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Book Review

Johanna Maria Tito, *Logic in the Husserlian Context*. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1990. 291 pages.

In his *Conversations with Husserl and Fink* Dorion Cairns recalls asking if it were impossible for the body to have a reflexive perception of itself (e.g., one hand touching the other) would there then be the possibility for the constitution of a world, or, for that matter, of a body? "If, for example, our only sense was an eye, would we have any sort of world? [Husserl] answered no."[1] Husserl's answer to Cairn's question is revealing in that it serves to correct a persistent misinterpretation of his philosophical project; i.e., that the innocence of the phenomenological eye – what in *Ideas*, Book I, is introduced as "the principle of all principles" – can be guaranteed only by securing a "pure thought" as its basis. However, as Husserl's reply to Cairns suggests, the presumed privilege accorded to "pure" vision – which since Plato has been, together with light, the metaphor *par excellence* for pure intellection – and the resulting elevation of the theoretical over the practical (together with the denigration of the empirical and the mundane) is faithful neither to Husserl's guiding philosophical motives nor to the substantive results of his extensive phenomenological investigations which led him to recognize the principal roles embodiment and kinaesthesia play in the constitution of Objectivity. Nevertheless, and despite the fact that a careful reading of his texts makes such an interpretation highly questionable, Husserl continues to be viewed by many as championing an eviscerated rationalism which, perpetuating the fateful divorce between reason and life, aspires to nothing less than the philosophical recuperation of the totality of being within the purity of the idea. To be sure there are many tendencies within Husserl's phenomenological project which could lead a less than careful reader to such a view. Not the least among them is Husserl's life-long interest in the foundations of the formal sciences and, in particular, logic as the "theory of science." Indeed, as early as 1903 Husserl was moved to respond publicly to critics who saw in his *Logical Investigations* nothing but a sterile platonic formalism.[2] After all, what could be further removed from the concerns of concrete worldly existence than the abstract categories of formal logic? In the recently published *Logic in the Husserlian Context*, Johanna Maria Tito shows convincingly, however, that it is precisely here, in his logical researches, that Husserl first discerns the themes that would lead ultimately to the development of a historical-teleological reflection and the grounding of the "world of science" in the *Lebenswelt*. The singular merit of this work is, then, that it confronts this intellectualist misrepresentation squarely, showing that Husserl's philosophical project is animated from the beginning by deeply practical – if not qualifiedly existential – motives and that, contrary to those who see in the later Husserl's "discovery" of history a turning away from his earlier logical interests, the unfolding elaboration of the life-world problematic cannot be properly understood apart from the context of his deepening reflections on logic. Stated briefly, and in her own words, the work "concerns itself with

reconciling Husserl's description of phenomenology as a rationality, as a purely formal, apodictic science, with his description of phenomenology as a science that understands itself through the *life-world* and as a science that deals with *life*" (p. 242). Thus, despite the misleadingly narrow focus of her title Tito has undertaken nothing less than an accommodation of the *eidetic* and the *practical* within transcendental phenomenology. If successful her efforts will go a great way toward furnishing phenomenology with both the credentials and the methodology needed to address problems of a practical nature. Broadly speaking, then, the focus of the work may be stated in terms of the following question: because phenomenology is first and foremost a philosophy of reflection directed toward immanent mental processes, acts, and their objective intentional correlates independent of all extrinsic relation to the world, is it possible to extend the sense and reach of the phenomenological method beyond its purely descriptive-analytic employment to address the normative, and so practical, questions which pertain to the concrete life of the human world? Since its first formulation in the early decades of this century in Husserl's logical and psychological studies phenomenology has proved itself to be a powerful and productive tool for the analysis of human experience. It is not at all clear, however, to what extent Husserl's descriptive insights into the constitution of the various orders of sense (including the intersubjective human world) provide a foundation for practically prescriptive judgments. In fairness it should be noted that the author does not set out to answer this question, at least as I have just phrased it. Nevertheless, given her own characterization of the work as a reconciliation of phenomenology's self-understanding as at once, substantively and methodologically, both a purely formal, apodictic science and a science of life together with her contention that "in its very being ... the ego embraces an ethics" (p. 245) it is not an injustice to read the present work with this question in mind. Obviously, given the compass of this problematic it clearly would be impossible in the space of a review alone to consider in detail the work as a whole. For this reason a summary sketch must make do both to suggest the range and interpretive contours of Tito's analysis and to prepare a context for a few critical observations which will serve as a concluding assessment.

Tito's account of Husserl's phenomenological conception of logic ambitiously traces a path across the entirety of his philosophical production, from the *Philosophy of Arithmetic* (1891) to the *Crisis* (1936), pausing to consider along the way not only the critical appraisals of the familiar secondary literature (de Muralt, Bachelard, Føllesdal, etc.) but Husserl's relation to his predecessors and contemporaries, from Kant to Frege and Freud. This is at once a strength and weakness of the work. For although the reader's appreciation of Husserl's phenomenology cannot help but be enriched by the historical-critical setting Tito provides, in the end it risks obscuring the development of the principal argument in tangential excursions which, in many cases, demand a much more extensively critical treatment than they receive. Briefly, then, and such secondary considerations aside, the work as a whole can be read as a progressive movement from the consideration of explicitly logical themes, through the analysis of the theory of the transcendental ego, to the intersubjective world of life, practical values, and action. Thus, in her "Introduction" Tito elaborates

broadly Husserl's phenomenological conception of logic in terms of its relation to the problematics of reason, life, and history. The discussion quickly turns on recognizing the connection between, on the one hand, the crisis of reason viewed as a crisis of value and, on the other, the development of transcendental logic as correcting traditional logic's failure to become a true "theory of science." Tito's account, then, follows Husserl's own by reading the crisis of humanity back to the historical alienation of logic from its true sense and foundation in "life." Husserl's view, then, is that "reason allows for no differentiation into 'theoretical,' 'practical,' 'aesthetic,'" and, indeed, more generally, that "being human is teleological being and an ought-to-be, and that this teleology holds sway in each and every activity and project of the ego" (*Crisis*, Appendix IV). Addressing humanity in the name of an "ought-to-be" Husserl leaves no doubt that both the understanding and the will are implicated in the crisis. In brief, Tito maintains that the crisis of humanity – the loss of science's and reason's significance for life within the prevailing objectivism which results from the historical identification of reason with a Galilean-Newtonian conception of science – is, at bottom, a crisis of values and so demands a reconsideration of the nature of science; i.e., properly conceived science intrinsically has questions of value at its center. On this point Husserl, who as a rule passes over his philosophical predecessors in silence, regularly invokes Plato for whom science first emerges in the attempt to establish in the face of sophistic challenges the possibility of identifying *moral* knowledge and rational standards which could guide a human life.[3] Because its ultimate first principles are descriptions of the Good, logic, as the "theory of science," is not yet alienated from the concerns of a morally responsible human existence. Thus, the historical task which confronts modernity is a matter of restoring the original idea and sense of science through a recovery of logic's original motives. It is for this reason that Husserl can characterize his phenomenological project in the *Crisis* as "the reestablishment of philosophy with a new universal task and at the same time with the sense of a renaissance of ancient philosophy – it is at once a repetition and a universal transformation of meaning" (*Crisis*, sec. 5).

In Chapters One and Two, closely following Husserl's own analysis as it is presented in *Formal and Transcendental Logic*, Tito shows that insofar as traditional formal logic implicitly presupposes experience and the world it fails to attain its self-announced ideal of purity; i.e., that the formal theory of the judgment presented by traditional logic must be supplemented by a theory of experience. She then goes on to explain how transcendental logic penetrates the foundations of traditional logic by situating it in the world-constituting activity of the transcendental ego thereby supplying the purity to which traditional formal logic only aims. Although in both these chapters the author adds little which is new to our understanding of this central text – it will never replace Suzanne Bachelard's study[4] for its critical acuity – her exposition of Husserl's argument in *Formal and Transcendental Logic* is, nevertheless, a model of clarity and for this reason alone should be recommended. Particularly lucid are her discussions of the intentionality of experience, the relation of evidence to objectification, the phenomenon of attention, the idea of a *mathesis universalis*, and the dependency of judgment sense upon a certain material lawfulness and ultimately the world.

Thus, the work opens, appropriately enough, with a systematic exposition of the considerations which lead Husserl to ground traditional formal logic in the constitutive achievements of the transcendental ego. The following chapters are less exercises in straight-forward exposition or text-analysis than attempts to reveal fully what it means to say that this pure transcendental ego "which grounds logic is also the center of *life*" and that, unlike Kant, Husserl achieves a true transcendentalism precisely because life is taken into account (p. 242). In fine, Tito's argument is that Husserl's conception of the transcendental ego as *lived* not only distinguishes his transcendentalism from Kant's by overcoming the naive objectivism of the natural-scientific world view which remains implicit in the latter's critical philosophy but suggests a solution to the problem of transcendental solipsism which eludes Husserl in the "Fifth Cartesian Meditation." As this brief sketch indicates, the proposed reconciliation of the eidetic and the practical within transcendental phenomenology is mediated, according to Tito's reading, by Husserl's egology and the possibility of successfully accommodating the phenomenon of the alter-ego and, by extension, the intersubjectively constituted world of life which speaks to the will as much as the understanding. Because the transcendental ego emerges as the key to Tito's reconstruction of Husserl I will limit my critical observations to certain features of this account as well as her proposed solution to the problem the constitution of the other poses to Husserlian phenomenology.

The discussion of the ego as the transcendental guarantor of logic and so science is circumscribed by two related concerns; first, "since the transcendental ego is a center of experience, logic will involve not only a theory of experience but will also involve a theory of life, since it is always a living subject who experiences" (p. 85) and, second, since, as the early chapters have shown, the judgment is not the deepest level of logic or phenomenology, working out a phenomenologically clarified theory of life need neither threaten the purity of the ego by an illicit importation of the factual into the apriori nor result in a logico-epistemological psychologism which resolves the ideality of the logical judgment into the relativities of subjective experience. What is novel about the analysis is Tito's suggestion that one can safely navigate the shoals of logic and life without succumbing to the twin dangers of logicism and psychologism by locating the question of the transcendental ego as the common ground of both logic and life within the setting of the Husserlian distinction between "fact" and "essence." Thus, in the Fourth and central chapter, "The Pure transcendental Ego, Ground of Logic and Life: Where Psychology and Phenomenology Meet," Tito argues that the resolution of the apparently incommensurable descriptions of phenomenology as both a formal, apodictic science and a science that understands itself through life, rests on a proper understanding of the relation which obtains between the "concrete transcendental ego" on the one hand, and the "pure *eidos* transcendental ego" on the other. On the surface, this approach to the question of logic's relation to experience and life appears promising insofar as the "*eidos* ego – transcendental ego" problematic has at its center questions pertaining to the relation which obtains between the sphere of eidetic necessities and the ego's transcendental life in its manifold concrete and worldly strivings. Unfortunately, the ensuing analysis fails to fulfill all it promises.

Tito begins by observing that for Husserl "fact and *eidos* are *one* in the living body (*Leib*), and [that] ... the living body ... is the concrete ego" (p. 90). However, the author immediately qualifies this by further distinguishing the concrete ego from the *absolute* ego: "although the living body is the concrete transcendental ego, it is not the *absolute* transcendental ego. The living body is what Husserl calls the *concrete* transcendental ego, and it is a 'fact' related to an *eidos*" (p. 92). Difficulties arise, however, when from the fact that the ego can be viewed both in its concrete singularity and as an instance of its corresponding idea, Tito asserts that the individual stream of experience or life is not only a factual instance of the *eidos* transcendental ego but "is in fact *constituted by the latter*" (ibid., emphasis added). Stated yet differently, and paraphrasing the *Crisis*, Tito writes that "the concrete transcendental ego, the living human being, which is an instance of the essence 'humankind,' is a self-objectification of the *eidos* transcendental ego" (pp. 93–94).

Two questions immediately suggest themselves: First, is this account faithful to Husserl's own stated views – or, at the very least, his philosophical intentions – regarding the nature of the relation which holds between the "transcendental ego" and the "*eidos* ego"? Second, and far more interesting, apart from whether or not her account can be textually defended, can it be philosophically defended? With respect to the question of textual fidelity Tito supports her reading with references to both the *Cartesian Meditations* and the *Crisis*. In many instances, however, the passages cited do not carry the sense attributed to them; e.g., the contention that the "concrete transcendental ego" is a self-objectification of the "*eidos* transcendental ego" is not simply an arguable interpretation of Husserl's position but a questionable reading of the text. The original passage reads: "each human being 'bears within himself a transcendental I' – not as a real part or a stratum of his soul (which would be absurd) but rather insofar as he is the self-objectification, as exhibited through phenomenological self-reflection, of the corresponding 'transcendental I'" (*Crisis*, sec. 54). As its context makes clear, Husserl's point is that the worldly, mundane ego of the human being is not a chance amalgam of purely empirical factors but is on a more deeper level a center of transcendental functions which not only unifies that life as a transcendental achievement in the world but invests it with its distinctively rational character. The object of the passage, then, is not the relation of the "*eidos* ego" to the "transcendental ego" but the relation of the living human ego in its absolute and concrete singularity *to itself*, albeit an aspect of itself routinely hidden from view. Likewise, in Sections 34 and 36 of the *Meditations* Husserl does not speak of the constitutive power of the *eidos* ego but rather is preoccupied with fixing the limits of a purely eidetic phenomenological accounting of the ego whereby "the *de facto* transcendental ego and particular data given in transcendental experience of the ego have the significance merely of examples of pure possibilities" (*CM*, sec. 34) such that "in a phenomenology developed as an intuitively apriori science *purely according to the eidetic method*, all its eidetic researches are nothing else but *uncoverings of the all-embracing eidos, transcendental ego as such*" (*CM*, sec. 36). What these, as well as other passages the author cites, address is the extension of Husserl's eidetic method (*Wesensschau*) – the apprehension of the invariant through the

process of free variation in fantasy – to the lived ego and by which an *eidos* ego is phenomenologically elicited and apprehended in its apriori universality. In other words, it is not a matter of relating two distinct egos as though the order of the real and the ideal were extrinsically correlated but rather it is a question of *altering the attitude* by which the fact, in this case the lived-ego, is viewed in terms of its ideal form and so now shows itself under the aspect of ideality. Thus, from the perspective of a purely eidetic accounting, my *de facto* ego is one possible instance of the *eidos* ego. To suggest, however, that the former is "in fact constituted" by the latter is not only to obscure what Husserl means by "constitution" but is to seriously misconstrue the nature of the ideal in its relation to the real. According to Tito's reading, the *eidos* ego emerges as a center of self-objectifying and constitutive powers which, in its relation to the concrete ego, suggest at times a kind of Plotinian emanation of the *aisthetos* from the *noetos* such that the order of the real is a necessary hypostatization of the ideal. Tito seems to be suggesting that from the fact that, insofar as it allows any object to be thought or thinkable, the *eidos* is a condition of intelligibility and, further, since for anything to be (in the phenomenologically qualified sense of "being-for-consciousness") it must be thinkable, the *eidos* functions as an *explanatory* principle of ontic facticity which somehow intervenes "materially" in the *de facto* "constitution" of the lived empirical order. The infinity of forms, of apriori types of actualities and potentialities of life which the eidetic form "universal apriori pertaining to a transcendental ego" contains is not to be taken metaphysically, however, such that the real is the exfoliation of the ideal but as circumscribing the lawful contours of the idea.

What is particularly surprising is that this interpretation is clearly unnecessary for, as Tito recognizes elsewhere, the transcendental correlation of logic and world is possible precisely because experience itself is intentional and exhibits a rationality or logic of its own; that is, it conforms to apriori conditions of possible sense in general. One might be tempted to overlook all of this and concede that Tito is guilty of nothing more than an unfelicitous or unintentionally misleading formulation – as Husserl himself often is. However, her proposed reconstruction is not made any clearer by the further suggestion that understanding the relation between the "pure *eidos* transcendental ego" and the "concrete transcendental ego," taken as a self-objectification of the former which alone is "absolute and pure subjectivity," requires "appreciating the way in which Husserl conceives the relation between objectivity and subjectivity *in general*" (p. 94); i.e., according to which both subject and object mutually imply one another as correlational. In the end, Tito's point seems to be that insofar as Husserl characterizes the "*eidos* transcendental ego" as absolute *subjectivity*, it demands a corresponding *objectivity*, the "concrete transcendental ego." This would mean that the essence-fact relation, and in particular the "*eidos* ego – concrete transcendental ego" relation, is to be viewed as an instance of the subject-object relation, which in fact is what Tito claims (p. 95). This amounts to nothing less than taking the "*eidos* of pure subjectivity" to be itself a true subject, indeed a subject in the same manner that the concrete ego is a subject, once again attributing to the *idea* transcendental powers, acts, and accomplishments. This confusion is further exacerbated by the

failure to recognize that Husserl's use of "absolute" ("absolute ego," "absolute subjectivity," "absolute consciousness," etc.) not only departs significantly from its customary sense within the tradition but is not univocal *within* his own phenomenology.[5] Thus, there are occasions when Tito fails to appreciate that by "absolute" Husserl variously means that which is eidetically necessary, that which is absolutely given – referring to modes of givenness and evidence – or that which is irreducible and underivable; for example, my *de facto* stream of mental life with its particular contents cannot be derived in its facticity from anything else. No principle or deduction can explain the sheer event of my being as consciousness. The absolute status accorded to the *eidos* ego refers, then, to its position in the order of ideas and excludes any metaphysical determinations.

This account of the ego is developed further with the introduction of the problem of other selves which is central to Tito's reconstruction in that it puts to the test the claim that phenomenology can account for the phenomena of life. In chapter Six, "The Problem of the Other: A Resolution of Solipsism," borrowing heavily from her discussion of the ego in the context of the "fact-essence" distinction presented in chapter Four, Tito argues that the key to the problem of the recognition of the other is to be found in the pure *eidos* ego. Solving the problem of the alter-ego requires, then, and contrary to Merleau-Ponty, more than the notion of embodied consciousness (what in chapter Four is the "concrete transcendental ego"): "it requires a *conceptual element* that is truly *universal*. As long as we start with the particular individual self and try to derive the universal, other selves from it through analogical reasoning ... we remain committed to solipsism. To know other selves I must have a universal of self, of livedness, for without a universal I would not recognize others. Hence, for there to be others for me, I must, in my livedness, be at once particular and universal" (p. 189 emphasis added); i.e., both *fact* and *eidos*. Tito's line of reasoning is that just as the perception of any individual, worldly thing involves perceiving it as a *type*, placing it under a universal even if the latter has not been made explicit, the perception of the other-ego must be an act of subsuming the other under the idea of its type, the *eidos*-ego. To be sure as in the perception of any mundane objectivity this is not an active process or inference but a matter of an immediate, passive association. "It is this type of process that is involved in recognizing an alter-ego according to Husserl. From my own being I have a tacit sense of universal ego, on the basis of which I can associate ... to others" (p. 193). In short, the *eidos* ego, which is apprehended through an eidetic phenomenological accounting of the concrete transcendental ego, both reveals the latter as one possibility of an infinity of potential forms of life and provides the universal through which the actual other is recognized as an instance of the same type as myself. Although there are features of this account which do reflect aspects of Husserl's own or, at least, recall certain directions his thinking takes in the *Crisis* and the *Cartesian Meditations*, exactly how faithful to Husserl this reading is cannot be pursued here and so, by way of conclusion, I will limit myself to two general observations: first, it is not at all clear how the infinity of apriori forms which the *eidos* ego contains acquire the sense of "forms of life of *existing alter*-egos." That is, how is it that from within the primordial sphere of the ego of *my epoché* the possibilities contained within

the *eidos* ego are not apprehended simply as my possibilities? It is true, of course, that for the practicing phenomenologist the reflection which follows the introduction of the transcendental-phenomenological *epoché* reveals the ego free of all mundane determinations and so free of the sense "my ego." Viewed in this way, the infinity of forms of possible life the "*eidos* transcendental ego" contains would not possess the sense "possibilities for me" precisely because the "me" has been placed in methodological parentheses. But this discovery of an anonymous, transcendental ego and its subsequent apprehension as an idea requires a radical disruption of the practicing phenomenologist's natural life in the form of the adoption of the transcendental-phenomenological attitude which interrogates the very ground of "naturalness." Thus, we should not lose sight of the fact that the issue here is not only how we, as reflecting philosophers already in a world of others, can retrospectively reconstruct the system of motivations and their corresponding achievements which issue in the sense "other-ego" and "world of others" but how in the spontaneous life of the concrete ego in its historical unfolding, and prior to any interest in rendering this understanding philosophically intelligible, the other is first recognized in this life. To suggest that in the genesis of the life of the concrete ego the recognition of the other is the result of an association mediated by an *idea*, a universal "conceptual element," helps little since it transforms what is *lived* into what is *thought*. As noted, the *eidos*-ego is apprehended in a reflexive act by the concrete ego upon itself and *after* the adoption of the transcendental *epoché* and so indicates the presence of a highly developed and theoretically founded interest on the part of the reflecting ego. In the life of the ego the apprehension of the *eidos*-ego is a historically late achievement. The question is, then, whether it is meaningful to speak of the *eidos*-ego as *cognitively* available for service in the life of the concrete ego prior to the constitution of the sense "alter-ego" – indeed, whether it is meaningful to speak of a self at all prior to and independent of the other-self. What would motivate a reflection the object of which is the apprehension of the idea of the ego as such? According to Tito, it could not be the givenness of the other in my field of experience since for the other as other to be given already implies the "*eidos*-ego" as the universal by which the other is typified. A more fruitful approach would be to phenomenologically discern the equiprimordial roots of self and other, but developing this line of research would clearly require more space than this review allows. For the present purpose it is enough to point out that Tito's difficulties relating the ego to the world of others reprise the difficulties she encountered in relating the concrete ego to the "*eidos*-ego" on the basis of her initial postulate that "*fact* and *eidos* are *one* ... in the concrete ego." This can be taken in either of two ways: that every concrete ego *qua* ego conforms in its being to a fixed apriori which can be eidetically apprehended or that the "*eidos*-ego" is somehow a substantive component of the ego which inheres as an active center of transcendental powers in the concrete ego and as such is readily and unproblematically accessible to the latter. As I have suggested above Tito appears to accept the latter view, confusing, in the end, the *eidos*-ego as describing the apriori conditions of possibility for any ego whatever and as the thematic object of an eidetic intuition. As an object of eidetic intuition the "*eidos*-ego" does indeed possess an ideal status such that its

independent integrity is thereafter assured and by which it can be spoken of apart from any *de facto* ego, yet it still remains an object of *reflection.* Since, as a "conceptual element," the apprehension of the latter is a theoretically motivated and so late achievement in the life of the concrete ego as well as one which clearly presupposes an already constituted experience of self and others, Tito effectively invokes what appears only subsequent to a fully developed phenomenological accounting as grounding the very possibility of that experience.

Second, and more to the point of the book as a whole, it is impossible not to ask whether this account does not undo all that Tito struggles throughout this work to achieve. That is, does it not encourage the intellectualist reading of Husserl by making the other accessible, in the end, only through the mediation of the idea? Over all, then, the work is a mixed success: whereas Tito's reading of Husserl convincingly shows that Husserl's later interest in questions pertaining to the life-world cannot be understood apart from his logical researches and that, properly understood, Husserlian phenomenology intends to address questions of the will as well as the understanding, the attempt to work out in detail the intricacies of this project raises more questions than it answers.

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Notes

1. Dorion Cairns, *Conversations With Husserl and Fink* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1976), p. 4.
2. See Husserl's "A Reply to a Critic of My Refutation of Logical Psychologism" which appeared in *Zeitschrift für Psychologie und Physiologie der Sinnesorgane* 31 (1903): 287–294. A translation by Dallas Willard is included in *Husserl. Shorter Works*, Peter McCormick and Frederick Elliston (eds.) (Notre Dame Press, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), pp. 152–158.
3. See, for example, Husserl's "Introduction" to *Formal and Transcendental Logic* and the first chapter of *Erste Philosophie.*
4. Suzanne Bachelard, *A Study of Husserl's Formal and Transcendental Logic.* Translated by Lester Embree (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1968).
5. See, for example, Rudolf Boehm, *Vom Gesichtspunkt der Phänomenologie* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1968), chapter III "Das Absolute und die Realität."

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Book Review

Quentin Smith, *The Felt Meanings of the World: A Metaphysics of Feeling*. West Lafayette, Indiana: Purdue University Press, 1986. xv + 352 pages $19.75.

Quentin Smith outlines an alternative to both the tradition of rational metaphysics which culminates in Hegel's *Encyclopedia*, and the post-Hegelian skepticism towards metaphysics which finds expression in Anglo-American and continental authors. Both metaphysical and anti-metaphysical (nihilistic) approaches rely on the assumption that "a meaning of the world can only be a rational meaning, such that if the world lacks a rational meaning, it can have no other meaning" (p. 12). The alternative offered by Smith is a "metaphysics of feeling" which proposes that rational meaning fails to adequately grasp and express the more genuinely metaphysical realm of "felt meaning." I want to distinguish Smith's global project, which involves outlining and defining his alternative metaphysics, from the detailed analyses which he develops within this general framework. I will argue here that the insightfulness of his detailed analyses fails to balance out the overwhelming problems involved with his larger project.

Smith's general project suffers from systemic problems, i.e., problems that relate to the very possibility of carrying out the project. He presents a *rational argument* against the metaphysics of reason, and he establishes and develops the metaphysics of feeling by *rational* justification. He attempts to give a rational account of how rational accounts are "degenerated" feelings, and thereby tries to show how rational metaphysics provides a false representation of things (see, e.g., pp. 93ff.). Smith not only argues rationally about the metaphysics of feeling, but within the metaphysics of feeling he uses rational argumentation to make his case (e.g., see his analysis of time and the present, pp. 152ff.). One does not need Derrida to see how this approach deconstructs itself.[1] Metaphysics is unavoidably a rational enterprise; Smith's attempt to construct a metaphysics of feeling demonstrates this in the clearest fashion. Since a metaphysics of feeling will always be embedded within a metaphysics of reason, Smith's project is undermined from the very beginning.

Smith finds himself in this circumstance because he buys into a fundamental metaphysical distinction, i.e., the distinction between reason and feeling. His critique of "the rationalist theory that feelings cannot be a source of metaphysical knowledge" (p. 14), a critique which is not based on his feelings about metaphysics, but is overtly reasonable, itself depends on the metaphysical distinction between feeling and reason. Thus, he argues, this rationalist theory "can be brought into question in the first instance through observing that it is developed from the perspective of reason, a perspective that proponents of this theory did not recognize to be a perspective but tacitly assumed to be the absolute standpoint" (pp. 17–18). Smith wants to go after the assumption that reason is the absolute standpoint, but he cannot succeed by using reason to establish and justify a completely divorced realm of feeling, as he seems to do. "If feelings are understood in

terms of themselves, from the perspective inherent in feelings themselves, they do not appear as inferior versions of reason that are in the service of the latter, but as phenomena with a positive nature of their own. They relate, not to rational meanings but to *felt meanings...*" which are "extrarational" (p. 18). At this point readers might be motivated to ask, if felt meanings are extrarational, if they "fall outside the sphere of rational evaluation altogether" (p. 18), then in what sense can they become "articulated and explicated in a body of theoretical knowledge," as Smith claims (p. 28). Would Smith not be better off arguing for an expanded sense of rationality, one that would include reason and feeling, rather than adopting a version of the very metaphysical distinction that he argues against – the exclusion of feeling from reason?

Smith's account amounts to a reversal of the privilege that metaphysics gives to reason. For example, Smith can judge the metaphysical mathematization of nature, and the epistemological primacy of primary qualities to be "misinterpretations" (rather than possible or alternative interpretations), only if he shifts metaphysical privilege to feeling and makes feeling the criterion of veracity (see pp. 83ff.).

The same systemic difficulty can be expressed in the following terms which traditionally form the standard argument against skepticism. First, Smith uses rational argumentation to justify the metaphysics of feeling. Second, Smith does not simply argue that there are both felt truths (or the "appreciative-metaphysical standard of truth") and rational truth, distinct from one another, but he argues further that the "rational standard of metaphysical truth is not a standard at all but a chimera," and that precisely this is what is "demonstrated" by nihilistic (anti-)metaphysics (p. 19). But if there is no real rational standard of truth, what is the status of Smith's rational justification of the metaphysics of feeling? What is the truth-value of his claim that the basic thesis of rational metaphysics is to be "judged" as "false" (p. 19), if it has already been "demonstrated" that the rational standard of truth and falsity amounts to a chimera? Of course Smith might want to slide into a feeling-based "appreciative-metaphysical standard of truth" in order to judge (?) the falsity of the rational thesis. But then he could not demonstrate, or judge, or justify by way of the rational argumentation that he offers.

Furthermore, it is not clear what the real criteria are for the appreciative standard of truth. If "felt truth" is, at bottom, "intuitional truth" (p. 131), what are the criteria that define veridical intuition? Smith names two: intrinsic grounds and extrinsic grounds (p. 132). Since an intrinsic ground is nothing other than a feeling (or belief) that the intuition is ("*seems to*" be) veridical, everything depends on extrinsic grounds. But what are extrinsic grounds? The source of extrinsic grounds are other feeling intuitions that would either reinforce or contradict the intrinsically grounded belief or feeling. To the extent that these other feelings validate or invalidate the feeling in question, they operate as reasons, or at least as evidence for maintaining the feeling. The veracity of a feeling seems to depend on reason, or on a consistency that would in turn be measured by reason. The appreciative standard of truth *seems to* require the rational standard of truth.

If we wanted to find our way out of these problems by attending to Smith's feeling-conceptions of adequacy, meaning, understanding, etc., we

run into similar difficulties. We might inquire whether the mode of Smith's (seemingly rational) understanding of feelings "in terms of themselves" is different from the mode of a felt understanding of meanings. Is understanding in these contexts something that falls on the side of feeling or on the side of reason? Smith contends that from the viewpoint of reason "we virtually have no *understanding* of feelings, or of how the world appears to us in our feelings. Accordingly, the prerequisite for achieving an *understanding* of the felt meanings of the world is to clear away the rationalist obstacles and prejudices that prevent us from *understanding* feelings, and to allow feelings and felt reality to put themselves into their own words and to reveal themselves as they are in themselves" (p. 29, emphasis added). What is the hermeneutics of feeling implied in such understandings? What is the epistemological status of these understandings? Smith uses terms like 'knowledge', 'truth', 'theory', 'transcendence', 'meaning', 'evidence', 'appearance', 'ego', 'self', 'world', and 'method'. These concepts have a traditional epistemological status closely tied to rational metaphysics. Can Smith hold epistemology steady as he shifts from one metaphysics to another? Smith does not address these issues, but they throw his whole project into question.

On a more general level one gets the impression that Smith is constructing a shadow metaphysics. I mean that Smith's metaphysics of feeling looks something like a mirror image of rational metaphysics. For example, he points out that "importances" (which are felt meanings) "have the same fundamental role in the metaphysics of feeling that causes and purposes have in the metaphysics of reason" (p. 20). Feeling, like reason, involves transcendence (p. 21), method (pp. 24–25), intuitive presence (p. 25), founding relations (pp. 26–27), etc. Within the metaphysics of feeling, we still end up with being (pp. 163ff.), transcendentals (pp. 168ff.), universals (p. 167), and distinctions between time and eternity (p. 160), essential and inessential (p. 43), self and world, internal and external (e.g., p. 53). Whatever structure one finds within rational metaphysics, Smith finds a corresponding, even if contrasting structure within the metaphysics of feeling (see, e.g., pp. 27–28). As Smith himself remarks, "we have so long been used to thinking in the categories of rationalist philosophies that it is extremely difficult for us to free ourselves from them ..." (p. 29). Smith's attempt to free himself from rational metaphysics may only be more evidence that it is more than just a difficult habit to break.

On a more positive note, Smith does a good job in his "descriptive explications," which resemble, in some respects, Husserlian descriptions. Most importantly he both *broadens* the field of description by focusing on many different and interesting feelings, and *deepens* the descriptive level by distinguishing numerous "internal typological determinations" of feeling (see p. 40). For example, he moves beyond the various analyses by Brentano, Scheler, Sartre, and others, by developing a metaphorics of space. He identifies feeling-flows which have a direction and manner (pp. 40ff.). A feeling can involve radiating, cringing, shrinking, sinking, plummeting, inflating, surging, or dragging down. Using other metaphors he identifies several "non-typological" characters of feeling, e.g., intensity, "color," "weight," and "temperature" (pp. 53ff.). His descriptions along these lines are extensive. He nicely supplements his descriptive explications with

references to literature, artistic and musical expressions (e.g., 49ff.). He makes clarifying references to both Western and Eastern philosophical traditions.

In order for Smith to broaden and deepen the phenomenological explication of feeling he is forced to address the poverty of descriptive language in this regard. Smith relies on evocative terms which are often metaphoric. He argues, however, that evocative language, which in any other context might be taken to provide inexact description, in the context of the description of feeling can be very precise. Indeed, in the description of feeling there may not be literal articulations that capture precisely what needs to be described (see p. 75). Smith is required to be as terminologically inventive as the early Heidegger. When Smith uses what he calls the "language of hues" and the "language of sense-qualities," he does a good job of uncovering certain resources in existing language which seem up to the task of his descriptions. He shows us that there is a broad adjectival discourse which we do not employ enough in philosophy. In some cases, however, Smith turns the language of feeling into a set of overly technical phrases. For example, he defines "global love" as "the affective captivation with the happening world-whole's apparential closeness to me..." (p. 150). Whether this is unavoidable or not, it does make for difficult reading.

Smith argues that feelings are not merely internal phenomena but correspond to "feeling-tonalities" which belong to the world, insofar as the world is felt by the feeling subject. My feeling of joy makes the world seem to be "infected with a joyousness." My sadness makes the world appear gloomy. In a feeling of fear the world looms towards me. If the locus of both internal feeling-sensations and external feeling-tonalities is the subjective ego, so that in a particular feeling-state the I "imbues the world with the tonality" (p. 56), still there are also objective or worldly "sources" of feeling which Smith calls "importances." A particular importance "demands or invites the I to appreciatively respond to the importance by imbuing the world with a tonality that flows from the importance" (p. 56).

The concept of importance is extremely important in Smith's overall project to displace reason and rational metaphysics. While I can not appreciate its central role in this larger project, for reasons already noted, I do find value in Smith's detailed descriptions of the role played by importances in human experience. Importances appear as "hues." Things are not ordinarily perceived as scientifically defined objectivities, but as drab, eerie, uncomfortable, or lovely, pure, calm, etc. Things are invested with felt qualities; the world is configured on an appreciative scale of importances and importance horizons. If, as Smith would contend, I am always in a particular affective state, then my attentiveness or lack of attentiveness, my perceptions, my interpretations of the world will always be oriented toward some aspect of the world which will operate in my experience as an importance. Rather than viewing affective importances as playing a role similar to "causes and purposes" in the metaphysics of reason (p. 20), it may be more productive to look at them as playing a role similar to that played by "practical interest" in the context of hermeneutics.[2] Affective importances, as well as practical interests, constrain our experience of the world. Smith is right to suggest that this is a pervasive feature of human experience. It is also a dimension that needs more exploration. Smith goes

too far, however, to claim that some relation of importance is always the primary (or exclusive) relation that we have to the world, or that because of this pervasive feature "the nature of human being is *appreciation*, not reason ..." (p. 64; see p. 86). Simply because Smith can describe experience from a perspective which privileges feeling, does not mean that all experience is reducible to felt experience or that his description is complete.

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Notes

1. Smith ends his historical analysis with Heidegger and the existentialists. He does not mention Derrida. Since his critique is aimed in part at contemporary nihilism, which includes Nietzsche and Heidegger, it seems odd that he does not include some reference to the post-structuralists.
2. See, for example, Graham Nicholson's analysis of practical interests in *Seeing and Reading* (Atlantic Highlands, New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1984), pp. 2ff.

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Book Review

J.N. Mohanty, *Transcendental Phenomenology: An Analytic Account.* Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989. vii + 176 pages. £25.00.

This book is the product of several individually investigated topics in transcendental phenomenology. In the "Preface" it is indicated that this volume is partially constructed of papers that have been written for separate occasions in recent years (p. vii). However, these papers have been synthesized and supplemented with fresh investigations so that a coherent account of transcendental phenomenology is presented. The preface is followed by three chapters, each divided into several parts, and containing extensive documentation in the form of endnotes. While the material in this volume is carefully structured to unfold complex ideas, numerous typographical errors mar its physical appearance.

Written for the most part in the style of an Aristotelian dialectic, this work integrates the insights of Husserl's phenomenology, Heidegger's existential-hermeneutic, and the analytic thought of Frege and Quine, among others. The author also consistently addresses the weaknesses of these same viewpoints with his own discriminating and unbiased analyses, thus formulating his own reasoned conclusions where those under consideration are found wanting. Throughout the text it is evidenced that Mohanty strives to assume the neutral stance of the "transcendental ego" which he describes as one that "respects pluralism and is tolerant of diversities" (p. 143). From this viewpoint he gives fair hearing to descriptive philosophy, hermeneutic theory, and analytic philosophy. Simultaneously, he emphasizes the need for internal criticism, and communication between opposing camps for the common good of the whole philosophical community, and the community of men.

Chapter 1, entitled "Description and Interpretation", begins with an investigation into description in general, aiming toward a narrower account of "genuine philosophical description". An example of the latter is given in a Husserlian passage wherein the adumbrative nature of external perception is described. Husserl's passage is characterized as a "good description (i.e. as approximating the ideal of good description...?)" (p. 12). It is asserted that genuine philosophical description necessitates the exercise of the phenomenological epoche in order to avoid ontological presuppositions. However, it is warned by reference to Husserl's own *dictum* that a presuppositionless description may, after all, be an unattainable idea (p. 13). The author's astute awareness of this difficulty is the guiding force of his thematic treatment of transcendental phenomenology.

Having thus indicated the Husserlian ideal, the author examines a plethora of problems and objections that arise in opposition to the project of descriptive philosophy. First, he considers several ways in which a "speculative philosopher" might, beginning with a "descriptive find", take leave and wander into the seductive world of metaphysics (Section 1.3). The speculative pursuit is marked as one that is escorted by an *interpretive bias*. Hence, aiming to avoid such prejudice, various sorts of philosophical

description are enumerated, among which Heidegger's "*Auslegung*" stands out. In an endorsement of Delius' critique of the Heideggerian account of descriptive philosophy (p. 20) the author, on the one hand, rejects the Heideggerian thesis that the phenomenological method makes interpretation its goal. On the other hand, by means of the same reference he agrees that interpretation might be the final product of descriptive philosophy. Intently reflecting upon several objections which argue that "pure description" involves interpretation, he considers the possibility that even the transcendental ego has a "point of view", at least insofar as description exceeds the bounds of intuition (p. 24). Pure description must be restricted to what is intuitively presented. When it transcends that limit, the descriptive project lapses into interpretation. Further development of this position ultimately leads to the characterization of "sense-bestowal" as an "interpretive function" of intentionality (p. 109, also pp. 53, 113). As a consequence of this insight into the intermingling of description and interpretation, the author is motivated to reevaluate Husserl's "*Wesenserschauung*" via a critique of phantasy variation. The insight also leads to a reexamination of the problem of psychologism. The "moral" of the first chapter is:

> Both sorts of phenomenology – descriptive as well as interpretive – can be either naive or self-critical. When they are naive, they perceive each other as opposed. When they are self-critical, they recognize each other as complementary, and, in fact, as mutually inseparable. (p. 60)

If the descriptive philosopher subjects his own claims to the rigorous demands of the intuitive methodology, then he can never rest assured that any description is free from interpretation. However, the author is not one-sidedly critical of the descriptive philosopher. The hermeneutic philosopher must also scrutinize his project, and reject the spurious claim that nothing is given (p. 54).

Chapter 2, entitled "The Intentional Content", contains a strong appeal to the undertakings of the Analytic School to develop the author's conception of transcendental phenomenology. The incipient formulation of the idea of intentional content (synonymous with the phenomenological concept of "noema") is afforded by means of a comparison with Fregean "*Sinn*". This comparison establishes the familiar distinction between content and object via Frege's distinction of "sense" and "reference".[1] In the second part of this chapter the author develops anew the notion of "perceptual meaning". Frege's "*Sinn*" is specified as belonging to "linguistic entities", and thereby deemed insufficient to account for the intentional content of perception. Several possible models for perceptual sense are evaluated, but none of them are found to be entirely suitable. Consequently, the author carefully reasons toward his own account in which he avoids the extremes of reducing perceptual meaning to either "conceptual meaning" or a mere perception of a particular. Ultimately, he argues for a middle position by linking perceptual sense to a "Kantian schema" in which "perceptual predicate-senses ... correspond to the conceptual predicate-senses" (p. 82).

The intimate relation between the perceived and the perceiver motivates an investigation into the relation between content and context. Two related claims are defended here: 1) A solipsistic methodology which strategically

"internalizes" the context (physical, psychological, and social) as "horizontal" is justified. 2) An "individualized theory of content" is "presupposed by any *theory* of context" (p. 84). The upshot of the argument is that any account of a causal relation between content and context is a theory that tends toward a realistic ontology. But the goal of transcendental phenomenology is to provide a foundation for ontology. Thus, an account of the causal relation between content and context must be evaluated first as a complex construction founded upon elementary contents basic to the *individual theorist*. These fundamental contents are the conditions for the possibility of the theory from the start. The validity of the theory of context is thus dependent upon the specific cultural and psychological framework from which it arises. Therefore, a genetic theory of contents must be pursued prior to the adoption of a causal theory.

The fourth part of the second chapter is a brief section that makes the important assertion that the content is, at least in one sense of the term, ideal. Here the author confutes the possibility of supposing that his amplified notion of content is confused with a solipsistic idea. Instead, he clarifies that although intentional contents are constituted by individuals in particular historical and cultural settings, they are nonetheless contents that are, or can be, possessed by a plurality of subjects. This feature of "shareability" is emphasized as the ideal aspect of intentional contents.

The final section of this chapter returns to thematize the relation between intentional content and context. This theme unfolds in critiques of three different conceptions of intentionality – "the naturalistic-causal, the descriptive-psychological, the existential" (p. 95) – on route toward the defense of a "'transcendental' interpretation of intentionality" (p. 108). While the critiques are uniquely directed toward these distinct appraisals of intentionality, each contains an objection to the intermingling of real causality with intentionality. In a summary at the end of this section the author presents an insightful account of the dialectic that unfolds throughout these changing conceptions of intentionality. Ultimately, it is suggested that the dialectic must culminate in

> the theory of intentionality as a transcendental-constitutive function according to which (a) *the intentional contents is* not an internal representation but *a publicly shareable meaning* (emphasis added), and (b) the world in which Dasein finds itself is the result of prior constitutive accomplishments of an intentionally implicated community of egos. (p. 112)

On this account the transcendental phenomenologist not only suspends all judgments on real causality, but also makes the inherited, conceptual world the theme for his investigations.

In the final chapter, entitled "Phenomenology as Transcendental Philosophy", the author elaborates the implications of the prior chapters in search of a distinct sense of foundationalism that is both suitable for transcendental phenomenology and fair to relativism. He begins by briefly reviewing four kinds of foundationalism and the criticisms against them. Subsequently, the conflict between foundationalists and anti-foundationalists is exposed as the author constructs a lengthy, quasi-dialogue

between them. These are preludes for the main task of overcoming relativism in both hermeneutic theory and phenomenology.

The relativism inherent to hermeneutic theory is located within a "liberal theory of interpretation" which espouses the position that no interpretation is able to confer "*the right* meaning" (p. 128). The author shows that analogously a "liberal theory of perception" denies the thing-in-itself. It is argued that such a theory could arise only if the theorist had first assumed an "*absolutistic standpoint*" (p. 130). In other words, the claim is that this liberal theory of perception is possible only when an *essential* characteristic of perception – its perspectivity – is introduced into the theory. In contrast to the liberal, the "conservative" interpreter confers the most suitable interpretation upon a text. "He is committed to the idea of '*the* meaning' which he claims to have laid bare" (p. 128). This conservative approach is preferred by the author since it preserves both the possibility that the correct meaning has *not* been exposed, and also the intellectual integrity of the hermeneutic enterprise.

The overcoming of relativism is then approached from a strictly phenomenological perspective. In this context the author expresses discontent for three Husserlian arguments which on his view dispose of relativism too hastily. Instead of adopting a preconceived solution to the problem of intersubjectivity, Mohanty wants "to begin with ... a recognition of the fact that a certain cultural pluralism ... is one of the desiderata of modern ways of thinking" (p. 136). Via this starting point relativism is duly recognized insofar as a plurality of viewpoints is a fact that presents itself. To think beyond this fact a strategy is adopted which utilizes 1) Husserl's noesis-noema correlation, and 2) a distinction between "internal and external discourse" (pp. 136–142). With respect to (1), while there are several viewpoints, each one can be considered as a "world-noema" which "overlaps" other world-noemata. This amounts to the claim that different ways of interpreting the world contain shared contents. Concerning (2), "internal discourse" is conducted from within a familiar cultural and *linguistic* setting; it is naive and perspectival. In contrast "external discourse" considers no particular language as its own, and all of them as "mutually translatable" (p. 139). Thus, from the stance of the transcendental ego one assumes a neutral position that respects the whole variety of cultures and languages, but at the same time posits a "world-in-itself" as a "regulative idea" (p. 143). The intended result of this strategy is to preserve and enhance the possibility for communication between even the most diverse of world-views. In defense of this position the author proceeds into an extensive, comparative analysis of the ethical life of the person, whereby he confirms that in the moral sphere, as well as the theoretical, a "unity of *principles*" (p. 148) is an ideal sought by a transcendental subject.

The author's practical aim to harmonize divergent world-views has significant ramifications for his reevaluation of the Husserlian enterprise. It engenders a critical reflection upon Husserl's methodology, accompanied by a softening of his loftier claims, and a rejection of his tendency toward subjective idealism. In particular, the ideative method, and its complementary phantasy variation, understood by Husserl as "the way in which all intuitive essential necessities and essential laws and every genuine intuitive a priori, are won"[2] is reinterpreted by Mohanty. In defense of the criticism

that Husserl's eidetic method is circular he asserts that "it is better to construe the method of imaginative variation as a method of clarifying the *sense* rather than as one of discovering an *essence*" (p. 33). The "seeing of an essence" is not appropriately described as a "discovery" if the essence is already vaguely known to the investigator prior to the phantasy variation. However, while the author's *preferred* construal of the method avoids the problem of circularity, he still suggests that it is possible to interpret the method either way (p. 36). Furthermore, in this same context he acknowledges an "intimate relation" between the concepts of meaning and essence, but postpones a thematic consideration of this relation (p. 36). A firm position is not established within the critique of Husserl's supremely important methodology. Thus, the reader is left to wonder whether, and under what circumstances, it is proper to describe Husserl's eidetic method as a "discovery of essences".

An account of the author's distinction of meaning and essence will reveal in part the significance for construing Husserl's method as one of sense-clarification.

> The concept of essence is an ontological concept. An essence, by its very definition, must *truly* belong to all members of the class.... Meaning in the phenomenological sense, i.e. as intentional content, is how a thing is *taken to be*, ... it does not as such provide a guarantee as to how the thing truly is. (pp. 87–88)

If one correlates this statement about essence with the preferred construal of the method, then it is clear that the result of the method is not an ontological find. That is, a philosophical description fails to truly account for *every* member of a designated class. This point can be emphasized if one considers that the descriptive philosopher must be "satisfied with a concept of being which is analogical and not generic" (p. 16). The advice is that ontological claims made by the descriptive philosopher must remain *conservative* ones. But what does this imply for the interpretation of the method as a discovery of essences?

Within the critique of Husserl's imaginative variation it is specified that "essence may be regarded in two different ways: metaphysically, as the hidden reality behind the appearances (the essence of water = H_2O) or phenomenologically, as the law of possible appearances" (pp. 34–35). A question arises regarding the status of the phenomenological essence as an invariant law. How is one to understand Husserl's statement about *the essence* of external perception as perspectival, etc. (quoted on pp. 11–12)? As a law, would it not *truly* account for every possible and actual instance of perception? How is such a law to be distinguished from an ontological principle? Should one always anticipate the possibility that Husserl's description might fail to accurately account for some perceptual experiences? Must one conclude that no eidetic search is ever completed to the point of yielding a *necessary* law extending to every actual and possible instance? A decisive response to these questions is not extant.

While an answer to these questions may not be sharply outlined, the author's thorough research, and devoted effort to give a balanced account of transcendental philosophy does imply a response. One of the key assertions

of the first chapter is that the "*philosophical facts*" to be described must be considered from three different regards – as "linguistic or meaning structures", "ontological structures", and "structures of subjectivity" (p. 10). This suggests that *intentional contents* must be evaluated from three mutually complementary perspectives. Moreover, it seems that specific fields of study have been demarcated for the analytic, Husserlian, and hermeneutic philosophers within transcendental phenomenology. While their viewpoints on intentional content may overlap, each has its peculiar domain. An analytic-phenomenological approach toward intentional contents would be conducted in a fashion "analogous to Quine's 'semantic ascent'" (p. 57). The major significance of the author's preferred construal of the eidetic method is that "*de dicto* descriptions" ("meanings" or "linguistic structures") are the theme for philosophical description. In this context it is argued, using "Quine's famed example", that "we can only speak of the essence of an individual under a certain description, and not *per se*" (p. 56). From this viewpoint, eidetic phenomenology is restricted to the clarification of descriptive statements. Arguably, this would be the most comprehensive viewpoint on intentional contents since it analyzes the concepts passed on from generation to generation, culture to culture. As such it can be understood as penetrating the ideal – "publicly shared" – aspect of the contents. Second, the approach to the facts as subjective structures would account for the noetic forms belonging to the intentional contents of *this* transcendental ego. While these noetic structures are not shareable *per se*, they might have similar qualities across a plurality of subjects who constitute the same meaning. Therefore, the Husserlian philosopher must renounce all apodictic claims about the noetic structures of transcendental egos in general. Finally, the approach toward intentional contents as ontological structures, with the goal of attaining their true being in general, would seem to belong to the hermeneutic enterprise in its conservative format.

Even if this interpretation of the author's three-fold demand upon transcendental phenomenology is not entirely accurate, it is nonetheless clear that Mohanty has conceived an integrated, philosophical system which incorporates with the tasks of the specialist the necessary checks and balances which preclude the possibility of a one-sided, speculative flight into tyranny.

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Notes

1. Gottlob Frege, "On Sense and Reference," *Translation from the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege*, ed. Peter Geach and Max Black (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1952) pp. 56–78.
2. Edmund Husserl, *Phenomenological Psychology*, trans. John Scanlon (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1977), p. 53.