IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE DEMOCRATIC SOCIALIST REPUBLIC OF SRI LANKA

In the matter of an application for mandates in the nature of writ of Certiorari under and in terms of Article 140 of the Constitution of the Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka.

 Galagedarage Dayananda, alias Dayananda Galagedara, No. 75/70, Sandun Uyana, Mabulgoda, Pannipitiya.

PETITIONER

CA No. CA/Writ/0382/2020

V.

- Mrs. Malani Abeywardena Ranathunga, Chairman,
 Debt Conciliation Board,
 No. 35A, Dr. N.M. Perera Mawatha, Colombo 08.
- T.D.K. Pujitha Thilakawardena, Member, Debt Conciliation Board, No. 35A, Dr. N.M. Perera Mawatha, Colombo 08.
- K.M. Karunarathna, Member, Debt Conciliation Board, No. 35A, Dr. N.M. Perera Mawatha,

Colombo 08.

 K.P. Bandula, Member, Debt Conciliation Board, No. 35A, Dr. N.M. Perera Mawatha, Colombo 08.

- K.A.P. Rajakaruna, Member, Debt Conciliation Board, No. 35A, Dr. N.M. Perera Mawatha, Colombo 08.
- 6. Haththimuni Sarath Maithripala De Silva, No.2/10, 1st lane, Mahamegawaththa, Maharagama.
- 7. Dadigamuwage Mallika Rathnaseeli, No. 218, Hiripitiya, Pannipitiya.
- 8. Debt Conciliation Board, No. 35A, Dr. N.M. Perera Mawatha, Colombo 08.

RESPONDENTS

BEFORE : M. Sampath K. B. Wijeratne J. & M. Ahsan, R. Marikar J.

COUNSEL : Warsha De Silva for the Petitioner.

P. S. Amarasinghe for the 6th Respondent.

P. Ranwala for the 7th Respondent.

WRITTEN SUBMISSION ON: 04.12.2023 (By the Petitioner) 08.01.2024 (By the 7th Respondent)

DECIDED ON : 09.02.2024

M. Sampath K. B. Wijeratne J.

Introduction

The Petitioner instituted these proceedings seeking *inter-alia*, a writ of *certiorari* quashing the decision of the 1st to 5th Respondents, namely, the Chairman and the Members of the Debt Conciliation Board dated 7th August 2019 ('X 7'). The 7th Respondent filed a statement of objection seeking to dismiss the Petitioner's application on the ground that the order marked 'X 7' of the Debt Conciliation Board is valid and correct. The other Respondents did not file objections and the Petitioner filed a counter affidavit in response to the objections filed by the 7th Respondent.

The matter was fixed for argument once the pleadings were complete. When the matter was taken up for argument on the 19th October 2023, the 6th and 7th Respondents and the Petitioner agreed to dispose the argument by way of written submissions.

Thereafter, both parties filed their respective written submissions and the matter was fixed for the judgement of Court.

Analysis

Admittedly, the 7th Respondent is the original owner of the land in issue. As it was submitted by the Petitioner, the 7th Respondent had agreed to transfer the subject matter to the 6th Respondent for a sum of Rs. 1,000,000/- and entered into the agreement to sell No. 181 dated 10th October 2001 ('X 2'). Subsequently, the deed of transfer No. 312 dated 18th November 2002 ('X 3') was executed in favour of the 6th Respondent for the agreed-upon value of Rs. 1,000,000.

However, according to the 7th Respondent, the 7th Respondent borrowed a sum of Rs. 1,250,000/- from the 6th Respondent for a specific need and as security, executed the aforementioned deed 'X 3' in favour of the 6th Respondent. Nevertheless, deed 'X 3' reflects a consideration of only Rs. 1,000,000/-.

Admittedly, even after the execution of deed 'X 3', the 7th Respondent retained possession of the land. The 7th Respondent asserts that her continued

occupancy is justified as deed 'X 3' served as security for the funds borrowed from the 6th Respondent. Conversely, the Petitioner contends that the 6th Respondent permitted the 7th Respondent to remain on the property until she secured alternative housing.

According to the 7th Respondent, in 2006, after the execution of the deed of transfer 'X 3,' the 7th Respondent required Rs. 500,000/- for a specific purpose, and the 6th Respondent couldn't provide that amount. Consequently, the 6th and 7th Respondents decided to sell and transfer the concerned land. Despite their efforts, they were unable to find a buyer for the property. Subsequently, the 6th Respondent reached out to the Petitioner, who is not only a neighbour but also a known broker to the 7th Respondent. As per the 7th Respondent, the Petitioner initially committed to providing Rs. 500,000/- but later, upon communicating with the 6th Respondent, raised the amount to Rs. 1,250,000/- out of the agreed Rs. 1,250,000/-, and for the remaining Rs. 750,000/-, executed Mortgage Bond No. 221 on 15th September, 2006.

The parties subsequently agreed to sell the property for Rs. 6,500,000/-, and allocate Rs. 3,500,000/- to the 7th Respondent, Rs. 3,000,000/- to the 6th Respondent, and a 3% commission to the Petitioner. The 1st to 5th Respondents, in their impugned order dated 7th August 2019 ('X7'), considered evidence of the 6th Respondent that the Petitioner had transferred Rs. 500,000/- to the 6th Respondent's account on the day the deed was executed. The Petitioner also deposited Rs. 100,000/- into the 6th Respondent's account during the pendency of the application before the Debt Conciliation Board.

The Notary who executed deed No. 1828 ('X 4') attested that the consideration of Rs. 1,250,000/- was paid before him. However, the Petitioner himself asserts that the agreed-upon consideration was Rs. 2,000,000/-, yet, he could only provide Rs. 1,250,000/-. In lieu of the outstanding Rs. 750,000/-, Mortgage Bond No. 221, dated 15th September 2006 ('X 5') concerning another property, was executed in favour of the 6th Respondent. In contrast, the 7th Respondent contended that the Petitioner paid only Rs. 500,000/- out of the agreed Rs. 1,250,000/-. Both positions, according to the 1st to 5th Respondents, do not align with the statement in the attestation of the deed regarding the consideration for the transaction. Accordingly, the conclusion drawn is that, based on the evidence of both parties, the statement regarding the payment of consideration in deed 'X4' cannot be accepted as true.

The Petitioner contends that the 6th and 7th Respondents, in their application to the Debt Conciliation Board, did not contest the validity of deed No. 1828 ('X 4'). It was further argued that in the application ('X 1'), the 6th and 7th Respondents identified the deed 'X 4' as an outright transfer. However, in Part V of the application to the Debt Conciliation Board ('X 1'), the 6th and 7th Respondents specifically mentioned deed No. 1828 ('X 4') as the deed in issue. Consequently, it is evident that the 6th and 7th Respondents sought relief from the Debt Conciliation Board concerning deed No. 1828 ('X 4'). No relief was sought regarding Mortgage Bond No. 221 ('X 5'), as asserted by the Petitioner.

Therefore, the Petitioner's claim that the 1st to 5th Respondents, the Chairman, and the Members of the Debt Conciliation Board, awarded reliefs not prayed for by the 6th and 7th Respondents lacks merit. Additionally, despite the Petitioner's assertion that the 6th and 7th Respondents described deed No. 1828 ('X 4') as an outright transfer in their application to the Debt Conciliation Board, it is evident from application 'X 1' that they explicitly characterized it as a conditional transfer.

The Petitioner contends that the 6th and 7th Respondents lack the *locus standi* to file an application under Section 17 of the Debt Conciliation Ordinance. This argument is grounded on the assertion that the 6th and 7th Respondents are not debtors of the Petitioner; instead, the 6th Respondent is considered a secured creditor of the Petitioner under Mortgage Bond No. 221 ('X 5'). Additionally, since the 7th Respondent is not a party to the Mortgage Bond, she, too, lacks the legal standing to bring the application before the Debt Conciliation Board.

However, it is important to note, as previously stated in this judgment, that the application by the 6th and 7th Respondents to the Debt Conciliation Board ('X1') is not based on Mortgage Bond No. 221 ('X 5') but on conditional transfer No. 1828 ('X 4'), to which the 7th Respondent is a party. Consequently, the Petitioner's submissions on this matter are deemed to be without merit.

As mentioned earlier in this judgment, even following the execution of deed No. 1828 ('X 4') on 15th September, 2006, the 7th Respondent retained possession. On the very same day the transfer deed 1828 was executed, the Petitioner entered into a lease agreement with the 7th Respondent. It is my opinion that the execution of the lease agreement was a strategic move intended to bypass the reality that deed of transfer No. 1828 ('X 4') was, in fact, executed to secure the funds lent to the 7th Respondent.

Even though the 7th Respondent signed deed of transfer No. 1828 ('X 4') as a transferor, it's worth noting that the 7th Respondent had already transferred her rights to the 6th Respondent through deed of transfer No. 312 ('X 3') executed on 18th November, 2002.

This sequence of events strongly indicates that deed of transfer No. 312 ('X3') was also executed to secure the loan advanced to the 7th Respondent by the 6th Respondent, as asserted by the Respondents, rather than being an outright transfer, as argued by the Petitioner.

The 1st to 5th Respondents have taken into account the discrepancy between the stated consideration for the land and its assessed value at the time. The Respondents presented valuation report marked 'P 8', indicating a land value of one perch extent ranging from Rs. 118,000/- to 200,000/-. In contrast, the Petitioner submitted valuation report '© 17' valuing the entire land at Rs. 2,150,000/-. Consequently, the Petitioner asserts a perch value of Rs. 65,013/-, significantly lower than the value in 'P 8'. The 1st to 5th Respondents stated in their decision that the valuer of '© 17' did not even physically inspect the land. Additionally, despite the Petitioner's claim of an agreed consideration of 2,000,000/-, the deed No. 1828 ('X 4') reflects a consideration of only 1,250,000/-. The 1st to 5th Respondents concluded that the actual land value surpasses the face value of deed ('X 4') or the purported agreed consideration by the Petitioner.

The Petitioner challenges decision of the 1st to 5th Respondents ('X 7') in this Court, asserting that it is *ultra-vires*, contains errors on the face of the record, lacks reasoning, and lacks a legal basis. Accordingly, the Petitioner contends that the decision 'X 7' holds no legal force or validity.

In light of the above analysis, I am of the view that the 1st to 5th Respondents in their impugned order ('X 7') has given sufficient reasons for their conclusion. Moreover, the aforementioned order does not contain material errors on the face of the record. Consequently, the order is not *ultra-vires*.

Conclusion

In view of the reasoning provided in this judgement in respect of the matter in issue, I hold that the Petitioner has failed to establish legitimate grounds that warrants issuing the writ prayed for in paragraph (b) of the prayer of the Petition.

Consequently, I hold that the Petitioner's application must fail. Application dismissed. No costs.

JUDGE OF THE COURT OF APPEAL

M. Ahsan. R. Marikar J.

I Agree.

JUDGE OF THE COURT OF APPEAL