

# ECN 594: Logit Demand and Identification

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# Announcements

- **Homework 1 released today**
- Due: Feb 4 (before Lecture 6)
- Demand estimation using Python and pyblp
- Start early!

## Plan for today

1. Logit model derivation
  2. Berry (1994) inversion
  3. Elasticity formulas
  4. IIA problem (preview)
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5. The identification problem
6. Direction of bias
7. Instrumental variables
8. Uber example

# Part 1: The Logit Demand Model

## Recap: Random utility

- Consumer  $i$  chooses among  $J$  products
- Utility:

$$u_{ij} = x_j\beta - \alpha p_j + \xi_j + \varepsilon_{ij}$$

- Consumer chooses the product with highest utility
- Last time: we left  $\varepsilon_{ij}$  unspecified
- Today: we assume  $\varepsilon_{ij}$  has a specific distribution

# The logit assumption

- Assume  $\varepsilon_{ij}$  is i.i.d. **Type I Extreme Value**
- Also called Gumbel distribution
- CDF:  $F(\varepsilon) = \exp(-\exp(-\varepsilon))$
- Why this assumption?
  - Gives us **closed-form** choice probabilities!
  - Computationally tractable

## Logit choice probabilities

- Define **mean utility**:

$$\delta_j = x_j\beta - \alpha p_j + \xi_j$$

- So utility is:  $u_{ij} = \delta_j + \varepsilon_{ij}$
- With Type I Extreme Value errors, the probability that consumer chooses  $j$ :

$$P(\text{choose } j) = \frac{\exp(\delta_j)}{\sum_{k=1}^J \exp(\delta_k)}$$

- This is the **logit** formula

## The outside option

- Problem: Our formula doesn't allow consumers to “not buy”
- We need an **outside option** (product  $j = 0$ )
- Utility of outside option:

$$u_{i0} = \varepsilon_{i0}$$

- We normalize:  $\delta_0 = 0$
- All other utilities are *relative* to this outside option



## Logit with outside option

- With the outside option, the share of product  $j$  is:

$$s_j = \frac{\exp(\delta_j)}{1 + \sum_{k=1}^J \exp(\delta_k)}$$

- And the share of the outside option is:

$$s_0 = \frac{1}{1 + \sum_{k=1}^J \exp(\delta_k)}$$

- Note:  $s_0 + \sum_{j=1}^J s_j = 1$  (shares sum to 1)

## Berry (1994) inversion: the key insight

- We observe: market shares  $s_j$
- We want: mean utilities  $\delta_j$  (to estimate  $\beta, \alpha$ )
- **Problem:** How do we get  $\delta_j$  from  $s_j$ ?
- **Berry's insight:** Take the log of shares!

## Berry (1994) inversion

- Start with:

$$s_j = \frac{\exp(\delta_j)}{1 + \sum_{k=1}^J \exp(\delta_k)}, \quad s_0 = \frac{1}{1 + \sum_{k=1}^J \exp(\delta_k)}$$

- Take logs:

$$\ln(s_j) = \delta_j - \ln \left( 1 + \sum_{k=1}^J \exp(\delta_k) \right)$$

$$\ln(s_0) = - \ln \left( 1 + \sum_{k=1}^J \exp(\delta_k) \right)$$

- Subtract:

$$\ln(s_j) - \ln(s_0) = \delta_j$$

## Berry (1994) inversion: the estimating equation

- We have:  $\ln(s_j) - \ln(s_0) = \delta_j$
- Substitute  $\delta_j = x_j\beta - \alpha p_j + \xi_j$ :

$$\ln(s_j) - \ln(s_0) = x_j\beta - \alpha p_j + \xi_j$$

- This is a **linear regression**!
- LHS: can compute from observed shares
- RHS: product characteristics, price, and an error term

## Logit elasticities

- Given shares  $s_j = \frac{\exp(\delta_j)}{1 + \sum_k \exp(\delta_k)}$
- We can derive price elasticities:

$$\eta_{jj} = \frac{\partial s_j}{\partial p_j} \frac{p_j}{s_j} = -\alpha p_j (1 - s_j) \quad (\text{own-price})$$

$$\eta_{jk} = \frac{\partial s_j}{\partial p_k} \frac{p_k}{s_j} = \alpha p_k s_k \quad (\text{cross-price})$$

- Note:  $\alpha > 0$ , so own-price elasticity is **negative** (as expected)

## Worked example: Logit elasticities

- **Question:**
- Suppose  $\alpha = 0.5$ , product  $j$  has price  $p_j = 20$  and market share  $s_j = 0.1$ .
- Compute the own-price elasticity for product  $j$ .

*Take 2 minutes to solve this.*

## Worked example: Logit elasticities (solution)

- Own-price elasticity formula:

$$\eta_{jj} = -\alpha p_j (1 - s_j)$$

- Plug in:  $\alpha = 0.5$ ,  $p_j = 20$ ,  $s_j = 0.1$

$$\begin{aligned}\eta_{jj} &= -0.5 \times 20 \times (1 - 0.1) \\ &= -0.5 \times 20 \times 0.9 \\ &= -9\end{aligned}$$

- Interpretation: A 1% price increase  $\Rightarrow$  9% decrease in quantity

## Worked example: Cross-price elasticity

- Now compute the cross-price elasticity with product  $k$
- Given:  $\alpha = 0.5$ ,  $p_k = 25$ ,  $s_k = 0.05$
- Cross-price elasticity formula:

$$\eta_{jk} = \alpha p_k s_k$$

- Plug in:

$$\begin{aligned}\eta_{jk} &= 0.5 \times 25 \times 0.05 \\ &= 0.625\end{aligned}$$

- Interpretation: A 1% increase in  $p_k \Rightarrow 0.625\%$  increase in  $s_j$



## The IIA problem (preview)

- Look at the cross-price elasticity again:

$$\eta_{jk} = \alpha p_k s_k$$

- This doesn't depend on product  $j$  at all!
- Implication: All products have the **same** cross-elasticity with product  $k$
- Is this realistic?
- Suppose BMW raises its price. Logit says: same fraction go to Mercedes as to Honda Civic!
- This is the **IIA** (Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives) property
- We'll discuss this in detail in Lecture 4

## Part 2: Identification and Instrumental Variables

## The estimating equation (reminder)


- From Berry inversion:

$$\ln(s_j) - \ln(s_0) = x_j\beta - \alpha p_j + \xi_j$$

- This looks like a regression we can run with OLS
- **But there's a problem...**

## The classic identification problem

- We observe equilibrium prices and quantities
- Problem: can't tell if demand shifted or supply shifted



# The classic identification problem

- If we just regress  $q$  on  $p$ , what do we get?
- Neither demand nor supply!
- **Key insight:** We need variation that shifts ONE curve but not the other
  - To identify demand: need **supply shifters**
  - To identify supply: need **demand shifters**

## Price endogeneity in demand estimation

- Our estimating equation:

$$\ln(s_j) - \ln(s_0) = x_j\beta - \alpha p_j + \xi_j$$

- $\xi_j$  = unobserved product quality
- **Problem:** Firms observe  $\xi_j$  when setting prices!
- High quality products ( $\xi_j$  high) tend to have high prices
- $\Rightarrow \text{Cov}(p_j, \xi_j) > 0$
- OLS gives biased estimates

## Direction of bias

- If high-quality products have high prices...
- OLS sees: high price, but demand still high (because of  $\xi$ )
- OLS concludes: price doesn't hurt demand much
- **Result:**  $\hat{\alpha}$  biased toward zero (less negative than truth)

## Worked example: Bias direction

- **Question:** You estimate a logit demand model using OLS and get  $\hat{\alpha} = -0.3$ . A colleague says the true  $\alpha$  is likely  $-0.5$ .
- Is this consistent with endogeneity bias? Why?



## Worked example: Bias direction

- **Question:** You estimate a logit demand model using OLS and get  $\hat{\alpha} = -0.3$ . A colleague says the true  $\alpha$  is likely  $-0.5$ .
- Is this consistent with endogeneity bias? Why?
- **Answer:** Yes!
  - OLS overstates how much consumers like expensive products
  - So OLS finds a smaller (less negative) price coefficient
  - $-0.3 > -0.5$ , so this is exactly what we'd expect

# The gold standard: Experiments

- Best solution: randomize prices!
- **Uber's price “wiggles”** (Cohen et al. 2016)
  - Uber experimentally varies surge multipliers up and down
  - Same time, same location → different riders see different prices
  - This randomization creates exogenous price variation
- Key insight: demand conditions are identical, only price differs
- Result: demand elasticity  $\approx -0.5$  (inelastic!)

## Why experiments are powerful

- No confounding: price variation is independent of demand shocks
- Clean identification of the demand curve
- **But:**
  - Tech companies can run experiments
  - Traditional industries can't randomize prices
  - Most IO settings require **instrumental variables**

## Instrumental variables: the solution

- Need variables  $z$  that are:
  1. **Relevant:** Correlated with price ( $\text{Cov}(z, p) \neq 0$ )
  2. **Exogenous:** Uncorrelated with  $\xi$  ( $\text{Cov}(z, \xi) = 0$ )
- These are cost shifters or other supply-side variables

# Common IVs in demand estimation

1. **Hausman IVs:** Prices in other markets
  - Same product in different cities has similar costs
  - But demand shocks may differ across markets
2. **BLP IVs:** Characteristics of competing products
  - More/different competitors  $\rightarrow$  lower prices
  - Competitors' characteristics don't affect YOUR  $\xi$
3. **Cost shifters:** Input prices, exchange rates
  - Affect production costs, hence prices
  - No direct effect on demand

## Worked example: IV intuition

- **Question:** Why do competitor characteristics work as IVs?

## Worked example: IV intuition

- **Question:** Why do competitor characteristics work as IVs?
- **Answer:**
- **Relevance:** More competitors nearby  $\rightarrow$  more competition  $\rightarrow$  lower price ✓
- **Exogeneity:** Competitor characteristics don't affect YOUR unobserved quality  $\xi_j$  ✓
- Example: If Toyota enters with a new Camry, this affects Civic's price but not Civic's unobserved quality

## Worked example: Evaluating an IV

- **Question:** A researcher proposes using gasoline prices as an IV for car prices. Is this valid?



## Worked example: Evaluating an IV

- **Question:** A researcher proposes using gasoline prices as an IV for car prices. Is this valid?
- **Relevance:** Higher gas prices  $\rightarrow$  higher operating costs  $\rightarrow$  might affect car prices? Maybe weakly.
- **Exogeneity:** Do gas prices affect car quality  $\zeta_j$ ?
  - Gas prices affect *demand* for fuel-efficient cars
  - This might shift which cars look “good” to consumers
  - Potentially problematic!
- **Verdict:** Probably not a great IV

## Summary: IV conditions

- For  $z$  to be a valid IV:
  1. **Relevant:**  $z$  must predict prices
    - Can test this! Run first-stage regression
  2. **Exogenous:**  $z$  must not affect demand directly
    - Cannot test this directly (requires economic reasoning)
- This is the standard IV framework from econometrics
- Applied to demand estimation: use supply-side variation

# Key Points

1. **Logit model:**  $\varepsilon_{ij}$  is Type I Extreme Value  $\rightarrow$  closed-form shares
2. **Share equation:**  $s_j = \frac{\exp(\delta_j)}{1 + \sum_k \exp(\delta_k)}$
3. **Berry inversion:**  $\ln(s_j) - \ln(s_0) = \delta_j$  turns demand estimation into a regression
4. **Elasticities:** Own  $= -\alpha p_j(1 - s_j)$ ; Cross  $= \alpha p_k s_k$
5. **IIA:** Cross-elasticities don't depend on product similarity (a limitation)
6. **Price is endogenous:** Firms observe  $\xi_j$  when pricing  $\rightarrow \text{Cov}(p, \xi) > 0$
7. **Bias direction:** OLS gives  $\hat{\alpha}$  biased toward zero
8. **Solution:** Instrumental variables (cost shifters, BLP IVs, Hausman IVs)

## Next time

- **Lecture 3:** Demographic Interactions and pyblp
  - Extending logit to allow preference heterogeneity
  - Estimation using pyblp package
  - Worked example with car data