Attack Lab

CSE251, Spring 2019

Recitation 1: Wed, March 13th, 2019

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Reference: CMU 15-213: Intro to Computer Systems Fall 2015 Recitation 3 - Dhruven Shah, Ben Spinelli

Agenda

- Stack review
- Attack lab overview
 - Phases 1-3: Buffer overflow attacks
 - Phases 4-5: ROP attacks

Notices

Typo in pdf, Due date is Apr 8. Monday.


x86-64 Linux Memory Layout

not drawn to scale

Stack

Runtime stack (8MB limit)

- ■E. g., local variables
- Heap
 - Dynamically allocated as needed
 - ■When call malloc(), calloc(), new()
- Data
 - Statically allocated data
 - ■E.g., global vars, static vars, string constants
- Text / Shared Libraries
 - Executable machine instructions
 - ■Read-only



Hex Address


400000 000000

x86-64: Register Conventions

- Arguments passed in registers:
 - %rdi, %rsi, %rdx, %rcx, %r8, %r9
- Return value: %rax
- Callee-saved: %rbx, %r12, %r13, %r14, %rbp, %rsp
- Caller-saved: %rdi, %rsi, %rdx, %rcx, %r8, %r9, %rax, %r10, %r11
- Stack pointer: %rsp
- Instruction pointer: %rip

x86-64: The Stack

- Grows downward towards lower memory addresses
- %rsp points to top of stack



Buffer Overflow Stack Example #1

After call to gets

```
Stack Frame
for call echo
            f6
    32
       31
           30
39
    38
       37
           36
35
    34
       33
           32
    30
        39
           38
    36
       35
           34
           30
33
   32
       31
```

```
void echo()
{
    char buf[4];
    gets(buf);
}
echo:
subq $24, %rsp
movq %rsp, %rdi
call gets
...
}
```

call_echo:

```
unix>./bufdemo-nsp
Type a string:01234567890123456789012
01234567890123456789012
```

"01234567890123456789012\0"

Overflowed buffer, but did not corrupt state

Buffer Overflow Stack Example #2

After call to gets



```
void echo()
{
    char buf[4];
    gets(buf);
}
echo:
subq $24, %rsp
movq %rsp, %rdi
call gets
...
```

call_echo:

```
...
4006f1: callq 4006cf <echo>
4006f6: add $0x8,%rsp
...
```

buf **←**%rsp

```
unix>./bufdemo-nsp
Type a string:0123456789012345678901234
Segmentation fault
```

Buffer Overflow Stack Example #3

After call to gets



```
void echo()
{
    char buf[4];
    gets(buf);
}
echo:
subq $24, %rsp
movq %rsp, %rdi
call gets
...
```

call_echo:

```
...
4006f1: callq 4006cf <echo>
4006f6: add $0x8,%rsp
...
```

buf **←**%rsp

```
unix>./bufdemo-nsp
Type a string:012345678901234567890123
012345678901234567890123
```

Buffer Overflow Stack Example #3 Explained

After call to gets

Stack Frame for call_echo								
00	00	00	00					
00	40	06	00					
33	32	31	30					
39	38	37	36					
35	34	33	32					
31	30	39	38					
37	36	35	34					
33	32	31	30					

register_tm_clones:

```
400600:
        mov
                %rsp,%rbp
400603:
                %rax,%rdx
        mov
400606:
                $0x3f,%rdx
         shr
40060a:
         add
                %rdx,%rax
40060d:
         sar
                %rax
                400614
400610:
         jne
400612:
        pop
                %rbp
400613:
         retq
```

buf ← %rsp

"Returns" to unrelated code

Lots of things happen, without modifying critical state

Eventually executes retq back to main

Attack Lab Overview: Phases 1-3

Overview

- Exploit x86-64 by overwriting the stack
- Overflow a buffer, overwrite return address
- Execute injected code

Key Advice

- Brush up on your x86-64 conventions!
- Use objdump –d to determine relevant offsets
- Use GDB to determine stack addresses

objdump/GDB – example1 / reci 2

• Purpose: To predict outputs of sample programs by analyzing assembly codes.

- There are 3 unknown binary files.
- "\$ objdump –d ex1" command generates an assembly code for ex1.
- You can store it as a file by redirection.
 ex) \$ objdump -d ex1 > ex1_assembly

Buffer Overflows


Exploit strcpy
 vulnerability to overwrite
 important info on stack
 Important info on stack

• When this function returns, where will it begin executing?

Recall

ret:pop %rip

What if we want to inject new code to execute?



Attack Lab Overview: Phases 4-5

Overview

- Utilize return-oriented programming to execute arbitrary code
 - Useful when stack is non-executable or randomized
- Find gadgets, string together to form injected code

Key Advice

 Use mixture of pop & mov instructions + constants to perform specific task


ROP Example: Solution

Gadgets:

Address 1: mov %rbx, %rax; ret

Address 2: pop %rbx; ret

```
void foo(char *input){
   char buf[32];
   ...
   strcpy (buf, input);
   return;
}
```



Gadget example

In rtarget

A. Encodings of movq instructions

movq S, D

Source	Destination D								
S	%rax	%rcx	%rdx	%rbx	%rsp	%rbp	%rsi	%rdi	
%rax	48 89 c0	48 89 c1	48 89 c2	48 89 c3	48 89 c4	48 89 c5	48 89 c6	48 89 c7	
%rcx	48 89 c8	48 89 c9	48 89 ca	48 89 cb	48 89 cc	48 89 cd	48 89 ce	48 89 cf	
%rdx	48 89 d0	48 89 d1	48 89 d2	48 89 d3	48 89 d4	48 89 d5	48 89 d6	48 89 d7	
%rbx	48 89 d8	48 89 d9	48 89 da	48 89 db	48 89 dc	48 89 dd	48 89 de	48 89 df	
%rsp	48 89 e0	48 89 e1	48 89 e2	48 89 e3	48 89 e4	48 89 e5	48 89 e6	48 89 e7	
%rbp	48 89 e8	48 89 e9	48 89 ea	48 89 eb	48 89 ec	48 89 ed	48 89 ee	48 89 ef	
%rsi	48 89 f0	48 89 f1	48 89 f2	48 89 f3	48 89 f4	48 89 f5	48 89 f6	48 89 f7	
%rdi	48 89 f8	48 89 f9	48 89 fa	48 89 fb	48 89 fc	48 89 fd	48 89 fe	48 89 ff	

Tools

- objdump –d
 - View byte code and assembly instructions, determine stack offsets
- ./hex2raw
 - Pass raw ASCII strings to targets
- gdb
 - Step through execution, determine stack addresses
- gcc -c
 - Generate object file from assembly language file

More Tips

- Draw stack diagrams
- Memo what data is assigned register
- Be careful of byte ordering (little endian)

Questions?