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LITERATURE: THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL ART

The usual understanding of the arts, rooted as it is in the acceptance of the division of the arts into the manual and the fine, is both deficient and crude. The paradigm that an object of art results from material given to a man, who by reason of his craft is an artist, and who by using his craft reshapes the material according to his needs or visions, holds validly in all of the manual arts and in many of the fine arts. But in the case of literature, we are convinced, this paradigm does not hold in any way whatsoever. All the manual and most of the fine arts are 'productive' in the sense that they make something out of the material given to the artist. But the writer certainly does not make anything in the sense of producing something new. Rather his artistic act is one of 'showing'. It is the task of this paper to clarify this 'showing' and to discuss what this 'showing' means for the understanding of literature.

Let us look again at the traditional paradigm structuring the understanding of art. This model, according to Aristotelean philosophy of nature, presupposes a Physic. This Physic sees the world as an organized complex of bodies which independently have their own existence and their own existential structure. Their existence and activity as bodies is complete and autonomous, without any reference to the existence and action of the human being. Aristotle calls them natural bodies : bodies which are capable of (1) motion and rest, and (2) the possibility of motion and rest. These natural bodies have existential autonomy, completeness and identity, and any change occurring in them is natural change. The resultant body becomes artificial when the change is brought about by a principle of motion and rest which is extrinsic to the natural body. The human being becomes the artist when he is the source of the extrinsic formal principle affecting motion and rest in the natural body. The human world or environment, as apart from the natural world, comes into existence when human craft brings changes in natural bodies. This is the conceptualization structuring the traditional paradigm of art, a conceptualization that has given rise to phrases as 'nature versus art' or 'art idealizes nature'.

When we come to the literary art this paradigm will not hold. Words do not offer the same possibility to the literary artist that the possibility of motion and rest found in the natural body affords to the fine and manual artists. Words do not parallel the possibility of change provided by the natural body. They have no existential autonomy, completeness, or identity. A word's meaning is arbitrary, fortuitous, and conventional. Words, in and of themselves, are nothing as a possibility of change.

Are we construing the material of literature — words — too narrowly ? Some of our critics might say that the writer's material is language, not words. But even in that case literature as a traditional art is impossible. Language, the body of logical rules, or syntax, cannot possibly admit of change. Otherwise it would entirely destroy the possibility of discourse. The logical positivists, or analysts, indeed say that there is literature in the sense of a body of discourse, not ostensively verifiable, but understood nonetheless. In their vocabulary the linguistic phenomenon known as literature is really discourse by emotive language. By this they mean that while there is no change brought about in language, there is change wrought by language in the emotive condition of the listener or the reader. We can hardly call this literature : it is more truly rhetoric whose function it is to influence the life of the listener or the reader by the use of language. We are, therefore, faced with the fact that the literary artist cannot find in the world of natural bodies, nor in words, nor in language, anything he can possibly change artistically. And if this is the final solution, language can never be more than a rhetoric.

Our understanding of language up to this point has been rooted in the traditional ontological analysis of human beings. According to this analysis the ontological categories applicable to all kinds of existents were equally and meaningfully applicable to man. This traditional analysis, held both by the metaphysicians and the positivists, is predicated upon the fact that the human being is structured by an essence from which there derive certain properties. This essence is the ontological principle determining the existence of the human being. Furthermore this essence is made manifest in existing through its properties. Language, traditionally understood as unique to the human being, was considered the most notable property of the human essence. Language, therefore, as a property 'stands for' the human essence. Language was never understood to structure human existence in such a way that it made it be what it is, nor to show the radical structure determining

that existence. All of that was accounted for by the formal determining principle of existence, the essence or soul or psyche; it was for this that language was a sign. Language thus understood could never serve as an access to the existential structure of the human being. For in the first place as a property of the essence it could only stand for the fact that the human essence exists where there is language. Secondly, it could not, per se, give any insight into the structure of the existence of the human being, because the existence of the human being is distinct from the essence of the human being, and language is a property of the essence, not of the existence. Therefore, any attempt to establish literature as an art while understanding language in the aforesaid way is futile.

Obviously, the traditional ontology as far as it applies to the human being, language, and literature is a *cul de sac.* We shall, therefore, turn to Heidegger's *Fundamentalontologie.* In his analysis of *Dasein,* or the human being, we find an understanding of language that helps establish literature as an art. Heidegger's fruitful analysis is indicated in the following statement :

> The 'essence' ["Wesen"] of this entity (Dasein) lies in its "to be" [Zu-sein]. Its Being-what-it-is [Was-sein] (*essentia*) must... be conceived in terms of its Being (*existentia*).[1]

While for the traditional ontology the existence of the human being, like that of all other beings, was a possible relationship grounded in the essence, in Heidegger's analysis the essence is a possible structure of the existence. In traditional ontology human being becomes manifest in existence through the properties of essence, in Heidegger's system, what the human being is shall be made manifest out of, as well as in, the human existence. Rather than speaking of 'essence', it is more proper to speak of the structures of human existence, which are possibilities of it making itself manifest out of, and in, itself. Thus human existence is not only the ground of the manifestation of what it is, but also is the possibility, of making itself manifest. Hence we can say that the human being has access to his very own existential possibilities. To sum up : Heidegger shows the human being as structured by two radical existential possibilities : (1) existence is so structured that it is able to make itself out of, and in, itself, that is it is able to 'essentialize' itself; and (2) it is able to have access to, or to let itself appear to, itself thus 'essentialized'. Such a human being Heidegger calls 'phenomenological', and

the structure making the human being capable of being phenomenological is what he calls 'Logos', of which he says :

Λόγος as "discourse" means rather the same as *δηλοῦν:* to make manifest what one is 'talking about' in one's discourse. Aristotle has explicated this function of discourse more precisely as *ἀποφαίνεσθαι*. The *λόγος* lets something be seen *(φαίνεσθαι),* namely, what the discourse is about; and it does so either *for* the one who is doing the talking (the *medium*) or for persons who are talking with one another, as the case may be. Discourse 'lets something be seen' *ἀπό...:* that is, it lets us see something from the very thing which the discourse is about. In discourse *(ἀπόφανσις),* so far it is genuine, *what* is said... is drawn *from* what the talk is about, so that discursive communication, in what it says... makes manifest what it is talking about, and thus makes it accessible to the other party. This is the structure of *λόγος* and *ἀπόφανσις.*[2]

Language or *logos,* therefore, is now seen not to be a material, nor a rhetorical tool, but rather the appropriate way whereby the human being can see, and let be seen, how out of, and in, his existence he has concretized the possibilities of that existence. This 'letting be seen', which Heidegger terms *logos,* we shall designate as 'expression', the first moment of phenomenological structure. But while we have avoided the former difficulties arising from the understanding of language as a set of logical rules and conventional signs, we still have not found in language the possibility of change that is required if there is to be an art of language.

A more careful understanding of language as constituting the phenomenological structure of the human being will answer this problem. Phenomenology

...is something that proximally and for the most part does *not* show itself at all : it is something that lies *hidden,* in contrast to that which proximally and for the most part does show itself; but at the same time it is something that belongs to what thus shows itself, and it belongs to it so essentially as to constitute its meaning and its ground... that which remains *hidden*... is... the *Being* of entities.[3]

Meaning, therefore, is the second moment of the human being as phenomenological. And human being is phenomenological because of the structure of language. The phenomenological moment of meaning consists of the showing how the existential possibilities concretely exist in the human being. But as the human being is a being-to-be; man is not a being to be

something : neither a goal, nor an ideal, nor an end. This is because no specifying or defining situation can arise as a terminal possibility of the human being as a being-to-be. Thus its existential possibilities are 'endless'. From this it follows that human meaning, as the phenomenological structure of a being-to-be endlessly, is an endless possibility.

We must add that meaning as an endless possibility of human existence, and as arising out of, and terminating in, this existence, is a meaning possible only for human existence. However, an existence whose meaning is so structured is free : for the human being is free in that out of, and in, his very own existential possibilities he shows for himself the possible meaning of his very own existence.

In the second moment of the phenomenon of language we have finally come upon what we required of literature if it were to be an art : the element offering the possibility of change. Human meaning as endlessly possible and consequently shown as freedom, offers the element of possibility. Literature, therefore, in language as a phenomenological structure finds both factors requisite for an art : a craft and a material. But obviously the understanding of these two terms in literature is quite different from that in other arts. For the first moment of language, *expression,* is nowise an act of production, but one of showing or letting appear. Hence it is more appropriately called *style* rather than craft. And the second moment of language, *meaning,* is not a possibility of change of the type used by the productive artist. Rather it is the structure whereby the human being may show out of, and in, and for his own existence his endless existential possibilities as being free. It is, therefore, by reason of uniqueness among beings of men, and his phenomenological structure, language, that literature is possible as a phenomenological art.

Does this analysis which we have just given establish literature as distinct from history ? For our understanding of language was rooted in the thesis that the human being is a being-to-be 'endlessly', and consequently is to be meaningful endlessly. The phenomenological structure giving the possibility of endlessness is Time. Moreover, Time as a structure of a being-to-be, and to be meaningful, endlessly, finds its determining and complete possibility in the phenomenon of history. For history is the phenomenon of the human being not only as a being-to-be, and to be meaningful, endlessly, but as a being-in-the-world. However a being-in-the-world finds its endlessness in the phenomenon of death, of which Heidegger says :

Death, as the end of Dasein, is Dasein's ownmost possibility — non-relational, certain and as such indefinite, not to be outstripped. Death is, as *Dasein's* end, in the Being of this entity *towards* its end.[4] (Original italics.)

Thus, history as the phenomenon of the human being as being-in-the-world and as being-to-death, completes the phenomenon of the human being as a being-to-be, and to be meaningful, endlessly.

All that we have said about history as the complete phenomenon of the human being is certainly true. But literature is a distinct phenomenon for it arises from history as a 'leap' of the human being as being free. For the being-in-the-world is there without any possibility of being able to be found in its existence for its becoming there. It is simply there, or 'thrown' as Heidegger says. But as "there" it is structured by the undefined, but certain, death. To say, as we did, that the meaning of such a being is to be free, may appear as an ambiguous statement. For it is certainly not free out of, in and for itself either in its beginning or end.[5] In history freedom cannot account for its beginning nor for its end. The leap from history to literature is a possibility of the being-in-the-world as being 'thrown' and 'endlessly' free, to decide and determine how its being free is totally meaningful out of, and in, for itself. For a history of the being-in-the-world, literature determines a moral cosmos structured by its own time, with its own beginning, middle, and end. It shows the moral cosmos in which human existence is structured totally and meaningfully in its own being free. This total determination by the human being, out of and in and for itself, of its possibilities of being free is *decision,* and it is decision that structures freedom into a moral cosmos. Literature as the moral epiphany of this moral cosmos develops through three phenomenological moments: (1) the integrity or wholeness of a total range of possibilities of being free; (2) the meaningful interaction of these possibilities within the wholeness of their range; (3) the justification through possible self-judgment of the meaning of the decision about the human being as being totally free. Obviously, the form the epiphany will take depends upon the decision taken concerning the possibility and nature of self-judgment. In the course of Western Literature there have been three different decisions taken resulting in three different epiphanies of the moral cosmos : (1) Greek tragedy; (2) Christian comedy; and (3) the drama of absurdity.

Tragedy is the epiphanic form arising in Greek history from the decision

that corporate human existence realised in the polis is actually self-meaningful because it is self-justified; and that the individual human being is a possibility of human meaning and justification as long as it is in and for the polis. Referring to the relationship of actual self-meaning, or the good life, of the polis as contrasted to that of the individual, Aristotle says :[6]

For even if the end is the same for a single man and for a state, that of the state seems at all events something greater and more complete whether to attain or to preserve; though it is worth while to attain the end merely for one man, it is finer and more godlike to attain for a nation, or for city-states. (*Nicomachean Ethics,* 1094b, 7-10).

And in *Politics,* he thus concludes about the good life of the polis :

...the final cause and end of a thing is the best, and to be self-sufficing is the end and the best. (1252b, 35-37).

Turning now to the possibility of actual self-justification of this good life in the polis, Aristotle speaks of justice as

...the bond of men in states, for the administration of justice, which is the determination of what is just, is the principle of order in political society. (*Politics,* 1253a, 38-40)

It is, indeed, the self-justified principle of order because it

...is complete virtue... proverbially 'in justice is every virtue comprehended'.
And it is complete virtue in its fullest sense, because it is the actual exercise of complete virtue. It is complete because he who possesses it can exercise his virtue not only in himself but towards his neighbour also. (*Nicomachean Ethics,* 1129b, 25-35).

But Aristotle also says that the ground of this principle of order is not a man but the rational principle. (*Nicomachean Ethics,* 1134a, 35). The Greek polis, therefore, is the actuality of the good life structured by justice which in turn is grounded in the corporate rational principle. Thus the integrity of human meaning actually exists in the polis, and in it alone is possible human meaning and justification. Outside of the polis there can only be gods and beasts for they have no possible human meaning. The individual man exists in the polis not simply as a possibility of happiness — as the ethical man —, but as the possibility of being justified — as the citizen.

These then are the moments of Greek tragedy : the actuality of the justified good life of the polis existing as structuring the individual human being as a possibility of the justified good life.

Human existence in the Greek thought, thus, becomes ironic. Tragedy is the epiphany of

> ...a man not pre-eminently virtuous and just, whose misfortune, however, is brought upon him not by vice and depravity but by some error of judgment, of the number of those in the enjoyment of great reputation and prosperity; e.g. Oedipus, Thyestes, and the man of note of similar families. (*Poetics,* 1453a, 7-14).

In this excerpt we find all of the factors for the ironic epiphany. On the one hand this man is in no way different from other men as far as his being intrinsically morally good is concerned. He is a good man in the same way and to the same extent as any man can be good. Moreover, his relationship with others is structured in exactly the same way and by exactly the same virtue as that of any other just man in the polis. But the irony of his situation arises from the fact that he appears to himself and to others 'highly renowned and prosperous'. The tragic protagonist, therefore, because of his apparent condition of embodying the actuality of human meaning and justification while, nevertheless, like all other men, being only a possibility of such meaning and justification, concretizes in his existence the total irony of the human situation. And he mediates the actual and the possible in his existence by some 'error' or understanding about the ironic structure of human existence in general, as well as the concretization of this irony in his own existence. The recognition of his ironic existence is his fall. Recognized by others as ironic in his status of uniqueness marked by renown and prosperity, he falls from a position of regard which he never truly held. Recognizing himself as an ironic being whose proper actuality lies in the abiding principle of possibility of human meaning and justification, he falls from a non-existing actuality to a constant existing possibility. Obviously the fall is the supreme irony. For in effect it is the resurrection of the human being from the death of the actual to the life of the possible. The Greek tragic protagonist is the Phoenix.

Although we have said that comedy is the proper epiphany of the decision arising with Christian history, clarification of this can be gained from what Aristotle has to say about comedy :

Comedy... is an imitation of men worse than the average; worse, however, not as regards any and every sort of fault, but only as regards one particular kind, the Ridiculous, which is the species of the Ugly. The Ridiculous may be defined as a mistake or deformity not productive of pain or harm to others... (*Poetics,* 1449a, 31-35).

With his use of the comparative φαμλότερος we are reminded that we are still within the context of the Greek polis as the actuality of the judged good life. For the comparative aspect is to be considered in regard to the good and just citizen in whose eyes the comic protagonist is indeed φανλότερος and consequently laughable. Thus we have come upon the phenomenon of judgment in comedy : laughter. But equally we have seen that the judge is the disengaged just citizen, not the comic protagonist. Therefore, even though the Greek comic protagonist wished to live the good and the just life, he was utterly unable to know and judge its meaning. Hence, he could never pass from ignorance of his condition to knowledge of it. He could not fall because he was already fallen. But only the spectator could see this, and his laugh was the supreme judgment. As far as the total human situation was concerned, it was saved from being ridiculous by the laugh of the good and just citizen. Hence for the Greek mind, comedy was derivative from the epiphany of tragedy.

On the other hand, Christian comedy is an epiphany resulting from a decision taken in, and about, the total human situation. The decision of the Christian is that even though human existence has no possibility of judging its own meaning, nevertheless it shall be judged, and consequently it is meaningful. The account of Adam and Eve in *Genesis* epiphanizes this decision excellently : God bade them to exist and enjoy the fruits of the earth, but the day they would entertain the possibility of judging the meaning of their existence, that day they would perish. For judgment, says the Lord, is 'Mine'. However, as a being that affirms its meaning as grounded in a judgment that lies in a possibility infinitely removed, the human being is shown as paradoxical. For the relationship between the judgment that will come and the meaning that will be shown through the judgment, does not actually exist in either or both of them, for they *will* come. Belief and hope for the judgment and the meaning that will follow structures the actually existing human being. It is the passionate belief in meaning through judgment that makes the actual existence of the human being a comedy rather than madness. It is the passion of this belief that

drives him to epiphanize his paradoxical situation in comedy to save him from madness.[7] It is the structuring which gives meaning to the saying of Christ as he dies : "My God, my God, why hast Thou forsaken me." For the Christian both the statement and the act of Christ constitute the supreme paradox. Even ritualistic body movements and words constituting liturgical worship would appear utterly mad, unless there is passionate faith and hope that God judges them meaningful.[8]

While indeed Christian comedy may be the epiphany of the human being as paradoxical, what about the ground of the decision giving rise to such a structured epiphany ? Is it not free of paradox and passion ? After all the paradox structured by passion depends upon the existence of God, and can we not prove this existence and thus remove the necessity of passion. Kierkegaard answers this well :

As long as I keep my hold on the proof, i.e. continue to demonstrate, the existence does not come out, if for no other reason than that I am engaged in proving it; but when I let the proof go, the existence is there. But this act of letting go is surely also something; it is indeed a contribution of mine. Must not this also be taken into account, this little moment, brief as it may be — it need not be long, for it is a *leap*.[9]

The decision, therefore, is a leap, but to understand by relinquishing the proof, is this not a paradox ? And how can we learn from that ? Again we turn to Kierkegaard :

But how does the learner come to realize an understanding with this Paradox ? We do not ask that he understand this Paradox, but only that this is the Paradox. How this takes place, we have already shown. It comes to pass when the Reason and the Paradox encounter one another happily in the Moment; when the Reason sets itself aside and the Paradox bestows itself. The third entity in which this union is realized (for it is not realized in the Reason, since it is set aside; nor in the Paradox which bestows itself — hence it is realized *in* something) is that happy passion to which we shall now assign a name, though it is not the name that so much matters. We shall call this passion : *Faith*.[10]

The drama of absurdity is the epiphany of the human being based upon the decision that the meaning of the human being and its justification lie as possibility only in the individual human being himself. Hence, there is no possibility of a transcendental justification of human meaning by reason of an appeal to the State or to God, as was the case for the Greek citizen or

the Christian faithful. Human existence, therefore, as the ground of both possibilities is equally the ground of their divorce, and consequently it is absurd. For as Camus says : the absurd is essentially a divorce; it lies in neither of the elements compared; it is born of their confrontation.[11] But Camus further says that man is absurd because he is set over against a *silent world,* and that is the divorce between this world and the human being that constitutes the relationship of absurdity. This analysis seems inadequate. Man's condition of being absurd is existential only if it arises purely from the structuring of his own existence. It is true that man must always exist in the world, but not necessarily in a world set over against him. For then the absurd would not structure his existence as a being-in-the-world. Absurdity must structure human existence in and of itself, not as set over against a 'silent world'. Hence the absurdity is the same as the human being existing as the possibility of its meaning and justification as being-in-the-world. But such an existent that is the ground of both its possible meaning and possible justification is limited in both by nothing and its own being-in-the-world. The meaning of a being-in-the-world, therefore, is always being justified, and is always being able to be justified. Hence, no actual justification of the meaning of the being-in-the-world can remove from it the possibility of justification; hence Gide's expression *'liberté sans emploie'* describes this existent so well. Whereas for the Greek human meaning and justification were mediated by irony, and the human being consequently became tragic, and while for the Christian the mediation by passion made man paradoxical and comic, in the drama of absurdity man is absurd because possible meaning and possible justification are structured by nothing.[12]

Liberté sans emploie now appears as the proper description of what we meant when we said that the meaning of human existence is always being justified, and is always being able to be justified. A corollary of this is found in Kafka : it is not necessary to accept everything as true, one must only accept it as necessary. Hence ambiguity is added to absurdity as a structure of human being. Meaning and justification as structures of human existence are utterly ambiguous because there is no transcendental possibility of justification. The concrete existence of the human being is the ground of possible meaning and justification. Hence an appeal can be made to nothing to prove or disprove the truth or validity of any concrete condition of human existence : one must only accept it as necessary, never as true.

The epiphany of the human situation as absurd and as ambiguous will be protean. It may be shown in the indifference and inertia of the Underground Man saying : "So at length we have reached the conclusion that the best thing for us to do is to do nothing at all but to sink into a state of contemplative inertia. For that purpose, all hail the underworld !" It may be found in the eternal, quiet, sullen revolt of Sisyphus appealing to nothing, of whom Camus says :

His fate belongs to him. His rock is his thing. Likewise the absurd man, when he contemplates his torment, silences all the idols. In the universe suddenly restored to its silence, the myriad wondering little voices of the earth rise up. Unconscious, secret calls, invitations from all the faces, they are the necessary reverse and price of victory. There is no sun without shadow, and it is essential to know the night. The absurd man says yes and his effort will henceforth be unceasing. If there is a personal fate, there is no higher destiny, or at least there is but one which he concludes is inevitable and despicable. For the rest, he knows himself to be the master of his days. At that subtle moment when man glances backward over his life, Sisyphus returning toward his rock, in that slight pivoting he contemplates that series of unrelated actions which becomes his fate, created by him, combined under his memory's eye and soon sealed by his death. Thus, convinced of the wholly human origin of all that is human, a blind man eager to see who knows that the night has no end, he is still on the go. The rock is still rolling.

I leave Sisyphus at the foot of the mountain ! One always finds one's burden again. But Sisyphus teaches the higher fidelity that negates the gods and raises rocks. He too concludes that all is well. This universe henceforth without a master seems to him neither sterile nor futile.[13]

It may be Kirillov seeing and being the divine and self-annihilating absurdity of *liberté sans emploie :*

To recognise that there is no God and not to recognise at the same instant that one is God oneself is an absurdity, else one would certainly kill oneself. If you recognise it you are sovereign, and then you won't kill yourself, but will live in the greatest glory. But one, the first, must kill himself, for else who will begin and prove it ? So I must certainly kill myself, to begin and prove it. Now I am only a god against my will and I am unhappy, because I am *bound* to assert my will. All are unhappy because all are afraid to express their will. Man has hitherto been so unhappy and so poor because he has been afraid to assert his will in the highest point and has shown his selfwill only in little things, like a schoolboy. I am awfully unhappy, for I'm awfully afraid. Terror is the curse of man... But I will assert my

will, I am bound to believe that I don't believe I will begin and will make an end of it and open the door, and will save... For three years I've been seeking for the attribute of my godhead and I've found it; the attribute of my godhead is self-will ! That's all I can do to prove in the highest point my independence and my new terrible freedom. For it is very terrible. I am killing myself to prove my independence and my new terrible freedom.[14]

Or it may culminate in the wonderful and ambiguous and absurd death of Barabbas :

When dusk fell the spectators had already gone home, tired of standing there any longer. And besides, by that time the crucified were all dead. Only Barabbas was left hanging there alone, still alive. When he felt death approaching, that which he had always been so afraid of, he said out into the darkness, as though he were speaking to it :

To thee I deliver up my soul.
And then he gave up the ghost.[15]

Having laid out these three kinds of epiphanies, that of the Phoenix, of Don Quixote and of Sisyphus, are we now caught in the same dilemma as Hegel whose dialectic, it seems, should have stopped with his death if his analysis of history were to be correct ? No, because we do not imply that these three epiphanies are related serially and dialectically because of some transcendent structure of existence. To say that these three epiphanies are exhaustive would be to deny the relationship we tried to establish between history and literature. These three epiphanies are simply there as the phenomenology of *Dasein* in its *Erschlossenheit* and *Entschlossenheit.*[16] They are indeed different but related as phenomenological analyses of the human being arising from different essentializing possibilities. They are indeed significant and defining in this sense : once an authentic epiphany has been expressed, the possible dialectic of human meaning has been widened, and from that point on human beings to be authentic must seriously regard it as a determining possibility. In other words, the introduction of new possibilities through phenomenological art of literature structures the reality of the human being. In that sense, literature, like Divine Revelation, intrinsically modifies history by revealing new horizons of human meaning.

NOTES

* The sudden death of William Gerhard in December 1964 interrupted his work on this paper. The present draft owes much to his earlier drafts and notes.

1 M. Heidegger, *Sein und Zeit* translated as *Being and Time* by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (London : SCM Press, 1962), p. 67.
2 *Ibid.*, p. 56.
3 *Ibid.*, p. 59.
4 *Ibid.*, p. 303.
5 Cf. the summation of this situation by Karl Jaspers : "...I was not at the beginning and I am not at the end. I am indeed between the beginning and the end and yet I ask about them." *Philosophie* (Berlin : Springer-Verlag, 1948), p. 1.
6 References to Aristotle are from *The Basic Works of Aristotle*, ed. by Richard McKeon (New York : Random House, 1941).
7 S. Kierkegaard, *Philosophical Fragments*, tr. by David F. Swenson (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1958), p. 35 : The paradoxical passion of the Reason thus comes repeatedly into collision with the Unknown, which does indeed exist, but is unknown, and in so far does not exist. The Reason cannot advance beyond this point, and yet it cannot refrain in its paradoxicalness from arriving at this limit and occupying itself therewith. It will not serve to dismiss its relation to it simply by asserting that the Unknown does not exist, since this itself involves a relationship. But what then is the Unknown, since the designation of it as God merely signifies for us that is unknown ? To say that it is the Unknown because it cannot be known, and even if it were capable of being known, it could not be expressed, does not satisfy the demands of passion, though it correctly interprets the Unknown as a limit : but a limit is precisely a torment for passion, though it also serves as an incitement. And yet the Reason can come no further, whether it risks an issue *via negationis* or *via eminentia*. What then is the Unknown ? It is the limit to which the Reason repeatedly comes, and in so far, substituting a static form of conception for the dynamic, it is the different, the absolutely different. But because it is absolutely different, there is no mark by which it could be distinguished. When qualified as absolutely different it seems on the verge of disclosure, but this is not the case; for the Reason cannot even conceive an absolute unlikeness.
8 S. Kierkegaard, *Concluding Unscientific Postscript*, translated by David F. Swenson and Walter Lowrie (Princeton : Princeton University Press, 1941), pp. 83-84, *passim*. Cf. "Prayer expresses the highest pathos of the infinite, and yet it is comical, precisely because it is, in its inwardness, incommensurable for every external expression. ...The true form of the comic is, that the infinite may move within a man, and no one, no one be able to discover it through anything appearing outwardly."
9 S. Kierkegaard, *Philosophical Fragments*, pp. 33-34.
10 *Ibid.*, p. 47.
11 Albert Camus, *The Myth of Sisyphus and Other Essays*, translated by Justin O'Brien (New York : Alfred A. Knopf, 1955), p. 30.
12 This condition is well summed up by the statement of the priest in Kafka's *The Trial* made in reply to K.'s questioning about the Court : "The Court makes no claims upon you. It receives you when you come, and it relinquishes you when you go."
13 Camus, *op. cit.*, p. 123.
14 F. Dostoyevsky, *The Possessed*, translated by C. Garnett (New York : The Modern Library, 1936), pp. 629-30.
15 Par Lagerkvist, *Barabbas*, translated by Alan Blair (New York : Random House, 1951), pp. 179-80.
16 We translate *Erschlossenheit* as the dynamism of the human being in revealing itself to itself in its existential structures; and, *Entschlossenheit* as the act of decision constituting the possibility of totality for the human being.