The Night Has a Naked Soul: Witchcraft and Sorcery among the Western Cherokee. *Alan Kilpatrick.* Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1997. xviii + 160 pp., maps, illustration, bibliography, index.

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Alan Kilpatrick has written a welcome addition to Americanist studies of witchcraft and sorcery that expands knowledge in significant ways. First, he demonstrates the continuing vitality of these beliefs among contemporary Native Americans. Widely recognized but little researched by current ethnographers, witchcraft and sorcery is regularly encountered throughout North and South America. Second, the author provides a deepened understanding of witchcraft and sorcery beliefs among the Cherokee, one of the largest North American tribal groupings. He builds upon foundational research by Jack and Anna Frederick Kilpatrick, his parents. He also provides readers with a study of Cherokee witchcraft and sorcery to compare with the seminal work of Clyde Kluckhohn on Navajo witchcraft and sorcery (*Navajo Witchcraft,* Beacon Press, 1967), the Navajo being the second largest North American Tribal grouping. Together with my own book, *Witchcraft and Sorcery of the American Native Peoples* (University of Idaho Press, 1989), these Americanist studies permit reformulation and reexamination of the reigning hypotheses concerning witchcraft and sorcery which are contained in volumes written by British social anthropologists about Africa, Oceania, and elsewhere.

Kilpatrick offers excellent translations of both historic and recent Cherokee witchcraft and sorcery accounts. Drawing upon already collected accounts as well as his own fieldwork, the author has presents a valuable ethnographic assessment of the Cherokee witchcraft-sorcery complex. But his analysis could be made even more valuable. While helpful, the transformational approach employed by the author would be aided by a fuller use of comparative accounts and theoretical interpretations such as those he undertakes in his references to Evans Pritchard and Clyde Kluckhohn in Chapter 7. The need for such comparative empirical research and theoretical interpretation is widely evident since most available studies are limited to only one culture. Few studies attempt the comparative research and interpretation essential for theoretical advances. Despite this possible limitation, this book is a welcome addition to the anthropological literature on witchcraft and sorcery. It is rich with data and very well presented. It should stimulate renewed interest in an important and widespread cultural phenomenon among contemporary American Indians.

Talking Heads: Language, Metalanguage, and the Semiotics of Subjectivity. *Benjamin Lee.* Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1997. ix + 376 pp., references, index.

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At the heart of Benjamin Lee's ambitious book is this question: "What is it about the structure of specific languages (those making up what [Benjamin L.] Whorf would call Standard Average European) and the culturally specific ways we look at (through?) them that makes the various views we have about language and mind possible?" (p. 10). En route to an answer Lee explores and synthesizes the ideas of an impressive range of philosophers, linguists, and literary theorists.

The first half of *Talking Heads* revolves around the concept of performativity developed by John Austin in his famous series of lectures, *How to Do Things with Words* (Oxford University Press, 1962). Lee identifies performatives as an important subset of the metalinguistic resources available for using language to represent speech and thought and hence a central component of Western forms of subjectivity. He takes the reader through the key points of Austin's theory. He then examines how Austin has been received in literary and philosophical circles. Here Lee provides a useful critical discussion of the acrimonious debate between Searle and Derrida which eventually spilled onto the pages of the *New York Review of Books* ("The Word Turned Upside Down", 1983).

Lee locates the roots of Austin's thinking in Frege's analytical philosophy. Although Austin's theory posed a serious challenge to Frege's foundationalist epistemologies, Lee concludes that Austin's theory still suffered from a reliance on Frege's sense-reference theory of meaning. In chapter 3 Lee uses the work of a number of philosophers including Saul Kripke ("Naming and Necessity" in *Semantics*

of *Natural Language*, D. Reidel Publishing Co., 1972) and Hilary Putnam ("The Meaning of Meaning" in *Mind, Language and Reality*, Cambridge University Press, 1975) to illustrate how a Fregean approach to meaning stumbles over phenomena such as proper names, natural-kind terms, and creative indexicals. In the next two chapters Lee outlines an alternative account of performativity based on the semiotic theory of C. S. Peirce and the Peircean-inspired linguistics of Roman Jakobson Jakobson ("Shifters, Verbal Categories, and the Russian Verb" in *Selected Writings II*, Mouton, 1971)) and Michael Silverstein ("Shifters, Linguistic Categories, and Cultural Description" in *Meaning in Anthropology*, University of New Mexico Press, 1976).

The key to this view of performativity is the recognition of the interplay between indexical and meta-indexical dimensions of all semiosis—between "signs whose interpretation is tied to the moment of speaking and signs that represent such signs" (p. 11). According to Lee, "performatives work because they coordinate these two levels—an indexicalized speech event brings about the very speech act it seems meta-indexically to refer to and to describe" (p. 11). Unlike Frege, who treats indexical/meta-indexical relationships as second order operators, Peirce places them at the center of his theory of quantification and propositional structure. Lee goes so far as to suggest that if Austin had been aware of Peircean logic he would have ditched his problematic distinction between locutionary and illocutionary speech acts.

Lee begins the second half of his book with a discussion of Whorf's work on grammatical categories (*Language, Thought and Reality*, MIT Press, 1956) and the linguistic mediation of thought and patterns of behavior. A great deal of controversy and misunderstanding has been generated by Whorf's arguments about the linguistic encoding of temporal and spatial categories and how such patterning might be related to thought and perception. Lee wisely sidesteps that morass by choosing to focus instead on how language is used to represent thought and speech. In doing so, he is able to recuperate the value of Whorf's original insights. Here Lee advances the hypothesis that Western notions of subjectivity depend upon grammatical patterns common to Standard Average European languages which treat verbs of thinking, feeling, and speaking in analogous ways.

In the final three chapters of *Talking Heads* Lee examines the various models of subjectivity which underlie Western philosophy, literature, and politics. In chapter 7 he deals with philosophical models of subjectivity, picking up on several issues raised in his earlier discussion of Frege, Austin, and Searle. For example, he asserts that Descartes' universalist claims about the relationship between mind, language, and reality turn out to "rest on the peculiarity of the way the languages [Descartes happens to use] grammatically encode propositionality in speech and thought" (p. 251). In the next chapter Lee revisits some of the issues raised in his earlier discussion of Derrida and examines how forms of narration produce specific genres and literary styles which model subjectivity in different ways. One of the highlights is his analysis of how Virginia Woolf manipulates metalinguistic structures in *To the Lighthouse* in order to create and intertwine the subjectivities of her characters and narrator. In chapter 9 Lee looks at the rise of yet another form of subjectivity, the "we the people" invoked in the Constitution of the United States. This last chapter of *Talking Heads* is starting to appear on a number of syllabi. It can be read alone; however, in the context of the book as a whole, it does a good job of tying together many of the issues raised in the preceding chapters and suggesting directions for further research.

Lee's scholarship is top-notch, and the remarkable ease with which he moves across disciplinary boundaries enables him to address old and vexing questions in an illuminating way. Readers who are already familiar with current work in linguistic and semiotic anthropology will not be surprised by the trajectory of Lee's argument or by his ultimate conclusions. Students and relative newcomers seeking an in-depth discussion of the theoretical underpinnings of these subdisciplines will be hard pressed to find a clearer and more comprehensive treatment.