Looking Back on Anger: Explaining the Social Origins of Left-Wing and Nationalist-Separatist Terrorism in Western Europe, 1970-2007

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Abstract: A unique dataset is used to separately analyze the social origins of left-wing and nationalist-separatist terrorism in 17 Western European countries between 1970 and 2007. We argue that the differences in the historic roots, ultimate goals as well as their negotiability, levels of domestic and international support, and politico-military strategies of these types of ideologically or ethnically motivated terrorism make it plausible that they respond differently to specific social conditions and changes. We show that there are indeed factors that matter either to left-wing (e.g., the Cold War, leftist party strength) or nationalist-separatist terrorism (e.g., ethnic polarization, non-violent protest). However, both types of terrorism are robustly associated with larger populations and higher unemployment rates. This suggests that both may be ameliorated through social progress, even though ethnic terrorism seems to respond more strongly to socio-economic and political incentives (e.g., economic progress, political participation). Finally, we show that a 'pooling' of terrorism data—which disregards motivational bonds, but is nevertheless common in empirical analyses—may mask the role of otherwise relevant terrorism correlates in distinct types of terrorism.

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1. Introduction

In recent years a plethora of large-*N* studies have tried to unveil the causes of terrorism (e.g., Abadie, 2006; Burgoon, 2006; Blomberg and Hess, 2008; Basuchoudhary and Shughart, 2010; Freytag et al., 2011).[1] Usually, these studies—in an effort to make use of datasets that are as large as possible—'pool' terrorism data, implicitly assuming that a single empirical and behavioral model can explain terrorist activity, irrespective of the underlying ideological, ethnic, religious or other motivations and goals of distinct terrorist organizations.

In this contribution we argue that underestimating the role of political motivations of terrorism might lead to biased findings in empirical research. In fact, there exists an array of typologies that classifies the spectrum of political terrorism according to its primary motivations and goals (cf. Schmid and Jongman, 2005). Among others, these approaches differentiate between *ideologically* motivated terrorism, such as left-wing or right-wing terrorism, *ethnically* motivated terrorism, such as nationalist-separatist terrorist movements, or *religiously* motivated terrorism (e.g., Post, 2005; Zimmermann, 2009). In this study, we account for the heterogeneity of terrorism by analyzing the mutual and distinct social origins of the two most prominent types of terrorism in 17 Western European countries[2] between 1970 and 2007: (revolutionary) *left-wing* and (ethnic) *nationalist-separatist* terrorism. These types differ with respect to a number of traits (Table 1, which is inspired by Zimmermann, 2009).

– Table 1 here –

In Western Europe, left-wing terrorism is historically rooted in 19th and early 20th century anarchist terrorism ('Propaganda of the Deed'), but also in the circumstances of the Cold War era (e.g., East-West conflict, Vietnam War, 'New Left'). Its ultimate goal is a regime change, i.e., the establishment of a communist or anarchist society, where this objective is linked to—sometimes only vaguely articulated—visions of social justice, anti-imperialism and anti-capitalism (e.g., Shughart, 2006). Nationalist-separatist terrorism, by contrast, is more closely related to grievances and conflict associated with ethnic discrimination and the vision of national liberation (e.g., Shughart, 2006). While post-World War I political currents (anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism) surely mattered to the emergence of this kind of terrorism, it is

[1] See Krieger and Meierrieks (2011) and Gassebner and Luechinger (2011) for recent reviews of large-*N* studies on the causes of terrorism.

[2] These countries are Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France (incl. Corsica), Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland and the United Kingdom (incl. Northern Ireland).

also strongly rooted in country-specific circumstances, meaning that conflict may have its origins well in the past. Ultimately, nationalist-separatist terrorism aims at territorial change (or its prevention).[3]

Importantly, the regime change goal of left-wing terrorism is non-negotiable. Left-wing terrorist activity is ideologically driven and can therefore be understood as a form of *supreme value terrorism*. As argued by Bernholz (2004), supreme value 'believers' prefer these values to all else, making them far less responsive and potentially immune to any cost-benefit considerations (which are typically referred to in rational-choice models of terrorist behavior). Ethnic terrorism, by contrast, usually does not adhere to supreme values. Its goals are negotiable, so that concessions—e.g., in the form of autonomy— can be made.

The non-negotiability of left-wing terrorist demands can be expected to limit their popular appeal and support. Consequently, they are more likely to strive for external support, while—as a 'revolutionary vanguard'—resorting to a strategy of targeted killings to incite a popular revolution (Shughart, 2006). Opposed to this, the negotiability of the demands of nationalist-separatist groups can be expected to create strong support from its ethnic target audience. Ethnic terrorism thus has fewer incentives to internationalize, with prominent international links, however, still existing (e.g., diaspora support). Ethnic terrorist groups aim at creating a distinct communal identity and ethnic 'infrastructure', i.e., they tend to create public goods (Byman, 1998). This public good provision may render nationalist-separatist terrorism even more persistent. Popular support and communal 'anchoring' make it possible for ethnic groups to resort to attrition warfare, while the negotiability of their goals makes truces and political talks a viable strategic option (e.g., Sanchez-Cuenca, 2007).

What this brief discussion about the differences between revolutionary and ethnic terrorism suggests is that both forms have different historic roots and pursue different goals. These factors in turn affect the size of the terrorists' potential support, their degree of internationalization as well as their politico-military strategy. We argue that, ultimately, due to these differences left-wing and nationalist-separatist terrorism have distinct mechanisms of mobilization and radicalization—related to specific social conditions—and therefore ought to respond differently to social change and politico-economic incentives. Nevertheless, we

[3] Some national liberation terrorist groups (e.g., PIRA, ETA) also adopted a (left-wing) revolutionary jargon (Sanchez-Cuenca, 2009). However, their central goal is to achieve territorial concessions. Following Sanchez-Cuenca (2009), we therefore consider such groups as nationalist-separatist.

believe it to be rather unlikely that there is no intersecting set of social conditions at all that simultaneously explains the genesis of both forms of terrorism.

Following this discussion on the potential heterogeneity in the causes of different forms of terrorism, we use a uniquely coded dataset to separately analyze the roots of revolutionary and ethnic terrorism in 17 Western European countries between 1970 and 2007. Our study builds on those few empirical studies that account for different types of political terrorism. For instance, Robison et al. (2006) distinguish between the determinants of Islamist and leftist transnational terrorism.[4] They find that leftist (but not Islamist) terrorism is particularly stimulated by the Cold War, while Islamic (but not leftist) terrorism is influenced by the growth of secular governments and religious competition. Sanchez-Cuenca (2009) identifies a unique set of variables (past dictatorship, population size, strong communist parties) that determines the intensity of left-wing terrorism in the developed world, while Blomberg et al. (2011) find that group ideology influences the survival of terrorist groups. In short, these studies suggest that motivational causes indeed matter to the emergence and continuity of terrorism.

To preview our empirical results, we similarly find differences in the determinants of left-wing and nationalist-separatist terrorism in Western Europe. Certain politico-demographic factors matter to either form of terrorism only. For instance, while only left-wing terrorism is strongly affected by the prevalence of the Cold War, only nationalist-separatist terrorism is fueled by ethnic polarization or, interestingly, the incumbency of—more security-prone—right-wing governments (that are typically thought to be the 'natural political enemy' of left-wing terrorists in the first place). The prevalence of democratic institutions even leads to opposing influences on the different types of terrorism. Yet, there are also some variables that sway both forms of terrorism. For example, certain socio-economic factors (e.g., unemployment, inflation) play an important and similar role in left-wing and nationalist-separatist terrorism. This may indicate that both kinds of terrorism are geared towards socio-economic change, where nationalist-separatist terrorist groups have commonly also embraced socialist agendas (e.g., ETA, IRA). Overall, our findings suggest that different types of terrorism are associated with different mobilization and radicalization mechanisms and different forms of popular and external support. Our results indicate that supreme value (left-

[4] *Transnational terrorism* involves citizens, groups, territory, etc. of more than one country, while *domestic terrorism* involves only one country. Previous empirical efforts have focused on the former type of terrorism due to data constraints, although the latter type of terrorism by far outnumbers the former (e.g., Enders et al., 2011).

wing) terrorism may also be alleviated through social improvements; however, ethnic terrorism seems to be more responsive to socio-economic and political incentives (e.g., economic progress, political participation). Finally, we also show that the 'pooling' of left-wing and nationalist-separatist terrorism affects our previous findings and may potentially mask the influence of specific variables that matter to distinct forms of terrorism only. This indicates that empirical studies should more thoroughly account for heterogeneity in terrorism—linked to motivational underpinnings—when studying its causes. It is our understanding that an inappropriate 'pooling' of different forms of terrorism in large-*N* studies may have contributed to the inconclusive evidence regarding the determinants of terrorism.

This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we give a description of the dataset and the patterns of left-wing and ethnic terrorism in Western Europe between 1970 and 2007. In Section 3 we establish our hypotheses, which we test in Section 4. Section 5 concludes.

2. Left-Wing and Nationalist-Separatist Terrorism in Western Europe

We use the *Global Terrorism Database* (*GTD*) of the *National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism* (START, 2011) to create a unique dataset that differentiates between left-wing and nationalist-separatist terrorist attacks. The GTD is a comprehensive database that includes information on both domestic and transnational terrorist events (START, 2011).[5] The count of the number of left-wing and nationalist-separatist terrorist attacks is used as the *dependent variable* in our statistical analysis (Section 4).

[5] There are potential shortcomings when using a public dataset such as the GTD. First, the problem of underreporting may occur due to the fact that the press is not able to report terror incidents in autocratic regimes (e.g., Drakos and Gofas, 2006). However, given that all countries in our sample during most of our observation period had a free press, we expect this underreporting bias to be negligible. Second, the GTD has been criticized for including violent incidents by actors that do not qualify as terrorists (e.g., Sanchez-Cuenca and de la Calle, 2009). For Western Europe there are some isolated reports of incidents by non-terrorist actors (e.g., youths, mobs, demonstrators, students). These attacks are excluded from our dataset. Third, Enders et al. (2011) argue that the GTD—in comparison to ITERATE, another terrorism dataset—tends to underreport terrorism for the period between 1970 and 1977, while it tends to overreport terrorism for the period between 1991 and 1997. While we use the unadjusted data as provided by the GTD, calibrating it with respect to the adjustment scores provided by Enders et al. (2011) yields similar findings to those reported in the main text. Our findings also do not systematically change when we limit our analysis to the period between 1978 and 2007.

In order to be counted, any terrorist attack has to meet three criteria. First, the attack has to be perpetrated by a known (i.e., identifiable) terrorist group. That is, we exclude all attacks by individuals (e.g., 'lone wolves') and by unknown perpetrators.

Second, the attack has to be carried out by a group operating in its *natural territory* (cf. Sanchez-Cuenca and de la Calle, 2009). This refers to the country in which a terrorist organization is rooted and whose politico-economic system or territorial integrity it challenges (Sanchez-Cuenca and de la Calle, 2009). Hence, we exclude all attacks by non-European groups on European soil (e.g., the attack by the Palestinian Black September group on the 1972 Olympic Games in Munich) and by European groups that act outside their natural territory (e.g., attacks by the PIRA on British interests on the European mainland). However, for the creation of our dataset it does not matter whether an attack is directed against a domestic or international target. That is, our dataset includes attacks by, e.g., the German Red Army Faction (RAF) on both German and international targets, as long as these attacks were carried out in Germany (the RAF's natural territory). As previously argued by Sanchez-Cuenca and de la Calle (2009), it is not plausible to artificially differentiate between domestic and transnational terrorism (e.g., RAF attacks against German targets vs. RAF attacks against U.S. targets), given that the terrorist actor—and thus the underlying set of social conditions motivating its activities—is identical. Through this approach our dataset provides a more consistent picture of terrorism in Western Europe than other datasets that—oftentimes for artificial reasons—cover only either domestic or transnational events.

Third, the attack has to be carried out by a group which pursues either left-wing or nationalist-separatist goals. Our main data sources for classification are the *START Terrorist Organization Profiles*[6] and the data appendices of Schmid and Jongman (2005), Engene (2007) and Masters (2009). These sources are also used to determine a terrorist organization's natural territory.[7]

For our classification efforts all terrorist organizations are coded as left-wing when they adhere to predominantly social revolutionary agendas that are directed against the existing socio-economic order. This includes anarchist, communist/socialist, anti-globalization and other leftist groups. The ultimate goal of all these groups is to destroy the capitalist and bourgeois society and replace it with an alternative (anarchist, Marxist-Leninist etc.) system, meaning that these groups usually strive for a regime change (e.g., Sanchez-Cuenca, 2009).

[6] http://www.start.umd.edu/start/data_collections/tops.

[7] A detailed list of those left-wing and nationalist-separatist terrorist organizations we identified in our coding efforts is available as supplementary appendix.

Prominent examples of these groups are the German RAF, the Spanish GRAPO, the French Action Directe and the Italian Informal Anarchist Federation. As shown in Figure 1, the countries that were hit the strongest by this kind of ideology terrorism between 1970 and 2007 were Italy, Spain, Greece, Germany and France.

– Figure 1 here –

Terrorist groups whose activities are predominantly related to territorial changes are coded as nationalist-separatist terrorist organizations. On the one hand, this includes groups with predominantly separatist agendas such as the British PIRA (unification of Northern Ireland with the Irish Republic), the Spanish ETA (establishment of an independent Basque state) and the French FLNC (creation of an independent Corse state). On the other hand, we also include armed groups that oppose these very territorial ambitions. For instance, we coded terrorist actions by the British UFF (opposed to Catholic emancipation efforts in Northern Ireland) and the Spanish GAL (opposed to the Basque independence movement) as nationalist-separatist terrorism. As shown in Figure 1, the countries that were affected the most from this type of terrorism in the period of 1970 to 2007 were the United Kingdom, Spain and France.

For our observation period (1970-2007) the GTD reports 14,404 terrorist incidents by known and unknown terrorist perpetrators in Western Europe. 1,670 (approx.11.6 per cent) of these attacks were carried out by left-wing terrorist groups within their respective natural territory. 7,180 (approx. 49.8 per cent) terrorist attacks were carried out by terrorist groups with separatist or nationalist agendas within their respective natural territory. This means that revolutionary and ethnic terrorism accounted for over 60 per cent of all attacks during our observation period. Figure 2 illustrates the dynamics of the number of attacks per type. The number of nationalist-separatist attacks was constantly high during the 1970s and 1980s, peaking several times. The absolute number of attacks of left-wing terrorists has always been much smaller and decreasing since the end of the 1970s. There is a clear decline in both left-wing and nationalist-terrorist attacks after the mid-1990s.

– Figure 2 here –

Figure 2 also shows the trend in other (i.e., non-left-wing and non-nationalist-separatist) forms of terrorism. These include attacks of unknown perpetrators and individuals (approx. 25 per cent of all attacks); attacks carried out by groups operating outside their natural territory (approx. 8 per cent), e.g., attacks by the Turkish PKK in Germany; as well as attacks by right-

wing and racist terrorist organizations within their respective territory (approx. 2 per cent).[8] A very small number of attacks during 1970 and 2007 were conducted by terrorist groups with religious (e.g., homegrown Islamic) and environmentalist agendas.

3. The Social Origins of Left-Wing and Nationalist-Separatist Terrorism: Literature Review and Hypotheses

In this section, we discuss several hypotheses regarding the social origins of left-wing and nationalist-separatist terrorism in Western Europe. Table 2 summarizes all hypotheses, variables and their operationalization used in the following statistical analysis (Section 4), where we identify the mutual and distinct social origins of revolutionary left-wing and nationalist-separatist terrorism.[9]

– Table 2 here –

3.1 Socio-economic conditions

An important strand of the literature relates the emergence of terrorism to the prevalence of unfavorable socio-economic conditions. As argued by Gurr (1970), if people perceive a mismatch between the economic benefits they subjectively think they deserve and the benefits they actually receive (relative deprivation) this might induce feelings of frustration, which lead to the use of violence. For instance, Freytag et al. (2011) argue that poor economic times coincide with lower opportunity costs of violence (e.g., because nonviolent economic opportunities are sparse) and higher perceived benefits from violence (e.g., because terrorist success may lead to a redistribution of scarce economic resources). Indeed, empirical studies by, e.g., Burgoon (2006) and Blomberg and Hess (2008) find that terrorism is more likely when poor socio-economic conditions abound. Also, the literature on civil war consistently finds poverty to be one of the main predictors for the emergence of civil war (e.g., Fearon and Laitin, 2003).

[8] Given the small number of right-wing terrorist attacks and the fact that it is difficult to distinguish between "false flag terrorism" (e.g., strategy of tension in Italy), unorganized right-wing extremism and right-wing terrorism, we exclude right-wing terrorism from our analysis. See Koopman (1996) for a discussion of right-wing and racist violence in Europe.

[9] As a robustness check, we also experimented with further variables (presence of U.S. troops, urban growth, growth in tertiary education, manufacturing exports, general strikes, period dummies) that may determine revolutionary left-wing and ethnic terrorism as well. Their inclusion in our empirical models did not systematically alter the findings reported in the main text.

We use the level of per capita income (GDP p.c.) as an indicator of the level of socio-economic development. In line with the previous discussion, we expect terrorism to decrease with an increase in economic development.[10] Given that left-wing ideologies (e.g., socialism, anarcho-communism) are usually rooted in the prevalence of poor material conditions, we expect left-wing terrorism to be particularly responsive to socio-economic development. However, we have no reason to believe that the effect of a higher level of income on the opportunity costs of terrorism—where a higher level of wealth makes terrorist activities less attractive—does not also matter to the calculus of ethnic terrorists. In fact, Piazza (2011) finds that economic discrimination along ethnic lines can lead to more terrorism. Therefore, a deterioration of socio-economic conditions may be felt most strongly by the discriminated who turn to violence to improve their socio-economic position. In summary, our first hypothesis regarding the relationship between socio-economic development and terrorism is:

H1a: The higher the level of *GDP p.c.* the fewer terrorist attacks will occur.

The majority of studies on the determinants of terrorism, however, come to the conclusion that economic conditions—measured in per capita income terms—share no robust association with terrorism (e.g., Abadie, 2006; Gassebner and Luechinger, 2011; Krieger and Meierrieks, 2011). This suggests to not only controlling for the effect of structural economic conditions (GDP p.c.) on the genesis of terrorism but also for the effect of short-run economic performance. Changes in social and economic life ought to be felt more strongly through short-run economic fluctuations and alignments and therefore may foster terrorism. For instance, technical and socio-economic innovations might produce shifts in the relative importance of industries, which may induce changes in the type of labor demanded. This leads to unemployment and may subsequently create a class of "modernization losers" (e.g., Olson, 1963), which may turn to violence to change material conditions to their favor.

Hence, we expect a higher unemployment rate to coincide with more terrorist activity because more unemployment ought to facilitate terrorist recruitment (due to comparatively lower terrorism opportunity costs), regardless of which form of terrorism we investigate. Our second hypothesis is:

H1b: The higher the level of *unemployment* the more terrorist attacks will occur.

[10] The civil war literature alternatively argues that per capita income is a proxy of state capacity, where rebel groups have higher chances to defeat a state with limited resources available for its defense (Fearon and Laitin, 2003). Following this argumentation we would also expect terrorism to be less likely in richer societies.

As part of our robustness analysis, we also consider the influence of three other socio-economic variables on terrorism. First, we use the inflation rate as an alternative measure of short-run economic change, expecting a similar relationship with terrorism as unemployment. Second, we control for the effect of economic integration (trade openness) on terrorism. This variable may reflect changes in the domestic and global economic order, potentially creating grievances and violence among the 'losers of globalization' (e.g., Robison et al., 2006), or creating a threat to local culture and identity. Arguably, economic integration may then matter to the patterns of left-wing and ethnic terrorism alike. Third, we consider the effect of income inequality on terrorism, which is an alternative proxy to measure relative economic deprivation. Revolutionary and nationalist-separatist groups tend to depict their armed struggle as a fight against social injustice created by capitalism and mechanisms of discrimination along ethnic lines (Sanchez-Cuenca, 2009; Piazza, 2011). Thus, we anticipate terrorism to increase with income inequality.

3.2 Domestic political factors

Given that a substantial number of empirical studies suggests politico-institutional factors to be more important for the emergence of terrorism than economic variables (e.g., Gassebner and Luechinger, 2011; Krieger and Meierrieks, 2011), we test the influence of specific political factors on the patterns of left-wing and nationalist-separatist terrorism in Western Europe. As detailed below, we focus on the roles of popular support, political representation and non-violent social protest in terrorism.[11]

Terrorist organizations depend on popular support in the form of, e.g., financial contributions and political allegiance (e.g., Siqueira and Sandler, 2006). A high level of popular support ought to make it easier to find new recruits and access material resources, consequently allowing for a sustained terrorist campaign. Popular support for a terrorist group is expected to closely correlate with the level of support for political parties with a related political agenda. Thus, our proxy for measuring support for a specific branch of terrorism is the vote share for political parties that have far-left (e.g., communist) or nationalist (e.g., separatist) agendas. On the one hand, this vote share may be positively related to terrorist activity. A higher vote share may mean a larger pool of potential recruits willing to use violence to achieve political goals, which consequently facilitates recruitment and mobilization. On the other hand, a higher vote share may also be negatively linked to terrorism, given that it may

[11] Given that almost all countries in our sample were democracies for almost all of the observation period, we do not consider the democracy-terrorism nexus here.

also make it more likely that terrorist demands are implemented through (non-violent) political action. That is, the precise effect of support for political parties that pursue goals similar to those of terrorist groups depends on whether this support actually strengthens or discourages the use of force to achieve political goals. Here, the negotiability of these goals may determine which effect dominates. Ethnic terrorist groups usually have negotiable goals, so that political success (e.g., more autonomy) may reduce support for terrorism. Revolutionary groups, however, have non-negotiable goals and concessions are not likely to be granted, even with rather strong political support. Thus, our first hypothesis relating a domestic political factor to the emergence of terrorism is:

> H2a: The larger the *support for their respective ideology,* the more left-wing but the fewer nationalist-separatist attacks will occur.

The ideological affiliation of the incumbent government may also affect the emergence of terrorism. Koch and Cranmer (2007) find that left-wing governments are more likely to be target of international terrorism than right-wing governments. They argue that right-wing governments tend to favor national security over other domestic policies, thereby making terrorism a less attractive option (e.g., due to higher opportunity costs from increased police efforts). Apart from this reasoning, Burgoon (2006) suggests that countries governed by left-wing governments are less prone to terrorism as left-wing governments tend to reduce inequality, poverty and economic insecurity through social welfare policies, in turn making violence incited by poor material conditions less likely. This implies that right-wing governments are likelier targets of terrorism. What is more, a right-wing government ought to be the 'natural political enemy' of left-wing and separatist terrorism because it usually pursues policies that are detrimental to their goals. For instance, a right-wing government tends to favor capitalism over socialism and territorial integrity over territorial concessions. The 'natural' hostility between right-wing governments and revolutionary and ethnic terrorism may increase terrorist support if non-violent means of achieving political change are constrained. Following this line of reasoning, we introduce a dummy variable that reflects whether a right-wing government is in office and we expect the following relationship between a government's ideological affiliation and left-wing and nationalist-separatist terrorism:

> H2b: The existence of a *right-wing government* will lead to more terrorist attacks.

Finally, we consider the impact of non-violent protest (anti-government demonstrations) on terrorism. These protests signal the existence of grievances, which in turn may contribute to

the emergence of terrorism. Also, political instability may facilitate terrorist fundraising, recruitment and training since even non-violent protests usually coincide with reduced government control (e.g., Piazza, 2008). What is more, harsh government measures against non-violent protest may create a vicious circle of violence and counter-violence, which may increase terrorist mobilization, i.e., the willingness to use force to voice dissent (e.g., Byman, 1998). We expect these mechanisms to matter both to revolutionary and ethnic terrorism, so that we arrive at the following hypothesis:

H2c: The prevalence of *anti-government protests* will lead to more terrorist attacks.

In addition to the aforementioned variables, we also control for the effect of government size and social spending on terrorism. Both variables ought to reflect government intervention in the socio-economic sphere. As argued by Burgoon (2006) and Krieger and Meierrieks (2010), such intervention may remove socio-economic grievances (e.g., inequality) which may otherwise lead to violence. Thus, we expect a negative effect of government size and social security spending on the emergence of terrorism in Western Europe.

3.3 Politico-historic factors

Terrorism may also be related to international political and historic factors. In particular, left-wing terrorism was not only dependent upon domestic circumstances but also international developments associated with the dynamics of the Cold War. Terrorist groups—particularly those that shared goals with the Soviet Bloc—received political and material support from the Soviet Bloc during the Cold War era, so as to instrument them in proxy wars against the U.S.-dominated Western bloc (O'Brien, 1996). Consequently, the end of the Cold War can be expected to have reduced especially revolutionary left-wing terrorism. First, the end of financial and military support by the Soviet Union reduced the clout of this kind of terrorism. Second, the end of the Soviet Bloc also meant an undermining of the ideological foundations of left-wing terrorism, which can be expected to have strongly discouraged the attractiveness of this kind of terrorism (e.g., Shughart, 2006). We include a dummy variable for the Cold War period to account for the effect of changes in the international political arena on terrorism in Western Europe. While it is true that ethnic terrorist groups in this part of the world also received some support from the Soviet Bloc during the Cold War era, we expect left-wing terrorism to be particularly sensitive to this change in the international political system. We test the following hypothesis:

H3a: During the *Cold War Era* more left-wing terrorist attacks occured.

Sanchez-Cuenca (2009) points out that countries with a dictatorial past are more prone to terrorism than established democracies. This implicitly speaks to Piazza (2008) who finds that political instability is conducive to terrorism. Sanchez-Cuenca (2009) argues that a dictatorial past may indicate the presence of stronger political conflict that makes the use of more extreme measures (terrorism) more likely. He also suggests that a dictatorial past may signal the possibility of state capture by insurgents as well as the prevalence of authoritarian structures that are conducive to state repression and thus the escalation of conflict. While Sanchez-Cuenca (2009) suggests that these mechanisms matter to the emergence of lethal left-wing terrorism, they may plausibly also matter to nationalist-separatist terrorism. We may speculate that old democracies (with no recent dictatorial past) are in ethnic-social equilibrium, so that ethnic needs are met through non-violent participation. Alternatively, however, the existence of this very equilibrium may coincide with structural discrimination along ethnic lines, making the use of violence—through the eyes of would-be terrorists—necessary to overcome it. That is, it is also possible that democratic stability fuels conflict.

We measure the dependence of terrorism on a country's political history by the—highly variable—number of years since a country can be considered as democratic. We test the following hypothesis:

H3b: The *older a democracy*, the fewer terrorist attacks will occur.

3.4 Demographic conditions

We also consider the impact of demographic factors. Here, we expect *population size* to correlate positively with left-wing and nationalist-separatist terrorism alike due to two effects. First, there is a simple scale effect as a larger population has more people in the tails of the distribution of political preferences and thus more people with radical political views (Sanchez-Cuenca, 2009). Second, policing is in general more costly in larger populations, suggesting that terrorist groups may find it easier to operate in more populous countries (e.g., Sanchez-Cuenca, 2009). In addition, the evidence from large-*N* studies consistently shows that population size is a strong and robust predictor of terrorism (e.g., Gassebner and Luechinger, 2011; Krieger and Meierrieks, 2011), indicating that this relationship holds for all forms of terrorism. Thus, our first hypothesis linking a demographic variable to terrorism is:

H4a: The larger the *size of the population,* the more terrorist attacks will occur.

Finally, we introduce a further demographic variable that ought to interact differently with left-wing and nationalist-separatist terrorism: the degree of *ethnic polarization*. Evidently,

ethnic polarization ought to be a particular relevant motivational cause of nationalist-separatist terrorism. For instance, the political violence literature argues that ethnic polarization leads to conflicts over the allocation of scarce resources along ethnic lines (e.g., Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005). Basuchoudhary and Shughart (2010) find that the degree of ethnic tensions within a country is significantly related to the genesis of terrorism. Ethnic polarization may, for instance, induce economic discrimination, which may then turn into terrorist violence by discriminated minorities. Piazza (2011) provides empirical evidence for this argumentation. In contrast, Victoroff (2005) suggests that left-wing terrorists have a less close relationship with their respective culture of origin and therefore ought to be less responsive to ethnic conflict. Thus, we arrive at the following hypothesis on the relationship between ethnic polarization and terrorism:

> H4b: The higher the degree of *ethnic polarization,* the more nationalist-separatist terrorist attacks will occur.

4. Empirical Methodology and Results

In this section we test which of the hypotheses discussed above are supported by the data for a panel of 17 Western European countries between 1970 and 2007. The corresponding summary statistics are reported in Table 3.

– Table 3 here –

4.1 Methodology

The choice of an adequate estimation technique is influenced by several factors. First, our dependent variables are count variables (i.e., the number of terrorist attacks by left-wing and nationalist-separatist terrorist group, respectively, in a given country and year) that can only assume non-negative values. This calls for the use of a count data model. Second, the variances of the dependent variables are larger than their respective means (cf. Table 3). Thus, we need to employ a count data model where the count is expected to come from a negative binomial distribution, which is able to take this over-dispersion into account. Third, while the use of panel data allows us to better control for heterogeneity, reduce problems of collinearity and deliver more efficient econometric estimations, we also face the problem that variables of interest are likely to be correlated over time (because the dataset includes repeated values for a country over time). In fact, initial tests indicate the presence of serial correlation. This non-

independence of the data calls for the use of a panel estimator that considers this temporal dependence accordingly (e.g., Zorn, 2001).

To adequately account for the data structure, we run a series of *generalized estimation equation (GEE) models* for negative-binomially distributed (panel) count data, where we control for an AR(1) term to factor in temporal correlation (e.g., Zorn, 2001; Robison et al., 2006). We choose the population-averaged GEE approach over a cluster-specific approach (e.g., the conditional fixed effects negative binomial regression) because the former is expected to yield parameter estimates that are much closer to the data, given that for the latter approach assumptions about the source of individual heterogeneity have to be made based on the available data. This leads to obvious difficulties to correctly specify the sources of individual heterogeneity (Zorn, 2001).[12]

To account for heterogeneity we use (semi-robust) Huber/White/Sandwich standard errors clustered over countries. We let the control variables enter the model with (t-1) lagged values to make a more stringent causal argument, while also reducing any correlation between the explanatory variables and the error term. Finally, we take the natural logarithm of population size and per capita income to correct for skewness and avoid any outlier bias.

4.2 The social origins of revolutionary terrorism

The GEE estimation results for the determinants of *left-wing terrorism* in Western Europe are reported in Table 4.

– Table 4 here –

Considering the role of socio-economic variables in terrorism, we find that per capita income exerts no influence on left-wing terrorism, meaning that there is no support for H1a. However, a higher unemployment rate is robustly associated with more terrorist activity, supporting H1b. Additional model specifications suggest that higher inflation rates and levels of income inequality are associated with more revolutionary terrorism, while trade openness shares no substantial relationship with it. The failure to find a robust relationship between socio-

[12] The conditional fixed effects (FE) negative binomial regression estimator also does not work as a 'typical' FE estimator as it usually does not eliminate the individual-specific time-invariant heterogeneity (e.g., Guimaraes, 2008). What is more, using the FE estimator we would be forced to drop all 'always-zero' country cases (e.g., Luxembourg), essentially losing the opportunity to compare countries that experienced terrorist activity to those that were spared. These factors additionally motivate our choice of a GEE approach over a FE negative binomial regression estimator.

economic development and terrorism speaks to the inconclusive evidence from large-*N* studies on this relationship (e.g., Abadie, 2006; Blomberg and Hess, 2008). While we do not find an effect of broad measures of socio-economic development (GDP p.c.) on terrorism, variables reflecting socio-economic imbalances (e.g., unemployment) tend to promote terrorism (e.g., by lowering its opportunity costs and facilitating recruitment), meaning that economic grievances may nevertheless matter to the left-wing terrorists' calculus.

In addition, our empirical findings show that domestic politics matter to left-wing terrorism insofar as a higher vote share of radical left-wing parties leads to more terrorism (supporting H2a). This is in line with Sanchez-Cuenca (2009) who finds that support for communist parties is among the strong predictors of left-wing terrorism. Potentially, a higher vote share may mean stronger popular support and a larger pool of potential recruits, which ought to foster terrorist recruitment and mobilization. The non-negotiability of revolutionary terrorism's goals (e.g., replacement of a capitalist with a socialist society) also makes it plausible that this mobilization effect dominates the potentially appeasing effect from voicing dissent in parliament. Indeed, among left-wing radicals there seems to have been a deep mistrust over the effectiveness of democratic institutions in fostering political change (cf. Sanchez-Cuenca, 2009).

By contrast, we find neither an effect of the existence of a right-wing government nor of anti-government demonstrations on left-wing terrorism (rejecting H2b and H2c, respectively). Also, the size of the government and social security transfers are not substantially associated with it. This indicates that the mobilization of revolutionary terrorism may have largely come from the rejection of capitalist ideas (as reflected by the share of votes for radical leftist parties) but not from non-violent social protest and government actions. Considering the role of social protest in left-wing terrorism, our findings are in line with Della Porta and Tarrow (1986) and Della Porta (1995: 83-112). Rather than arguing that increases in social protest precede the emergence of political violence, these studies suggest that terrorist groups emerge when the intensity of social movements declines in order to compensate for the loss in public support and visibility.

Furthermore, revolutionary terrorism in Western Europe between 1970 and 2007 was more likely in young democracies (supporting H3b). This corresponds to large-*N* study evidence (e.g., Piazza, 2008; Kis-Katos et al., 2011) arguing that instability breeds terrorism, but also to Sanchez-Cuenca (2009) who argues that especially past dictatorship has contributed to the intensity of revolutionary left-wing terrorism. Young democracies may be more vulnerable to

terrorism because their institutions are comparatively weak, making it more difficult to defend themselves against terrorism. Also, many Western European countries have had fascist regimes (e.g., Germany, Italy, Spain) before democratic transformation took place. A conservation of authoritarian structures may have contributed to the escalation of social conflict and the emergence of left-wing terrorism directed against those very structures.

Left-wing terrorism was more likely during the Cold War era, too (supporting H3a). This finding is in line with earlier studies by Robison et al. (2006) and Choi (2010) focussing on global samples. Many revolutionary groups in Western Europe stressed their solidarity with non-European liberation movements (e.g., PLO, Tupamaros) and framed their armed activity as part of a global struggle between 'capitalist imperialism' and the 'Third World' (e.g., Shughart, 2006). Their ideological proximity to the Soviet Union makes it likely that these groups received political and material support from the Soviet Bloc. For instance, the GDR—a Soviet satellite—provided members of the West German RAF with shelter and assistance. The collapse of the Soviet Union consequently diminished support, while also undermining the ideological appeal of revolutionary terrorism. This is likely to have reduced the attractiveness of this kind of terrorism and greatly impeded recruitment.

Finally, our empirical findings suggest that population size is a positive predictor of terrorism, supporting H4a. This result matches the empirical mainstream. However, we do not find that ethnic polarization contributes to the emergence of left-wing terrorism. That is, the positive effect of population size on terrorism is more likely to result from a scale effect—where a large population simply coincides with more victims and more perpetrators—than to indicate that left-wing terrorism originates from demographic distress.

4.3 The social origins of ethnic terrorism

The GEE estimation results for the determinants of *nationalist-separatist terrorism* are reported in Table 5.

– Table 5 here –

With respect to the role of socio-economic deprivation and modernization in ethnic terrorism, we find that there is a rather robust, negative effect of per capita income on it (supporting H1a), while the unemployment rate is a very robust and positive predictor of nationalist-separatist terrorism (supporting H1b). There is also evidence that higher levels of inflation and economic inequality lead to more terrorism, whereas trade openness reduces it. Our findings tend to support Caruso and Schneider (2011) who detect a negative effect of GDP

p.c. and a positive effect of youth unemployment on the emergence of terrorism in Western Europe between 1994 and 2007. Apparently, socio-economic success seems to increase the opportunity costs of violence, so that ethnic terrorism becomes less attractive. There may be a close and reinforcing relationship between socio-economic underdevelopment, modernization strain and economic discrimination along ethnic lines (cf. Piazza, 2011). The importance of socio-economic factors in ethnic terrorism—as indicated by our estimation results—may explain why a number of separatist movements (e.g., ETA, PIRA, INLA) integrated ideological positions (e.g., socialism, communism) into their agendas.

Besides economic conditions, our findings also show that domestic politics are relevant to some extent. First, an increase in vote shares for nationalist-separatist parties tends to reduce ethnic terrorism (rejecting H2a). Arguably, the increased political influence of separatist parties makes it more likely to achieve concessions, which are possible as the goals of—violent and non-violent—separatist movements are negotiable. We also find that there is a weakly robust, positive effect of a right-government incumbency on the emergence of ethnic terrorism (supporting H2b). Right-wing governments may more strongly favor hawkish policies over concessions and negotiations, potentially limiting the possibilities to achieve change non-violently and making violence more attractive. Indeed, e.g., Barros (2003) finds that the banning of political parties in the Basque country—fostered by the conservative Spanish Popular Party—contributed to an increase in terrorist activity by ETA. That is, our findings point at a substitution of violent for non-violent activity by means of political participation, where these means may be influenced by a right-wing incumbent government.

We also find that anti-government demonstrations are positively correlated with ethnic terrorism (supporting H2c). As argued by Sanchez-Cuenca and de la Calle (2009: 44), "because terrorist organizations need voluntary compliance, they may develop strong links with social movements […]". Terrorist groups may try to use non-violent protest—which signals the existence of grievances—to facilitate recruitment and financing. Perhaps even more importantly, terrorist groups may capitalize on harsh government responses to terrorism. This speaks to the idea that terrorism benefits from cycles of protest and repression, e.g., in terms of increased sympathy towards the means of armed struggle (e.g., Byman, 1998). Indeed, for instance, White (1989) finds that participation in terrorism in the Northern Ireland conflict is strongly associated with state repression and the individual perception that peaceful protest does not work.

Considering the additional politico-institutional variables that enter our estimations as robustness checks, we find that ethnic terrorism does not respond to government size, but is negatively affected by social security transfers. The latter variable seems to better reflect government interventions in the socio-economic life. As in Krieger and Meierrieks (2010), social welfare spending seems to reduce nationalist-separatist terrorism, presumably by removing socio-economic grievances. This is also consistent with our earlier findings that stress the role of socio-economic variables in ethnic terrorism.

The Cold War era has not influenced the patterns of nationalist-separatist terrorism. This kind of terrorism is motivated by country-specific historic conflict and the wave of anti-colonial terrorism that began in the 1920s (cf. Shughart, 2006). As a matter of fact, ethnic terrorist groups were far less dependent on ideological and material support from the Soviet Bloc. Consistent with our findings, nationalist-terrorist groups were thus less likely to be responsive to a changing political climate after the end of the Cold War. Interestingly, ethnic terrorism in Western Europe becomes more likely with the persistence of a democratic regime (rejecting H3b). This finding runs counter to the global evidence which stresses that instability and regime immaturity foster terrorism (e.g., Piazza, 2008; Kis-Katos et al., 2011). It may indicate that ethnic conflict in Western Europe has a long history—e.g., the origins of the Northern Ireland conflict date back to the 1600s—and has not been sufficiently moderated by democratic institutions. In fact, due to their specific political traditions, older democracies (e.g., Great Britain) tend to favor centralism and nation-building over decentralism and ethnic plurality, while younger democracies tend to be more multicultural or consociational, so that ethnic conflict can be better managed (e.g., Smooha, 2002).

Finally, our finding that population size is a strong and positive predictor of ethnic terrorism is in line with the empirical mainstream and our expectations (H4a). Also, ethnic polarization is found to be a robust and positive determinant of this kind of terrorism (supporting H4b). Polarization may signal politico-economic conflicts over scarce resources and the prevalence of economic discrimination, where related grievances (the desire to change or conserve this very discrimination) may turn into terrorist violence (e.g., Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005; Piazza, 2011). As argued by Basuchoudhary and Shughart (2010: 68), "emphasizing differences and fabricating ethnic tensions cultivates the grievances of groups perceiving themselves to be disadvantaged under the status quo." This ought to make ethnic terrorist mobilization and recruitment less costly, particularly as the opportunity costs of violence (e.g., employment) can be expected to be rather low. Indeed, for example, O'Hearn (1987)

argues that one of the origins of the Northern Ireland conflict were socio-economic grievances of the catholic population, which in turn were rooted in ethnic polarization and discrimination.

4.4 Extension and further discussion

Our estimation results show that left-wing and nationalist-separatist terrorism share some social origins (e.g., unemployment), but differ with respect to others. At times, there are even detrimental effects of certain social conditions on the emergence of these two types of terrorism. These findings indicate that motivational causes matter. There are indeed some studies which suggest that political motivations and terrorism goals need to be taken into account, where supreme value terrorism with abstract goals (e.g., left-wing terrorism) may respond differently to social change than terrorism with discrete policy goals such as national liberation (e.g., Bernholz, 2004; Zimmermann, 2009; Freytag et al., 2011). However, as argued in the introduction, most empirical studies on the causes of terrorism ignore the implications of different types of terrorism.

What happens to our findings when we likewise disregard the motivational bonds of terrorist groups and "pool" terrorism data as previous statistical efforts have done? To answer this question we use three alternative dependent variables to re-run our baseline empirical model. The first alternative dependent variable, constructed from our own dataset, is the combined number of left-wing and nationalist-separatist terrorist attacks. Our second variable is the number of domestic terrorist incidents. The data are drawn from Enders et al. (2011). This variable accounts for all domestic attacks (regardless of their types), but disregards incidents with an international dimensions, even when those attacks occurred within the natural territory of a terrorist group. The third variable is the total number of terrorist incidents, where the data are drawn from the GTD. It records domestic and transnational terrorist attacks by known and unknown groups (regardless of their types) in a given country and year. The corresponding empirical findings are reported in Table 6. For the sake of brevity, we only report the signs of the respective regression coefficients and significance levels.

– Table 6 here –

In summary, the empirical findings suggest that the 'pooling' of terrorism data may mask the true correlates of different types of terrorism. For instance, using 'pooled' data we find that terrorism in Western Europe was more pronounced during the Cold War era, even though a closer inspection shows that this is only true for left-wing terrorism. Using aggregated terrorism measures may also lead to suboptimal policy advice. For example, ethnic polarization does not seem to matter to terrorism—so that policies do not need to address it to

reduce terrorism—when we use 'pooled' data, even though it is a robust correlate of ethnic terrorism.

Our findings show that there is some degree of heterogeneity in the determinants of different types of terrorism. This heterogeneity can be expected to be more severe for global samples since they also include information on religious (Islamic) terrorism. In the light of this heterogeneity, it seems questionable to apply one theoretical model—and consequently, one empirical model—to the study of terrorism. One way of accounting for the different role of certain social conditions in different types of terrorism is to consider their interaction with the motivational underpinnings and goals of terrorist organizations.

5. Conclusion

In this contribution we use a uniquely coded dataset to separately analyze the social origins of left-wing and nationalist-separatist terrorism in 17 Western European countries between 1970 and 2007. Our study is motivated by a lack of comparative studies on the causes of different types of political terrorism. While the differences in the historic roots, ultimate goals and their negotiability, politico-military strategies etc. of revolutionary and ethnic terrorism make it plausible that these forms of terrorism are differently affected by certain social conditions and changes, this potential heterogeneity has been largely ignored in the empirical literature.

We find that (1) revolutionary left-wing terrorism shares a unique, positive association with the Cold War era, while nationalist-separatist terrorism is uniquely motivated by ethnic polarization, poor structural socio-economic conditions (low GDP p.c., trade openness and poor social security institutions to ameliorate them) and social protest (anti-government demonstrations). Left-wing terrorism correlates positively with political support for radical leftist parties, while political success of nationalist parties seems to drain support for ethnic terrorism. Both types of terrorism also share a detrimental relationship with the prevalence of democratic institutions. While left-wing terrorism is more likely in young and potentially unstable democracies, ethnic terrorism is more common in older ones. (2) Both types of terrorism are robustly associated with larger populations and higher unemployment, with robustness checks also suggesting that higher inflation rates and economic inequality matter, while government size plays no role in both of them. (3) Our findings suggest that different types of political terrorism are associated with different mechanisms of mobilization and radicalization, different levels of popular and external support etc., so that social conditions

affect the terrorists' calculus (partly) depending on their political motivation, while other influencing factors are universally important.

Empirical research on the determinants of terrorism should more thoroughly account for the heterogeneity in terrorism associated with differences in the terrorists' motivations and goals. As indicated in an extension of our statistical analysis, the 'pooling' of terrorism data may mask the true role of some terrorism correlates in distinct types of terrorism. An analysis of the role of political motivations in terrorism on a global scale is a clear avenue of future research, which may help to establish a better understanding of the social origins of terrorism, given that large-*N* evidence on the origins of terrorism remains inconclusive (cf. Gassebner and Luechinger 2011; Krieger and Meierrieks, 2011).

Counter-terrorism efforts need to take political motivations—which crucially influence terrorist goals and goal negotiability—into account when deciding between the 'stick' (e.g., police efforts) and the 'carrot' (e.g., concessions). For Western Europe our study suggests that nationalist-separatist terrorism can be effectively reduced by enabling socio-economic and political participation. While socio-economic incentives—particularly, employment—may also be helpful against left-wing terrorism, its overall responsiveness to politico-economic incentives is expected to be weaker, given the more abstract and non-negotiable goals of this kind of terrorism. The same ought to be true for a potential future threat for Western Europe, homegrown Islamic terrorism. Similar to left-wing terrorism, it adheres to supreme values and has strong international links—where it is framed as part of a global war between the Islamic and Western World—, making appeasement and concessions difficult. In line with our analysis, it seems necessary to carefully identify the social origins of homegrown Islamic terrorism. In a first comparative analysis, Ganor (2011) argues that policies that counter social exclusion and discrimination and foster employment may be helpful against this most recent wave of domestic terrorism. That is, there is hope that Islamic terrorism—like its left-wing and nationalist-separatist companions—may at least be partly rooted in very 'this-worldly' social conditions and thus also be responsive to their improvement.

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Figures and Tables.



Figure 1: Spatial Distribution of Different Types of Terrorism in Western Europe, 1970-2007



Figure 2: Trends of Different Types of Terrorism in Western Europe, 1970-2007

	Left-Wing Terrorism	Nationalist-Separatist Terrorism
Historic Roots	- Propaganda of the Deed - Internationalism - Cold War - Anti-colonialism - Protests of 1968 and Vietnam War - Anti-capitalism and anti-globalization	- Country-specific roots (occupation, discrimination) - Irredentism - Anti-colonialism and right to self-determination - Anti-imperialism - Incorporation of socialist/communist ideas possible
Ultimate Goal	Regime change: establishment of communist/socialist/anarchist etc. society	Territorial change: creation of an independent state (or its prevention)
Negotiability of Goal?	No	Potentially, yes (autonomy, independence etc.)
Popular Support and Appeal	Limited appeal to privileged, well-educated, "modernist" avant-garde	Restricted to specific ethnos, but broader coalition within it possible
Provision of Public Goods?	No	Potentially, yes (identity, security etc.)
International Links	- Alliances with other foreign terrorist groups - Support from foreign countries - International targets (mainly U.S.)	- Alliances with other foreign terrorist groups - Diaspora support - Cross-border attacks possible
Strategy	- Urban guerrilla - Actions by 'revolutionary vanguard' to incite popular revolution	- War of attrition - Negotiations by political wings possible

Table 1: Attributes of Left-Wing and Nationalist-Separatist Terrorism

Hypothesis	Variable	Expected Sign	Source and Operationalization
H1a	GDP p.c.	-	Source: Penn World Tables
			Operationalization: Real per capita income, logged
H1b	Unemployment	+	Source: Comparative Political Data Set
			Operationalization: Unemployment rate as a percentage of civilian labor force
H2a	Left-wing/nationalist parties influence	+/-	Source: Comparative Political Data Set
			Operationalization: Share of votes for parties classified as left-wing (socialist, communist etc.) or ethnic (separatist etc.) in last general election
H2b	Existence of a right-wing government	+/-	Source: Comparative Political Data Set
			Operationalization: Dummy variable; 1 indicating government dominated by right-wing (e.g., conservative) political parties
H2c	Anti-government protests	+	Source: CNTS Data Archive
			Operationalization: Number of peaceful public gathering of at least 100 people for the primary purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to government policies or authority
H3a	Cold war era	+	Source: —
			Operationalization: Dummy variable; 1 until 1991, 0 from 1992 onwards
H3b	Age of democracy	+/-	Source: POLITY IV Project
			Operationalization: Persistence of polity as a democracy, in number of years
H4a	Population size	+	Source: Penn World Tables
			Operationalization: Number of inhabitants, logged
H4b	Ethnic polarization	+	Source: Alesina et al. (2003)
			Operationalization: Constant index of ethnic polarization reflecting the probability that two randomly chosen individuals from a country belong to different ethnic groups

Data Sources: PENN World Tables = http://pwt.econ.upenn.edu/php_site/pwt_index.php. Comparative Political Data Set = http://www.ipw.unibe.ch/content/team/klaus_armingeon/comparative_political_data_sets/index_ger.html. Polity IV Project = http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm. CNTS Data Archive = http://www.databanksinternational.com/53.html.

Table 2: Hypotheses, Data Sources and Operationalization

Variable	N*T	Mean	SD	Min.	Max.
Left-Wing Terrorist Attacks	684	2.441	10.166	0	166
Nationalist-Separatist Terrorist Attacks	684	10.497	35.693	0	279
Per Capita Income (logged)	684	10.019	0.344	8.940	11.262
Unemployment	680	6.133	4.300	0.002	24.171
Population Size (logged)	684	9.103	1.535	5.319	11.320
Cold War Era	684	0.579	0.494	0	1
Left-Wing Parties Influence	668	7.752	8.359	0	41.1
Nationalist Parties Influence	668	1.043	3.077	0	15.7
Right-Wing Government	666	0.495	0.500	0	1
Age of Democracy	684	67.766	37.639	0	138
Ethnic Polarization	684	0.326	0.253	0.020	0.871
Anti-Government Demonstrations	684	0.544	1.453	0	13
Government Size	684	14.214	4.017	5.623	26.741
Inflation	684	6.797	7.833	-9.629	84.222
Trade Openness	684	67.664	47.873	13.989	301.412
Social Security Transfers	681	14.534	4.303	3.106	28.909
Income Inequality	483	0.018	0.014	0.003	0.134

Notes: Additional data on government size (= government economic activity to real GDP) and trade openness (= exports and imports to real GDP) drawn from the PENN World Tables. Data on social security transfers (= social security transfers as percentage of GDP) from Comparative Political Data Set. Data on inflation (annual growth rate of the GDP implicit deflator) drawn from the World Development Indicators = http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators. Data on income inequality (= industrial pay-inequality Theil index) from the University of Texas Inequality Project = http://utip.gov.utexas.edu/. Income inequality data only available for 17 countries and the period between 1970 and 2003.

Table 3: Summary Statistics

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GDP p.c. $_{t-1}$	-0.378	-0.428	0.096	-0.310	-0.827	-0.489
	(0.866)	(0.890)	(0.781)	(1.186)	(0.736)	(0.861)
Unemployment $_{t-1}$	0.131	0.134	0.141	0.133	0.094	0.111
	(0.048)***	(0.046)***	(0.048)***	(0.047)***	(0.051)*	(0.046)**
Population Size $_{t-1}$	0.893	0.857	0.997	0.871	0.840	1.079
	(0.246)***	(0.225)***	(0.253)***	(0.321)***	(0.821)***	(0.271)***
Cold War Era $_{t-1}$	1.103	1.151	0.902	1.092	0.966	1.142
	(0.394)***	(0.419)***	(0.458)**	(0.493)**	(0.630)***	(0.528)**
Left-Wing Parties	0.064	0.064	0.054	0.063	0.073	0.054
Influence $_{t-1}$	(0.020)***	(0.019)***	(0.019)***	(0.021)***	(0.019)***	(0.018)***
Right-Wing	0.256	0.231	0.174	0.261	0.251	0.122
Government $_{t-1}$	(0.246)	(0.259)	(0.210)	(0.239)	(0.290)	(0.250)
Age of	-0.030	-0.028	-0.028	-0.030	-0.034	-0.026
Democracy $_{t-1}$	(0.013)**	(0.015)*	(0.012)**	(0.012)**	(0.016)**	(0.012)**
Ethnic	-1.523	-1.456	-1.550	-1.468	-1.172	-1.869
Polarization $_{t-1}$	(1.192)	(1.208)	(1.242)	(1.230)	(1.101)	(1.212)
Anti-Government	0.002	0.001	-0.014	0.001	-0.002	-0.004
Demonstrations $_{t-1}$	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.049)	(0.043)	(0.050)	(0.052)
Government		-0.057				
Size $_{t-1}$		(0.075)				
Inflation $_{t-1}$			0.046			
			(0.015)***			
Trade Openness $_{t-1}$				-0.002		
				(0.024)		
Social Security					0.110	
Transfers $_{t-1}$					(0.070)	
Income						34.271
Inequality $_{t-1}$						(10.016)***
No. of Countries	18	18	18	18	18	17
N*T	644	644	644	644	641	466
Wald χ^2	542.05	445.06	283.68	545.96	1104.89	365.35
Prob. > χ^2	(0.000)***	(0.000)***	(0.000)***	(0.000)***	(0.000)***	(0.000)***

Notes: Dependent variable is the number of terrorist attacks by left-wing groups within their natural territory. Robust standard errors clustered on countries reported in parentheses. All models control for an AR(1) term. Constant not reported. (*), (**) and (***) indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.

Table 4: The Determinants of Left-Wing Terrorist Attacks

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
GDP p.c. $_{t-1}$	-5.284	-5.327	-4.249	-3.065	-5.210	-6.137
	(2.503)**	(2.782)*	(2.711)	(2.876)	(1.738)***	(2.200)***
Unemployment $_{t-1}$	0.162	0.162	0.199	0.144	0.271	0.143
	(0.065)**	(0.068)**	(0.064)***	(0.066)**	(0.090)***	(0.049)***
Population Size $_{t-1}$	2.570	2.585	2.637	1.738	2.614	2.311
	(0.567)***	(0.529)***	(0.572)***	(0.534)***	(0.375)***	(0.387)***
Cold War Era $_{t-1}$	0.122	0.120	0.025	-0.453	0.378	0.192
	(0.845)	(0.844)	(0.873)	(0.795)	(0.600)	(0.597)
Nationalist Parties	-0.163	-0.161	-0.164	0.039	-0.104	-0.313
Influence $_{t-1}$	(0.085)*	(0.079)**	(0.087)*	(0.084)	(0.074)	(0.101)***
Right-Wing	0.232	0.231	0.240	0.270	0.270	0.279
Government $_{t-1}$	(0.132)*	(0.137)*	(0.131)*	(0.187)	(0.151)*	(0.248)
Age of	0.025	0.025	0.029	0.030	0.036	0.035
Democracy $_{t-1}$	(0.014)*	(0.016)	(0.013)**	(0.010)***	(0.016)**	(0.016)**
Ethnic	7.713	7.715	7.863	7.338	5.956	8.707
Polarization $_{t-1}$	(1.320)***	(1.287)***	(1.211)***	(1.120)***	(1.407)***	(1.451)***
Anti-Government	0.094	0.093	0.088	0.064	0.109	0.036
Demonstrations $_{t-1}$	(0.013)***	(0.013)***	(0.021)***	(0.024)***	(0.014)***	(0.031)
Government		-0.007				
Size $_{t-1}$		(0.067)				
Inflation $_{t-1}$			0.076			
			(0.030)**			
Trade Openness $_{t-1}$				-0.078		
				(0.016)***		
Social Security					-0.286	
Transfers $_{t-1}$					(0.097)***	
Income						59.866
Inequality $_{t-1}$						(31.067)*
No. of Countries	18	18	18	18	18	17
N*T	644	644	644	644	641	466
Wald χ^2	2808.60	3464.33	12515.84	7314.36	43056.80	104866.87
Prob. > χ^2	(0.000)***	(0.000)***	(0.000)***	(0.000)***	(0.000)***	(0.000)***

Notes: Dependent variable is the number of terrorist attacks by nationalist-separatist groups within their natural territory. Robust standard errors clustered on countries reported in parentheses. All models control for an AR(1) term. Constant not reported. (*), (**) and (***) indicate significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively.

Table 5: The Determinants of Nationalist-Separatist Terrorist Attacks

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
Dependent Variable (No. of Attacks)	Left-Wing Terrorism (cf. Table 4)	Nationalist-Separatist Terrorism (cf. Table 5)	Left-Wing and Nationalist-Separatist Terrorism	Total Domestic Terrorism	Total Terrorism
GDP p.c.	(0)	**(-)**	(0)	(0)	*(-)*
Unemployment	**(+)**	**(+)**	**(+)**	**(+)**	**(+)**
Population Size	**(+)**	**(+)**	**(+)**	**(+)**	**(+)**
Cold War Era	**(+)**	(0)	**(+)**	**(+)**	**(+)**
Support for Ideology†	**(+)**	*(-)*	*(-)*	(0)	**(-)**
Right-Wing Government	(0)	*(+)*	**(+)**	**(+)**	**(+)**
Age of Democracy	**(-)**	*(+)*	(0)	*(-)*	(0)
Ethnic Polarization	(0)	**(+)**	(0)	(0)	(0)
Anti-Government Demonstrations	(0)	**(+)**	(0)	**(+)**	**(+)**

Notes: Significant at 0.05 = bold; significant at 0.10 = italics; 0 = results insignificant. † = variable changes with model specification (combined support for left-wing and nationalist parties in specifications 3-5). Estimation method, empirical setup and variable operationalization as described in the main text (baseline model).

Table 6: Influencing Factors of Terrorism Using Different Definitions

Supplementary Appendix: List of terrorist groups in Western Europe included in GTD, per type, 1970-2007

Austria	Left-wing	-
	Nationalist-separatist	-
Belgium	Left-wing	Communist Combatant Cells (CCC), Proletarian Revolutionary Action Front (FRAP)
	Nationalist-separatist	-
Denmark	Left-wing	Anarchists
	Nationalist-separatist	-
France	Left-wing	Action Directe, Autonomous Revolutionary Brigade, International Revolutionary Action Group (GARI), Gracchus Babeuf, Black War, Raul Sendic International Brigade, Armed Nucleus for Popular Autonomy, Partisan Sharpshooters, Meinhof-Puig-Antich Group, Sixth of March Group, Comite de Liberation et de Detournements d'Ordinateurs, International Revolutionary Solidarity, January 22, Coordination for Revolutionary Action (CAR), Autonomous Group for Armed Action, Revolutionary Anarchist Armed Terrorist Movement, Autonomous Groups
	Nationalist-separatist	Breton Liberation Front (FLB), Resistenza Corsa, Armata Corsa, Gazteriak, Armata di Liberazione Naziunale (ALN), Indipendenza, Resistenza, Corsican National Liberation Front- Historic Channel,

		Corsican Revolutionary Brigade, Corsican National Liberation Front (FLNC), Unione di u Populu Corsu (UPC), Iparretarrak (IK), Caribbean Revolutionary Alliance (ARC), Francia, Guadeloupe Liberation Army, Fronte Paesanu Corsu di Liberazione (FPCL), Basque Rectitudes, Others (Basque Separatists, Breton Separatists, Corsican Separatists, Carribean Nationalists)
Finland	Left-wing	-
	Nationalist-separatist	-
Germany	Left-wing	Red Army Faction (RAF) a.k.a. Baader-Meinhof Group, Anti-Imperialist Cell (AIZ), Revolutionary People's Army, Revolutionary Cells, Red Cell, 2nd of June Movement, Socialist Patients' Collective (SPK), Other Left-Wing Groups (Autonome, Rote Zora, Other Militants, APO, Black Cells etc.)
	Nationalist-separatist	-
Greece	Left-wing	November 17 Revolutionary Organization (N17RO), Revolutionary People's Struggle (ELA), Khristos Kasimis, October-80, Athens and Thessaloniki Arsonist Nuclei, November 21 Organization, 4 August National Organization, Anti-State Justice, Revolutionary Anti-Capitalist Initiative, Autonomous Resistance, Revolutionary Popular Left, 1 May, Revolutionary Struggle, Conscientious Arsonists (CA), Popular Resistance (Laiki Antistasi), Black Star, Anti-State Action, May 98, Arsonists for Social Cohesion, Popular Rage, Anarchist Solidarity, Revolutionary Nuclei, Fighting Guerrilla Formation, 15th

		May Organization, Greek Anarchists' Union, Revolutionary Action of Liberation, Popular Revolutionary Resistance Group, Anti-Authority Group Popular Resistance Sabotage Group, Other Left-Wing and Anarchist Groups (e.g., Autonomy, Children of November, Resistance Cell)
	Nationalist-separatist	Greek Anti-Dictatorial Youth (EAN), Turks of Western Thrace, The Hawks of Thrace
Iceland	Left-wing	-
	Nationalist-separatist	-
Ireland	Left-wing	-
	Nationalist-separatist	-
Italy	Left-wing	Armed Proletarian Nuclei (NAP), Red Brigades, Red Brigades Fighting Communist Party (BR-PCC), Informal Anarchist Federation, Angry Brigade (Italy), Anti-Imperialist Territorial Nuclei (NTA), Revolutionary Action, Communist Group of Proletarian Internationalism, Front Line Armed Nuclei (FLAN), Workers Brigade for Communism, People's Liberation Movement, Autonomy (Italy), Proletarian Fighting Patrol, Communist Territorial Nuclei, Communist Fighting Unit, Revolutionary Communist Party, Armed Workers Squads, Armed Proletarian Squads, Armed Proletarian Groups for Communism, Armed Communist Formations, Armed Nuclei for Communism, Proletarian Patrols, Armed Proletarian Power, Prima Linea, Fighting Proletarian Squads, Armed Struggle for Communism, Armed Communist

		Nucleus, Worker Autonomy - Continuous Struggle, Anti Imperialistic Communist Revolutionaries, Worker Counterpower, Armed Communist Struggle, Organized Proletarian Communists, Armed Fight for Communism, Communist Fighting Nuclei, Communist Fighting Unit, Communist Progress, Fighters for Communism, Further Left-Wing Groups (Armed Communist Struggle, Communist Brigade Dante Dimani, Communist Fighting Unit, Combat Territory Groups, Armed Commandos in the Fighting Army of Mario Zichieri, Armed Communist Commando, Armed Fighting Nucleus For Communism, Armed Nucleus of Communist Workers, Armed Proletarian Groups for Communism, Armed Proletarian Patrols, Armed Squads for Communism, Armed Radical Groups for Communism, Armed Revolutionary Groups, Armed Struggle for Proletarian Power, Armed Workers Squads, Combat Brigades, Combat Nucleus of Communist Unity, Combatent Communists, Communist Armed Nucleus, Communist Brigades, Communist Combat Unit, Communist Fighters Group, Communist Fighting Corunim-Maria Anna Maria, Fighting Communist Front, Fighting Nucleus for Communism, Fighting Workers for Communism, Nucleus of the Armed Struggle, Proletarian Armed Squads, Proletarian Fighting Brigades, Radical Communist Armed Nucleus, Tonino Micciche Workers Nucleus, Vyborg Brigade, Armed Anti-Imperialist Movement, Armed Fight for Workers Power, Armed Womens Nuclei, Armed Workers Nuclei, Autonomous Students. Combatant Communist Front et al.)

	Nationalist-separatist	Ein Tirol (One Tyrol), Sudtiroler Volkspartei (South Tyrol People's Party), Tyrolean Defense League, Sardinian Autonomy Movement, Further Separatists (Tyrol, Sardinia)
Luxembourg	Left-wing	-
	Nationalist-separatist	-
Netherlands	Left-wing	Red Resistance Front, Red Revolutionary Front, Autonomy Front
	Nationalist-separatist	South Moluccans
Norway	Left-wing	-
	Nationalist-separatist	-
Portugal	Left-wing	Popular Forces of April 25, Further Left-Wing Groups (Action Group for Communism, Anti-Capitalist Brigades, Revolutionary Autonomous Group, Communists)
	Nationalist-separatist	Front For the Liberation of the Azores
Spain	Left-wing	First of October Antifascist Resistance Group (GRAPO), Revolutionary Patriotic Anti-Fascist Front (FRAP), Red Guerrilla, Iberian Anarchist Federation, Iberian Liberation Movement (MIL), Revolutionary Communist League (LCR), GAC, Other Left-Wing Groups (1st of May Group, Organization of Anti-Fascist Students, Armed Groups for Communism, Autonomous Anarchist Groups, Spanish International Communist Party)

	Nationalist-separatist	Basque Fatherland and Freedom (ETA), Terra Lliure, Catalan Liberation Front (FAC), Free Galician People's Guerrilla Army, Guerilla Party of the Galician Poor, Red Army for the Liberation of Catalonia, Anti-terrorism ETA (ATE), Anti-terrorist Liberation Group (GAL), Spanish Basque Battalion (BBE), Catalonian Resistance, Basque Battalion, Canary Islands Independence Movement, 28 February Armed Group, Spanish National Action, Catalan Independence Group, Other Basque Groups (e.g., Haika, Jarrai, Autonomous Anti-Capitalist Commandos (CAA))
Sweden	Left-wing	-
	Nationalist-separatist	-
Switzerland	Left-Wing	Revolutionary Perspective
	Nationalist-separatist	-
United Kingdom	Left-wing	Angry Brigades, Black Liberation Front
	Nationalist-separatist	Irish Republican Army (IRA), Official Irish Republican Army (OIRA), Continuity Irish Republican Army (CIRA), Real Irish Republican Army (RIRA), Irish National Liberation Army (INLA), Irish People's Liberation Organization (IPLO), People's Liberation Army (Northern Ireland), Ulster Freedom Fighters (UFF), Red Hand Commandos, South Londonderry Volunteers (SLV), Loyalist Action Force, Red Hand

		Defenders (RHD), Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), Other Groups in North Ireland Conflict (e.g., Catholic Reaction Force, Extremist Protestants, Loyalist Volunteer Forces (LVF), Orange Volunteers (OV), Red Flag, Direct Action Against Drugs (DADD), Protestant Action Group, Extremist Catholics, Republican Action Force), Scottish National Liberation Army, Army for Freeing Scotland, Scottish Socialist Republican League, Meibion Glyndwr, Other Welsh Extremists