For Realz Mode!

Reversing an MBR from the CSAW CTF (and how to write a keygen with a SAT solver)

t0x0 numinit

DC858, DC619, and VAPORSEC

2017-10-11

Outline

About us

- Morgan (@numinit)
 - Software developer by day
 - Tinkerer on everything by night
 - First Def Con and Toorcon experiences this year
 - Doing CSAW CTF for a while
- t0x0 (@t0x0pg)
 - Writes lots of interpreted code
 - Lives mostly in Windows world
 - Jack of all trades, master of none (so far)
 - Obsessively curious



3 / 1

What's CSAW?

An annual security capture the flag run by New York Polytechnic that contains challenges with a wide range of difficulties, attracting everyone from undergraduates to well-known teams



What's a security capture the flag?

■ 48 hours of caffeinated reverse engineering and exploitation

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- 48 hours of caffeinated reverse engineering and exploitation
- More seriously: an event where you break a bunch of programs to retrieve hidden strings of text (the flags)

What's a security capture the flag?


- 48 hours of caffeinated reverse engineering and exploitation
- More seriously: an event where you break a bunch of programs to retrieve hidden strings of text (the flags)
- An opportunity to learn new things we wouldn't even be presenting if it wasn't for this CTF

Who are VAPORSEC?

- A new AESTHETIC San Diego CTF team
- Had 10 participants during the CSAW CTF
- Achieved 15th in CSAW industry professional bracket, not bad for the first time

RE400 what?...

- Challenge worth 400 points
- Reverse Engineering category
- We get some hints right away...
 - This is an MBR
 - ...from an ×86 system



A place to start...

Wikipedia, of course!



Main page Contents

Featured content
Current events
Random article
Donate to Wikipedia
Wikipedia store

Interaction

Help About Wikipedia Community portal Recent changes Contact page

Tools

What links here Related changes Article Talk

Master boot record

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

This article is about a PC-specific type of boot sector of

A master boot record (MBR) is a special type of boot sec intended for use with IBM PC-compatible systems and be

The MBR holds the information on how the logical partition function as a loader for the installed operating system—us record (VBR). This MBR code is usually referred to as a b

The organization of the partition table in the MBR limits the limit assuming 33-bit arithmetics or 4096-byte sectors are operating systems and system tools, and can cause serior partitioning scheme is in the process of being superseded provide some limited form of backward compatibility for ok

MBRs are not present on non-partitioned media such as fl

Contents [hide]

1 Overview

2017-10-11

A place to start...

- Wikipedia, of course!
 - 512 bytes
 - MBR signature: 55 AA
 - "expected to contain real mode machine language instructions"
 - little-endian
 - loads at 0000:7C00



Main page Contents

Featured content
Current events
Random article
Donate to Wikipedia
Wikipedia store

Interaction

Help
About Wikipedia
Community portal
Recent changes
Contact page

Tools

What links here Related changes



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
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Contents [hide]

8 / 1

qemu (gift wrapped)

- -s (gdb)
- -S (suspend)
- -vnc:1



qemu (gift wrapped)

- QEMU/Monitor
 - info registers
 - system reset

```
TR =0000 00000000 0000ffff 00008b00
     000fd3a8 00000037
     11500000 00000000
CRO=0000001Z CRZ=00000000 CR3=00000000 CR4=00000600
0R0=00000000 DR1=00000000 DRZ=00000000 DR3=00000000
R6=ffff0ff0 DR7=00000400
FER=000000000000000000
CW=037f FSW=0000 [ST=0] FTW=00 MXCSR=00001f80
PR0=0000000000000000 0000 FPR1=00000000000000000 0000
PR2=00000000000000000 0000 FPR3=00000000000000000
FPR4=0000000000000000 0000 FPR5=0000000000000000 0000
FPR6=0000000000000000 0000 FPR7=000000000000000000
memu)
```

9 / 1

Reversing the MBR Tools 2017-10-11

gdb

- target remote localhost:1234
- set architecture i8086 (bootloaders are 16 bit, right?)
- display/i \$pc print program counter
- br *0xADDR set breakpoint
- si run one instruction
- c continue

GNU gdb (GDB) 7.4.1-debian

Copyright (C) 2012 Free Software Foundation, Inc.

License GFLv3+: GNU GFL version 3 or later http://gnu.org/licenses/gpl.html

This is free software: you are free to change and redistribute it.

There is NO WARRANTY, to the extent permitted by law. Type "show copying" and "show warranty" for details.

This GDB was configured as "x86_64-linux-gnu".

For bug reporting instructions, please see:
https://www.gnu.org/software/gdb/bugs/>.
(gdb) target remote localnost:1234

gdb) target remote localhost:1234

■ info reg

(qdb) info req		
eax	0x0	0
ecx	0x8b	139
edx	0x26183	156035
ebx	0x6ef2	28402
esp	0x6ed2	0x6ed2
ebp	0x1234	0x1234
esi	0x0	0
edi	0x0	0
eip	0xbdd2	0xbdd2
eflags	0x46	[PF ZF]
cs	0xf000	61440
SS	0x0	0
ds	0x0	0
es	0x9f40	40768
fs	0x0	0
gs	0x0	0
(gdb)		

- info reg
- info frame

```
(gdb) info frame
Stack level 0, frame at 0x123c:
eip = 0x656a; saved eip 0x5f5f5f5f
called by frame at 0x5f5f5f5f49
Arglist at 0x1234, args:
Locals at 0x1234, Previous frame's sp is 0x123c
Saved registers:
ebp at 0x1234, eip at 0x1238
```

- info reg
- info frame
- x /CT 0xADDR display C units of T type from ADDR
- set {int}0xADDR = 42
- set $\{char[4]\}\ 0 \times ADDR = "AAA"$

```
0x5f
                         0x5f
                                  0x5f
                                           0x5f
                                                            0x5f
                                                                     0x5f
gdb) set {int} 0x1234 = 41
                                  0x00
                0 \times 0.0
                         0x00
                                           0x5f
                                                    0x5f
                                                            0x5f
                                                                     0x5f
     set {int} 0x1234 = 0x41
gdb) x /8x 0x1234
0x1234: 0x41
                 0x00
                         0x00
                                  0x00
                                           0x5f
                                                    0x5f
                                                            0x5f
                                                                     0x5f
adb) c
Continuing.
Program received signal SIGINT, Interrupt.
```

- info reg
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
```
x /8x 0x1234
                0x5f
                         0x5f
                                 0x5f
                                          0x5f
                                                   0x5f
                                                           0x5f
                                                                    0x5f
gdb) set {int} 0x1234 = 41
     x /8x 0x1234
                0 \times 0.0
                         0x00
                                 0x00
                                          0x5f
                                                   0x5f
                                                           0x5f
                                                                    0x5f
     set {int} 0x1234 = 0x41
gdb) x /8x 0x1234
0x1234: 0x41
                0x00
                         0x00
                                 0x00
                                          0x5f
                                                   0x5f
                                                           0x5f
                                                                    0x5f
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Program received signal SIGINT, Interrupt.
gdb) x /8x 0x1234
                0x5f
                         0x5f
                                          0x5f
                                                  0x5f
                                                           0x5f
                                                                    0x5f
    set {int} 0x1234 = 0x5f5f5f41
gdb) x /8x 0x1234
x1234: 0x41
                0x5f
                        0x5f
                                 0x5f
                                          0x5f
                                                  0x5f
                                                           0x5f
                                                                    0x5f
```

Reversing the MBR Tools 2017-10-11 10 / 1

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Rebase



Rebase

Common ASM

- int
- mov
- inc, dec
- and, or, not, xor...
- cmp
- jmp, jz, jge, jle...

```
sea000:7000
                             mov
                                     ax. 13h
                                                       : - UIDEO - SET UIDEO MODE
seq000:7003
                                     1.0h
                             int
seq000:7003
                                                      : AL = mode
seq000:7005
                             mov
                                     eax, cr0
seq000:7008
                             and
                                     ax. ØFFFBh
seq000:700B
                                     ax, 2
                             nr.
seq000:700E
                                     cr0, eax
                             mou
seq000:7C11
                                     eax, cr4
                             mov
seq000:7014
                                      ax, 600h
                             or
seg000:7C17
                             mou
                                     cr4, eax
seq000:7C1A
                                     word ptr ds:1266h, 0Ah
seq000:7C20
                                     bx. 0
                             MOV
```

- Rebase
- Common ASM
- Registers
 - E AX Accumulator
 - E CX Counter
 - E DX Data
 - E BX Base
 - E SP Stack pointer
 - E BP Stack base pointer
 - E SI Source
 - E DI Destination

```
sea000:7000
                             mov
                                     ax, 13h
seq000:7003
                             int
                                                       : - VIDEO - SET VIDEO MODE
                                     10h
sea000:7003
                                                       : AL = mode
seq000:7005
                             mou
                                     eax, cr0
seq000:7008
                                     ax. ØFFFBh
                             and
seq000:700B
                                     ax. 2
seq000:700E
                                     cr0, eax
seq000:7C11
                                     eax, cr4
seg888:7014
                                     ax. 600h
                             or
seq000:7C17
                                     cr4, eax
sea888:7018
                             mov
                                     word otr ds:1266h. 88h
seg888:7028
                                     bx. 8
                             mov
```

■ Look for hints

- Look for hints
 - Loops

- Look for hints
 - Loops
 - Comparisons

 seg800:7C6F
 cmp
 dword ptr ds:1234h, 67616C66h

 seg800:7C78
 jnz
 loc_7D4D

- Look for hints
 - Loops
 - Comparisons
 - Unknowns

```
sea000:7C7C
                            movaps xmm0, xmmword ptr ds:1238h
seq000:7C81
                            movaps xmm5, xmmword ptr ds:loc 7000
seq000:7086
                            pshufd
                                    xmm0, xmm0, 1Eh
                                    si, 8
seq000:7C8B
                            mov
seq000:7C8E
seg888:708E loc 708E:
                                                    : CODE XREF: seq000:7CC11j
seg000:7C8E
                            movans
                                    xmm2, xmm8
seq000:7091
                            andos
                                    xmm2, xmmword ptr [si+7D98h]
seq000:7096
                            psadbw xmm5, xmm2
seq000:709A
                            movaps xmmword ptr ds:1268h, xmm5
```

We know that 0x7C6F compares user input to "flag"

 seg000:7C6F
 cmp
 dword ptr ds:1234h, 67616C66h

 seg000:7C78
 jnz
 loc_7D4D

- We know that 0x7C6F compares user input to "flag"
- There's a bunch of complicated instructions right after that cmp

```
sea888:7070
                            movaps xmm0, xmmword ptr ds:1238h
sea888:7081
                                   xmm5, xmmword ptr ds:loc 7000
sea888:7086
                                   xmm0, xmm0, 1Eh
seq000:7C8B
                                    si, 8
                            mov
seq000:708E
seq000:708E loc 708E:
                                                    : CODE XREF: sea000:70011i
seq000:7C8E
                            movaps
                                    xmm2, xmm0
seq000:7091
                                    xmm2, xmmword ptr [si+7D98h]
seq000:7096
                            psadbw xmm5, xmm2
seq000:709A
                            movaps xmmword ptr ds:1268h, xmm5
```

- We know that 0x7C6F compares user input to "flag"
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- We can use gdb and qemu/monitor to see what's happening...



- We know that 0x7C6F compares user input to "flag"
- There's a bunch of complicated instructions right after that cmp
- We can use gdb and qemu/monitor to see what's happening...
- Now we just have to work backwards from there.

Other useful tools...that I didn't know about

- Binary Ninja
- pwndbg
- Radare

We have an x86 boot sector that's asking us for the flag

```
== ENTER FLAG ==
```

- We have an x86 boot sector that's asking us for the flag
- The flag is clearly in the boot sector SOMEWHERE...

```
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- We have an x86 boot sector that's asking us for the flag
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 - ...but not in plaintext, because this is a 400 point challenge and that would be too easy


```
== ENTER FLAG ==
```

- We have an x86 boot sector that's asking us for the flag
- The flag is clearly in the boot sector SOMEWHERE...
 - ...but not in plaintext, because this is a 400 point challenge and that would be too easy
- So, where is it?



Reversing the boot sector


 Open the file in your favorite disassembler (e.g. IDA); rebase at 0x7c00



Getting the flag Recap 2017-10-11

Reversing the boot sector

- Open the file in your favorite disassembler (e.g. IDA); rebase at 0x7c00
- We can visally pick out three sections:
 - Init code (responsible for the protected mode transition)
 - Display code (identifiable by a large number of int instructions)
 - Some other code that uses Intel SSE2 instructions



16 / 1

Getting the flag Recap 2017-10-11

First leads

■ The program asks you to enter 20 characters, and immediately breaks out if the first 4 characters aren't 'flag' after you enter character #20

Getting the flag First leads 2017-10-11 17 / 3

First leads

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- We can verify this in a debugger after eyeballing the code

Getting the flag First leads 2017-10-11 17 /

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Getting the flag First leads 2017-10-11 17 / 1

As it turns out...

After several hours of staring at x86 assembly

■ The flag is hashed using a custom algorithm implemented with Intel SSE instructions (and this isn't very surprising)

Getting the flag First leads 2017-10-11 18 / 1

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Getting the flag First leads 2017-10-11 18 /

As it turns out...

After several hours of staring at x86 assembly

- The flag is hashed using a custom algorithm implemented with Intel SSE instructions (and this isn't very surprising)
- Ugh...
- We have to find an input to the hash algorithm that hashes to the same value that's stored in the boot sector

Getting the flag First leads 2017-10-11 18 / 1

"My Intel CPU can do that?"

The author of the challenge decided to use a bunch of obscure x86 SSE2 instructions to force us to trawl through Intel documentation

Note

SSE2 instructions operate on XMM registers, which are 128 bits (16 bytes) wide.

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- movaps
- andps
- pshufd
- psadbw

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- movaps: Moves to/from/between XMM registers
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Question


Why are these instructions useful for writing a hash function (even if it's a bad hash function that we can break?)


19 / 1


That's a mouthful...

xmm0: 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15


xmmO:	0	1	2	3 4	1 5	6	7	8	9	10	11	l 1	2	13	14	15
(minus)																
xmm1:	15	14	13	12	11	10	9	8	7	6	5	4	3	2	1	0







That's a mouthful...



It's hard to go back...

You have to find two sets of 8 bytes where the absolute values of their differences sum to 64

20 / 1

SAT solvers to the rescue!

How to master Sudoku without memorizing strategies

"I think a serious case can be made that the decline in the American economy can be blamed on the sapping of the mental energy and productivity of the American workforce that sudoku addiction alone has wrought"

- Some Slate writer

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Some Slate writer

Notice anything strange about this puzzle?

d	С	6	1	9	0	е	b	5	7	3	2	4	8	f	a
5	8	a	4	f	С	2	d	9	0	b	е	ვ	7	6	1
2	b	9	7	5	3	6	1	4	8	a	f	d	0	е	С
0	3	f	е	4	a	8	7	d	U	6	1	თ	b	2	5
8	d	С	6	1	9	3	2	Ъ	5	е	7	0	4	a	f
b	1	5	0	d	8	С	6	f	a	9	4	7	2	3	е
9	a	4	f	7	5	0	е	2	3	1	8	Ъ	d	С	6
7	2	е	3	ъ	4	a	f	0	d	U	6	1	9	5	8
е	4	d	С	6	1	9	0	a	Ъ	2	5	8	f	7	3
1	9	8	2	3	7	5	4	е	6	f	0	a	С	d	b
f	6	7	a	2	d	b	С	1	9	8	3	5	е	0	4
3	5	0	b	a	е	f	8	7	4	d	С	6	1	9	2
a	е	3	d	С	6	1	9	8	f	7	р	2	5	4	0
6	0	2	5	е	b	d	3	C	1	4	9	f	a	8	7
С	7	1	9	8	f	4	5	6	2	0	a	е	3	b	d
4	f	b	8	0	2	7	a	3	е	5	d	C	6	1	9

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"I think a serious case can be made that the decline in the American economy can be blamed on the sapping of the mental energy and productivity of the American workforce that sudoku addiction alone has wrought"

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Notice anything strange about this puzzle? Stranger still: a SAT solver created it from thin air

d	Ω	6	1	თ	0	е	ರ	ഥ	7	ფ	Ŋ	4	8	f	а
5	8	a	4	f	C	2	d	თ	0	ъ	е	თ	7	6	1
2	b	9	7	5	3	6	1	4	∞	a	f	d	0	Φ	С
0	3	f	е	4	a	8	7	đ	U	6	1	თ	Ъ	Ω	5
8	d	С	6	1	9	3	2	Ъ	5	е	7	0	4	а	f
b	1	5	0	d	8	С	6	f	a	9	4	7	2	3	е
9	a	4	f	7	5	0	е	2	3	1	8	Ъ	d	C	6
7	2	е	3	b	4	a	f	0	d	C	6	1	တ	ഥ	8
е	4	d	О	6	1	9	0	a	Ъ	2	5	8	f	7	3
1	9	8	2	3	7	5	4	е	6	f	0	a	С	d	b
f	6	7	a	2	d	b	С	1	9	8	3	5	е	0	4
3	5	0	b	a	е	f	8	7	4	d	С	6	1	თ	2
a	е	3	d	C	6	1	9	8	f	7	Ъ	2	5	4	0
6	0	2	5	е	b	d	3	C	1	4	9	f	a	8	7
С	7	1	9	8	f	4	5	6	2	0	a	е	3	b	d
4	f	b	8	0	2	7	a	ദ	Ф	15	d	U	6	1	9

SAT solvers

- SAT solvers
 - Only operate on Boolean logic

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SMT solvers

- "Satisfiability modulo theories" a fancy term for a piece of software that uses a SAT solver to act as a theorem prover
- Takes standard mathematical operations, bit operations, etc, and converts them to Boolean CNFs that a SAT solver can work with

22 / 1

SAT solvers

- Only operate on Boolean logic
- Take large sets of Boolean CNFs (e.g. $(v_1 \lor v_2 \lor v_3) \land (v_4 \lor v_5 \lor v_6))$
- Try to come up with inputs so the formula returns true (or fail and report that the formula is "unsatisfiable", which means that it's impossible for the formula to be true)

SMT solvers

- "Satisfiability modulo theories" a fancy term for a piece of software that uses a SAT solver to act as a theorem prover
- Takes standard mathematical operations, bit operations, etc, and converts them to Boolean CNFs that a SAT solver can work with
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- Symbolic execution engines
 - Convert CPU instructions into a SMT solver language



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23 / 1

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If there's one thing you should take from this presentation: SMT solvers are tools for solving constraint problems, just like SQL is a tool for making sense of large amounts of data

Modern SMT solvers and symbolic execution engines

- Z3 (SMT)
 - Open source, developed by Microsoft
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We'll be mainly focusing on using Z3, since all the other tools use it under the hood (and it's awesome)



Back to our sudoku...

How do you create a hexadoku puzzle out of thin air with Z3?

Back to our sudoku...

How do you create a hexadoku puzzle out of thin air with Z3?

```
Creating the board
import z3
# Define a 16x16 Sudoku
order = 4; side = order ** 2
# Create a solver and a 16x16 board (list of lists)
smt = z3.Solver()
cells = [list() for row in range(side)]
for r in range(side):
    for c in range(side):
        cells[r].append(z3.Int('cell_%d_%d' % (r, c)))
```

Getting the flag Generating sudoku puzzles 2017-10-11

25 / 1

We'll define our first rule: each cell has to be between 0 and 15

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```
The most basic of Sudoku rules
for r in range(side):
    for c in range(side):
        # Each cell must be between 0 and 15.
        # Also, this is our first constraint!
        # Add it to the solver with `smt.add`.
        smt.add(z3.And(cells[r][c] >= 0, cells[r][c] < side))</pre>
```

Now, the rules everyone knows

Now, the rules everyone knows

```
Rows and columns
for r in range(side):
   this row = [cells[r][c] for c in range(side)]
    # Ensures that all values are represented only once
    smt.add(z3.Distinct(*this row))
# Columns must have unique values
for c in range(side):
   this col = [cells[r][c] for r in range(side)]
    smt.add(z3.Distinct(*this col))
```

27 / 1

Mini-boxes are slightly more complicated

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```
Mini-boxes
# Each mini-box must have unique values
for r in range(0, side, order):
    for c in range(0, side, order):
        selected = []
        for i in range(box size):
            for j in range(box size):
                selected.append(cells[r + i][c + j])
        smt.add(z3.Distinct(*selected))
```

28 / 1

Telling z3 how to play our version of sudoku

Now for the initial values ... dc858 isn't sudoku-able, but dc619 is

Telling z3 how to play our version of sudoku

Now for the initial values ... dc858 isn't sudoku-able, but dc619 is

```
Initial values
# Now, define the initial values
smt.add(cells[0][0] == 0xd)
smt.add(cells[0][1] == 0xc)
smt.add(cells[0][2] == 0x6)
smt.add(cells[0][3] == 0x1)
smt.add(cells[0][4] == 0x9)
```

Telling z3 to start solving

This will take a little bit of time


Telling z3 to start solving

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```
Start solving!
if smt.check() == z3.unsat:
    print('Sudoku is impossible to solve :(')
else:
    # Retrieve each cell from the model as a python long
    model = smt.model()
    result = [list() for row in range(side)]
    for r in range(side):
        for c in range(side):
            cell = model[r][c]
            print('%x ' % model[cell].as long(), end='')
        print()
```

30 / 1

The results...




The power of SMT solvers

Maybe familiar to anyone who's tried Prolog

We only had to define the constraints of the puzzle we wanted, and Z3 found one satisfying those constraints

Constraint solving our boot sector

"Hey, Z3, I want you to find me input values that, after being put through this crazy operation (among other things), end up being equal to the ones stored in the boot sector"



Useful primitives

- We need to implement the pshufd and psadbw x86 instructions in Z3
- Documentation at http://x86.renejeschke.de already provides us pseudocode for these instructions

```
Operation

Destination[0..31] = (Source >> (Order[0..1] * 32))[0..31];
Destination[32..63] = (Source >> (Order[2..3] * 32))[0..31];
Destination[64..95] = (Source >> (Order[4..5] * 32))[0..31];
Destination[96..127] = (Source >> (Order[6..7] * 32))[0..31];
```

Useful constraints

The flag looks like flag{some_text_here}, but the word "flag" is chopped off before it's loaded into an XMM register, so the first and last characters of the remaining 16 are { and }, respectively.

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The flag looks like flag{some_text_here}, but the word "flag" is chopped off before it's loaded into an XMM register, so the first and last characters of the remaining 16 are { and }, respectively. This may not look like much, but we already have a few constraints...

```
Initial constraints
import z3
smt = z3.Solver()
flag = [z3.BitVec('flag_%d' % i, 8) for i in range(16)]

# Flag must start with '{' and end with '}', and the rest must be ASCII
smt.add(z3.And(flag[0] == ord('{'}, flag[-1] == ord('}')))
for i in range(1, 15):
    smt.add(z3.And(flag[i] >= 32, flag[i] < 127))</pre>
```

Understanding the hash function's word shuffling

The flag is initially shuffled using the pshufd instruction; create a new constraint ("shuf") that just describes the permutation

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Implementing the hash function's word shuffling

37 / 1

Implementing the hash function's bitmasking

For each of the hash function's 8 rounds, a different mask is applied to the shuffled value, so create another set of intermediate values called "masked"

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For each of the hash function's 8 rounds, a different mask is applied to the shuffled value, so create another set of intermediate values called "masked"

```
Implementing the masking operation (andps)
# Masks for each round:
  ffffffff ffffff00 ffffffff ffffff00
  ffffffff ffff00ff ffffffff ffff00ff
  ffffffff ff00ffff ffffffff ff00ffff
  ffffffff OOffffff ffffffff OOffffff
mask = [0x00 \text{ if } i == round \text{ else } 0xff \text{ for } i \text{ in } range(8)] * 2
masked = [z3.BitVec('masked %d %d' % (round, i), 8) for i in range(16)]
for i in range(16):
    smt.add(masked[i] == (shuf[i] & mask[i]))
```

Implementing the packed sum of absolute differences

A single x86 instruction turned into like 30 lines of Python...

Implementing the packed sum of absolute differences


A single x86 instruction turned into like 30 lines of Python...

```
Implementing psadbw (greatly simplified; trust me, it's nasty)
ps lo, ps hi = z3.BitVec('psadbw lo', 16), z3.BitVec('psadbw hi', 16)
smt.add(ps lo == (
    Abs(iv[0] - masked[0]) + Abs(iv[1] - masked[1]) +
    Abs(iv[2] - masked[2]) + Abs(iv[3] - masked[3]) + ...
)) # and repeat for ps hi. Assumes that we have an `Abs` helper.
res = [z3.BitVec('psadbw %d' % i, 8) for i in range(16)]
smt.add(res[0] == ps lo & Oxff)
smt.add(res[1] == (ps lo >> 8) & Oxff)
smt.add(res[2] == 0) # ... etc. Read Intel docs if you care.
```

And the rest of the algorithm...

AKA: continuing to give up on explaining the details

- Would be boring to present, since there were a few arbitrary things thrown into the challenge that made it deliberately more annoying to reverse-engineer
- ... Like x86 tricks where they loaded a register like eax and used ah and al backwards
- Not to mention that the algorithm has to run for 8 iterations...



Once we've got the constraints defined...

Now, we can solve it as usual, and retrieve the flag from the model

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```
Solving for the flag
if smt.check() == z3.unsat:
    print('Formula was unsatisfiable :-(')
else:
    print('Formula was satisfiable.')
    model = smt.model()
    flag str = 'flag'
    for i in range(16):
        flag str += chr(model[flag[i]].as long())
    print(flag str)
```

Run it, and...

Formula was satisfiable.
flag{ D`?T\B?3F> P`}


Does it work?

Well, no

```
== ENTER FLAG ==
flag( D"?T\B?3F>~P')
flag( D"?T\B?3F>~P')
```

Does it work?

But, using IDA's debugger and setting breakpoints, we see that it got through the first round of the hash function, but failed on the second - turns out, we forgot to solve the remaining rounds



Debugging SMT solvers

■ Baby steps - try to get a satisfiable formula first, then focus on making it the *correct* satisfiable formula

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45 / 1

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45 / 1

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- If you're reimplementing some piece of code in Z3, make sure its flow matches the original's
 - Match control structures as faithfully as possible
 - Use Python functions to implement complex behaviors like Intel SSE2 instructions with the correct series of smt.add calls

After some refactoring...

Formula was satisfiable. $\label{eq:flag} \texttt{flag}\{4\texttt{e@alz_p\%Z/TnW}\}$

After some refactoring...

Formula was satisfiable. flag{4e@alz_p%Z/TnW}

And, it got through 6 out of the 8 rounds this time!

46 / 1

After some refactoring...

Formula was satisfiable. flag{4e@alz_p%Z/TnW}

And, it got through 6 out of the 8 rounds this time! ... But, it returned unsatisfiable when trying to solve for 7 or 8

46 / 1

Spot the difference...

```
What I typed
outputs = (
    0x02df028f.
    0x0290025d,
    0x02090221,
    0x027b0279.
    0x01f90233.
    0x025e0291,
    0x02290255,
    0x02110270
```

```
What I meant
outputs = (
    0x02df028f.
    0x0290025d.
    0x02090221.
    0x027b0278, # single bit typo
    0x01f90233.
    0x025e0291.
    0x02290255.
    0 \times 02110270
```

After fixing the typo...

Formula was satisfiable. flag{4r3alz_m0d3_y0}

After fixing the typo...

Formula was satisfiable. flag{4r3alz_m0d3_y0}

So, what did we learn?

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Conclusion Wrapping up 2017-10-11

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So, what did we learn?

- Emulators like QEMU can be used to help debug code for non-native architectures
- Intel x86 vector instructions are complex, but we can get past the complexity by following the documentation
- SMT solvers can be used to query constraints, similarly to how you can use SQL to query lots of data

 Conclusion
 Wrapping up
 2017-10-11
 49 / 1

The end!

- This presentation is built on the shoulders of giants; check out Dennis Yurichev's fantastic writeup on SAT and SMT solvers
 - https://yurichev.com/writings/SAT_SMT_draft-EN.pdf
- Z3 code for generating sudokus is at https://goo.gl/ZC1546
- Z3 code for solving the CTF challenge is available at https://goo.gl/cJPJDN
- Questions?



Conclusion Wrapping up 2017-10-11 50 / 1