

ECN 594: Midterm Exam

February 9, 2026

Instructions:

- You have **70 minutes**
- You may bring a calculator and notes on a two-sided cheat-sheet (letter-size paper)
- Please be neat. If your work is too messy it will not be graded.
- Be sure to show your working.
- This is a long exam, so there are lots of ways to get points. If you get stuck, move on!
- Good luck!

Name: _____

Question:	1	2	3	4	Total
Points:	30	30	20	20	100
Score:					

1. Short Answer Questions (30 points)

1. For each question, write either:

- a number or formula
- one of: True, False, or NEI (Not Enough Information)
- a brief definition or explanation (one sentence)

(a) (3 points) A monopolist faces constant elasticity demand with $\varepsilon = -4$ and has marginal cost $c = 15$. What is the optimal price?

(a) _____

(b) (3 points) Write the Berry inversion formula that relates market shares to mean utilities in the logit model.

(b) _____

(c) (3 points) True, False, or NEI: Adding demographic interactions to a logit model fully solves the IIA problem.

(c) _____

(d) (3 points) What is the economic interpretation of the price coefficient α in the logit demand model?

(d) _____

(e) (3 points) True, False, or NEI: If marginal cost increases, a monopolist with linear demand will raise price by exactly the same amount as the cost increase.

(e) _____

(f) (3 points) True, False, or NEI: Under a two-part tariff, setting the per-unit price equal to marginal cost maximizes total surplus.

(f) _____

(g) (3 points) Name one reason why the “BLP instruments” (characteristics of other products) help identify the price coefficient.

(g) _____

(h) (3 points) True, False, or NEI: In a self-selection problem, the firm can extract the entire surplus from low-type consumers.

(h) _____

(i) (3 points) What is “versioning” in the context of price discrimination?

(i) _____

(j) (3 points) True, False, or NEI: Consumer surplus in the logit model can be computed using the log-sum formula, which equals the “inclusive value” divided by $|\alpha|$.

(j) _____

2. Demand Estimation (30 points)

2. Consider a market with 4 differentiated products. The logit demand model is:

$$u_{ij} = \delta_j + \alpha p_j + \varepsilon_{ij}$$

where $\alpha = -0.4$ is the price coefficient.

The following data are observed:

Product	Price (p_j)	Mean Utility (δ_j)
1	\$15	3.0
2	\$12	2.5
3	\$18	3.5
4	\$10	2.0

- (a) (8 points) Compute $v_j = \delta_j + \alpha p_j$ for each product. Then compute the market shares using:

$$s_j = \frac{\exp(v_j)}{1 + \sum_k \exp(v_k)}$$

- (b) (6 points) Compute the own-price elasticity for each product. Which product has the most inelastic demand?

- (c) (6 points) A researcher estimates demand using OLS (regressing $\ln(s_j) - \ln(s_0)$ on price and product characteristics). Explain why this leads to biased estimates of α . What is the direction of the bias?

- (d) (10 points) Using the log-sum formula, compute consumer surplus per consumer. If product 1 is removed from the market, what is the change in consumer surplus?

3. Price Discrimination (20 points)

3. A streaming service has two customer segments: “binge watchers” (B) and “casual viewers” (C). Marginal cost is \$2 per subscriber.
- Binge watcher demand: $Q_B = 200 - 10P_B$
 - Casual viewer demand: $Q_C = 100 - 10P_C$
- (a) (6 points) The firm can identify customer type through usage patterns. Find the optimal prices under price discrimination by indicators.
- (b) (4 points) Compute total profit under price discrimination.
- (c) (6 points) Suppose the firm cannot distinguish customers. What is the optimal uniform price?
- (d) (4 points) Which group is better off under price discrimination compared to uniform pricing?

4. Self-Selection (20 points)

4. An airline offers two fare classes: Business (B) and Economy (E). There are two types of travelers: executives with high willingness to pay and students with low willingness to pay.

Consumer Type	Willingness to Pay	
	Business Class	Economy Class
Executive (50 travelers)	\$500	\$200
Student (100 travelers)	\$150	\$120

Marginal cost is \$50 for economy and \$100 for business class.

- (a) (4 points) If the airline could perfectly identify consumer types, what prices would it charge and what is its profit?
- (b) (4 points) The airline cannot identify types but offers both fare classes. Write down the incentive compatibility (IC) constraint that ensures executives buy business class.
- (c) (6 points) Find the profit-maximizing prices for business and economy class under self-selection.
(Hint: Which IC constraint binds?)
- (d) (6 points) The airline considers “damaging” economy class by adding restrictions (no changes, middle seat only). How would this affect the equilibrium? Explain the economic logic.