Studies in Contemporary Linguistics

A series edited by John Goldsmith, James D. McCawley, and Jerrold M. Sadock

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Syntax and Human Experience

Edited and Translated by

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The University of Chicago Press
Chicago and London

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The University of Chicago Press, Chicago 60637
The University of Chicago Press, Ltd., London
© 1991 by The University of Chicago
All rights reserved. Published 1991
Printed in the United States of America
00 99 98 97 96 95 94 93 92 91 5 4 3 2 1

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Ruwet, Nicolas.
[Essays. English. Selections]
Syntax and human experience / Nicolas Ruwet ; edited and translated by John Goldsmith.
p. cm.
Papers revised and translated from the French.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 0-226-73221-5 (cloth). —ISBN 0-226-73222-3 (paper)
1. Grammar, Comparative and general—Syntax. 2. Generative grammar. I. Goldsmith, John A., 1951– . II. Title.
P291.R89213 1991
415—dc20 90-23535
CIP

♾The paper used in this publication meets the minimum requirements of the American National Standard for Information Sciences—Permanence of Paper for Printed Library Materials, ANSI Z39.48–1984.

Contents

questions which point to man's place in the world, his relation to himself, to his body, to other human beings, and to the cosmos under its various aspects (such as weather phenomena; see chapter 3).

To me at least, what is most fascinating about language is precisely the fact that some parts of it lend themselves to formalization and the Galilean approach, while others, though often intermingled with the first, seem to require a different approach. This situation creates a fundamental tension, which I do not expect to be resolved in the near future. The only thing I do hope for is a little more tolerance on the part of the different schools of linguists, that they allow a bit more graciously others to "look through other windows." And thus we return to the words of Nietzsche with which we opened this Introduction.

A Note on Notation

The diacritic marks accompanying the examples (*, ?, etc.) mark raw acceptability judgments, and they must often be taken with a grain of salt, and do not necessarily reflect the way in which the grammar should ultimately analyze the materials (which is to say, I draw a sharp distinction between competence and performance). Regarding judgments, I use two convenient forms of abbreviation: X *(Y) Z means that XYZ is OK, but XZ is unacceptable. On the other hand, X (*Y) Z means that XYZ is unacceptable, but XZ is OK. The sign ? indicates either that most of my informants find the example marginal, without completely rejecting it, or else that considerable variability was found among my informants.

In chapter 5, it should be noted that when I discuss syntactic constructions that are idiomatic, when it is helpful I have italicized (or, in examples, underlined) those parts which are strictly part of the idiom.

1 *Je veux partir /*Je veux que je parte:* On the Distribution of Finite Complements and Infinitival Complements in French

I must warn the reader that the effort that I will demand of him is not of the sort generally required for papers in generative grammar. A certain amount of meditation on the examples, whose acceptability will pose problems in virtually every case, an attention to the description as well as to the argumentation: in these matters the reader will have to meet the writer half-way (a commendable exercise in today's world, in any event). As Montesquieu said, "as for the details, I have not given them all; for who would say everything without running the risk of terminal boredom?"[1]

1. The Initial Problem

The two paradigms (1)–(4) are well known. We have here juxtaposed two sets of data, one from French on the left, and one from English on the right. The alignment of the forms are intended to express a parallelism between the subjunctive forms in French and the nonfinite forms with overt subject given in the English equivalents. In some cases, as in (1)–(4), the equivalent in English is an infinitival; in others, as we shall see below, the nonfinite form that we shall investigate is the gerundive (*-ing*) form. Let us be clear on the parallelism that is being suggested between the French cases, which is the main point of this essay, and the English cases which appear to work in quite similar ways. In French, in a wide range of cases, both a subjunctive clause (a form which obligatorily contains an overt subject NP) and an infinitival form (which cannot contain an overt subject NP) are syntactically permitted in a given construction. The (ultimately iconic) principles explored in this essay determine under what conditions the form, with or without overt subject, will be appropriate. In English, on the other hand, the choice between a form with and a form without an overt subject is available without the striking morpho-

logical differences that are seen in French between the subjunctive and the infinitive; in English, both the infinitive and the gerundive form can appear with or without a subject. Whether a particular construction in English chooses the infinitive, the gerundive, or neither falls outside the scope of this paper (though the matter has been studied, and deserves further study); what does follow, however, from the principles outlined here is whether in English, an overt NP subject for certain types of nonfinite complement clause is appropriate or not.

(1) a.	**Je veux que je parte.*	a. *I want (for) me to leave.
b.	*Je veux que tu partes.*	b. I want (?for) you to leave.
c.	*Je veux qu'il parte.*	c. I want (?for) him to leave.
(2) a.	*Veux-tu que je parte?*	a. Do you want (?for) me to leave?
b.	**Veux-tu que tu partes?*	b. *Do you want (for) you to leave?
c.	*Veux-tu qu'il parte?*	c. Do you want (?for) him to leave?
(3) a.	*On dirait qu'il veut que je parte.*	a. It seems like he wants (?for) me to leave.
b.	*On dirait qu'il veut que tu partes.*	b. It seems like he wants (?for) you to leave.
c.	**On dirait qu'il_i veut qu'il_j parte.*	c. *It seems like he wants (for) him to leave.

(OK, if il_i and il_j are disjoint in reference, bad otherwise.)

(4) a.	*Je veux partir.*	a. I want to leave.
b.	*Veux-tu partir?*	b. Do you want to leave?
c.	*On dirait qu'il veut partir.*	c. It seems like he wants to leave.

In the good old days of the Standard Theory, the gaps in the paradigm in (1)–(3), along with the possibility of the sentences in (4) which apparently filled those gaps, seemed quite enough to justify the rule known as Equi-NP Deletion (or Equi, for short). Deleting an embedded subject "identical" to an NP in the upper clause (in this case, the subject), the rule killed two birds with one stone. It excluded (1a), (2b), and (3c) with the coreferential interpretation, and generated the sentences in (4). To simplify matters, I will limit the discussion to sentences with a direct object complement clause, where in the infinitival case, the only possible antecedent of the embedded subject is the matrix subject; I leave aside for now the cases of control by an object, direct or indirect, special cases such as those of *promise* or *menacer* 'threaten', as well as those of control into a sentential subject, an indirect complement, or adjunct or adverbial complements. Since the impossibility of sentences like (1a), as well as (2b) and (3c), is so central to the phenomena being considered in this paper, it will be handy to have a name for these sentences, which I shall henceforth refer to as the **Paradigmatic Equi sentences**. (For relevant classical literature, see, for French, Ruwet 1972, 67ff., as well as Gross 1968, 122ff.; for English, see Rosenbaum 1967 and Postal 1970b.) The rule of Equi-NP Deletion, in any event, was purely descriptive. It explained very little. Sometimes obligatory, sometimes optional (see (7)), it had to be sensitive to coreference, as we have seen; it presupposed a common underlying structure for the sentences corresponding to (1)–(3) and (4); it had to be supplemented by other rules: for example, following the details of Gross (1968), the deletion of *que*, and of Tense, replaced by the infinitive formative—not to mention the insertion of a complementizer (ø, *de*, or even *à*, depending on the matrix verb; compare (4) with (95b), (96b), (113), etc.).

In the last few years, it has become a matter of general consensus among generativists that it is preferable to generate different kinds of complements directly in the base, each quite independently; this includes finite complements (S_T), either indicative or subjunctive, infinitival complements (S_I) with or without an overt subject (compare (4) to the causative construction, as in *j'ai laissé Pierre partir* 'I let Pierre leave'), *for-to* complements in English, and so forth—verbs being subcategorized in the lexicon according to the types of complements that they allow or exclude. (See Bresnan 1970; Jackendoff 1972; Chomsky 1977a, 1981a; Rouveret 1980; Rouveret and Vergnaud 1980; Kayne 1984, chap. 3, among many others.) To make the matter a bit more concrete, consider how Chomsky would represent now the D-structure of (1c), in (5), and that of (4a), as in (6).[2]

(5) *Je veux* $[_{S'}\ [_{COMP}\ que]\ [_S [_{NP}\ il]\ +\text{INFL}\ [_{VP}\ partir\ ]]]$.
I want that he to-leave.

(6) *Je veux* $[_{S'}\ [_{COMP}\ e]\ [_S\ [_{NP}\ \text{PRO}]\ -\text{INFL}\ [_{VP}\ partir\ ]]]$.
I want to-leave.

These two structures are generated independently of each other. But the problem for which Equi was supposed to be the solution has suddenly reappeared: *all* the sentences in (1)–(4) are generated directly, including the ungrammatical Paradigmatic Equi sentences (e.g., (1a))—a typical case of "overgeneration." We must thus find a new tack, enlightening if possible, if we are to account for the gaps in the paradigm (1)–(3).

Various linguists have recently suggested certain solutions to this problem, generally in passing, and no more than schematically in any event.

Some of these reveal fatal flaws with even a cursory examination;[3] others, more interesting at first glance,[4] are based on the contrast between (1)–(4), on the one hand, and (7):

(7) a. *Je crois qu'il peut résoudre cette question.*
I think that he can resolve this question.
b. *Je crois que je peux résoudre cette question.*
I think that I can resolve this question.
c. *Je crois pouvoir résoudre cette question.*
I think to-be-able to-resolve this question.

Unlike (1a), (7b) is acceptable. This is the prediction made by the Binding Theory of Chomsky (1981a). According to one of the principles of this theory, Principle B, "a pronominal must be free in its governing category." However, *je* is a pronominal,[5] and the governing category of the embedded *je* is the subordinate clause itself; hence (7b) should be well formed.[6] But the finite complements in (7) are in the indicative and those of (1)–(3) are in the subjunctive; it might therefore be tempting to suppose that subjunctive complements have special structural properties which prevent them, at least under certain conditions, from functioning as governing categories as far as the pronominals or anaphors which are contained within them are concerned. In (1a), for example, the governing category of the subordinate *je* would no longer be the subordinate clause, but rather the main clause; the embedded *je* would no longer be **free** in its governing category, but rather **bound** (by the *je* in the matrix clause)—and this, violating Principle B, would account for the unacceptability of (1a). In other words, subjunctive complements would be, from this point of view, closer to infinitives than to indicative complements: (1a) would be excluded, roughly speaking, for the same reasons that (8a) is in English:

(8) a. *John$_i$ believes him$_i$ to be a genius.
b. John believes himself to be a genius.

I will not present a direct critique of this proposal. The discussion which follows will show that it encounters practically insurmountable difficulties. It is no doubt not an accident that the facts of "disjoint reference" are found in subjunctive complements, but the correlation between subjunctive and "disjoint reference" is far from perfect,[7] as even the acceptability of (9a) indicates:

(9) a. *Je ne crois pas que je puisse résoudre cette question.*
I do not think that I can$_{subj}$ resolve this question.
b. *Je ne crois pas que je peux résoudre cette question.*
I do not think that I can$_{indi}$ resolve this question.

In any event, the hypothesis in question is purely structural or formal; whether it approaches the distribution of the subjunctive and the indicative, or the facts of "disjoint reference," it does not bring to bear the differences in meaning between *vouloir* and *croire*. I will propose a quite distinct explanation, where these meaning differences will in fact play a decisive role. But first, it is important to note the existence of a class of facts which seem to me relevant, although they have not to date been the focus of linguistic attention.

Consider the examples (10) through (15). Gross (1975, 76–77) is one of the rare places where facts of this sort are mentioned; see also Dominicy (1979, 297). *Remarquer* in (10) means 'to have one's attention attracted by something' (i.e., to notice) and is not the verb of saying "to remark," its other possible meaning. Similarly, in (14), (14b) is unacceptable only if it is taken as synonymous for (14a) ("to know that . . ." and not "to know how . . ."); and in fact, I found (14b), with the meaning "to know that . . . ," in Claude Manceron, *Austerlitz* (Marabout Université, p. 226)—but one could hardly say that this is good French.

(10) Early in the morning, after a sleepless night, Pierre is shaving in front of his mirror:
a. *Pierre remarque qu'il a les traits tirés.*
Pierre notices that he has haggard features.
b. **Pierre remarque avoir les traits tirés.*
*Pierre notices to have haggard features.

(11) Waterloo: night falls, the last attack of the Old Guard has just failed:
a. *Alors, Napoléon comprend qu'il est vaincu.*
And so, Napoleon understands that he is defeated.
b. **Alors, Napoléon comprend être vaincu.*
*And so, Napoleon understands to be defeated.

(12) Paul, a great smoker, contemplates an X-ray of his lungs:
a. *Paul voit qu'il souffre d'un cancer.*
Paul sees that he is suffering from cancer.
b. **Paul voit souffrir d'un cancer.*
*Paul sees to suffer from cancer.

(13) a. *Luc trouve qu'il est génial.*
Luc finds (i.e., thinks) that he is brilliant.
b. **Luc trouve être génial.*
*Luc finds to be brilliant.

(14) a. *Davout sait qu'il commande des troupes sacrifiées.*
Davout knows that he commands troops (being) sacrificed.
b. **Davout sait commander des troupes sacrifiées* (in the intended sense).
*Davout knows to command troops (being) sacrificed.

(15) a. *L'inculpé apprend (de son avocat) qu'il risque la chaise électrique.*
The accused learns (from his lawyer) that he may be electrocuted (lit., that he risks the chair).
b. **L'inculpé apprend (de son avocat) de risquer la chaise électrique.*
Lit., The accused learns (from his lawyer) of risking the electric chair.

Among the verbs which allow a finite complement if the matrix subject and the embedded subject are disjoint in reference (and ignoring the mood of the embedded clause), it appears that we must distinguish not two, but at least three cases,[8] to describe their behavior when the matrix and embedded subjects are coreferential: (i) *croire* 'believe', *estimer* 'believe', *penser* 'think', *dire* 'say', *pretendre* 'pretend (claim)', *déclarer* 'declare', etc., which allow either a finite clause or an infinitive, with no apparent difference between the two; (ii) *vouloir* 'want', *souhaiter* 'wish', *désirer* 'desire', *aimer* 'love', *attendre* 'wait', *mériter* 'deserve', etc., which apparently allow only an infinitive when the matrix and the embedded subjects are coreferential; (iii) *remarquer* 'notice', *comprendre* 'understand', *voir* 'see', *trouver* 'find', etc., which allow a finite complement and disallow the infinitive. The distribution of facts here seems to present a curious symmetry, and the three theoretical possibilities seem to be realized: the infinitival complement being either forbidden, obligatory, or permitted in free variation with a finite clause, depending on the choice of the matrix verb. A few other examples of cases (i) and (ii): alongside (7), we find (16)–(19):

(16) a. *J'admet m'être trompé.*
I admit being wrong.
b. *J'admet que je me suis trompé.*
I admit that I was wrong.
(17) a. *Alex déclare avoir tout compris.*
Lit., Alex declares to have understood everything.
b. *Alex déclare qu'il a tout compris.*
Alex declares that he understood everything.
(18) a. *Noam prétend être parti sans laisser de traces.*
Noam claims/pretends to have left without a trace.
b. *Noam prétend qu'il est parti sans laisser de traces.*
Noam claims/pretends that he left without leaving a trace.
(19) a. *Justine s'imagine être admirée de tout le monde.*
Lit., Justine imagines herself to be admired by everyone.

b. *Justine s'imagine qu'elle est admirée de tout le monde.*
Justine imagines that she is admired by everyone.

Parallel to (1)–(4), we find:

(20) a. *Le marquis aime se faire caresser par Justine.*
The marquis loves to have himself caressed by Justine.
b. **Le marquis aime qu'il se fasse caresser par Justine.*
The marquis loves it when/*that he has himself caressed by Justine.
(21) a. *Je désire épouser Marie.*
I desire to marry Marie.
b. **Je désire que j'épouse Marie.*
I desire for me to marry Marie.
(22) a. *J'attends de mourir.*
I am waiting to die.
b. **J'attends que je meure.*
?I am waiting for me to die.
(23) a. *Tu mérites d'avoir une retraite dorée.*
Lit., you deserve to have a golden retirement.
b. **Tu mérites que tu aies une retraite dorée.*
Lit., you deserve for you to have a golden retirement.

A priori, one could maintain that the facts in (10)–(15) have nothing to do with those in (1)–(4), and that they involve radically different mechanisms. Confronted with the problem posed by (1)–(4), it would be relatively easy (though certainly not very enlightening) to simply get rid of (10b)–(15b) by subcategorizing *remarquer* 'notice', *comprendre* 'understand', etc., in the appropriate and obvious way in the lexicon.[9] Let us entertain the hypothesis, however, that the distribution of the facts is not a matter of random accident; and in entertaining this hypothesis, we shall come to see that there is a sense in which the same reasons are responsible for why the facts of (1)–(4), (7), and (10)–(15) are as they are.

2. Self-to-self and Self-to-other Relations

Let us forget for a moment what we know about formal syntax, D-structure, S-structure, empty categories, abstract constraints, etc., and let us simply look at the surface of things, at the given, at what we see from a naive perspective on language. By "surface," I mean two distinct things.

a. The surface is, first, the purely superficial form of sentences: a sequence of words of various categories, articulated in groups (constituents) in a more or less obvious way and which belong to one or another syntactic

category, again in more or less obvious ways. In technical terms, I mean a "terminal string." But I would prefer to avoid this term, precisely because it has a technical definition and I would much rather stick as closely as possible to what is accessible to our intuition. Viewed from this perspective—and by contrast with the abstract representations given in (5)–(6), which are all essentially equally complex—a sentence such as (4a) appears much more simple, more compact, than (1a) or (1c), which are more complex, more articulated, and similarly, mutatis mutandis, for (7c) compared to (7a, b), and (10b) compared to (10a). To be a bit more concrete, let us represent complement sentences, like (1c), etc., as in (24a), and those with infinitival complements, like (4a), as in (24b) (where V_T means a finite, or "tensed," verb):

(24) a. NP V_T [*que* [NP V_T X]]
b. NP V_T V_{inf} X

A sentence like (1c) *Je veux qu'il parte* is divided into two parts, matrix and embedded clause, as in (24a), with the boundary clearly marked by the complementizer *que;* it contains two distinct occurrences of subject NPs, and two distinct occurrences of finite verbs, and all other things being equal,[10] the two verbs can appear with distinct tenses, as well as distinct person or number marking. On the other hand, (4a), *je veux partir,* as in (24b), has only one explicit subject NP, one single finite verb, and it does not explicitly mark the division between the matrix clause and the complement. (With verbs like *mériter* 'deserve' or *attendre* 'wait', this boundary seems to be marked by the complementizer *de* (*à* with other verbs); but we should note that unlike *que, à* and *de* are related to prepositions, elements that can appear in a simple mono-clausal sentence.)

b. The surface of things, the given, is also, from another perspective, the experience that we have, the representation that we construct for ourselves, the content[11] expressed by the sentences, an experience or representation in which the choice of matrix verb (*vouloir* 'want', *croire* 'believe', or *remarquer* 'notice', for example) will clearly play a central role.

My hypothesis is this: that there exists an **iconic** link between the (superficial) form of the sentence—simple or complex, compact or articulated—and the content, experienced as relatively simple or relatively complex, perceived as a unitary process or else as being decomposable into separate moments. More precisely, the differences between the surface forms available a priori **tend** to be used iconically to suggest certain aspects of the relative complexity, or the internal articulation, of the content. (Other linguists before me have emphasized the importance of iconic factors in language, to be sure: Jakobson, Bolinger, Ross; see Cooper and

Ross 1975; Haiman 1985; and, for a brief review, Lakoff and Johnson 1980, chap. 20).

What are the elements of the content which bear primarily on the choice? The essential point, I would suggest, comes from the relation which is indirectly established, via the relation between the matrix and the subordinate clause, between the referent of the matrix subject and the referent of the subordinate subject (whether the latter is expressed overtly or not). These referents can be identical (coreferential) or distinct.[12] If the referents of the two subjects are identical, I will speak of a relation which is of **self-to-self**; if they are distinct, I will speak of a relation of **self-to-other**. For reasons of simplicity I will limit myself in general to cases where the "other" is a human. It would be easy to extend the discussion to nonhumans, but that would in certain cases pose additional problems. Two questions arise: within the context of a given verb and its inherent meaning (and all other things being equal), (a) are self-to-self and self-to-other relations experienced as being identical, or radically different, or somewhere in between? For example, is the action of the sort that can be done indifferently by an agent to another or to (him)self, or will such a change markedly affect the type of relationship that is being described? (b) Is the self-to-self relationship always the same, or must we not rather distinguish different facets in the self-to-self relationship, these distinctions being, presumably, based on the choice of the matrix verb?

Before going any further, a quick survey of simple sentences will perhaps clarify what I mean by resemblances and differences between the self-to-self and self-to-other relationships, and by the various distinct aspects of the self-to-self relationship. For a similar comparison, see Steele et al. (1981, 198ff.).

A large number of transitive verbs describing actions allow either a direct object which is noncoreferential with the subject, or a direct object which is coreferential with the subject, expressed then by a reflexive pronoun.[13] In this way there will be either a relation of self-to-other (as in *Pierre rase Paul* 'Pierre shaves Paul'), or a relation of self-to-self (as in *Pierre se rase* 'Pierre shaves himself'). A few years ago Jean-Paul Boons[14] noticed a rather bizarre range of facts involving the syntactic behavior of a goodly number of verbs. Consider the following paradigm:

(25) a. *Marie a jeté Pierre par la fenêtre.*
Marie threw Pierre out the window.
b. *Marie a pendu Paul à la branche.*
Marie hung Paul from a branch.
c. *Marie a hissé Luc sur la plate-forme.*
Marie hoisted Luc up on the platform.

(26) a. *Marie s'est jetée par la fenêtre.*
Marie threw herself out the window.
b. *Marie s'est pendue à la branche.*
Marie hung herself from a branch.
c. *Marie s'est hissée sur la plate-forme.*
Marie hoisted herself up on the platform.

(27) a. *Marie n'a jeté que Pierre par la fenêtre.*
Marie threw only Pierre out the window.
b. *Marie n'a pendu que Paul à la branche.*
Marie hung only Paul from a branch.
c. *Marie n'a hissé que Luc sur la plate-forme.*
Marie hoisted only Luc up on the platform.

(28) a. ??*Marie n'a jeté qu'elle-même par la fenêtre.*
Marie threw only herself out the window.
b. ??*Marie n'a pendu qu'elle-même à la branche.*
Marie hung only herself from a branch.
c. ??*Marie n'a hissé qu'elle-même sur la plate-forme.*
Marie hoisted only herself up on the platform.

"If the sentences [of (26)]," wrote Boons, "sound fine as reflexive constructions,[15] the corresponding restrictives [see (28)] are bizarre: their acceptability involves an interpretation where, for example, Mary's body is split into an agent-body and a patient-body, as if Mary stayed in place without undergoing her own fall, her own hanging. . . ." (See Boons-Guillet-Leclère (1976, 123–124); I have replaced one of their examples with one from Kayne 1975, 393.)

To be sure, the actions expressed by the sentences in (25) and (26) have certain common elements (which is what justifies the use of the same verbs in the two cases): for example, the verbs are causatives, and the resultant state of the action will be the same for the patient undergoing the action. Whether Marie hoists herself or hoists Luc up onto the platform, the result will be in either case that Marie, or Luc, will be on the platform. But the action *will* take quite different forms (in the movements, for example) depending on whether it is applied back onto oneself or onto another. Depending on the type of action, the differences between a self-to-self relation and a self-to-other relation will be more or less sharp. Sometimes they practically vanish, as in (29):

(29) a. *Denis envoie des lettres par la poste à Jean-Jacques.*
Denis sends letters in the mail to Jean-Jacques.
b. *Denis s'envoie des lettres par la poste.*
Denis sends himself letters in the mail.

c. *Denis n'envoie des lettres par la poste qu'à Jean-Jacques.*
Denis sends letters only to Jean-Jacques in the mail.
d. *Denis n'envoie des lettres par la poste qu'à lui-même.*
Dennis sends letters only to himself in the mail.

If (29d) is as natural as (29a–c),[16] it is due to the fact that not only are the consequences of sending a letter in the mail identical regardless whether one sends a letter to oneself or to another (the addressee will presumably receive the letter if the postal service is functioning properly), but in addition the series of steps which comprise the action—putting the letter in an envelope, putting a stamp on the envelope, writing the address on the front, slipping the letter into a mailbox, and so on—are exactly the same in the two cases. Quite generally, if I send myself a letter in the mail, I treat myself exactly as I would treat another.[17]

Thus, in simple sentences, the relation between the subject and the object (direct object as in (25)–(28), or indirect, as in (29)) is interpreted sometimes in an entirely parallel way, and sometimes in a quite distinct way, in the two cases in question, that is, when it involves a self-to-self rather than a self-to-other relationship. In general, too, whether the treatment is parallel or distinct is the direct responsibility of the choice of verb. The differences between the self-to-self case and the self-to-other can in some instances be quite sharp, and in others virtually imperceptible, or anywhere in between. On the other hand, the variation in acceptability that arises out of these differences, as in (28), is not a syntactic matter; however we choose to treat the relationship in the syntax between reflexive constructions and transitive constructions with lexical NP object (cf. inter alia, Kayne 1975; Burzio 1981, 1985; Grimshaw 1982), there is no argument to be drawn from facts of the sort in (27)–(28): (28) would be considered syntactically well formed. If (28) is bizarre, the reason clearly derives from the fact that in restrictive constructions with *ne . . . que* 'only', the focus is implicitly contrasted with other terms in a semantico-pragmatic context which is presumed to be held constant; however, in cases like that in (28), our different experience of self-to-self and self-to-other relations makes it impossible for us to perceive the context, or situation, as remaining constant when we switch from the one kind of relation to the other.[18]

Let us turn now to what I referred to earlier as the different facets of the self-to-self relation. What is central to the matter here is precisely how to characterize the notion of underlying "identity" between two linguistic terms (especially "human" ones) which are bound by coreference, typically the case of an antecedent and either a pronoun or an anaphor.[19] We will hold in abeyance the exotic and even pathological cases of the sort

illustrated by the famous example due to Jim McCawley: *I dreamed that I was Brigitte Bardot and that I was kissing me/myself.* The types of cases that interest me are rather those suggested by the examples in Nunberg (1979), with a particularly metonymic character, and those involving "mental space," a notion set forth in Jackendoff (1975a, 1976) and developed further in Fauconnier (1985).

With respect to many of the facts discussed by Nunberg, Jackendoff, and Fauconnier, one can frequently consider the cases to involve two distinct entities (despite the possibility of coreference between the terms[20])—distinct in the real or phenomenological world—involving, for example, a person and his portrait (*Marie, who has blue eyes in reality, has brown eyes in this painting*), an actor and the character he plays (*in "The Naked and the Dead," Aldo Ray ends up getting killed*), an author and his literary work (*I have just finished reading Plato, and I see that he did not believe in the immortality of the soul*), a copy of a newspaper and the company that publishes it (*the newspaper that you are reading belongs to Rupert Murdoch*), etc. By contrast, what I am interested in is the linguistic effects of the internal differentiations of the self: the distinction between the soul, broadly construed, and the body, and their conflation in the person considered globally, as well as the focusing on a particular part of the body, the distinction between the parts of the soul, such as the distinctions drawn by Plato: the *nous*, or rational part, the *thumos*, or anger and aggressivity, and the *epithumiai*, or desires[21]; and also the conflicts between these parts, their placement in hierarchies, and so forth. These distinctions are always present even in simple sentences, where the problem of coreference does not arise. Compare, for example, "I am 5'7" tall," "I love this woman," "I am torn between my love for my family and my love for my country," "What an idiot I am being!" "I don't hear you very well," "Hey, I'm talking to you!" The distinctions become more apparent in sentences where coreference enters into the picture, as in (30).

(30) a. *Pierre se regarde dans son miroir.*
Pierre looks at himself in his mirror.
b. *Pierre n'arrive pas à se dominer.*
Pierre can't manage to get a hold of himself.
c. *Pierre se contredit.*
Pierre contradicts himself.
d. *Cette fois, Pierre s'est dépassé.*
This time, Pierre has surpassed himself.
e. *Pierre est toujours très maître de lui.*
Pierre is always very much in control of himself.
f. *La colère a mis Pierre hors de lui.*
His anger has made Pierre simply beside himself.

g. *Pierre a rougi malgré lui.*
Pierre blushed despite himself.
h. *Pierre a toujours très peu d'argent sur lui.*
Pierre never carries much money on him.
i. *Pierre est resté fidèle/semblable/égal à lui-même.*
Pierre has remained faithful/similar/equal to himself.
j. *Pierre a pris une certaine distance vis-à-vis de lui-même.*
Pierre has stepped back to take a look at himself.
k. *Pierre est rentré en lui-même/a fait un retour sur lui-même/s'est replié sur lui-même.*
Lit., Pierre has entered into himself (i.e., has fallen silent)/has gone back into himself/has folded back on himself (i.e., has closed up).
l. *Pierre se suffit à lui-même.*
Pierre fends for himself.
m. *Pierre se parle à/s'entretient avec lui-même.*
Pierre talks to/converses with himself.

In these examples, Pierre is never viewed in entirely the same light in the first instance of the sentence (*Pierre*) and in the complements with *se, lui, lui-même.* One indication of this shift in perspective can be found in the possibility of paraphrasing some of the sentences in (30) (where the numbering refers back to the examples in (30) as well):

(31) a. *Pierre regarde son visage dans le miroir.*
Pierre looks at his face in the mirror.
b. *Pierre n'arrive pas à dominer ses passions.*
Pierre can't manage to get a hold of his passions.
c. *Pierre contredit ce qu'il vient de dire.*
Pierre contradicts what he has just said.
e. *Pierre est toujours très maître de ses émotions.*
Pierre is always very much in control of his emotions.
g. *Pierre a rougi malgré ses efforts.*
Pierre blushed despite his best efforts not to.
i. *Pierre est resté fidèle à l'idée qu'il se fait de lui.*
Pierre has stayed faithful to the conception he has made of himself.

In no sense should I be taken as suggesting a transformational derivation of the sentences in (30) from something like those in (31), nor even providing any sort of systematic relation between the two in the formal grammar (as Zribi-Hertz 1978 does): far from it. Sentences of the sort in (30) do not all have more or less natural paraphrases of the sort in (31). I

do not see how one could derive (30d, f, h, or m) from natural paraphrases by the deletion of an appropriate noun: compare (30h) to (32):

(32) ??Pierre never has much money on his body (vs. in his pockets, in his wallet).

As for (30d), compare (33a) and (33b):

(33) a. *Dans cette course, Sebastian Coe s'est dépassé.*
In this race, Sebastian Coe has surpassed himself.
b. *Coe dépasse Coe.*
Coe surpasses Coe. (*L'Equipe*, 17 July 1981)

(33b) involves Coe breaking a record that he himself had set, while (33a) describes a situation in which Coe realizes forces within that he did not know he had. In any event, even for those sentences that do have one appropriate paraphrase, still other equally fine paraphrases would be possible, and other expressions could be substituted for *se, lui, or lui-même;* this kind of uneasy paraphrase relationship is not the sort that would serve as the basis for a useful relationship within a formal syntactic grammar. For example, (31a) is not synonymous with (30a); Pierre can look at himself in the mirror without particularly looking at his face. *Pierre looks at his body,* which seems to exclude the face of the person being looked at, would hardly be any more appropriate. In (31b, e), one could permute "passions" and "emotions," terms which are not synonyms (see Heidegger 1979/1961); still other substitutes are possible (gestures, reactions, reflexes, etc.). For (30c), an appropriate paraphrase in certain circumstances would be "Pierre's present behavior contradicts his earlier behavior." (30i) has several paraphrases that are more or less appropriate. However, none of the sentences in (30) is perceived as being strictly ambiguous. The same remarks often hold for the cases studied by Zribi-Hertz—for example, *se surveiller* 'watch one's step.' We can see in attempts like those of Zribi-Hertz (hers is more carefully done than others) the atomism of purely analytic thought, its incapacity to envisage the human being, the person, the soul, as having a diversified and ramified internal unity. This atomism has taken on virtually the form of a caricature in Harris's work, as well as in the work of the generative semanticists; it is not absent in the work on mental spaces by Jackendoff and by Fauconnier (though given what I say below about *vouloir* 'want,' I feel uneasy with Fauconnier's treatment of such verbs, which has them introducing a "hypothetical space"—see Fauconnier 1985, 1.6.4). For a philosophical critique of analytical philosophy, especially concerning its capacities for dealing with man, ethics, politics, and so on, see Rosen (1980), Capaldi (1984), Schaefer (1984).

On the other hand, the fact that in all the examples in (31) the subject NP remains the same as in (30) might suggest that the subject always refers to the person, viewed in a global way, and that the various particular facets of the person tend to be expressed in complements, a suggestion which brings into the picture the asymmetry between subject and complement. There is no doubt a certain degree of truth to this observation, but it requires closer attention; compare, for example, (30g) and (31g) to "Pierre's face turned red/to hard stone despite himself."[22]

In any event, a comparison of (30) and (31) is suggestive, and brings out the existence of relations between various aspects of the person: between the global person (or subject of perception) and the body as a physical object (as object of perception) (cf. (30a, g)); between the person (or the rational part of the soul, linked to the will or *thumos*[23]) and the passions, the emotions, the desires (cf. (30b, e, f)); between the person (or the thinking subject) and the idea or image that the person makes of him- or herself (cf. (30i, j)); between the person and the idea that others make of him or her (cf. (30i)) (these last two relations are often difficult to distinguish); between two moments or aspects of the person viewed from the exterior (30c, i); between the person as speaker and as listener (30m), and so on. These relations are often at quite different levels and of different sorts; they may be harmonious (30i, l, m), or in conflict (30b, f), relations of equality (30c, i, n), of reciprocity (30m), of superior to inferior (30b, d), of inferior to superior (30g); they can involve various movements (30d, f, j, k). The distance between self and self, so to speak, will vary, and can be present even if the referent of both the subject and the nonsubject-referring expression is considered as a global person. Finally, the relation of self to self can be relatively close to the relation of self to other determined by the same verb, cf. *Pierre s'est tué/a tué Paul d'une balle dans la tête* 'Pierre killed himself/killed Paul with a bullet in the head'; *Je ne me/le vois pas gagner cette course* 'I don't see myself/him winning that race.'

3. The Iconic Distancing of the Biclausal Construction

Let us return to the biclausal constructions. Here the fundamental question concerns the relations that are created, given the meaning of the matrix verb, between the referents (identical or not) of the subject of the matrix clause and that of the embedded clause. From the point of view of form—focusing here on the situation in French—the central fact is this: in the case of coreferentiality, it is possible to choose between a single occurrence of the subject (a choice which yields infinitival complements) and

two occurrences of the subject (which gives rise to finite complement structures). In the first case, there is obviously a formal contrast between coreferentiality and noncoreferentiality. In the second case, an embedded subject coreferential to the matrix subject appears on the same footing as an embedded subject which is not coreferential to the matrix subject; both contrast with the matrix subject, by the simple fact that they offer a distinct occurrence of a formal element.

It is this possibility of choice which will be used iconically. All other things being equal, the finite complement, with two occurrences of coreferential subjects, will be adequate if, on the one hand, the relation of self-to-self determined by the meaning of the matrix verb[24] involves an internal differentiation and highlights two distinct facets of the self, and/or introduces a certain distance between self and self—and if, on the other hand, the relation of self-to-self tends to be viewed, in the same context, in the same manner as the relation of self-to-other. Inversely, the infinitival complement, with a single occurrence of the subject, will be appropriate if the relation of self-to-self, as determined by the matrix verb, contrasts with the relation of self-to-other, and if the internal distance between the two instances of the self tends to vanish, or if they are viewed from fundamentally the same point of view.

Let us begin by illustrating this with some extreme cases. Consider that of *remarquer* 'notice': consider the examples in (10), repeated in (34).[25]

(34) Early in the morning, after a sleepless night, Pierre is shaving in front of his mirror:
   a. *Pierre remarque qu'il a les traits tirés.*
      Lit., Pierre notices that he has haggard features, i.e., Pierre notices that he looks tired.
   b. **Pierre remarque avoir les traits tirés.*
      *Pierre notices to have haggard features.

A sentence like (34a) is natural only if we imagine Pierre looking in a mirror, or a reflective surface of some sort, or a movie he is in: if he cannot see his face, he will not notice that his features look haggard (cf. also *Pierre remarque qu'il commence à avoir des cheveux gris* 'Pierre notices that he is starting to get some gray hair', or *Marie remarque qu'elle a un grain de beauté sur la fesse gauche* 'Marie notices that she has a beauty mark on her left buttock', which presupposes either that Marie performs some gymnastics in front of a large mirror, or that she has two mirrors appropriately placed). In other words, a natural use of *remarquer* 'notice' always presupposes a fairly sharp distancing between the subject and the object of the noticing; the subject of *notice* designates the conscious subject, and to notice something is to bring to the reflective consciousness something from its exterior which was not present to that consciousness, and which corresponds to a facet (though not just any facet) of the self.[26] This accounts for the bizarreness of any use of *remarquer* or *notice* involving punctual events simultaneous with the noticing: compare *I notice that I am lighting a cigarette* with *I notice that I lit a cigarette with my left hand*, or with *I notice that I light a cigarette every time I get upset.* A similar point emerges with facts already present to the reflective consciousness (compare *the policeman notices that he has been carefully tailing the spy for a half-hour* with *the spy notices that he is being followed by a policeman;* also consider cases where the noticing is based on internal sensations, where, out of context, it is odd to say *Pierre notices that he has a headache*).[27]

Thus the uses of *remarquer* 'notice' involve a self-to-self relation that is essentially the same as the relation of self-to-other. The self-to-self relation is often even more complex, for it can involve a certain indirection which is not necessary in the case of the self-to-other relation. A simple glance at Pierre suffices to allow me to notice that his face is drawn, or that his hair is graying, or that he has put on weight (cf. also *Marie's lover notices that she has a beauty mark on the left buttock*), while Pierre (at least in the case where the observation is based on direct perception)[28] must somehow involve an intermediary that is external to him: a mirror in (34a), a scale, the belt that he must let out a notch, last summer's pants that he can no longer get into, in a case like *Pierre notices that he has put on weight recently.* The intermediary in question is often another person; note the expression, cited in all the dictionaries, *faire remarquer à quelqu'un que S* (lit., 'to make someone notice that S'). Thus one says in French:[29]

(35) *Ma femme me fait remarquer* { *que j'ai grossi.* / *que j'ai les traits tirés.* / *que j'ai l'air en forme.*
   Lit., my wife makes me notice (i.e., points out to me)
   { that I have put on weight / that my face is drawn. / that I'm looking well.
(36) *L'amant de Marie lui fait remarquer qu'elle a un grain de beauté sur la fesse gauche.*
   Marie's lover points out to her that she has a beauty mark on her left buttock.

Let us move on to *want* 'vouloir', and consider once again our paradigmatic example:

(37) a. *Je veux partir.*
I want to leave.
b. **Je veux que je parte.*
I want for me to leave.

We conceive of the relation between our will and our own acts quite differently from the relation between our will and the acts of others. In the former case, there is a continuity that is quite missing in the latter. All other things being equal, if I want to accomplish an act—to raise my hand, to smile, to close the door, to go on a trip, to read a book—whether I accomplish it or not depends ultimately on my will. As soon as my will bears on the act of another, there will always be at least one thing which can stand between my will and the accomplishment of the act: the will of the other. However formidable my powers of pressure and persuasion may be, if I say to you "I want you to close the door," in the final analysis it still comes down to you wanting to close it if the door is going to get closed.

Partir 'leave' in (37) is an action verb, and I have just spoken about verbs of actions, one's own actions (due to oneself) and those of others. It is no accident that linguists who discuss the syntax of *vouloir* or *want* virtually always choose examples where the subordinate verb is an action verb, most often from the same class as *partir/leave*.[30] The point, to be sure, is that there is a special affinity between the will and action, in particular one's own action. It is not that *vouloir* or *want* is an agentive verb,[31] nor that an action can be involuntary or that one can want things other than actions.[32] But prototypical action is voluntary action, and the object of the wanting is first and foremost action, and in particular one's own action. If I say *I want P,* I mean by this that I am ready to do whatever is necessary for P to be realized. There is also a direct link between the will and power, and wanting creates an intimate link, a link of "enveloping" between the subject and the object of the wanting.[33] "Wanting," says Heidegger,[34] "establishes a powerful seizure of the one wanting and on the thing wanted . . . the very fact of wanting is to extend one's domination outside of oneself to . . . ; the will is in itself power . . . whoever says will says power . . . the will is self-resolution as domination, as being master beyond oneself."

The self-to-self relation established by *vouloir* 'want' is thus particularly intimate, and at the same time it is quite distinct from the relation established between self-and-other. In all respects *vouloir* 'want' is the opposite of *remarquer* 'notice'. The distribution of acceptable and unacceptable surface forms reflects this contrast.

One swallow (or two) does not a summer make. If we went no further, the reader could well leave these observations with the thought that they were of no more than anecdotal interest. I ought now to examine a large number of verbs, and to consider each of them in turn, describing, as I did for *want* and for *notice,* the experiences or the representations which are associated with them, and verifying in each case whether the predictions that I make concerning the behavior of the surface forms is confirmed. Such an enterprise is—for now, at least—too great for me personally to undertake. In any event, as Nunberg says with regard to a similar situation (see Nunberg 1978, 123; see also chapter 5), we are in a situation where, it seems, "the best we can do is to give a plausible account of a few cases, and let the argument follow inductively."

However, I will not let the matter drop completely with just the verbs *remarquer* 'notice' and *vouloir* 'want', and we will find later on, when we consider other verbs, characteristics that are entirely comparable to those which I have just presented.[35] Fortunately, however, we are not entirely constrained to this single mode of investigation. The hypothesis which I maintain in fact makes other predictions of a different sort. If the explanation of the facts we are considering is based essentially on an iconic relationship between content and surface form, these facts are not directly a matter for the formal grammar in the strict sense of the term. (Relations of this iconic sort certainly are not limited specifically to the linguistic domain; they undoubtedly come under "general intelligence" or "central" cognitive processes (see Fodor 1983)). From the point of view of formal syntax, *all* the sentences of (1)–(4), (7), (10)–(15), are well formed—a point which simplifies the task of the formal syntax. But this means in principle that, for example, we should expect that sentences of the same form as (1a)—involving a subordinate clause in the subjunctive with a subject coreferential to the matrix subject—would be (in varying degrees) more acceptable than (1a), if they differ from (1a) in one way or another in terms of their content. We will see that this is indeed the case. In section 4, I will examine a certain number of types of sentences whose matrix verb is in each case *vouloir* 'want.' In section 5, I will proceed to other verbs which take, like *vouloir,* a subjunctive complement. In the Postscript, I will mention very briefly several remaining problems which I leave for future research.

4. Syntactic Effects That Facilitate Distancing

One's will enjoys an especially intimate relationship with one's actions, with the scope of one's possessions, with one's power, with one's capabil-

ities of acting upon oneself; there is no rupture between one's will and one's actions that is in any way comparable to the gulf between one's will and the actions of another. If my hypothesis is correct, if the choice of surface forms reflects iconically the internal structure of the content, then the unacceptability of (1a) is due to the fact that its surface structure suggests, iconically, a discontinuity between the will and the action of the same person ("I," in this case)—as if I were forced to split up, to see myself from the outside, and having considered an action, had to exert some kind of pressure on myself in just the same way that I would have to do when the action considered was someone else's action. If this is correct, we should be able, by modifying the semantic content in predictable ways, to come up with sentences which, though similar to (1a) in syntactic structure are nonetheless different semantically, and are thus in varying degrees more acceptable.

4.1 *Passive*

Let us consider first the following sentences:[36]

(38) a. ?*Je veux que je sois autorisé à partir demain.*
?I want for me to be allowed to leave tomorrow.
b. *Je veux être autorisé à partir demain.*
I want to be allowed to leave tomorrow.

(39) a. ?*Je veux que je sois enterré dans mon village natal.*
I want for me to be buried in the village of my birth.
b. *Je veux être enterré dans mon village natal.*
I want to be buried in the village of my birth.

While it is still true that the sentences in (38a) and (39a) are less good than the corresponding (b) examples,[37] they are certainly more acceptable than the Paradigmatic Equi cases. The explanation is not hard to find. By definition, a passive sentence does not express an action of the subject; if the verb, as in (38)–(39), is an action verb, it must involve an action performed by someone else, whether that other person is overtly expressed or not. Thus in both cases, the accomplishment of my will must somehow make a detour and pass by way of someone else's will: (38a), (39a) have at least that much in common with (1b) and (1c). The actual semantic content of the embedded verb can be relevant in affecting acceptability judgments as well:[38] *autoriser* 'allow' indicates that the power of the other person involved surpasses my own, while *enterrer* 'bury' suggests that I will not be around to safeguard the accomplishment of my will—the will

that my lawyer provides being simply an insufficient vehicle for my true will.

4.2 *Pouvoir*

Let us consider another type of example:

(40) a. ?*Je veux que je puisse partir dès demain.*
?I want for me to be able to leave (by) tomorrow.
b. *Je veux pouvoir partir dès demain.*
I want to be able to leave (by) tomorrow.

(41) a. ?*Je veux que je puisse attaquer à l'aube.*
?I want for me to be able to attack at dawn.
b. *Je veux pouvoir attaquer à l'aube.*
I want to be able to attack at dawn.

Once again, the (a) sentences are probably less good than the (b) sentences, but they begin to appear natural if one imagines the appropriate contexts. For example, (40a) could be said by a busy businessman addressing his secretary, who is supposed to be getting a reservation for an airplane seat for an important meeting. (41a), similarly, might be said by a general speaking to his field officers the day before the battle. It should be noted that the relations of power (between superior and inferior) in (40)–(41) are the opposite of what they are in (38)–(39). As with the passive, the use of *pouvoir* (or *to be able*) introduces a distance between the expression of the will and the accomplishment of the act, whether the word be taken in the root sense of "capacity" or the epistemic sense of "possibility" (on the relations between root and epistemic interpretations of modals, see, e.g., Sweetser 1982 and Woisetschlaeger 1976).[39]

According to Pierre Pica (personal communication), the equivalents of (38a)–(39a) in the third person would be less acceptable. I think he is right; this may be related to the fact that if I say, "Pierre wants . . . ," I do not have direct access to Pierre's will. Thus "Pierre wants . . ." corresponds in a sense to "I believe that Pierre wants . . . ," or to "They say Pierre wants . . ." or to "Pierre tells me that he wants . . . ," etc. See (3) above. I will come back to this in the Postscript. In this section, I will restrict the discussion in general to first-person sentences. There is, in addition, the potential ambiguity of such sentences as (3c); for some differences in the behavior of first-person sentences versus third-person sentences with the *croire* 'believe' class, again see the Postscript to this chapter.

The carrying out of the will of a superior, even if that will directly involves one's own action, can depend on intermediate actions accom-

plished by inferiors. (40a), (41a) are interpreted as if one had an intermediate subordinate; compare (42):

(42) *Je veux que tout soit fait pour que je puisse partir demain (attaquer à l'aube).*
I want everything to be done so that I can leave tomorrow (attack at dawn).

The repetition of *je* 'I' in the French example suggests perhaps the distinction between the *je*, the commander himself (the person), and the *je* identified metonymically with his army. The inversion of the relations between superior and inferior does not derive from the opposition between *pouvoir* 'to be able' and the passive form; it involves rather the choice of the particular examples, as we can see with the next two examples. Compare (43):

(43) *Je voudrais vraiment bien que je puisse partir demain.*
I would really, really like for me to be able to leave tomorrow.

said by a Soviet Jew waiting for his emigration permit, and compare this with the case with opposite superior/inferior relation, as in (44), said by a banker to his barber:

(44) *Je veux que je sois rasé impeccablement.*
?I want for me to be shaved impeccably.

If we combine a modal and a passive in the subordinate clause, and if in addition we soften the expression of the will by putting *vouloir* 'to want' in the conditional and adding *bien*—in effect, changing *want* to *would like*—then we find that the result is a perfectly acceptable sentence, at least for some informants. Imagine again a Jewish citizen of the Soviet Union saying (45):

(45) *Je voudrais bien que je puisse enfin être autorisé (par l'État) à partir pour Israel/à émigrer en Israel.*
I would like for me to be able at last to be allowed (by the state) to leave for Israel/to emigrate to Israel.

4.3 *Perfective*

The conditions which make the nonreduced subjunctive complement sentences more acceptable are not limited to these factors (passive, modals, the conditional on *vouloir* 'to want', the modulating effect of the addition of *bien* to *vouloir*). Any element which would tend to suggest a distance between the will and the accomplishment of the corresponding act tends

to improve acceptability. For example, it is sometimes enough just to put the embedded clause in the perfective aspect, which emphasizes the accomplishment of the act, as in (46), or to modify it in various ways, as in (47).

(46) a. *Je veux (absolument) que je sois parti dans dix minutes.*
I want (absolutely) for me to be gone in ten minutes.
[said in circumstances like those for (40)].
b. *Ah! Je voudrais que je sois déjà parti!*
Oh! I would like for me to be already gone!

(47) a. *Je veux que j'aie le temps de me préparer à partir.*
?I want for me to have the time to prepare myself for leaving.
b. *Je veux que je sois en mesure de partir dès demain.*
I want for me to be able to leave by tomorrow.
c. *Je veux que je sois prêt à attaquer à l'aube.*
?I want for me to be ready to attack at dawn.

4.4 *Coordination*

Any element that introduces a contrast between self and other also contributes to improving the acceptability. This applies, for example, in cases of coordinate complements under *vouloir* 'want':

(48) a. **Je veux que je parte et que tu restes.*
I want for me to go and for you to stay.
b. ?*Je veux que tu partes et que je reste.*
I want to you to go and for me to stay.
c. *Je veux que tu partes et que je puisse rester.*
I want for you to go and for me to be able to stay.

(49) *Je veux qu'il soit vaincu et que je sois vainqueur.*
I want for him to be beaten and for me to be the one to do it.

Here the role of iconic factors is particularly noticeable. If (48a) is still poor, it is because, as with the Paradigmatic Equi case, the embedded clause with coreferential subject immediately follows the matrix verb.[40] (48b) is better: the embedded clause with coreferential subject, following the other complement, is at a distance from the matrix verb. (48c), which combines this factor with a modal, is perfect. In the French case in (49), finally, a "poetic" factor comes into play: the complements are parallel in their syntactic and phonetic form, and it is even a classic alexandrine (not quite, actually; there is a hiatus at the caesura). In English likewise such surface pressures involving form could come into play, if we were to construct an example like:

(50) I'd like for him to lose this time,
for me to win for once.

We may mention in this connection the very sentence which closes Annie Cohen-Solal's biography of Jean-Paul Sartre, a quotation from one of Sartre's last conversations before his death:

(51) *Je veux . . . que ma mort ne rentre pas dans ma vie, ne la définisse pas, que je sois toujours un appel à vivre.*
I want . . . that my death not reenter into my life, that it [my death] not define it [my life], that I be always a call [for people] to live.

Pseudo-clefts also introduce an implicit contrast.[41] If the pseudo-cleft corresponding to the Paradigmatic Equi sentences is still bad (as in (52a)), we need only add to the focus of the pseudo-cleft one of the facilitating elements that we explored a moment ago to get an acceptable sentence:

(52) a. **Ce que je veux, c'est que je parte.*
What I want is for me to leave.
b. *Ce que je veux, c'est partir.*
?What I want is to leave.

(53) a. *Ce que je veux, c'est que je sois autorisé à partir.*
What I want is for me to be allowed to leave.
b. *Ce que je veux, c'est que je puisse partir dès demain.*
What I want is for me to be allowed/able to leave by tomorrow, i.e., what I want is that I be allowed to leave by tomorrow.
c. *Ce que je veux, c'est que j'aie le temps de me préparer à partir.*
What I want is for me to have time to get ready to leave.
d. *Ce que je veux, c'est que je sois parti dans dix minutes.*
What I want is for me to be gone in ten minutes.

Other types of contrasts have comparable effects, as we see in (54):

(54) a. *Je veux absolument que je sois le seul à partir.*
I absolutely want for me to be the only one to leave.
b. *Je voudrais* { *que, moi aussi, je puisse partir.* / *que, moi aussi, je sois engagé par cette compagnie.*
I would like { for me, too, to be able to leave. / for me, too, to be hired by that company.

4.5 *Active/Stative Contrast*

Up to now I have restricted the discussion to cases where the verb of the embedded clause expressed an action. If I am right, though, we would

expect that sentences where the embedded clause contained a verb which did not express an action would be, all other things being equal, better than our Paradigmatic Equi sentence (1a). Here, intuitions become murky, but we can make a few interesting observations. Thus, if (55a) is simply bad, it is because *recevoir* 'receive' is used to describe an action. The French example in (56a), and even more in (57a), seems much better to me. The reason is clear: it is not simply a matter of my own will whether I receive a message or a letter; the sender of the letter and the postal service have to do their parts for the letter to be received:

(55) Said by the lady of the house:
a. **Je veux que je reçoive mes invités avec faste.*
*I want for me to receive the guests in grand style.
b. *Je veux recevoir mes invités avec faste.*
I want to receive the guests in grand style.

(56) Said by Napoleon to an aide-de-camp he is sending to Davout, who commands another detachment:
a. ?*Dites-lui bien que je veux que je reçoive son message dans les plus brefs délais.*
??Do be sure to tell him that I want for me to receive his message without delay.
b. *Dites-lui bien que je veux recevoir son message dans les plus brefs délais.*
Do be sure to tell him that I want to receive his message without delay.

(57) Said by an emigré:
a. *Je voudrais bien que je puisse recevoir de temps en temps des nouvelles de ma famille restée au pays.*
I really would like for me to be able from time to time to get news of my family back in the old country.
b. *Je voudrais bien pouvoir recevoir de temps en temps des nouvelles de ma famille restée au pays.*
I really would like to be able from time to time to get news of my family back in the old country.[42]

Or again:

(58) a. ?*Je veux* (or better: *voudrais*) *que je guérisse.*
?I would like for me to get better.
b. *Je veux guérir.*
I would like to get better.

(59) a. ?*Je veux que je réussisse.*
I want for me to succeed.
b. *Je veux réussir.*
I want to succeed.

If the (a) examples are relatively acceptable, it is because every success depends to some degree on an element of chance, an element that is beyond the control of the personal will, just as getting well, as in (58), depends only in part on the will.

See also (60), said by a boxer to his trainer:

(60) *Je veux que je sois en forme pour le match de demain.*
I want for me to be in form for tomorrow's match.

There are no doubt some nuances between the (a) examples and the (b) examples; compare (61), said by Didier Pironi, the racing champion whose legs were seriously injured, and (62), from the mouth of a lady who eats not wisely but too well.

(61) *Je veux absolument guérir.*
I absolutely want to recover.
(62) *Je voudrais bien que je maigrisse, mais j'aime tant les sucreries!*
I would really like for me to lose some weight, but I do love sweets so!

Another example, this time with the verb *ressembler* 'resemble':

(63) a. *Quand j'étais petit, j'aurais voulu que je ressemble un jour à Napoléon.*
When I was a little boy, I wanted for me someday to look like Napoleon.
b. *Quand j'étais petit, j'aurais voulu ressembler un jour à Napoléon.*
(64) Said to a painter who is starting my portrait, or by a painter who is doing a self-portrait:
a. *Dans ce tableau, je veux que je ressemble à Napoléon.*
In this painting, I want for me to look like Napoleon.
b. *Dans ce tableau, je veux ressembler à Napoléon.*
In this painting, I want to look like Napoleon.

Ressembler 'to look like' does not express an action, and whether I resemble someone or not, physically or even morally, depends at best quite indirectly on my will; the recognition of the similarity is as much for someone else to notice as it is for me to do so. In addition, in (64) the two

instances of *je* 'I' belong to two different mental spaces (the person, and his image in the painting).[43]

4.6 *Psychological Verbs*

Psychological verbs such as *amuser* 'amuse', *étonner* 'surprise', etc. (Ruwet 1972, chap. 5) present an interesting problem. We know that when they have a human subject they oscillate between an agentive and a nonagentive interpretation.[44] What is going on in the following examples?

(65) a. ?*Je veux que j'amuse ces enfants.*
*?I want for me to amuse those children.
b. *Je veux amuser ces enfants.*
I want to amuse those children.
(66) a. ?*Je veux que je séduise cette femme.*
I want for me to seduce that woman (or, to be found seductive by her).
b. *Je veux séduire cette femme.*
I want to seduce that woman.

The (b)-examples are better, in any event, than the (a)-examples. The (b)-examples are probably ambiguous between an agentive and a nonagentive interpretation, perhaps with a dominantly agentive reading. Insofar as the (a)-examples are acceptable at all, they are interpreted as nonagentive; when the subject is repeated, I tend to see, as if from the exterior, a second instance of myself, the one denoted by the embedded subject, and this encourages the nonagentive interpretation. Once again, the examples become more natural when one or more of the facilitating factors of the sort we have been looking at are included, as in (67)–(68).

(67) a. *Je voudrais bien que je puisse amuser ces enfants.*
I certainly would like for me to be able to amuse those children.
b. *Ce que je veux, c'est que je séduise cette femme* (*par ma bonne mine*/*ces cravates*/*mon brillant*).
What I want is for me to dazzle that woman (with my looks/my ties/my brilliance).
(68) a. *Je veux que je sois très amusant ce soir.*
I want for me to be quite amusing tonight.
b. *Je veux que je sois très séduisant ce soir.*
I want for me to be very dazzling (lit., seductive, seducing) tonight.

To my ear, passives of *Psych*-verbs embedded under *je veux que . . .* sound rather worse than the passives of action verbs in (38)–(39); cf. (69).

(69) ?*Je voudrais que je sois impressionné/amusé par cet homme/ce problème.*
I would like for me to be impressed/amused by this man/this problem.

The corresponding active is either as unnatural as (69), (cf. (70)), or better (71), with sometimes a somewhat agentive sense (72); compare (73).

(70) ?*Je veux que ce livre m'intéresse.*
I want this book to interest me.
(71) *Je voudrais que ce problème m'amuse.*
I would like for this problem to amuse me.
(72) *Je veux qu'on m'étonne.* (Diaghilev)
I want people to astonish me.
(73) ??*Je veux que je sois étonné.*
I want me to be astonished.

Here (a) the subject of the passive designates the "experiencer," and there is a minimum of distance between the *je* 'I' subject of *vouloir* 'want' and the *je* 'I' experiencer in the lower clause; and (b) in the nonagentive interpretation, unlike the case of the action verbs, there is no intervention of another's will.

(74) below, in which *séduire* is used in its agentive sense, is better. (75) is relatively natural; *aimer* 'love' is not agentive, but to be loved does not depend on my will. This matter deserves closer scrutiny.

(74) *Je voudrais que, un jour, je sois séduite par ce bel homme.*
I would like, one day, for me to be seduced by that handsome man.
(75) *Je voudrais que je sois aimé de cette femme.*
I would like for me to be loved by that woman.

Examples (69)–(75) illustrate the hopelessness of a purely formal approach to the question (cf. Gerschenfeld 1982). It would not suffice to exempt passive complements of *vouloir* 'to want' from the Disjoint Reference constraint, i.e., Principle B of Binding Theory. The same point holds for modals or Raising verbs (see below). Gerschenfeld proposes a means for exempting from Disjoint Reference all sentences which (like the passives, Raising cases, and modal cases) would have an "empty" subject in D-structure. But, according to an analysis which is becoming standard (Burzio 1981, 1985), "unaccusative" verbs would also have an "empty" subject in D-structure. See (1)–(4), note 32, and chapters 3 and 4 here as well.

With various Raising verbs, similar in certain respects to psychological

verbs (see Ruwet 1972, chap. 5 and chapter 2 of this book), the embedded clause is relatively natural:

(76) *Max voudrait qu'il paraisse/qu'il ait l'air plus intelligent.*
Max would like for him to appear more intelligent.

(but see note 31, and chapter 2). Compare also (77):

(77) *Je voudrais que je finisse par partir/que j'arrive à partir.*
I would like for me to end up by leaving/for me to manage to leave.

Tough-constructions are also better than the Paradigmatic Equi sentences; see chapter 5, section 3.1.:

(78) *J'aurais bien voulu que je sois plus facile à comprendre.*
I would really have liked for me to have been easier to understand.

4.7 *Negation*

Still another set of facts to consider. If the matrix clause is negative, and if the embedded clause expresses something that involves a more or less negative expression as far as the subject is concerned, the finite embedded clause (i.e., without Equi-NP-Deletion) is relatively acceptable:

(79) a. ?*Je ne veux pas que je rate une occasion pareille.*
?I do not want for me to miss a chance like that.
b. *Je ne voudrais pas que j'oublie de donner ce coup de téléphone.*
I would not want for me to forget to give (them) a phone call.
c. ?*Je ne veux pas que je me trompe de clé (encore).*
?I do not want for me to mix up the keys (again).
d. ?*Je ne veux pas que je m'égare dans toutes ces subtilités.*
?I do not want for me to get lost in all these profundities.

This factor, combined with the others that we have already seen, gives us sentences that are practically perfect (80):

(80) a. *Je ne voudrais (vraiment) pas que je sois obligé de partir plus tôt que prévu.*
I wouldn't (really) like for me to have to (or be obliged to) leave earlier than I had planned.
b. *Je ne voudrais (vraiment) pas que j'aie l'air de n'avoir rien compris à cette conférence.*
I wouldn't (really) like for me to look like I have understood nothing at all of this lecture.

Bernard Fradin has suggested to me the sentence in (81), said by the owner of a car to his mechanic.

(81) *Je ne voudrais pas* { *que je dérape.* / *que je crève un pneu à tout bout de champ.*
I would not want { for me to skid. / for me to get a flat all the time.

In this sentence we find, once again, a metonymic relation between the two instances of *je* 'I'—the person, and his car; cf. *je me suis garé là-bas*, literally 'I parked myself over there,' idiomatically, 'I am parked over there.' See note 43 and the corresponding text.

4.8 *Polar Reinforcement*

We have seen several times that an explicit attenuation of the will ("I would very much like . . ." as opposed to "I want") will facilitate the acceptability of the non-Equi sentence with an overt embedded subject. But reinforcing the expression of the will will sometimes have the same effect; cf. (82), and (46a), (54a) above:

(82) a. *Je veux absolument que j'amuse ces enfants.*
I absolutely want for me to amuse the children.
b. *Je veux absolument que je guérisse.*
I absolutely want for me to get well.
c. *Je veux absolument que je sois enterré dans mon village natal.*
I absolutely want for me to be buried in the village of my birth.
d. *Je veux absolument que je sois en mesure d'attaquer à l'aube.*
I absolutely want for me to be able to attack at dawn.
e. *Je veux absolument que je puisse partir demain.*
I absolutely want for me to be able to leave tomorrow.

The fact that the resolve of the subject needs to be underscored by the word *absolument* 'absolutely' suggests—all other things being equal, since **je veux absolument que je parte* is still bad—that we conjure up images involving serious obstacles to the carrying out of the will; and this point is entirely in harmony, then, with the choice of an overt subject in the lower clause, according to our hypothesis.

4.9 *A Special Construction*

Milner and Milner (1975) have pointed out a kind of construction in French which, they suggest, may only appear in a very specific kind of dialogue. These sentences are always given in response to another person, and have no clear equivalent in English. They are of the form *Pourquoi veux-tu* (or *voulez-vous*) *que S?*, where "S" is a sentence that repeats, nearly word for word, a certain part of the interlocutor's utterance. Literally, this means 'Why do you want that S?' but idiomatically it means

something along the lines of 'why in heaven's name do you take it that S?' Consider the following examples, from Milner and Milner (1975, 147):

(83) A: *Mais alors, vous êtes brouillés?*
So, you're feuding?
B: *Brouillés? Pourquoi veux-tu que nous soyons brouillés?*
Feuding? Why do you say we're feuding?
(84) A: *Et surtout, ne va pas à l'hôpital . . .*
And above all, don't go to the hospital . . .
B: *Pourquoi veux-tu que j'aille à l'hôpital?*
Why do you say that I should go to the hospital?

Milner and Milner (1975, 125) note that given the discourse conditions that permit this construction, sentences where the subject of the embedded clause is coreferential with the subject of the matrix clause are possible—the case of the Paradigmatic Equi Sentence. The corresponding cases with the embedded infinitive (as if Equi had applied) are even a bit unnatural in these contexts. Examples (85) and (86) come from Milner and Milner (1975, 125 and 148); example (87) is my own, where we see that the Paradigmatic Equi Sentence has become quite acceptable.

(85) A: *J'ai sûrement pris froid.*
I've surely caught a cold.
B: *Pourquoi veux-tu que tu aies pris froid?*
Why do you think you've caught a cold? (lit., why do you want for you to have caught cold?)
(86) A: *Si je sèche, je suis sûr que mon bégaiement me reprendra. C'est nerveux.*
If I clutch, I am sure my stuttering will come back. It's my nerves.
B: *Pourquoi veux-tu que tu sèches?*
But why should you clutch?
(87) A: *C'est malheureux, il va falloir que je parte.*
It's too bad, I am going to have to leave.
B: *Pourquoi veux-tu que tu partes?*
But why should you leave? (lit., why do you want for you to leave?)

I will not discuss the sketchy description that Milner and Milner give of the facts, nor the interpretation that they propose. Milner and Milner oppose the ordinary usage of *vouloir*, on the one hand, and its use in this type of construction, on the other. In this respect they follow traditional analysis, and they claim (p. 124) that "in all the [other] uses of *vouloir*,

the infinitive is obligatory if the subject of the complement is identical to that of *vouloir"*; they do not say how, syntactically, they would account for the difference. In light of the discussion so far, the reader will understand that I find the facts in (85)–(87) to represent simply an extreme case of a much more general phenomenon. The main point is this: in all these exchanges, B attributes to A, or projects onto A, a will that involves a certain content, a content that has been expressed in some way in A's prior statement, though that statement does not in fact imply that A *wants* this content to come about; it is often quite the opposite—compare, for instance, (87) with (88), which is surely less natural.

(88) A: *Bon, c'est décidé, je pars.*
OK, its decided, I'm leaving.
B: *Pourquoi veux-tu que tu partes?*
Why do you want for you to leave?

In (85)–(87), what B projects as A's will is thrown upon A from the outside, while it should be clear from what A has just said, as well as from the context, that the content of the complement in (87) does *not* correspond to A's will. Actually A would be entitled to reply to B, in (87), *mais, espèce d'idiot, tu vois bien que je ne veux pas partir* 'But, you idiot, you do see that I don't want to leave, don't you?' or, even better, *tu vois bien que je ne veux pas que je parte* 'You do see that I do not want for me to leave.' It should be obvious that there is no continuity, in the sense of our earlier discussion, between A's will and the content of the complement in B's utterance.[45]

The following examples tend to support the idea that the facts studied by Milner and Milner represent only an extreme case. These examples are the missing link between the rather special dialogue construction and the more familiar uses of *vouloir;* a special dialogic context is not always necessary here:

(89) A: *Mais tu débloques complètement, mon vieux!*
You're coming completely undone, my friend.
B: *Je veux bien que je débloque un peu, mais, franchement, tu exagères!*
OK, sure, (lit., I do want that) I'm coming undone, but, really, you're overdoing it.

(90) A: (*A part*) *Quel demeuré, ce gars-là!*
(Aside) What a retard that guy (is).
B: (*Qui a surpris le monologue de A*) *Je veux bien que je sois un demeuré . . . mais rira bien qui rira le dernier.*
(Overhearing) Sure I'm a retard (lit., I do want for me to be a retard) . . . but he who laughs last laughs best.

(91) Monologue of a department chairman who is unhappy with his colleagues:
Je veux bien que je sois le seul à me dévouer dans ce foutu département, mais il ne faudrait quand même pas qu'ils me prennent pour une poire!
OK, sure I'm the only one (lit., I really want for me to be the only one) who takes his job seriously in this damn department, but that's no reason for everyone to take me for a sucker.

4.10 *A Final Remark*

After this discussion, it should come as no surprise that even our Paradigmatic Equi Sentences can sometimes occur, and even without the special discourse context of section 4.9. Jean-Claude Anscombre told me that he heard the following sentence in a conversation:

(92) *Je veux que je parte si tôt demain que personne ne m'entende.*
I want for me to leave so early tomorrow that no one hears me.

This sentence was uttered by a friend of Anscombre's at Anscombre's house late at night, just before going to bed. The friend in question was a French linguist who works in Brussels, and comes from time to time to Paris, and who then stays with Anscombre. He had to leave early the following morning, and did not want to wake up the other members of the household. Like Anscombre, I find this sentence, given the context, practically acceptable; it seems to me easy to interpret from the perspective that I have adopted. The speaker here somehow sees his own departure from the perspective or point of view of another—of those whom he does not wish to awaken tomorrow morning.

This sentence would no doubt be better as (93).

(93) *Je veux que, demain, je parte si tôt que personne ne m'entende.*
I want that, tomorrow, I should leave (subj.) so early that no one hears me.

Another way to improve the acceptability would be as in (94):

(94) *Je veux une (seule) chose: que je parte/puisse partir le plus tôt possible.*
I want one (single) thing: for me to (be able to) leave as soon as possible.

5. Further Verbal Studies

Let us move on to other verbs which, like *vouloir,* require a subjunctive complement. The picture becomes even more complicated, and the hope

(if one remained) that we could come up with a purely formal analysis of the facts will now go up in smoke.

5.1 *Fear and Regret*

Lemhagen (1979, 156), criticizing Ronat (1974, 118ff.), suggested that in (95)–(96) (borrowed from Seelbach 1978, 79), the (a)-examples are as good as the (b)-examples:

(95) a. *Jean-Paul craint qu'il ne soit pas reçu au bac.*
Jean-Paul fears that he will not pass his secondary school exams (roughly, that he will do badly on his SATs).
b. *Jean-Paul craint de ne pas être reçu au bac.*
Jean-Paul fears not passing his secondary school exams.

(96) a. *Jean-Paul regrette qu'il ne soit pas reçu au bac.*
Jean-Paul regrets that he did not pass his secondary school exams.
b. *Jean-Paul regrette de ne pas être reçu au bac.*
Jean-Paul regrets not passing his secondary school exams.

The French sentences in (95a), (96a) are perhaps just slightly less natural than the corresponding (b)-examples, but the difference in acceptability, if there is any, is of an entirely different order of magnitude from that of the sharp contrast between (1a) and (4a). And it is no accident that Seelbach's examples have the complement in the passive voice; the considerations dealt with in section 4.1 above are highly relevant here. In any event, whenever we take the contrasts that we looked at above in section 4, where the matrix verb was *vouloir,* and substitute *craindre* 'fear' or *regretter* 'regret', we find that the full subjunctive complement cases (i.e., those "without" Equi) are more acceptable than were the cases with *vouloir.* Consider (97)–(100):

(97) a. *Je crains que je ne puisse pas partir dès demain.*
I am afraid that I cannot leave by tomorrow.
b. *Je regrette que je ne puisse pas attaquer à l'aube.*
I regret that I cannot attack at dawn.

(98) a. *Je crains que je (ne) reçoive bientôt de mauvaises nouvelles de ma famille.*
(*)I fear my receiving bad news soon from my family.
b. *Je regrette que je ressemble si peu à Napoléon.*
(*)I regret my resembling Napoleon so little.

(99) a. *Je crains que je n'amuse guère ces enfants.*
I fear that I do not amuse these children very much.
b. *Je regrette que j'aie ennuyé cette femme.*
I regret my having bored this woman.

(100) a. *Je crains que tu ne partes et que je reste seul.*
I fear your leaving and my staying behind alone.
b. *Je regrette que tu partes et que je reste seul.*
I regret your leaving and my staying behind alone.

Even the sentences closest to (1a), the Paradigmatic Equi Sentence, are relatively acceptable:

(101) a. ?*Je crains que je (ne) parte bientôt.*
I fear my leaving soon, i.e., that I will leave soon.
b. OK: *Je crains que je ne doive partir bientôt.*
I fear that I must leave soon.
c. ?*Je regrette que je parte si tôt.*
I regret that I leave so early (i.e, my leaving so early).

(101a) is better with the discordantial *ne.*[46]

I recently found myself uttering the following sentence, which, in context, seemed to everyone to be quite natural, without Equi applying, which would normally be thought to be obligatory here.

(102) *Je crais que je ne puisse pas venir chez toi ce soir.*
I fear that I cannot come to your house tonight.

I think there is a slight difference in meaning between (102) and (103):

(103) *Je crains de ne pas pouvoir venir chez toi ce soir.*
I fear not being able to come to your house tonight.

(102) suggests something like "I'm sorry for you, not for myself, that. . . ." It is a fact that when I uttered (102) I did not care much about spending the evening at the party to which the person in question had invited me; I did not inquire at the time whether the lady to whom I addressed the sentence caught the nuance.

For other examples of the same sort, see Damourette and Pichon (1911–1934, 4: 151); these sentences would no doubt be less natural without the discordantial negation.

Other examples seem to me to be perfect:

(104) *Je crains que je ne lui paraisse pas très malin.*
I fear that I do not seem very clever to him.

(105) *Ce que je crains, c'est que je (ne) doive partir demain.*
What I fear is that I must leave tomorrow.

(See (52)–(53).)

Craindre 'fear' and *regretter* 'regret' express an affect or emotion of the subject. They have in common with *vouloir* 'want' that the subject is involved in the content expressed by the subordinate clause, but now the

involvement is of a different sort. In the first place, with neither the emotion of fear nor that of regret is there any kind of direct and intimate connection to one's own action or abilities, as there is with wanting. Anything can be the object of fear, and one can regret something that has already happened.[47] "I fear that P" means, roughly, that "I expect P and I would like not-P," while "I regret P" means roughly "it is true that P and I would have wanted not-P." *Fear* and *regret* introduce a subjective distancing, a cleavage, between that facet of the self that is expressed by the main verb and that which corresponds to the subject of the subordinate clause. We can thus see why full complements, with subject NPs, are in general better with these verbs than with *vouloir* 'want', for this cleavage is then iconically emphasized.

We might add that it is surely no accident that *craindre* 'fear' allows the discordantial *ne* of negation (see Damourette and Pichon 1911–34, as well as note 46). We might say that in (97)–(101), the two *je*s or *I*s belong to two different mental spaces, in Fauconnier's (1985) sense, one designating the subject of the fear or regret, the other the patient that one would not want to be, or that one would not have wanted to be, in a disagreeable event. Note the acceptability of the pseudoclefts in (106)–(107):

(106) *Ce que je crains, c'est que je doive partir bientôt.*
What I fear is that I must leave soon.

(107) *Ce que je regrette, c'est que je ne l'aie pas emmenée quinze jours à la campagne.*
What I regret is that I did not take her for two weeks to the countryside.

5.2 *Wishing and Demanding*

Other verbs (*souhaiter* 'wish', *désirer* 'desire', *aimer* 'love', *préférer* 'prefer', *exiger* 'require') are closer in meaning to *vouloir* 'want'. These verbs, together with *vouloir* 'want' and others, and with the possible exception of *aimer* 'love', are traditionally classified as volitional verbs; they are opposed to the class of emotive verbs, such as *craindre* 'fear' or *regretter* 'regret' (see Ronat 1974; Togeby 1982; among others). This traditional classification is clearly insufficient, as will be seen shortly. Consider also what is said above regarding the implicit relations between *craindre* 'fear' or *regretter* 'regret' and *vouloir* 'want'.

For reasons that vary from verb to verb, it is often possible to construct sentences with embedded subjects coreferential to the matrix subject that are relatively natural (and sometimes completely natural)—more acceptable, in any event, than the corresponding sentences with *vouloir* 'want'.

"To wish," Heidegger writes (1985), "is not always to want. He who only wishes in the most pure way does not really want; he hopes that the wished-for object will arise by itself without himself being involved in that process."[48] In other words, one wishes that something, a something over which one does not have real control, should "happen to us." "I want P" (see above) means that I am ready to do what is necessary for P to be realized; if I say, "I wish that P," it could be said that I have abdicated my will, that I put myself in the hands of exterior forces so that P will be realized.[49] Compare (108) and (109):

(108) a. *Je veux gagner les élections.*
I want to win the elections.
b. *Je veux être champion du monde cette année.*
I want to be world champion this year.

(109) a. *Je souhaite gagner les élections.*
I wish to win the elections.
b. *Je souhaite être champion du monde cette année.*
I wish to be world champion this year.

In (109a), for instance, I seem to stay aloof, as if I were leaving the decision entirely to the electorate, without exerting myself to get myself elected; a better translation of (b) might be, "I would love to be world champion this year." In contrast, (108a) gives the impression that I am committed to getting myself elected, and I may even use dirty tricks to achieve that end.

This character of *souhaiter* 'wish' is the source of the touch of bizarreness of sentences where P corresponds to an action whose realization depends exclusively or essentially on my will (*I wish to blink, I wish to assassinate the king;* compare *John wishes to leave his wife* and *John wishes that his wife would leave him*). The (less than perfect) acceptability of sentences such as (38a), (40a), (65a), seemed to depend on a single factor, the content of the embedded clause. The acceptability of (110a), (111a), (112a) depends on two factors, the content of the embedded clause, and the meaning of *souhaiter* 'wish'. These two factors combine to make the sentences quite natural, every bit as natural as the (b)-examples (and (111a) is perhaps a touch more natural than (111b)).

(110) a. *Je souhaite que je sois élu au premier tour.*
I wish for me to be elected on the first ballot.
b. *Je souhaite être élu au premier tour.*
I wish to be elected on the first ballot.

(111) a. *Je souhaite que je puisse partir dès demain.*
I wish for me to be able to leave tomorrow.

b. *Je souhaite pouvoir partir dès demain.*
I wish to be able to leave tomorrow.

(112) a. *Je souhaite que j'amuse ces enfants.*
(*)I wish for me to amuse these children.

b. *Je souhaite amuser ces enfants.*
I wish to amuse these children.

Exiger is another story. *Exiger,* roughly equivalent to 'require' or 'demand,' is every bit as strong as *vouloir* 'want'; cf. *Napoleon demanded of his subordinates (a) blind obedience, Napoleon demanded of his subordinates that they follow his orders blindly.* "I demand to be obeyed" means, roughly, "I want X to act in such a way that I will be obeyed."[50] One can only demand something whose realization involves the active intervention of another person (explicitly or not); this is the source of the incongruity of sentences such as:

(113) a. *?J'exige de partir demain.*
?I demand to leave tomorrow.

b. *?J'exige de cligner de l'oeil.*
?I demand to blink my eye.

c. *?J'exige de me lever.*
?I demand to get up.

d. *?J'exige de séduire cette femme.*
?I demand to seduce that woman.

e. *?J'exige de ressembler à Napoléon.*
?I demand to resemble Napoleon.

These sentences may lose their bizarre ring if they are placed in an appropriate context; for example, (113e) said to a painter who is beginning my portrait, or (113d) said by an actor discussing the plot of his next film with the scriptwriter.

When the subject of the matrix clause is coreferential with the subject of the embedded clause, then unlike the case with *vouloir* 'want', the relation of self-to-self induced by *exiger* 'demand' is mediated by a self-to-other relation (schematically, self→other→self). It thus resembles the relation of self to other in the parallel cases without coreference, which can be of two sorts: either (i) self→other$_1$→other$_1$ (e.g., "I demand (of you) that you leave immediately"), or (ii) self→other$_1$→other$_2$ (e.g., "I demand (of the authorities) that my son be released"). We should note that the incongruity of (113) is echoed by that of (114a), said in a situation of pure dialogue, where the person of whom I am demanding something cannot be anyone other than the person I am speaking to:

(114) a. ?I demand that you be arrested.

b. I demand that you let yourself be arrested.

c. I have demanded (of the police) that you be arrested.

d. I will demand (of the police) that you be arrested.

See also *j'exige qu'il pleuve* 'I demand that it rain', which is only natural, for example, in the mouth of Hera speaking to Zeus in Homer's Olympus. See (113); see also chapter 3 below.

It follows, therefore, that all other things being equal, sentences with coreferential subjects in matrix and non-Equi complements will be better with *exiger* 'demand' than with *vouloir* 'want.' This is particularly striking when the complements are in the passive, where the embedded verb denotes an action;[51] it is no accident that Gerschenfeld (1982), noting that the passive in the embedded clause improves the acceptability, chooses a sentence where the matrix verb is *exiger* 'demand' (his example is repeated in (115a); (115c) is due to Jean-Claude Anscombre):

(115) a. *Le prisonnier exige qu'il soit libéré.*
The prisoner demands that he be released.

b. *Notre secrétaire exige qu'elle soit rémunérée selon ses mérites.*
Our secretary demands that she be paid according to her skills.

c. *J'exige que je sois confrontée aux témoins.*
I demand that I face the witnesses.

d. *"Mais, bon Dieu!" hurla le ministre, "j'avais pourtant bien exigé que je sois constamment tenu au courant des développements de cette affaire!"*
"But heavens," cried the minister, "didn't I absolutely demand that I be kept constantly informed of the developments in the matter!?"

Other verbs, such as *obtenir* 'obtain,'[52] share an obvious feature with *exiger* 'require' without the latter's force, and this leads to the possibility of sentences such as (116):

(116) a. *J'ai obtenu (non sans peine) que je sois chargé de cette délicate mission.*
Lit., I have obtained (not without difficulty) for me to be in charge of this delicate mission.

b. *J'ai obtenu que je parte (seulement) demain.*
I have obtained for me to leave (subj.) (only) tomorrow, i.e., I have gotten permission to stay until tomorrow.

Jean-Claude Anscombre accepts (116b) without *seulement* 'only' and finds this sentence perfect with *seulement: seulement* suggests that permission for my departure is already granted. See also section 4.4 above.

Préférer 'prefer', finally, behaves much like *souhaiter* 'wish', *désirer* 'desire', *aimer* 'love' with regard to passive, modals, etc. But *préférer* 'prefer' always implies a contrast (see section 4.4): one prefers one thing to another. Entirely out of context, it is true, (117b) will seem more acceptable than (117a). But when the object of the preference is expressed by a proposition, the contrast can actually involve either the subjects ("I leave or you leave"; in effect, x prefers f(x) to f(y), or the predicates ("I go or I stay," i.e., x prefers f(x) to g(x).[53] In an explicit context, not only does (117a) become natural, but it can become preferable to (117b), as in (118)–(119), a judgment that holds both in English and French.

(117) a. *?Je préfère que je parte.*
?I prefer for me to leave.
b. *Je préfère partir.*
I prefer to leave.

(118) A: *Alors, tu pars ou tu restes?*
So, you're leaving, or you're staying?
B: *Je préfère ?que je parte/partir.*
I prefer ?for me to leave/to leave.

(119) A: *Alors, tu pars, ou je pars?*
So, you're leaving, or I'm leaving?
B: *Je préfère que je parte/ ?partir.*
I prefer for me to leave/ ?to leave.

Finally, we may note that (120), compared to (48a), seems entirely natural:

(120) *Je préfère que je parte et que tu restes.*
I prefer for me to leave and for you to stay.

5.3 *Deserving and Waiting*

In (22), (23) above, I noted as inacceptable several sentences repeated here:

(121) a. *J'attends de mourir.*
I am waiting to die.
b. **J'attends que je meure.*
?I am waiting for me to die.

(122) a. *Tu mérites d'avoir une retraite dorée.*
You deserve to have a golden retirement.

b. **Tu mérites que tu aies une retraite dorée.*
*You deserve for you to have a golden retirement.

Mériter 'deserve' and *attendre* 'wait' thus seem to allow in French full subjunctive complements as poorly as *vouloir* 'want'; similar judgments hold for the English cases.

Let us begin with *mériter* 'deserve'. This verb, as is well known, involves a close relation between the embedded clause and the matrix subject. The content of the embedded clause must be understood in some manner or other as affecting (positively or negatively) the referent of the matrix subject. If the matrix subject is not also the subject of the embedded clause, then the embedded clause usually contains a pronoun which itself refers to the matrix subject, as in (123). The English 'deserve' is always used with a positive sense, unlike French *mériter.* (Thus (123a) might be translated idiomatically as "you're looking for a beating, you're cruisin' for a bruisin', you're going to get your face knocked in if you don't watch it.")

(123) a. *Tu mériterais qu'on te casse la figure.*
Roughly, you would deserve for them to beat you up.
b. *De pareilles femmes ne méritaient pas que d'honnêtes gens se battissent pour elles.* (Laclos)
Such women did not deserve for honest men to fight each other for them.
c. *Max mérite que son fils entre à Polytechnique.*
Max deserves for his son to get into MIT.

In the absence of an explicit link of this sort, appropriate pragmatic considerations are necessary if the complement clause is to be natural. Consider (124):

(124) a. *Napoléon ne méritait pas que Ney commette de telles gaffes pendant la campagne de Waterloo.*
Napoleon did not deserve for Ney to commit such blunders during the Waterloo campaign.
b. *Max mérite que Luc parte.*
Max deserves for Luc to leave.

(124a) is readily accepted by someone who knows that Ney was one of Napoleon's marshals, and that he had an important command in 1815. Out of context, (124b) is hard to swallow; it is understandable only if one imagines an appropriate context—such as, for example, if we know that Luc is a total good-for-nothing, that he is Max's son, that he refuses to

leave home, that he makes life absolutely miserable for Max, and so forth (compare this with (123c)).

We probably do not need to look any farther to understand the resistance of *mériter* 'deserve' to an embedded complement in which the overt subject is coreferential with the matrix subject. The infinitive expresses this relationship directly, iconically. The finite complement is, however, not totally impossible, in French at least; consider (125a), said in a tone of deep distrust, or (125b), similarly:

(125) a. *?Ce type ne mériterait même pas qu'il soit autorisé à cirer mes godasses.*
*?That guy wouldn't even deserve for him to be given permission to shine my shoes.
b. ?Those guys really didn't deserve for them to be awarded all the top prizes.

The verb *attendre* 'wait' presents a different picture. Suppose I am waiting for something. While I wait, there is a continuity or connection between the successive moments of my consciousness; I am pulled toward the object of my waiting. When what was awaited arrives, that tension is resolved. There is thus a peculiar continuity between the me who is the subject who does the waiting, and the me who is affected by the expected event at the moment when it occurs. Perhaps one could draw an analogy here to the continuity found in music in the development of a movement in a symphony and the final cadence that resolves it. On the other hand, there is also a discontinuity: the resolved tension creates a new situation; it puts me in new conditions; I am no longer quite the same as before. The discontinuity tends to be the dominant characteristic when what I am waiting for does not depend on me, when it happens to me from the exterior ("I am waiting for it to start raining/for Max to arrive/for Mary to kiss me/for the enemy to attack"). The continuity tends to be dominant when the resolution of the wait depends on an activity in which I am engaged ("I am waiting to have finished this article before I go off on a vacation"). In case of coreferentiality between the matrix subject and the embedded subject, we should therefore expect to find cases where the finite complement is rather natural, with the element of discontinuity coming to the fore. This is indeed what we find, and the examples are rather similar to what we have seen in the case of *vouloir* 'want':

(126) a. *Je n'attendrai pas que je sois complètement encerclé pour lancer une contre-attaque!*
I will not wait for me to be entirely encircled before launching a counter-attack!

b. *J'attends que je puisse lire les kana avant de me mettre à parler japonais.*
I am waiting for me to be able to read kana before I get to working on speaking Japanese.
c. *Avant de faire des projets d'avenir, j'attends que je guérisse/que je sois tout à fait guéri.*
?Before getting involved in new projects, I am waiting for me to get well/for me to be completely back on my feet.
d. *J'attends que je sois à la retraite pour me mettre à lire Hegel sérieusement.*
I am waiting for me to be retired before I sit down to read Hegel seriously.
e. *J'attends que je sois parti (que j'aie quitté les lieux) pour faire une déclaration officielle.*
I am waiting for me to have left (the premises) before I make an official statement.

Why, then, does (121a) sound so bad, out of context? The sentence suggests that I place myself in the position of an external observer with respect to my death. However, there is a tight, intimate connection between me, as a thinking subject, and my death: no one else can "live" my death in my place. In addition, death is the ultimate annihilation, and there is no sense in talking about continuity or discontinuity between the me before death and the me after death—unless, of course, one believes in immortality of the soul or in some form of life after death. And given a context in which such a belief is found, the same sentence, either as such or slightly modified, becomes much more natural (compare also to (46) above):

(127) a. *J'attends que je meure pour monter au ciel.*
I am waiting for me to die to go to heaven.
b. *J'attends que je sois mort pour savoir si l'enfer existe.*
I am waiting for me to be dead so I will find out whether hell exists.

(127), indeed, implies that I maintain a form of existence after death, and the two occurrences of the *je* 'I (me)' point quite distinctly to two different instances of the subject; after the death in question the *je* 'I (me)' changes status, and (127b) resembles (126d).

As a last example of a verb which at first glance allows only the infinitive as complement, but which, upon reflection, allows also a full subject NP even when coreferential with the matrix subject, let us consider *éviter* 'avoid'. This verb expresses a voluntary action: "to avoid P" is to "do

something so that not-P." In the case of coreferential subjects, if the embedded clause expresses an action, the matrix subject and the embedded subject will tend to be seen from the same perspective, to express the same facet of the self. On the other hand, *éviter* 'avoid' has something in common with *craindre* 'fear': we avoid something that we have reasons to fear and, like *craindre*, the French verb *éviter* allows the discordential *ne* (e.g., *J'ai évité qu'ils ne retrouvent ma trace*, lit., 'I avoided that they (neg.) find my trace,' i.e., I managed for them not to trace my whereabouts). We thus find examples like (128)–(129) as well as those in (130).

(128) a. *J'ai évité de lui parler.*
I avoided talking to him.
b. **J'ai évité que je (ne) lui parle.*
*I avoided my talking to him.

(129) a. *J'eviterai d'arriver trop tôt à cette soirée.*
I will avoid arriving too early at the party.
b. ??*J'éviterai que j'arrive (que je n'arrive) trop tôt à cette soirée.*
*I will avoid my arriving too early at the party.

(130) a. *Je ferai tout pour éviter que je (ne) sois encerclé/reconnu/pris au dépourvu.*
I will do anything to avoid my being encircled/recognized/caught off guard.
b. *Ce que je veux éviter, c'est que je sois en retard.*
What I want to avoid is my being late.
c. *A ta place, j'éviterais que je (ne) doive partir trop tôt.*
If I were in your position, I would avoid my having to leave too early.
d. *J'ai essayé d'éviter que, par ma supériorité, je (ne) ridiculise Max aux yeux de cette femme.*
I tried to avoid my making Max look ridiculous in the eyes of that woman by my superiority.

5.4 *Almost non-Equi Constructions*

A few brief remarks finally on verbs which not only permit coreferential embedded subjects, but sometimes seem more natural with such an embedded subject overtly present.

One of the clearest examples, in my opinion at least, is the verb *admirer* 'admire.' Consider the following examples:

(131) *J'admire:*	I admire:
a. *que je sois si populaire.*	a. my being so popular.
b. *que je sois pris au serieux par ces imbéciles.*	b. my being taken so seriously by those idiots.

c. *que j'intéresse ces gens.*	c. my being able to interest these people.
d. ?*que je travaille tant.*	d. my working so much.
e. ?*que je sois si intelligent.*	e. my being so intelligent.
f. ?*que j'aie vaincu tant d'ennemis.*	f. my having defeated so many enemies.
g. (?)*que je séduise tant de femmes.*	g. my seducing so many women.

(132) ?**J'admire:*	*I admire:
a. *d'être si populaire.*	a. being so popular.
b. *d'être pris au sérieux par ces imbéciles.*	b. being taken so seriously by these idiots.
c. *d'intéresser ces gens.*	c. being able to interest these people.
d. *de travailler tant.*	d. working so much.
e. *d'être si intelligent.*	e. being so intelligent.
f. *d'avoir vaincu tant d'ennemis.*	f. having defeated so many enemies.
g. *de séduire tant de femmes.*	g. seducing so many women.

If we compare the French examples in (131)–(132) to (1)–(4), the reversal of acceptability judgments is almost complete. The full complement is perfect, at least for a certain class of cases, and the infinitive is practically unacceptable in the intended control (coreferential) sense, i.e., where the subject of the embedded infinitive is the same as the matrix subject.[54] Let us compare the acceptable cases and the incongruous cases of (131). First of all, the sentences all become equally acceptable if we replace the embedded subject with another subject which is not coreferential with the matrix subject, e.g., *j'admire que tu sois si intelligent/que Napoléon ait vaincu tant d'ennemis* 'I admire your being so intelligent/Napoleon's having defeated so many enemies.' The examples in (131a–c) all involve (explicitly or implicitly) the image that others make of me, which is not the case in (131d–f), and (131g) is only really natural in the nonagentive sense of the French *séduire*, a sense which is not available in its cognate English verb (see section 4.6 above). This sense brings it closer to (131a–c) (compare especially (131g) and (131c)).

One admires something that one sees from the outside, that one has in front of him, with respect to which one has a certain distance and perspective. *Admiring something* has something in common with *seeing, understanding, looking, noticing*, or, rather, admiring something presupposes that one has seen, understood, etc. There is a considerable distance between the facet of the self expressed by the matrix subject (the *me* as a

thinking subject) and that expressed by the embedded subject (my image in the consciousness of the other); the choice of a finite complement reflects this distance iconically. *Admirer* offers a clear example of the absence of a direct link between the subjunctive and the phenomenon of Disjoint Reference (see the discussion following (8) above).

Of course, the examples in (131d–f) become acceptable if, slightly forcing the interpretation, I see myself from the exterior, as if I were another; the ironic element, always lurking in the uses of *admire* with coreferential subjects, comes to the fore. A sense of narcissism (which may drown out the irony) can also emerge. Consider (133) as well:[55]

(133) a. *Rétrospectivement, j'admire que j'aie pu continuer à travailler pendant ces terribles semaines.*
In retrospect, I [can only] admire my being able to continue to work during those terrible weeks.
b. *J'admire que je sois si belle en ce miroir.*
I admire my looking so beautiful (fem.) in this mirror.

Another interesting verb is *exclure* 'exclude':

(134) a. *J'exclus que je parte demain.*
I exclude my leaving tomorrow.
b. *J'exclus de partir demain.*
I exclude leaving tomorrow.

Exclure 'exclude' seems to pose a number of knotty problems, and virtually deserves a study all to itself,[56] where we could discuss its semantic connections to *refuser* 'refuse', which is much closer to *vouloir* 'want' in its syntactic behavior. In any event, (134a) seems to me perfect; (134b) is acceptable, although perhaps less good than (134a), but, contrary to all the cases considered up to now, except perhaps for that of *admirer* 'admire' (see note 54), it is not clear that the implicit embedded subject should be (exclusively) taken as coreferential with the matrix subject. In other words, (134b) may be synonymous with (134a), but it is also synonymous with *J'exclus qu'on parte/que nous partions demain*, lit., 'I exclude that we leave tomorrow'. The embedded subject can refer to a set which includes the matrix subject; as the following examples suggest, this is neither control in the strict sense, nor "arbitrary reference" (cf. *il faut partir*, or *it would be wise to leave now*).

(135) *J'exclus de* { *me* / *nous* / *?se* / **vous* } *mêler de cette affaire.*

Lit., I rule out involving { myself / ourselves / oneself / yourself } in this matter.

Another verb, *concevoir* 'conceive', behaves a bit like *admirer* 'admire', but my intuitions are less clear, and in any event *concevoir* can on occasion allow an indicative complement (see Togeby 1982, 124):

(136) a. *Je conçois que je puisse me tromper.*
I can imagine my being able to be wrong/make a mistake.
b. *?Je conçois (de) pouvoir me tromper.*
I can imagine being able to be wrong/make a mistake.

To conceive of something, in this sense, is to form something within oneself (recall the other sense of *to conceive*), something which separates itself off, and which one can then re-present to oneself, or hold in front of one. Perhaps the lack of clarity of intuitions here, even compared to *admirer* 'admire', is due to the greater complexity of the self-to-self relations involved in the meaning of *concevoir* 'conceive'.[57]

Finally, notice that the idiom *mettons que S* is an idiomatic expression meaning 'Let's say that S', literally 'let us put that S', i.e., a first-person plural imperative or hortative. There is no corresponding **je mets que S* 'I put (i.e., assume) that S', or **mets-tu que S?* 'do you put (assume) that S?' or **mets que S*, the familiar second-person imperative, and marginally *?mettez que S*, the corresponding plural or formal imperative (in these respects, *admettre* 'admit' and *supposer* 'suppose' are similar, though not identical). This is one more example of an idiom which is possible in a construction (here, the imperative) which is perhaps syntactically derived (by subject deletion) and which has no equivalent in more basic forms. See chapter 5 below.

6. Postscript

If my recollection is accurate, the central idea of this essay occurred to me during a class at the University of Ottawa in the fall of 1980. I developed it in the following years, in classes at NYU (fall 1981), and, more fully, at Paris VIII (1982–1983), as well as in lectures at the University of Chicago (December 1980), the conference "Lexique-grammaire des langues romanes" (La Croix-en-Touraine, September 1982), and the Conference on Complementation at the UFSAL (Brussels, June 1983). I wrote the French version of it in 1983 and early 1984, and it was published shortly thereafter in the *Cahiers de grammaire* (Université de Toulouse-le-Mirail)

7:74–138 (May 1984). At about the same time, I presented it in our Seminar on Advanced Syntax (Paris VIII) before an audience that included many of the Chomskian syntacticians then working in France (D. Couquaux, J. Guéron, R. S. Kayne, H. G. Obenauer, P. Pica, J.-Y. Pollock, the late Mitsou Ronat, and Anne Zribi-Hertz); none of them raised important objections concerning the data nor, as far as I can tell, to my approach to them.

At about the same time, the main topic of this essay was becoming, quite independently, a topic of central concern for linguists working within the GB framework on the grammar of Romance languages. See, among others, Suñer and Padilla-Rivera (1984) and Suñer (1987) on Spanish, Picallo (1984, 1985), mainly on Catalan, and Raposo (1987) on Portuguese. I will not discuss these works at any length, but the interested reader may want to compare the two approaches.[58] Only Suñer is firmly convinced that semantics plays a crucial role in explaining the facts of "obviation," but she states her restrictions in terms of semantic "features" relying on traditional semantic classes such as "desire" or "volition," "factive-emotion," "denial," and the like; I think I have shown that this is insufficient. Raposo claims, correctly I think, that the opposition between subjunctive and indicative moods is not the central factor at play (see above, sections 4.1, 4.2) to "weaken the 'disjoint reference effect'," but he explains them in purely formal terms.[59] None of these authors covers the facts in as detailed a manner as I do, and all tend to think in all-or-nothing terms (i.e., grammatical/ungrammatical), while I think I have shown that the degree of acceptability of any particular sentence depends on a variety of factors; finally, none of them takes into account the whole problem of self-to-self versus self-to-other relations, nor the possible role of iconic factors.

In any event, this essay is, in a way, unfinished. To deal with all the problems that have arisen would require a large book in itself. I will mention here, very succinctly, some of the problems which seem to me particularly worthy of detailed study.

6.1 *Noticing*

I have not dealt in any detail with the *remarquer* 'notice' class (see (10)–(15) above) nor with the intermediary *croire* 'believe' class (see (16)–(19), and the classification above, p. 6). Regarding the *remarquer* class, my general hypothesis predicts that, under special conditions, these verbs would allow subjectless infinitival complements; this is the case for *remarquer* itself, cf. *Vendredi n'avait pas remarqué avoir laissé des traces de pas sur le sable* 'Friday had not noticed having left footprints on the sand.' However, several of these verbs, such as *trouver* 'find' (see (13)) and the verbs of perception (see (12)) seem to be especially averse to having a subjectless infinitival complement—though Togeby (1983) mentions a literary example involving, not too surprisingly, *sentir* 'feel.' As for the *croire* 'believe' class (in general, epistemic verbs and verbs of saying), I would have to show that the distribution of finite and infinitival complements is relatively immaterial, though I would predict that, under various conditions, one finds somewhat subtle differences of behavior between the two types. (137) presents a few facts bearing on this question.

(137) a. *Elle prétendait qu'elle m'aimait.*
She claimed/pretended that she loved me.
b. *Elle prétendait m'aimer.*
She claimed/pretended to love me.

(138) a. *Elle murmurait qu'elle m'aimait.*
She murmured that she loved me.
b. ?*Elle murmurait m'aimer.*
*She murmured to love me.

"Physical manner of saying" verbs such as *murmurer* 'murmur' or *hurler* 'yell' are awkward with an infinitival complement. This is reminiscent of the problem of "bridges" (see Erteschik 1973) and suggests that the behavior of "bridges" or "non-bridges" under Wh-movement should be studied in conjunction with their behavior in sentences like those in (138).

(139) a. *Max a ajouté qu'il était prêt à faire cela.*
Max added that he was ready to do that.
b. *Max a ajouté être prêt à faire cela.*
*Max added to be ready to do that.

(140) a. *J'ai ajouté que j'étais prêt à faire cela.*
I added that I was ready to do that.
b. ?*J'ai ajouté être prêt à faire cela.*
*I added to be ready to do that.

(141) a. *Max croit qu'il est malade.*
Max believes that he is sick.
b. *Max croit être malade.*
*Max believes to be sick.

(142) a. *Je crois que je suis malade.*
I believe that I am sick.
b. ?*Je crois être malade.*
*I believe to be sick.

(143) a. *L'année dernière, je croyais que j'étais gravement malade.*
Last year, I believed that I was seriously ill.
b. *L'année dernière, je croyais être gravement malade.*
*Last year, I believed to be seriously ill.

Here we find contrasts between sentences with a first-person and a third-person subject; the conditions under which such contrasts arise are complex and involve the lexical choice of the main verb as well as the choice of tense. (141a) simply states Max's opinion, while (141b) suggests that that opinion is unfounded—hence the oddity of (142b) and the naturalness of (143b). For similar contrasts between sentences like (142a) and the "small clause" construction *je me crois malade* 'I believe myself sick', see Ruwet (1982, chap. 4, 154ff.; chap. 5, 175). Such contrasts may ultimately be traced to the fact that the *V que S* construction is (iconically) more appropriate than either the "small clause" or the $V\ VP_{inf}$ constructions to represent a clear distinction between the "act" of thinking, expressed by the main verb, and the content of the thought, expressed by the subordinate clause—while we have in general a clearer view of that distinction when we talk about our own thoughts than when we report the thoughts of other people.

6.2 *Reciprocals*

An interesting corroboration of my proposal concerning the contrast between *vouloir, croire,* and *remarquer* ('want, believe, notice') comes from a different quarter, the interpretation of reciprocals. Higginbotham (1980, 97) notes a contrast in interpretation between (144) and (145):

(144) *John and Mary* thought *they* loved each other.
(145) John and Mary wanted to visit each other.

According to Higginbotham, "one has an interpretation of [(144)] according to which John and Mary thought the same thing, that each loved the other, and another interpretation according to which they thought different things; that is, John thought he loved Mary and Mary thought she loved John, while [(145)] has no interpretation according to which they thought the same thing; that is, [(145)] is uniquely interpreted like the second interpretation of [(144)]."

If I translate, or rather, adapt, these two sentences into French, I agree with Higginbotham's judgments, at least at first sight:

(146) *Jean et Marie croient qu'ils s'aiment.*
(147) *Jean et Marie voulaient se rendre visite.*

(146) seems to mean either that Jean believes that Jean and Marie love each other, and Marie believes the same thing, or else that Jean believes that he loves Marie, and Marie believes that she loves Jean. On the other hand, (147) seems to mean only that Jean wanted to visit Marie and that Marie wanted to visit Jean. Now, if I consider (148), a third interpretation becomes possible, so that (148) is three-ways ambiguous. In addition to the two interpretations corresponding to those of (146), (148) may also mean that Jean noticed that Marie loved him, and Marie noticed that Jean loved her.

(148) *Jean et Marie ont remarqué qu'ils s'aiment.*
Jean and Marie noticed that they love each other.

In point of fact, I tend to believe that all three sentences (146)–(148) are three-ways ambiguous; they differ only in that one interpretation or the other comes to the foreground depending on the choice of the main verb and the choice of the construction (finite vs. infinitival). Notice in this connection the examples in (149)–(150).

(149) *Jean et Marie croyaient s'aimer.*
Jean and Marie believed to love each other, i.e., that they loved each other.
(150) ?*Jean et Marie auraient bien voulu qu'ils tombent amoureux l'un de l'autre.*
Jean and Marie would have been quite happy to fall in love with each other.

It seems to me that the most prominent reading of (149), compared with (146), is the same as the (most prominent) reading of (147), while (150) is (almost) acceptable with a reading similar to that of (148). In addition, (149) carries the same implication as (141b): what Jean and Marie believe is an illusion.

6.3 *Summing Up*

Why is it that on the whole, informants—especially nonlinguists—are still more or less uncomfortable with sentences involving *je veux que je . . .* , and prefer those with an infinitival complement (see especially sections 4.1, 4.2)? One might think that this would be the proper place to invoke the Avoid Pronoun Principle (but see note 3). I am still reluctant to make such a move. Let us consider again for instance (39a), repeated here as (151a). Note that (151a) is not only in competition with (151b), but also with (151c), which also involves a pronoun (*on*), not to mention (151d).

(151) a. *?Je veux que je sois enterré dans mon village natal.*
?I want (for) me to be buried in my native village.
b. *Je veux être enterré dans mon village natal.*
I want to be buried in my native village.
c. *Je veux qu'on m'enterre dans mon village natal.*
I want *one/OK: them to bury me in my native village.
d. *Il faut qu'on m'enterre/que je sois enterré dans mon village natal.*
Lit., it "needs" that one (i.e., they) bury me/that I be buried in my native village.

Given this range of possible choices, as well as the tendency of French to prefer active sentences (such as (151c)) to passive sentences, the relative uneasiness of informants with sentences like (151c) is not too surprising. Moreover, the influence of normative grammars, which keep repeating that our Paradigmatic Equi Sentences are "incorrect" or excluded by grammatical "servitude" (Gougenheim; see note 30) should not be underestimated.

On the whole, I think that if we want to understand what is going on here, we will have to supplement the traditional approach of generative grammar, based on the systematic use of informant judgments (not so systematic, as we have seen, in the actual practice of many generative grammarians) with sociolinguistic inquiries, stylistic studies, studies on child language and language pathology, the perusal of oral and written corpora, and historical studies (Paul Hirschbühler, for example, tells me that sentences such as (1a) were more common in Old French than they are now).

6.4 *Beyond the Case at Hand*

The role played in language by iconic factors is presumably universal, as is the role played by the self-to-self versus self-to-other relations, though different cultures may no doubt have somewhat different views of the self and the other. In other words, my hypothesis cannot possibly be limited to French; it will stand or fall depending on whether it extends itself naturally to phenomena in other languages. It is clear that facts very similar to those I have studied are to be found in other Romance languages; John Goldsmith, in his careful translations of my examples, has noted many similarities between the behavior of French subjunctive clauses and English *for/to* infinitival complements. But much work remains to be done.

My general prediction is that phenomena very similar to those of French should be found in other languages, but not necessarily at precisely the same points in the various languages. For any particular language, much will depend on the range of the possible complement structures and on the

general possibility of choice between them. Here purely syntactic parametric variations among languages may have a crucial role to play. If there were a hypothetical language, similar to French in other respects, but lacking altogether the infinitival complement, so that the standard form were something like *je veux que je parte*, I would not expect it to express iconically the fine-grained distinctions we have noticed in French. For this to happen, the language would have to resort to other means: for instance if, unlike French, it had the option of choosing a null or an overt subject in tensed sentences, it might make iconic use of this.[60] English, on the other hand, is rather different. It is far richer than French in its range of complement structures: besides residual subjunctive clauses, English has *that*-S_{ind} complements, *that*-less complements, and *it-that*-S complements; it also has gerunds with null, overt, and genitival subjects; and finally, it has infinitival complements, with and without *for*, and with and without an overt subject. John Goldsmith has noted (at the beginning of section 1 of this paper) that in the case of the *vouloir* 'want' class, French has two very different types of structures at its disposal (V que S_{subj} vs. V VP_{inf}), while English establishes a strikingly parallel contrast within a more restricted formal domain, with the contrast expressed solely by means of the choice of a null or an overt (reflexive, nonreflexive) subject. On the other hand, French lacks a *que*-less construction in subordinate clauses, while most English verbs of the *believe*-class do not allow a subjectless infinitival complement. These differences may well be properly explained in terms of formal parameters (see, for instance, Kayne 1984, chap. 5). But an interesting question arises here, concerning the kind of facts we alluded to above in section 6.1: could it be that in some cases, the fine nuances which French expresses in terms of the choice of a *que* S versus an infinitival complement are expressed in English by means of the presence versus absence of *that* in finite complements to verbs of the *believe*-class? If this were correct, the means used by the two languages to convey some nuances of meaning would be quite different, though something common would still be present in both: the contrast between simpler versus more complex surface structure (see section 2(a) above). Bolinger (1972) has devoted a monograph-length study to this extremely subtle distinction in English, and I will not presume to hunt game on his turf, but rather refer the reader to it. A range of other parallel contrasts remain to be studied in as well-combed a grammar as that of English, including the syntactic contrast of English already noted, a formal contrast that is in its iconic values quite similar to what we have studied in French, and yet enhanced by one more degree of contrast: not only is there a difference between a surface V_{ing} complement and a surface NP-V_{ing} complement, as in (152a, b), there

is the contrast to be considered with a full finite complement (152c) (cf. section 6.1). It is no doubt significant that the verb that most comfortably occurs as V_{ing} complement to *notice* is the verb *feel,* as in (152d), and this example, as with (152a) and others of its sort, suggests the kind of division of the ego discussed above throughout this paper, though now in a different syntactic context. A similar contrast, though markedly sharper, is found in the contrasting constructions in (152e, f); (152f), containing no overt lower subject, involves a much closer relationship between the subject of the higher verb and the activity expressed in the complement than is found in the structurally less unified construction found in (152e). Similar contrasts arise with a verb such as *remember,* as illustrated in (152g, h). When the complement subject is overt, a noticeable distance is set up between the reference of the subject of the higher clause and that of the complement, a distance not found in the iconically more unified construction. Thus (152g) would be more natural in a context where the speaker has an odd sense that the words in question somehow floated out of his mouth without much prior reflection—at least in retrospect. For similar reasons, the longer form in (152h) is quite odd.

(152) a. ?I noticed thinking a lot about her during my coffee break. ??I noticed getting some gray in my hair.
b. I noticed myself thinking a lot about her during my coffee break. ?I noticed myself getting some gray in my hair.
c. I noticed that I was thinking a lot about her during my coffee break. I noticed that I was getting some gray in my hair.
d. I noticed feeling odd about the way he was talking to me, but I couldn't put my finger on just what it was until later.
e. I felt like I was crying all day long.
f. I felt like crying all day long (not same as (e)).
g. I remember saying that.
h. I remember myself saying that.
i. I have such fond childhood memories of that place—I remember (*?myself) going down to the lake each morning and swimming with the other kids.

Many of these thorny issues will arise and rearise as we pass through the dense but ecologically balanced thickets of grammatical structure that we will explore in the following essays. We will see recurrences of the same patterns that have been laid out in this first study: grammatical options opened by the formal syntax, whose use and range is determined by such factors as iconicity and the structure of human experience. The formal grammar serves to provide a scaffolding, an almost physical background against which a richer grammatical ecology can develop; if formal syntax is the geology that studies the determination of that physical basis, our goal shall be the rendering of the living ecology that has sprung up on top of it.[61]