REVIEWS

Herbert Galton, *Freedom – from Illusions*, Lawrence (Kansas), Coronado Press, 1977, 154 pp.

"Since there are no laws governing history for us, there is also no law preventing man's 'return to nature', but in the process he would cease being man. Cut out all artificiality and convention, and you annihilate man as such – a true genocide." This basic observation is illuminated by our author through a critique of neo-Russophilism, which is also relevant to other Romanticisms. "It is even impossible to be part of the way and return to the Middle Ages, say to Russian medieval society as envisaged by Solzhenitsyn. It is neither feasible nor desirable, and that author, also a prophet, if he were steeped in that society for a few years, would come out with a denunciation of it as harsh as that of the ideologist Stalin's rule." Not all of Solzhenitsyn's friends would be too sure. Efim Etkind thinks that Solzhenitsyn would want an Ayatollah for Russia (or even himself as Caesaro-Papist leader). One could add that Solzhenitsyn is not the only one who wants a firm hand to bring matters back under control in his homeland. If Galton's suspicions are correct, then this would mean that Solzhenitsyn himself must suspect that he would then have to persecute, arrest and silence himself. A significant stride beyond this position is taken by Alexander Zinov'ev, the exiled Moscow logician. In response to Solzhenitsyn's 'Message from Exile' (February 1979), Zinov'ev declared that between Solzhenitsyn's position and that of the Soviet regime (which he rejects with heavy satire) he would have to opt for the latter.

As illuminating as Galton's considerations are, they labor under very serious difficulties: "The purpose of this book is a most general one – to find foundations for our values which all intelligent men and women can accept, believers as well as unbelievers". Galton's book is a work of enlightenment in the best sense of the term. Without any scholasticism or ornamentation, the author provides a critical and self-critical account of the world-views that have come down to us, and offers the necessary minimum for understanding among men. He speaks to all trends and 'camps', without denying his own

spiritual background (including Freud, Popper and Topitsch) or his philological formation in Vienna and Prague under the masters of the 1930s.

There is, however, no self-satisfaction here. He takes elements from all directions without favoritism to form his illusionless *minima moralia.* This is where he goes beyond an apparent understanding between different ideologies, and approaches an overcoming of mutually exclusive ideologies – a goal which is not sought even by the professional dialoguers. The latter too often seek self-justification or maintenance of a status quo in reference to power.

This is why Galton runs the risk of remaining a voice crying in wilderness without entrée into either camp and unable to create space for reason and tolerance. But, this is precisely why it is worthwhile following Galton through his thirteen cleverly laid out chapters. He knows not only the fragility of his position but also the 'wherefore' of a life worth living. "If this is schizophrenia, so be it".

Translated by
T. J. BLAKELEY

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Adam B. Ulam, *The Unfinished Revolution*, rev. ed., Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1979, 287 pp.

By now everyone interested in the topic is aware of the general argument of this book: Marxism, like liberalism, has its sources in – and owes the extent and character of its influence to – the process of industrialization. Those who are not aware of the precise manner in which Ulam made this argument nearly twenty years ago, and most especially of the analogy on which it is based, ought to have a look at *The Unfinished Revolution* in this new edition. Those who *are* should not perhaps go very far out of their way to do so, unless of course they feel inclined to refresh their memories. The book is so little changed in substance from the 1960 edition that one ought to consider it more of a reissue than a revision.

That is not to say that there is nothing new in this edition: its section on Marxism in the Soviet Union has been updated, and there is a bit of new material on the relationship of the influence of Marxism to "the contemporary crisis of liberal institutions in the West". With regard to the former, however, twenty years has not significantly altered Ulam's view of ideology and politics in the Soviet Union. What he has made of post-Khrushchevian Russia could well be guessed from a reading of the original edition. With regard to Marxism and liberalism, Ulam has not gone much beyond his old arguments in explaining the greater success of Marxism in the developing world. True, we are told that Marxists have wielded political and military power more efficaciously, that the morality and spirituality vital to liberalism's career have been weakened by "the catastrophic decline of religion in the traditional meaning of the term", and that the New Left has made it tougher for liberals to behave as they ought. But Ulam deals with all this only in concluding and in just a half-dozen pages.

Clearly, Ulam thinks the matter of the present condition of liberalism is of critical importance to the audience of 'post-industrial' liberals for whom he writes. It seems to me that he might then have done much more regarding it. As it stands, *The Unfinished Revolution* might be said to employ an understanding of liberalism in the age of industrialization to aid us in understanding the career of Marxism. Given the current reawakening of interest in liberal social and political theories – witness the work of John Rawls and Robert Nozick and their critics – the times seem to encourage Ulam to turn things around a bit and to proceed anew; that is, to use whatever understanding

we might have of post-industrial Marxism toward the development of a reformulated liberalism. Had Ulam attempted even the most tentative of beginnings of this, *The Unfinished Revolution* 1979 would have been updated and revised in a most timely and useful manner.

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Don Ihde, *Technics and Praxis*, Pallas Paperbacks, Dordrecht, D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1979, 150 pp.

This volume consists of a series of essays, which admittedly overlap and are neither "totally systematic" nor "comprehensive" (p. xxvii), but are rather to be viewed as preliminary probings. It is Ihde's contention that, until recently, technology has been ignored by the philosophic traditions. Exceptions do exist, and can be grouped under the label *praxis philosophies*. "Praxis philosophies, broadly defined, are those which in some way make a theory of action primary. Theory of action precedes or grounds a theory of knowledge." (p. xv) Idhe lists several of these, including parts of analytic philosophy, the three-stemmed continental tradition (existentialism, phenomenology, and Marxism), neo-Thomism, and pragmatism. His own approach is phenomenological (specifically American phenomenology), primarily because in that tradition technology is not treated merely as applied science. In contrast to the applied science motif, Ihde contends that, both speculatively and historically speaking, " . . . modern science is necessarily *embodied* in its instruments which function as a necessary condition for its knowledge gathering". (p. 68)

Idhe assumes the Husserlian 'Ego-cogito-cogitatum' model and the Heideggerian transformation of this as 'Being-in-the-World'. But he adapts this structure quickly and clearly for his own purpose. 'Being-in-the-World' is adapted to 'Human $\longrightarrow$ World', the relationship is reflexive, i.e. 'Human $\rightleftarrows$ World'. These are preliminaries; what Ihde is interested in is the more complex relationship where we experience the world through instruments. These are of two types: "embodiment relations in which something is experienced *through* a machine, and hermeneutic relations in which the machine becomes an 'other' as a focal object of experience". (p. 13) He contends that " . . . what is experienced [through a machine] is in some ways *transformed*" (p. 8), i.e., that such experiences are "non-neutral". (p. 53). More specifically, in an embodiment relationship such as a dentist using a probe, symbolized as (Human-machine) $\longrightarrow$ World, " . . . the use of the probe transforms direct perceptual experience. This is its non-neutrality. But second, the transformation itself displays an invariant feature which I . . . call the *amplification-reduction* structure." (p. 21). That is, while certain aspects of the phenomenon studied are intensified via the machine employed, others are placed in an opaque background, i.e. ignored. The relationship is only "partially

transparent" (p. 10). Depending on the degree of opacity involved, we may move to a second type of relationship, symbolized as Human —→ (machine-world). Here the machine demands more attention; it is not simply functional, but is rather "something like a text" (p. 12). Consider, for example, one's relationship with an automobile that has malfunctioned, i.e., has become a problem which must be deciphered. Here the relationship is hermeneutic. Finally, though there is no strict determinism involved, " . . . there are latent telic *inclinations* which are made possible through the use of instruments, inclinations which favor certain rather than other directions" (p. 42). For example, the use of a quill pen, with its attendant slowness, makes the composition of belles lettres more feasible than say, the typewriter, which "punches out" words and sentences.

Such, in brief outline, is the essence of Ihde's phenomenological description of technology. Various chapters in the book apply this structure to specific issues, e.g. music, computer technology. The final chapters of the volume situate Ihde's position on technology vis-à-vis other philosophers in the field. Thus, while praising the work of Hans Jonas, Ihde believes that Jonas has become too pessimistic, offering " . . . an apocalyptic ethic which as with all apocalypses poses a clear either/or" (p. 139). A chapter on Harvey Cox and the existentialists defends the latter against the charge that they are inherently anti-technological, romantic, and individualistic. But by far the most penetrating of these chapters is the one on Heidegger's philosophy of technology. Ihde has clearly derived his position from Heidegger, whose work on technology he considers " . . . one of the most penetrating to date" (p. 103). He describes Heidegger's position clearly and enticingly – no easy task to accomplish. In particular, Ihde shows the radically praxial character of Heidegger's early philosophy: "*praxis* in *Being and Time* functions as the basic existential stratum *through* which world is revealed and as the basic realm of action *from* which sciences may arise . . . . " (pp. 123–24). Heidegger "argues that readiness-to-hand [*Zuhandenheit*] precedes presence-at-hand [*Vorhandenheit*] and it is this argument which is both the inversion of Husserlian phenomenology and the source of what later becomes the primacy of technology in relation to science" (pp. 120–121). Going further, it is only as a machine malfunctions, i.e., becomes obstinate or conspicuously obtrusive, that Heidegger "derives the origin of the present-at-hand" (p. 123) as a "*negative* characterization" (p. 123). Ihde goes on to describe how this distinction (of *Zuhandenheit* vs. *Vorhandenheit*) begins to collapse in the

later Heidegger with the result that " . . . the earlier positive tone given to the praxical also disappears and is replaced with the characterizations of technological culture as 'dangerous', 'ambiguous', 'mysterious' " (p. 128). Hence Heidegger's demand for the development of an *artful* praxis, i.e. technics as *art*, "is not some simple addition to the current epoch of Being, but is the strategic counterbalance to what Heidegger fears is the threat of closure" (p. 129).

In the Introduction, Ihde upholds the importance of Heidegger's position but asserts that "it is not without difficulties and problems . . . [and] needs to be explored in depth" (p. xxvi). He has indeed undertaken such explorations in this volume. While one might wish for a sharper focusing on the critical differences between his position and Heidegger's, nonetheless, Ihde's phenomenological descriptions are not only profound and precise, but also charmingly attractive. He has appropriated and extended the sometimes heavy-handed language of Heideggerian phenomenology in a way which is easy to comprehend yet subtle in its distinctions. The result is a book both readable and well worth reading.

Melvin Rader, *Marx's Interpretation of History*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1979, 242 pages.

Rader contends that Marx utilized three different models in his interpretation of history: dialectical development, base-superstructure, and organic unity (p. xvii). These, according to the author, should be looked at as heuristic devices rather than as competing descriptions of reality. The dialectical model stresses strife and conflict as one epoch is replaced by another. But this model also has a more adequate dialogical version, one where synthesis arises as the more inclusive result of thesis and antithesis. Rader discusses the dialectical model separately only for revolutionary transformation. At other times, he incorporates aspects of this model into the other two – these being his chief concern in the book.

The base-superstructure model is well-known and need not be repeated here in detail. Rader distinguishes two versions of the base-superstructure model: a fundamentalist version and a dialectical one. His basic point is that neither version does complete justice to the riches of Marx's thought. This model is far too static; it presupposes distinct disciplines, external relations,

and at times a one-way causal determinism. The dialectical version, stemming from Engels' letters in the 1890's, allows for interaction between the various disciplines, but does not allow for interpenetration. Rader's attack on the sufficiency of this model consists in pointing out that in many instances base and superstructure overlap, the result being that clear distinctions cannot be articulated. This occurs, for example, with science. Rader contends that Marx "knew from his own experience that science has a momentum of its own" (p. 29), that scientific concepts grow incrementally in relative independence of the economic base. "Even in Marx's lifetime science floated uncertainly between base and superstructure, being both cause and effect of industrial technology." (p. 30). A similar point can be made concerning education, law, and the state; none of these fit neatly into the base-superstructure model. While Rader is careful to recognize the importance of the base-superstructure account (p. 55), his conclusion is that the "distinction between economic causes as necessary and economic causes as *both* necessary and sufficient to explain the given phenomena is too seldom made". (p. 51)

Rader prefers an organic model, which he asserts is more dynamic and allows for differentiation. The organic model has both a synchronic and a diachronic aspect. Synchronically, Rader sees Marx's outlook as an organic structure which can be described in terms of internal relatedness and hierarchy (p. 57). Such a configuration stresses the interrelatedness of production, distribution, consumption, and exchange. These are members within a totality; "although production is dominant in the organic hierarchy, it is not independent". (p. 60) Such an outlook is obviously of Hegelian origin, but Rader is careful to point out that neither Marx nor Hegel would accept a doctrine of internal relations. Marx "believed that all the elements in a social order are distinctions within a totality, but that to the extent that they are distinct, the political and cultural elements are causally less dominant than the economic". (p. 75)

Diachronically, Rader sees Marx as a philosopher who takes change seriously (p. 87), as one who traces out the conflict between technology and class structure, bourgeoisie and proletariat. Interpreting Marx's notion of alienation as *separation*, Rader shows in detail how his description of the alienated person (from work process, products, nature, and species-being) constitutes an integral part of the organic model. Alienation plays a much more important role in the organic interpretation than in a base-superstructure model, wherein it is regarded as a mere "by-product of economic forces"

(p. 113). Alienation is the subjective dimension of historical development; the objective dimension consists in "the transformation of society from one socio-economic formation to another". (p. 120) Finally, the process of organic development is multi-dimensional, as opposed to being merely unilinear and deterministic.

In sum, Rader has offered a clear and 'multi-modeled' analysis of Marx. While he is concerned to point up the attractiveness of the organic model, he is careful to show that each model makes up for deficiencies in another one, and holds that there is "no necessary conflict if we think of them as models rather than as descriptions or social entities" (p. 232). When compared to the usual reductionistic presentation, Rader's account of Marx is both refreshing and persuasive.

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Lucien Goldmann, *Lukács and Heidegger: Towards a New Philosophy*, trans. by William Q. Boelhower, London, Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1977, xxii + 111 pp.

It is a truism that philosophical ideas and positions do not arise in a vacuum, but in the social and conceptual context of an historical moment. Although it is interesting and no doubt necessary, certainly as a preliminary step, to study ideas solely within the framework of one or another position, and then the position within the development of a school to which it belongs more or less closely, at a further remove and as the discussion progresses the relation of that position to competing viewpoints should also be raised. This is necessary for two reasons essentially: in order to grasp the clash of competing world views through which variations on their basic themes frequently arise; and further, as a means towards the evaluation of the intrinsic merit of one or another theoretical option in terms of its direct comparison with contemporary alternatives.

The present work belongs to the category of a comparative and evaluative study of aspects of the thought of Lukács and Heidegger. Lucien Goldmann, the author, is well known in French Marxist circles for a series of books concerning phases of the Enlightenment, with particular attention to Pascal and Racine, works on Kant, and a study of dialectic. His scholarly corpus is further distinguished by a life-long fascination with the early Lukács, particularly as concerns *History and Class Consciousness*, extending from the time of his dissertation in 1945 until his untimely death in 1968. The present short book further reflects this interest. It is in the main an expanded version of the suggestion in his thesis, published under the title *Mensch, Gemeinschaft und Welt in der Philosophie Immanuel Kants: Studien zur Geschichte der Dialektik* (Zurich, Europa Verlagsanstalt, 1945), that Heidegger's *Being and Time* can be viewed as a response to Lukács' *History and Class Consciousness*. It consists of a series of small essays, of which only the first was in fact prepared for publication by its author, supplemented by the texts of several formal, university lectures.

In view of its varied origin, it is not surprising that the book is of rather unequal value. The work itself is divided into three parts, the first of which contains a polished, if overly brief, presentation of the relation between the positions of Lukács and Heidegger. The second part, which is further subdivided into five short chapters, is composed of lectures given during the

1967–8 academic year. The discussion here is partly complementary to that in the initial part and partly concerns related themes, which occasionally cast additional light on the main topic. Included under this category are Chapter 3, which discusses the manner in which the early Lukács was closer to Luxemburg than to Korsch, Chapter 4 which deals variously with Derrida's view of subjectivity and the genetic approach, and the criticisms in Chapter 5 of structuralism as a form of ideology and of the later development of Adorno's thought. Finally, the third part, which was not included in the French original, is the text of an article in which Goldmann sketches briefly his own, obviously derivative, conception of ontology. The introduction to the French edition, which was not helpful, has been omitted, and a useful glossary of important terms has been prepared by the translator. Since these portions of the work, alluded to above, are incidental to the central point, concerning Lukács' alleged influence on Heidegger, they will not be further discussed here.

Goldmann's thesis, that Heidegger's position is in part a reaction to that of Lukács, may well appear implausible without prior reflexion. Heidegger never mentions Lukács by name, either in *Being and Time* or, according to Feick, in later writings. Further Lukács and Heidegger are alike in the respect that each tends, although this is more often the case for Heidegger than for Lukács, to conceal the proximate origins of his thought. Lukács, who is profoundly dependent on the German philosophical tradition, especially the form of neo-Kantianism prevalent at Heidelberg prior to the first World War, turns against so-called bourgeois philosophy, and thereby tends to obscure its input into his own position, even as he turns towards Marxism. Heidegger, who is not less dependent on the German tradition, although less on neo-Kantianism than on Kant, Schelling, Dilthey, and, to be sure, Kierkegaard, does his best to hide this relation through his appeal to the importance of the pre-Socratic philosophers.

Nevertheless, it is clear that both are basically German philosophers, and this despite Lukács' Hungarian origin. As such, they belong to the tradition stretching through time, from Leibniz, over Kant and Hegel, to Marx and various forms of neo-Kantianism, and on to Husserlian phenomenology. But the exact relation is not, however, at all obvious. How can two such different thinkers, whose respective views led them in opposing political directions – on the one hand to Stalinism and on the other to Hitler – be reconciled at all?

Even on a generous reading, Goldmann's response is poorly formulated. In fact, he offers two answers in the space of several pages, each of which is at least partially and perhaps wholly irreconcilable with the other. On the one hand he asserts that phenomenology arose, and from it existentialism emerged; and further asserts that both gave rise to dialectical Marxism. This manner of putting the relation, which would make Lukács' thought dependent on that of both Husserl and Heidegger – which at least for his early writings is clearly impossible, as concerns Heidegger, for strictly chronological reasons – is also contrary to the sense of Goldmann's discussion. On the other hand, he puts forth the controversial opinion, in the context of the book 'correctly' stated, that Lukács' thought is at the origin of contemporary dialectical materialism. This is either a platitude if the contemporary period is held to date from his own thought, or an implicit but well-taken indication of his position's significance in terms of the evolution of modern Marxism. In addition, he couples this claim with the further suggestion that it is Lukács who provided the intellectual impulse for Heidegger's creation of 'existentialism', a designation which, one can note in passing, the latter has always refused for his own position.

Goldmann's evidence for the latter, controversial claim is developed on both the philological and conceptual planes. Reification (*Verdinglichung*) is a term utilized by Lukács in *History and Class Consciousness* to designate phenomena of alienation and objectification, which he, in ignorance of Marx's as yet unpublished text, does not distinguish at this time. Goldmann bases the philological dimension of his argument on two passages in *Being and Time*, where the word 'reification' occurs. These passages, he suggests, refer to Lukács, despite the fact that he is not directly named. Left unclear is why another passage (para. 80) in which this word occurs is not also taken into account.

In para. 10, meant to differentiate his own view from others, Heidegger distinguishes as perspectives he rejects those of Scheler and personalism, as well as Dilthey and *Lebensphilosophie*, and further rejects any concept of subjectivity which, if not grounded in his own concept of fundamental ontology, must result in a 'reification of consciousness'. Again, in the final paragraph of the book, in fact on the last page, Heidegger returns to the problem of reification, and poses a series of questions relative to its occurrence, predominance, and conceptual adequacy. It can be seen that the concept of reification, central to Lukács' position in *History and Class Consciousness*,

resurfaces in Heidegger's book at the point in which he is evidently attempting both to differentiate his own position from others as well as to indicate perspectives for further development, presumably in the never published second volume of *Being and Time*. For these reasons, Goldmann draws the inference that the Lukácsian concept of reification plays a central role in Heidegger's thought, even if the latter clearly rejects certain aspects of its original formulation.

This philological approach is further supplemented by a conceptual analysis, in which Goldmann calls attention to significant similarities which subtend the obvious differences in the two positions. Both philosophers, for instance, reject the traditional subject-object distinction even as they reject traditional philosophy and science. But whereas Lukács argues that philosophy and science in their ordinary mode fail to come to grips with, and in fact function as an intellectual justification for, the social status quo, Heidegger maintains that fundamental ontology is independent of, because prior to, such more usual conceptual activities. A further consequence of the rejection of the traditional subject/object distinction is the conception of the subject as immanent and hence literally inseparable from its surroundings. The difference here is that Lukács is in the first instance concerned with a plural subject, above all with the proletarian class, while Heidegger is interested only in the individual. This difference is further reflected on the political plane in the former's turn towards Stalinism as the only avenue at present open to the liberation of the class, which could thus attain authenticity. For Heidegger, on the contrary, social authenticity was sought in national socialism on the level of the exceptional individual. Finally, both Lukács and Heidegger reject passivity in favor of an active view of life. Here there is an analogy between the Marxist view of praxis as opposed to theory, and Heidegger's emphasis on *Zuhandenheit* as distinguished from *Vorhandenheit*.

In view of its brevity and unfinished state, this little book cannot be considered as a definitive analysis. Nevertheless, it is helpful in revealing one of the probable strands of the genesis of Heidegger's position as in part a reaction against the Lukácsian form of Marxism. Indeed, it would be implausible that someone like Heidegger, who read widely in the tradition, would not have been aware of and thus to some extent influenced by Marxism in general, especially as formulated by Lukács. For at the time that Heidegger was writings *Being and Time*, Lukács was already well known in German philosophical circles. By the same token, the early awareness of and partial agreement with

certain Marxian ideas helps explain the occurrence of other, later passages in Heidegger's writings, such as in the *Letter on Humanism*, where cautious praise is offered to Marx as one who thought on an historical plane.

This work is helpful in another sense. The 'school' approach has unfortunately again become dominant in contemporary philosophy. Analysts talk mainly, if not only, with others of the same stripe, and phenomenologists reject out of hand different ways of doing philosophy. But each of the several schools is concerned with the same external world, which it seeks to know through the medium of thought. One of the most powerful ways to measure the relative success of rival views is through comparing and contrasting their respective capacities to come to grips with the world as given in experience. Although Goldmann does not actually accomplish the task, by bringing into conceptual proximity two such apparently unrelated philosophers, each representative of a major strand of contemporary thought, he at least points in this direction.

But comparative analysis of two or more positions requires as its prerequisite a conceptual precision which, it must be said, this study honors mainly in the breach. Although it is correct that for different reasons Lukács and Heidegger reject the subject/object dichotomy of modern philosophy, the genesis of this similarity is more probably to be found in Hegel's criticisms of Kant and Descartes than in the relation of either philosopher to Husserlian phenomenology. Again, it would seem that the Heideggerian concept of *Zuhandenheit* is more closely related to various forms of instrumentalism, for instance in Dewey's philosophy, than it is to the Marxist concept of praxis. Further, it seems implausible to construe Heidegger's view of Being as the counterpart to the Lukácsian concept of a dialectically articulated totality, since Heidegger himself continually calls attention to the Parmenidean concept of being as opposed to nothing. Thus although this study is interesting, informative, and partially plausible, much, indeed the lion's share, remains to be done.

Andrew Arato and Paul Breines, *The Young Lukács and the Origins of Western Marxism*, NY, Seabury Press, 1970, xiii + 256 pp.

Although various forms of political orthodoxy have preferred Engels or Lenin, or as the case may be Luxemburg or Trotsky, there is little doubt that Georg

Lukács is the outstanding Marxist philosopher in the tradition which claims allegiance to Karl Marx, and one of the outstanding intellectual figures of this century. But for reasons connected with the political history of our time – including the victory of Bolshevism and his own, altogether too flexible espousal of numerous, different, and often incompatible versions of the Bolshevik party line, which has recently been characterized as a betrayal of reason itself – even in the controversy immediately surrounding the publication of *History and Class Consciousness*, Lukács' thought has never received the attention it merits. This is the case both in academic philosophical circles, where his name is virtually unknown, as well as within Marxist circles where, prior to the republication of his classic study of proletarian class consciousness in French translation his works had been virtually unobtainable and certainly little discussed.

Nevertheless, one should not infer that the field of Lukács scholarship is entirely barren. Since the reappearance of Lukács' early study, and especially following his death, a series of books devoted to aspects of his thought has appeared. In the period following publication of the brief, but informative study by George Lichtheim, others since published include discussions by Parkinson, Matassi, Vacca, and Rosshoff, each of which, often in ignorance of other available material, contributes, from one or another perspective, to the now growing concern to understand and evaluate the nature of Lukács' contribution to Marxism within the context of his time.

The present study can fairly be characterized as a form of Marxist intellectual history, whose recent predecessors include works by Jay, Poster, and Anderson, and, on a wholly different level, by Kołakowski. The authors, who are both associated with the journal *Telos*, seek here to perform a double task centered around Lukács' flawed masterpiece, *History and Class Consciousness*. They study it both for itself within the context of Lukács' intellectual corpus, and as the text which allegedly gave rise to a peculiarly 'western Marxism', in the sense in which this term has been employed by Merleau-Ponty, as opposed to Marxism–Leninism. Their study is divided into three parts, which concern respectively the intellectual itinerary by which Lukács arrived at Marxism and composed this book, the nature of the book's contribution, and its reception in the decade immediately following its publication.

The initial part of the book, entitled Lukács' 'Road to Marx', is evidently meant to broaden and deepen his own schematic account in the essay, *Mein Weg zu Marx*. This phase of the discussion, which consumes seven of the

book's eleven chapters, is interesting and rich in detail. But it is never made clear to what, if any, extent the authors have had direct access to Lukács' Hungarian corpus. In this respect, at least, the present account necessarily falls short of Matassi's study, which is solidly based on research in the Budapest archives. The book is also highly derivative, depending heavily on members of the Budapest School, most of whom are now in exile, for the analysis of one or another text; and it is strangely naive or incomplete at points in the discussion. Indeed, the failure to state the obvious prior to inquiry into the more recondite sides of Lukács' life and work is one of the problems of this volume which, for this reason, often seems strangely unbalanced. For example, it seems odd to insist, as the authors do at several points, that Thomas Mann was highly impressed by Lukács' intelligence if it is not also mentioned, a fact which is widely known, that the latter's unpleasant and dogmatic personality led the same writer to satirize Lukács in recognizable fashion in *Magic Mountain*.

This problem of detail, and others of similar nature, should not be allowed to hide the relative success with which the authors succeed in sketching Lukács' rich intellectual, pre-Marxist background, so necessary to the comprehension of his later, Marxist thought. Attention, for instance, is called to the relation of Lukács to Szabo and Ady, and to his membership, in Heidelberg, in an informal circle clustered around Max Weber. But not enough is said, in my opinion, of the fascination of the young Lukács, at this point, for the thought of Emil Lask, as revealed in his obituary of this gifted philosopher. We further learn of Lukács' early interest in Dostoevsky and Fichte. The latter concern, indeed, cannot be too heavily emphasized, since it is one of the intellectual keys to Lukács' later, Marxist reading of German philosophy. But it serves no purpose to point out, as is done here, that early on Lukács held Fichte's thought to be at the root of both Stirner's and Marx's philosophies, if it is not also noted that he later rejected that claim as regards Marx.

There are other problems which relate more to wider comprehension than to a grasp of relevant detail. Despite the appeal of Marxism for many intellectuals then and now, one of the difficulties which must be confronted by any serious student of Lukács is the explanation of why, in precise terms, this gifted intellectual, born to a life of relative ease in a semi-noble family, later turned towards a dogmatic form of Marxism. This problem can be separated into two parts, of which the first concerns Lukács' adoption of Marxism, and the second relates to his specific interest in its dogmatic form.

It would seem that the authors have relatively greater success with the second part of this problem, although neither phase of their response is entirely convincing.

With respect to the initial phase of the problem, one strategy, employed for instance by Mészáros in his own study of Marx, is to view the pre-Marxist and Marxist stages of Lukács' career as relatively continuous moments, both of which express a similar, underlying concern. In analogous fashion, the authors of this book suggest that Lukács' unexpected decision to become a member of the Hungarian Communist Party, a surprise even to his closest associates, was motivated by three reasons: his radical critique of capitalist alienation, his Fichtean-inspired desire for action, and his quasi-Kierkegaardian concept of the leap (of faith).

If we prescind for a moment from the question of Lukács' concern to act, which seems plausible, the other two reasons advanced to explain the transition to Communism seem less convincing. It is implausible to regard his early writings, particularly *The Soul and the Forms*, as a critique of capitalism since in essence this is to presume that Lukács did not, in fact, later deduce a version of Marx's concept of alienation from study of *Capital*, beginning from the concept of the fetishism of commodities, as the authors also assert. Rather, he would already have had the concept, with which he had always operated, and only later rediscovered a similar view in Marx's thought. Now this seems most unlikely, rather like Pascal's alleged rediscovery of Euclid's axioms in the same order as they had originally been found. By the same token, to explain something by a 'leap' in the Kierkegaardian sense, which Kierkegaard himself regarded as an extra-rational occurrence, is tantamount to not explaining it at all.

The account of the dogmatic form of Lukács' Marxism is more nearly convincing. According to the authors of this book, the 'Bolshevization' of his thinking was the result of his understanding that in the conditions which prevailed after the fall of the Hungarian Republic it would have been utopian to desire any alternative to the Leninist conception of the Party, since in fact none was objectively possible. If this is a correct explanation, which seems plausible, since we need only attribute a form of political realism to Lukács which, according to Lenin, was always lacking in all of his opponents, then Lukács' later, intellectually disgraceful, repeated instances of political self-criticism may well be explicable in a similar manner. In this case they would be due less to a case of *force majeure*, a reason that has often been invoked,

than to a conviction, so well expressed by Trotsky, that one cannot be right against the Party.

Both the second and third parts of the book, concerning the discussion of *History and Class Consciousness* and an account of its reception, topics which are treated in two chapters each, are somewhat less satisfactory than the initial phase of the study. The discussion in the latter parts is detailed, but all too often proceeds on a conceptual plane that is insufficiently deep to yield a satisfactory analysis, although important details are also lacking.

The supposedly critical discussion of *History and Class Consciousness*, which focusses mainly on the central essay in that work, is in part interesting, but overly derivative and surprisingly incomplete. The authors helpfully call attention to Lukács' attempt, at the time the book was written, to navigate in the difficult conceptual straits separating the positions of Lenin and Luxemburg. The authors are further helpful in noting the similarity on numerous points between the positions of Bukharin and Lukács, despite the latter's later criticism of this fallen Bolshevik angel. But it should be observed that it was above all Lukács' partial infidelity to Lenin, rather than the supposed fact that his thought at that time pointed beyond Marxism, a reason adduced by the authors, which was responsible for the book's difficult reception.

Despite the interest of this aspect of the discussion, certain flaws should be mentioned. A number of problems, although not all of them by any means, are attributable to an uncritical acceptance of Merleau-Ponty's overly simplistic reading of Lukács' position at this point as an attempted synthesis of Weber and Marx. Lukács, to be sure, does rely heavily in this work on the Weberian view of formal rationality. But the concept of philosophical rationality with which he operates is neither derived from Weber, nor is it a standard Marxist concept. It comes rather from Emil Lask's form of neo-Kantianism, whose relation to Lukács' thought has been usefully explored in the literature, notably by Rosshoff. Although Lukács' account of the supposed antinomies of bourgeois thought is perhaps the first, indeed still the only serious, Marxist account of philosophy, it is further circular since he employs Marx to analyze the tradition and the tradition to study Marx. Further, his critique of Kant's ethics is too standard to be called 'powerful'. And although his concept of proletarian liberation is indeed voluntaristic, it is also circular since, as Lukács freely concedes, the proletariat must be free to become free. Finally, most surprisingly, no mention is made of Lukács'

celebrated inference of the concept of alienation in ignorance of the *Paris Manuscripts*, nor of the equally celebrated conflation of objectification and alienation; and almost no attention is devoted to his important discussion of the concept of totality, which is a central theme in his writings, and has continued to interest later Marxists, especially Kosík.

The study of the reception of Lukács' ground-breaking book is similarly incomplete. There is a brief, but interesting *aperçu* of the European cultural situation in 1923, and there is an adequate summary of the debate immediately following the publication of this work. But although, from the Bolshevik perspective, Deborin and Bukharin are mentioned, Mitin, who played an equally important role, is not. There is a rapid account of Korsch's position in relation to Lukács', but the authors seem unaware of Vacca's contribution to this topic. Again, there are additional references to Mannheim and to Heidgger which, in the latter case, serve no other purpose than to call attention to Goldmann's own, problematic contribution to this question.

Unfortunately, the restriction of the limits of this phase of the discussion to the decade immediately following the publication of Lukács' book makes it difficult to perceive the nature of its considerable influence on later Marxists. Indeed, it could fairly be said that with the exception of Marx, and including Lenin, Lukács has exerted by far the strongest influence on the theoretical discussion over the last half-century, as may be seen at present with respect to such diverse figures as Sartre, Habermas, and Kołakowski. But even granting this point, which is nowhere either established or even argued for in the present volume, it does not follow that there are grounds to regard Lukács as the founder of a specifically Western form of Marxism, except in the indirect sense that his study of alienation later directed others back to Marx's early writings. For although he criticized Engels' position, upon which Soviet Marxism is ultimately and mainly based, as mediated through Lenin's thought, he nevertheless uncritically accepted other main premisses of the Engelsian view, such as the claim that there is a difference, not in degree, but in kind between bourgeois philosophy and Marxist science, or the further claim that the latter is adequate to resolve all contemporary problems. Indeed, it is because there is finally no fundamental difference, despite Lukács' legitimate criticism of Engels, between their respective views of Marxism, that it was so easy for Lukács to rally to the Bolshevik flag. I conclude, therefore, that although the present book is interesting, informative, and on occasion casts new light on Lukács, especially with respect to

the intellectual itinerary which preceded and led up to his Marxist conversion, numerous gaps in the account, both as regards detail and conceptual analysis, remain to be filled in.

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