



INSTITUTO SUPERIOR TÉCNICO

DEPARTAMENTO DE ENGENHARIA INFORMÁTICA

FORENSICS CYBER-SECURITY

MEIC, METI

Tutorial II

Introduction to Cyberforensic Investigations

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nuno.m.santos@tecnico.ulisboa.pt

Introduction

This guide aims to provide a hands-on introduction to cyberforensic investigations. Since time constraints prevent us from covering all stages of the forensic process in detail, i.e., from assessment down to reporting stages, this tutorial will focus primarily in giving you some basic training in stages that require more creativity and insight from the digital investigator, namely collecting and analyzing electronic evidence. The most important outcome from this exercise should be the understanding of the forensic process leading from capturing evidence in unaltered form, through the examination of suspicious activities. During all steps the forensic principles must be followed, keeping impact on data as low as possible, saving the state of data before altering it and documenting all the alterations, tools and methods used.

We present you an exercise in which you can practice such skills in the context of a bank fraud case involving phishing. Let's assume that, during a phishing case investigation, one of the bank's customers identified as hit by phishing malware agreed to cooperate with the bank's CSIRT¹ team, which assigned you the job of conducting an investigation. You arrange a meeting during which you will be able to examine his personal computer for traces of malicious software. Your goal is to find evidence of malware activity in the customer's computer. For simplicity reasons, we assume that you have already cold cloned the hard disk and preserved the respective image on a forensic station. This exercise has two parts: gather live data from a working system, i.e., his personal computer (Section 2), and check obtained data for forensic value (Section 3). Throughout this exercise, create a document and a folder for keeping track of all your steps and collected evidence, respectively.

1 Preparing the environment

Before we begin, we must prepare the environment for forensic analysis. We provide you with a virtual machine (VM) package which has been prepared with the tools you need and digital artifacts to be inspected. This section explains how to set up this VM on your workstation. Start by downloading the VM package from: <https://turbina.gsd.inesc-id.pt/csf2324/t2/enisa-main.ova>. Once you download this OVA package, import it into VirtualBox and instantiate a VM as described in the following steps. Note Virtualbox must be installed on your workstation.

1.1 Import the OVA package

To import the OVA package, open the "Oracle VM VirtualBox Manager". In the File menu, select "Import Appliance". The "Import Virtual Appliance" wizard is displayed in a new window. Select the downloaded OVA package and click "Next".




Figure 1: Appliance settings.

¹CSIRT, Computer Security Incident Response Team

You can make adjustments to the default settings, as displayed in Figure 1, (you can change settings later if needed). It is recommend that you choose the “Generate new MAC addresses for all network adapters” option for the “MAC address policy”. Next, click the “finish” button. After successfully importing the appliance, the wizard will close and the imported virtual machine will be listed in Oracle VM VirtualBox Manager.

This task can also be executed in command line (for the stations at Taguspark campus’ laboratories) as explained below:

```
# make an attempt without changing the system and
# list the options to import
$ VBoxManage import enisa-main.ova --dryrun
# import the image
$ VBoxManage import enisa-main.ova --vsys 0 --vmname enisa-main
```

If you are following this guide in the stations at Alameda’s RNL labs, you must first convert the OVA package to a suitable format and import it as explained below:

```
# extract the files within the OVA package
$ tar xvf enisa-main.ova -C /tmp
# convert the VMDK image to qcow2
$ qemu-img convert -O qcow2 /tmp/enisa-main-disk1.vmdk /tmp/ENISA.qcow2
# start the QEMU/KVM virtualization manager
$ rnl-virt manager
```

Then, choose *QEMU/KVM User Session* → *New*. Select Import and navigate to /tmp to import the generated .qcow2 disk and configure the VM.

1.2 Boot the VM

Select the virtual machine you have imported and click on the “Start” button to start it up. Or start up the imported virtual machine using command line as follows:

```
$ VBoxManage startvm enisa-main
```

On the first run of the virtual machine, you will be asked to enter username and password. The credentials for the virtual machine are as the following (case sensitive):

- Username: enisa
- Password: enisa

After you have logged onto the virtual machine you will need to run an initial setup to initialize the exercise environment. This should only be done on the first run of the virtual machine. To do so open up “LXTerminal” by clicking the start menu in the bottom left corner and select “Accessories” -> “LXTerminal” as shown in Figure 2.




Figure 2: LXTerminal selection.

If you have a keyboard with Portuguese layout, you can adjust the virtual machine keyboard as follows:

```
enisa@10:~\$ setxkbmap pt
```

Now, configure the exercise environment in the LXTerminal window, typing the following command and press “Enter” to continue:

```
enisa@10:~\$ ./setup.sh
```




Figure 3: Run setup.

The complete setup will take approximately five minutes depending on the processing power of your host machine. When the setup phase is complete, press “Enter” again. This will force the system to reboot as shown in Figure 4.




Figure 4: Finish setup.

After the reboot, all the required material will be displayed on the desktop under the folder “TrainingMaterial”. You can now continue with the specific exercise instructions, and enjoy the session.

2 Gather live data

As we now have a full system image stored safely for further examination (or for restoring the computer to its original state) we can move on to the next step. In this step we will try to gather some evidence without installing or running any external software on the computer. While it must be stressed, that powering on the computer and running any software on it will change the system state, some evidence must be gathered in the runtime for behavioural analysis. To make the case acceptable (remember, we’ve secured the original state) we must mimic a regular users behaviour – by performing typical actions the

user would perform on a day to day basis. We make the least possible impact, trying to see if there are any anomalies in system's behaviour. In the very nature of malware we may expect in this case that there is persistence. In all cases but some very specialised and targeted attacks, malware installs a persistent part and tries to hide and stay in the system forever. To make it even worse – there is known malware that activates only when user activity is detected, mouse clicks in case of Trojan.APT.BaneChant for instance. There is virtually no way of capturing malicious activity in that case without simulating a regular user.

As we cannot provide a copy of an infected Windows operating system, we've prepared a PCAP file with traffic from the actual examined computer. The file name is `network.pcap` and it is located in folder `/home/enisa/Desktop/Training-Material/Dig_For_and_Handl_Ev`. We did not use the computer during the network capture in this case, all the traffic logged comes from system components or from installed software communicating without user interaction, possibly malicious software. Load the file to Wireshark, by right-clicking it and selecting *Wireshark*:




Figure 5: Network traffic loaded into Wireshark.

This capture contains data from the moments just after the computer was booted. We can see some network activity, so the computer tried to communicate with the external world. After a few ARP packets (the protocol that performs IP address to MAC address translation) some DNS queries were made. We decide to filter the traffic to DNS only to see what addresses the computer tries to find automatically. We type 'dns' in the 'Filter' field and accept the input by pressing ENTER:




Figure 6: Possible malware trace in network traffic.

There are Google servers prevailing in the log, but one query catches our attention: The computer

queried about the IP address of 'alazqwryx.cn' and got a response with IP address '172.27.128.9', highlighted in this picture. This is one of common patterns used by malware – asking for 'unidentified addresses' which are the most probably botnet C&C servers. C&C servers are contacted by malware for configuration or to send harvested data. Actually, we can see in previous picture, that the computer was contacting this IP address over HTTP protocol. We modify the filter to see what the communications looked like:




Figure 7 shows a Wireshark capture of network traffic. The filter is set to 'http and ip.addr == 172.27.128.9'. The table below represents the data shown in the packet list pane.


No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
13	3.365466	192.168.0.44	172.27.128.9	HTTP	232	GET /z12/config.bin HTTP/1.1
15	3.370505	172.27.128.9	192.168.0.44	HTTP/DL	687	unknown (0x2f)
83	3.828823	192.168.0.44	172.27.128.9	HTTP	548	POST /z12/gate.php HTTP/1.1
85	3.839159	172.27.128.9	192.168.0.44	HTTP	367	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)
151	604.329876	192.168.0.44	172.27.128.9	HTTP	232	GET /z12/config.bin HTTP/1.1
153	604.332602	172.27.128.9	192.168.0.44	HTTP/DL	687	unknown (0x2f)
223	605.223898	192.168.0.44	172.27.128.9	HTTP	552	POST /z12/gate.php HTTP/1.1
225	605.234086	172.27.128.9	192.168.0.44	HTTP	367	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/html)

Figure 7: Suspected malware traffic filtered out.

New filter shows only the HTTP protocol where the IP address in question is used. We notice two HTTP requests:

```
GET /z12/config.bin
POST /z12/gate.php
```

If we look in the Time column, we see that the pattern repeated after roughly 600 seconds (10 minutes). All this information combined suggests that we have a computer infected with malware, and the HTTP requests format suggests this is some ZeuS variant. We have also acquired probable botnet's C&C server IP address. Now that we know what we're looking for, we have to gather more traces. First, we make a dump of physical memory inside the workstation, as figure 8 demonstrates:



```
C:\WINDOWS\system32\cmd.exe

C:\>mdd.exe -o memdump.raw
-> mdd
-> ManTech Physical Memory Dump Utility
   Copyright (C) 2008 ManTech Security & Mission Assurance

-> This program comes with ABSOLUTELY NO WARRANTY; for details use option '-w'
   This is free software, and you are welcome to redistribute it
   under certain conditions; use option '-c' for details.

-> Dumping 199.48 MB of physical memory to file 'memdump.raw'.

50717 map operations succeeded (0.99)
351 map operations failed
took 23 seconds to write
MD5 is: 9f5e984c1bcef8675ee0bf7b439090b1
C:\>
```

Figure 8: Acquiring memory.

We use a small and simple tool called mdd². This tiny utility copies all the contents of computer's physical memory to a file, memdump.raw in this case. Memory dump from infected workstation is available in folder /home/enisa/Desktop/Training-Material/Dig_For_and_Handl_Ev.


²mdd tool can be found at <http://sourceforge.net/projects/mdd/>

3 Evaluate gathered evidence

After we have completed the network traffic analysis, we would like to verify the existence of malicious code from the information gathered. Although we expect to find ZeuS code based on traffic pattern experienced, we must obtain a proof, a code sample in this case. Some malware might be injected to a running system from the network without writing its code to the disk. This is not the way Zeus works, but we've not yet proved it was ZeuS, this is our guess.

In the first step we should find the process which was communicating with C&C server. We will use VF (Volatility Framework) commands: connections, connscan, sockets and sockscan. Note that we have an updated version of volatility installed. Thus, instead of “**vol.py**”, simply use “**volatility**” command:


```
$ vol.py -f memdump.raw connections
```



```
enisa@enisa-VirtualBox: ~/enisa/forensic2
enisa@enisa-VirtualBox:~/enisa/forensic2$ volatility -f memdump.raw connections
Volatile Systems Volatility Framework 2.1
Offset(V)  Local Address      Remote Address      Pid
-----
0x811d0680 192.168.0.44:1044    172.27.128.9:80     236
enisa@enisa-VirtualBox:~/enisa/forensic2$
```

Figure 9: Identification of active connections.

```
$ vol.py -f memdump.raw connscan
```



```
enisa@enisa-VirtualBox: ~/enisa/forensic2
enisa@enisa-VirtualBox:~/enisa/forensic2$ volatility -f memdump.raw connscan
Volatile Systems Volatility Framework 2.1
Offset(P)  Local Address      Remote Address      Pid
-----
0x010c4680 192.168.0.44:1044    172.27.128.9:80     236
0x058c3b48 192.168.0.44:1043    173.194.70.94:80     236
0x0a5b1b48 192.168.0.44:1043    173.194.70.94:80     236
0x0c06add8 192.168.0.44:1030    172.27.128.9:80     236
enisa@enisa-VirtualBox:~/enisa/forensic2$
```

Figure 10: Identification of all connections.

We can see that the computer had an active connection to the IP address 172.27.128.9 (suspected to be a C&C server) on port 80 in the very moment of performing memory dump. Additionally, a connection scan found information about past connections, but still not overwritten by other data. Again there were connections to the suspect, along with the IP 173.194.70.94 port 80 – which is Google.com server. You can check back with the Wireshark output in Task 2 to compare.

Another piece of information we extracted is the windows process ID (PID) that opened the connections: 236. We use the Volatility Framework³ command pslist:

```
$ vol.py -f memdump.raw pslist
```

³See: <https://www.volatilesystems.com/default/volatility> and <https://code.google.com/p/volatility/wiki/CommandReference22>


```

enisa@enisa-VirtualBox: ~/enisa/forensic2
enisa@enisa-VirtualBox:~/enisa/forensic2$ vol.py -f memdump.raw pslist
Volatile Systems Volatility Framework 2.1
Offset(V)  Name                PID    PPID    Thds    Hnds    Sess    Wow64    Start                Exit
-----
0x8132b020 System                4       0       54      523     ----- 0          0 2013-08-26 15:32:08
0x81231c60 smss.exe             408      4        3       21     ----- 0          0 2013-08-26 15:32:08
0x8119b698 csrss.exe            564     408       10      341     0          0 2013-08-26 15:32:09
0x811f4b00 winlogon.exe         588     408       18      503     0          0 2013-08-26 15:32:09
0x81232020 services.exe        792     588       15      253     0          0 2013-08-26 15:32:09
0x81235020 lsass.exe            804     588       20      331     0          0 2013-08-26 15:32:09
0xffbd5530 VBoxService.exe     988     792        8      107     0          0 2013-08-26 15:32:09
0x81230020 svchost.exe         1060    792       22      215     0          0 2013-08-26 15:32:09
0x81195790 svchost.exe         1172    792        9      239     0          0 2013-08-26 15:32:10
0xffac11d8 svchost.exe         1368    792       59     1139     0          0 2013-08-26 15:32:10
0xffab8688 svchost.exe         1424    792        6        76     0          0 2013-08-26 15:32:10
0x811d7760 svchost.exe         1456    792       14      206     0          0 2013-08-26 15:32:10
0xffa92c08 spoolsv.exe          2008    792       10      106     0          0 2013-08-26 15:32:11
0x811c62f0 explorer.exe         236     216       18      365     0          0 2013-08-26 15:32:12
0xffa7b8c0 VBoxTray.exe        288     236        7        71     0          0 2013-08-26 15:32:12
0xffa7b280 nsmmsgs.exe          296     236        3      176     0          0 2013-08-26 15:32:12
0xffa7a660 emneo.exe            304     236        0     ----- 0          0 2013-08-26 15:32:12 2013-08-26 15:32:13
0xff9d6d08 alg.exe            868     792        6      104     0          0 2013-08-26 15:32:29
0xffbb7228 wscntfy.exe          200    1368        3        48     0          0 2013-08-26 15:32:30
0x811d5c08 taskmgr.exe          340     588        3        76     0          0 2013-08-26 15:32:35
0x8119a130 cmd.exe              1432    236        1        53     0          0 2013-08-26 15:32:56
0x811e3a58 wpabaln.exe          1356    588        1        77     0          0 2013-08-26 15:34:08
0xffa9f800 mdd.exe              744    1432        1        41     0          0 2013-08-26 15:42:21
enisa@enisa-VirtualBox:~/enisa/forensic2$

```

Figure 11: Listing processes.

In the PID column we quickly find that process number 236 is explorer.exe. This is the name of a Windows Explorer executable, the main process of the Windows user interface. Under normal conditions the process should not make any external connections, so we might expect that the binary was modified or some other process injected malicious code into one of explorer's threads. Such an injection is a popular technique used by malicious software to hide its existence.

Another finding is easy to spot here, a process 'emneo.exe' which started and quit almost immediately (this is the only finished process, which makes it easy to find).

Next, we want to find so called 'API hooks'. Hooking is method for modifying a program at runtime. An API hook is basically a way of asking the operating system to call a specific function every time something happens in the system (for example a specific API function is called). One good example is an antivirus registering to be called every time the system or any application wants to open a file from disk. Given the power hooking gives to applications and its creators it's understandable that malicious software uses this technique often. The following command can take several minutes to execute and can produce large amount of output, so we redirected the output to a file 'apihooks.out':

```
$ vol.py -f memdump.raw apihooks > data/apihooks.out
```



```

apihooks.out (~/.enisa/forensic2/data) - gedit
*****
Hook mode: Usermode
Hook type: Inline/Trampoline
Process: 236 (explorer.exe)
Victim module: ntdll.dll (0x7c900000 - 0x7c9b0000)
Function: ntdll.dll!LdrLoadDll at 0x7c9161ca
Hook address: 0x1246b69
Hooking module: <unknown>

Disassembly(0):
0x7c9161ca e99a099384 JMP 0x1246b69
0x7c9161cf 681863917c PUSH DWORD 0x7c916318
0x7c9161d4 e8e98bffff CALL 0x7c90edc2
0x7c9161d9 a134c0977c MOV EAX, [0x7c97c034]
0x7c9161de 8945e4 MOV [EBP-0x1c], EAX
0x7c9161e1 8b DB 0x8b

Disassembly(1):
0x1246b69 55 PUSH EBP
0x1246b6a 8bec MOV EBP, ESP
0x1246b6c e8169dffff CALL 0x1240887
0x1246b71 84c0 TEST AL, AL
0x1246b73 7507 JNZ 0x1246b7c
0x1246b75 5d POP EBP
0x1246b76 ff2500332501 JMP DWORD [0x1253300]
0x1246b7c 53 PUSH EBX
0x1246b7d 56 PUSH ESI
0x1246b7e 8b7514 MOV ESI, [EBP+0x14]

*****
Hook mode: Usermode
Hook type: Inline/Trampoline
Process: 236 (explorer.exe)
Victim module: ntdll.dll (0x7c900000 - 0x7c9b0000)
Function: ntdll.dll!NtCreateThread at 0x7c90d7d2
Hook address: 0x1246989
Hooking module: <unknown>

Plain Text Tab Width: 8 Ln 1, Col 1 INS

```

Figure 12: Investigating hooks.

As we can see after opening the file there are many hooks created at miscellaneous API functions calls. Let's find what processes memory spaces contained API hooks with something registered:

```
$ cat apihooks.out | grep Process | sort -u
```

```

enisa@enisa-VirtualBox: ~/.enisa/forensic2/data
enisa@enisa-VirtualBox:~/.enisa/forensic2/data$ cat apihooks.out | grep Process | sort -u
Process: 1356 (wpabaln.exe)
Process: 1432 (cmd.exe)
Process: 200 (wscntfy.exe)
Process: 236 (explorer.exe)
Process: 288 (VBoxTray.exe)
Process: 340 (taskmgr.exe)
Process: 744 (mdd.exe)
enisa@enisa-VirtualBox:~/.enisa/forensic2/data$

```

Figure 13: Listing hooks with registered processes.

As we expected explorer.exe is in that list. We will now extract from the computer memory image the memory space of explorer.exe:

```
$ vol.py -f memdump.raw memdump -p 236 -D data/
```

```
enisa@enisa-VirtualBox: ~/enisa/forensic2
enisa@enisa-VirtualBox:~/enisa/forensic2$ vol.py -f memdump.raw memdump -p 236 -D data/
Volatile Systems Volatility Framework 2.1
*****
Writing explorer.exe [ 236] to 236.dmp
enisa@enisa-VirtualBox:~/enisa/forensic2$
```

Figure 14: Creating process explorer.exe memory dump.

With the extracted memory space and information gathered previously we search the process memory for phrases of interest. First, is there any reference to the bank we are working for, to the C&C server or domain and if we're able to find the mysterious 'emneo.exe'? We will use an internal tool in UNIX system – 'strings', to extract information from a binary file:

```
$ strings 236.dmp | grep bank.pl
#
$ strings 236.dmp | grep alazqwryx.cn
#
$ strings 236.dmp | grep emneo.exe
```

```
enisa@enisa-VirtualBox: ~/enisa/forensic2/data
enisa@enisa-VirtualBox:~/enisa/forensic2/data$ strings 236.dmp | grep bank.pl
http://bank.pl/*
enisa@enisa-VirtualBox:~/enisa/forensic2/data$ strings 236.dmp | grep alazqwryx.cn
: alazqwryx.cn
://alazqwryx.cn/z12/config.bin
alazqwryx.cn
alazqwryx.cn
://alazqwryx.cn/z12/gate.php
://alazqwryx.cn/z12/gate.php
http://alazqwryx.cn/z12/config.bin
http://alazqwryx.cn/z12/config.bin
http://alazqwryx.cn/z12/bot.exe#N
http://alazqwryx.cn/z12/gate.php%N
://alazqwryx.cn/z12/gate.php
http://alazqwryx.cn/z12/config.bin
alazqwryx.cn
http://alazqwryx.cn/z12/config.bin
|alazqwryx.cn
http://alazqwryx.cn/z12/config.bin
http://alazqwryx.cn/z12/config.bin
http://alazqwryx.cn/z12/config.bin
http://alazqwryx.cn/z12/config.bin
Host: alazqwryx.cn
Host: alazqwryx.cn
Host: alazqwryx.cn
Host: alazqwryx.cn
Host: alazqwryx.cn
enisa@enisa-VirtualBox:~/enisa/forensic2/data$ strings 236.dmp | grep emneo.exe
emneo.exe
Myyw\emneo.exe
Myyw\emneo.exe
Myyw\emneo.exe
C:\Documents and Settings\Peter Kowalski\Application Data\Myyw\emneo.exe
C:\Documents and Settings\Peter Kowalski\Application Data\Myyw\emneo.exe
C:\Documents and Settings\Peter Kowalski\Application Data\Myyw\emneo.exe
emneo.exe
enisa@enisa-VirtualBox:~/enisa/forensic2/data$
```

Figure 15: Investigating explorer.exe memory dump.

In all cases the strings we were looking for are present in the memory dump. There's our bank website, there are numerous references to alazqwryx.cn domain and URLs within it. Finally, there is a reference to 'emneo.exe' file. We suspect that this is a process run just after powering up the system and then used to inject malicious code into explorer.exe process.

We can now look into the file with the GHex hex editor (accessible through the start button menu, in the "Programming" tab) and search for our bank website (we know there is exactly one reference). To do so, one can use "Find" in the "Edit" tab, typing the known keyword:




Figure 16: Using hex-editor.

We found a suspicious line, which we expect to be e-banking URL along with part of the input form instructing the malicious code where to inject its scripts. Now we may consider the evidence verification complete, we found traces of malicious software, we found proof of connections being made. However, taking a full image of user computer's hard disk might not be possible or practical. We may want to do one more thing in that case — find and copy files related to the malware found. There is a prepared list of files on the examined system in /home/enisa/Desktop/Training-Material/Dig_For_and_Handl_Ev/fs.list. We verify the location of emneo.exe file:

```
$ cat fs.list | grep emneo.exe
```




Figure 17: Finding suspected malware locations.

This is exactly the location we have found in the explorer.exe memory dump. We notice the date and time of file creation: 26th August 16:12:05 2013. This is probably the moment this computer got infected, or the moment malware was last updated. We look for other files created around the same time:

```
$ cat fs.list | grep "26 16:1"
```

```
enisa@enisa-VirtualBox: ~/enisa/forensic2
enisa@enisa-VirtualBox:~/enisa/forensic2$ cat fs.list | grep "26 16:1"
Mon Aug 26 16:12:06 2013, /Documents and Settings/Peter Kowalski/Application Data/Microsoft/Address Book
Mon Aug 26 16:12:06 2013, /Documents and Settings/Peter Kowalski/Application Data/Microsoft/Address Book/Peter Kowalski.wab
Mon Aug 26 16:12:06 2013, /Documents and Settings/Peter Kowalski/Application Data/Microsoft/Address Book/Peter Kowalski.wab-
Mon Aug 26 16:12:05 2013, /Documents and Settings/Peter Kowalski/Application Data/Myw
Mon Aug 26 16:12:05 2013, /Documents and Settings/Peter Kowalski/Application Data/Myw/emneo.exe
Mon Aug 26 16:12:05 2013, /Documents and Settings/Peter Kowalski/Application Data/Uhan
Mon Aug 26 16:14:57 2013, /Documents and Settings/Peter Kowalski/Cookies/peter.kowalski@google[1].txt
Mon Aug 26 16:12:34 2013, /Documents and Settings/Peter Kowalski/Cookies/peter.kowalski@google[2].txt
Mon Aug 26 16:12:06 2013, /Documents and Settings/Peter Kowalski/Local Settings/Application Data/Identities
Mon Aug 26 16:12:06 2013, /Documents and Settings/Peter Kowalski/Local Settings/Application Data/Identities/{BAD605FE-6ED6-4C5C-9A8C-515509
B3AA9B}
Mon Aug 26 16:12:06 2013, /Documents and Settings/Peter Kowalski/Local Settings/Application Data/Identities/{BAD605FE-6ED6-4C5C-9A8C-515509
B3AA9B}/Microsoft
Mon Aug 26 16:12:06 2013, /Documents and Settings/Peter Kowalski/Local Settings/Application Data/Identities/{BAD605FE-6ED6-4C5C-9A8C-515509
B3AA9B}/Microsoft/Outlook Express
Mon Aug 26 16:12:06 2013, /Documents and Settings/Peter Kowalski/Local Settings/Application Data/Identities/{BAD605FE-6ED6-4C5C-9A8C-515509
B3AA9B}/Microsoft/Outlook Express/Folders.dbx
Mon Aug 26 16:12:06 2013, /Documents and Settings/Peter Kowalski/Local Settings/Application Data/Identities/{BAD605FE-6ED6-4C5C-9A8C-515509
B3AA9B}/Microsoft/Outlook Express/Inbox.dbx
Mon Aug 26 16:12:06 2013, /Documents and Settings/Peter Kowalski/Local Settings/Application Data/Identities/{BAD605FE-6ED6-4C5C-9A8C-515509
B3AA9B}/Microsoft/Outlook Express/Offline.dbx
Mon Aug 26 16:12:06 2013, /Documents and Settings/Peter Kowalski/Local Settings/Application Data/Identities/{BAD605FE-6ED6-4C5C-9A8C-515509
B3AA9B}/Microsoft/Outlook Express/Sent Items.dbx
Mon Aug 26 16:12:30 2013, /WINDOWS/Prefetch/EEV34FD5H425.EXE-35053617.pf
Mon Aug 26 16:12:30 2013, /WINDOWS/Prefetch/EMNEO.EXE-22992292.pf
Mon Aug 26 16:12:13 2013, /WINDOWS/system32/keylog1.bin
Mon Aug 26 16:12:14 2013, /WINDOWS/system32/keylog2.bin
enisa@enisa-VirtualBox:~/enisa/forensic2$
```

Figure 18: Listing all files suspected to be malware related.

There are more suspicious files found, there are two files in \WINDOWS\system32 – keylog1.bin and keylog2.bin. Their names suggest they may contain information about keys pressed by the user. All the files found should be secured for further investigation.