

**IoT Security**  
**Narudom Roongsiriwong, CISSP**  
**November 8, 2017**

# WhoAmI

- Lazy Blogger
  - Japan, Security, FOSS, Politics, Christian
  - <http://narudomr.blogspot.com>
- Information Security since 1995
- Embedded System since 2002
- Head of IT Security and Solution Architecture,  
Kiatnakin Bank PLC (KKP)
- Consultant for OWASP Thailand Chapter
- Committee Member of Cloud Security Alliance (CSA), Thailand  
Chapter
- Committee Member of Thailand Banking Sector CERT (TB-CERT)
- Consulting Team Member for National e-Payment project
- Contact: narudom@owasp.org






**OWASP**  
Open Web Application  
Security Project

# My Journey to IoT Security

# Microcontroller and Assembly Language

- 1986 Studied Electrical Engineering, Chulalongkorn University
- 1987 Worked Part-Time, Controllers Using Zilog Z80
- 1989 Was Apprenticed at Intronics, Using Intel 8048
- 1989 Designed Heat Exchanger Controller as a Senior Project, Using Intel 8031 (My Favorite 8051)

The 8051 Block Diagram



# Network Security

- 1995 Started Working at Information and Telecommunication Services (ITS) as Business Development
- Was Assigned to Market a Firewall, “Eagle Raptor”
- Started My Life in Information Security

# Embedded System and C/C++

- 2002 Started a Company, Structure and Composites, Embedded System Design for Bridge and Building Structure Monitoring
- 2004 First WiFi IP Based Bridge Structure Monitoring System
- 2004 Became a Special Instructor in Embedded System Design at Faculty of Engineering, Thammasat University
- 2006 My Company Went Broke
- 2007 Joined Incotec Automation (Thailand)
- 2009 Joined Chanwanich, Project Implementation on Smart Card, PLC and Information Security



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# Information Security Fundamental

# What is Security?

- “The quality or state of being secure—to be free from danger”
- A successful organization should have multiple layers of security in place:
  - Physical security
  - Personal security
  - Operations security
  - Communications security
  - Network security
  - Information security

# What is Information Security?

- The protection of information and its critical elements, including systems and hardware that use, store, and transmit that information
- Necessary tools: policy, awareness, training, education, technology

# Security Concepts

## *Security Concepts*

*Core*

*Confidentiality*

*Integrity*

*Availability*

*Authentication*

*Authorization*

*Accountability*

*Design*

*Need to Know*

*Least Privilege*

*Separation of Duties*

*Defense in Depth*

*Fail Safe / Fail Secure*

*Economy of Mechanisms*

*Complete Mediation*

*Open Design*

*Least Common Mechanisms*

*Psychological Acceptability*

*Weakest Link*

*Leveraging Existing Components*



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# Confidentiality-Integrity-Availability (CIA)


To ensure protection against unauthorized access to or use of confidential information



To ensure that information and vital services are accessible for use when required

To ensure the accuracy and completeness of information to protect business processes

# Security vs. Usability



# Security vs. Safety (General Usage)

- Security is concerned with malicious humans that actively search for and exploit weaknesses in a system.
- Safety is protection against mishaps that are unintended (such as accidents)



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# Why Secure IoT Ecosystems

# Problems of IoT Security

- Initial design was for private communication network then moved to IP network and later on the Internet
- Firmware updates are hard or nearly impossible after installations
- Started with basic security then found the security flaws and attached more complex security requirements later
- Low security devices from early design are still out there and used in compatible fall-back mode

# Flaw in Design

Home

Hacking

Tech

Deals

Cyber Attacks

Malware

Spying



# The Hacker News™

Security in a serious way

## Unpatchable Flaw in Modern Cars Allows Hackers to Disable Safety Features

Thursday, August 17, 2017    Mohit Kumar

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48

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749

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1.34k


Share

### Unpatchable Car Hack

<https://thehackernews.com/2017/08/car-safety-hacking.html>

# Flaw in Library

Welcome > Blog Home > Cloud Security > Bad Code Library Triggers Devil's Ivy Vulnerability in Millions of IoT Devices



by Tom Spring

July 19, 2017, 6:00 am

Tens of millions of products ranging from airport surveillance cameras, sensors, networking equipment and IoT devices are vulnerable to a flaw that allows attackers to remotely gain control over devices or crash them.

<https://threatpost.com/bad-code-library-triggers-devils-ivy-vulnerability-in-millions-of-iot-devices/126913/>

The vulnerability, dubbed Devil's Ivy, was identified by researchers at Senrio, who singled out high-end security cameras manufactured by Axis Communications. Senrio

## Top Stories

Silence Gang Borrows From Carbanak To Steal From Banks

November 1, 2017, 12:24 pm

Flaw in Google Bug Tracker Exposed Reports About Unpatched Vulnerabilities

October 30, 2017, 4:39 pm

Chain of 11 Bugs Takes Down Galaxy S8 at Mobile Pwn2Own

November 2, 2017, 1:35 pm

Popular 'Circle with Disney' Parental Control System Riddled With 23 Vulnerabilities

October 31, 2017, 5:37 pm

Rockwell Automation Patches Wireless Access Point against Krack

October 27, 2017, 12:23 pm

Emergency Oracle Patch Closes Bug Rated 10 in Severity

October 31, 2017, 12:48 pm


Taking HTTPS Denial to an Absurd Level

November 2, 2017, 2:01 pm

# Rises of Threats Target IoT Devices

## IoT devices at risk: malicious programs target the ‘Internet of Things’

Currently, over 6 billion of ‘smart’ devices exist globally. It was when the Mirai botnet emerged in 2016 that the whole world learned how dangerous such devices may become in the hands of cybercriminals. However, the history of malware attacking IoT devices began much earlier.




<https://securelist.com/honeypots-and-the-internet-of-things/78751/>


# Types of IoT Classified by Communication

- Client Type
  - Most of implementation
  - e.g. payment terminal, IP Camera (call back to server), Smart Cars
- Server Type
  - e.g. IP Camera (built-in web interface)
- Peer-to-Peer or Mesh


# Typical IoT Infrastructure




# Typical Attack: Fake Control Server




# Typical Attack: Attack on Device Open Ports




# Typical Attack: Attack on Server Open Ports




# Typical Attack: Steal Credential



# Typical Attack: Inject Bad Configuration or Firmware



# Typical Attack: Sniff Data on Private Network



# Other Attack Surface Areas → See OWASP

- Ecosystem
- Device Memory
- Device Physical Interfaces
- Device Web Interface
- Device Firmware
- Device Network Services
- Administrative Interface
- Local Data Storage
- Cloud Web Interface
- Third-party Backend APIs
- Update Mechanism
- Mobile Application
- Vendor Backend APIs
- Ecosystem Communication
- Network Traffic
- Authentication/Authorization
- Privacy
- Hardware (Sensors)

[https://www.owasp.org/index.php/IoT\\_Attack\\_Surface\\_Areas](https://www.owasp.org/index.php/IoT_Attack_Surface_Areas)

# OWASP Top 10 IoT Vulnerabilities 2014

- I1 Insecure Web Interface
- I2 Insufficient Authentication/Authorization
- I3 Insecure Network Services
- I4 Lack of Transport Encryption/Integrity Verification
- I5 Privacy Concerns
- I6 Insecure Cloud Interface
- I7 Insecure Mobile Interface
- I8 Insufficient Security Configurability
- I9 Insecure Software/Firmware
- I10 Poor Physical Security

# OWASP

## INTERNET OF THINGS

### VULNERABILITY CATEGORIES

# 10

## TOP 10



1

## Insecure Web Interface

covers IoT device administrative interfaces

### Obstacles



Default usernames  
and passwords



No account lockout

XSS, CSRF, SQLi  
vulnerabilities



### Solutions



Allow default usernames  
and password to be changed



Enable account lockout



Conduct web application  
assessments



## Insufficient Authentication/Authorization

covers all device interfaces and services

2



### Obstacles



Weak passwords



Password recovery mechanisms  
are insecure



No two-factor authentication  
available

### Solutions



Require strong, complex  
passwords



Verify that password recovery  
mechanisms are secure



Implement two-factor  
authentication where possible

# OWASP

## INTERNET OF THINGS

### VULNERABILITY CATEGORIES

# 10

## TOP

# 10



## Insecure Network Services

covers all network services including device, cloud, web and mobile

3



### Obstacles



Unnecessary ports are open



Ports exposed to the internet via UPnP



Network services vulnerable to denial of service

### Solutions



Minimize open network ports



Do not utilize UPnP



Review network services for vulnerabilities



## Obstacles

Sensitive information is passed in clear text

SSL/TLS is not available or not properly configured

Proprietary encryption protocols are used

## Solutions

Encrypt communication between system components

Maintain SSL/TLS implementations

Do not use proprietary encryption solutions

**Lack of Transport Encryption**  
covers all network services including device, cloud, web and mobile

4





5

## Privacy Concerns

covers all components of IoT solution



### Obstacles

- Too much personal information is collected
- Collected information is not properly protected
- End user is not given a choice to allow collection of certain types of data

### Solutions

- Minimize data collection
- Anonymize collected data
- Give end users the ability to decide what data is collected

# OWASP

## INTERNET OF THINGS

### VULNERABILITY CATEGORIES

# 10

## TOP

# 10



## Obstacles

Interfaces are not reviewed for security vulnerabilities

Weak passwords are present

No two-factor authentication is present

## Insecure Cloud Interface

covers cloud APIs or cloud-based web interfaces

6

## Solutions



Security assessments of all cloud interfaces



Implement two-factor authentication



Require strong, complex passwords

7

## Insecure Mobile Interface

covers mobile application interfaces



Weak passwords  
are present

### Obstacles



No two-factor authentication  
implemented



No account lockout  
mechanism



Implement account  
lockout after failed  
login attempts



Implement two-factor  
authentication



Require strong,  
complex passwords

### Solutions



## Insufficient Security Configurability

covers the IoT device

8

### Obstacles

Password security options are not available

Encryption options are not available

No option to enable security logging



### Solutions



Make security logging available



Allow the selection of encryption options



Notify end users in regards to security alerts



## 9 Insecure Software/Firmware

covers the IoT Device



### Obstacles

-  Update servers are not secured
-  Device updates transmitted without encryption
-  Device updates not signed

### Solutions

-  Sign updates
-  Verify updates before install
-  Secure update servers



## Poor Physical Security

covers the IoT device

10

### Obstacles

Unnecessary external ports like USB ports

Access to operating systems through remove media

Inability to limit administrative capabilities

### Solutions

Minimize external ports like USB ports

Properly protect operating system

Include ability to limit administrative capabilities





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# Secure IoT Devices That We Use

# Mirai Malware

- Malware that turns networked devices running Linux into remotely controlled "bots" that can be used as part of a botnet in large-scale network attacks
- Primarily targets online consumer devices such as IP cameras and home routers using a table of more than 60 common factory default usernames and passwords, and logs into them to infect them with the Mirai malware
- First found in August 2016
- Use in DDoS attacks
  - 20 September 2016 on the Krebs on Security site which reached 620 Gbit/s and 1 Tbit/s attack on French web host OVH
  - 21 October 2016 multiple major DDoS attacks in DNS services of DNS service provider Dyn
  - November 2016 attacks on Liberia's Internet infrastructure
- The source code for Mirai has been published in hacker forums as open-source

# What Can We Learn from Mirai Attacks?

- Do not use default passwords for all default usernames
- If possible, do not allow configuration interface from Internet side
- If the IoT devices are used only in the organization, do not expose to the public Internet
- If there is a need to use from the Internet, open only necessary ports and use non-default ports where possible

# Q&A

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