

On Covert Channels using Quic Protocol Headers

Implementing a covert channel in high-entropy fields of the QUIC protocol

David Cheeseman

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In this paper a covert channel exploiting headers in the QUIC protocol is described and demonstrated. Many header values are randomly chosen and are specified to require high entropy values for security considerations. These headers provide a storage channel for high entropy data such as encrypted or compressed data to be transmitted in ways that evade detection. The primary challenge of developing such a covert channel is ensuring all headers used conform to the entropy requirements of the protocol specification. This includes ensuring that key distribution and encrypted packets are indistinguishable from random high entropy values. An implementation of this covert channel was constructed and demonstrated. Detection and disruption vectors are also enumerated.

Introduction

The Quick UDP Internet Connections (QUIC) protocol was proposed by J. Roskind as an alternative to TCP. The goals of the protocol were to make an alternative protocol which could be deployed broadly, reduce head-of-line blocking, reduce round trip time (RTT), improve efficiency of mobile device connections, reduce congestion from sources and sinks with asymmetric performance, comparable privacy assurance to TLS, reliable and scalable server and client resource requirements, reducing bandwidth, reducing packet count, support of reliable transport of multiplex streams, efficient demux/mux for proxies, and to reuse or revise existing protocols [1].

To do this, QUIC operates directly over UDP, which allows it to avoid some of TCP's initial connection setup delays. QUIC uses encryption to securely establish a connection between a client and a server. It combines the handshake and encryption setup into a single step to reduce latency. Once connected, QUIC can transmit data using multiplexing allowing one to send multiple streams of data simultaneously over a single connection. QUIC also includes built-in mechanisms for error correction and congestion control, ensuring reliable and

efficient data transfer even in less stable network conditions such as mobile device connections.

Motivations

While QUIC protocol connections are often protected with TLS 1.3 [4] some nation states block foundational features of TLS 1.3 such as ESNI [7]. Additionally, nation state actors and organizations implement TLS inspection firewalls or proxies [9] or execute deliberate MITM attacks by creating their own certificate authority and requiring its installation on assets in the scope of their interest. Such techniques can be used legitimately for data loss prevention as well as censorship or acts of espionage. An example of an attempted MITM attack was conducted in 2014 when China replaced legitimate certificates with self-signed certificates [8]. This attempt did not use a trusted CA and was transparent, but proper implementations of TLS inspection will not be apparent to the user.

In this context, we cannot rely on protocols like TLS 1.3 which depends on verifying the trustworthy nature of certificates used to negotiate and encrypted connection. We must assume all packets are visible in clear text to a passive or active warden. To do this we need to hide communications in fields which a passive warden would not be able to distinguish from benign traffic and in a way where manipulation by an active warden would cause disruptions to legitimate traffic to an unacceptable degree.

Overview

The QUIC protocol is defined in RFC 9000 [2], RFC 8999 [3], RFC 9001 [4], RFC 9002 [5], and QUIC v2 extends these specifications in RFC 9369[6]. In particular RFC 9000 defines the base protocol which provides us a reference to what fields in protocol headers may be useful for a covert channel.

Connection ID

Each connection in the QUIC protocol has a unique connection ID to ensure connections can be correlated even if there are changes in lower protocols such as UDP and IP. This field requires that related connections cannot be correlated by their connection IDs [2, Section 5.1] and, in the context of address validation, that connection IDs must have at least 64 bits of entropy [2, Section 8.1].

Address Validation Token

Address validation tokens are an optional field that can be provided by a server and used in validating subsequent connections [2, Section 8.1.3]. An address validation token is required to have 128 bits of entropy to make it difficult to guess.

Path Challenge Frames

A path challenge frame can be sent by a client to check if a path is reachable. The Data field of a path challenge frame is required to have 64 bits of entropy to make it difficult to guess [2, Section 19.17].

Related Work

A review of literature and media at the time of writing did not show any existing QUIC based covert channel implementations. Use of QUIC as a covert channel has been proposed before, though in the context of enabling QUIC services as a covert channel operating on ports that have alternative uses. Specifically, the use of SMB over QUIC was proposed by Zdrnja as a covert channel on port 443 stood up by a malicious actor to exploit the legitimate use of port 443 for HTTP/3 connections [10].

Implementation

Of the available high-entropy fields, the connection ID is the only one explicitly required. We can meet the high-entropy requirements of the connection ID by encrypting all communications.

Keys for encryption are ideally provided out of band (OOB) which would allow for all data transmitted to meet the entropy requirements and would prevent a man in the middle (MITM) attack.

Without an OOB distributed key a key exchange mechanism is proposed, where only high-entropy parameters to the encryption scheme are exchanged, and low-entropy values are agreed upon ahead of time by the client and server.

With keys established through OOB or key exchange, all further communication is encrypted and connection IDs are replaced with chunks of the encrypted payloads. Several connections are then made to transfer the chunks of the encrypted payloads which are saved by the recipient in a buffer indexed by the sender's address until a successful decryption is achieved.

Base Implementation

The implemented covert channel uses the aioquic python library by Jeremy Lainé [12]. This library implements a QUIC based HTTP server and client which provided a foundational base to build the proposed covert channel.

Encryption Algorithms

In this implementation RSA [11] was selected based on its ubiquity in public/private key encryption. Block encryption was conducted using PKCS1_OAEP and AES.

While OOB key exchange is preferred to mitigate the risk of MITM, attack, for public keys exchanged ahead of covert communication only the N modulus is exchanged, with RSA bit strength and public exponent agreed to ahead of time as 4096 and 65537, respectively. The N modulus is also only exchanged as a binary big-endian encoding. The N modulus being high entropy itself, it can be used in connection IDs and satisfy the entropy requirements, making it indistinguishable from benign traffic making it harder to detect the covert channel.

Payload Construction

In this implementation 4 commands were established for use and are described in the table below:

Command	Command Byte	Description
Message	m	Used to send plaintext messages between endpoints
File	f	Used to signal the decrypted bytes represent a file
Command	c	Used to signal a remote command to execute and to queue stdout/stderr
Keep Alive	k	Used to maintain encrypted channel synchronization to allow receipt of other commands

Each command is pre-pended with the command byte. The remaining bytes are then populated with the message, file bytes, or command bytes.

The payload is then constructed by generating a random initialization vector (IV) and generating a random AES key. The AES key is encrypted with the public RSA key using PKCS1_OAEP and the plaintext message is compressed then encrypted with the AES key. The final payload P is then the ciphertext C pre-pended with the encrypted AES key E_{aes} and the random IV :

$$P = (IV, E_{aes}, C)$$

Key Exchange

Out of Bound Key Distribution

In OOB key distribution, the client obtains the server's covert channel public key (which is different from the server's TLS key) by other means. The client then loads the public key upon starting of the covert channel tool and can send a copy of their public key encrypted by the server's public key. The server then responds with a keep alive message to confirm receipt of the public key which upon successful decryption by the client validates the server has received their key.

Covert Channel Key Exchange

If an out of bound key cannot be exchanged, the covert channel can be used to distribute public keys in the connection IDs. In this key exchange the client and server generate random RSA keys indexed by the IP address of the host or client. The server will maintain a pool of RSA keys generated in a key generation thread and stored in a thread safe queue.

Upon initial connection the client will set the connection ID to the first 8 bytes of their N modulus and the server will pull a new RSA key from the queue and send the first 8 bytes of its N modulus. The server and client will continue sending 8-byte chunks of their N modulus values until their receive buffers have sufficient bytes to reconstruct a public key using the agreed upon bit strength and public exponent. A keep alive message is then encrypted and transmitted by both client and server which will have an expected constant size. Upon receipt of the expected number of bytes a successful decryption of the keep alive message confirms the key exchange was successful.

Such a key exchange requires the server use a different RSA key for every connection since using a common RSA key would result in the same N modulus bytes being transmitted for all new connections which would break the requirements for the connection ID to have 64 bits of entropy [2, Section 8.1],

This key exchange adds risk because an active warden could swap out the transmitted N modulus values with their own and insert themselves between the client and server. This risk is mitigated by the high entropy nature of the N modulus and encrypted keep alive messages making them indistinguishable from benign traffic, requiring an active warden to treat all connections as potential covert communications and executing a MITM attack attempt on each connection which would incur significant resource expenditure to implement and slow or disrupt communications.

Covert Channel Operation

After key exchange has been completed, the client can construct payloads and send them to the server. In the absence of any commands that require a response,

or messages or files queued by the server operator, the server will encrypt keep alive messages to maintain cryptographic sync with the client. Both the server and the client will treat every new connection ID as the next portion of a payload and attempt decryption. The decryption will fail if the entire payload has not been transmitted and the client or server will then continue to receive connection IDs and host IDs until a successful decryption is achieved.

Bandwidth Calculation

In the current implementation, each connection ID can encode 8 bytes of encrypted data per connection. However, RFC 9000 only specifies that the connection ID must have at least 64 bits of entropy [2, Section 8.1] but allows for connection ID sizes to exceed 8 bytes up to 160 bytes in the new connection id frame [2, Section 19.15]:

```
NEW_CONNECTION_ID Frame {
    Type (i) = 0x18,
    Sequence Number (i),
    Retire Prior To (i),
    Length (8),
    Connection ID (8..160),
    Stateless Reset Token (128),
}
```

Since the length of the connection ID is explicitly communicated in the new connection ID frame, a client and server could configure larger values than 8 bytes to facilitate a higher bandwidth channel.

Given the above, we define a value C_r for the connection rate in connections per second which also accounts for latency between the client and server. We then define L_{cid} for the length in bytes per connection. Finally, we define a simple product of these values provides the total raw bandwidth of the channel:

$$BW_{raw} = C_r L_{cid}$$


That only describes the bandwidth of encrypted payloads, however. For each payload there is overhead provided by the initialization vector, the encrypted AES key, which is either 128, 256, 384, and 512 bytes for 1024-, 2048-, 3072-, and 4096-bit RSA respectively, plus the compressed encrypted payload length. The larger the payload the less overhead this represents, but it does represent a geometric reduction of the total bandwidth. To quantify this, we can determine the fraction of data in the total payloads that is the encrypted message by defining B_{rsa} as the bit-strength of the RSA key, B_{iv} for the size of the IV, and M_l as the size of the message and R_c as the compression ratio expressed as a value between 0 and 1. We can then combine it with the previous function to get final bandwidth:

$$BW = \frac{C_r L_{cid} M_c}{\frac{B_{rsa}}{8} + B_{iv} + R_c M_c}$$

Variable	Description	Variable	Description
BW	Effective Bandwidth	B_{iv}	Size of IV
C_r	Connections/sec	B_{rsa}	RSA bit strength
L_{cid}	CID Size in Bytes	R_c	Compression Ratio [0,1]
M_c	Uncompressed Message Size		

If we fix the AES IV size to 16 bytes, assume a compression ratio of 1 (uncompressed) and the bit-strength of RSA to 4096 we can plot a 3d graph of the relationship between connection rate and the real bandwidth of the covert channel in Figure 1.

QUIC Connection ID Based Covert Channel Bandwidth



In the plot we can see that as the message size grows the overhead from IV and B_{rsa} is diminished. Additionally, we can see the dominant affect connection rate can have on the covert channel's overall bandwidth.

Limitations

Synchronization Disruption

An active warden could swap out any connection ID during the use of the covert channel to break the encryption sync between the client and server. Future work is needed to determine a synchronization protocol to mitigate against this risk.

Single Connection

The current implementation also depends on having only one connection opened between the client and server at a time. This may be a reasonable limitation since the goal of QUIC is to reduce the number of connections to a single connection between a client and server and leverage multiplexing to allow access to multiple resources over a single connection.

Detection and Mitigation

Statistical Analysis of Odd Numbered Connection IDs

Specific to key exchange done in-band because the N modulus will be an odd number, statistical analysis of the first 128, 256, 384, and 512 bytes for 1024-, 2048-, 3072-, and 4096-bit RSA respectively will show a statistically significant increase in the prevalence of odd numbers. This would then signal to a passive warden that this covert channel technique is being used.

This detection risk is not applicable to OOB key distribution.

Conclusion

In conclusion the connection ID presents a viable vector for use as a covert channel. Its high entropy nature makes it ideal for sending encrypted payloads including the public modulus of RSA public keys if out of band key distribution is not possible. This provides a channel for use when conventional means of encrypting data is compromised by techniques such as TLS inspection. Even if a passive warden can see the connection IDs being exchanged the use of high entropy encrypted payloads for CIDs will make the covert channel traffic indistinguishable from benign traffic.

References

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