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If we follow Hick down the path of strong ineffability for the noumenal Real, the Real is simply empty, pointless, 'otiose – it does no real work in Hick's hypothesis – and is thus an excisable appendage' (p. 112). Rose proposes that we accept the Real as 'a *causal* factor in the generation of human religious experience' (p. 127), always filtered by human freedom and the indefinite diversity of human personalities, cultures, and traditions. In this revision Rose draws on Hick's doctrines of human freedom, the world's inherent ambiguity, and faith as interpretation.

There are grave risks in insisting on the cognitive validity of religious truth. It can fuel fundamentalism and particularism, and invites people to fight it out in defense of their own truths. But rather than give up hope of religious truth except as purely mythological, Rose hopes for truth as 'an emergent feature of the conversation of human beings of any and all tribes and races and creeds talking earnestly with one another ...' (p. 142).

Rose's goals are important and clearly defined. His knowledge of Hick's work is excellent, and he brings a genuinely impressive range of relevant literature into the discussion. My criticisms are too minor to pursue here. I totally agree that the noumenal Real is empty. I can't imagine what it means or why I should care about it. As a naturalist I'm comfortable replacing Hick's Real with the natural world in which we all live. Readers wanting more will wish that Rose had given a full blown defense of his revision of Hick's ideas. You are left hanging, wondering if he can really pull it off, hoping for the sequel.

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Norman Kretzmann, *The Metaphysics of Theism: Aquinas's Natural Theology in Summa Contra Gentiles I*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997, xii + 302 pages. \$35.00

The Metaphysics of Theism is the first of three projected volumes by Norman Kretzmann on Aquinas's Summa contra gentiles. The present volume deals with Book I, the subject of which is God considered in himself. Future volumes will deal with the topics of Book II, viz., the emergence of created things from God, and of Book III, viz., the ordering and directing of created things toward God as their goal.

Kretzmann's book is of the nature of a selective commentary on Aquinas's text. His focus is on the exegesis and critical assessment of Aquinas's argumentation concerning the existence and attributes of God.

Of the five arguments for God's existence presented in *Summa contra gentiles* (hereafter SCG) I.13 Kretzmann chooses to discuss in depth the

second one, based on motion and putatively demonstrating the existence of a separated, altogether immovable first mover. While representing Aquinas's "most intricate argument for God's existence" and containing "lines of thought that illuminate later developments in his natural theology," Kretzmann ultimately judges it to have "fatal flaws" (p. 83). At the same time he discerns in SCG I.15 the suggestion of another existence argument based on considerations of causality which postulates a first necessary being that is necessary through itself. In view of the negative assessment generally given to the history of attempts to prove God's existence, Kretzmann makes the intriguing claim that this latter argument provides "good evidence" (p. 112) and is "an acceptable cosmological argument" (p. 117).

In considering Aquinas's delineation of God's attributes in SCG I, Kretzmann selects for extended discussion the elimination from God of the ordinary distinction between "essential nature" and "existence", the divine perfection, uniqueness, and infinity, the postulation of intellect and will in God, the presence of freedom of choice in divine volition, the divine experience of love and joy of a non-emotional variety, and the presence of moral virtues in God, in particular, the moral virtue of liberality. In discussing the divine nature Kretzmann has an agenda beyond the critical exposition of Aguinas's text. One of the standard criticisms of the concept of God developed in medieval philosophical theology is that it represents a "God of the philosophers" divorced from the God of the Bible and the experience of the faith community. Thus Kretzmann is careful to explore Aquinas's establishment of personifying attributes in God. Specifically, Kretzmann proposes that the presence of intellect and will constitute jointly sufficient conditions of personhood, conditions enriched by the presence of free choice, the experience of joy, and the love which establishes interpersonal relationships. In this way Kretzmann goes some distance in exonerating Aquinas of the charge that his picture of God describes "a being that only a metaphysician could love" (p. 169).

In the course of discussing Aquinas's attribution of non-emotional varieties of love and joy to God, Kretzmann briefly treats Aquinas's argumentation rejecting the possibility of God experiencing emotion. In so doing Kretzmann resurrects an issue of theological debate richer than he seems to recognize. In the Bible God is represented as anthropopathic, as experiencing, for example, joy, regret, sorrow, compassion, jealousy, and anger. But in early Church theology and medieval philosophical theology the very legitimacy of attributing emotions to God was called into question. We find discussion of this issue in the writings of Clement of Alexandria (*Stromata* 2.16, 2.18–19, 4.22–23, 6.9, 7.3; *Eclogae ex Scripturis Propheticis* 21; *Paedagogus* 1.8.68.3, 1.8.74.4), Origen (*De Principiis* 2.4.4, 4.2.1), Tertullian

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(Adversus Marcionem 1.25–27, 2.16, 5.4, 5.17), Novatian (De Trinitate 5), Lactantius (De Ira Dei), Augustine (De Civitate Dei 9.5, 15.25; Enchiridion ad Laurentium 33), Moses Maimonides (The Guide of the Perplexed 1.52, 1.54), Anselm (Proslogium 8), and Duns Scotus (Commentaria ad IV Libros Sententiarum 4.46.2) and as well as Thomas Aquinas (Summa contra Gentiles I.89–91). In the literature prior to Aquinas three different positions were articulated: the denial of emotions to God, the affirmation of divine emotions, and the mixed view that God can experience some emotions but not all of them. In view of the history of this debate, Aquinas's putatively definitive resolution of the question deserves further, careful study by medievalists and philosophers of religion.

A major topic of discussion among contemporary analytic philosophers of religion has been the contention of Alvin Plantinga that belief in God is properly basic, that is, that it is reasonable and proper to believe in God without any evidence or argumentation. While Kretzmann intends this book to "make a contribution to medieval philosophical scholarship" (p. 1), he also explicitly casts it as a response to Reformed epistemology. He sees the book advocating the enterprise of natural theology, understood as the project of providing clarification by analysis and support by argumentation for theistic propositions (p. 5). Thus this book has an extended introduction in which Kretzmann critiques three Reformed thinkers, viz., Bavinck, Calvin, and Barth, whom Plantinga uses in support of his position. Kretzmann's conclusion is that Plantinga has "overinterpreted" these Reformed thinkers (p. 20). According to Kretzmann's exegesis, they "are not really 'rejecting natural theology,' but only one possible application of it" (p. 20). Specifically, "since they are raising religious objections against that application, what they would mean by 'the propriety or rightness of belief in God' or '[t]he correct or proper way to believe in God' would constitute a religious, not an epistemological, approbation of shunning evidence or argument as a basis for believing in God" (p. 20). Thus, "in finally paraphrasing these Reformers as having thought that 'the correct way is to take belief in God as basic", Kretzmann believes that Plantinga wrongly suggests that "the high spiritual value they place on believing without evidence constitutes an epistemological appraisal" (p. 20).

Kretzmann's book is both informative about Aquinas's positions and provocative for the study of philosophy of religion. It promises that his projected three volume commentary on the *Summa contra gentiles* will constitute one of the most significant contributions to the study of Aquinas within the analytic tradition.

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