Moral development proceeds in three phases: rule attunement, social sensitivity, and self-awareness.

a socioanalytic theory of moral development

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The space limitations of most journals require that authors provide only a cursory account of the theoretical context for their ideas. The purpose of this chapter is to present, for the first time, our perspective on moral development in a way that will clarify its theoretical foundations. The chapter is organized in four sections. The first develops definitions. The second section outlines the metatheory—the assumptions and presuppositions that support the model. The theory itself is presented in the third section, and the final section briefly reviews some implications of the theory that might not be obvious from a statement of its principal claims.

introduction and definitions

Before the 1900s psychology and philosophy were nearly synonymous. The rise of behaviorism and logical positivism during the 1920s, however, drove a wedge between them. The positivist movement argued that "real" sci-

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ence avoids speculation and restricts itself to what is immediately observable or to logical deductions from statements about the observable. Psychology enthusiastically adopted this positivism philosophy (Boring, 1950), with the result that the study of moral development became disreputable—morality, after all, involves concepts that are in principle unobservable.

Soon other philosophers began to argue that positivism was misguided. Margenau (1950) and Collingwood (1940) showed how all science requires metaphysical presuppositions; Pepper (1942) argued that all knowledge is essentially metaphorical; Hanson (1961) and Feyerabend (1965) showed how objective observations can be and usually are theory-laden. As the intellectual climate changed, the study of value-related psychological phenomena again became legitimate in the 1960s.

Positivism, nevertheless, continues to influence contemporary psychology, specifically in the degree to which philosophy is banished from psychological curricula. Their positivist-inspired educations often leave psychologists ill equipped to discover, evaluate, or justify their unconscious intellectual commitments—see, for example, Bem's (1970) discussion of "zero-order beliefs." Because the moral-development literature abounds with theoretical arguments whose presuppositions are unspecified, making meaningful comparisons among them is impossible. Failure to clarify one's implicit philosophical stance leads to conceptual confusion; failure to examine one's biases leads to the trivialization and politicization of knowledge (Emler and Hogan, forthcoming).

Relativism, Absolutism, and Relative Absolutism. There are four core issues implicit in every competent theory of moral development; these issues are largely matters of definition. The first concerns the moral relativism/moral absolutism dichotomy, which, on closer analysis, turns into a split among relativism, absolutism, and relative absolutism. *Moral relativism* maintains that there are no defensible grounds for preferring one set of moral values to another. Certain sociologists take this view by stressing the arbitrary nature of social institutions. Thus Berger and Luckmann (1967) refer to the socialization process as a "confidence trick" (p. 135). Anthropologist Ruth Benedict (1959) insists that cultures often adopt and even glorify values which serve no purpose. Finally, behavioristic social learning theorists (such as Aronfreed, 1968, and Bandura, 1969) focus on the mechanisms of socialization to the exclusion of the purposes socialized values serve; thus, they become relativists by default. Bandura (1969), for example, claims that the values one adopts "toward individualism, equalitarianism, theism," and so on, depend upon one's idiosyncratic social learning history (p. 614); this view (that the values one holds are a product of chance circumstances) implies that values serve no purpose and cannot therefore be justified.

Moral relativism appears to be supported by anthropological evidence showing that values do indeed vary from culture to culture. Moral relativism also remains implicit in many contemporary social theories with behavioristic origins. Nonetheless, sophisticated anthropologists (Herskovits, 1972; Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck, 1961) have argued that extreme moral relativism is untenable for several reasons. First, the existence of cultural universals—such

as religion, language, family groups, incest taboos, prohibitions on gratuitous cruelty—indicates that cultural institutions are neither arbitrary nor idiosyncratic. Second, the variations one observes in values across cultures are not random; rather, they are predictable, given the ecology and history of each culture. Finally, nearly everyone, including moral relativists, has intuitions about the wrongness of genocide, torture, and slavery, yet moral relativism provides no grounds for criticizing these practices. On the other hand, moral absolutism and relative moral absolutism suggest grounds in terms of which such practices can be criticized.

Moral absolutism assumes that by careful thought one can discover timeless, universal moral principles applicable to all mankind. The values of any culture or person are justified only to the extent that they correspond to these moral principles. Currently popular universal moral principles include the sacredness of human life and a notion of justice defined as the equal preservation of everyone's rights. Cognitive-developmental theory is the primary example of moral absolutism in contemporary psychology. Moral absolutism is an important counterfoil to the simplicities of moral relativism. Still, it contains simplicities of its own. Because absolutism attempts to provide final solutions when in fact there are none, it suffers from two major shortcomings. The first is that even the most careful moral philosophers cannot agree on a set of universal moral principles, and those principles endorsed by cognitive-developmental theory reflect distinctive social-class and political biases (see Emler and Hogan, forthcoming). The second problem is that even if humans could get universal consensus on what is moral, it does not follow that they ought to act that way; knowledge of what is can never tell people what ought to be.

Our perspective, which we call *relative moral absolutism,* has the following tenets: Certain behaviors are essential for group living and the survival of culture. These are necessary for the existence of any social group and are therefore universal. There are other behaviors that if unchecked would destroy any society. The morality of a culture therefore includes rules that make such behaviors either mandatory or forbidden. At a deep level all viable cultures share the same set of rules—rules about lying, cheating, stealing, incest, and so on. Each culture also has rules that reflect what people have to do to survive in their unique ecological circumstances. There are two points to be noted about this perspective. First, there is no ultimate justification for those moral rules shared by all ongoing social groups; the rules are justified only by the fact that they make social life possible. This justification is not trivial, however, since social living is the key to man's evolutionary success. If the rules are ignored, social living is impossible. If a person seriously does not care about the survival of his or her culture, then that person would not be immoral in an absolute sense—but that person would be either criminal or insane. Second, the moral rules that make social living possible only tell us what kinds of behavior were necessary for survival in the past; they may not be valid for the future. Moreover, the conditions under which any social group lives may change. Thus cultures must always be open to the possibilities for change and innovation.

Morality. The second major issue is the definition of morality itself.

We regard it as a set of (usually codified) rules that defines a network of reciprocal rights and obligations, prohibits gross acts of malevolence, and specifies the range of persons to whom the rules apply. This definition means that morality has to do with rules, moral behavior has to do with conduct oriented toward these rules (obeying, disobeying, justifying, and criticizing them), and the rules may not extend to everyone. Moral relativists argue that these rules are perfectly arbitrary. Absolutists maintain that these rules are related only conditionally to morality; true morality is defined by a set of universal principles, discoverable by the use of reason and/or moral intuition, which is then used to evaluate and criticize the existing rules of a culture. Our view, in contrast with the preceding two, is that the rules are important not in themselves but because they serve to legitimize, sanction, and promote certain behaviors that are essential to the operation and survival of culture. Whether or not these rules are "truly moral" is a debatable point—but one for which a sound argument can be made (Gert, 1970). Their philosophical status aside, these rules are what most people mean by the word *morality*.

Morality and Authority. A third theme running through discussions of moral development is the problem of authority: What are the reasons for and the sources of our obligation to follow the rules of our society? This is one of those implicit, hidden issues about which moral development theorists rarely make their assumptions clear. It is important first to distinguish the question of why people follow the rules—a psychological problem—from the question of how the rules are justified—the logical/philosophical problem of authority. Again there are three views here. The first is the utilitarian or social-contract view: People follow the rules for rational reasons—because they believe it is in their best interests to do so, because they can only enjoy the benefits of civilization by following the rules. They justify the rules in terms of their collective best interests and their mutual agreement to live by a common set of laws or rules. The second view is the higher-law position; here, people follow the rules only if these correspond to their personal views of justice and the preservation of human rights. The reason for following the rules and the manner in which these are justified are the same—the rules correspond to people's conscious view of what a rational morality should look like. When public rules do not correspond to their private views of morality and justice, these laws lose their legitimacy, and people no longer need follow them. Thus, in this case, the sources of moral authority lie in the operation of reason and the dictates of personal conscience.

The third view, a classic statement of which can be found in Weber (1946), suggests there are at least three sets of reasons why people follow the rules. First, most people comply most of the time because they believe they want to and because they perceive their government as legitimate. When or if they no longer perceive this leadership as legitimate, they may discover the second reason for their compliance—that they have no choice, because their compliance will be ensured by force. Third, people comply for unconscious reasons: They need order, guidance, and direction, and fear its absence. Concerning the question of how the rules are justified, this third view distinguishes between morality and authority (which exist in a constant state of ten-

sion) and regards force as the ultimate source of authority in society. In every social group, power will be concentrated in the hands of the political leadership; if one refuses to comply with the rules long enough, force will be used to bring about compliance. Thus, according to this position, it is a myth to think that one's compliance is voluntary (because it serves one's long-range interests or is consistent with one's private view of morality). The reasons one uses to rationalize his or her compliance are often unrelated to the true causes of that compliance.

Development. When we come to the fourth core issue, defining development, we again find three prevailing definitions. For social-learning theorists, development consists of acquiring specific behavior patterns. These behaviors are not acquired in any particular order, and the end point of development is defined by a repertoire of behaviors common to most adults. From the cognitive-developmental standpoint, development proceeds in terms of a series of intellectual stages, each more complex but adaptively more adequate than the one that preceded it. Development is therefore defined as the achievement of increasingly more complex and adequate modes of thought. The sequence of stages is assumed to be invariant, and the end of development is achievement of the highest stage in the sequence. The socioanalytic view, like cognitive-developmental theory, adopts a quasi-biological model of development, but with certain important differences. First, there are no stages defined by qualitatively distinct modes of thought; there are only developmental periods or phases characterized by the unique psychological problems found in each phase of growth. Second, development is a never-ending process of trying to adjust internal conditions to external demands (that is, to adapt). These adjustments are necessary because the environment as well as the person is continually changing. But since change is the only certainty, any accommodation made will only be temporary. Finally, according to socioanalytic theory, the person's moral development ends in moral maturity, but this is largely an ideal state rather than something that is practically attainable.

metatheoretical assumptions

In the preceding section we tried to show how our definitions of certain key words differ from those employed by other major theoretical perspectives on moral development. In this section we want to show how our theoretical assumptions are different.

The Evolutionary Basis of Morality. Socioanalytic theory differs from other perspectives first of all in its ties to evolutionary theory and evolutionary ethics as developed by Charles Darwin and Herbert Spencer and more recently by Donald Campbell (1975), Erik Erikson (1950), and C. H. Waddington (1967). Here, moral behavior is assumed to be a solution to the problems of survival that confronted our ancestors nearly four million years ago. The relative defenselessness of early man (lack of fighting teeth, nails, or horns), coupled with the dangers of living on the open African savannah (Washburn, 1961), made group living and cooperation essential for survival.

Group living was synonymous with the evolution of culture—defined in terms of language, family structure, patterns of leadership and authority, division of labor, tools, and other technology. Thus, the distinctive feature of man's evolution is his group-living, culture-bearing tendencies. Groups that on the whole were more structured and cohesive, and that had superior technology, would have had greater reproductive success. Culture also includes rules and values that support those behaviors that proved to be evolutionarily adaptive; thus the process of transmitting culture across human generations is fundamental to human survival.

Individualism and Communalism. These speculations about human evolution lead to the second set of assumptions that characterize socioanalytic theory. Every other theory of socialization and moral development in psychology can be described as a form of individualism (see Hogan, 1975b). The essence of individualism is a particular view of the relation between the person and his or her society. Specifically, individualism assumes that each child's nature is fundamentally transformed during the socialization process. This transformation is necessary because each child's natural or presocialized tendencies are incompatible with the demands of adult society as transmitted in the socialization process. In this view deviancy is normal and conformity must be explained. From a socioanalytic perspective, the individualism of contemporary psychology is highly implausible. Given the central role culture played in human evolution, it is more sensible to assume a deep compatibility between each child's natural tendencies and the demands of adult society; thus conformity is normal and deviancy must be explained. Not only is conformity to culture normal, but the internalization of culture is essential to the normal development of personality. Man has a deep, organic need for his culture, and the feeling of belonging to and participating in a viable, ongoing group gives substance to personality and meaning to life (Berger and Kellner, 1964; Turner, 1975).

Human Motivation. A third distinctive feature of socioanalytic theory is its view of human motivation. Although it is currently unfashionable in developmental psychology to talk about motivation, we assume that, as a result of man's particular evolutionary history, three broad motives underlie social behavior. These hypothetical motives or drives give rise to three separate classes of behavior that are essential for cooperative group living. The first of these is a need for social attention and approval. Much social behavior is designed to maximize positive attention and approval or to minimize social criticism (Lovejoy, 1961). The net effect of this motivational tendency is to produce the affiliative behavior that preserves the cohesiveness of social groups.

The second hypothetical instinct is a need for structure, predictability, and order. This need produces the tendency to turn repeated interactions (the morning coffee, the evening meal, baby's bath) into rituals; it also produces the tendency to codify, classify, and legislate and to organize groups into functional roles (sex roles, work roles, leadership roles, and so on). These tendencies toward ritualization, codification, and organization make social living predictable and more efficient.

Finally, we assume people have a need for aggressive self-expression, which results in competitive tendencies, status seeking, self-aggrandizement, and dominance behavior. These tendencies produce status hierarchies (pecking orders) in children as young as four or five, and these hierarchies, with their associated group leadership roles, make social living even more predictable. Thus, these tendencies both reinforce hierarchical order and ensure a steady supply of effective leadership to the group.

Three final points about this view of motivation should be mentioned. First, the effects of these motivational tendencies are interlocking and complementary, producing, within a group, cohesiveness, predictability, and efficient use of human resources. All the distinctive features of human social organization can be derived from these motivational assumptions; however, these hypothetical motives give us no clue to the actual contents of any culture, which will of course be determined by the culture's history and the specific local conditions to which it must adapt.

The second point is that the needs for attention and for competitive self-expression result in contradictory behaviors—that is, affiliation and competition. This suggests a deep conflict is built into human nature so that, although we are a group-living species, interpersonal relations are inherently conflictful; social existence is invariably marked by struggles for status, competition for scarce resources, jealousy, and rivalry, as well as affiliation and cooperation.

Third, the operation of these hypothetical motives is chiefly unconscious. This assumption contradicts the rationalist trend in modern psychology, perhaps best exemplified by cognitive-developmental theory. According to this theory, social behavior is guided by a conscious rational attempt to cope with the moral conflicts which accompany interpersonal relations. We are suggesting on the contrary that our social conduct is largely determined by unconscious motives outside our rational control—needs for attention, predictability, and status.

Morality, Personality, and Culture. Our final set of theoretical assumptions concerns the role of moral socialization in the development of personality and the evolution of culture. Every human group inhabits a concrete and specific geographic environment (the Sahara desert, the Arctic, the steppes of central Asia) that defines the material conditions of its existence. If the group is to survive, it must develop and sustain a culture that allows it to exploit the resources available in its particular environment. One important aspect of this culture is the accumulated technology that determines how these resources can be exploited. Another is a set of values that orients the members of the culture appropriately to their environment; thus farmers must be dependable, farsighted, acquisitive, and willing to stay in one place. Nomadic hunters, on the other hand, must be entrepreneurial, somewhat restless, and nonacquisitive. A third aspect of culture is a set of child-rearing practices that serves to transmit whatever technological wisdom the group has evolved, together with the values necessary to apply that wisdom effectively. Thus we have a feedback loop consisting of environmental demands, the cultural resources developed in response to these demands, and child-rearing practices

which provide for cultural transmission and development of the character type best suited to the environmental demands. The members of a single culture or social class will share a common set of values; for the concept of modal personality (Inkeles and Levinson, 1954) we would substitute the notion of a modal character type.

the theory

Two structures form the basis of human personality. The first of these, character structure, reflects the accommodations one has made to the demands of one's parents, the expectations of one's peers, and the promptings of one's inner demon by late adolescence. The second major aspect of personality, role structure, consists of the strategies of self-presentation and styles of value expression that appear in one's dealings with other people. Character structure includes one's attitudes toward the rules of the social game; role structure provides one's unique style of playing the social game. Character structure evolves early, is relatively unconscious, stable, and enduring. Role structure evolves later, is relatively conscious, responsive to situational demands, and therefore changeable. In socioanalytic theory, moral development is equivalent to the evolution of character structure.

Rule Attunement. Character structure evolves through three phases in response to three different but overlapping sets of problems that confront each developing individual. The first requirement each child faces is rapid assimilation of its culture—including, most crucially, language—so as to enhance its chances of survival. Because human infants lack both the instincts and the physical capacities necessary to survive by themselves, they are, compared to the young in other species, unusually helpless. Consequently, young children are probably predisposed to accept adult authority and to defer to tribal lore regarding natural hazards and dangers, dietary customs, food gathering, tool making, and religious observances. In an era of permissive child rearing it is important to point out that aspects of this first phase of development are deeply authoritarian. In the process of teaching a child language, for example, normal parents do not negotiate with their children about the names of common objects; they merely tell the child what a thing is called. And so it is with other aspects of the socialization process. Only children who are educable, who are able to follow effortlessly the demands, requests, and instructions of adults, will be able to assimilate their culture and survive.

The developmental precursors of educability are relatively well understood. With Bowlby (1969), we believe the development of a secure attachment relationship between each child and its caretakers is the most important event in that child's development. A successful attachment seems to require parents who love their child and are sensitive to its needs. Obviously, parents who are frequently egocentric, self-absorbed, imperceptive, depressed, anxious, or merely worried will foster a less than optimal attachment bond. Since people are all occasionally self-absorbed, depressed, anxious, and so on, even the best-intentioned parents will act in ways that disrupt the attachment

relationship. Whereas Bowlby implies that unambivalent attachment relationships are attainable, we feel they are an ideal rarely achieved in reality. We would further qualify attachment theory by arguing that rule attunement depends on limit setting and parental authoritativeness as well as warmth and sensitivity.

Stayton, Hogan, and Ainsworth (1971) present evidence that clearly supports these conjectures. In a sample of eleven-month-old children, those infants who, by an independent measure, were classified as well attached were also willing to comply with maternal directives; the other children were essentially noncompliant. Variations along the dimensions of parental warmth and restrictiveness suggest four kinds of rule attunement by the time children reach nursery school age. Children whose parents were warm and restrictive make an effortless accommodation to adult authority. A second group with warm, permissive parents tend to be self-confident and self-assured but unconcerned with rule following because they feel their transgressions will be overlooked; in ordinary language such children are called spoiled. A third group, whose parents were cold but restrictive, tend to be angry, anxious, and sullenly compliant. Finally, the most delinquent children tend to have parents who are cold and permissive; such children are hostile and rule defying. This typology works well as a first approximation, but it obviously ignores genetic factors underlying the disposition to comply with rules. We feel these genetic factors will in the long run be of great theoretical importance (see Mednick and Christiansen, 1977).

Social Sensitivity. The second problem faced by every developing child involves learning to get along in the peer group and extended family. Many theories of social development regard children as egocentric until some time between ages ten and twelve, when intellectual maturity is supposed to break down their natural egocentrism (Piaget, 1965). Our view, however, is that children are sociocentric at birth and that peer interaction is impeded by social incompetence rather than egocentrism. The surprisingly complex patterns of verbal interaction found among children as young as three and a half years simply would not occur if the egocentrism hypothesis were true (Garvey and Hogan, 1973). The speed and facility of the transition to peer interaction, however, depends on the quality of the earlier attachment relationship (Lieberman, 1977).

In their roles as tutors, adults tell children what they should or should not do. Very little instruction of this type goes on in the peer group, where successful interaction requires that children be sensitive to each other's (often implicit) social expectations. The evolution of social sensitivity or empathy is the key process during this second phase of development. Individual differences in social sensitivity seem largely to be a function of earlier attachment bonds, intelligence, and unspecified genetic factors.

Once developed, social sensitivity can compensate for failures during the first phase of development (Kurtines and Hogan, 1972). This is not surprising; group cooperation is so vital to human survival that it is no doubt overdetermined. Empathy can be thought of as a backup mechanism which ensures moderate levels of rule compliance even in unsocialized individuals.

Rule attunement is associated with following the letter of the law; empathy, however, permits a child to think in terms of the spirit of the law. This capacity provides a means by which contradictions in the rules can be resolved—that is, by appealing to the principle(s) guiding the activity rather than the rules structuring it.

Cognitive-developmental theorists maintain that peer interaction produces the concept of fairness in children (Piaget, 1965; Rawls, 1971), which subsequently turns into the concept of justice in adulthood. According to these writers, the idea of fairness arises out of the experience of cooperation, turn taking, sharing, and considerateness in the peer group. Moreover, these natural and desirable features of peer experience are inhibited when adults intervene in children's play. We would like to suggest, in contrast, that what children actually encounter in the peer group when adults are not around is bullying, exploitation, and persecution. Turn taking and cooperation occur primarily because adults intervene and force children to share, take turns, and "play fair." The concept of justice, in this analysis, is largely produced by the injustice one suffers at the hands of older and larger peers in childhood.

To summarize this discussion, there are two distinguishable aspects of social sensitivity that develop during the approximate age range of four to sixteen. The first is a capacity for social interaction; this is a matter of acquiring social skills, of being able to take the role of the other, to read others' implicit intentions, feelings, needs, and expectations. The second is an appreciation of a general principle for regulating interaction with others, a principle variously called reciprocity, fairness, turn taking, and justice.

Autonomy. The third challenge facing every developing individual after age fourteen to sixteen is one of establishing a life and family of one's own. This involves the concept of autonomy (Durkheim, 1961). Autonomous behavior also corresponds to what we normally think of as "moral behavior." That is, persons who conform to authority or the social pressures of peers are often regarded as conventional and not very heroic in moral stature. Many psychologists believe that truly moral conduct often contradicts conventional law and social pressure. Thus autonomy is often defined so as to stress this element of nonconformity in the concept. For example, in cognitive-developmental theory, principled moral thinking is believed to derive from one's personal views of justice, which may often contradict the established rules of society. In our view, however, autonomous moral behavior is not autonomous with regard to collective rules and values. It is, rather, the autonomous defense of what one sees as highest in one's culture, despite the demands of family, peers, and conventional authority. Socrates choosing to drink the hemlock poison provides a timeless example of autonomous behavior. He drank the poison not to please the corrupt authorities who had condemned him, and despite the pleas of his friends; he drank it because he felt it was consistent with the ideals of Athenian citizenship to do so.

The next question concerns the psychological mechanisms leading to autonomy. The critical mechanism underlying autonomy, we believe, is self-awareness. This includes a conscious appreciation of (1) the motives for one's actions; (2) the relativity of one's own values and principles; (3) the limitations

of all human philosophies; and (4) the message of Ecclesiastes—that the race is not to the swift nor the battle to the strong but rather that life is unpredictable, unjust, and without any clearly visible meaning. Self-awareness has two consequences. On the one hand it produces a sense of inner detachment and role distance (Goffman, 1959), the capacity for what some Oriental philosophers call wu-wei, or actionless action (Waley, 1958), and a distrust of violent passions or enthusiasms because one knows from experience the nonrational sources of these emotions. On the other hand, self-awareness can produce an enlightened commitment to the values and conventional evaluative standards of one's society. This is so because one realizes that no values can be justified in an absolute sense, that there must be values in any case, and the existing values are usually no more or less valid than any others.

The developmental processes fostering autonomy are not as well understood as they might be. Baumrind (1971) provides persuasive evidence for the role of modeling in the development of autonomy: Autonomous school children have been exposed to autonomous adult models (usually their parents). Beyond modeling, we believe any experience that encourages introspection, role distance, and perspective on one's self is important. This would include travel, a wide range of social experience (pleasant as well as unpleasant), and parents or caretakers who encourage or require children to engage in self-monitoring and introspection.

We can distinguish three kinds of nonautonomous moral conduct, which we call moral realism, moral enthusiasm, and zealotry. These behavior patterns reflect lack of self-awareness and can have disastrous consequences. Moral realism is a function of high rule attunement, low social sensitivity, and low self-awareness. This pattern of dispositions produces an unconscious overaccommodation to authority and institutionalized rules. Moral realists make good bureaucrats and police; but rule following as an end in itself can be detrimental to the welfare of a society in those cases where the rules are unjust or dysfunctional. Moral enthusiasm is a function of high rule attunement, high social sensitivity, and low self-awareness. Moral enthusiasts are conventionally moral and well-intentioned, but they have no internal moral gyroscope. As a consequence of their lack of perspective, they rush from one moral cause to another—this week saving the whales, next week banning the bomb. Their very enthusiasm reduces their effectiveness. Zealotry is a function of hostility toward authority (low rule attunement), sensitivity to injustice (high social sensitivity), and low self-awareness. Zealots are the urban guerillas and terrorists who seek aggressive confrontations with authority in the name of social justice.

In short, moral development, defined as the evolution of character structure, proceeds through three phases, called rule attunement, social sensitivity, and self-awareness. During the first phase children must learn to live with authority; during the second, they learn to live with other people; and in the third they must learn to live with themselves. There are characteristic developmental processes and problems associated with each phase. People differ in terms of how successfully they master the problems associated with each phase; consequently, as a result of his or her developmental history, each person has a relatively unique moral orientation.

Evidence. Three central concepts of this theory have been operationally defined in terms of objective personality scales for socialization (rule attunement), empathy (social sensitivity), and autonomy (self-awareness). These measures are scorable from the California Psychological Inventory (CPI) (Gough, 1975) and can be used with subjects as young as junior high school age. It would be inappropriate to review here the evidence for the theory based on these measures. Suffice it to say that these measures have repeatedly been shown to predict various kinds and degrees of delinquent behavior, presocial conduct, and level or quality of moral reasoning (Haier, 1977; Hogan, 1975a; Tsujimoto and Nardi, forthcoming). Thus socialization, empathy, and autonomy are deeply implicated in conventional rule following/rule violation and in predisposing toward certain forms of moral reasoning.

The theory also provides a useful way to conceptualize guilt—the emotional consequence of rule violation. According to the theory, guilt responses should fall into four classes: (1) impunitive responses where there is no guilt; (2) guilt over the disapproval of authority figures; (3) guilt about disappointing others; and (4) guilt about not living up to personal standards of conduct. Hogan and Beehler (1978) asked 104 adult men and women about their guilt experiences. Two of their findings are relevant here. First, with no prior training, raters could sort all responses into the four above-mentioned categories with 78 percent agreement. Second, younger subjects (late adolescents) generally felt guilty about disruptions in relations with parents and peers, whereas older subjects (job-holding adults and parents) generally felt guilty about not meeting responsibilities. Both findings support the analysis of guilt derived from socioanalytic theory.

summary

There are three major developmental problems, rule attunement (socialization), social sensitivity (empathy), and self-awareness (autonomy) which are worked out in different ways throughout the life cycle. Rule attunement begins in attachment. Adolescents who are attuned to rules are educable—they can be coached, taught, advised, and depended on. Well-socialized adolescents do well in athletics, in peer relations (Hogan, forthcoming), and in their studies (Holland, 1959). Finally, their unambivalent accommodation to authority ensures that their morality in adulthood will be consistent with the requirements of conventional religious orientations.

Social sensitivity also begins in secure attachment. Socially sensitive adolescents are other-directed, socially acute, tactful, understanding, and perceptive (Hogan, 1969). In adulthood these people are concerned with fairness, justice, equity, civil rights, and other traditional ethical issues (Hogan and Dickstein, 1972).

Autonomy begins in attachment as well. Autonomous adolescents are inner-directed, task oriented, and more concerned with adult than peer approval. As adults they are autonomous and self-aware and live according to

their own self-chosen principles of conduct, principles which (recalling Socrates) are consistent with the values and ideals of their culture.

implications and speculations

In this final section we will highlight five issues that were implicit in the foregoing discussion and require further elaboration.

Differences from Earlier Versions. The present discussion differs from earlier published versions of the same theory in three important aspects. No mention has been made so far of the Ethics of Personal Conscience/Ethics of Social Responsibility dimension of moral judgment. The reason for this will be clarified below. A second difference is the role assigned to religion in the development of character structure. Earlier versions of the theory explained autonomy in terms of "ideological maturity"—the capacity to rationalize one's goals, values, and interests in terms of a metaphysical world view. Religions are ready sources of world views and therefore could provide the basis for ideological maturity and, hence, autonomy. We no longer believe this analysis. Our present view is that religion has less to do with autonomy and more to do with a healthy accommodation to authority and the demands of society in adulthood; that is, being religious in the conventional sense implies no self-chosen commitment. It reflects instead an unquestioning acceptance of the legitimacy of all the routines, customs, traditions, values, and rules of one's society, of which church attendance is one aspect. We now conceptualize autonomy in much the same way that Kierkegaard defined authentic Christianity. Persons who are authentic have arrived at Christian (or any other) values through a process of intense and agonizing introspection; their religiosity, however, bears almost no relationship to organized religion, which they regard as a perfidious abomination. Like Kierkegaard, we also believe that few people develop true self-awareness and autonomy.

Personality and Moral Development. The second point is one we have made before but is so important that it deserves special reemphasis. There is a strong tendency in contemporary psychology to treat moral development as if it were a specialized topic in developmental or social psychology (see Brown and Herrnstein, 1975; Lamb, 1978). In so doing the topic is decontextualized, misconstrued, and, in our judgment, trivialized. Moral development is properly considered within the context of personality development as a whole. The principle function of morality is to link the individual to his or her society or culture; there is a distinct tendency to lose sight of this function when moral development is studied in the abstract as an isolated phenomenon.

Ethics of Conscience vs. *Ethics of Responsibility.* Our third point, related to the foregoing, concerns the role of the Ethics of Personal Conscience/Ethics of Social Responsibility continuum in moral development. Hogan (1970) developed the Survey of Ethical Attitudes (SEA) to assess individual differences along the continuum defined by these two perspectives. Persons who adopt the Ethics of Conscience are idealistic reformers who love their brother man, dislike rules, and regard unjust social institutions as the

major source of injustice in the world. Persons who chose the Ethics of Responsibility are pragmatic, factual, and conservative; they distrust other people and believe social institutions, rules, and laws are necessary to keep their wayward impulses under control.

Subsequent work with this scale has led us to reconceptualize the meaning of the dimension in the following way. Tomkins (1965) describes what he calls an ideological polarity in Western thought. The polarity consists of the (New Testament) view on one hand that man is an end in himself, intrinsically valuable, and if given the opportunity, man will develop his innate potential and worth. The other pole consists of the (Old Testament) view that man has no intrinsic value but rather achieves value by living up to or aspiring toward certain external standards of excellence. Tomkins goes on to show how this ideological polarity runs through mathematics, the philosophy of science, metaphysics, epistemology, the general theory of value, political theory, jurisprudence, aesthetics, educational theory, psychology, psychiatry, and child development. Consider these two examples provided by Tomkins (p. 86):

New Testament	*Old Testament*
"And ye Fathers provoke not your children to wrath lest they be discouraged."—Eph. 6:2 and 3	"He that curseth Father or Mother let him die the death."—Lev. 20:9

The two quotations reflect remarkably different attitudes toward child rearing, paralleling Tomkins' ideological polarity.

We believe that the Ethics of Conscience/Ethics of Responsibility dichotomy reflects the same ideological polarity that Tomkins has identified; in moral reasoning this comes down to a series of mini-polarities, including contrasts between mercy and justice, liberalism and conservatism, rule avoiding and rule following. But more importantly, we believe these ideological polarities reflect the presence of two broad *personality syndromes* that are equally represented in most human groups. The nature of these two types is given by the following contrasting terms: hysteric vs. paranoid; health-souled vs. sick-souled; socioemotional orientation vs. task orientation; passionate-spontaneous vs. rational-reflective.

Our point regarding the SEA can be simply stated as follows. There are two broad personality syndromes to be found in every human group. These two s romes entail dramatically contrasting views of human nature; these view of human nature will be reflected in the moral judgments and moral reasoning of the persons who hold them. The SEA is a robust but somewhat inefficient measure of these two personality syndromes. The research on the SEA, finally, provides one more example of how personality theory and moral development are inextricably linked.

Delinquency and Cultural Decay. The fourth point concerns a possible misconception that our heavy emphasis on evolutionary theory may have fostered. In view of the stress on how moral development is overdetermined and how culture evolves in response to environmental demands, the reader may

wonder why, according to this theory, individuals go bad or civilizations fail. In fact the theory has explicit answers to both these questions.

Individual failures in moral development (delinquency) begin with poor attachment bonds between an infant and its caretakers. This produces insecurity, hostility, and low rule attunement. Disturbances in the attachment bond spill over into the next phase of development, disrupting peer relations and further isolating the child. By adolescence such children are socially isolated, insecure, hostile to authority, and insensitive to social expectations and to the rights of others—in short they are potential criminals.

Social systems or culture also fail when the process of socialization/moral development goes awry, as it may do in three ways. First, the environmental conditions to which a culture is adapted may change, requiring the culture to produce a new modal character type; but changes in institutionalized child-rearing practices occur very slowly, if at all. The fate of the Plains Indians of North America reflects this kind of externally caused failure—a nomadic culture, adapted to a migratory life style on the open plains, was forced into a farmlike existence on reservations with predictable and disastrous consequences.

A second condition for the failure of social systems occurs when the feedback loop between environmental demands and cultural responses is broken. Currently, for example, the technology of advanced Western societies buffers individuals from the demands of the environment. This buffering makes it unclear what kinds of values, skills, and character types are necessary to respond to the environment. When the world's supply of cheap energy is finally exhausted, there is bound to be a painful transition period as the Western technological societies begin to move back into realistic alignment with nature.

The failure of a social system may also be generated internally by the factionalism that is an inevitable feature of human societies. The status hierarchies and division-of-labor characteristic of culture are, at the same time, a source of internal division and strife that undermine group solidarity and unified purpose. Thus, through forces latent in human nature, culture can self-destruct.

Real and Ideal Views of Moral Maturity. Our last point concerns the contrast between ideal definitions of moral conduct and moral maturity and the levels of moral maturity that one can realistically expect to encounter in the world. Over time, human action becomes more self-conscious and self-controlled. In phylogenetic terms, we have evolved, over the course of several million years, from creatures impelled largely by instincts to creatures capable (at least in principle) of some conscious control of our actions. In ontogenetic terms, each person evolves from an initial presocialized state through the period of rule attunement, where actions are almost instinctually regulated by the letter of the law, through the period of social sensitivity, where actions are regulated by the spirit of the law, and then, one hopes, onto the period of self-awareness, where actions are under full conscious control.

Part of what it means to be self-aware (autonomous) is to realize that the motives for one's actions are never fully conscious, that it is always possible

to be self-deceived about the "true" causes of one's behavior. And this, consequently, implies that is is unrealistic to expect very many people to be "truly moral" very much of the time. In fact, authentic moral conduct may be a rare event, precisely because it requires absolute self-understanding—the necessary psychological condition for freedom. And freedom is the necessary precondition for moral action. To put the argument in a nutshell, in order for an act to be moral, it must be the product of free choice; it cannot be determined. The only free actor is one who is fully self-aware. But absolute self-awareness is, in daily reality, unattainable. So then is truly moral conduct.

Truly moral conduct is thus an ideal, and it is unrealistic to hope that many people will ever behave in a moral fashion defined in ideal terms. Thus, the most we can hope for is that people will avoid deliberately doing evil, that they will comply with the conventional norms of civil conduct, and that they will consider the consequences of their actions for the general welfare. Even this limited aspiration may be too ambitious.

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