# **BEAST TITLE TO-FILL**

Yang Shichu Huazhong University of Science and Technology TO-FILL Shu Yi Huazhong University of Science and Technology TO-FILL Su Haochen Sichuan University TO-FILL

Li Yucong Shandong University TO-FILL Liao Haicheng University of Electronic Science and Technology of China TO-FILL

#### **ABSTRACT**

Transport Layer Security (TLS) is an protocol that provides communication security over networks. However, there is a flaw in TLS 1.0 where the initial vectors for block ciphers are predictable. The BEAST attack, with some prerequisites and efforts, allows attackers in the middle to decrypt those encrypted messages without knowing the key. This paper will demonstrate the procedures of the BEAST attack, and propose methods in simulation and vulnerability detection.

## **Keywords**

BEAST attack, TLS flaws, CBC exploits, vulnerability detection  $\,$ 

#### 1. INTRODUCTION

Transport Layer Security (TLS) has several versions. The specification for TLS 1.0 is RFC 2246[1].

#### 2. BACKGROUND

## 2.1 A glance at TLS

TLS protocols

## 2.2 CBC in block ciphers

CBC is one of the modes of operation used in block ciphers.

Supposing that  $P_1, P_2, \dots P_n$  are the plaintext blocks, with a initial vector IV, we have:

$$C_1 = E_k(P_1 \oplus IV)$$
  

$$C_i = E_k(P_i \oplus C_{i-1})(i \ge 2)$$

to obtain ciphertext blocks  $C_1, C_2, \cdots, C_n$ .




Figure 1: CBC encryptor

#### 3. THREAT MODEL

## 3.1 Prerequisites for attackers

• TO-DO

4.

#### 5. DEMONSTRATION

## 6. FEASIBILITY AND DEFENSE

### 6.1 Feasibility

While BEAST attacks are theoretically feasible, with the enhancement of security features of browsers and other clients, BEAST attacks are less and less practical for an attacker to exploit.

#### 6.1.1 CORS

CORS is a group of policies to regulate the contents of crossorigin requests. An attacker cannot make a request to other sites using JavaScript. If an attacker wants to send some requests to Facebook, they will be rejected by browser's policies.

That is to say, when attackers want the clients to forge a request to websites with credentials. These requests will not be sent. Thus, BEAST attacks will not work any longer.

#### 6.1.2 WebSocket mask

WebSocket is not subject to CORS policies, and it can be also wrapped by TLS. It seems that WebSocket will be a good choice to implement BEAST attack.

However, in modern clients, WebSocket payloads are masked by a value shown in 2.

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0001 = Opcode: Text (1) 1 = Mask: True																										
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Figure 2: WebSocket mask

Besides, WebSocket prepends extra bits before real payload. It is still hard to control the block boundary.

The mask makes it hard for attackers to do BEAST attacks, since the attack requires the first sent block mostly controllable by attackers.

#### **6.2** Defense

BEAST attacks make use of a flaw in the specification of TLS 1.0, and the attack only works for block ciphers. That is to say, stream ciphers with TLS 1.0 are not vulnerable to BEAST attacks.

However, TLS 1.0 is still vulnerable to other attacks when using stream ciphers (e.g. RC4). Therefore, a much more direct way is just to abandon TLS 1.0, and update to later TLS versions.

Many modern browsers and clients have also limited users to browse those sites with TLS 1.0 enabled alone. This kind of action will boost organizations to update their websites TLS versions. Today there are only few sites supporting TLS 1.0.

#### 7. DETECTION

We will propose a method to detect BEAST vulnerability of a server, together with a Python script which is easy to use.

At the stage of TLS handshake, a cipher suite will be selected through steps:

- 1. (Client Hello) Client sent a list of accepted cipher suites.
- (Server Hello) Server chose a best accepted cipher suite, or a handshake failure occured.

Based on this, a scanner could change the list of cipher suites to enumerate all cipher suites that the server will accept.

Figure 3: Negotiation on the cipher suite

The server is vulnerable to BEAST attacks if it accepts TLS 1.0 handshake and support cipher suites with CBC modes.

```
python scan.py host port
```

The openss1 utility is able to start a TLS server with many options.

```
openssl s_server \
-CAfile ca_cert.pem \
-cert server_cert.pem \
-key server_key.pem \
-HTTP -port 5008 -tls1
```

```
siger@siger-laptop ~/b/detection (main)> python scan.py 10.0.10.121 5008
Cipher suites:
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA <- VULNERABLE TO BEAST
TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA <- VULNERABLE TO BEAST
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA <- VULNERABLE TO BEAST
TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA <- VULNERABLE TO BEAST
TLS_CDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA <- VULNERABLE TO BEAST
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA <- VULNERABLE TO BEAST
TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA <- VULNERABLE TO BEAST
```

Figure 4: Detection output on a TLS 1.0 server

## 8. REFERENCES

 C. Allen and T. Dierks. The TLS Protocol Version 1.0. RFC 2246, Jan. 1999.

# **APPENDIX**