



Sergej Schumilo, Cornelius Aschermann, Ali Abbasi, Simon Wörner and Thorsten Holz

Chair for Systems Security Ruhr-Universität Bochum





# **Hypervisor**





Hypervisor

**Virtual Machine** 









## Related Work

Henderson et al. "VDF: Targeted

Evolutionary Fuzz Testing of Virtual Devices"

(RAID 2017)

Schumilo et al. "Hyper-Cube: High-Dimensional Hypervisor Fuzzing"

(NDSS 2020)




# Our Approach



Hyper-Cube

# Our Approach



[1] Schumilo et. al - NDSS 2020

[2] Schumilo et. al. - USENIX Security 2017 [3] Aschermann et. al - NDSS 2019 RUHR
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# Our Approach



[1] Schumilo et. al - NDSS 2020

[2] Schumilo et. al. - USENIX Security 2017 [3] Aschermann et. al - NDSS 2019 RUHR UNIVERSITÄT RUB

# Design &

Implementation

# Contributions


• Hypervisor Fuzzing (coverage-guided)

Fast Snapshots (for stateful code)


Affine Type Mutation Engine (for complex interfaces)




Coverage-Guided



**HYPER-CUBE** 




**HYPER-CUBE** 




**kAFL / REDQUEEN** 






**HYPER-CUBE** 



**kAFL / REDQUEEN** 



NYX



# Nested Fuzzing Features

Special Hypercalls (L2-L0)


(tranparent to the target hypervisor)

Intel PT Tracing (L1 only)

(by enabling tracing during VMX transitions)

Inter-VM SHM (L0 to L2)

(by translating HVA to L2 GPA)





# Dirty Page Logging






# Dirty Page Logging



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# Dirty Page Logging

(via stack instead of a bitmap)

Fast Device State Reset

(by flatten QEMU's VMState tree)



Dirty Page Logging

(via stack instead of a bitmap)

Fast Device State Reset

(by flatten QEMU's VMState tree)

QEMU Disk COW Layer

(in-memory state)

O(1) Reset

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# Affine Type


Mutation Engine

# Hypervisor Attack Surface


- Memory-Mapped I/O (MMIO)
- Legacy Port I/O (PIO)
- Hypercalls
- Direct Memory Access (**DMA**)
- ...




# xHCl in a Nutshell



## xHCl in a Nutshell



### xHCl in a Nutshell



```
cmd_ring = alloc_cmd_ring()
cmd_ring.mmio_enable()
trb_msg = Data(0x01, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x20, ...)
cmd_ring.push_trb(data)
cmd_ring.free()
```



```
cmd_ring = alloc_cmd_ring()
cmd_ring.mmio_enable()
trb_msg = Data(0x01, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x20, ...)
cmd_ring.push_trb(data)
cmd_ring.free()
```

Grammar Fuzzing?



```
cmd_ring = alloc_cmd_ring()
cmd_ring.mmio_enable()

trb_msg = Data(0x01, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x20, ...)

cmd_ring.push_trb(data)

cmd_ring.free()

Mutated

AFL-Style
```




```
cmd_ring = alloc_cmd_ring()
cmd_ring.mmio_enable()
trb_msg = Data(0x01, 0x00, 0x20, 0x00, 0x20, ...)
cmd_ring.push_trb(data)
cmd_ring.free()
Not reused
```





# **Graph Mutations**



















Evaluation


# Hyper-Cube Spec





# **Complex Spec**

# **QEMU 5.0.0 (xHCI)**





### Case Study: xHCl

# bhyve: xHCl infinite loop

in pci\_xhci\_comple\_commands

#### Case Study: xHCl

#### bhyve: xHCl infinite loop


in pci\_xhci\_comple\_commands

```
while (1) {
 /* ... */
  switch (trb->tvpe) {
    case XHCI_TRB_TYPE_LINK:
      break:
   /* ... */
  if (type != XHCI_TRB_TYPE_LINK) {
    /* ... */
    return;
  trb = pci_xhci_trb_next(xdev, trb, &crcr);
```

#### Case Study: xHCl

#### bhyve: xHCl infinite loop

in pci\_xhci\_comple\_commands



QEMU: CVE-2020-25048

UAF write in usb\_process\_one



# Findings

KVM/QEMU (5.0.0)


FreeBSD bhyve (12.1-RELEASE)





# Fast Snapshots

#### QEMU-PT vs. AFL Forkserver





# Conclusion

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• Fuzz Hypervisors & Everything Below

Outperforms Fast Blind Fuzzers

• Full-System Coverage Fuzzing



# Thank You!

**Q & A** 

sergej.schumilo@rub.de

