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Youth Future Civic Participation in Europe: Differences Between the East and the Rest

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Abstract European countries were economically and politically separated during the Cold War, but since its end processes of globalization and the formation of the European Union have contributed to blur the borders. Previous studies suggest that the social transformations have affected differently civic participation of youths, but shortage of more recent data has precluded researchers from examining the differences in a country-comparative fashion. Along these lines, this paper has two main objectives: to explore the differences in the levels of expected civic participation across Europe, and to evaluate the fit of a theoretical model of civic participation in regard to the different points in time their democracies were established. To achieve these goals, data from 22 European educational systems (9 post-communist and 13 established democracies) participating in the International Civic and Citizenship Study (2009) conducted by International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement is used. The results, in accordance with the literature, suggest differentiated patterns of future civic participation between the new and established democracies, but they are not that clear, suggesting that convergence between the two groups is ongoing. However, the tested empirical model of civic participation functions in a better way in the established than in the new democracies. In contrast with previous findings, differences in levels of expected civic participation seem to be related not only with the countries' experience with democracy, but also with their cultural similarities and common history.

Keywords Youth · Expected civic participation · ICCS · Post-communism · Democracy

1 Introduction

European countries were divided by the Iron Curtain for decades. During the communist era, the East Bloc countries shared similar values and ideology and followed a similar

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course of political and socioeconomic development. This was also reflected in civic participation patterns that distinguished Eastern Europe from the rest of the continent—regimes were forcing their citizens for mass civic participation in state-controlled activities and organizations (Coffé and van der Lippe 2009; Howard 2002; Letki 2004). The fall of communism brought many changes among the "brother nations", each one of them taking a different path towards democratic changes in their societies. And yet, recent studies indicate differences in civic outcomes between the post-communist countries and their Western counterparts which continued at least until the end of the 1990s.

For example, using data from the Civic Education Study (CivED) 1999, conducted by the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA), Torney-Purta (2002a, b) found that adolescents in Eastern Europe had lower levels of knowledge about civic issues and trust in governmental institutions compared to their peers in West Europe. With data from 2002, Hoskins (2009) found lower rates of active participation in South and East Europe compared to the rest of the continent, as well as differences in various aspects of civic competencies between different regions in Europe.

About 20 years after the fall of communism in East Europe, data from the IEA's International Civic and Citizenship Study (ICCS 2009) provides us with a unique opportunity to reanalyze differences in civic participation and evaluate whether the influence of the long communist period can still be observed. This study is exploratory in nature and its main purpose is to identify the differences in expected civic participation of 14-years-old students between the post-communist and the rest of the countries in Europe. The main objectives are, firstly, to explore the levels of different dimensions of expected future civic participation across the European countries participating in ICCS 2009. Secondly, to evaluate the fit of a theoretical model of civic participation across the European countries using predictors of participation that the relevant literature have found as being important. The analyses use data from 22 European countries and results are examined in terms of the countries' experience with democracy, dividing countries into two groups: new European democracies (9 post-communist countries—Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic and Slovenia) and 13 established European democracies—Austria, Belgium (Flemish), Cyprus, Denmark, England, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland. In this study, the distinction between the new and established democracies is based on the countries experience with democracy, assuming that societies experiencing democracy longer time would also have better developed democratic institutions. The established democracies listed above took paths towards democratic development around the World War II, when most of the European countries disestablished the monarchy as a system of political rule in their countries. The new democracies are the European countries which after World War II took the path towards communism, and introduced democratic changes only after 1989 when most communist regimes in Europe collapsed. The rationale behind this division is that without the citizens' involvement in the society, the democracy will lack legitimacy and guiding force (for more details see Dalton 2008; Mondak and Gearing 1998), and the two groups of countries will have different experience with democracy and civic participation in particular. The outcome variables examined are the students' future informal participation, future electoral participation and future political participation.

The research questions are:

1. What are the levels of expected future participation across the analyzed countries?
2. How and to what extent the expected future civic participation of students is related to their personal characteristics, attitudes, behavior and perceptions?

3. Do the levels of participation and associations between those and student characteristics vary between the new and established democracies in Europe?

This study has two main limitations. The first one is that the students are at grade 8 which might be too early age for establishing steady attitudes and perceptions towards participation in society, especially concerning expectations about future. The second one is that although 22 European countries' data was used in the analyses, the results cannot be considered as representative for all countries on the continent and therefore shall be interpreted accordingly.

2 Contextual Background

During the Cold War communist countries were encapsulated behind the Iron Curtain under authoritarian rule. There was an attempt for convergence in political, social, demographic and economic development and social classes. Strong norms of civic involvement and participation were promoted and imposed by the media, forcing membership to youth organizations like the Young Pioneers and Comsomol being mandatory. People had to participate in state-controlled organizations and autonomous forms of civic participation were suppressed (Coffé and van der Lippe 2009; Flanagan et al. 1993).

The newly emerged regimes forced people in post-communist societies to "relearn" civic and political behavior and to change their attitudes (Coffé and van der Lippe 2009). The educational reforms in East and Central Europe required big and urgent changes including mass hiring and preparation of new teachers in civic education. One of the challenging tasks was the formal and informal political socialization of the previous generation due to the political and economic changes (Torney-Purta 2002b).

In part related to these changes, there is some empirical evidence suggesting that differences in civic engagement and participation between countries in East and West Europe have reduced. Two main explanations have been provided to account for this trend: first, that Eastern European countries have been trying to get in line with the West; and second, the fact that levels of engagement and participation of youths in the West have declined, especially with respect to political interest and voting (Listhaug and Grønflaten 2007; Torney-Purta 2002b; Whitely 2005).

Despite this trend, differences in civic engagement and participation still exist between the two sets of countries. For example, data from the the CivED study indicate that levels of trust in government-related institutions are lower in former East Bloc countries and Portugal than the international average (Torney-Purta 2002a). Furthermore, in Western European countries highly institutionalized forms of civil society are found, while in Southern and Eastern Europe it is more typical to find the less formalized forms of village community, extended clans or other types of social networks, that is, less formalized organizations in comparison to the ones in the West (Immerfall et al. 2010). Other studies (see Coffé and van der Lippe 2009) have also shown that former East Bloc countries have lower levels of participation. These differences could suggest that citizens from established democracies have more experience in principles and practices of civic society and are more active, while the post-communist countries have to get in line with the democratic traditions in the rest of Europe (Coffé and van der Lippe 2009).

3 Conceptual Framework

3.1 Definition of Civic Participation

There is no consensus on a single definition of civic participation, in part because it has been often mixed with civic engagement (see Clougherty 2009; Wing 2009; Zaff et al. 2010 for detailed discussion).

This study adopts a working definition similar to the one provided by Starosta (2010), which focuses on the manifestations of civic behaviors: Civic participation refers to activities in the local community, politics or general society within the local country context and includes formal and informal group or organization membership, individual actions, voluntary activities, political activities aimed to bring improvement to the local, societal or country-wide settings.

3.2 Predictors of Civic Participation

There are different agents that shape youth's civic participation and engagement: for example the family, school, peers, non-governmental organizations, religion and media (Ménard 2010; Wing 2009), although in some cases, e.g. school and family, they overlap (Schulz et al. 2009). The variables from these different dimensions can be organized into two larger categories (Schulz et al. 2009):

- Antecedents: These variables affect the way students learn and acquire understanding on civic phenomena and the way these phenomena take place. They cover aspects of the educational system (school/classroom characteristics, composition and resources), historical, cultural, family, students' and social group contextual variables.
- Processes: These variables are related to civic learning and acquisition of understanding, competences and disposition. These are contextual variables related with the educational policies (instruction and governance), student socialization and learning, political events, communication and activities at home.

The outcomes, according to Schulz et al. (2009), shape civic society and systems, civic principles, civic participation and civic identities. In this model the antecedents exert influence over and restrict both the processes and outcomes, but the link is one way—the processes and outcomes do not influence the antecedents back. The processes and outcomes can exert influence over each other.

The focus of this paper is not on the different models explaining civic participation and the underlying processes. Rather we use the model described by Schulz et al. (2009), which is more empirical and oriented towards the relationship between the background variables and the outcomes in terms of civic participation, to evaluate the model fit across the new European democracies and their counterparts. The variables falling within the aforementioned two large groups are divided in subgroups. Variables in each subgroup might belong to one or both broader categories, for example, some family variables can be categorized as antecedents or processes, but not as both.

3.2.1 Family Variables

Parent-youth political discussion has been found to show a strong impact on many different areas of civic outcomes (Wing 2009) through giving the first meaningful experiences and affecting self-assertion and self-confirmation by debating ideas (Ménard 2010), although it

can also have restraining effect on transformation processes (Wing 2009). Students from families with higher interest in political and social issues tend to have higher civic knowledge and engagement in civic participation (Schulz et al. 2009). Family income also has also been found to have predictive power on civic participation of children–students from low-income families tend to participate less (Foster-Bey 2008). In a similar manner, empirical research suggests that a broader concept such as students' socioeconomic status (i.e. the family SES) tends to be a strong predictor of their volunteer participation (Smith 1994). Likewise, students with immigrant background may appear to be less civically active compared to the native ones due to unfamiliarity with the country's language, lack of knowledge about culture or opportunities for participation in local community (Foster-Bey 2008).

3.2.2 Student Variables

Positive relationship has been detected between civic knowledge and skills and civic participation (Bradshow et al. 2007; Schulz et al. 2010; Torney-Purta 2002a). By acquiring knowledge and skills students learn how to access and develop the mental capabilities necessary for civic participation (Bradshow et al. 2007). Gender has been found to be related to civic commitment and engagement in different kind of civic actions, being girls more likely to participate than boys (Schulz et al. 2010). Spending time with peers has been associated with both negative and positive influence on participation and knowledge (Torney-Purta 2002a, b). According to Kahne and Sporte (2008), when peers help each other in school-related matters, they share commitment and are more likely to engage in civic participation. There are also some purely personal characteristics that are perceived as important to civic participation. For example, trust and bonding to others (Bobek et al. 2009; Pattie et al. 2003) and trust in institutions (Torney-Purta et al. 2004) are considered as necessary premises for participation and engagement. Student expectations for their further education have been found to be a powerful predictor of civic knowledge and competencies together with taking classes in civic education (Torney-Purta 2002a, b). As Smith (1994) summarizes, it can be said that individuals with internal locus of control, higher feeling of efficacy, self-esteem, empathy, morality and emotional stability are more likely to get involved in volunteer participation.

3.2.3 School Variables

Schools can be effective in promoting students' civic engagement through their formal curriculum, classroom climate and school culture. As Torney-Purta (2002a, b) points out, schools can help students to acquire civic knowledge and skills, by ensuring open classroom discussions and providing opportunities for participation in school life.

Following Torney-Purta (2002b), teachers can also influence civic knowledge, attitudes and behavior of students in schools. Teacher characteristics such as qualification, years working as teachers and teachers' morale can influence the academic development of the students (Geske et al. 2006).

Teacher, parent and student participation at school are considered to promote schools' understanding on students' learning needs and securing parents' and teachers' commitment in supporting educational activities (Schulz et al. 2009). The presence of civic learning opportunities in schools and classrooms can also contribute to increase the level of civic participation (Kahne and Sporte 2008). According to Bradshow et al. (2007) the current

participation of youth and political interest today provides an insight on their future participation as citizens.

3.2.4 Community and Neighborhood Variables

Some studies suggest that school interaction with the local community and local civic institutions could foster student perceptions on their role in the society and the local community (Schulz et al. 2010). Kahne and Sporte (2008) note that the neighborhood and family are assumed to play an important role in developing civic orientation. Communities that are civically active tend to shape young people that are active themselves. Social capital plays a significant role within communities by fostering the norms and the social networks which affect the effectiveness of democracy positively (Kahne and Sporte 2008). In many cases, the extent to which children become interested in politics and are given the opportunity for civic participation at school depends on the environment they live in (Bradshow et al. 2007).

4 Data and Methods

The data used for this work comes from the IEA's ICCS 2009 study. ICCS 2009 is an international large-scale comparative study conducted in 38 Asian, European and Latin American countries by the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA). Its main objective is to investigate the ways young people are prepared to undertake their role as citizens of their countries as adults. The study collected data on grade 8 students' civic knowledge and background data: civic attitudes, dispositions and basic student, student family, teacher and school characteristics (Schulz et al. 2009).

The total number of European countries participating in ICCS 2009 is 26, but four countries had to be excluded: The Netherlands due to low participation rates (see Schulz et al. 2010) and in three countries because of the small number of sampled schools—Liechtenstein (9), Luxemburg (31) and Malta (55)—which deterred us from performing reliable analysis at school level. The final country sample included 9 new and 13 established democracies. Table 1 presents the list of countries along with the sample and population sizes of targeted students.

A set of Likert-type items reflected future participation levels of students. Three derived scales are used as dependent variables: Students' Expected Future Informal Political Participation (5 items), Students' Expected Adult Electoral Participation (3 items) and Students' Expected Adult Participation in Political Activities (4 items). The Rasch Partial Credit Model (Masters and Wright 1997) was applied to constituent items (see Table 2) for scaling. The resulting weighted likelihood estimates (Warm 1989) were transformed into scales with a mean of 50 and a standard deviation of 10 for equally weighted ICCS national samples that satisfied guidelines for sample participation (see Schulz and Friedman 2011). The Cronbach's alpha reliability coefficients computed for the pooled data from all countries for the three civic participation scales is above .80 (Schulz and Friedman 2011).

The analyses were divided in two parts. In a first step, the expected levels of future participation of students across Europe are reported. For ease of interpretation, the reports are based on single items collapsed into two categories (1 = "I will probably or certainly do this"; 2 = "I will probably or certainly not do this", see Table 2) instead of the scales.

Table 1 Sample and population sizes of students per country

Countries	Number of students in the sample	Number of students in the population (estimate)
New democracies		
Bulgaria	3,257	63,557
Czech Republic	4,630	95,781
Estonia	2,743	11,748
Latvia	2,761	20,885
Lithuania	3,902	37,636
Poland	3,249	439,315
Russian Federation	4,295	1,271,558
Slovak Republic	2,970	51,643
Slovenia	3,070	17,295
Established democracies		
Austria	3,385	88,528
Belgium (Flemish)	2,968	67,913
Cyprus	3,194	8,872
Denmark	4,508	62,234
England	2,916	552,108
Finland	3,307	62,768
Greece	3,153	100,804
Ireland	3,355	55,370
Italy	3,366	539,499
Norway	3,013	59,638
Spain	3,309	441,446
Sweden	3,464	106,712
Switzerland	2,924	83,210

Table 2 Variables used for construction of the derived scales

Scale	Source questions
Future informal participation	Talk to others about your views on political and social issues
	Write to a newspaper about political and social issues
	Contribute to an online discussion forum about social and
	Political issues
	Join an organization for a political or social cause
Future electoral participation	Vote in local elections
	Vote in national elections
	Get information about candidates before voting in an election
Future political participation	Help a candidate or party during an election campaign
	Join a political party
	Join a trade union
	Stand as a candidate in local elections

Source Brese et al. (2011)

In a second step, the fit of future civic participation models was evaluated with multiple linear regression models performed with each country's data separately. The dependent variables of multivariate analyses are the derived continuous scales (students' informal, electoral and political participation). The analyses were performed using the IEA IDB Analyzer (IEA 2012) which can handle the complex sample design and analysis issues. The predictors in the multivariate models were selected using two criteria: theoretical relevance and data reliability. Predictors with little variation between categories (e.g. immigration status) were excluded from the analysis. The three aforementioned scales were used as dependent variables. The regression analyses were preferred to Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) due to the very low intra-class correlation coefficients (ICC) in the outcome variables. We found that the ICC's coefficients ranged between 0 and 0.06 across countries, indicating that responses within schools are highly independent and that most variation occurs at the student level.

The independent variables used as predictors are listed below.

1. Student's sex—boy: 0; girl: 1.
2. National Index of Socioeconomic Background (NISB)—continuous indicator of family socio-economic status (SES); combines highest occupational status of parents, highest parental education (as total number of years) and number of books at home. The scale has a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1 for all participating countries.
3. Civic knowledge—IRT continuous scale comprised by a set of five plausible values.
4. Students' expected years of further education—expected further education level recoded into years of education.
5. Index of students' civic participation at school—continuous WLE scale derived from questions about participation in various activities at school.
6. Index of students' discussion of political and social issues outside of school—continuous WLE scale derived from questions about participation in political and social discussions with parents and friends outside of school.
7. Index of Parents' interest in political and social issues—continuous WLE scale derived from questions about mothers' and fathers' level of interest about political and social issues.
8. Index of students' trust in civic institutions—continuous WLE scale derived from questions about level of trust in different social and political institutions within the country.
9. Index of students' sense of internal political efficacy—continuous WLE scale derived from questions about students' knowledge, understanding, intentions and beliefs about their efficacy as citizens.
10. Index of students' citizenship self-efficacy—continuous WLE scale derived from questions about students' feeling of own participation and influence on various social issues.
11. Index of students' perceptions of openness in classroom discussions—continuous WLE scale derived from questions about students' feeling towards the opportunity to participate in open discussion in classrooms with peers and teachers.

All indices have a mean of 50 and a standard deviation of 10. The only exception is NISB with a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. For more information on the scales and means of their construction see Brese et al. (2011) and Schulz and Friedman (2011).

The independent variables used in the regression models reflect only student and their families' characteristics (see the theoretical background section) which here are provisionally divided in three groups: student personal and family characteristics (1–4, 7); students' current civic behavior (5–6) and student attitudes and perceptions (8–11) related with civic participation.

5 Results

5.1 Levels of Future Participation

The levels of expected future participation (the first stage of the analysis) are reported in Table 3 of the Appendix where the new democracies appear first. The median percentages for each group (i.e. new and established democracies) are provided at the bottom of the table. If the country's percentage is significantly higher or lower ($p < .05$) than the median percentage for all countries in the counter group, the percentage is flagged with a symbol indicating the direction. The significance of the difference is tested using z-test for equality between two proportions (binomial distribution).

As Table 3 in the Appendix indicates, the median percentages in both new and established democracies are highest for the future electoral participation statements (81–88 %) followed by the future informal ones (30–59 %) and lowest for the future political participation (26–50 %). In general, all established democracies show higher anticipated participation. And when comparing countries within the group of new democracies, it can be observed that students from the Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovenia, Poland and Slovak Republic (countries closer to the established democracies) have lower levels of expected future participation than Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania and the Russian Federation (see Table 3 in the Appendix), but also lower than the established democracies, although some exceptions exist. For example for the block of statements comprising the future informal participation scale the aforementioned countries indicate consistently lower than the established democracies' percentages of students for writing to a newspaper, but significantly higher for the online discussion forums. Also, for standing as a candidate in local elections Slovak Republic, Slovenia and Poland have significantly higher percentages, while Czech Republic has insignificant difference and Estonia has significantly lower percentage. For joining an organization this group of countries exhibits mostly lack of significant differences with the established democracies' median except for Czech Republic (lower) and Slovenia (higher).

On the other hand Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania and the Russian Federation exhibit consistently significantly higher percentages than the established democracies for all statements of the future informal participation scale. For the future political participation there is no clear pattern: Bulgaria and Latvia have significantly lower, while Lithuania have significantly higher than the established democracies' median percentages and the Russian Federation does not show significant differences except for the voting in national elections. For the future political participation the pattern within this set of countries differs a lot: for joining political party and standing as candidates the percentages are significantly higher than the established democracies' medians, while for joining a trade union are mixed (higher, lower or insignificantly different) and for helping a candidate no significant difference was found in almost all cases (see Table 3 in the Appendix).

When comparing the individual new democracies' percentages against the medians of the established ones, almost perfect mirror image can be found: if the percentages in the established democracies are lower than the medians of the new ones', the new democracies' percentages are higher than the medians for the established. However, Greece and Cyprus show a pattern that opposes the one for rest of the countries in their group. Both countries indicate higher than the new democracies' median percentages for all statements comprising the future informal (Cyprus—69, 53, 58 and 58 %; Greece—77, 53, 58 and 64 %) and future political participation (Cyprus—59, 53, 52 and 56 %; Greece—51, 50, 65 and 46 %). It is interesting, that both countries do not exhibit consistently different percentages with the medians of the new democracies for the future electoral statements, except for voting in national elections in Cyprus (85 %) and voting in local elections in Greece (91 %) where the percentages are significantly higher, but the differences are very small. Cyprus, Greece and Italy are the only established democracies who exhibit higher than the new democracies' medians for students' anticipation to stand as candidates in local elections (56, 46 and 34 %) with Cyprus and Greece having the highest percentages across all countries (see Table 3 in the Appendix). Interestingly, Finnish students have the lowest percentages for all the four statements comprising the future informal participation scale among all countries, especially for the ones that are related with direct communication, followed by the Belgian (Flemish) ones.

5.2 Civic Participation Model Fit

The results of the regression models, second stage of the analysis, are presented in Tables 4, 5, 6 in the Appendix. Here only statistically significant results ($p < 0.05$) are reported.

Student personal and family characteristics show different patterns of association depending on the scale with which their relationship is tested. Students' sex does show different pattern in the two groups of countries depending on the outcome variable. While only Poland indicates statistically significant and negative (−0.75) relationship with the future informal participation (boys tend to anticipate higher informal participation), in all other new democracies no significant results were found (see Table 4 in the Appendix). In seven out of thirteen established democracies significant positive coefficients are found (girls anticipate higher informal participation in future): Denmark (1.08), England (0.96), Finland (1.16), Ireland (0.70), Norway (0.75), Sweden (1.24) and Switzerland (1.00). For the future electoral participation scale in only five from the 22 countries in total statistically significant coefficient of sex are present (see Table 5 in the Appendix). In Czech Republic, Austria and England significant negative relationship is found (−0.76, −1.21 and −1.03) and in Denmark and Sweden—a significant positive coefficient (1.11 in both countries). The coefficient of student sex for the future political participation across the two groups of countries differs a lot compared to the previous two scales. Only a significant negative association is found in eight out of nine new and five out of thirteen established democracies. In Bulgaria (−0.17), Belgium (Flemish) (−0.50), England (−0.17), Finland (0.21), Ireland (−0.68), Norway (<0.01), Spain (−0.33) and Sweden (0.14) no significant association with sex is present (see Table 6 in the Appendix).

The association of civic knowledge with the civic participation also differs, depending on the outcome variable. Positive significant association of civic knowledge with the anticipated future informal participation is present only in the Czech Republic (the more knowledgeable students anticipate higher participation), but the coefficient is very small (<0.01). In all other countries where significant relationship is found, it is negative

(less knowledgeable students will participate more). No significant association is found in Denmark, Greece, Poland, the Russian Federation and Slovak Republic where coefficients are also very small (see Table 4 in the Appendix). As with the results for the future informal participation scale, the future political participation models yield significant negative relationships with the civic knowledge (see Table 6 in the Appendix). The only country where significant negative relationship does not exist (less knowledgeable anticipate higher participation) is Denmark (<0.01). While student civic knowledge is negatively related to future informal and political participation, its relationship with future electoral participation is positive in all countries included in this study without any exceptions (see Table 5 in the Appendix).

The association with student socioeconomic background indicates no clear pattern. The expected years of further education is significantly associated with future informal participation (see Table 4 in the Appendix) in Slovak Republic (−0.21) and Finland (−0.14) where negative relationship is found (the less years of education the students expect to have, the more they expect to participate). A negative association with the future political participation was found in Austria (−0.15) and positive in Estonia (0.16) and England (0.27). The association with the future electoral participation is positive, that is, the more years in further education the students expect for themselves, the higher participation they anticipate (see Table 5 in the Appendix). Only two of the new democracies indicate significant relationship—Slovak Republic (0.31) and Slovenia (0.37). In contrast, in only four of the thirteen established democracies significant positive relationship is not present—Austria (0.06), Belgium (Flemish) (−0.01), Cyprus (−0.05) and Sweden (−0.01).

Parental interest in social and political issues is related significantly and positively with future electoral participation in all countries. It is not related with future informal participation in only two new democracies—Poland (0.40) and Slovenia (0.21), and in six established democracies—Austria (0.31), Belgium (Flemish) (0.32), Finland (0.20), Ireland (0.31), Sweden (0.32) and Switzerland (0.12). Conversely, in only three out of thirteen established democracies—Austria (0.40), Greece (0.34) and Sweden (0.44)—a positive significant relationship between the parental interest and the future political participation is not found as well as in four new democracies (see Tables 4, 5 and 6 in the Appendix)—Latvia (0.12), Lithuania (0.09), Poland (0.36) and Slovak Republic (0.21).

Current participation at school is associated only positively (students who currently participate more at school also anticipate higher participation in future) with pattern across the countries depending on the outcome variable. Five out of nine new democracies indicate positive relationship with the future informal participation (see Table 4 in the Appendix)—Bulgaria (0.04), Czech Republic (0.06), Estonia (0.07), Poland (0.07) and Slovenia (0.05), while in only two of the established democracies such relationship is found—Cyprus (0.06) and Denmark (0.04). Similar to the future informal participation, the future political participation (see Table 6 in the Appendix) is significantly and positively associated with the current participation in school in more new (Czech Republic—0.05, Estonia—0.09, Latvia—0.06, Lithuania—0.05, Poland—0.06, and the Russian Federation—0.10) than established democracies (Belgium—0.06, Cyprus—0.08, and Norway—0.06). In comparison to the previous two scales, the number of countries that do not exhibit significant relationship between the participation at school and future electoral participation (see Table 5 in the Appendix) in both country groups is much smaller and no distinctive pattern could be found.

The social and political discussion outside the school is positively related to the future informal scale (the more students discuss, the more likely they are to participate) in all countries (see Table 4 in the Appendix). The relationship with the other two future participation scales differs from the one with informal participation and is found in much smaller number of countries without a distinctive pattern across the groups of countries.

Compared to the groups of personal, family and behavioral variables, the relationship of the attitudes and perceptions with civic participation is more coherent across the groups of countries. Trust in civic institutions, sense of internal political internal efficacy and citizenship all show positive and significant relationship with all the three different dependent variables in all countries. The only exceptions are Denmark (0.03) and Italy (0.03) where no significant relationship between the trust in civic institutions and the future informal participation (see Table 4 in the Appendix) is present. The perception of openness of classroom discussion indicates positive (the more opened the classroom is towards discussion, the higher participation the students tend to anticipate) and significant relationship with future informal participation in Finland (0.04), Italy (0.06), Norway (0.07) and Poland (0.04). The association with the future electoral (see Table 5 in the Appendix) participation is positive in four of the new democracies (Estonia—0.04, Latvia—0.07, Lithuania—0.04 and the Russian Federation—0.05) and five of the established democracies (Denmark—0.03, England—0.04, Greece—0.07, Italy—0.06 and Norway—0.06). A negative relationship is indicated in Switzerland (−0.08). Positive relationship with the future political participation is found in Norway (0.05) and negative in Spain (−0.04) and Switzerland (−0.06).

The median amount of variance explained by the model for the future informal participation across all 22 countries is 33 %, with median of 31 % in the new democracies and a slightly higher (34 %) in the established democracies. The highest amounts of explained variance are in England (40 %), Italy (39 %), Ireland (39 %) and Finland (38 %) and the lowest—in Estonia (28 %), Slovenia (28 %), Greece (28 %), Bulgaria (29 %) and Lithuania (29 %).

The median amount of explained variance by the model for the future electoral participation across all 22 countries is 31 %, 26 % among the new democracies and 34 % in the established democracies. The highest amounts of explained variance are in England (41 %), Denmark (39 %), Austria (38 %) and Czech Republic (38 %), and the lowest—in Latvia (22 %), Lithuania (24 %), the Russian Federation (24 %), Bulgaria (26 %), Slovenia (26 %) and Greece (26 %).

The median amount of explained variance for the future political participation model across all countries and within the two groups of countries is 24 %. The greatest amounts of explained variance are in Ireland (29 %), Slovak Republic (29 %), England (28 %), Cyprus (28 %), the Russian Federation (28 %) and Bulgaria (28 %) and the lowest—in Denmark (21 %), Estonia (20 %) and Greece (20 %).

6 Summary and Discussion

The main objective of this paper was twofold: to explore the differences in the levels of expected civic participation across European countries and to evaluate the empirical model fit in regard to political division of the countries (new and established democracies) for which data from ICCS 2009 exist.

In general, the new democracies do have lower levels of intended future participation compared to the established European democracies as found by previous studies (see Coffé and van der Lippe 2009 for a summary). However, this is not valid for all types of future civic participation: students from the new democracies tend to have higher anticipated informal participation. The latter could be explained with the existence of only formal, strictly organized, state-controlled and mandatory civic participation in communist countries and the suppression of any autonomous activities by the state (see Coffé and van der Lippe 2009; Letki 2004; Schwartz and Bardi 1997) which led to less formalized and community-based forms of engagement (Immerfall et al. 2010). Even within a single domain of civic participation the new democracies exhibit differences in regard to different activities (higher or lower). Also, there are differences among the new democracies across the different types of participation. In general, North-East European countries exhibit higher expectations about their future electoral and political participation compared to the established democracies.

The levels of participation found in this study do not seem to be related so much to whether the states are new or established democracies. Rather, countries tend to cluster more depending on their cultural similarities and common history that they share. Similar pattern of between-country differences is also found by Torney-Purta (2002b). Also, apart from the civic context, Caro and Mirazchiyski (2012) find patterns in socioeconomic gradients across the new democracies that are similar to the ones were found in this study. For example, most of the Central European new democracies exhibit traits similar to the established ones.

The background and rationale of the differences among the new democracies and the similarities between the Central European new and established democracies in Europe in terms of culture, common history and educational systems are provided mainly by Cerych (1997) and Kotásek (1996). First, Central European new democracies belong to the Roman Catholic Church, while the East-European are mainly Orthodox with mixture of Protestant and in the South-East part of Europe—mainly Orthodox with Roman Catholic and even Islamic populations as well (Cerych 1997; Kotásek 1996; Schwartz and Bardi 1997). Central European new democracies were part of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire and the influence of the Central European educational traditions, mainly Austrian (later Austrian-Hungarian) and the German ones, on their educational systems still persists. The educational systems of Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were under Soviet tutelage for more than 50 years. After 1989 they restored their previous relationships with Central European and Scandinavian countries, also in regard to educational policies, almost immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union (Cerych 1997; Kotásek 1996).

Second, the introduction of communism differed between Central and East Europe. The penetration of the regime in Central European countries met a greater resistance and opposition compared to the East which may have resulted in different impact of communism on the values (Schwartz and Bardi 1997).

Third, the transition from totalitarian to democratic regimes was characterized with different pace and different quality of the democratic and economic institutions. In most Central and some East European countries the communist regimes were abolished suddenly, even with revolutions, while in former Soviet Union such swift change was not apparent (Mishler and Rose 2002).

Fourth, these differences among the new democracies can be also explained by the divergence in political and socioeconomic development in the region after the fall of the communist regimes. According to Cornia (2010) some countries built strong democracies with equal rights and obligations for all, rigid tax systems, granting property rights and

posing the rule of law (Central European countries). While others built liberal democracies with limited freedom and fairness of the elections, limited rule of law and ineffective administration that could not serve its citizens (former Soviet Union and Balkan countries). According to Cornia (2010), a third group of countries remained authoritarian with no rule of law (Central Asian countries and Belarus). The findings in this paper, to a large extent, overlap with Cornia's countries' classification as well. Previous empirical studies (see Howard 2002) have also found large discrepancies within the new democracies indicating that the term "post-communism" is gradually losing its relevance. In sum, the lack of robust patterns across the new democracies would suggest that convergence between the two groups has already begun.

Besides the cultural, historical, educational and socioeconomic explanations of the heterogeneity in both new and established democracies, the quality of democracy rather than the duration of citizens' experience with it could also have an explanatory power and unveil different patterns. The aforementioned differentiating paths in historical, cultural, political and educational developments may have led to different quality of the democratic regimes across Europe regardless whether they are new or established. However, such analysis goes beyond the purpose of this paper which is to compare the post- and non-post-communist countries in Europe.

Regarding the second part of the analysis, namely to evaluate the empirical model fit in regard to political division of the countries, the multivariate models reveal different association of the predictors of future civic participation in Europe based on the country grouping.

The personal and family characteristics of the students have varying predictive power across different countries and outcome variables:

- While convincing association between students' sex and the future informal participation scale was not found in the new democracies, in more than half of the established democracies (and mainly North-European countries) only significant association favoring girls was apparent. The results for the future political participation reveal completely different pattern—the relationship is only negative and is more frequently found in the new democracies. No convincing evidence for gap between boys and girls was found for the future electoral participation in both sets of countries.
- While better civic knowledge comes along with increased anticipation to participate in future elections, and this is found in all countries in this study, as expected, for the future informal and political participation it is surprisingly the opposite—the less knowledgeable students are more likely to participate in future. This trend is observed equally in both new and established democracies. For the future informal participation scale this negative association appears to be apparent for fewer countries.
- Although theory points that the differences in student socioeconomic background have important relationship with civic participation (Foster-Bey 2008; Torney-Purta 2002a), this study did not find any convincing evidence in almost all countries, and no patterns were found regardless whether the countries are new or established democracies or any other classification.
- Similarly, the association of expected future education is rather weak with the future informal and political participation in both groups of countries. Such distinction between the new and established democracies, however, exists for the future electoral participation: while the relationship in the new democracies is fairly weak, in the established democracies is apparent in the majority of countries.

- Parental interest showed stronger association with the future informal participation in the new democracies, and in the established democracies for the future political participation. The association with future electoral participation is also significant, but does not indicate any differential pattern across countries.

To a large extent, students' current civic behavior reveals distinct patterns in the new versus the established democracies: students' current participation at school reveals differences between the established and the new democracies for the future informal and political participation: students' current participation has a strong association in most of the new, but not in the established democracies.

The association with student perceptions and attitudes exhibited almost uniform pattern among all countries, regardless of the political division. However, in unreported analysis we pooled the data from all countries together and interacted a dummy variable, indicating whether the countries are new or established democracies, with each covariate. We found that the trust in civic institutions has significantly weaker effect on students intentions for informal and electoral participation in the established democracies compared to the new ones. This result might mean that trust represents something different in the established and new democracies. While in new democracies it still might relate to the lack of trust arising from the former communist regimes that affects participation, in the established democracies trust may not relate to lack of motivation to participate, but could be less relevant concept for participation.

The explained variance for the future informal and future electoral participation models is more or less the same across all countries in the study while the future political participation model explains substantially lower amounts of variance. However, it has to be borne in mind that compared to participation in informal civic activities and elections, smaller number of people tends to be involved directly in politics. In general, the new democracies tend to have lower amounts of explained variance for the future informal and electoral participation (although not for the political) compared to their counterparts indicating that these models fit better to the established democracies. It is not a surprise, since the theories of civic participation have been developed mainly in the context of Western societies, and most of the studies found in the literature review were conducted there.

7 Limitations of the Study

This study has several limitations. Participants are students in Grade 8, on average 14 year old. At this age the majority of them may still have not yet developed a sense of critical reflection about the dynamics of civil society nor may have fully understood and accepted the rights and responsibilities that go with society membership. However, our analyses use civic knowledge in the models and several studies (Torney-Purta 2002a, b) argue that civic knowledge is related with civic participation, so we control for student civic competence.

Also, future participation scales are based on student subjective reports on anticipated future participation and as such could be biased by social desirability, for example. The data provided by ICCS 2009, however, do not include social desirability measures which could have been used to control for in the regression models, or to produce adjusted levels of future participation. Also, because ICCS has a cross-sectional design, the test–retest (i.e. expected vs. actual participation) is unknown. However, other studies have found future participation measures to be good predictors of actual participation; for example,

based on data from a panel study, Campbell (2007) reported that 84 % of high-school students who reported they expect to vote in elections really did 10 years later.

Another caveat should be borne in mind regarding regression models. Indeed, most indices included as predictors proved to be significant, but effect sizes are rather small and should not be overstated. Similar are the findings by Starosta (2010) who used European Social Survey data. However, the amount of explained variance in the separate countries is quite satisfying.

Yet another limitation is that the observational data of ICCS 2009 can provide evidence of association but no causation. Students have not been randomly assigned to experimental and control conditions. Analyses could suffer from omitted variables bias if unobserved variables affect the predictor and outcome variable simultaneously. Therefore, our results need carefully to be interpreted in terms of associations, only.

Finally, another caveat is that this study cannot and does not intend to represent the European continent with the data of 22 countries utilized. The analytic sample includes only the European countries that participated in ICCS 2009, but many European countries did not participate and their information could shed more light on the results. Due to these limitations, the results should be interpreted with caution and not be easily generalized.

Appendix

See Tables 3, 4, 5, 6.

Table 3 Levels of future civic participation in Europe

Countries	Future Informal Participation				Future Electoral Participation			Future Political Participation			
	Talk about own views	Write to a newspaper	Online discussion forum	Join an organization	Vote in local elections	Vote in national elections	Get information about candidates	Help a candidate or party during an election campaign	Join a political party	Join a trade union	Stand as a candidate in local elections
Bulgaria	63.85 (1.09) ▲	45.30 (1.22) ▲	56.12 (1.15) ▲	42.57 (1.39) ▲	85.71 (0.89) ▼	77.06 (0.80) ▼	79.20 (0.87) ▼	48.68 (1.25)	34.86 (1.69) ▲	32.35 (1.22) ▼	40.06 (1.60) ▲
Czech Republic	44.25 (0.99) ▼	22.59 (0.94) ▼	47.87 (0.81) ▲	22.62 (0.89) ▼	78.60 (0.72) ▼	61.07 (1.06) ▼	74.08 (0.87) ▼	32.43 (0.92) ▼	21.00 (0.86) ▼	22.34 (0.82) ▼	32.50 (0.92)
Estonia	55.60 (1.28)	21.98 (1.04) ▼	40.70 (1.41) ▲	32.10 (1.16)	82.44 (1.19) ▼	77.49 (1.16) ▼	71.10 (1.34) ▼	34.05 (1.42) ▼	21.37 (1.20) ▼	30.46 (1.31) ▼	24.01 (0.98) ▼
Latvia	68.75 (1.02) ▲	47.82 (1.22) ▲	59.05 (1.35) ▲	42.94 (1.28) ▲	84.66 (0.88) ▼	82.76 (0.94) ▼	84.65 (1.01) ▲	47.90 (1.36)	35.17 (1.38) ▲	38.88 (1.29)	44.85 (1.44) ▲
Lithuania	58.80 (0.92) ▲	38.41 (1.08)	58.90 (0.97) ▲	39.09 (1.12) ▲	91.38 (0.67) ▲	91.25 (0.64) ▲	87.98 (0.77) ▲	47.42 (1.11)	26.39 (0.97)	29.93 (1.00) ▼	29.87 (1.17)
Poland	62.39 (1.15) ▲	31.02 (1.05) ▼	52.98 (1.07) ▲	32.00 (0.96)	87.91 (0.77)	84.42 (0.88) ▼	69.98 (1.27) ▼	32.76 (1.18) ▼	20.97 (1.05) ▼	38.40 (1.08)	33.49 (1.14) ▲
Russian Federation	69.62 (0.95) ▲	51.49 (0.98) ▲	57.35 (1.14) ▲	52.82 (0.99) ▲	93.15 (0.39) ▲	88.11 (0.68)	80.83 (0.81)	53.39 (0.81) ▲	47.00 (1.06) ▲	44.40 (1.18) ▲	45.39 (1.06) ▲
Slovak Republic	58.18 (1.34) ▲	28.28 (1.22) ▼	42.31 (1.19) ▲	32.10 (1.36)	79.99 (0.91) ▼	80.72 (1.02) ▼	81.72 (1.03)	35.86 (1.06) ▼	24.98 (1.12)	20.72 (1.06) ▼	34.41 (1.40) ▲
Slovenia	51.67 (0.99) ▼	30.00 (1.23) ▼	42.88 (1.28) ▲	57.93 (1.13) ▲	86.22 (0.80) ▼	86.35 (0.69) ▼	81.64 (0.81)	39.53 (1.31) ▼	28.24 (1.41)	30.41 (1.30) ▼	44.19 (1.23) ▲
Austria	56.90 (1.24)	37.61 (1.34) ▲	39.82 (1.30) ▼	40.27 (1.35)	87.85 (0.70) ▲	86.58 (0.78) ▲	88.02 (0.74) ▲	53.68 (1.12) ▲	37.18 (1.43) ▲	38.73 (1.30) ▲	40.53 (1.22) ▲
Belgium (Flemish)	44.07 (1.41) ▼	26.30 (1.24) ▼	27.29 (1.53) ▼	19.78 (1.11) ▼	81.59 (0.91) ▼	78.94 (1.08) ▼	61.44 (1.40) ▼	32.36 (1.63) ▼	15.59 (1.20) ▼	23.73 (1.22) ▼	19.71 (1.35) ▼
Cyprus	68.59 (0.97) ▲	53.08 (1.24) ▲	57.96 (1.00) ▲	57.92 (1.10) ▲	86.39 (0.69)	84.95 (0.71) ▲	80.84 (0.86)	59.11 (1.00) ▲	52.85 (1.07) ▲	51.65 (1.43) ▲	56.48 (1.19) ▲
Denmark	53.34 (1.09) ▼	20.60 (1.05) ▼	31.64 (0.84) ▼	24.67 (0.98) ▼	84.69 (0.70) ▼	92.51 (0.53) ▲	74.69 (0.73) ▼	30.37 (1.03) ▼	25.67 (1.03)	67.87 (1.04) ▲	14.83 (0.75) ▼
England	53.26 (1.21) ▼	36.37 (1.21) ▲	38.78 (1.02) ▼	29.63 (1.27) ▼	80.82 (0.94) ▼	76.95 (1.00) ▼	75.08 (1.02) ▼	40.25 (1.04)	25.17 (1.08)	26.31 (1.11)	23.73 (1.32) ▼
Finland	31.48 (1.17) ▼	14.65 (0.68) ▼	23.24 (0.90) ▼	12.61 (0.71) ▼	88.04 (0.59) ▲	87.50 (0.63) ▲	79.90 (0.85)	15.40 (0.68) ▼	16.12 (0.90) ▼	33.59 (0.91) ▲	10.75 (0.82) ▼
Greece	77.21 (0.93) ▲	52.97 (1.31) ▲	57.99 (1.21) ▲	63.69 (1.11) ▲	90.56 (0.66) ▲	84.15 (0.88)	82.24 (0.87)	50.63 (1.50) ▲	49.70 (1.38) ▲	65.04 (1.29) ▲	45.94 (1.42) ▲
Ireland	56.23 (1.21) ▼	37.47 (1.15) ▲	33.96 (1.28) ▼	35.34 (1.20) ▼	93.21 (0.52) ▲	90.73 (0.53) ▲	83.95 (0.73) ▲	50.27 (1.25) ▲	27.56 (1.15)	46.91 (1.53) ▲	31.52 (1.32)
Italy	70.11 (1.09) ▲	41.86 (1.41) ▲	47.25 (1.30) ▼	39.23 (1.40)	93.77 (0.53) ▲	91.04 (0.56) ▲	91.62 (0.56) ▲	51.62 (1.21) ▲	35.15 (1.11) ▲	36.03 (1.28) ▲	34.09 (1.11)
Norway	52.40 (1.33) ▼	37.39 (1.38) ▲	38.59 (1.21) ▼	27.14 (1.38) ▼	90.03 (0.67) ▲	88.39 (0.84) ▲	85.27 (0.91) ▲	49.63 (1.14) ▲	26.64 (1.29)	36.71 (1.51) ▲	20.72 (1.17) ▼
Spain	61.16 (0.99)	36.57 (1.23) ▲	37.48 (1.10) ▼	37.29 (1.34)	91.91 (0.61) ▲	90.06 (0.61) ▲	84.40 (0.76) ▲	47.28 (1.15) ▲	42.53 (1.18) ▲	37.26 (1.27) ▲	31.63 (1.42)
Sweden	53.04 (1.41) ▼	27.95 (1.29)	35.07 (1.19) ▼	21.24 (1.09) ▼	85.31 (0.85)	89.38 (0.71) ▲	80.82 (1.02)	35.59 (1.04) ▼	23.11 (1.06)	35.31 (1.35) ▲	29.78 (1.05) ▼
Switzerland	54.56 (1.23) ▼	21.91 (1.24) ▼	31.05 (1.26) ▼	26.62 (1.31) ▼	76.38 (1.22) ▼	75.94 (1.35) ▼	84.83 (0.83) ▲	50.79 (1.24) ▲	29.32 (1.39)	25.62 (1.25) ▼	24.83 (1.33) ▼
Median (new democracies)	58.8	31.02	52.98	39.09	85.71	82.76	80.83	39.53	26.39	30.46	34.41
Median (established democracies)	54.04	36.47	36.98	32.48	86.9	87.04	82.97	49.95	30.92	36.03	30.65

() Standard errors appear in parentheses

▲ the percentage is significantly higher than the median of the counter group of countries ($p < .05$, two-tailed)

▼ the percentage is significantly lower than the median of the counter group of countries ($p < .05$, two-tailed)

Table 4 Regression models for future informal participation scale

Countries	R^2	Constant	Gender	Civic knowledge	Socio-economic background	Expected years of further education	Participation at school
Austria	0.30	15.07 (1.86)	0.37 (0.36)	−0.01* (<0.01)	0.08 (0.21)	−0.02 (0.07)	−0.01 (0.02)
Belgium (Flemish)	0.32	14.71 (1.77)	0.30 (0.3)	−0.01* (<0.01)	0.17 (0.15)	−0.01 (0.08)	0.02 (0.02)
Bulgaria	0.29	21.46 (2.39)	−0.31 (0.37)	−0.01* (<0.01)	0.08 (0.21)	0.03 (0.07)	0.04* (0.02)
Cyprus	0.35	13.01 (1.99)	−0.04 (0.49)	−0.01* (<0.01)	0.40 (0.22)	−0.18 (0.1)	0.06* (0.02)
Czech Republic	0.32	7.41 (1.43)	<0.01 (0.22)	<0.01* (<0.01)	0.01 (0.16)	−0.12 (0.09)	0.06* (0.02)
Denmark	0.34	14.77 (1.45)	1.08* (0.32)	<0.01 (<0.01)	−0.08 (0.15)	−0.09 (0.08)	0.04* (0.01)
England	0.40	13.99 (1.72)	0.96* (0.31)	−0.01* (<0.01)	0.27 (0.16)	−0.13 −(0.13)	0.01 (0.02)
Estonia	0.28	13.66 (1.77)	−0.17 (0.36)	−0.01* (<0.01)	<0.01 (0.17)	0.06 (0.08)	0.07* (0.02)
Finland	0.38	14.67 (1.58)	1.16* (0.25)	−0.01* (<0.01)	−0.01 (0.13)	−0.14* (0.06)	0.01 (0.01)
Greece	0.28	16.83 (1.75)	−0.12 (0.39)	<0.01 (<0.01)	0.29 (0.21)	−0.05 (0.10)	0.03 (0.02)
Ireland	0.39	11.84 (1.69)	0.70* (0.33)	−0.01* (<0.01)	0.24 (0.16)	0.12 (0.07)	0.02 (0.02)
Italy	0.39	7.60 (1.67)	0.06 (0.3)	<0.01* (<0.01)	0.29* (0.14)	0.08 (0.06)	0.03 (0.02)
Latvia	0.31	12.32 (2.19)	−0.19 (0.35)	−0.01* (<0.01)	−0.26 (0.17)	0.02 (0.08)	0.01 (0.02)
Lithuania	0.29	17.00 (1.92)	−0.01 (0.28)	−0.01* (<0.01)	0.18 (0.14)	0.15 (0.10)	<0.01 (0.02)
Norway	0.34	11.98 (2.19)	0.75* (0.36)	−0.01* (<0.01)	−0.01 (0.21)	0.09 (0.08)	0.05 (0.03)
Poland	0.33	9.51 (1.67)	−0.75* (0.31)	<0.01 (<0.01)	0.24 (0.16)	0.02 (0.08)	0.07* (0.02)
Russian Federation	0.37	7.07 (1.63)	0.44 (0.32)	<0.01 (<0.01)	−0.35* (0.13)	−0.08 (0.09)	0.03 (0.02)
Slovak Republic	0.35	10.53 (2.01)	−0.04 (0.28)	<0.01 (<0.01)	0.26 (0.15)	−0.21* (0.08)	0.03 (0.02)
Slovenia	0.28	21.37 (1.57)	−0.33 (0.26)	−0.01* (<0.01)	−0.22 (0.19)	−0.08 (0.1)	0.05* (0.02)
Spain	0.33	12.32 (1.56)	0.61 (0.34)	−0.01* (<0.01)	−0.06 (0.17)	0.07 (0.07)	0.04 (0.02)
Sweden	0.33	19.18 (1.56)	1.24* (0.32)	<0.01* (<0.01)	0.06 (0.17)	−0.17 (0.12)	0.03 (0.02)
Switzerland	0.30	15.60 (2.55)	1.00* (0.36)	−0.01* (<0.01)	0.39 (0.23)	−0.02 (0.06)	0.01 (0.02)

Table 4 continued

Countries	Social and political discussion outside school	Parental interest in social and political issues	Trust in civic institutions	Sense of internal political efficacy	Citizenship self-efficacy	Perception of openness in classroom discussion
Austria	0.11* (0.02)	0.31 (0.33)	0.07* (0.02)	0.22* (0.03)	0.34* (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)
Belgium (Flemish)	0.12* (0.02)	0.32 (0.25)	0.09* (0.02)	0.24* (0.02)	0.29* (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)
Bulgaria	0.04* (0.02)	0.80* (0.27)	0.09* (0.02)	0.21* (0.02)	0.27* (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)
Cyprus	0.08* (0.02)	0.83* (0.28)	0.09* (0.02)	0.23* (0.03)	0.35* (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)
Czech Republic	0.08* (0.02)	0.86* (0.19)	0.08* (0.02)	0.26* (0.02)	0.29* (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Denmark	0.16* (0.02)	1.15* (0.22)	0.03 (0.02)	0.19* (0.02)	0.23* (0.03)	<0.01 (0.02)
England	0.11* (0.03)	0.69* (0.27)	0.12* (0.02)	0.20* (0.03)	0.32* (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Estonia	0.10* (0.02)	0.58* (0.23)	0.09* (0.02)	0.23* (0.02)	0.25* (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)
Finland	0.10* (0.02)	0.20 (0.19)	0.04* (0.02)	0.28* (0.02)	0.27* (0.03)	0.04* (0.02)
Greece	0.05* (0.02)	0.89* (0.22)	0.06* (0.02)	0.21* (0.03)	0.31* (0.03)	<0.01 (0.02)
Ireland	0.11* (0.02)	0.31 (0.22)	0.12* (0.02)	0.25* (0.02)	0.28* (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
Italy	0.12* (0.02)	0.72* (0.24)	0.03 (0.02)	0.22* (0.02)	0.36* (0.02)	0.06* (0.02)
Latvia	0.11* (0.02)	0.64* (0.26)	0.14* (0.02)	0.24* (0.03)	0.35* (0.03)	<0.01 (0.02)
Lithuania	0.06* (0.02)	0.45* (0.22)	0.10* (0.02)	0.28* (0.03)	0.30* (0.02)	0.03 (0.02)
Norway	0.09* (0.02)	0.93* (0.32)	0.08* (0.02)	0.24* (0.03)	0.24* (0.03)	0.07* (0.02)
Poland	0.07* (0.02)	0.40 (0.22)	0.08* (0.02)	0.19* (0.02)	0.33* (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)
Russian Federation	0.08* (0.02)	0.83* (0.22)	0.08* (0.02)	0.27* (0.03)	0.39* (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)
Slovak Republic	0.10* (0.02)	0.52* (0.24)	0.08* (0.02)	0.23* (0.03)	0.33* (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)
Slovenia	0.07* (0.02)	0.21 (0.29)	0.08* (0.02)	0.23* (0.02)	0.23* (0.02)	<0.01 (0.02)
Spain	0.09* (0.02)	0.61* (0.25)	0.18* (0.02)	0.26* (0.02)	0.27* (0.03)	−0.02 (0.02)
Sweden	0.12* (0.02)	0.32 (0.21)	0.05* (0.02)	0.19* (0.02)	0.22* (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Switzerland	0.09* (0.02)	0.12 (0.25)	0.06* (0.03)	0.28* (0.02)	0.25* (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)

() Standard errors appear in parentheses, * The coefficient is statistically significant ($p < .05$)

Table 5 Regression models for future electoral participation scale

Countries	R^2	Constant	Gender	Civic knowledge	Socio-economic background	Expected years of further education	Participation at school
Austria	0.38	4.68 (1.69)	−0.76* (0.3)	0.03* (<0.01)	0.43* (0.17)	0.06 (0.07)	0.03 (0.02)
Belgium (Flemish)	0.30	2.52 (1.29)	−0.39 (0.31)	0.02* (<0.01)	0.36* (0.18)	−0.01 (0.06)	0.05* (0.02)
Bulgaria	0.26	1.01 (1.99)	−0.01 (0.38)	0.03* (<0.01)	−0.51* (0.16)	0.12 (0.07)	0.04 (0.02)
Cyprus	0.32	2.31 (1.93)	−0.5 (0.36)	0.03* (<0.01)	0.11 (0.21)	−0.05 (0.07)	0.05* (0.02)
Czech Republic	0.38	−9.37 (1.39)	−1.21* (0.28)	0.04* (<0.01)	0.49* (0.15)	0.1 (0.10)	0.05* (0.02)
Denmark	0.39	3.50 (1.43)	1.11* (0.25)	0.01* (<0.01)	0.11 (0.16)	0.21* (0.08)	0.04* (0.01)
England	0.41	−0.88 (1.8)	−1.03* (0.39)	0.02* (<0.01)	0.34 (0.22)	0.27* (0.13)	0.06* (0.02)
Estonia	0.29	0.61 (1.86)	−0.16 (0.35)	0.02* (<0.01)	0.07 (0.18)	0.1 (0.07)	0.05* (0.02)
Finland	0.37	5.35 (1.6)	0.49 (0.35)	0.01* (<0.01)	0.42* (0.14)	0.19* (0.06)	0.06* (0.02)
Greece	0.26	2.35 (2.31)	0.02 (0.34)	0.03* (<0.01)	0.08 (0.24)	0.31* (0.10)	0.05 (0.02)
Ireland	0.34	6.96 (1.85)	0.52 (0.35)	0.03* (<0.01)	0.14 (0.18)	0.32* (0.08)	0.04* (0.02)
Italy	0.29	7.34 (1.98)	−0.24 (0.31)	0.03* (<0.01)	−0.13 (0.17)	0.27* (0.07)	0.03 (0.02)
Latvia	0.22	2.61 (2.25)	−0.06 (0.38)	0.03* (<0.01)	0.33 (0.22)	<0.01 (0.08)	0.03 (0.03)
Lithuania	0.24	1.62 (2.24)	0.41 (0.34)	0.03* (<0.01)	0.09 (0.18)	0.21 (0.11)	0.03 (0.02)
Norway	0.35	3.14 (2.38)	0.51 (0.35)	0.03* (<0.01)	0.47 (0.27)	0.38* (0.11)	0.09* (0.02)
Poland	0.29	1.43 (1.62)	<0.01 (0.3)	0.02* (<0.01)	0.12 (0.17)	0.06 (0.10)	0.10* (0.02)
Russian Federation	0.24	4.31 (1.59)	−0.02 (0.3)	0.02* (<0.01)	−0.22 (0.16)	0.17 (0.10)	0.07* (0.02)
Slovak Republic	0.33	−3.54 (2.09)	−0.29 (0.32)	0.03* (<0.01)	0.11 (0.20)	0.31* (0.10)	0.07* (0.02)
Slovenia	0.26	7.64 (2.03)	−0.42 (0.41)	0.03* (<0.01)	0.18 (0.27)	0.37* (0.14)	−0.01 (0.02)
Spain	0.29	5.21 (1.67)	−0.61 (0.36)	0.02* (<0.01)	−0.11 (0.17)	0.25* (0.09)	0.07* (0.03)
Sweden	0.35	9.04 (1.53)	1.11* (0.35)	0.02* (<0.01)	0.38 (0.20)	−0.01 (0.10)	0.01 (0.02)
Switzerland	0.33	9.21 (1.99)	−0.31 (0.44)	0.02* (<0.01)	0.58 (0.39)	0.42* (0.08)	0.03 (0.03)

Table 5 continued

Countries	Social and political discussion outside school	Parental interest in social and political issues	Trust in civic institutions	Sense of internal political efficacy	Citizenship self-efficacy	Perception of openness in classroom discussion
Austria	0.01 (0.02)	1.59* (0.25)	0.21* (0.02)	0.13* (0.02)	0.20* (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Belgium (Flemish)	0.05* (0.02)	1.35* (0.30)	0.19* (0.02)	0.17* (0.03)	0.15* (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)
Bulgaria	0.01 (0.02)	2.21* (0.30)	0.18* (0.03)	0.20* (0.03)	0.13* (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)
Cyprus	<0.01 (0.02)	1.32* (0.27)	0.18* (0.03)	0.16* (0.03)	0.18* (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)
Czech Republic	0.04 (0.02)	2.77* (0.21)	0.16* (0.02)	0.22* (0.02)	0.12* (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Denmark	0.08* (0.02)	1.4* (0.21)	0.20* (0.01)	0.15* (0.02)	0.13* (0.02)	0.03* (0.02)
England	0.05* (0.02)	1.98* (0.25)	0.19* (0.03)	0.15* (0.02)	0.13* (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)
Estonia	<0.01 (0.02)	1.59* (0.28)	0.21* (0.02)	0.18* (0.02)	0.16* (0.03)	0.04* (0.02)
Finland	0.07* (0.02)	2.27* (0.22)	0.23* (0.02)	0.10* (0.03)	0.14* (0.03)	0.02 (0.02)
Greece	0.01 (0.02)	0.71* (0.28)	0.20* (0.02)	0.20* (0.03)	0.09* (0.03)	0.07* (0.02)
Ireland	0.02 (0.02)	1.38* (0.23)	0.21* (0.02)	0.14* (0.02)	0.10* (0.02)	0.02 (0.01)
Italy	−0.01 (0.02)	1.63* (0.26)	0.17* (0.03)	0.11* (0.02)	0.11* (0.02)	0.06* (0.02)
Latvia	0.05* (0.02)	0.77* (0.28)	0.21* (0.02)	0.12* (0.03)	0.20* (0.03)	0.07* (0.03)
Lithuania	0.04 (0.02)	1.61* (0.26)	0.24* (0.02)	0.15* (0.03)	0.14* (0.02)	0.04* (0.02)
Norway	0.04 (0.02)	1.72* (0.29)	0.18* (0.02)	0.11* (0.03)	0.08* (0.03)	0.06* (0.02)
Poland	0.05* (0.02)	1.67* (0.31)	0.18* (0.02)	0.08* (0.02)	0.21* (0.02)	0.04 (0.02)
Russian Federation	0.04 (0.02)	0.79* (0.24)	0.27* (0.02)	0.10* (0.02)	0.14* (0.02)	0.05* (0.02)
Slovak Republic	0.01 (0.02)	1.82* (0.29)	0.20* (0.02)	0.18* (0.02)	0.18* (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)
Slovenia	0.04* (0.02)	1.92* (0.32)	0.13* (0.02)	0.12* (0.02)	0.15* (0.02)	0.03 (0.03)
Spain	0.01 (0.02)	1.19* (0.27)	0.26* (0.02)	0.15* (0.02)	0.15* (0.02)	−0.04 (0.02)
Sweden	0.06* (0.02)	1.3* (0.19)	0.17* (0.02)	0.14* (0.03)	0.13* (0.02)	0.02 (0.02)
Switzerland	−0.02 (0.03)	2.02* (0.34)	0.15* (0.02)	0.26* (0.02)	0.08* (0.03)	−0.08* (0.03)

() Standard errors appear in parentheses, * The coefficient is statistically significant ($p < .05$)

Table 6 Regression models for future political participation scale

Countries	R^2	Constant	Gender	Civic knowledge	Socio-economic background	Expected years of further education	Participation at school
Austria	0.24	30.93 (1.80)	−1.68* (0.35)	−0.02* (<0.01)	0.15 (0.21)	−0.15* (0.07)	0.03 (0.02)
Belgium (Flemish)	0.24	25.35 (1.84)	−0.50 (0.39)	−0.02* (<0.01)	0.39* (0.18)	<0.01 (0.08)	0.06* (0.02)
Bulgaria	0.28	27.14 (2.13)	−0.17 (0.48)	−0.02* (<0.01)	−0.44* (0.22)	0.05 (0.07)	0.02 (0.02)
Cyprus	0.28	23.05 (1.94)	−2.57* (0.40)	−0.02* (<0.01)	0.31 (0.26)	−0.07 (0.10)	0.08* (0.02)
Czech Republic	0.24	15.43 (1.63)	−0.51* (0.26)	−0.01* (<0.01)	−0.18 (0.16)	0.07 (0.09)	0.05* (0.02)
Denmark	0.21	26.14 (1.46)	0.22 (0.30)	<0.01 (<0.01)	−0.29* (0.14)	0.08 (0.10)	0.02 (0.01)
England	0.28	20.81 (1.74)	−0.17 (0.35)	−0.01* (<0.01)	−0.24 (0.19)	0.27* (0.13)	0.02 (0.02)
Estonia	0.20	22.61 (1.89)	−1.50* (0.38)	−0.01* (<0.01)	−0.20 (0.19)	0.16* (0.07)	0.09* (0.02)
Finland	0.25	27.97 (1.56)	0.21 (0.32)	−0.01* (<0.01)	−0.10 (0.13)	0.05 (0.06)	0.02 (0.02)
Greece	0.20	27.50 (1.79)	−1.03* (0.32)	−0.02* (<0.01)	0.14 (0.22)	0.09 (0.09)	0.02 (0.02)
Ireland	0.29	21.94 (1.66)	−0.68 (0.37)	−0.01* (<0.01)	−0.01 (0.20)	0.11 (0.09)	0.04 (0.02)
Italy	0.25	22.26 (2.13)	−1.97* (0.34)	−0.01* (<0.01)	0.22 (0.16)	<0.01 (0.08)	<0.01 (0.02)
Latvia	0.22	26.85 (2.51)	−1.24* (0.52)	−0.02* (<0.01)	−0.02 (0.20)	−0.01 (0.09)	0.06* (0.02)
Lithuania	0.23	27.07 (2.37)	−1.59* (0.32)	−0.03* (<0.01)	0.22 (0.13)	0.11 (0.11)	0.05* (0.02)
Norway	0.23	25.27 (2.35)	<0.01 (0.30)	−0.02* (<0.01)	−0.02 (0.20)	0.17 (0.09)	0.06* (0.02)
Poland	0.22	24.45 (1.74)	−2.32* (0.34)	−0.02* (<0.01)	−0.09 (0.19)	0.14 (0.09)	0.06* (0.02)
Russian Federation	0.28	18.46 (1.97)	−1.70* (0.30)	−0.02* (<0.01)	−0.35* (0.16)	0.01 (0.09)	0.10* (0.02)
Slovak Republic	0.29	24.05 (2.09)	−1.01* (0.27)	−0.02* (<0.01)	−0.33 (0.19)	−0.02 (0.10)	0.04 (0.02)
Slovenia	0.24	27.72 (1.59)	−2.03* (0.37)	−0.02* (<0.01)	−0.40 (0.20)	0.17 (0.13)	0.01 (0.02)
Spain	0.25	27.46 (1.64)	−0.33 −(0.33)	−0.02* (<0.01)	−0.16 (0.20)	0.04 (0.07)	0.03 (0.02)
Sweden	0.22	29.66 (1.43)	0.14 (0.29)	−0.01* (<0.01)	0.17 (0.18)	−0.02 (0.11)	0.04 (0.02)
Switzerland	0.22	29.25 (2.12)	−1.00* (0.44)	−0.01* (<0.01)	0.20 (0.20)	0.10 (0.08)	0.02 (0.02)

Table 6 continued

Countries	Social and political discussion outside school	Parental interest in social and political issues	Trust in civic institutions	Sense of internal political efficacy	Citizenship self-efficacy	Perception of openness in classroom discussion
Austria	<0.01 (0.02)	0.40 (0.27)	0.17* (0.02)	0.14* (0.02)	0.27* (0.02)	−0.03 (0.02)
Belgium (Flemish)	0.02 (0.02)	0.62* (0.26)	0.10* (0.02)	0.26* (0.03)	0.20* (0.03)	<0.01 (0.02)
Bulgaria	0.01 (0.02)	0.90* (0.28)	0.18* (0.02)	0.25* (0.02)	0.17* (0.02)	−0.02 (0.02)
Cyprus	0.02 (0.03)	0.99* (0.32)	0.17* (0.02)	0.22* (0.03)	0.25* (0.03)	−0.03 (0.02)
Czech Republic	0.05* (0.02)	1.04* (0.20)	0.15* (0.02)	0.26* (0.02)	0.20* (0.02)	<0.01 (0.02)
Denmark	0.04* (0.02)	0.80* (0.21)	0.08* (0.02)	0.19* (0.02)	0.14* (0.02)	−0.01 (0.01)
England	0.04* (0.02)	0.75* (0.25)	0.18* (0.02)	0.19* (0.02)	0.20* (0.02)	0.01 (0.02)
Estonia	−0.03 (0.02)	0.51* (0.23)	0.20* (0.02)	0.21* (0.02)	0.19* (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)
Finland	<0.01 (0.01)	0.64* (0.29)	0.08* (0.02)	0.19* (0.02)	0.25* (0.03)	−0.02 (0.02)
Greece	−0.01 (0.02)	0.34 (0.23)	0.19* (0.02)	0.19* (0.02)	0.17* (0.03)	0.03 (0.02)
Ireland	0.02 (0.02)	0.70* (0.23)	0.19* (0.02)	0.23* (0.02)	0.19* (0.02)	−0.02 (0.02)
Italy	0.04* (0.02)	0.87* (0.20)	0.08* (0.03)	0.25* (0.02)	0.25* (0.03)	<0.01 (0.02)
Latvia	0.05* (0.02)	0.12 (0.31)	0.22* (0.02)	0.14* (0.03)	0.26* (0.03)	−0.01 (0.02)
Lithuania	0.02 (0.02)	0.09 (0.27)	0.19* (0.03)	0.24* (0.03)	0.20* (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)
Norway	0.02 (0.02)	0.76* (0.32)	0.14* (0.02)	0.22* (0.02)	0.13* (0.02)	0.05* (0.02)
Poland	0.04* (0.02)	0.36 (0.26)	0.17* (0.02)	0.11* (0.02)	0.26* (0.02)	<0.01 (0.02)
Russian Federation	0.01 (0.01)	0.69* (0.25)	0.16* (0.02)	0.20* (0.02)	0.34* (0.03)	0.01 (0.02)
Slovak Republic	0.01 (0.02)	0.21 (0.26)	0.16* (0.02)	0.25* (0.03)	0.27* (0.03)	−0.04 (0.02)
Slovenia	0.05* (0.02)	0.91* (0.32)	0.15* (0.02)	0.23* (0.02)	0.16* (0.02)	<0.01 (0.02)
Spain	−0.01 (0.02)	1.06* (0.25)	0.22* (0.02)	0.21* (0.03)	0.24* (0.03)	−0.04* (0.02)
Sweden	0.03 (0.02)	0.44 (0.25)	0.12* (0.02)	0.18* (0.02)	0.15* (0.02)	<0.01 (0.02)
Switzerland	−0.02 (0.02)	1.50* (0.29)	0.15* (0.02)	0.22* (0.02)	0.18* (0.03)	−0.06* (0.02)

() Standard errors appear in parentheses, * The coefficient is statistically significant ($p < .05$)

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