## Problem7: CPA Game

In our solution, we just consider the first block of CBC.

• i = 1: Victor chooses  $m_{1,0} = 0^n$  and  $m_{1,1} = 0^n$ . After Alice's encryption, Victor obtains  $c_1 = c_{1,0} = c_{1,1} = (IV||E(IV))$ 

After the first iteration, we know IV and E(IV)

• i = 2: Victor chooses  $m_{2,0} = 0^n$  and  $m_{2,1} = IV \oplus E(IV)$ . After Alice's encryption, Victor obtains two possible  $c_2$  corresponding to  $m_{2,0}$  and  $m_{2,1}$ 

$$c_{2,0} = (E(IV)||E^{2}(IV)),$$
  
 $c_{2,1} = (E(IV)||E(IV))$ 

Because Victor already knows E(IV), he can realise the ciphertext  $c_2$  sent to him is the encryption of  $m_{2,0}$  or  $m_{2,1}$ . In other words, he knows exactly which is the bit of b.

## **CPA Game Generalize**

Notation:

1. Given a message M of the  $i^{th}$  query for bit b:

$$M_{i,\,b} = \{m_1,m_2,...,m_k \ : \ m_j \ \in \ F_2^n\}$$

We call the  $j^{th}$  block ( $m_i$ ) of the  $i^{th}$  message ( $M_{i,\,b}$ ) as  $M_{i,\,b}[j]$ 

2. Given a ciphertext C of the  $i^{th}$  query for bit b:

$$C_{i, b} = \{c_0, c_1, ..., c_k : c_j \in F_2^n\}$$

We call the  $j^{th}$  block  $(c_i)$  of the  $i^{th}$  ciphertext  $(C_{i,b})$  as  $C_{i,b}[j]$  or  $C_i[j]$ 

From the property of Alice encryption, we have:  $C_i[0] = C_{i-1}[k]$  and  $C_1[0] = IV$ 

We can generalize for any 2 sequential query with message M of k blocks ( $k \ge 1$ ).

• For any  $i^{th}$  query, Victor send:

$$M_i = M_{i,0} = M_{i,1} = \{M_i [1] \parallel ... \parallel M_i [k-1] \parallel M_i [k]\}$$

Victor will receive:  $C_i = C_{i,0} = C_{i,1}$ 

$$C_i = \{C_i [0] \parallel ... \parallel C_i [k-1] \parallel C_i [k]\}$$

• For the  $(i+1)^{th}$  query, Victor modifies the 1st block the message  $M_{i+1}$ :

$$M_{i+1,\,1}[1]=C_i[k]\oplus C_i[k-1]\oplus M_i[k]$$

$$M_{i+1,\,0}[1]\neq M_{i+1,\,1}[1]$$

Then, Victor has two possible of  $C_{i+1}[1]$ :

$$C_{i+1, 0}[1] = E(C_{i+1}[0] \oplus M_{i+1, 0}[1])$$
  
=  $E(C_i[k] \oplus M_{i+1, 0}[1])$ 

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\begin{split} C_{i+1,\,1}[1] &= E(C_{i+1}[0] \oplus M_{i+1,\,1}[1]) \\ &= E(C_i[k] \oplus M_{i+1,\,1}[1]) \\ &= E(C_i[k] \oplus C_i[k] \oplus C_i[k-1] \oplus M_i[k]) \\ &= E(C_i[k-1] \oplus M_i[k]) \\ &= C_i[k] \end{split}
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Because Victor knew  $C_i[k]$ , based on the value of  $C_{i+1}[1]$ , Victor can realise whether the ciphertext  $C_{i+1}$  was created using  $M_{i+1,\,0}$  or  $M_{i+1,\,1}$ . Therefore, Victor knows exactly the value of bit b.