population projections should not be taken too seriously; Kingsley Davis writes on why we understand so little about international migration; Kenneth Boulding writes on why development economics has not developed much since Adam Smith; and Allen Kneese advocates natural resource economics as a frontier science.

What these essays lack is reflection on *why* population/resource issues are political issues—they both follow from and generate power differentials. We may be able to eliminate much of the precipitate that clouds our understanding of the empirical interrelationships between population and resources once we better understand how and why population processes influence resource access costs and the power differentials that structure human social interaction.

The Predicament of Culture: Twentieth-Century Ethnography, Literature, and Art. *James Clifford.* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988. 392 pp. $30.00 (cloth), $15.95 (paper).

JAMES FERNANDEZ
University of Chicago

Although James Clifford describes himself as a "rootless person" in a rootless time (p. 290), there is more history to his consciousness than that! He comes to us from the Ancient Empire of History. He has learned our language well. He has followed our practice closely and noted the contradictions of our commitments. He has caused alienation among our youth. He seems a sixties-generation historian (Haverford 1967), who despite the invidious bellicosity, the "possessive individualism" of the Reagan "revolution," has not abandoned the consciousness of that generation summed up in its bumper stickers: "Question Authority!" and "Hell No We Won't Go." That wisdom is much enriched and elaborated by Clifford's subsequent immersion in the decolonizing world of the French self-consciousness of the fifties, sixties, and seventies. Such history has produced rare comparative understanding, and this book is an insightful compendium indeed. Many of the essays here—"On Ethnographic Authority," "Power and Dialogue," "On Ethnographic Self Fashioning," "On Collecting Art and Culture"—are obligatory reading. But they create a predicament for us.

The most forceful points in this wide-ranging collection have to do with our predicaments—the key word in his argument (beside author-ity) that plays upon its subordinate etymological meaning: to assert or make something known. The overall predicament of anthropology—a predicament that if not antecedent to such other predicaments as are exposed here is consequent to them—is that of making our knowledge known in a convincing way. It is the predicament of *authoritative assertion:* the impossibility of making something known without implicating the subjective involvement of the knower in the knowing. This postmodern predicament par excellence is everywhere present in this book.

But many other predicaments are here detailed. There is the predicament of the *mixing of modernity:* of finding, as far as culture is concerned, that rootlessness and mobility have made it difficult if not impossible to find authentic, uninvented, unmixed traditions—pure products Clifford calls them. There is the predicament of *adequate synthesis:* the predicament given the overdetermined nature of culture of finding a way of presenting anything like a total picture of it. There is the predicament of *sincerity:* the predicament of maintaining an ethical center in fieldwork when the ethnographer has to cultivate his or her informants for ulterior purposes, scientific or geopolitical. This is ultimately the predicament of combining the engagement and accountability of participation with the distance and exploitation present in observation. There is the predicament of the *saving or authorizing fiction:* the predicament given the multitude of perspectives and diversity of voices in the field of finding some one coherent way—through such allegories as "ethnographic liberalism," or "reciprocal encounter," or "redemption," for example—to tell the ethnographic story. And there is the predicament of *humanism in tension with surrealism:* of wanting to make the strange familiar and thus humanizing it and at the same time wanting to make the familiar strange thus rescuing it from ennui and meaninglessness.

These and other predicaments are forcefully presented here, and the old springs of our anthropological "will to knowledge" are called into question right and left: our claim to authority, the heroic self-fashioning of our fieldwork persona, the Western power that conditions our dialogues with the other, the linkage between primitive art collecting and culture collecting and between anthropological explanation and the redemptive aesthetics of primitive art historians. But this book is not simply a catalog of negativities. There is an appreciation here of what an ethnography true to its times is and should be.

I would like to comment on that vision using Clifford's own "ethnography" of the Mashpee Indian Tribe court case of 1976, previously unpublished, as a case in point. One puts the term in quotes because Clifford listened to the testimony and watched the performances of plaintiffs and defendants, witnesses and lawyers and judges, but he did not methodically interview participants or live among them. So this is an observer's, not a participant's, ethnography. Yet what the Mashpee case was about, "proving the identity" of other and of self, is so central to what ethnography is about as to make his report pertinent to our central task.

Essentially this is an "ethnography" at all moments aware of the "contingent fictions"—or, as I prefer, the "argument of images"—the negotiation of which is basic in the human condition. There are the fictions of the Mashpee themselves, the set of images they possess that tells them, and enables them to tell the world, that they are and have always been a tribe. This is History I, as Clifford calls it. History II is the view of the larger White American society that the Mashpee, whoever they pretend they are, were a collectivity that assimilated to American society long ago and are now only opportunistically a tribe.

Clifford's account is sensitive to the way these two histories are embodied and dramatized in witnesses, lawyers, and judges. For the courtroom is essentially an arena of agonistic performance. He is also sensitive, given the complexities of the case and the oversimplifications of the term *tribe,* to the clumsiness of adversarial (either-or) proceedings in disentangling this Gordian knot of human identity. In any event, the Mashpee were the losers in an ambiguous final decision.

There is much to appreciate here: Clifford's own reflective self-awareness, his penetrating capsule characterizations of the main contestants, his summary of the categories of thought in White American society that prejudiced the case from the start. But there is a subtext here, a contest between history and anthropology, that bears pondering for its wider implications.

For it was historians who were the expert witnesses in the case *against* the Mashpee and anthropologists the witnesses *for.* The historians with their precise-seeming summary of the written archives prevailed against the anthropologists and their ambiguities about central terms such as *tribe,* their forthcoming uncertainty about the exactitudes of participant-observation. Despite the effort of anthropological witness to redeem the wholeness of their cause the Mashpee ended up being the mincemeat of history.

It is not that Clifford is not aware of the ironies of this contest between disciplines—those who have never personally known the Mashpee prevail over those that do. He sees the degree to which the hierarchical relation of literate over oral forms of knowledge prejudices the case for history and against anthropology and the degree to which the narrative continuity the historian can provide—even though used *against* the argument for Mashpee tribal continuity—prevails over anthropological hesitancy about composing such overarching narratives.

But in this contest between history and anthropology there hangs a tale suitable for meditation—and an undercurrent worry. For what are the consequences of such forceful articulation of the predicaments of our field? One hopes—and surely Clifford hopes—that such culture critique will lead to more wide-ranging and reflective ethnography. But there is some evidence among us now of a turning away, perhaps with these predicaments in mind, from long-term participant-observation with the distinctly other. There is a tendency toward immersion either in history or in the less problematic immediacies of our own tradition. There's a faint echo in my ears: "Hell no we won't go!"

Surely the response to such possibly discouraging predicaments as here detailed is not a turning *back* or a turning *in* but rather a multilateral sharing *out* of these predicaments—a more wide-ranging guarantee of the human right of participant-observation in the affairs of others. This less unilateral study of the other—the prevailing hegemony of the West studying the rest—is not contemplated by Clifford as an "authorizing strategy" though it complements the reflexivity argued here. The inclusion of native voices in *our* ethnographies is not enough. What we need is *their* ethnographies of *us.* That might begin with an African anthropologist conscientiously studying the "history of consciousness" program at Santa Cruz! It is in such collegial turn taking that a healthy future of our discipline lies if we believe, as we must, that there are invaluable consequences to the crossing of boundaries and the study of other cultures whatever the predicaments of culture.

Research Methods in Social Network Analysis. *Linton C. Freeman, Douglas R. White,* and *A. Kimball Romney,* eds. Fairfax, VA: George Mason University Press (distr. by University Publishing Associates, Lanham, MD), 1989. 537 pp. $44.75 (cloth).

ALVIN WOLFE
University of South Florida