news coverage in exchange for payments.
- 2: It is common, but not routine, for journalists, publishers, and broadcasters to alter news coverage in exchange for payments.
- 3: It is not normal for journalists, publishers, and broadcasters to alter news coverage in exchange for payments, but it happens occasionally, without anyone being punished.
- 4: Journalists, publishers, and broadcasters rarely alter news coverage in exchange for payments, and if it becomes known, someone is punished for it.

Note: There will be additional indicators that measure the extent of print, broadcast, and internet media, drawn from various sources including the World Development Indicators.

11.12 Media comments (C)

v2 tag: v2mecommnt

PM: Holli Semetko

Question: Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on the media.

[text]

12 Political Equality

12.1 Political equality introduction (C)

PM: John Gerring

This section pertains to political equality, that is, the extent to which members of a polity possess equal political power. It does not refer to the inevitable differentiation in power that occurs in all large societies between those who hold positions of power within the state (political elites) and lay citizens. It is, rather, about the distribution of political power among identifiable groups within the population.

What does it mean for a group of individuals to wield real political power? Although political power cannot be directly observed, one can infer that groups possess power to the extent that they: (a) actively participate in politics (by voting, etc. et al.), (b) are involved in civil society organizations, (c) secure representation in government, (d) are able to set the political agenda, (e) influence political decisions, and (f) influence the implementation of those decisions. Please consider all these factors when answering the following questions. (Of course, the picture across these different dimensions may be mixed; your response should indicate the overall picture, taking all aspects of political power into account.)

12.2 Power distributed by socioeconomic position (C)

v2 tag: v2pepwrse

PM: John Gerring

Question: Is political power distributed according to socioeconomic position?

Clarification: All societies are characterized by some degree of economic (wealth and income) inequality. In some societies, income and wealth are distributed in a grossly unequal fashion. In others, the difference between rich and poor is not so great. Here, we are concerned *not* with the degree of social inequality but rather with the political effects of this inequality. Specifically, we are concerned with the extent to which wealth and income translates into political power.

- 0: Wealthy people enjoy a virtual monopoly on political power. Average and poorer people have almost no influence.
- 1: Wealthy people enjoy a dominant hold on political power. People of average income have little say. Poorer people have essentially no influence.
- 2: Wealthy people have a very strong hold on political power. People of average or poorer income have some degree of influence but only on issues that matter less for wealthy people.

- 3: Wealthy people have more political power than others. But people of average income have almost as much influence and poor people also have a significant degree of political power.
- 4: Wealthy people have no more political power than those whose economic status is average or poor. Political power is more or less equally distributed across economic groups.

12.3 Power distributed by social group (C)

v2 tag: v2pepwrSOC

PM: John Gerring

Question: Is political power distributed according to **social groups**?

Clarification: A social group is differentiated within a country by caste, ethnicity, language, race, region, religion, or some combination thereof. (It does *not* include identities grounded in sexual orientation or socioeconomic status.) Social group identity is contextually defined and is likely to vary across countries and through time. Social group identities are also likely to cross-cut, so that a given person could be defined in multiple ways, i.e., as part of multiple groups. Nonetheless, at any given point in time there are social groups within a society that are understood - by those residing within that society - to be different, in ways that may be politically relevant.

- 0: Political power is monopolized by one social group comprising a minority of the population. This monopoly is institutionalized, i.e., not subject to frequent change.
- 1: Political power is monopolized by several social groups comprising a minority of the population. This monopoly is institutionalized, i.e., not subject to frequent change.
- 2: Political power is monopolized by several social groups comprising a majority of the population. This monopoly is institutionalized, i.e., not subject to frequent change.
- 3: Either all social groups possess some political power, with some groups having more power than others; or different social groups alternate in power, with one group controlling much of the political power for a period of time, followed by another - but all significant groups have a turn at the seat of power.
- 4: All social groups have roughly equal political power *or* there are no strong ethnic, caste, linguistic, racial, religious, or regional differences to speak of. Social group characteristics are not relevant to politics.

12.4 Power distributed by gender (C)

v2 tag: v2pepwrG

PM: John Gerring

Question: Is political power distributed according to gender?

- 0: Men have a near-monopoly on political power.
- 1: Men have a dominant hold on political power. Women have only marginal influence.
- 2: Men have much more political power but women have some areas of influence.
- 3: Men have somewhat more political power than women.
- 4: Men and women have roughly equal political power.

12.5 Girlpower index (A)

PM: John Gerring

Question: Average age of marriage of women minus the average age difference between men and women.

Clarification: This index assumes that the agency of women in marriage/household is to some extent reflected in the age of marriage: the younger she marries, the less say she will have had in the selection of the marriage partner, and the larger the age difference between her and her spouse is, the more unequal the marriage will probably be (de Moor and Van Zanden 2006).

Sources: CLIO-INFRA.

Coverage: to be determined.

12.6 Power distributed by sexual orientation (C)

v2 tag: v2pepwrort

PM: John Gerring

Question: To what extent is political power distributed according to sexual orientation?

Clarification: This question contrasts (A) the political power of heterosexuals and lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) members of the polity who are not open about their sexuality with (B) the political power of lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender (LGBT) members of the polity who are open about their sexuality. (A) will be referred to as “heterosexual” and (B) as “LGBT.”

Note that in comparing the political power of these two groups we are comparing their power *per person*. So, when we say that LGBT have less, equal, or more power than heterosexuals we mean *relative to their share of the population* (as near as this can be estimated).

- 0: LGBTs are entirely excluded from the public sphere and thus deprived of any real political power (even though they may possess formal powers such as the ballot).

- 1: LGBTs have much less political power than heterosexuals. LGBTs enjoy formal rights to participate in politics but are subject to informal norms that often serve to exclude them from the halls of power.
- 2: LGBTs have somewhat less political power than heterosexual citizens.
- 3: LGBTs have about the same political power as heterosexuals. Each group enjoys a degree of political power that is roughly proportional to their population.
- 4: LGBTs enjoy somewhat more political power than heterosexuals by virtue of greater wealth, education, and high level of organization and mobilization.

12.7 Educational equality (C)

v2 tag: v2peedueq

PMs: Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

Question: To what extent is high quality basic education guaranteed to all, sufficient to enable them to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens?

Clarification: Basic education refers to ages typically between 6 and 16 years of age but this varies slightly among countries.

- 0: Extreme. Provision of high quality basic education is extremely unequal and at least 75 percent (%) of children receive such low-quality education that undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.
- 1: Unequal. Provision of high quality basic education is extremely unequal and at least 25 percent (%) of children receive such low-quality education that undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.
- 2: Somewhat equal. Basic education is relatively equal in quality but ten to 25 percent (%) of children receive such low-quality education that undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.
- 3: Relatively equal. Basic education is overall equal in quality but five to ten percent (%) of children receive such low-quality education that probably undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.
- 4: Equal. Basic education is equal in quality and less than five percent (%) of children receive such low-quality education that probably undermines their ability to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens.

12.8 Health equality (C)

v2 tag: v2pehealth

PMs: Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan Lindberg

Question: To what extent is high quality basic healthcare guaranteed to all, sufficient to enable them to exercise their basic political rights as adult citizens?

Clarification: Poor-quality healthcare can make citizens unable to exercise their basic rights as adult citizens by failing to adequately treat preventable and treatable illnesses that render them unable to work, participate in social or political organizations, or vote (where voting is allowed).

- 0: Extreme. Because of poor-quality healthcare, at least 75 percent (%) of citizens' ability to exercise their political rights as adult citizens is undermined.
- 1: Unequal. Because of poor-quality healthcare, at least 25 percent (%) of citizens' ability to exercise their political rights as adult citizens is undermined.
- 2: Somewhat equal. Because of poor-quality healthcare, ten to 25 percent (%) of citizens' ability to exercise their political rights as adult citizens is undermined.
- 3: Relatively equal. Basic health care is overall equal in quality but because of poor-quality healthcare, five to ten percent (%) of citizens' ability to exercise their political rights as adult citizens is undermined.
- 4: Equal. Basic health care is equal in quality and less than five percent (%) of citizens cannot exercise their basic political rights as adult citizens.

12.9 Educational attainment (A+)

v2 tag: v2peeduatt

PM: John Gerring

Sources: Morrison, Murtin (2008); Nardulli, Peyton, Bajjalieh (2010 – an updating and extension of Barro, Lee (1996).

Coverage: 1900-.

12.10 Primary Schools (A+)

v2 tag: v2peprimsc

PM: John Gerring

Question: Number of primary schools (public and private; secular and religious)

Sources: British Colonial Office Lists, British Colonial Office Reports, Mitchell (1993, 2003a, 2003b), Statesmen's Yearbook (annual) – all collected in CLIO (Gerring, Mahoney 2012).

Coverage: to be determined.

12.11 Students (A+)

v2 tag: v2pestdnts

PM: John Gerring

Question: Number of students – all levels (primary, secondary, tertiary) and all schools.

Sources: British Colonial Office Lists, British Colonial Office Reports, Comin, Hobijn (2009), Mitchell (1993, 2003a, 2003b), Statesmen's Yearbook (annual) – all collected in CLIO (Gerring, Mahoney 2012).

Coverage: to be determined.

12.12 Teachers (A+)

v2 tag: v2peteach

PM: John Gerring

Question: Number of teachers – all levels (primary, secondary, tertiary) and all schools.

Sources: British Colonial Office Lists, British Colonial Office Reports, Mitchell (1993, 2003a, 2003b), Statesmen's Yearbook (annual) – all collected in CLIO (Gerring, Mahoney 2012).

Coverage: to be determined.

12.13 Land distribution (A+)

v2 tag: v2peland

PM: John Gerring

Question: The distribution of total land holdings (disposable land per farm) across the total extent of agricultural land, expressed as a Gini coefficient.

Sources: Frankema (2006), collected in CLIO-INFRA.

Coverage: to be determined.

12.14 Gini (A+)

v2 tag: v2pegini

PM: John Gerring

Question: The distribution of income, expressed as a Gini coefficient.

Sources: Baten et al. (2009 [CLIO-INFRA]), Bourguignon, Morrisson (2002 [www.delta.ens.fr/XIX/#III]). Note: Bourguignon/Morrisson count income by deciles but these can be aggregated into gini coefficients (as in Ansell, Samuels 2010).

Coverage: to be determined.

12.15 Infant mortality rate (A+)

v2 tag: v2peinfmor

PM: John Gerring

Question: Number of infant deaths per 1000 live births in a given year.

Sources: Gapminder, Lindert (2007), Mitchell (1993, 2003a, 2003b) – all collected in CLIO (Gerring, Mahoney 2012).

Coverage: to be determined.

12.16 Life expectancy (A+)

v2 tag: v2pelifexp

PM: John Gerring

Question: Expected longevity at birth based on current age-specific mortality rates.

Sources: Gapminder, Lindert (2007), Mitchell (1993, 2003a, 2003b) – all collected in CLIO (Gerring, Mahoney 2012).

Coverage: to be determined.

12.17 Inequality of life expectancy (A+)

v2 tag: v2pelfexin

PM: John Gerring

Question: [Not sure how defined].

Sources: CLIO-INFRA.

Coverage: to be determined.

12.18 Inequality of heights (A+)

v2 tag: v2pehgths

PM: John Gerring

Question: [Not sure how defined].

Sources: Tubingen hub of CLIO-INFRA.

Coverage: to be determined.

12.19 Political equality comments (C)

v2 tag: v2pecommnt

PM: John Gerring

Question: Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions on political equality.

[text]

13 Post-Survey Questionnaire

13.1 Post-survey questionnaire introduction (A)(B)(C)

v2 tag: v2zzint1

PM: John Gerring

Please answer this set of questions *after* you have completed all other sections of the survey. It consists of questions about your personal background and political perspectives, as well as some general questions about democracy. Answers to personal questions will remain strictly confidential.

13.2 Today's date (A)(B)(C)

v2 tag: v2zzdate

PM: John Gerring

Question: What is today's date?

[yyyy-mm-dd]

13.3 Gender (A)(B)(C)

v1 tag: zz01gender

v2 tag: v2zzgender

PM: John Gerring

Question: What is your gender?

0: Male

1: Female

13.4 Education (A)(B)(C)

v1 tag: zz02edlev

v2 tag: v2zzedlev

PM: John Gerring

Question: What is your level of education?

- 0: None.
- 1: Incomplete primary.
- 2: Primary completed.
- 3: Incomplete secondary.
- 4: Secondary completed.
- 5: Post-secondary trade/vocational school.
- 6: University undergraduate degree incomplete.
- 7: University undergraduate degree completed.
- 8: Masters degree (MA).
- 9: Ph.D.
- 10: Juris Doctor or other professional degree (medicine, business).

13.5 Current educational status (A)(B)(C)

v2 tag: v2zzcurred

PM: John Gerring

Question: Are you currently enrolled in a degree program?

- 0: No.
- 1: Yes.

13.6 Country of education (A)(B)(C)

v1 tag: zz03edcnt

v2 tag: v2zzedcnt

PM: John Gerring

Question: In which country are you currently attending school or – if no longer in school – in which country did you complete your highest educational degree (e.g., BA, MA, PhD)?

[menu]

13.7 Year of birth (A)(B)(C)

v1 tag: zz04born

v2 tag: v2zzborn

PM: John Gerring

Question: In what year were you born?

[numeric]

13.8 Country of birth (A)(B)(C)

v1 tag: zz05bornin

v2 tag: v2zzbornin

PM: John Gerring

Question: In which country were you born?

[menu]

13.9 Country of residence (A)(B)(C)

v1 tag: zz06reside

v2 tag: v2zzreside

PM: John Gerring

Question: In what country do you live today?

Clarification: If your time is split between several countries, list that country where you spend the most time or that which constitutes your official residence.

[menu]

13.10 Years in country (B)(C)

v1 tag: zz07timein

v2 tag: v2zztimein

PM: John Gerring

Question: How much total time, in years, have you spent in the country that you worked on for this project?

Clarification: Please count time in residence and time visiting. You may enter fractions of years, such as 0.7. Enter only the number measured in years, not any words such as "years", "months", or "days".

[numeric]

13.11 Years away from country (B)(C)

v1 tag: zz08yrsout

v2 tag: v2zzyrsout

PM: John Gerring

Question: How many years have passed since you most recently lived in or visited the country you will be working on?

Clarification: If you are there now, enter 0. You may enter fractions of years, such as 0.7. Enter only the number measured in years, not any words such as "years", "months", or "days".

[numeric]

13.12 Country of employer or university (B)(C)

v1 tag: zz09empcnt

v2 tag: v2zzempcnt

PM: John Gerring

Question: Is your current employer or university located in the country on which you are working for this project?

0: No.

1: Yes.

2: Unemployed/Retired.

13.13 Employer (A)(B)(C)

v1 tag: zz10employ

v2 tag: v2zzemploy

PM: John Gerring

Question: For whom do you currently work?

0: Self-employed, unemployed, or retired.

1: The current executive (presidential administration/cabinet).

2: A ministry, board, or agency within the central government.

3: A ministry, board, or agency within the local/regional government.

4: A state-owned enterprise or another branch of the public administration.

5: A public university.

6: A private university.

7: A private-sector company.

8: An NGO or non-profit private organization.

9: Full-time student.

10: Other.

13.14 Role in project (A)(B)(C)

v2 tag: v2zzrole

PM: John Gerring

Question: What is your primary role in the Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) project?

- 0: Research assistant coding (or entering) factual data across many countries – type (A) coder.
- 1: Country research assistant – type (B) coder.
- 2: Country expert – type (C) coder.
- 3: Research assistant working at University of Gothenburg.
- 4: Research assistant working at University of Notre Dame.
- 5: Other research assistant.
- 6: Regional manager (RM).
- 7: Project manager (PM).
- 8: Principal investigator (PI).
- 9: Not sure.

13.15 Democracy Scores (A)(B)(C)

v2 tag: v2zzdemoc

PM: John Gerring

Question: What democracy score would you assign to the following countries on a 0-100 scale?

Clarification: Imagine a scale that measures the degree of democracy-autocracy in countries around the world today, stretching from 0 to 100. 0 represents the most extreme autocracy in the world today and 100 represents the most democratic country in the world today.

These scores are meant to represent the actual state of regimes across the world today, not ideal-types. Thus, countries could become, over time, more autocratic than the most autocratic country in the world today, or more democratic than the most democratic country today. And they may have been so in the past. All we are concerned about here is the state of regimes at the current time.

Because some regimes are undergoing rapid change, it is important to clarify a specific date. Your coding should reflect the state of democracy in a country on 1 January, 2012.

In assigning scores we ask that you apply *your* understanding of democracy. This need not accord with the vision of democracy embraced by extant indices (Freedom House, Polity, et al.) or with the perspective of the V-Dem project (which embraces a variety of models of democracy).

All we ask is that you consider democracy-autocracy on a unidimensional scale. Of course, we realize that democracy is much more complicated than this. But we feel nonetheless that important information can be captured in a single dimension and we want to know how you view the subject.

We realize that you know more about some of these countries than about others. Do not be concerned by this. Simply enter the score that represents your best estimate. If you are very uncertain, this should be reflected in your confidence score for that country.

0: The country you worked on [range] (Regional managers (RMs) should insert here the country that they know best within the region they are assigned to work on. Leave this question blank if you are working on numerous countries across multiple regions.)

1: Costa Rica [range]

2: Cuba [range]

3: India [range]

4: Nigeria [range]

5: North Korea [range]

6: Russia [range]

7: Saudi Arabia [range]

8: South Africa [range]

9: Sweden [range]

10: Switzerland [range]

11: United Kingdom [range]

12: United States [range]

13: Venezuela [range]

14:

Answer type: Multiple-input.

13.16 Free markets (A)(B)(C)

v2 tag: v2zzfremrk

PM: John Gerring

Question: Consider the following statement: “The free market, the protection of property rights, and private ownership of businesses are fundamental principles of a free society.” How strongly do you agree or disagree?

- 0: Strongly disagree.
- 1: Somewhat disagree.
- 2: Neither agree nor disagree.
- 3: Somewhat agree.
- 4: Strongly agree.

13.17 Principles of democracy introduction (A)(B)(C)

V2tag: v2zzint2

PM: John Gerring

There are many ways of conceptualizing democracy. In the following section, we ask about your own views of this subject. Specifically, we ask you to consider seven conceptions of democracy – electoral, liberal, majoritarian, consensus, participatory, deliberative, and egalitarian. After a short description of each conception, we ask you to rate how strongly you support this conception of democracy on a standard Likert scale (strongly disagree, somewhat disagree, neither agree nor disagree, somewhat agree, strongly agree).

We are interested in your own views of the subject, i.e., how closely these various conceptualizations fit with your intuitive sense of what democracy means, or should mean. When you say “democracy,” what do you mean to communicate? How do you think the concept is most usefully defined?

13.18 Electoral democracy (A)(B)(C)

v2 tag: v2zzelcdem

PM: John Gerring

Question: The *electoral* principle is an important, perhaps even essential, element of democracy. Do you agree or disagree?

Clarification: The electoral principle — also known as contestation, competition, elite, minimal, realist, or Schumpeterian — is the idea that democracy is achieved through competition among leadership groups, which vie for the electorate’s approval during periodic elections before a broad electorate. Parties and elections are the crucial instruments in this largely procedural account of the democratic process. Of course, many additional factors might be regarded as important for ensuring and enhancing electoral contestation, e.g., civil liberties, an active media, a written constitution, an independent judiciary (to enforce the rules of the

game), and so forth. However, these factors are viewed as secondary to electoral institutions.

- 0: Strongly disagree.
- 1: Somewhat disagree.
- 2: Neither agree nor disagree.
- 3: Somewhat agree.
- 4: Strongly agree.

13.19 Liberal democracy (A)(B)(C)

v2 tag: v2zzlibdem

PM: John Gerring

Question: The *liberal* principle is an important, perhaps even essential, element of democracy. Do you agree or disagree?

Clarification: The liberal principle identifies democracy with limited government, rule of law, and the preservation of individual liberties. The liberal model assumes a “negative” view of political power insofar as it judges the quality of democracy by the limits placed on government. Principles and procedures must be established so as to ensure that rule by the majority does not result in the loss of individual liberties.

- 0: Strongly disagree.
- 1: Somewhat disagree.
- 2: Neither agree nor disagree.
- 3: Somewhat agree.
- 4: Strongly agree.

13.20 Majoritarian democracy (A)(B)(C)

v2 tag: v2zzmajdem

PM: John Gerring

Question: The *majoritarian* principle is an important, perhaps even essential, element of democracy. Do you agree or disagree?

Clarification: The majoritarian principle (aka responsible party government) reflects the principle that the will of the majority should be sovereign. The many should prevail over the few. To facilitate this, political institutions must concentrate power (within the context of competitive elections). In practical terms, this means strong and centralized parties, a unitary

rather than federal constitution, plurality rather than proportional electoral laws (or PR with high statutory thresholds), and so forth.

- 0: Strongly disagree.
- 1: Somewhat disagree.
- 2: Neither agree nor disagree.
- 3: Somewhat agree.
- 4: Strongly agree.

13.21 Consensus democracy (A)(B)(C)

v2 tag: v2zzcondem

PM: John Gerring

Question: The *consensus* principle is an important, perhaps even essential, element of democracy. Do you agree or disagree?

Clarification: The consensus principle is the idea that democracy is achieved when consensus is achieved. This means that new policies should not be adopted by a polity unless and until a consensus (or near consensus) is reached. In order to assure that the principle of consensus is honored institutions should be set up in such a way as to assure that power is dispersed across numerous independent (or quasi-independent) bodies. In practical terms, this means a large party system or diffusely organized parties, a federal constitution, proportional electoral rules, and so forth (directly contrary to the majoritarian conception).

- 0: Strongly disagree.
- 1: Somewhat disagree.
- 2: Neither agree nor disagree.
- 3: Somewhat agree.
- 4: Strongly agree.

13.22 Participatory democracy (A)(B)(C)

v2 tag: v2zzprtdem

PM: John Gerring

Question: The *participatory* principle is an important, perhaps even essential, element of democracy. Do you agree or disagree?

Clarification: The motivation for participatory democracy is uneasiness about delegating complete authority to representatives. Direct rule by citizens is preferred, wherever practicable. And within the context of representative government, the participatory

component is regarded as the most democratic element of the polity. This model of democracy thus highlights the importance of voting, but also of citizen assemblies, party primaries, referenda, social movements, public hearings, town hall meetings, and other forums of citizen engagement.

- 0: Strongly disagree.
- 1: Somewhat disagree.
- 2: Neither agree nor disagree.
- 3: Somewhat agree.
- 4: Strongly agree.

13.23 Deliberative democracy (A)(B)(C)

v2 tag: v2zzdeldem

PM: John Gerring

Question: The *deliberative* principle is an important, perhaps even essential, element of democracy. Do you agree or disagree?

Clarification: The deliberative principle focuses on the process by which decisions are reached in a polity. A deliberative process is one in which public reasoning focused on the common good motivates political decisions—as contrasted with emotional appeals, solidary attachments, parochial interests, or coercion. In this conception, democracy requires more than a mindless aggregation of existing preferences; there should be respectful dialogue at all levels—from preference formation to final decision—among informed and competent participants who are open to persuasion. Some political institutions have a specifically deliberative function, such as consultative bodies (hearings, panels, assemblies, courts); polities with these sorts of institutions might be judged more deliberative than those without them. However, the more important issue is the degree of deliberativeness that can be discerned across all powerful institutions in a polity (not just those explicitly designed to serve a deliberative function) and among the citizenry.

- 0: Strongly disagree.
- 1: Somewhat disagree.
- 2: Neither agree nor disagree.
- 3: Somewhat agree.
- 4: Strongly agree.

13.24 Egalitarian democracy (A)(B)(C)

v2 tag: v2zzegldem

PM: John Gerring

Question: The *egalitarian* principle is an important, perhaps even essential, element of democracy. Do you agree or disagree?

Clarification: The *egalitarian* principle of democracy stresses that formal political rights and civil liberties are insufficient for political equality. The polity should also address material and immaterial inequalities that inhibit the actual exercise of these rights and liberties. Ideally, groups – as defined by income, wealth, education, ethnicity, religion, caste, race, language, region, gender, sexual identity, or other ascriptive characteristics – should have approximately equal participation, representation, agenda-setting power, protection under the law, and influence over policymaking and policy implementation. If such equality does not already exist, the egalitarian principle requires state efforts to make the distribution of socio-economic resources, education, and health more equal so as to enhance political equality. (This principle does not entail equality of power between leaders and citizens, as leaders in all polities are by definition more powerful.)

- 0: Strongly disagree.
- 1: Somewhat disagree.
- 2: Neither agree nor disagree.
- 3: Somewhat agree.
- 4: Strongly agree.

13.25 Post-survey questionnaire comments (A)(B)(C)

v2 tag: v2zzcoment

PM: John Gerring

Question: Add here any comments you have about any of the previous questions.

[text]

GLOSSARY

Note: Cross-referencing in the Glossary is accomplished in the same fashion as highlighting within the document – as [this](#).

Civil Society

Civil society is an organizational layer of the polity that lies between the state and private life. Civil society is composed of voluntary associations of people joined together in common purpose. Four varieties of organizations should NOT be considered part of civil society:

(A) Any organization that has forced membership for some class of people (e.g. transmission belt organizations under totalitarian, post-totalitarian regimes, or authoritarian regimes).

(B) Economic firms (whether private or public). However, if owners or workers of firms organize for their mutual interest such organizations are part of civil society. Illustration – General Motors is not part of civil society, but any producers association it takes part in, or any labor union which its workers belong to, clearly is.

(C) Those parts of religious organizations devoted to the practice of spirituality. However, organizations devoted to social or political ends that are based in common religious belief or affiliation (the Moral Majority, CARE, American Friends Service Committee, Southern Christian Leadership Conference, the Anti-Defamation League, or the Council on American-Islamic Relations) are clearly part of civil society. To clarify: the Catholic Church should not be considered a civil society organization, but in many societies there are a multitude of Catholic organizations, linked to the Church in varying degrees, that are a part of civil society. Such public activities even when physically housed in places of worship should be considered civil society organizations (e.g., charitable or social action committees that are physically located on ecclesiastical property).

(D) Criminal Associations. Such associations may influence or even capture elements within the state or political society. They are not to be considered part of civil society. Examples include narcotics cartels, smuggling organizations, and slavery networks. Civic associations that are declared criminal by political authorities for carrying out civic or political activities should not be conflated with criminal associations.

Country

A sovereign state or **semi-sovereign territory**. All political units of concern to V-Dem are referred to as countries, even though their status in international law varies – some being colonies others being nation-states or empires.

Disadvantage

Refers to socioeconomic disadvantage. Specifically, a group or individual is judged disadvantaged if their annual income is significantly below the median national income.

Government

The executive branch of the government, including its head of state (HOS) and/or head of government (HOG) - whichever is most prominent, or both if they are both powerful - along with the cabinet, ministries, and top civil servants. We are only concerned here with the government that actually resides within the country or semi-sovereign territory. Thus, in a typical British colony the government would include the governor-general and his local administration but not the King/Queen of England or government of England.

Head of Government (HOG)

A head of government (HOG) is the chief officer(s) of the executive branch of its government, typically presiding over a cabinet. If you are considering a semi-sovereign territory, such as a colony, please answer the questions respect to the head of government that is seated within

the territory in question (such as the local prime minister in a British colony, not the prime minister in London).

Head of State (HOS)

A head of state (HOS) is an individual or collective body that serves as the chief public representative of the country. If you are considering a semi-sovereign territory, such as a colony, please answer the questions with respect to the head of state that is seated within the territory in question (such as the governor-general in a British colony, not the King/Queen of England).

High Court

By high court we mean the constitutional court of your country or the highest ordinary court. Specifically, if your country has a constitutional court, please answer the question with respect to that court. If there is no constitutional court, please answer the question with respect to the country's highest ordinary court. For example, in Mexico in 2004, you would consider the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation and not the Electoral Tribunal for the Federal Judiciary. In Russia the same year, you would consider the Constitutional Court of the Russian Federation and not the Supreme Court of the Russian Federation, and in Sweden, you would ignore the Supreme Administrative Court and instead focus on the Supreme Court. If the state is a federation, please focus on the federal judiciary. Finally, if you are considering a semi-sovereign territory, such as a colony, please answer this question with respect to highest ordinary court seated within the territory in question, not abroad (i.e., do not consider a colonial court like the Privy Council for British Colonies).

Identity Group

An identity group is any group within a society that is defined in non-economic terms, i.e., by caste, ethnicity, gender, language, race, region, religion, sexuality, or some combination thereof. Contrast **social group**.

Local government

The lowest level of government recognized by the V-Dem project. Situated below **regional government** (if there is a regional government). Refers to government at the level of towns, cities, and counties/communes (all-inclusive).

Lower chamber

The lower chamber in a bicameral legislature, sometimes also called the "second chamber," typically means the more numerous chamber that is also more directly representative of the general population. If you are considering a semi-sovereign territory, such as a colony, please answer these questions with respect to the lower (or unicameral) chamber of the legislature that is seated within the territory in question (such as the lower chamber of a local legislative assembly in a British colony, not the House of Commons in London).

National government

The highest level of aggregation recognized by the V-Dem project. Refers to the national government of a sovereign state or the territorial level of government for a semi-sovereign colony or territory. Thus, the “national” government of India prior to independence – the British Raj - was situated in New Delhi, *not* in London – even though decisions affecting the Indian colony were often made in London.

Ordinary Court

A court with general jurisdiction or a court with civil and/or criminal jurisdiction.

Political Party

An organization that nominates candidates for public office. The term includes a longstanding coalition such as the CDU/CSU in Germany if that coalition functions in most respects like a single party. Sometimes, the identity of a party is obscured by name changes. However, if the party changes names but retains key personnel and is still run by and for the same constituencies then it should be considered the same organization.

Popular Election

Any election in which the number of voters is much larger than the number of representatives being selected. This process of selection may be direct (when voters vote directly for the candidates) or indirect (when voters choose electors who then choose among candidates, perhaps in a series of stages).

It does not include a situation in which a body such as an assembly selects a leader. (Of course, if the assembly is elected then this is counted as a popular election. It is only the selection of a leader by that body that does not count as a popular election.)

The electorate (those allowed to vote) in a popular election may include all adult citizens or it may be restricted to particular groups (e.g., men, property holders, racial or ethnic groups). The extent of suffrage is not what qualifies an election as popular (so long as the number of voters is much larger than the number of representatives being selected). Likewise, the freeness or fairness of an election is not at issue. A popular election may be restricted to a single party or candidate, for example.

Public Authorities

Includes the **government** as well as subnational governments, agencies, para-statal, and the like. Compare **State**.

Regional government

The second-highest level of government recognized by the V-Dem project. A regional government is situated below the **national government**. Regional units may be referred to as cantons, departments, provinces, regions, or states. Note that some countries are so small that they do not have regional governments, or did not have regional governments for some portion of the 20th century.

Semisovereign Territory

This refers to a country that is not fully sovereign but nonetheless exercises some – at least minimal – level of self-determination. Many of the countries of concern to this project began as colonies of an empire. If a country moved from semi-sovereign status to sovereign status over the course of the twentieth century – maintaining comparable borders – then we want to code both entities. Likewise, we want to include countries like Taiwan that are not universally recognized as sovereign but nonetheless enjoy self-determination (in part or in full).

Most questions pertaining to semi-sovereign territories ask you to reflect on the practices and institutions located within that territory – rather than the empire or nation-state that may claim ultimate sovereignty over the territory. Thus, a question about the government or judicial bodies seated within a British colony would refer to the governor-general and his local administration rather than the King/Queen or government of England.

Social Group

A social group is differentiated within a country by caste, ethnicity, language, race, region, religion, or some combination thereof. (It does *not* include identities grounded in sexual orientation, gender, or socioeconomic status.) Social group identity is contextually defined and is likely to vary across countries and through time. Social group identities are also likely to cross-cut, so that a given person could be defined in multiple ways, i.e., as part of multiple groups. Nonetheless, at any given point in time there are social groups within a society that are understood – by those residing within that society – to be different, in ways that may be politically relevant. Contrast **Identity group**.

Specialized Court

Specialized courts have jurisdiction restricted to particular areas of the law outside of criminal and civil law. Examples of specialized courts include administrative, commercial, immigration or environmental courts. We exclude constitutional courts from this category.

State

A political organization that organizes compulsory domination over a fixed territory on a continual basis.

Upper chamber

The upper chamber in a bicameral legislature, often called the "senate" or sometimes the "first chamber," typically means the less numerous chamber that is also less directly representative of the general population. If you are considering a semi-sovereign territory, such as a colony, please answer these questions with respect to the upper chamber of the legislature that is seated within the territory in question (such as the "senate" or upper chamber of a local legislative assembly in a British colony, not the House of Lords in London).

Background Notes

This section of the document lays out background information about various topics undertaken in the questionnaire: (1) Civil Liberty, (2) Civil Society Organizations, (3) Deliberation, (4) Direct Democracy, (5) Elections, (6) Executive, (7) Judiciary, (8) Legislature, (9) Media, (10) Political Equality, (11) Political Parties and Electoral Systems, (12) Sovereignty, (13) Subnational Democracy, and (14) Voting and Representation.

We list the V-Dem *project manager* who constructed the indicators for that topic and is primarily responsible for their collection, *experts* on these topics (scholars whose work has influenced our thinking, some of whom were personally consulted in the process of devising these indicators), *organizations* that collect data on these subjects (if any), and extant *studies or datasets* that relate to the subject.

Civil Liberty

PM: Sven-Erik Skaaning

Experts: David Beetham (U. of Leeds, emeritus), David Cingranelli (SUNY, Binghamton), Christian Davenport (U. of Notre Dame), Todd Landman (Essex), David Richards (U. of Connecticut).

Organizations: Amnesty International, Freedom House, Hauge Institute for the Internationalisation of Law, Human Rights First (formerly Lawyers Committee for Human Rights), Human Rights Watch, Interamerican Commission on Human Rights, World Justice Project.

Studies, datasets: Annual Reports (Amnesty International); Annual Reports (Human Rights Watch); Arat (1991); Bertelsmann Transformation Index (Bertelsmann Foundation); Cederman et al. (2009); Cingranelli & Richards (1999; n.d.); Freedom in the World, Nations in Transit, Countries at the Crossroads (Freedom House); Freedom House (2006); Gibney & Dalton (1996); Green (2001); Landman (2004); Landman, Carvalho (2009); Skaaning (2006a, 2006b, 2008); Country Reports on Human Rights Practices (US Department of State).

Civil Society Organizations

PM: Michael Bernhard

Experts: Sheri Berman (Barnard College), Lena Blomstrand (Head of Civil Society Center, Sida), David Campbell (Notre Dame), Grzegorz Ekiert (Harvard), Andrew Green (independent scholar), Gretchen Helmke (Rochester), Marc Howard (Georgetown), Jude Howell (Director, Centre for Civil Society, LSE), Jan Kubik (Rutgers), Steven Levitsky (Harvard), Susan Stokes (Yale), Lucan Way (University of Toronto), Meredith Weiss (SUNY Albany).

Organizations: Center for Civil Society (UCLA), Centre for Civil Society (LSE), Civil Society Center (Sida, Sweden), National Endowment for Democracy (Washington, DC), Center for Civil Society and Democracy (Georgetown), Center for Civil Society Studies (Johns Hopkins University).

Studies, datasets: Anheier (2004); Andrew Green (proposal); The Comparative Non-Profit Sector Project,¹ Ekiert, Kubik (2001); Helmke, Levitsky (2004); Civil Society Index (CIVICUS); Civil Society Ratings (the Civil Society Center at Sida and Helmut K. Anheier); European Social Survey; Freedom House; Nations in Transit; The U.S. “Citizenship, Involvement, Democracy” Survey;² World Values Survey.

Deliberation

PMs: Michael Coppedge, John Gerring, Staffan I. Lindberg

Experts: Andre Bächtiger (University of Luzern), John Dryzek (ANU), Jurg Steiner (UNC, Chapel Hill).

Studies, datasets: Bächtiger (2005); Dryzek (2009); Mutz (2008); Ryfe (2005); Steiner et al. (2004); Thompson (2008).

Direct Democracy

PM: David Altman

Experts: Shaun Bowler (UC Riverside), Anita Breuer (Cologne), Todd Donovan (Western Washington), Markus Freitag (Konstanz), Archon Fung (Kennedy School of Gov, Harvard), Elisabeth Gerber (Michigan), Sara Hobolt (Oxford), Simon Hug (Geneve), John Matsusaka (USC), Maija Setälä (Turku), Caroline J. Tolbert (Iowa), Adrian Vatter (Zurich).

Organizations: Centre for Democracy (C2D), IRI-USA.

Studies, datasets: Suchmaschine für direkte Demokratie; National Conference of State Legislatures (US only).

Elections

PM: Staffan I. Lindberg

Experts: Matthijs Bogaards (Jacobs University, Bremen), Jörgen Elklit (Aarhus U., Denmark), Jennifer Gandhi (Emory), Susan Hyde (Yale), Philip Keefer (World Bank), Judith Kelly (Duke), Gerry Munck (USC), Andrew Reynolds (UNC), Andreas Schedler (CIDE), Rakesh Sharma (IFES).

¹ www.ccss.jhu.edu/index.php?section: content&view: 9&sub: 3

² www.uscidsurvey.org/

Organizations: ACE Electoral Knowledge Network, Carter Center, IFES, National Democratic Institute (NDI), OAS Department of Cooperation and Electoral Observation.

Studies, datasets: Bjornlund (2004); Carter Center et al. (2005); Elklit, Reynolds (2005); Eriksson (2002); European Union (2007); Gerken (2009); Hyde & Malinov (2009); Kelley, Kolev (2010); Kollman et al. (2011); Lindberg (2009); Munck (2006); Nohlen and colleagues (1999, 2002, 2005, 2010); Polity IV (Marshall, Jaggers 2007); Project on International Election Monitoring; Schedler (2006b).

Executive

PM: Jan Teorell

Experts: Kirk Bowman (Georgia Institute of Technology), John Carey (Dartmouth), Steven Fish (UC Berkeley), Jennifer Gandhi (Emory), Fabrice Lehoucq (UNC Greensboro), Gerardo Munck (USC), Anibal Perez-Linan (U. of Pittsburgh), Andreas Schedler (CIDE), Matthew Shugart (UCSD).

Studies, datasets: Amorim Neto (1998); the ARCHIGOS project (Goemans, Gleditsch, Chiozza 2009); Banks (2009); Bienen & van de Walle (1991); Bowman, Lehoucq & Mahoney (2005); CCP (Elkins et al. 2012), CCP (Elkins et al. 2012) (Elkins et al. 2009); van Cranenburgh (2008); DPI (Beck et al. 2000); the ACLP dataset (Cheibub et al. 2009); Henisz (2000; 2002); the Institutions and Elections Project, IAEF (Regan et al. 2009); Lentz (1994; 1999); Metcalf (2000); Ahmed Mushfiq Mobarak (dataset); Schemmel (rulers.org); Siaroff (2003); UNDP (2004: 77-84); worldstatesmen.org.

Judiciary

PM: Jeffrey Staton

Experts: Vanessa Baird (Colorado-Boulder), Rebecca Bill-Chavez (Navy), Dan Brinks (UT-Austin), Clifford J. Carrubba (Emory), Matthew Gabel (Washington U.), Gretchen Helmke (Rochester), Jeffrey Lax (Columbia), Andrew Martin (Washington U.), Georg Vanberg (UNC).

Organizations: Human Rights Watch; The World Justice Project (American Bar Association); World Bank. See also organizations listed under Civil Liberties.

Studies, datasets: American Bar Association (2007); Bertelsmann (2008); Carrubba, Gabel, Helmke, Martin, Staton (2008); Cingranelli and Richards (2008); Clague et al (1999); Elkins and Ginsburg (2009); Executive Opinion Survey of the *Global Competitiveness Report* (available for 80 countries in 2002); Feld and Voigt (2003); Gwartney and Lawson (2007); Henisz (2000); Howard and Carey (2004); Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2007); Keith (2002); La Porta et al (2004); Ríos-Figueroa (2006); Ríos-Figueroa and Staton (2009); Tate and Keith (2007); Tate et al (2002); Vera Institute of Justice (2003).

Legislature

PMs: Steven Fish, Matthew Kroenig

Experts: Joel Barkan (University of Iowa), John Carey (Dartmouth), Scott Desposato (UCSD), John Huber (Columbia), Mark Jones (Rice), Lanny Martin (Rice), Robert Mattes (U. of Cape Town), Scott Morgenstern (U. of Pittsburgh), Shaheen Mozaffar (Bridgewater State College).

Organizations: IPU.

Studies, datasets: African Legislatures Project (ALP); CCP (Elkins et al. 2012); Fish, Kroenig (2009).

Media

PM: Holli Semetko

Experts: Devra Moehler (Annenburg School, University of Pennsylvania), Erik Nisbet (Ohio State), Pippa Norris (Kennedy School of Government); Wisdom Tettey (University of Calgary).

Organizations: IREX.

Studies, datasets: IREX Media Sustainability Index (www.irex.org/msi/index.asp); Freedom House Freedom of the Press Index; Index of internet freedom (Berkman Center for Internet and Society, Harvard University).

Parties

PM: Allen Hicken

Experts: Stefano Bartolini (EU Institute, Florence), Pradeep Chhibber (UC Berkeley), Kenneth Janda (Northwestern), Mark Jones (Rice), Richard S. Katz (Johns Hopkins University), Philip Keefer (World Bank), Herbert Kitschelt (Duke), Steven Levitsky (Harvard), Scott Mainwaring (Notre Dame), Peter Mair (EU Institute, Florence), Karen Remmer (Duke), Kenneth Roberts (Cornell), Erik Wibbels (Duke).

Studies, datasets: John Carey (dataset); Comparative Manifestoes Project; Michael Coppedge (classification of Latin American parties); DPI (Beck et al. 2000); Kenneth Janda (dataset); Wiesehomeier-Benoit (dimensions of party competition), CLEA (Kollman et al. 2011).

Political Equality

PM: John Gerring

Experts: Kathryn Hochstetler (University of New Mexico), Ayesha Jalal (History and Sociology, Tufts), Raúl Madrid (Texas-Austin), Mick Moore (Center for the Future State/Institute for Development Studies, Sussex), Alex Pacek (Texas A&M), Deborah Yashar (Princeton).

Sovereignty

PM: Michael Bernhard

Experts: Karen Adams (U. of Montana), Tanisha Fazal (Columbia), Erik Gartzke (UCSD), Robert Jackson (Boston University), Stephen Krasner (Stanford), Douglas Lemke (Penn State), Kunle Owolabi (Villanova).

Organizations: Correlates of War project.

Studies, datasets: Karen Adams (dataset); Correlates of War (dataset); List of Independent States (Gleditsch, Ward)³.

Subnational Democracy

PM: Kelly McMann

Experts: Andrew Barnes (Kent State University), Caroline Beer (University of Vermont), Karen Beckwith (Case Western Reserve University), Dan Berger (University of Chicago), Justin Buchler (Case Western Reserve University), Ernesto Calvo (University of Maryland, College Park), Rebecca Bill Chavez (U.S. Navel Academy), Todd Eisenstadt (American University), Carlos Gervasoni (Universidad Torcuato), Agustina Giraudy (American University), Brian Grodsky (University of Maryland, Baltimore), Matt Ingram (State University of New York, Albany), Pierre Landry (University of Pittsburgh), Tomila Lankina (De Montfort University), Alfred Montero (Carleton College), Bryon Moraski (University of Florida), Nikolai Petrov (Carnegie Center Moscow), Elizabeth Remick (Tufts University), Karen Remmer (Duke University), Aseema Sinha (Claremont-McKenna College), Oxana Shevel (Tufts University), Lily Tsai (MIT)

Organizations: United Cities and Local Government, Global Observatory on Local Democracy and Decentralization.

Studies, datasets: Ammons (2001); Bardhan, Mookherjee (2006); Bierschenk, Olivier de Sardan (1997); Campbell (2003); Clark, Hoffmann-Martinot (1998); *Commonwealth Local Government Forum*⁴; Council of Europe (Local democracy reports for member states)⁵; Crook, Manor (1998); *Fiscal Austerity and Urban Innovation Project*; *Globalization and World Cities*; John (2001); Kaufmann, Leautier, Mastruzzi (2005); McCarney, Stren (2003); Montero, Samuels (2004); Municipal Development Partnership (PDM, seat in Cotonou, Benin)⁶; Olowu, Wunsch (2003); Oxhorn (2004); Soos (2002); *UN Habitat* (various years); *World Report on Decentralization and Local Democracy*, aka the *Gold Report*.⁷

³ //PRIVATEWWW.ESSEX.AC.UK/~KSG/STATELIST.HTML

⁴ WWW.CLGF.ORG.UK

⁵ WWW.COE.INT

⁶ WWW.PDM-NET.ORG

⁷ WWW.CITIES-LOCALGOVERNMENTS.ORG/GOLD/INDEX.ASP?L

Voting and Representation

PM: Pamela Paxton

Experts: Kenneth Bollen (UNC), Drude Dahlerup (Stockholm), Matt Golder (Florida State U.), (Rochester), Melanie Hughes (Pittsburgh); Tatu Vanhanen (University of Tampere, Finland, emeritus).

Organizations: IDEA, IPU, U.S. Department of State.

Studies, datasets: Cederman et al. (2009); Chronicle of Parliamentary Elections (IPU); CCP (Elkins et al. 2012); IDEA (Global Survey of Voter Turnout); IDEA Quota Database; Moon et al. (2006); Paxton et al. (2003); Paxton, Hughes, and Green (2008); US Office of Personnel Management Investigations Service (2001); U.S. Department of State Human Rights Reports; Vanhanen (2000).

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