

# ECN 565: Data Science & Econometrics II

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Lecture 8b: Limited Dependent Variables – Discrete Choice

# Discrete Choice Models

- Goals
  - Extend our knowledge of binary models to multinomial discrete choice
  - Maintain (and extend) the tight link to economics

# Discrete Choice Models

- Agents select from a finite set of differentiated alternatives
- Each alternative provides them with a certain payoff
- Agents select the alternative that gives them the highest payoff
  - McFadden (1974) transportation mode choice
  - Smartphone brand choice, e.g., Apple vs. Samsung vs. Google
- Latent variable framework takes on a specific economic interpretation.
  - Individuals maximize utility
  - Firms maximize profit

# Discrete Choice Models

- Heterogeneous agents choose among differentiated alternatives
- $i \in \{1, \dots, N\}$  agents
- $j \in \{1, \dots, J\}$  alternatives
- $x$ : alternative characteristics
- $z$ : agent characteristics

# Discrete Choice Models

- Choice set:
- Mutually Exclusive
  - Not restrictive
- Exhaustive
  - Not restrictive
- Finite
  - Only slightly restrictive

# Discrete Choice Models

- Choice Set example
- Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (JPE 2004)
  - “Micro-BLP”
- $i \in \{1, \dots, 37500\}$  vehicle buyers
- $j \in \{1, \dots, 203\}$  vehicles
- $x$ : price, HP, seats, MPG, safety, model, minivan, pickup, luxury
- $z$ : kids, rural, income

# Random Utility Model

- Discrete-choice models often derived from utility maximization
  - Methods can also be used to model other behavior
  - Or to statistically describe outcomes
- RUM Random Utility Model (Marshall (1960) McFadden (1974))
- Decision maker,  $i$  chooses alternative  $j$  to max utility/payoff/profit
- Utility  $i$  receives from  $j$  is  $U_{ij}$
- Choose alternative  $j$  if  $U_{ij} > U_{ik} \forall k \neq j$

# Random Utility Model

- Don't observe  $U_{ij}$
- Observe alternative attributes,  $x_{ij} \forall j$ 
  - different agents may face different attributes
- Observe agent attributes,  $z_i$
- Observe agent choice  $d_{ij} \in \{0, 1\} \forall j$
- e.g. electric vehicle adoption based on prices, incentives, and charging availability.



# Random Utility Model

- Specify function relating observables to (part of) utility
  - $V_{ij} = V(x_{ij}, z_i; \theta)$
  - Sometimes called “representative utility”
  - $V_{ij} \neq U_{ij}$
  - $U_{ij} = V_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij}$
  - $\epsilon$  typically has an economic interpretation

# Random Utility Model

- As usual, econometrician doesn't observe  $\epsilon$
- $f(\epsilon_i)$  is joint density of  $\epsilon_i = [\epsilon_{i,1}, \dots, \epsilon_{i,J}]'$
- Now have ingredients to make probabilistic statements about agent's choice:

$$\begin{aligned} P_{ij} &= \text{Prob}(U_{ij} > U_{ik} \ \forall k \neq j) \\ &= \text{Prob}(V_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij} > V_{ik} + \epsilon_{ik} \ \forall k \neq j) \\ &= \text{Prob}(\epsilon_{ij} - \epsilon_{ik} > V_{ik} - V_{ij} \ \forall k \neq j) \\ &= \text{Prob}(\epsilon_{ik} - \epsilon_{ij} < V_{ij} - V_{ik} \ \forall k \neq j) \end{aligned}$$

# Random Utility Model

- This probability is a cumulative distribution
- Probability that each  $\epsilon_{ik} - \epsilon_{ij}$  is below  $V_{ij} - V_{ik}$ 
  - Recall that  $V_{ij}$  is observed/specified by econometrician

$$\begin{aligned} P_{ij} &= \text{Prob}(\epsilon_{ik} - \epsilon_{ij} < V_{ij} - V_{ik} \quad \forall k \neq j) \\ &= \int_{\epsilon} I(\epsilon_{ik} - \epsilon_{ij} < V_{ij} - V_{ik} \quad \forall k \neq j) f(\epsilon) d\epsilon \end{aligned}$$

- multidimensional integral over density of  $\epsilon$

# Random Utility Model

- Specification of  $f(\epsilon)$  determines which discrete model we specify.
- Multidimensional integral may or may not have closed form solution
- Closed form: Logit, GEV (including nested logit)
- Not closed form: Probit, Mixed Logit
- Simulate  $\int_{\epsilon} I(\epsilon_{ik} - \epsilon_{ij} < V_{ij} - V_{ik} \ \forall k \neq j) f(\epsilon) d\epsilon$

# Quick preview of models

- Logit: Quick, easy, popular
- Assumes  $f(\epsilon)$  is i.i.d. type 1 extreme value (Gumbel)
  - Difference in type 1 extreme values is logistic
  - Max of type 1 extreme values is type 1 extreme value
- Unobserved factors are uncorrelated across alternatives.
  - Also have the same variance across alternatives
- What if alternatives are bus, train, and car?
  - Seems likely that  $\epsilon_{i,bus}$  and  $\epsilon_{i,train}$  are correlated.
- Other approaches (GEV, Probit) mainly used to avoid independence assumption

# Identification

- Closely related to your theory classes
  - Meaningless properties of utility are not identified
    - not surprising!
- 1 Only differences in utility matter
  - 2 Scale of utility is arbitrary

# Identification – Differences in Utility

- Only differences in utility matter
- If a constant is added to  $U_{ij} \forall j$ :
  - Alternative with highest utility doesn't change
  - Choice probabilities don't change
  - $P_{ij} = \text{Prob}(\epsilon_{ik} - \epsilon_{ij} < V_{ij} + c - V_{ik} - c \forall k \neq j)$
  - $P_{ij} = \text{Prob}(\epsilon_{ik} - \epsilon_{ij} < V_{ij} - V_{ik} \forall k \neq j)$
- only identified parameters are those that capture differences across alternatives

# Identification – Differences in Utility

- Agent characteristics,  $z_i$
- Only enter the model if they shift utility differences
- Can't identify the impact of  $z$  on  $U$
- Can identify the impact of  $z$  on  $U_j - U_k$
- Does education affect overall utility?
- Does education affect the choice among cars?



# Identification – Scale of Utility

- Multiplying each alternative utility by constant will not change decision
  - multiplying  $U_{ij}$  by constant will not change optimal decision
  - multiplying  $V_{ij}$  by constant could change optimal decision
- Address this (usually) by normalizing the variance of the error term.
- $U_{ij} = V_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij}^* = V_{ij} + \sigma\epsilon_{ij}$ 
  - where  $\epsilon_{ij}^*$  has scale =  $\sigma$  and  $\epsilon_{ij}$  has scale = 1
- Normalize  $\sigma = 1$
- Equivalent to dividing through by  $\sigma$
- $U_{ij}/\sigma = V_{ij}/\sigma + \epsilon_{ij}$

# Identification – Scale of Utility

- $U_{ij} = x'_{ij}\beta + \sigma\epsilon_{ij}$
- $U_{ij}/\sigma = x'_{ij}\beta/\sigma + \epsilon_{ij}$
- $\beta$  is not identified;  $\beta/\sigma$  is identified;
- Typically, normalize  $\sigma = 1$ .
- $U_{ij} = x'_{ij}\beta + \epsilon_{ij}$ 
  - important to remember what units  $\beta$  is measured in
  - $\beta$  is really  $\beta/\sigma$

# Identification – Scale of Utility

- Ratio of  $\beta$  coefficients is invariant to scaling
  - Important as this is what we are usually interested in
  - MRS between two attributes
  - When one attribute is price, this is MWTP

# Logit Model

- Make assumption that  $\epsilon$  i.i.d. type 1 extreme value
- Difference between extreme value RVs is distributed logistic
- Very similar to independent Normal

# Logit Model

- Choice Probabilities

$$\begin{aligned}P_{ij} &= \text{Prob}(U_{ij} > U_{ik} \ \forall k \neq j) \\&= \text{Prob}(V_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij} > V_{ik} + \epsilon_{ik} \ \forall k \neq j) \\&= \text{Prob}(\epsilon_{ij} - \epsilon_{ik} > V_{ik} - V_{ij} \ \forall k \neq j) \\&= \int_{\epsilon} I(\epsilon_{ik} - \epsilon_{ij} < V_{ij} - V_{ik} \ \forall k \neq j) f(\epsilon) d\epsilon \\&= \frac{e^{V_{ij}}}{\sum_k e^{V_{ik}}}\end{aligned}$$

# Logit Model

- If assume  $V_{ij} = x'_{ij}\beta$
- $$P_{ij} = \frac{e^{x'_{ij}\beta}}{\sum_k e^{x'_{ik}\beta}}$$

# Logit Model

- Desirable properties of these choice probabilities:
- $P_{ik}$  is between 0 and 1
  - Any sensible model derived from utility maximization would yield this
- The probabilities sum to one
  - Any sensible model derived from utility maximization would yield this

# Logit Model




Figure 3.1. Graph of logit curve.



# Logit Model

- Taste Variation
- Substitution patterns

# Logit Model – Taste Variation

- Logit model is restrictive in the type of taste variation it can handle
- Heterogeneity in tastes for attributes that varies with observables
- No heterogeneity in tastes for attributes that varies with unobservables
  - Only have heterogeneity in taste for overall alternative,  $\epsilon_{ij}$

# Logit Model – Taste Variation

- Start with general model:  $U_{ij} = x'_{ij}\beta_i + \epsilon_{ij}$ 
  - note  $i$  subscript on  $\beta_i$
- for element  $l$  of  $x_{ij}$ , let  $\beta_{il} = \alpha_{0l} + z'_i\alpha_{1l} + \eta_{il}$
- Logit model naturally allows for  $\alpha_1$  (and  $\alpha_0$ )
- Logit model assumes  $\eta_i = 0$
- Without  $\eta_i = 0$ , error term is  $x'_{ij}\eta_i + \epsilon_{ij}$ 
  - Error term will not be independently distributed
  - Also won't be identically distributed
- Extent to which  $\eta_i = 0$  is restrictive depends on how informative  $z$  is

# Logit Model – Substitution Patterns

- If we improve an attribute of one alternative, its probability must rise
- Offsetting reduction in the sum of the probabilities of other alternatives.
- Logit places strong restrictions of the nature of this offsetting effect

# Logit Model – Substitution Patterns

- Independence from Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA):

$$\begin{aligned}\frac{P_{ij}}{P_{ij'}} &= \frac{e^{V_{ij}} / \sum_k e^{V_{ik}}}{e^{V_{ij'}} / \sum_k e^{V_{ik}}} \\ &= \frac{e^{V_{ij}}}{e^{V_{ij'}}} \\ &= e^{V_{ij} - V_{ij'}}\end{aligned}$$

- odds ratio does not depend on alternatives other than  $j$  and  $j'$
- proportional substitution patterns
- Red bus, blue bus, car

# Logit Model – Substitution Patterns

- Consider the following model (with no observed  $z_i$ ):
- $U_{ij} = \beta_1 * HP_j + \beta_2 * Price_j + \epsilon_{ij}$
- $J = 3$ ; one sports car and two regular cars
- $HP = [400, 100, 100]$ ;  $Price = [40, 10, 10]$
- $\beta_1 = 2$ ;  $\beta_2 = -20$
- $V_{i1} = V_{i2} = V_{i3} = 0 \forall i$
- $P_1 = P_2 = P_3 = 1/3$

# Logit Model – Substitution Patterns

- What happens if we remove one of the regular cars from the choice set?
- $U_{ij} = \beta_1 * HP_j + \beta_2 * Price_j + \epsilon_{ij}$
- $J = 2$ ; one sports car and one regular car
- $HP = [400, 100]$ ;  $Price = [40, 10]$
- $\beta_1 = 2$ ;  $\beta_2 = -20$
- $V_{i1} = V_{i2} = 0 \forall i$
- $P_1 = P_2 = 1/2$

# Logit Model – Substitution Patterns

- What happens if we observe (informative)  $z_i$
- $U_{ij} = \beta_{i1} * HP_j + \beta_{i2} * Price_j + \epsilon_{ij}$
- $J = 3$ ; one sports car and two regular cars
- $HP = [400, 100, 100]$ ;  $Price = [40, 10, 10]$
- $z_i \in \{0, 1\}$ .  $P(z_i = 1) = 2/3$
- $\beta_{i1} = 6 - 6 * z_i$ ;  $\beta_{i2} = 0 - 30 * z_i$ 
  - $z_i = 1 \rightarrow \beta_1 = 0, \beta_2 = -30$
  - $z_i = 0 \rightarrow \beta_1 = 6, \beta_2 = 0$



# Logit Model – Substitution Patterns

- $V_1(z_i = 1) = -1200, V_2(z_i = 1) = V_3(z_i = 1) = -300 \forall i$
- $P_1(z_i = 1) \approx 0, P_2(z_i = 1) = P_3(z_i = 1) \approx 1/2$
- $V_1(z_i = 0) = 2400, V_2(z_i = 0) = V_3(z_i = 0) = 600 \forall i$
- $P_1(z_i = 0) \approx 1, P_2(z_i = 0) = P_3(z_i = 0) \approx 0$
- $P_1 = P_2 = P_3 = 1/3$

# Logit Model – Substitution Patterns

- What happens if we remove one of the regular cars from the choice set?
- IIA holds separately for each value of  $z_i$
- $V_1(z_i = 1) = -1200, V_{i2}(z_i = 1) = -300 \forall i$
- $P_1(z_i = 1) \approx 0, P_2(z_i = 1) \approx 1$
- $V_1(z_i = 0) = 2400, V_{i2}(z_i = 0) = 600 \forall i$
- $P_1(z_i = 0) \approx 1, P_2(z_i = 0) \approx 0$
- $P_1 \approx 1/3, P_2 \approx 2/3$
- I chose extreme numbers to make a point.

# Logit Model – Characterizing alternatives

- It is important to carefully characterize set of alternatives
- This is especially true for Logit model
- Example 1: Is the Honda CRV LX a different alternative to Honda CRV EX
  - If so, Logit model says errors are independent
- Example 2: How to determine what is a “neighborhood”
  - Block or Block group?
- Logit models can have poor properties when  $J$  is large
  - Independence is the source of the problems

# Logit Model – Consumer Surplus

- CS is the utility (in dollar terms) that an individual receives from a given situation.
- Convert utils to dollars using marginal utility of income
  - Coefficient on price, income, numeraire consumption
- Let  $\partial U_i / \partial \text{Income}_i = \alpha_i$ 
  - For simple case let  $\alpha_i$  be constant over income
- $CS_i = (1/\alpha_i) \max_j (U_{ij})$

# Logit Model – Consumer Surplus

- Don't observe  $U_{ij}$
- Integrate out over unobservable,  $\epsilon_i$
- $E(CS_i) = (1/\alpha_i)E[\max_j(V_{ij} + \epsilon_{ij})]$
- $E(CS_i) = (1/\alpha_i)\log(\sum_j^J e^{V_{ij}})$
- $\Delta E(CS_i) = (1/\alpha_i)\left(\log(\sum_j^{J^1} e^{V_{ij}^1}) - \log(\sum_j^{J^0} e^{V_{ij}^0})\right)$
- e.g., difference in consumer surplus when commute times drop by 10 minutes.
- e.g., difference in consumer surplus when one car is removed from choice set.

# Logit Model – Estimation

- Assume that  $x_{ij}, z_i$  are exogenous
- Likelihood contribution of individual  $i$ :  $\prod_j P_{ij}^{d_{ij}}$
- Likelihood Function:  $L(\beta) = \prod_i \prod_j P_{ij}^{d_{ij}}$
- Log-likelihood Function:  $\mathcal{L}(\beta) = \sum_i \sum_j d_{ij} \log(P_{ij})$
- $\hat{\beta}_{mle} = \operatorname{argmax}_{\beta} \mathcal{L}(\beta)$
- McFadden (1974):  $\mathcal{L}(\beta)$  is globally concave in  $\beta$  when  $V_{ij} = x'_{ij}\beta_i$ 
  - Pre-canned routines exist for this case

# Logit Model – More examples

- Marketing: Brand choice modeling for new product launches.
- Urban economics: Housing location or school choice.
- Environmental economics: Estimating willingness-to-pay for clean air or EVs.
- Health economics: Patient choice of hospital or treatment plan.

# GEV Model

- IIA property can be restrictive
  - This is especially true when we don't observe  $z_i$
- Main alternatives to Logit are:
  - 1 GEV Generalized Extreme Value
    - Logit is a special case of GEV
    - Most commonly used GEV structure is Nested Logit
  - 2 Probit
  - 3 Mixed Logit
    - Logit is a special case of Mixed-Logit