### For Realz Mode!

Reversing an MBR from the CSAW CTF (and how to write a keygen with a SAT solver)

t0x0 @numinit

VAPORSEC


2017-10-11

#### About us

- @numinit
  - Software developer by day
  - Tinkerer on everything by night
  - First Def Con and Toorcon experiences this year
  - Doing CSAW CTF for a while
- t0x0 (@t0x0pg)
  - Writes lots of interpreted code
  - Lives mostly in Windows world
  - Jack of all trades, master of none (so far)
  - Obsessively curious

### What's CSAW?

An annual security capture the flag run by New York Polytechnic that contains challenges with a wide range of difficulties, attracting everyone from undergraduates to well-known teams like PPP



## Who are VAPORSEC?

- A new A E S T H E T I C San Diego CTF team
- Had 10 participants during the CSAW CTF
- Got 15th in CSAW industry professional bracket, which is cool I guess

### Outline


1 Introduction

2 Reversing the MBR

3 Finding the flag

#### RE400 what?...

- Challenge worth 400 points
- Reverse Engineering category
- We get some hints right away...
  - This is an MBR
  - ...from an x86 system



### A place to start...

Wikipedia, of course!




## A place to start...

- Wikipedia, of course!
  - 512 bytes
  - MBR signature: 55 AA
  - "expected to contain real mode machine language instructions"
  - little-endian
  - loads at 0000:7C00



### Tool Time!...

- qemu (gift wrapped)
  - -s (gdb)
  - S (suspend)
  - -vnc:1



#### Tool Time!...

- qemu (gift wrapped)
  - QEMU/Monitor
    - info registers
    - system reset

```
9f40 0009f400 0000ffff 00009300
  00d60000 11110000 00001000 0000
  -0000 00000000 0000ffff 00009300
  9000 93339999 99339999 99999999999999
  =0000 00000000 0000ffff 00009300
DT=0000 00000000 0000ffff 00008200
 =0000 00000000 0000ffff 00000h00
     000fd3a8 00000037
     00000000 000003ff
R0=00000012 CR2=00000000 CR3=00000000 CR4=00000600
R0=00000000 DR1=00000000 DR2=00000000 DR3=00000000
R6=ffff0ff0 DR7=00000400
FER=0000000000000000
FCW=037f FSW=0000 [ST=0] FTW=00 MXCSR=00001f80
PRZ=0000000000000000 0000 FPR3=0000000000000000 0000
PR4=0000000000000000 0000 FPR5=0000000000000000 0000
PR6=0000000000000000 0000 FPR7=0000000000000000 0000
   (gemu)
```

 We have an x86 boot sector that's asking us for the flag

```
== ENTER FLAG ==
```

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


- We have an x86 boot sector that's asking us for the flag
- The flag is clearly in the boot sector SOMEWHERE...
  - ...but not in plaintext, because this is a 400 point challenge and that would be too easy
- So, where is it?




## Reversing the boot sector

 Open the file in your favorite disassembler (e.g. IDA); rebase at 0x7c00



## Reversing the boot sector

- Open the file in your favorite disassembler (e.g. IDA); rebase at 0x7c00
- We can visally pick out three sections:
  - Init code (responsible for the protected mode transition)
  - Display code (identifiable by a large number of int instructions)
  - Some other code that uses Intel SSE2 instructions



#### First leads

■ The program asks you to enter 20 characters, and immediately breaks out if the first 4 characters aren't 'flag' after you enter character #20

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```
00007C6F
00007C6F precheck_flag:
00007C6F cmp dword ptr ds:1234h, 'galf'
00007C78 jnz end_of_loop_failure
```

#### As it turns out...

After several hours of staring at x86 assembly

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- The flag is hashed using a custom algorithm implemented with Intel SSE instructions
- Ugh...
- We have to find an input to the hash algorithm that hashes to the same value that's stored in the boot sector

"My Intel CPU can do that?"

The author of the challenge decided to use a bunch of obscure x86 SSE2 instructions to force us to trawl through Intel documentation

#### Note

SSE2 instructions operate on XMM registers, which are 128 bits (16 bytes) wide.

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- movaps: Moves to/from/between XMM registers
- andps: Performs bitwise AND between XMM registers
- pshufd: Reorders 32-bit words in XMM registers
- psadbw: Sums absolute values of differences between bytes (it's as crazy as it sounds)

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#### Question


Why are these instructions useful for writing a hash function (even if it's a bad hash function that we can break?)

# Packed Sum of Absolute Differences of Bytes in Word That's a mouthful...


xmm0: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15




#### It's hard to go back...



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#### It's hard to go back...

#### SAT solvers to the rescue!

How to master Sudoku without memorizing strategies

"I think a serious case can be made that the decline in the American economy can be blamed on the sapping of the mental energy and productivity of the American workforce that sudoku addiction alone has wrought"

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Notice anything strange about this puzzle?

d	С	6	1	9	0	е	b	5	7	3	2	4	8	f	a
5	8	a	4	f	C	2	d	9	0	b	е	3	7	6	1
2	b	9	7	ഥ	3	6	1	4	8	a	f	d	0	е	С
0	3	f	е	4	a	8	7	d	С	6	1	თ	b	2	5
8	d	С	6	1	9	3	2	Ъ	5	е	7	0	4	a	f
b	1	5	0	d	8	С	6	f	a	9	4	7	2	3	е
9	a	4	f	7	5	0	е	2	3	1	8	b	d	С	6
7	2	е	3	b	4	а	f	0	d	С	6	1	9	5	8
е	4	d	С	6	1	9	0	а	b	2	5	8	f	7	3
1	9	8	2	3	7	5	4	е	6	f	0	а	С	d	b
f	6	7	a	2	d	b	С	1	9	8	3	5	е	0	4
3	5	0	b	а	е	f	8	7	4	d	С	6	1	9	2
a	е	3	d	C	6	1	9	8	f	7	b	2	5	4	0
6	0	2	5	е	b	d	3	С	1	4	9	f	a	8	7
С	7	1	9	8	f	4	5	6	2	0	a	е	3	b	d
4	f	b	8	0	2	7	a	3	е	5	d	С	6	1	9

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Notice anything strange about this puzzle?

Stranger still: a SAT solver created it from thin air

5 8 a 4 f c 2 d 9 0 b e 3 7 6 2 b 9 7 5 3 6 1 4 8 a f d 0 e 6 0 3 f e 4 a 8 7 d c 6 1 9 b 2 3 8 d c 6 1 9 3 2 b 5 e 7 0 4 a 2 b 1 5 0 d 8 c 6 f a 9 4 7 2 3 6 9 a 4 f 7 5 0 e 2 3 1 8 b d c 6 7 2 e 3 b 4 a f 0 d c 6 1 9 5 8 e 4 d c 6 1 9 0 a b 2 5 8 f 7 3 1 9 8 2 3 7 5 4 e 6 f 0 a c d 1 f 6 7 a 2 d b c 1 9 8 3 5 e 0 4 3 5 0 b a e f 8 7 4 d c 6 1 9 5	٦	_	C	4	0	Λ	_	'n	Е	7	2	<u> </u>	1	0	£	_
2 b 9 7 5 3 6 1 4 8 a f d 0 e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e e	a	C	Ö	Ţ	9	U	e	D	0	1	3		4	<u>0</u>	Ī	a
0 3 f e 4 a 8 7 d c 6 1 9 b 2 l 8 d c 6 1 9 3 2 b 5 e 7 0 4 a : b 1 5 0 d 8 c 6 f a 9 4 7 2 3 d 9 a 4 f 7 5 0 e 2 3 1 8 b d c c 7 2 e 3 b 4 a f 0 d c 6 1 9 5 8 e 4 d c 6 1 9 0 a b 2 5 8 f 7 3 1 9 8 2 3 7 5 4 e 6 f 0 a c d 1 f 6 7 a 2 d b c 1 9 8 3 5 e 0 4 3 5 0 b a e f 8 7 4 d c 6 1 9 5	5	8	а	4	f	С				0	b	е	3	7	6	1
0 3 f e 4 a 8 7 d c 6 1 9 b 2 l 8 d c 6 1 9 3 2 b 5 e 7 0 4 a : b 1 5 0 d 8 c 6 f a 9 4 7 2 3 d 9 a 4 f 7 5 0 e 2 3 1 8 b d c c 7 2 e 3 b 4 a f 0 d c 6 1 9 5 8 e 4 d c 6 1 9 0 a b 2 5 8 f 7 3 1 9 8 2 3 7 5 4 e 6 f 0 a c d 1 f 6 7 a 2 d b c 1 9 8 3 5 e 0 4 3 5 0 b a e f 8 7 4 d c 6 1 9 5	2	b	9	7	5	3	6	1	4	8	a	f	d	0	е	С
b 1 5 0 d 8 c 6 f a 9 4 7 2 3 6 9 a 4 f 7 5 0 e 2 3 1 8 b d c 6 7 2 e 3 b 4 a f 0 d c 6 1 9 5 8 e 4 d c 6 1 9 0 a b 2 5 8 f 7 1 1 9 8 2 3 7 5 4 e 6 f 0 a c d 1 f 6 7 a 2 d b c 1 9 8 3 5 e 0 4 3 5 0 b a e f 8 7 4 d c 6 1 9 5	0	3	f	е	4	a	8	7	d	С	6	1	9	b	2	5
9 a 4 f 7 5 0 e 2 3 1 8 b d c 6 7 2 e 3 b 4 a f 0 d c 6 1 9 5 8 e 4 d c 6 1 9 0 a b 2 5 8 f 7 1 9 8 2 3 7 5 4 e 6 f 0 a c d 1 f 6 7 a 2 d b c 1 9 8 3 5 e 0 4 3 5 0 b a e f 8 7 4 d c 6 1 9 5	8	d	С	6	1	9	3	2	Ъ	5	е	7	0	4	a	f
7 2 e 3 b 4 a f 0 d c 6 1 9 5 8 e 4 d c 6 1 9 0 a b 2 5 8 f 7 3 1 9 8 2 3 7 5 4 e 6 f 0 a c d 1 f 6 7 a 2 d b c 1 9 8 3 5 e 0 4 3 5 0 b a e f 8 7 4 d c 6 1 9 5	b	1	5	0	d	8	С	6	f	a	9	4	7	2	3	е
e 4 d c 6 1 9 0 a b 2 5 8 f 7 1 9 8 2 3 7 5 4 e 6 f 0 a c d f 6 7 a 2 d b c 1 9 8 3 5 e 0 4 3 5 0 b a e f 8 7 4 d c 6 1 9 5	9	a	4	f	7	5	0	е	2	3	1	8	b	d	С	6
1 9 8 2 3 7 5 4 e 6 f 0 a c d 1 f 6 7 a 2 d b c 1 9 8 3 5 e 0 4 3 5 0 b a e f 8 7 4 d c 6 1 9 5	7	Ω	Ф	3	b	4	a	f	0	d	С	6	1	9	5	8
f 6 7 a 2 d b c 1 9 8 3 5 e 0 4 3 5 0 b a e f 8 7 4 d c 6 1 9 2	е	4	d	С	6	1	9	0	а	b	2	5	8	f	7	3
350baef874dc6191	1	9	8	2		7	5	4	е	6	f	0	a	С	d	b
	f	6	7	a	2	d	b	С	1	9	8	3	5	е	0	4
a e 3 d c 6 1 9 8 f 7 b 2 5 4 0	3	ഥ	0	b	а	е	f	8	7	4	d	С	6	1	9	2
	а	е	3	d	С	6	1	9	8	f	7	b	2	5	4	0
	6	0	2	5	е			3	C		4	9	f	a	8	7
c 7 1 9 8 f 4 5 6 2 0 a e 3 b c	C	7	1	9	8	f	4	5	6	2		a	е	3	b	d
4 f b 8 0 2 7 a 3 e 5 d c 6 1 9	4	f	b	8	0	2	7	a	3	е	5	d	С	6	1	9

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- Symbolic execution engines
  - Convert CPU instructions into a SMT solver language

In case this all seemed too abstract...

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The SMT query itself can be constructed from a language like Python, C, or even raw x86 assembly

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We'll be mainly focusing on using Z3, since all the other tools use it under the hood (and it's awesome)

#### Back to our sudoku...

How do you create a hexadoku puzzle out of thin air with Z3?

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How do you create a hexadoku puzzle out of thin air with Z3?

```
Creating the board
import z3
 Define a 16x16 Sudoku
order = 4
side = order ** 2
 Create a solver
smt = z3.Solver()
cells = [list() for row in range(side)]
for r in range(side):
    for c in range(side):
        cells[r].append(z3.Int('cell %d %d' % (r, c)))
```

We'll define our first rule: each cell has to be between 0 and 15

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```
The most basic of Sudoku rules
for r in range(side):
    for c in range(side):
        # Each cell must be between 0 and 15
        smt.add(z3.And(cells[r][c] >= 0, cells[r][c] < side))</pre>
```

Now, the rules everyone knows

Now, the rules everyone knows

```
Rows and columns
# Rows must have unique values
for r in range(side):
    this row = [cells[r][c] for c in range(side)]
    smt.add(z3.Distinct(*this row))
 Columns must have unique values
for c in range(side):
    this_col = [cells[r][c] for r in range(side)]
    smt.add(z3.Distinct(*this_col))
```

Mini-boxes are slightly more complicated

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```
Mini-boxes
 Each mini-box must have unique values
for r in range(0, side, order):
    for c in range(0, side, order):
        selected = []
        for i in range(box_size):
            for j in range(box_size):
                selected.append(cells[r + i][c + j])
        smt.add(z3.Distinct(*selected))
```

### Telling z3 how to play our version of sudoku

```
Now for the initial values ... dc858 isn't as sudoku-able :-(
```

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```
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```

```
Initial values
# Now, define the initial values
smt.add(cells[0][0] == 0xd)
smt.add(cells[0][1] == 0xc)
smt.add(cells[0][2] == 0x6)
smt.add(cells[0][3] == 0x1)
smt.add(cells[0][4] == 0x9)
# ... etc.
```

### Telling z3 to start solving, and printing the result

This will take a little bit of time

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```
Start solving!
if smt.check() == z3.unsat:
    print('Sudoku is impossible to solve :(')
else:
    model = smt.model()
    # Retrieve each cell from the model as a python long
    result = [list() for row in range(side)]
    for r in range(side):
        for c in range(side):
            cell = model[r][c]
            print('%x ' % model[cell].as long(), end='')
        print()
```

#### The results...

		_	4	$\sim$	$\overline{}$		٠.	_	-			4	$\overline{}$	_	
a	С	6	1	9	0	е	b	5	1	3	2	4	8	f	a
5	8	a	4	f	С	2	d	9	0	b	е	3	7	6	1
2	b	9	7	5	3	6	1	4	8	a	f	d	0	е	С
0	3	f	е	4	a	8	7	d	С	6	1	9	b	2	5
8	d	С	6	1	9	3	2	b	5	е	7	0	4	a	f
b	1	5	0	d	8	С	6	f	a	9	4	7	2	3	е
9	a	4	f	7	5	0	е	2	3	1	8	b	d	С	6
7	2	е	3	b	4	a	f	0	d	С	6	1	9	5	8
е	4	d	С	6	1	9	0	a	b	2	5	8	f	7	3
e 1	4 9	<b>d</b> 8	<b>c</b> 2	6 3	1 7	9 5	0 4	a e	b 6	2 f	5 0	8 a	f c	7 d	3 b
_			-			_	_	-	<u> </u>	_	_	_	=	·	_
1	9	8	2	3	7	5	4	е	6	f	0	a	С	d	b
1 f	9	8	2 a	3	7 d	5 b	4 c	е	6 9	f 8	0	a 5	c e	d 0	b 4
1 f 3	9 6 5	8 7 0	2 a b	3 2 a	7 d e	5 b f	4 c 8	e 1 7	6 9 4	f 8	0 3 c	a 5 6	c e 1	d 0 9	b 4 2
1 f 3 a	9 6 5 e	8 7 0 3	2 a b	3 2 a c	7 d e 6	5 b f	4 c 8	e 1 7 8	6 9 4 f	f 8 d 7	0 3 c b	a 5 6 2	c e 1	d 0 9	b 4 2

## The power of SMT solvers

Maybe familiar to anyone who's tried Prolog

We only had to define the constraints of the puzzle we wanted, and Z3 found one satisfying those constraints

### Constraint solving our boot sector

"Hey, Z3, I want you to find me input values that, after being put through this crazy operation, end up being equal to the ones stored in the boot sector"

