

Reorganisational and educational demands of psychoanalytic training today:

Our long and marasmic night of one century

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with a rejoinder by

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Reality does not change simply because we choose to ignore it
(Wilfred R. Bion, 1976, personal communication).

I. Organisational and educational incongruities in psychoanalytic training today

Causes

Our psychoanalytic discipline has its origins, has evolved and is still located within a congregational network that blends and binds together, in an inextricable yet contradictory way, the characteristic prerogatives and functions of a ‘movement’ and a ‘cause’ (e.g. being quasi-religious, ideological, socio-political) with the representative prerogatives and functions of a science and an academic profession (Eisold, 1994, 1997; Steiner, 1994; Bergman, 1997). For the past 100 years we have taken for granted that the ‘unique’ and ‘special’ nature of psychoanalytic education justifies the extension of this inherited organisational and educational syncretism.

Over the period of a century—and as a result of the actively perpetuated interplay of historical determinants and organisational and educational incongruities—our isolated and traditional societies/institutes of psychoanalysis have amalgamated and regenerated the absolutist syncretism that had been inherent in the psychoanalytic movement at the beginning of the 20th century. Starting from the organisational and the educational dissonances, the implicit chimera—the congenital aberration of the initial group of our founders (our *primal* Society-Institute)—of condensing educational criteria and proselytism into a closed system of hegemonic surveillance has degenerated into the current meta-state wherein the International Psychoanalytic Association and its component societies/institutes appropriate to themselves and syncretically superimpose prerogatives and irreconcilable functions, such as:

- a) educational and those of scientific research (the task of universities);
- b) the normativity and regulation of the practice of a profession and its proselytising, including economical, political and ideological aspects (the task of the conventional society of professionals and technicians);
- c) ‘as-if’ accreditation, certification, continuing education and recertification (the tasks of government and civic organisations, as well as of local and external inter-institutional collegiate bodies and multirepresentative and independent consortia or national coalitions).

The dissociation between the—seemingly educational and scientific—objectives and the organisational structure (truly one that combines a monastic educational model with characteristics typical of a technical trade school) of our existing societies/institutes leads to an idealisation of their referential schemes and of personal analysis, orchestrated in a confined atmosphere that intertwines therapeutic and educational intentions. Both of these—the dissociation between objectives and administrative structure and the primitive idealisation of personal analysis—give rise to serious organisational dysfunction and collective regressive phenomena, including a climate of predominantly doctrinaire instruction and a spiral of paranoid anxieties, each, in turn, reinforcing the quasi-religious and closed nature of the administrative structure of these institutions (Holzman, 1976a, 1976b, 1985, 1993; Kernberg, 1986, 1993, 2000, 2001; Garza-Guerrero, 2002a, 2002b).

II. Organisational and educational syncretism: Recurring problems and pathological manifestations

Although in any other professional or scientific field the incongruous multidimensional precepts and functions inherited with our colossal syncretism would ordinarily cancel each other out, in our case, in the context of collective regressive phenomena (i.e. primitive idealisations and their counterpart, paranoidising processes) these precepts and ritualistic procedures not only acquire a life of their own, but they also become invested with an ideological and quasi-religious fervour that transforms them into *missionary mandates and doctrines*. Among the restrictive consequences derived from these evangelising commendations, the following stand out.

1. Educational monasticism

In a recent systematised analysis of the two universal archetypes that are currently used for psychoanalytic training—Eitingon’s traditional model and the French model—Kernberg (2000) critically emphasised problems that are common to both: (1) the infantilisation of candidates; (2) scientific isolation and ignorance; (3) irresponsibility regarding candidates’ educational experience; (4) authoritarianism, violence and arbitrariness; and (5) the denial of the external reality and its effects on psychoanalytic education.

Both models, being predominantly monastic and akin to a technical trade-school model (Kernberg, 1986, 1993), are homogamous (of endogamous psychocloning: among equals, for equals and leading to more equals) and homogeneous (one same levelling programme for everyone, regardless of prior professions). The training, which requires

only a *part-time commitment* and is divorced from universities and research centres as well as from the support of either governmental or civilian institutions, was already denounced long ago by Anna Freud as a genuine anachronism. In her words: ‘the present part-time system seems as out of date to me as if church services were still conducted in catacombs since this is where the early Christians were obliged to meet’ (1966, p. 81).

2. Our dual ‘cross-sterilisation’: Conceptual fragmentation and the absence of organising paradigms

Our organisational syncretism and educational monasticism have, for a whole century, tolerated and even promoted a clinical practice based merely on inductive arguments; this, in turn, explains the proliferation of theories and pseudo-explanatory metaphors. Even more serious—warns Fonagy (1999)—is the progressive conceptual disarticulation and the already critical absence of general agreement within the psychoanalytic community. In Fonagy’s words: ‘We are no longer accumulating knowledge ... we are all developing the discipline in our own individual direction’ (1998). The loss of an organising paradigm has, he suggests, led us into a ‘major epistemological problem of conceptual fragmentation’ and, consequently, to ‘the confusing absence of shared assumptions’ and a pluralistic sectarianism. If our outward cross-sterilisation (i.e. our lack of external coherence) is critical, still more so is our inward cross-sterilisation (i.e. the absence of consensual postulates derived from one single epistemological frame of reference). This dual cross-sterilisation is responsible for our retrogressive stagnation: we are not generating knowledge—rather, we still persevere in our cultism, dedicated to the accumulation of ‘schools’ and sects.

3. The universal lack of external, local, independent systems of accreditation, certification and continuing education

The lack, worldwide, of any external and independent accreditation and certification systems—legally sanctioned by Secretaries or Departments of Education or by autonomous collegiate bodies in their respective locations—for any of our society-institutes of psychoanalysis is living proof of our quasi-religious isolation and of our syncretic operation as an homogenous and ecumenical movement rather than a professional and scientific discipline.

For a century, our hegemonic system for the exclusivity of franchise control (a legacy of the psychoanalytic ‘movement’) has confused, as it still confuses, a fear of the loss of the collective communion in and loyalty to our homogenous system (i.e. psychoanalysis as a ‘cause’) with an acceptance of what would be genuine independent external mechanisms of accreditation and certification of psychoanalysis as a professional discipline and science. Quality and standards are confused with membership and affiliation.

4. Psychoanalytic training as a regressive professional undifferentiation and a ‘*sui generis*’ reprofessionalisation

Any effort aimed at resolving the problems connected with the universal absence of external, local, independent mechanisms for the accreditation and certification of

psychoanalytic training would have to begin with the questions: what kind of programmes should we accredit? And what type of graduates should we certify?

If, as I have pointed out, the administrative structure, the educational model and the human and economic resources for the traditional training in psychoanalysis—even as a sub-speciality of a clinical speciality at postgraduate level (e.g. simultaneously with, or subsequent to, a full-time residency in psychiatry or in clinical psychology, or following a doctorate in the area of mental health or the behavioural sciences)—have become obsolete with regard to the level of competence currently demanded, then offering a ‘special speciality’ in psychoanalysis immediately upon graduation, or an ‘independent profession’, let alone a master’s degree and/or a doctorate, supposedly consolidating a *sui generis* reprofessionalisation, seems to me somewhat adventurous.

In addition, consider that:

- a) ‘more than a hundred years after its foundation, what psychoanalysis is, what a psychoanalytic treatment is and how and for whom it works, are very much in doubt, within and outside the discipline’ (Tuckett, 2001a);
- b) a qualitative and quantitative exploration of some of our central conceptual constructions—such as the *psychoanalytic process*—reveals an inability on the part of 10 training and supervising analysts from the same institute, let alone 10 from different countries or continents, to reach a consensus (Vaughan and Roose, 1995; Vaughan et al., 1997);
- c) we still lack a validated epistemological frame of reference that might permit sifting through our imaginative soliloquies, making it possible—or impossible—to be anchored in the reality of established knowledge outside our consulting rooms (Emde and Fonagy, 1997; Olds and Cooper, 1997; Bleichmar, 2001); as a result, our profession does not yet satisfy major canons for a scientific activity (Fonagy, 1999, 2000);
- d) even more alarmingly, the essential ingredients of the only modality of intervention to which we still devotedly confine ourselves in our catechetical study plans—that is, ‘classical psychoanalysis’—have not yet been defined in any consensual or even communicable and therefore teachable fashion (Cavell, 1988; Ellman, 2000; Garza-Guerrero, 2001; Tuckett, 2001a, 2001b);
- e) the disjointed ‘articles of faith’ (in Wallerstein’s (1998) terms) of our multiplicity of ‘schools’ are just beginning to divest themselves of their infiltrated myths and fallacies, in the light of contemporary advances in the neurosciences, psychiatry and psychology (Fonagy, 2000; Panksepp, 2000; Bleichmar, 2001).

If we attend to the above considerations, we may well ask whether psychoanalysis—as a method of exploration, treatment modality and theoretical frame—can today be defined as an ‘independent profession’, supraordinately accreditable and certifiable, in the complex world of contemporary mental health and behavioural sciences. Or might it, at best, aspire to a consolidation as yet another ‘person’-ology, in evolution and evaluation, with the potential to integrate with other disciplines—for example, with psychiatry and psychology, which rather (at least epistemically, if not ideologically) subordinate it—and be professionally certifiable as a sub-speciality, a master’s degree or a doctorate?

5. Societal and political philocenobism and social irrelevance

The concatenation of a multiplicity of factors derived from the disarticulation between the educational model and the administrative structure and expressed in regressive group phenomena interferes with the potential for real productivity of the traditional society/institute. The most significant of these factors are: the range of problems that part-time training entails; the lack of economic support from the community, a result of our self-imposed parochial isolation; the rigidity and persecutory anxieties and, consequently, the impermeability of our boundaries to vital and flexible interchanges with the exterior; our fixation on collective idealising transferences that subject the membership to an undifferentiating homogenisation; furthermore, the paranoiac envy and resentment towards every individuating movement that threatens the internal stability of the group; the difficulties in tolerating the internal critical analysis of restrictive and sabotaging obstacles that stand in the way of generativity; and the immovable inertia that prevents us from projecting outward the origin of our stumbling blocks and problems.

All these elements converge to reduce the horizon of productivity to the only thing that would seem to be above all recrimination and suspicion and that lends to the conventional society-institute a reason for its existence: the psychoanalytic indoctrination of candidates and, through this, the continuation of the 'cause'.

6. Our pathological missionary co-dependency, local and international

As I have pointed out elsewhere (Garza-Guerrero, 2002a), the time has come to explore and submit to critical scrutiny our administrative structure and the organising principles of our superordinate leadership, our primary tasks and functions, the subordinate nature of our diverse subsystems, as well as our goals, methods and philosophy (Holzman, 1976b; Thomä, 1993). But it would be even more important to review and study the regressive impact of the pathologically complementary local and international organisational and educational incongruencies that go into making up our monastic educational model (Kernberg, 2000, 2001) and the way the latter has, in turn, contributed to a consolidation and perpetuation of the very collective and universal dysfunctional structure that it brought about in the first place, and which traps us in a vicious circle (Garza-Guerrero, 2002a, 2002b).

III. Towards a fundamental reorganisation: The spectrum of possibilities and contemporary demands and challenges

If we take as our basis the diagnostic evaluation of proteanic symptoms (i.e. the collective organisational and educational regressive phenomena just described), and if the causative explanation given—that is, the disarticulation and incongruity between primary objectives and administrative structure, which Kernberg (1986) has detailed at the local level of our societies, but which I consider as ineluctably extending their implications to our international organisation as an interacting whole—is plausible, and if the resulting recontextualisation and reconceptualisation regarding the organisational and educational crisis in psychoanalysis (in its internal, not its external origin) is unavoidable, then the solution to our problems may be self-inferred (Garza-Guerrero, 2002b):

a) a radical reversal within our psychoanalytic organisation of the regressive inertia—a homogenous and megamagnified legacy of the beginnings of the psychoanalytic movement—that imposes and feeds back synergically the levelling ecumenicism of an educational model (combining the characteristics of a religious retreat and a technical trade school) that syncretically amalgamates incompatible prerogatives and functions (educational and scientific, societal and political, and ‘as-if’ accreditation-certification) into one unique inextricable system: our basic control units as represented by the traditional societies-institutes of psychoanalysis),

b) a move towards a university model, either within conventional institutions or outside them, which, from its established foundation in our own communities and from its independent, open and interactive inception and in congruence with its own environment, promotes:

c) a gradual reorganisation of our local and international membership into one association that agglutinates the common, collective interests and objectives of autonomous component societies,

d) now subordinated (as opposed to holding a centrally superordinate position) to the arbitration of local educational systems and psychoanalytic societies, within the context of respecting the latter’s sovereignty and a delimitation of their prerogatives and functions:

- ▲ educational and scientific exploration (the tasks of a university model);
- ▲ professional regulation and societal-political proselytisation (the job of a conventional society of professionals and technicians); and
- ▲ accreditation, certification, continuing education and recertification (the mandate of local and external inter-institutional collegiate bodies and, when called for, of independent and multirepresentative national coalitions and consortia).

Independently of local variations arising from the substratum of external and internal resources and of differences of form (though not of nature) in the administrative conception of their future educational model, for most of our societies-institutes a true reorganisational process will require a basic infrastructure that attends to the vices, limitations and needs that have encumbered and obstructed our traditional psychoanalytic training ever since its foundation. In accordance with the critical analysis stated above, among the fundamental aspects that a reorganising infrastructure must furnish, I believe the following 12 are invested with transcendental interest:

- 1) a university educational model, preferably one with a full-time and exclusive residential programme;
- 2) economic support to candidates and instructors ordinarily accepted in publicly sanctioned postgraduate clinical education;
- 3) didactic and administrative continuity, in the context of functional criteria, that is absolutely segregated from societal and political prerogatives and procedures;
- 4) open, interactional and genuinely differentiating inter-disciplinarity;
- 5) the scientific exploration of convergences and divergencies between psychoanalysis and psychotherapies;

- 6) a broad variety of clinical situations and a flow of patients under optimal conditions for supervised attention and follow-up, publicly accountable to internal and external legislative and regulatory systems;
- 7) community presence and social relevance;
- 8) nomothetic and ideographic research, and a methodology of scientific communications;
- 9) a consolidated identity of professional and scientific explorers of mental and personality functioning;
- 10) external and independent systems of accreditation, certification, continuing education and recertification;
- 11) experience of faculty and candidates in group psychodynamics and organisational theory;
- 12) as a corollary of the above, the development of our generative potential.

In spite of the possibility of immediately implementing the suggested basic infrastructure in numerous psychoanalytic communities, reading about it could, unsurprisingly, still elicit counter-reactions on the part of those who may consider this suggestion an 'idealised' proposition. The problem of confusing conventional ideals, which must guide the search for solutions to our internal organisational and educational problems, with a utopia is that, paradoxically, the latter permits yet again a denial of the primitive idealisations that turn psychoanalysis as a movement (not as a science and a clinical profession) into an authentic and unsustainable chimera (Garza-Guerrero, 2002b).

As I have pointed out elsewhere (Garza-Guerrero, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c), each society with its respective institute and each study group would have to evaluate its internal and external resources within its own geographic context. Regardless of means, however, from the perspective of the proposal presented above, the basic objectives that should guide a reorganising process would be those that consider:

- a) what variants offer the greatest possibility of reducing disjunctions and incongruities between administrative structure and our primary educational and scientific objectives; and
- b) above all, which of these take us closer to—or farther away from—the probability of integrating the 12 essentials elements of a genuine reorganisation.

The commission responsible for deliberating on the feasibility or insubstantiality of the 'ideal institute', in the National Conference on Education and Research in Psychoanalysis (COPER) of the American Psychoanalytic Association, aware of the fact that human tasks are not susceptible to perfect conditions, redefined 'ideal' as, simply, '... the best possible arrangements, in the actual circumstances at a particular time, to encourage movement towards a desired goal ...' (Goodman, 1977, p. 139).

Conscious of the need to take local factors and attitudes into consideration, COPER admits to the desirability of an 'ideal institute' that could exist in different forms:

- a) an independent institute in its present form, but improved in function;
- b) an independent psychoanalytic university with the resources to support pre-clinical, clinical and research activities, including programmes for training professional psychoanalysts, courses for undergraduates and graduate academics, courses on the

application of psychoanalysis to allied disciplines and courses for the interested general public;

c) a modification of the traditional institute, offering a full-time psychoanalytic residency for its medical and non-medical students;

d) an institute of psychoanalysis within the departments of psychiatry in the schools of medicine;

e) an independent department of psychoanalysis within the university, with its own undergraduate and graduate divisions and professional training programmes;

f) a cross-disciplinary institute within the universities (Goodman, 1977, pp. 165–6).

To consider the operability and viability, or the impracticability, or even the rationality or irrationality of each one of these programmes would go beyond the scope of this position statement. It must be emphasised, however, that, if the underlying incongruities between functional, educational and scientific criteria, on the one hand, and societal-political and proselytistic prerogatives, on the other, were to remain unattended to, then none of these models would solve anything.

At present a unique ideal model for psychoanalytic training does not exist. Depending on the—rational or irrational—position taken when facing the manifold problems and obstacles described, one could, at best, simply select the one that seems most convenient for that particular position. However, I believe that only the elimination of our organisational syncretism and a newly gained congruence between objectives and administrative structure, both local and international, could answer to what I visualise as the *five great contemporary challenges* that psychoanalysis has to face:

1) *The Educational Model*: an autonomous educational model, independent from societal-political prerogatives (i.e. local and international memberships); guided by functional criteria embodying university objectives (i.e. engaged not just in the transmission, but also the investigation and generation of knowledge); with a psychoanalytic educational programme on completion of, or simultaneously with, a full-time residency-speciality in general psychiatry or clinical psychology, or a master's degree or doctorate in the area of mental health or behavioural sciences (that satisfy specific theoretical and clinical criteria of previous preparedness and/or are complementary); or, preferably, integrated as a sub-speciality of general psychiatry or clinical psychology, in a full-time, openly interdisciplinary, four- to six-year residency programme, which would selectively attend to the theoretical and clinical sequences necessary for the interactional articulation of specific axes (i.e. characteristic of each discipline) and branches common to both (i.e. converging areas in psychoanalysis and psychotherapies, among others); and, throughout the entire training period, such a programme would transcend the mediocrity of our retrograde part-time masochistic monasticism.

2) *Epistemological foundation*: the consolidation of an epistemological organising foundation, ideographic, nomothetically substantiated and consistent not only with our intrinsic methodology, but also with that of neighbouring disciplines in the area of mental health; leading to a deductive and inductive exploratory referential framework on which our professional, educational and research activities could be based—and, consequently, putting a stop to the cumulative inductivism that is the seedbed of the

boundless and conceptually fragmenting sectarianism of schools as well as being responsible for our dual cross-sterilisation (i.e. outward, with others, and inward, among ourselves) and our international pseudo-ecumenism.

3) *Accreditation and certification*: external accreditation systems recognised by the national ministries of education and by local, independent, inter-institutional state or national, governmental and/or civic organisms, with accreditation and certification functions that are absolutely divorced from affiliation and membership privileges, which would facilitate the establishment of new training facilities—in contrast to the psycho-cloning and undifferentiating, and hence de-professionalising, syncretism of our homogamous and homogenising *ecclesia* and the altogether indefensible and reprehensible parodic franchise control of one single ‘official’ psychoanalytic education.

4) *Social relevance*: an external, interactive and critical presence, academic and communitarian, of our psychoanalytic societies, integrated with educational media and gestational programmes of genuine social relevance, government- or civic-sponsored, giving a life of their own and a sense of direction to our societies and allowing them to transcend the philocynobism of our ancestral cloistering in the primitive idealisation of our internal, quasi-religious promulgating activities—i.e. the indoctrination of candidates and the evangelising perpetuation and expansion of psychoanalysis merely as ‘movement’ (i.e. in contrast to psychoanalysis as a science and clinical profession).

5) *Creative interdependence*: a creative local and international reorganisation of our psychoanalytic societies, in the context of demarcating between societal and political tasks and proselytising activities, on the one hand, and, on the other, functions inherent in educational and scientific investigative systems, as well as the prerogatives of juridical supported bodies in our respective communities charged with accrediting and certifying results and quality, which would unbind the proverbial pathological local and international co-codependence that is, in turn, responsible for the ubiquity of our crusading organisational syncretism.

IV. Should we awaken or will life have passed us by?

Facing the second century of psychoanalysis and stemming from the retrograde interplay of historical determinants of the psychoanalytic movement and our incongruous administrative and educational system, I believe that a harmonisation between objectives and organisational structure is essential if we are to loosen the talons of faith that keep us tied to our past.

For more than a century we have uncritically taken for granted that our organisational and educational syncretism should generate colleagues whose training transcends that of their predecessors, towards the assimilation of challenges derived from their respective time and spaces. Organisational and educational pseudo-generative regressive phenomena, local and international, would seem to have amalgamated themselves so as to prolong the long night of over a hundred years in the propagation of our ‘psychoanalytic movement’: it has taken a great deal of time to awaken from our idealising and soporific marasmus.

The future of psychoanalysis as science and as a clinical discipline must be one of evolution and transformation. It is the survival of its legendary psychoanalytic institutes and societies, of its local and international organisation, with their inherited but now

untenable syncretism—that is, psychoanalysis as a ‘movement’ and a ‘cause’—that is being questioned.

This paper represents a synthesis of the essential concepts of previously published material, or in press (Garza-Guerrero, 2002a, 2002b, 2002c), related to psychoanalytic education, here presented in the style of a position statement.

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Rejoinder

With reference also to Garza-Guerrero (2002)

EGLÉ LAUFER

I welcome Dr Garza-Guerrero's challenging paper—but I also found it a difficult paper with which to enter into a discussion about the necessity for reform in the educational structures of the psychoanalytic institutes, because the criticisms of the present state of psychoanalysis used by Dr Garza-Guerrero do not allow for any reflection. Dr Garza-Guerrero writes as if the criticisms he brings to bear against the current state of psychoanalytic thinking have to be taken as an accepted fact, supported only with references to those authors with whom he agrees. He then uses these criticisms as proof of the failures of our organisational and educational structures and holds them responsible for the present crisis. He condemns the educational structures for creating impediments against permitting for the evolution and transformations in psychoanalytic established knowledge because of 'their inherited but now untenable syncretism' that is inherited from 'the absolutist syncretism ... inherent to the psychoanalytic movement at the beginning of the 20th century'. In particular, he seems to feel that we still see ourselves as part of a monastic movement that goes out to gain converts rather than as a science and a recognised profession.

Dr Garza-Guerrero blames what he defines as the ‘tendency to idealisation’ of the training analysis for producing generations of analysts who have an unquestioned sense of loyalty to their teachers and their ideas and so are unable to respond to the challenges of the new ideas and ways of validating knowledge that have changed scientific thinking over the last century, and describes us as stuck in ‘our long and marasmic night’. Of course, I recognise what Dr Garza-Guerrero is referring to but I do not think this is a characteristic which is unique to psychoanalysis but is one that is always present in response to any revolutionary demand on us to change our well-established ways of thinking. Moreover, to use this argument as a way of attacking the central place given to the training analysis in our educational system is, I feel, throwing out the baby with the bathwater. I do not see it simply as an idealisation to regard the training analysis as ever more central to the whole training process and its role as one that is unique to the process of training in psychoanalysis. Far from allowing it to become idealised and thus acting as an impediment for the new psychoanalyst, I would see it as a failure of the training analysis if it has not been able to be used to free the candidate eventually to develop in his own way and to use that which feels meaningful to him as the basis for developing new ideas. And this does not have to mean that every analyst will end up having his own theory or working model as Peter Fonagy pessimistically is quoted as saying, but that we can only use creatively that which has an emotional truth for us through our personal experience, or else, as Dr Garza-Guerrero rightly says, it becomes just a meaningless exercise of applying what has been learned as handed down by the authority of the teacher or supervisor.

Therefore, although, of course, the relationship of the student to his teachers is highly coloured by the relationship to his own analyst, and in that sense the personal analysis does have a regressive influence which is bound to become displaced on to the institution and creates a tendency to the idealisation of the teachers and the paranoid anxieties at being judged, this is something that has to be kept in mind, and understood in the analysis and not exploited by the institution and teachers but rather understood and worked with.

What I also found particularly difficult as a statement of fact, and cannot agree to be bound by, is his statement that ‘for the past hundred years we have taken for granted that the “unique” and “special” nature of psychoanalytic education justifies the extension of this inherited organisational and educational syncretism’. I do think that there are aspects of psychoanalytic education which are unique and specific to psychoanalysis and which create problems that have to be understood and kept in mind, as I said, when we look for ways of improving our training structures, in order to set free the minds of the next generations and enable them to ask new questions generated by the advances in other disciplines. But mocking those who insist that the specific nature of the subject matter that is being transmitted has just been used as an excuse for institutional conservatism is I think misleading and suggestions for change that do not include a consideration of the specific nature of psychoanalysis leave me feeling unconvinced.

Dr Garza-Guerrero blames the ‘congenital aberration of the initial group of our founders’ for being responsible for the ‘monastic educational model’ with its isolation in which we chose to function, and as represented by the IPA. He says,

the dissociation between objectives and administrative structure and the primitive idealisation of personal analysis—give rise to serious organisational dysfunction and collective regressive phenomena, including a climate of predominantly doctrinaire instruction and a spiral of paranoid anxieties, each, in turn, reinforcing the quasi-religious and closed nature of the administrative structure of these institutions.

It seems to me that he cannot have it both ways—complaining of the submission to authority and its idealisation and accusing it of leaving the candidate with deep uncertainties. I think part of the special nature of psychoanalytic knowledge is that by its very nature it must create uncertainty in all of us—but it should also aim to help us to live with it and to feel free to think creatively. Moreover, it is within the experience of the personal analysis that the regressive tendency to idealisation can be exposed as well as the wish to submit passively to ‘predominantly doctrinaire instruction’ and the paranoid anxieties and uncertainties that are masked by this submission. I think it is the teacher’s task to understand this and question it with the student rather than enjoying an idealised and unchallenged role.

It is in that sense that I regard the personal analysis as central to psychoanalytic education fulfilling both a therapeutic and an educational role, despite the wish of some to separate the two functions. In my view, this dual aspect is not only the central difference between a psychoanalytic education and education in the other sciences, but also constitutes its strength. Such an emphasis on the training analysis does not make our educational model into a trade school where you just follow the master craftsman. It is our task to follow the student in his own experience and teach him to learn from it. The difference is that we do take the emotional context of the learning experience of becoming an analyst as essential to being able to integrate the learning experience and that one of our tasks is how to help the student to learn to use it. As teachers, we have to remain sensitive to the anxiety experienced by the student in dealing with the subjective emotional understanding of the functioning of the unconscious forces which dominate another person, the patient, and understand with him how it makes him have to rely on the theoretical knowledge he has acquired so far, to provide him with a fixed point in a sea of uncertainty. However, our judgement of the student’s progress is not made only on his academic knowledge or his ability to learn by imitation of his teachers, but also on how far he has been able to allow his understanding to become a part of his own knowledge through the link to his own emotional experience.

I also think that, although it has the disadvantages of creating a hierarchy of authority, that is why we have to have specially selected analysts to carry out the training analysis, despite the call by some that, since it is only a personal analysis like any other, it should be able to be carried out by any trained analyst. But, when an analyst is first qualified, it is an accepted fact that this is only the beginning of a long process, the outcome of which will only show itself some years later once the analyst has had sufficient time and experience to develop into his own analytic style.

A selection system for giving approval for the carrying out of supervision and training analysis and that knows what it is looking for in making the selection is, therefore, of vital importance for the future of psychoanalysis and I see it as a very important function of the IPA to act as a ‘meta state’ in order to bring some pressure to bear and create universally accepted standards that we can all share. I do not share Dr Garza-Guerrero view, therefore, that it was an aberration of our founders to see the need to create national and supranational organisations instead of striving to become an accepted subject of

study in local universities. Although, in fact, Freud did struggle to become a professor in Vienna, he used his position to interest the students in the new ideas and insights into mental functioning using his considerable persuasive powers to overcome their conservatism and convince them of the validity of his revolutionary ideas

I also think there is a very real practical impediment to involving ourselves too much in being part of the university curriculum. We know that those who are able to further psychoanalytic knowledge continue to be immersed in clinical work and use their findings to bring new ideas for discussion to the psychoanalytic community, a function of the congresses provided by the IPA. Universities cannot provide the laboratories for research in our field of knowledge, even though they can contribute to systematic research methodology to validate our findings. And, as in other sciences, being practically involved in the subject doesn't leave time for being a whole-time academic teacher, and does result perhaps in the 'meagre diet of lectures and seminars' that are offered to our students. On the other hand, teaching through involving the student himself in the practical work of carrying out his own analyses with patients does not make us into an isolated trade school and thus academically not respectable, but we all know it is a necessary part of learning to deal with the experience of being at the receiving end of the patient's projections and anxieties while having the opportunity in his own analysis to be helped to understand what he is listening to and experiencing. And from the student's point of view, if all these elements—what I would describe as the practical as well as the theoretical aspects—are added together, they constitute as much a demand on the student's time commitment as any university course. Moreover, I think that a clinical setting where the patients are a part of the training structure and the student has the opportunity to observe and discuss various clinical approaches, as well as having his own experience of supervised analytic work, provides a more appropriate setting for psychoanalytic education than a university.

Where I can agree with Dr Garza-Guerrero is that I see that our organisations are as important now for the future development of psychoanalysis as they were for our aberrant founders, and that we must ensure that they remain relevant and of use to us, by using them to develop links between the established knowledge or models and the changes occurring inside psychoanalysis as well as the new ideas and discoveries coming from adjacent subjects in other areas and within the academic institutions. Freud had created what he saw as a coherent scientific model, one that was in accordance with other views of the time, in physics, evolution, biology and the field he had specialised in, neurology, and not one that stood in isolation from the knowledge of his time. One certainly cannot accuse Freud of having developed psychoanalysis in isolation from other scientific areas of enquiry of his time. In fact, many studies have demonstrated how Freud's discoveries were the result, as so many of the revolutionary scientific discoveries, of the power to use and synthesise many of the new developing ideas of his day. Moreover, I do not agree with the gloom-laden view Dr Garza-Guerrero evokes in his phrase of 'our long and marasmic night of one century'. I believe that, for a completely revolutionary way of thinking about the functioning of our minds and one that, in doing so, inflicts a huge narcissistic wound in its questioning our power for rational thought and motivation, a huge amount has been achieved in a comparatively short span of time and perhaps our structures have also had some positive role to play in this achievement. Where I do agree is that, in having achieved so much, we

are now in a position where we do not have to feel so protective of psychoanalysis because so many of its radical ideas have become part of our culture. Instead, we can feel free to explore the new ideas spawned by psychoanalysis such as various other psychotherapeutic models and methods for purposes of comparing therapeutic effectiveness and the elucidation of the nature of the therapeutic process in differing models.

Of course, we should also respond to the criticisms of psychoanalysis as demands and make them into ones we make on ourselves, but I think there comes a point where we have to make a stand against becoming intimidated by the demand to be scientific and to engage more in research that satisfies our own desires to increasing our knowledge. I think we must feel free to use our imagination and intuition, as, in fact, the most creative scientists do, without immediately being intimidated by the need to prove it scientifically in order to achieve credibility. We can use the data coming from our clinical work in order to demonstrate the questions that it raises and how it is then able to fire the imagination before needing to put it into a more systematic framework and see whether it conforms with already existing models and with data coming from other fields of enquiry.

Equally, I do not think we have to give up on any claim to scientific validity and to seeking to take refuge in theories about the subjective nature of the analytic discourse, but instead we can devise new ways of using our observations to extend the power of our own specific method of enquiry. In fact, it seems to me that psychoanalysis comes out pretty well not as a science stuck in its past but as having made huge steps beyond where it began while still based on the original hypotheses. As Dr Garza-Guerrero rightly remarks, we have always had to learn to live in the shadow of uncertainty and survive, and this does not mean that we should now sit smugly on our achievements on our own island cut off from what is going on around us. On the contrary, I think we are at the beginning of a very exciting time where we now have the opportunity to see which of our models of the functioning of the mind and of the development of the structures of the mind fit in with the new findings of neuropsychology for instance and which will have to be refined in the light of the new evidence that is emerging. We also have a far greater opportunity through the modern means of communication and of data storage to take advantage of the huge increase of the numbers of patients being seen by psychoanalysts to set up studies to compare outcomes and the structure of different forms of pathology. Each analyst, including Freud can only see a very limited number of patients in his lifetime. And, now that the number of analysts has risen from the original small band of followers to nearly 10,000, we have a much greater chance to compare our findings with those of other analysts and to test out the coherence of our theories and define new areas that need to be understood. For this, too, we must maintain international structures.

Dr Garza-Guerrero lists 12 fundamental aspects that a reorganising infrastructure must furnish but I do not see any recognition of the fundamental issues related to the nature of the subject of the training included in his suggestions for change.

I do not believe the major issues he is concerned with—what he regards as our isolation from the stimulation provided by working within a university setting—will provide the answer, however appealing the idea of being part of an academic institution would be. Certainly it would help if students did not have to continue working in order to pay for the training and could get on with immersing themselves in becoming practising psychoanalysts—but not within a totally a closed-off academic world. I feel it could, in fact, make it much more difficult, since they would have to learn to live not only with having

to work in the shadow of their own uncertainty, but they also would be under the constant strain of feeling challenged to provide proof of psychoanalytic findings and theories before having been able to achieve a certain degree of confidence in choosing which ideas to make their own through their own experience.

In addition, I assume that his point number 10 ‘of external and independent systems of accreditation, certification, continuing education and recertification’, to which he gives great importance, is directed at the role given to the IPA via the setting of minimum training standards. Now I agree it would be desirable for all psychoanalysts to be accredited by the state as a way of gaining professional recognition and hopefully being included in what the state provides to help its people with emotional problems, but what must be added is that it has to be on our terms and not on those decided by governmental bodies which may seek to impose a system that is either too widely inclusive of all therapeutic models without sufficient recognition of the distinctions being made between them, or that they bring in inappropriate preconditions for acceptance to the profession which would limit the pool of potential analysts from whom we would be allowed to draw. I think the issue of selection of suitable candidates, however difficult and imperfectly realised, is vital and not one that we can hand over to bodies that do not share our view of its importance. We are the only caring profession that takes selection as seriously as the results at the end of the training in deciding who shows a potential for learning to deal with the anxieties raised in clinical work even if it excludes at times some very brilliant intellects. The difficulty of training in psychoanalysis is how to bring together the intellectual potential with the imaginative and emotionally creative forces in our trainees without impeding either one or the other. Primitive identifications and idealisation of teachers showing both qualities may be a necessary first step in becoming free to trust their own ideas and feelings. My main concern in discussing the aspects put forward by Dr Garza-Guerrero is that in mocking those that use the claim for the special nature of psychoanalysis in order to justify our institutional conservatism he does not take them into consideration at all. And, although having taken part for many years on various committees of our training structure, I not only recognise where Dr Garza-Guerrero’s concerns come from but I have also shared them. I do not see that his suggestions will automatically address the issues he raises until he does take the special nature of psychoanalysis into account.

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Response

CÉSAR GARZA-GUERRERO

As a writer of a paper I truly appreciate Mrs Eglé M. Laufer’s time and devotedly dedicated efforts manifested in her commentary to my position statement regarding psychoanalytic training today.

Though her reply doesn't follow a classified system of headings, I will try to organise my response along the following salient themes in her writing.

1) 'Difficulties to enter into a discussion'

Mrs Laufer found it difficult to enter into a discussion of a paper, where my criticisms 'have to be taken as accepted facts ... without much further discussion'.

From the outset of our candidate initiation rituals, we are accustomed to the unquestionability of our training plan. As training analysts, regarding our educational and organisational models, as an apothegm bearing an indisputable supreme purpose, we take for granted that our outcome must be the generative result of colleagues, whose training transcends that of their predecessors, leading to the assimilation of challenges derived from their respective times and spaces. Hence, it is painful to question ourselves as to whether, through our educational advocacy, we could, inadvertently, reinsert our collective organisational pathology, in such a way that our labours culminate in pseudo-generative actions.

The extreme vulnerability of the human condition to collective regressive phenomena runs parallel to our excessive resistance to acknowledge it. We find it unacceptable to admit the nature of our regressive organisational functioning, when the local and international 'mirror' in our secluding and secluded milieu, reconfirms and renders ego-syntonic our subjective experience of a collectively idealised co-constructed reality. Therefore, in spite of the generalised quality of our collective regressive manifestations, when these are pointed out to us, we usually respond with a sensation of bewilderment leading us to deny or, at best, rationalise them: 'Well ... but group regressive phenomena exist in every institution'.

It is not immunity to conflicts when exposed to incongruities between objectives and administrative structure (consubstantial with every organisation or social system) that this study questions, but, rather, its different management and the consequences when a corporate substratum prevails that promotes the aberrant and transgenerational acting out of its basic regressive assumptions.

As set forth by Bleger:

a generalized law of organizations, knowing that in all of them the explicit objectives for which they were created, always run the risk of passing to a second level, taking as the first plane the perpetuation of the organization as such (1971).

This tendency preserves the cleavage of the syncretic or regressively dependent closed groupability, but at the expense of obstructing the more evolved forms of truly generative and interactional open social systems (Miller, 1993; Mejía and Campuzano, 1995).

2) Idealisations and the 'unique' nature of psychoanalytic training

The centrality of idealising processes in psychoanalytic training is incontrovertible. Their complex individual and group psychodynamic substrata require, however, more explication and specification. The idealisations of the training analyst and training analysis have both been written about *ad nauseam*. But, in general, no attention is paid to

the dimensional and categorical variations of the broad spectrum in the human condition of idealisations and the counterpart of paranoid mechanisms; as well as their different individual, group and organisational psychodynamic substrata, along a hierarchy of distinct levels of psychological, individual and group functioning.

From the perspective of a conventional psychology of the individual, Mrs Laufer seems to defend the 'primitive identifications and the idealisation of teachers ... [as a] first step in trainees becoming free to trust their own ideas and feelings'. In fact, it is in the regressive tendency to idealisation and the wish of candidates to passively submit to a 'doctrinaire instruction' that Mrs Laufer sees the essential 'strength' of the 'specific nature' of psychoanalytic training—provided it is analysed!?

From the vantage point of a contemporary view in group psychology and psychoanalytically informed organisational theories, the just mentioned position sounds, ironically, like a primitive idealisation of the primitive expression of group regressive tendencies.

Group regressive phenomena, the generators of primitive idealisations and persecutory anxieties—pervasive in our societies-institutes—must be explored in the light of advances in our contemporary conception of the pre-oedipal level of group functioning and the psychostructural organisation of pre-genital conflictive configurations, with their respective splitting defences. Also, in the context of advances, refinements and reformulations in both normal and pathological superego functioning and their pre-oedipal forerunners, in the individual (Jacobson, 1964, 1971; Garza-Guerrero, 1981a, 1981b, 1985, 1986, 1988, 1989, 1994a; Kernberg, 1984) and, even more imperative, in the group and in the organisation (Garza-Guerrero, 1975, 1994b; Anzieu, 1978; Chasseguet-Smirgel, 1984; Ganzaraín, 1989; Kernberg, 1991a, 1991b, 1991c; Miller, 1993; Solís-Garza, 1995).

The mechanisms for idealisation must be investigated through a developmental process, genetically (in its psychoanalytic sense) discontinuous, that exposes them to an entire potential spectrum of nodal transmutations—and, consequently, a continuum of significant categorical and dimensional variations—throughout the complete life cycle, for example: from the early pre-oedipal idealisations (i.e. paranoid, depressive-reparative and depressive-restorative) to the reactive ones of the oedipal stage, and from there to the emancipating idealisations at the end of adolescence and, finally, to the transcendental idealisations, subsequent to the intrapsychic reorganisation of adolescence and early adulthood (Garza-Guerrero, 1989, 1994b, 2000).

The same universal spectrum—of paranoid and idealising human dispositions—is extraordinarily sensitive to being activated or deactivated by the regressive or progressive phenomena of groups and organisations, in accordance with the interaction of the more essential variables which affect and have a bearing on the functioning of a social system: for example, task definition, functional leadership, congruency between objectives and administrative structure, analysis of real and emotional impediments, mechanisms for evaluation and corrective measures, spaces for resolving arbitrariness, and independent systems of accreditation and certification.

In the context of task groups at optimal operational capacity, the result of the congruency between explicit objectives and their administrative substratum, transcendental idealisations (at the higher, more mature end of the spectrum, and that are derived from the projected activation of a fully integrated and differentiated superego) contribute towards

the actualisation and transformation of values and ideals in the creation of a new reality, co-constructed with the ideological identification of the group and its functional leadership system. However, in the context of regressive phenomena of the group immersed in basic assumptions (as in the monastic educational model of our legendary societies-institutes of psychoanalysis), the paranoid idealisations (at the lower, more primitive end of the spectrum, and that are derived from the activation and projection of dissociated, idealised and sadistic precursors of the superego) bring about the homogenous reaffirmation of a pseudo-ecumenic reality, co-constructed with the primitive 'ideopathic introjections' (in the terms of Solís-Garza, 1988) of the homogenising organisationally dysfunctional system and its collective pseudo-leadership.

The dislocation between objectives and administrative structure, combined with an organisational confinement that blends therapeutic and educational goals in a single 'society-institute' system, restricts and limits the analysis of primitive idealisations and paranoid anxieties—a situation that, in time, renourishes and reinforces, circularly, the collective regressive phenomena that perpetuate a monastic atmosphere in the majority of our societies-institutes (Bruzzone et al., 1985; Kernberg, 1986, 1993; Garza-Guerrero, 2002a).

Hence, from my perspective, whereas Mrs Eglé Laufer sees primitive identifications and idealisations as a necessary, therapeutically promoting precondition that responds to the 'specific' and 'unique' demands of psychoanalytic education, and henceforth needs to be preserved; I contrariwise consider primitive paranoid idealisations as something not only unnecessary, but also as a regressively induced and therapeutically impeding group side effect that results from our non-specific or unique incongruities between educational and organisational structure, and consequently needs to be properly understood and eliminated.

The corrosive effect of idealisation mechanisms in the 'paranoid' end of the spectrum of idealisations and paranoid processes, both individually and in the group, is summarised by Kernberg in one phrase: 'Idealization corrupts the idealizable' (1986, p. 819).

Paranoid idealisations protect against the candidate's unanalysed ambivalence towards the training analyst, and that of the training analyst for his 'mother-institution'. This dissociation allows the externalisation of negative transferences towards other tendencies or psychoanalytical schools, while this triad (the idealisation of the training analyst, the training analysis and the 'mother-institution') preserves and perpetuates the 'family romance' of several generations of candidates (Arlow, 1973, unpublished, cited in Kernberg, 1986, p. 818), aligned with their personal lineage (i.e. their psychoanalytic genealogical tree), or their school 'coat of arms' (e.g. ego-psychology, self-psychology neo-Freudians, post-Kleinians, object-relationship theories, structural theory etc.). These dissociative processes contribute, too, 'the conflicts of psychoanalytic education as a sadomasochistic subjection (of both, training analysts and candidates) to motherly-institutional tyrannies' (Ganzaraín, 1995, personal communication).

3) Regarding research

Mrs Laufer states that there comes a point where we have to 'respond to criticisms and engage more in research that satisfies our own desires to increase our knowledge ...

without becoming intimidated by the demand to be scientific'. Further along she adds: '... we can devise new ways of using our observations to extend the power of our own specific method of enquiry'.

I wholeheartedly agree with Mrs Laufer. Nevertheless, afraid that she may have read me as more inclined to privilege one type of research against another, I hasten to clarify here my position regarding the traditional pseudo-dichotomy between explanations based on causes (typical of the natural sciences) and explanations based on reasons (typical of the humanities). I believe that, from a perspective of scientific realism, a causative model of the mind is also compatible with the language of meanings and purposes inherent to the central task of psychoanalysis (Mackay, 1989).

Concerning how the dichotomy between causes and reasons has recently overlapped with another pseudo-dichotomy between empirical research (viewed unfavourably by its opponents as anchored in an objectivism, realism and extreme positivism, which lead only to irrelevant findings) and narrativistic, pluralistic, constructivist and idiographic forms of investigation (devalued, in turn, by their detractors as hopelessly bound to an uncontrolled relativism and an untamed subjectivity), it is critical to point out that both varieties of discourse and research not only complement one another, but that they also need one another (Schafer, 1997)—exploration and development in one dimension is inconceivable without the influence of the other.

From the perspective of the central issue in my position statement—that is, the current dilemma in psychoanalysis over its status as either a 'movement' or a science and clinical discipline—the question we should ask ourselves is not which form of investigation to choose (i.e. empirical versus narrativistic), but just how far will the incongruities between our objectives and educational structure (with their consubstantial, collective regressive phenomena) have interfered with—and will continue interfering with, if not corrected—the exploration of ideas, both in a nomothetic dimension as in one of an idiographic order, and in the context of seriousness, integrity and plausibility.

4) University 'setting' and 'accreditation by the state'

In her reply, Mrs Laufer mentions that a 'clinical setting—where the patients are a part of the training structure and the student has the opportunity to observe and discuss various clinical approaches while doing supervised analytic work—provides a more appropriate setting for a psychoanalytic education than would a university'.

I am just puzzled by this statement, because, although I absolutely agree with it, my point is that this is exactly what the overwhelming majority of our present societies-institutes (worldwide) can't provide with their present part-time, homogenous and homogenising, as well as syncretistic training plans; self-secluded and divorced from the public support of the state and, consequently, still dependent on the donation of a few hours a week of their memberships and the meagre quotas collected from candidates. On the other hand, this is precisely what a clinical setting, with a university model, could offer (e.g. psychoanalysis as a sub-speciality of general psychiatry or clinical psychology, in a full-time, inter-disciplinarian and openly interactional residency programme, at the department of psychiatry, of a university hospital—among other already available possibilities).

The differences between university ‘setting’ and university model call for more precisions. When I talk of a university model, I refer to those standards of quality and organising principles that guarantee, not just the transmission of information, but also its critical analysis, towards the generation of knowledge. A university model may or may not exist in a university setting, just as it may or may not flourish in a space outside a university. ‘University setting’ is not necessarily synonymous with a ‘university educational model’.

Regarding accreditation by the state Mrs Laufer expresses her concern that ‘the issue of the selection of suitable candidates ... is vital and not one that we can hand over to bodies that do not share our view of its importance’.

From my perspective, to come up with a functional reorganisation that satisfies the standards of truly independent and autonomous bodies of accreditation, certification, continuing education and recertification doesn’t mean relinquishing the responsibilities of our own co-participation at all, much less those regarding the selection of candidates. The essential point here has rather to do with how to disentangle our present organisational and educational syncretism; that which superimposes our proselytism and societal-political activities to our educational and ‘as-if’ accreditation and certification functions. Mrs Laufer’s preoccupations limpidly reveal the eternal problems surrounding our universal syncretism: how do we congruously change and articulate at a local level the administrative structure and educational model, without modifying our sense of belonging to the psychoanalytic movement or losing international or national, ecumenic and homogenous control over our century-old patrimony?

The basic infrastructure for a reorganisation of psychoanalytic education must avoid the confusion of local and international societal-political prerogatives with the functional criteria inherent to our objectives and primary tasks of an educational and scientific order; and must, in turn, avoid the confusion and submission to patrimonial criteria and prerogatives which warranty our control over ‘franchise exclusivity,’ with the external and independent functional criteria, necessary for the accreditation and certification of an educational system characteristic of a scientific discipline.

In my judgement, both purposes (i.e. societal-political, on the one hand; and accreditation and certification, on the other) would be obtained at a lesser cost (economic, emotional and time-wise) and with better results, by only:

- a) reverting the order of our organisational hierarchy and liberating the horizon of possibilities to diverse variants for psychoanalytic training in our established communities;
- b) propitiating the congruence of the administrative structure, of these new variants, with their corresponding local spectrum of intrinsic and extrinsic resources;
- c) freely letting the creative potential and inter-institutional concertation come into play at the regional level, when the generation of independent and external accreditation and certification systems are in order (as in any other clinical discipline);
- d) guided by educational and functional criteria (i.e. in contrast to societal-political and proselytising) which guarantee efficacy and efficiency to educate, train and research; and in the context of a clear demarcation of educational objectives from those of an accrediting and certifying order, as well as from local and/or international membership privileges.

These same local systems of external and independent accreditation and certification would be responsible for defining the parameters of continuing education and recertification, as in any of our other disciplines with clinical responsibilities. Up until now, once graduation ‘minimal criteria’ have been satisfied, fossilisation and deprofessionalisation in our institutes has prevailed.

Problems connected to external and independent accreditation and certification procedures of psychoanalytic programmes, as well as continuing education and recertification, have risen to alarming levels in many countries or academic communities, where not only mechanisms (internal or independent) for the accreditation of psychoanalytic training programmes and the certification of some degree of experience do not exist, but moreover where none exist for the profession or clinical field prior to initiation of training—training which, paradoxically, as a consequence of its undifferentiating and homogenising consubstantial processes, end up, in turn, deprofessionalising its previous professional identity.

As I have pointed out elsewhere (Garza-Guerrero, 2002b), in many countries international membership is exploited as if it were an instrument that can simultaneously accredit, certify and recertify in perpetuity, as long as dues are paid, locally and to the IPA. With the lack of legitimate university postgraduate studies sanctioned by governmental systems and/or external academic and professional recognition and certification, in many countries it is now common to find commercial promotion on business cards as well as in the yellow pages of telephone books: ‘member of and/or affiliated with the International Psychoanalytic Association’.

After a hundred years it is time to ask ourselves whether a system which we have devotedly kept as the only organisational infrastructure that would guarantee the highest quality norms in psychoanalytic training could rather militate, not only against our primary educational and scientific objectives, but also conceal and condone serious incongruities and professional limitations.

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