Problem Set 3

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Note: I use bold symbols to denote vectors and nonbolded symbols to denote scalars. I primarily use vector notation to shorthand some of the sums, since many of the sums are dot products.

Problem 1

(1) The optimal time length of schooling maximizes:

$$\max_{S} \int_{S}^{\infty} e^{-rt} w(t) h(t)$$

$$\max_{S} \int_{S}^{\infty} e^{-(r-g)t} S^{\alpha}$$

$$\max_{S} \frac{S^{\alpha}w(0)e^{-(r-g)S}}{r-g}$$

$$\frac{\alpha S^{\alpha - 1}}{S^{\alpha}} = r - g$$

$$S = \frac{\alpha}{r - g} = 11.25$$

(2) The present value of consumption is

$$\int_{S}^{\infty} e^{-rt} c_t = \int_{S}^{\infty} w(0) e^{-(r-g)t} S^{\alpha}$$

$$=\frac{w(0)e^{-(r-g)S}S^{\alpha}}{r-g}$$

(3) We need

$$\max \int e^{-(\rho+\nu)t} \log c(t)$$

subject to

$$\int e^{-rt}c(t) = \frac{w(0)e^{-(r-g)S}S^{\alpha}}{r-g}$$

we have

$$e^{-(\rho+\nu)t}\frac{1}{c(t)} = \lambda e^{-rt}$$

$$\frac{1}{\lambda}e^{-(\rho+\nu-r)t} = c(t)$$

and we get the EE:

$$\frac{\dot{c}(t)}{c(t)} = r - \rho - \nu$$

which implies

$$c(t) = c(0)e^{(r-\rho-\nu)t}$$

Plugging into budget constraint:

$$\frac{c(0)}{\rho + \nu} = \frac{w(0)e^{-(r-g)S}S^{\alpha}}{r - g}$$
$$c(0) = \frac{w(0)(\rho + \nu)e^{-(r-g)S}S^{\alpha}}{r - g}$$

(4) Intuitively, since consumption is smoothed across time, individuals will go into debt before they reach their optimal level of schooling. Specifically, at time T < S, we have the present value of an individual's asset holding is given by

 $-e^{rT}\int_0^T e^{-rt}c(t)$

which is clearly negative. However, after the individual finishes schooling, the present value of asset holding is

$$\begin{split} e^{rT} \left(\int_{S}^{T} e^{-rt} W_{t} dt - \int_{0}^{T} e^{-rt} c_{t} \right) \\ &= e^{rT} \left(w(0) S^{\alpha} \int_{S}^{T} e^{-(r-g)t} dt - c(0) \int_{0}^{T} e^{-(\rho+\nu)t} \right) \\ &= e^{rT} \left(\frac{w(0) S^{\alpha}}{r-g} \left(e^{-(r-g)T} - e^{-(r-g)S} \right) - \frac{w(0) (\rho + \nu) e^{-(r-g)S} S^{\alpha}}{r-g} \left(\frac{e^{-(\rho+\nu)T} - 1}{\rho + \nu} \right) \right) \\ &= \frac{w(0) S^{\alpha} e^{rT}}{r-g} \left(\left(e^{-(r-g)T} - e^{-(r-g)S} \right) - e^{-(r-g)S} \left(e^{-(\rho+\nu)T} - 1 \right) \right) \\ &= \frac{w(0) S^{\alpha} e^{rT}}{r-g} \left(e^{-(r-g)T} - e^{-(r-g)S} \left(e^{-(\rho+\nu)T} \right) \right) \\ &= \frac{w(0) S^{\alpha} e^{rT} e^{-(r-g)S}}{r-g} \left(e^{-(r-g)(T-S)} - e^{-(\rho+\nu)T} \right) \end{split}$$

Since $r - g > \rho + \nu$, this will eventually turn positive at

$$e^{-(r-g)(T-S)+(\rho+\nu)T} = 1$$
$$(r-g)(T-S) = (\rho+\nu)T$$
$$(r-g-\rho-\nu)T = (r-g)S$$
$$T = \frac{(r-g)S}{(r-g-\rho-\nu)}$$

so after that point, the individual paid of their student loans and will begin accummulating wealth. (5) If we take the log of the wage rate, we find that $\log W(t) = \log w(0) + \alpha \log S + gt$ which we can use to empirically measure the schooling effectivness parameter α . (6) Imposing a borrowing constraint can induce people to take less schooling than they would otherwise, since due to a borrowing constraint they would have to reduce consumption as a result. Alternatively, individuals might also have to instead work first, and take schooling later in their life. One potential way to alleviate this issue is to provide students a stipend, funded from wages. That way, consumers may be able to still achieve the same welfare since they receive some income during their schooling. Problem 2 **(1) (2)** (3)(4)**(5)** (6)(7)(8)

Problem 3

(1)

(9)

(2)

(3)

(4)	
(5)	
(6)	
Problem 4	

- (1)
- **(2)**
- (3)
- **(4)**
- **(5)**
- (6)
- **(7)**

Problem 5

- (1)
- **(2)**
- (3)
- **(4)**

(5)