

# LTU Health System - Technical Documentation

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**Module:** COM7033 Secure Software Development

**Version:** 1.0.0

**Date:** 2025

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## 1. Design Rationale & Architecture

The LTU Health System was architected to address the specific security and scalability challenges inherent in handling sensitive medical data (PII/PHI). The design follows the **Defense-in-Depth** principle.

### 1.1 Hybrid Polyglot Database Architecture

Instead of a monolithic database, the system utilizes a **Polyglot Persistence** pattern:

- **Authentication Layer (SQLite):**
  - **Why:** SQLite is transactional (ACID compliant) and highly efficient for structured, relational data like user credentials.
  - **Security Benefit:** By isolating credentials in a separate file (`auth.db`), we minimize the blast radius. A SQL Injection vulnerability in the auth layer does not inherently grant query access to the medical records stored in NoSQL.
- **Data Layer (MongoDB):**
  - **Why:** Medical records vary between patients (e.g., some have stroke history, others don't). MongoDB's schema-less nature allows for flexible data modeling without complex `JOIN` operations.
  - **Security Benefit:** MongoDB allows for document-level operations and pairs well with application-level encryption logic.

### 1.2 Security Controls Implementation

- **Confidentiality (Encryption at Rest):** All Personally Identifiable Information (PII)—specifically Names and NHS Numbers—are encrypted using **Fernet (AES-128)** before insertion into MongoDB. This ensures that a database dump is unreadable without the `secret.key`.
  - **Integrity (Audit Logging):** Critical actions (Login, Update Record, Delete User) are written to an immutable `audit_logs` collection. This ensures non-repudiation and GDPR accountability.
  - **Availability (Rate Limiting):** The `Flask-Limiter` extension enforces a limit of **10 requests per minute** on authentication endpoints to mitigate Brute Force and DoS attacks.
  - **Input Validation:** The `clean_input()` wrapper utilizes the **Bleach** library to strip malicious tags, preventing Cross-Site Scripting (XSS).
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## 2. Installation & Usage Instructions

### 2.1 Prerequisites

- **Python 3.8+** installed.
- **MongoDB Community Server** installed and running on `localhost:27017`.

## 2.2 Setup Steps

### 1. Install Dependencies:

```
pip install Flask pymongo fpdf Flask-WTF Flask-Limiter cryptography bleach
pandas openpyxl email_validator scikit-learn joblib
```

2. **Initialize System:** Run the setup script to generate encryption keys, create databases, and migrate the CSV dataset:

```
python setup_hybrid.py
```

*Output should confirm: "MIGRATION COMPLETE" and "Admin Password set to: Admin123!"*

### 3. Run the Application:

```
python app.py
```

Access the web interface at: <http://127.0.0.1:5000>

## 2.3 User Login Credentials

The system comes pre-seeded with role-specific accounts for testing:

Role	Username (Email)	Password	Access Rights
<b>Admin</b>	admin@ltu.ac.uk	Admin123!	User Management, Security Logs
<b>Doctor</b>	dr.sterling@ltu.ac.uk	Doctor123!	View/Edit Patients, Approve Appts
<b>Patient</b>	patient9046@ltu.ac.uk	Patient123!	View Own Profile, Book Appts

## 3. API Reference

Although the application renders server-side HTML, the internal routing acts as an API for the frontend logic.

### 3.1 Authentication Endpoints

Method	Endpoint	Access	Description
POST	/login	Public	Authenticates user against SQLite. Rate limit: 10/min.
POST	/register	Public	Creates SQLite auth record and encrypted MongoDB profile.

Method	Endpoint	Access	Description
GET	/logout	Authenticated	Clears session and logs audit event.
<b>3.2 Patient Endpoints</b>			
Method	Endpoint	Access	Description
GET	/patient-dashboard	Patient	Renders the dashboard with decrypted PII and Risk Score.
POST	/update_profile	Patient/Doctor	Updates medical metrics (BMI, Glucose). Triggers Audit Log.
POST	/book_appointment	Patient	Creates appointment request if Risk Score > 30%.
GET	/download_report	Patient	Generates dynamic PDF with health persona and advice.
<b>3.3 Doctor/Admin Endpoints</b>			
Method	Endpoint	Access	Description
GET	/doctor-dashboard	Doctor	Lists all patients (Search/Sort enabled) and appointment requests.
GET	/edit_patient/<id>	Doctor	Renders edit form for a specific patient ID.
GET	/process_appointment/<id>/<action>	Doctor	Updates appointment status (Approve/Neglect).
GET	/admin-dashboard	Admin	Shows system stats and full Security Audit Log.
POST	/admin/add_doctor	Admin	Creates new Doctor account.
GET	/admin/delete_user/<id>	Admin	Hard deletes user from <b>both</b> SQLite and MongoDB.

## 4. Security Controls Matrix

Vulnerability Class	Mitigation Strategy	Implementation File
<b>Injection (SQLi)</b>	Parameterized Queries (?)	app.py (Line 150)
<b>Injection (NoSQLi)</b>	Object Mapping via PyMongo	app.py (Line 160)
<b>XSS (Cross-Site Scripting)</b>	Input Sanitization (Bleach)	app.py (clean_input)
<b>Sensitive Data Exposure</b>	AES Encryption (Fernet)	app.py (encrypt_data)
<b>Broken Access Control</b>	Role checks (session['role'])	All Routes

Vulnerability Class	Mitigation Strategy	Implementation File
<b>CSRF</b>	Flask-WTF Tokens	HTML Forms
<b>Brute Force</b>	IP-based Rate Limiting	<a href="#">app.py</a> (Line 20)