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Institutional Affiliation as a Measure of Organizational Social Capital: A Case Study of Korea

Joonmo Son[1]

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Abstract It has been a widespread practice in the literature to measure organizational social capital with a summated scale of the number of memberships in voluntary associations. However, treating all associations alike may produce biased conclusions. This study therefore proposes that institutional affiliation, defined as a socially contextualized pattern of group belonging, is a form of organizational social capital. Specifically, I suggest that there are three types of institutional affiliations. First, the primary affiliation is composed of groups in which members share strong ties and bond together with personal, empathic, and enduring relationships. Second, the secondary affiliation comprises certain associations that seek to achieve their proclaimed goals within or beyond their collectivities, in the latter case possibly reaching to the level of a wider community or a whole society. Lastly, the dual affiliation exists as an intersection between the two prior affiliations. Using a nationally representative data set from Korea, the study found that both primary and secondary affiliations are related to occupational status, whereas only the secondary affiliation is associated with civic actions. However, dual affiliation is redundant and unable to form a positive association with either outcome. In conclusion, this study suggests that institutional affiliation is an alternative measure of organizational social capital, taking the contextual characteristics of associations in a case country into account.

Keywords Institutional affiliation · Organizational social capital · Status attainment · Civic engagement

✉ Joonmo Son
josef209@gmail.com

[1] Department of Sociology, FASS, National University of Singapore, AS1 #04-24, 11 Arts Link, Singapore 117570, Singapore

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1 Introduction

This study proposes that institutional affiliation, defined as a socially contextualized pattern of group belonging, is a form of organizational social capital (Newton 2001; Wilson 2000). Specifically, institutional affiliation denotes that people in a society tend to form certain patterns of group belonging out of various associations that were created due to individual and collective needs. Apart from individual choices of associations, a variety of social factors such as culture, history, religion, or education may also be at work in shaping group belonging patterns.

Specifically, I suggest three types of institutional affiliation based partly on Cooley's (1962) categorization of social organization. The first type is primary affiliation, a pattern of group belonging in which members share strong ties and bond together with personal, empathic, and enduring relationships. This affiliation type aims for a stable existence of the collectivities and informal support among their members. Next, the secondary affiliation is composed of organizations that seek to achieve their proclaimed goals within or outside of their collectivities. This affiliation type comprises social relations not necessarily based on strong ties. And the duration of its membership can be relatively shorter than that of the primary affiliation. Lastly, the dual affiliation does not possess its own associations under its typology, but rather intersects between primary and secondary institutional affiliations. The degree of the mixture between the two affiliations can thus vary by how an actor constitutes his/her associational memberships.

To explore the concept of institutional affiliation, I use the Republic of Korea (Korea hereafter) as a case. Korea is one of a few countries in the colonial Third World that achieved condensed development from a poor agricultural feudal society to an advanced industrialized nation (Amsden 1992; Evans 1995; Wade 2004). Meanwhile, this macro change introduced unprecedented voluntary associations in a country where social groups had been mainly dominated by particularistic ties (Fukuyama 1995). Thus the case country holds both primary affiliation embedded in its local culture and secondary affiliation of external origin, and the blend between the two types creates a third affiliation of duality.

In order to examine the effects of institutional affiliations, I employ socioeconomic and social behavioral outcomes, namely occupational status and civic actions. The former is an indicator of status attainment in the labor market whereas the latter concerns civic participation. Many studies report that voluntary associations generally help promote status attainment and stimulate civic actions as well (Wilson 2000, 2012; Wilson and Musick 2003), but little is known about the role of institutional affiliation. Thus this study aims to suggest the concept of institutional affiliations and identify how they are associated with social and economic outcomes, using nationally representative data from a case country.

To analyze the issues at hand, it is necessary to see how the literature has delineated the influence of social change on patterns of group belonging. I then describe the three types of institutional affiliation in Korea, and propose several hypotheses to be tested.

2 Group Belonging, Macro Social Change, and Institutional Affiliation

Group belonging is of general interest to sociologists and especially to researchers of social networks and social capital. Sociologists have long maintained that key sociocultural traits are reflected in the web of associations (e.g., Simmel 1955). That is, associations and their networks are formed on the basis of norms, values, and principles of social relations upheld

by a people. In the premodern period, to a large extent belonging to associations followed a form of concentric circles in a hierarchical manner (Pescosolido and Rubin 2000). For instance, this indicates that membership in a family automatically subjugates a person to a clan that in turn belongs to a tribe, chiefdom, or caste network. The larger group embracing smaller concentric subunits within it creates an exclusive collectivity that structurally limits a member's chances to reach out to external groups (Blau 1993). In conjunction with this structural constraint, normative indoctrination of particularistic ideas emphasizing in-group superiority and favoritism would be fostered, instigating discrimination against out-groups as a result (Baker 1979; Fukuyama 1995).

However, in the modern era macro social changes such as division of labor, political democratization, and expansion of universal education promote interactions among heterogeneous social groups, which in turn weakens the rigid concentric network structure built in social collectivities (Durkheim [1893] 1997). This large-scale structural change tends to develop various secondary associations to meet the demands of new social, economic, and political restructuration. Once such secondary groups become widespread, they allow actors to access information and resources from diverse sources otherwise unavailable in the past (Lin 2001). Some tangible benefits of this accessibility is the increased probability of getting jobs and promotions (Burt 1992; Granovetter 1973; Lin 2001, 2006; Marsden and Gorman 2001; Marsden and Hurlbert 1988; McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1986; Ruiter and De Graaf 2009; Son and Lin 2012; Wilson and Musick 2003); being involved in voluntary associations (Lyson et al. 2001; Rotolo and Wilson 2004); and engaging in civic activities (McAdam 1986, 1989; Lim 2008; Son and Lin 2008; Wellman and Wortley 1990). Moreover, accessing diverse organizational fields provides more social resources (McDonald et al. 2009; McPherson et al. 2001; Thomas and Ely 1996) because network diversity cuts across the boundaries of social groups, reducing in-group constraints (Lazarsfeld and Merton 1954; McPherson and Smith-Lovin 1987). Memberships in a variety of secondary associations also help increase tolerance of and trust in unfamiliar social ties, decreasing the influence of homogeneous traditional social relations (Giddens 1990).

Therefore macro social change formulates three types of institutional affiliation. In practice, some actors prefer to subscribe only to a primary affiliation composed of certain traditional groups in which they can interact with only those who share the same particularistic ties. Others choose a secondary affiliation alone, engaging with modern voluntary associations that pursue specific civic, political, or cultural causes and giving no or less emphasis to particularistic homophily among group members. Still others form a dual affiliation with a varying ratio between primary and secondary groups. In regard to this mixed type, two competing arguments exist. First, Uzzi (1999) suggests that dual affiliation can be instrumentally efficacious. Specifically, analyzing over 1800 corporations and their strength of ties with banks, he reports that network complementarity between embedded and arm's-length ties provides the lowest interest rates of loans to the firms. Thus this perspective maintains that at the organizational level dual affiliation adds more explanatory power on top of what either primary or secondary affiliations can exert. Second, in contrast, Friedkin (1980) hypothesizes that strong ties are not apt to function as local bridges because they are likely to encourage triadic closure. In other words, strong local bridges are eliminated over time, whereas weak local bridges tend to be maintained. This suggests that when a primary affiliation (with mostly strong ties) intersects with a secondary affiliation (generally composed of weak ties), the resultant dual affiliation is limited in its efficacy as well as redundant in its function compared to the other two affiliations. In this study I take the second perspective in constructing hypotheses regarding institutional affiliations.

I now turn to the specific case of the present study and hypothesize how the three types of institutional affiliation are related to the two instrumental outcomes of socioeconomic status and civic actions.

3 Institutional Affiliation and Instrumental Outcomes in Korea

Under the influence of Confucian ideology from China, Korea created its own social organization as early as the fourth century. Even with the imported Confucian ideology and the legal and bureaucratic system of the Chinese Tang, Ming, and Qing dynasties, Korea maintained its own distinct culture (Eckert 2000). Nonetheless, the Confucian tradition constrained social relations by emphasizing a hierarchical social order (Hamilton 1990). The hierarchical sorting mechanism of seniority, patriarchy, and gender discrimination produced a pattern of social organization largely authoritarian in nature (Evans 1995; Han and Ling 1998; Tu 1991). Confucianism thus restricted the formation of social ties across structural boundaries such as those between age cohorts, genders, and social statuses (Hyun 2001; Li 2000a, b).

The dominant pattern of affiliation during this premodern era was the primary type, forged by particularistic blood, regional, and school ties, that constructed an exclusionary concentric structure of social relations. Along with the Confucian emphasis on seniority and male dominance, blood ties among same-surname holders constituted an element of social relations, even though their influence dwindled in the modern period (Shin and Chin 1989). Regional and school ties by themselves are crucial components of the primary affiliation, but the bonding effect strengthens when the two ties are intertwined (e.g., in the case in which those from the same region attended the same educational institution; Yee 2000).

Today ties forged on the basis of family, region, and school vary in their importance from one East Asian country to another. Lee (2005) measured strength of blood, regional, and school ties in China, Japan, and Korea on a ten-point scale using indices such as perceived importance, contact frequency, and activation frequency. Regional (8.21) and school ties (8.53) have significantly greater mean scores on the scale in Korea than in China (5.72 and 6.36 respectively) and Japan (7.36 and 7.92 respectively), whereas there is no significant difference in blood ties among the three countries. This indicates that regional and school ties are important particularistic traits in Korea. For instance, the top Korean colleges accept students from varied provinces purely on merit (i.e., exam scores and school records); however, once a tie is formed among otherwise unrelated college students it generates a network closure in which members tend to exchange favors with one another more frequently than with outsiders for the rest of their lives. The degree of network closure gets even stronger among the alumni who share an additional school tie from middle or high school and/or a common regional tie.

The primary affiliation is frequently criticized because it promotes in-group interests at the expense of the common good (Fukuyama 1995). *Ji-yon* (regional ties) and *Hak-yon* (school ties) are the representative primary ties in Korea long believed to matter significantly in determining various life chances (Kim 2000; Yum 1988). For instance, regional ties serve as the backbone of a Korean political system that relies heavily on a few large provinces as the power bases of major parties (Choi 1993; Lee and Brunn 1996; Mehra et al. 1998; Moon 2005; Morriss 1996). School ties are a crucial factor in forming bonding relations to the extent that they are often prominently featured in describing the exclusive

nature of social cliques in Korea. It is thus believed that in Korea, as in other East Asian countries, a primary affiliation helps achieve better socioeconomic status in the labor market (Bian 1997; Yee 2000). However, due to its closed nature and in-group orientation, the primary affiliation is less likely to be related to civic actions.

Hypothesis 1 The primary affiliation is related to socioeconomic status, other things being equal.

Hypothesis 2 The primary affiliation is unassociated with civic actions, other things being equal.

The secondary type of associations was imported in the Japanese colonial period. For instance, it was not until 1924 that the first national association of labor unions appeared in Korea (Kim 1992). Secondary associations such as labor unions, professional organizations, or civil rights groups were established mostly on the basis of common public causes that attract like-minded people irrespective of particular social relations among the members (Smith 1972). As a result, it is likely that members of secondary affiliation are more likely to take civic actions than nonmembers. Further, joiners in secondary affiliation are expected to get higher socioeconomic status than nonparticipants because they may acquire nonredundant information from this affiliation that are rich with weak ties.

Hypothesis 3 The secondary affiliation is related to civic actions, other things being equal.

Hypothesis 4 The secondary affiliation is related to socioeconomic status, other things being equal.

Dual affiliation then comes into being when one has memberships in both primary and secondary types of groups. In empirical terms, there is no concrete organizational entity that is an example group. Still, dual affiliation is not an accidental combination of the other two types of affiliation; rather, it indicates intentional choice to maintain the advantage of bonding in the primary affiliation and acquire the benefit of bridging in the secondary affiliation. Nonetheless, I propose that dual affiliation is inefficacious in its relationship with the two instrumental outcomes because its role is superfluous when the other two affiliations are taken into account.

Hypotheses 5-1 and 5-2 The dual affiliation is related to neither socioeconomic status (H5-1) nor civic actions (H5-2).

4 Data

The data employed in this study come from the 2004 Korean General Social Survey (KGSS) in which social networks were the main thematic topic. More specifically, I use this data set because it furnishes both individual social network items and memberships in voluntary associations. The KGSS began in 2003, emulating both the International Social Survey Program and the U.S. General Social Survey, and has since been administered annually to nationally representative samples by the Survey Research Center at Sungkyunkwan University (Kim et al. 2010; Smith et al. 2006).

The face-to-face national survey of adults aged 18 years old or over was administered from June to August 2004 based on the multistage stratified cluster sampling scheme. The response rate was 65.8 % with a sample size of 1312 respondents. This response rate falls

in the normal range of national surveys in Korea and is also close to that of other KGSS surveys in previous and subsequent years. No biases were found in the 2004 KGSS when compared against the general demographic features of the Korean population, such as age, gender, or employment status (Kim 2009).

5 Measures

5.1 Institutional Affiliation

KGSS 2004 has a battery of questions on memberships in nine types of voluntary associations. Each of the survey items on memberships provided four response categories: (1) belong and actively participate; (2) belong but don't participate; (3) used to belong; and (4) never belonged. Because this study aims to test the relationship of organizational membership and its resultant affiliation types to socioeconomic status and civic actions, I treated only those who chose (1) or (2) as belonging to an organization.

A confirmatory factor analysis in Table 1 confirms that five of the associational types belong to the primary affiliation and the other three to the secondary affiliation. Additionally, there appears to be a decent correlation between the two affiliations, which shows the need to take the dual affiliation into consideration. The factor loadings of each affiliation and overall model fit indices validate this categorization. Based on this validation, I

Table 1 Confirmatory factor analysis of primary and secondary affiliations

	Latent variable	
	Primary affiliation	Secondary affiliation
Indicator		
Alumni group	0.62 (0.04)***	–
Regional association	0.54 (0.03)***	–
Religious association	0.05 (0.03)	–
Informal social gathering	0.46 (0.04)***	–
Sports group	0.50 (0.03)***	–
Political association	–	0.51 (0.05)***
Civic association	–	0.45 (0.04)***
Labor (or professional) association	–	0.40 (0.04)***
Correlation between primary and secondary affiliations	0.31 (0.05)***	
Model fit index		
RMSEA	0.014	
CFI	0.995	
TLI	0.991	
CD	0.774	

Standardized factor loadings are reported. OIM (observed information matrix) standard errors are in parentheses

RMSEA Root mean squared error of approximation, *CFI* comparative fit index, *TLI* Tucker–Lewis index, *CD* coefficient of determination

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed test)

used count measures of each affiliation in multivariate analyses. In addition, I employed other type of organizations, a remnant category, as a control variable.

5.1.1 Primary Affiliation

As shown in Table 1, this affiliation is comprised of five primary types of groups: alumni, regional, religious, informal social gathering, and sports. (The survey did not ask if a respondent was a member of a clan organization.) These types are indicators of a latent construct of primary affiliation although the factor loading of religious association is low. Therefore I employed the count variable of primary affiliation by the five types of groups. In light of the low factor loading of religious association, a supplementary analysis using an alternative count variable omitting religious association was then conducted ("Appendix 2", Table 6). Table 2 shows that a respondent had about two memberships on average in the primary affiliation.

5.1.2 Secondary Affiliation

Table 1 also confirms that the latent variable of secondary affiliation subsumes three types of groups with high factor loadings: political, civic, and labor (or professional). Thus a count variable of these three types is employed in the data analysis. According to Table 2, a respondent had less than one membership in this affiliation on average.

5.1.3 Dual Affiliation

This variable is an interaction term between the count measures of primary and secondary affiliations.

5.2 Individual Social Networks

Individual social networks were controlled because social networks at the individual level may confound the effect of institutional affiliations. Individual networks were measured as follows.

Number of family members Korean society has a Confucian legacy of an extended family system, even though the nuclear family has become the dominant form (De Vos and Lee 1993; Ruggles and Heggeness 2008). It is therefore necessary to control for family size. This variable ranges from 1 to 9, with a mean of about 3.

Co-workers This variable is based on a question asking how many close friends a respondent had at work. The mean is close to 4.

Neighborhood friends This variable is derived from a question asking how many close friends a respondent had in the neighborhood. The mean is about 5.

Other friends This variable is based on a question asking the number of close friends a respondent had in other kinds of relationships. The mean is about 10.

5.3 Sociodemographic Features

Age and Age^2 The mean age of the respondents is about 44. The squared term of age was also used to identify the nonlinear effect of age.

Female A dummy variable in which female = 1 and male = 0.

Table 2 Measures and correlation between types of institutional affiliation and other covariates

	N	Mean (SD)	Bivariate correlation	
			Primary affiliation	Secondary affiliation
Institutional affiliation				
Primary (range 0–5)	1312	1.76 (1.33)	–	–
Secondary (range 0–3)	1312	0.13 (0.40)	0.19***	–
Dual (primary × secondary) (range −3.29 to 9.31)	1312	0.10 (0.66)	0.11***	0.52***
Other organizations[a] (range 0–1)	1312	0.29 (0.45)	0.32***	0.07*
Individual social networks				
Number of family members (range 1–9)	1312	3.16 (1.29)	0.11***	0.06*
Co-workers (range 0–100)	1310	3.69 (8.89)	0.15***	0.11***
Neighborhood friends (range 0–100)	1310	5.30 (9.36)	0.14***	0.03
Other friends (range 0–100)	1311	10.47 (15.99)	0.29***	0.11***
Sociodemographic features				
Age (range 18–93)	1312	43.64 (15.67)	−0.11***	−0.03
Female (1 = female; 0 = male)	1312	0.53 (0.50)	−0.15***	−0.11***
Married (1 = married; 0 = nonmarried)	1312	0.66 (0.47)	0.09**	0.07**
Education (0 = no schooling–6 = graduate school)	1308	3.32 (1.56)	0.28***	0.06*
Geographic controls (dummy)				
Seoul (reference)	1312	0.20 (0.40)	−0.03	−0.06*
Gyeong-gi	1312	0.25 (0.43)	0.04	0.05
Gang-won	1312	0.03 (0.17)	0.02	0.04
Chung-cheong	1312	0.09 (0.29)	−0.00	0.02
Gyeong-sang	1312	0.29 (0.45)	−0.01	−0.02
Jeolla	1312	0.13 (0.33)	−0.01	0.03
Je-ju	1312	0.01 (0.12)	0.00	−0.01
Outcome measures				
Occupational status (1988 ISCO SEI: 16–87)	1161	39.55 (14.59)	0.22***	0.10**
Civic actions (range 0–6)	1312	0.76 (1.14)	0.23***	0.21***

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed test)

[a] "Other associations" are controlled for in the multivariate models

Married A dummy variable in which married = 1 and nonmarried = 0.

Education This variable ranges from 0 (no formal schooling) to 6 (graduate school degree). The mean is 3.3, which falls between high school and junior college degrees.

5.4 Geographic Control

Considering that regional associations are part of the primary affiliation, I controlled for the geographic location of the respondent. Another reason for this control is that provinces in Korea vary in their level of economic development. Taking the capital city (Seoul) as the reference category, the geographic controls comprise provincial dummy variables (1 = province of interest; 0 = other).

5.5 Outcome Measures

There are two outcome measures: occupational status and civic actions.

5.5.1 Occupational Status

The SEI (socio-economic index) scores from the 1988 ISCO (International Standard Classification of Occupations) code created by the International Labor Organization were assigned to the current/last jobs of the respondents (Ganzeboom and Treiman 1996). The score ranged from 16 to 87, with a mean of about 40.

5.5.2 Number of Civic Actions

This variable is a summated measure of civic actions taken by respondents in the past year. Six kinds of civic actions were probed in the survey: signing a petition; boycotting certain goods because of political, ethical, or environmental causes; engaging in a public demonstration; participating in a political rally; contacting politicians or governmental officials to voice one's opinion; and donating to social and political causes. The mean is a little less than one.

6 Method

Multivariate regression models were employed to test the hypotheses. The ordinary least squares (OLS) regression was applied to the outcome measure of occupational status. For number of civic actions, a zero-inflated Poisson model was used to account for its dominant zero count and the skewedness of the variable (Long and Freese 2006). This model runs two latent variable analyses concurrently: the first is the logit regression (inflation binary equation) for those who always get a zero count, and the second the Poisson regression (count equation) for those who do not always get a zero count. Thus the model produces robust estimates of number of civic actions, taking the inflated proportion of excess zeros into account.

7 Results

7.1 Bivariate Correlation

According to the bivariate correlations in Table 2, the primary affiliation is significantly associated with being a younger male who is married, a higher level of education, all types of individual social networks, occupational status, and number of civic actions. The secondary affiliation is also related to these variables except for neighborhood friends and age. No geographic controls were related to the primary affiliation, whereas being in Seoul, the capital city, was negatively associated with the secondary affiliation.

7.2 Multivariate Analyses

The main purpose of multivariate analyses is to examine whether institutional affiliations are related to socioeconomic status and civic actions when other possibly confounding variables are taken into consideration. Nested models were used for both outcome measures. Specifically, the first model employs primary and secondary institutional affiliations and individual social networks. Sociodemographic features and geographic controls were added to the second model. The last step included the dual affiliation, an interaction term between primary and secondary affiliations.

The occupational status of the respondents is the outcome measure in Table 3. The first two models report that the primary affiliation is related to occupational status. However, when the dual affiliation is added in the third model, both primary and secondary

Table 3 OLS regression of occupational status on institutional affiliation

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Institutional affiliation			
Primary	2.02 (0.34)***	0.62 (0.31)*	0.66 (0.31)*
Secondary	1.29 (1.02)	1.27 (0.90)	2.71 (1.03)**
Dual (primary × secondary)	–	–	−1.71 (0.63)**
Other organizations	1.80 (0.96)	1.07 (0.85)	1.17 (0.84)
Individual social networks			
Number of family members	1.02 (0.31)**	−0.14 (0.32)	−0.11 (0.31)
Co-workers	0.23 (0.05)***	0.18 (0.04)***	0.17 (0.04)***
Neighborhood friends	−0.20 (0.05)***	−0.06 (0.04)	−0.06 (0.04)
Other friends	0.02 (0.03)	−0.02 (0.03)	−0.02 (0.03)
Sociodemographic features			
Age	–	0.27 (0.17)	0.25 (0.17)
Age^2	–	−0.00 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)
Female	–	3.02 (1.30)*	2.95 (1.30)*
Married	–	6.22 (1.31)***	6.16 (1.31)***
Female × married	–	−4.43 (1.72)**	−4.26 (1.61)**
Education	–	5.30 (0.31)***	5.22 (0.32)***
Geographic controls (reference: Seoul)			
Gyeong-gi	–	−1.80 (1.08)	−1.82 (1.07)
Gang-won	–	−2.94 (2.30)	−2.87 (2.29)
Chung-cheong	–	−2.38 (1.45)	−2.46 (1.45)
Gyeong-sang	–	−1.60 (1.05)	−1.58 (1.05)
Jeolla	–	−2.82 (1.29)*	−2.78 (1.28)*
Je-ju	–	−0.86 (3.16)	1.00 (3.15)
Intercept	35.50 (1.14)***	10.28 (4.27)*	11.10 (4.27)**
N	1158	1154	1154
Adjusted R^2	0.09	0.31	0.32

OLS unstandardized estimates are reported. Robust standard errors are in parentheses

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed test)



Fig. 1 Interaction between primary and secondary affiliations on occupational status. *Note* The *lines* represent predicted value of occupational status when other covariates are statistically controlled

affiliations are positively associated with occupational status, whereas dual affiliation is negatively related to it. Hypotheses 1 and 4 are thus supported. In regard to the effect of dual affiliation, it seems that (1) duality between primary and secondary affiliations, when not specifically taken into account, suppresses the association of the secondary affiliation with occupational status, and (2) when primary and secondary affiliations are jointly considered by an interaction term, it is in negative association with occupational status. The interaction plot helps clarify the two points (Fig. 1). The figure shows that when a greater number of memberships in secondary affiliation coexists with primary affiliation, the mean socioeconomic index scores tend to decrease. Thus Hypothesis 5-1, which predicted no association between dual affiliation and occupational status, is rejected.

Among the control measures, the full model reports that a higher level of education, having more co-workers, being married, and being female are related to obtaining better jobs. However, according to the interaction between gender and marital status, females who were married had lower SEI jobs, which is in line with relevant research findings that in Korea women's work is devalued when they reenter the labor market after marriage and childbirth (Turner and Monk-Turner 2007). In terms of geographic controls, living in Jeolla province was associated with lower occupational status compared to the capital city.

Table 4 takes civic actions as the outcome measure. Throughout the three nested models, only the secondary affiliation is related to civic actions, which supports Hypotheses 2, 3, and 5-2. In regard to control measures, education is positively related to civic actions whereas neighborhood friends are negatively associated with them. To simplify the presentation, the results of the inflation binary equation of zero count in civic actions are not presented (table available upon request).

8 Conclusion and Discussion

I proposed that institutional affiliation—a socially contextualized pattern of group belonging—has a distinct relationship with social and economic outcomes. I then hypothesized that both primary and secondary institutional affiliations are related to

Table 4 Zero-inflated Poisson regression of number of civic actions on institutional affiliation

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Institutional affiliation			
Primary	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)	0.05 (0.03)
Secondary	0.35 (0.08)***	0.34 (0.11)**	0.45 (0.09)***
Dual (primary × secondary)	–	–	−0.10 (0.06)
Other organizations	0.15 (0.09)	0.13 (0.09)	0.13 (0.09)
Individual social networks			
Number of family members	0.01 (0.04)	0.05 (0.04)	0.06 (0.04)
Co-workers	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Neighborhood friends	−0.01 (0.01)	−0.01 (0.00)*	−0.01 (0.00)*
Other friends	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Sociodemographic features			
Age	–	0.01 (0.03)	0.02 (0.03)
Age^2	–	−0.00 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)
Female	–	−0.05 (0.14)	−0.06 (0.14)
Married	–	−0.05 (0.15)	−0.06 (0.15)
Female × married	–	0.05 (0.20)	−0.07 (0.19)
Education	–	0.10 (0.04)*	0.09 (0.04)*
Geographic controls (reference: Seoul)			
Gyeong-gi	–	0.00 (0.13)	−0.00 (0.13)
Gang-won	–	−0.09 (0.32)	−0.09 (0.31)
Chung-cheong	–	−0.26 (0.18)	−0.26 (0.18)
Gyeong-sang	–	0.06 (0.13)	0.06 (0.13)
Jeolla	–	0.23 (0.14)	0.24 (0.14)
Je-ju	–	0.13 (0.34)	0.13 (0.34)
Intercept	0.21 (0.14)	−0.21 (0.59)	−0.29 (0.56)
N	1309	1305	1305
Number of zero observations	776	773	773
Likelihood Ratio χ^2	23.35**	60.81***	69.08***

Zero-inflated Poisson models are employed and only the logit coefficients from their count equations are reported, omitting those from the inflation binary equations that deal with zero observations (table available upon request). Standard errors are in parentheses

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed test)

occupational status, whereas only the secondary affiliation is associated with number of civic actions. Regarding the dual affiliation, I posited that it is related to neither outcome largely due to its redundant nature that does not add significantly to what primary and secondary affiliations have already explained.

There are two critical conclusions to be drawn from this study, one theoretical and the other empirical. First, the theorization of institutional affiliation in this study offers a new perspective regarding memberships in voluntary associations. The literature on status attainment, social capital, or volunteerism has mainly focused on the total number of memberships in voluntary associations and its relationship with certain outcomes, such as occupational status, civic actions, trust, and health, treating all memberships equally (e.g.,

Putnam 2000; Rietschlin 1998; Wilson 2000, 2012). However, the concept of institutional affiliation can be used to categorize associations and examine how different affiliation types are associated with instrumental outcomes. Specifically, the primary affiliation is more apt to seek in-group interests and social bonding whereas the secondary affiliation is more likely to serve out-group orientation and perform a bridging function. Second, the results of the study challenge the belief that a primary affiliation based on particularistic group belonging is essential to succeed in status attainment in Korea (Kim 2006; Yee 2000). The present study shows that not only the primary but also the secondary type of affiliation is positively associated with occupational status. Therefore investment in a secondary affiliation does not bog its members down in terms of socioeconomic mobility. Further, the negative association between dual affiliation and occupational status indicates that joining both primary and secondary affiliations does not provide additional benefit. That is, either of the two types of affiliation should be sufficient for status attainment. Therefore, considering all the associations between the two types of institutional affiliation and occupational status and civic actions, I conclude that the secondary affiliation is efficacious for both status attainment and civic engagement, whereas the primary affiliation mainly promotes personal interests in the labor market.

The study has several limitations. First, the causality between explanatory and outcome measures needs further exploration because the data were cross-sectional. A plausible way to deal with the endogeneity issue with cross-sectional data is the instrumental variable approach. However, the data set does not offer instruments that are strongly related to institutional affiliations but uncorrelated with the error terms of the two outcome measures. I thus conducted a supplementary analysis of monthly income because the occupational status variable included some respondents who had retired at the time of the survey—in this case, their last jobs were coded. In contrast, the measure of monthly income took only those who were currently working at the time of the interview ($N = 721$, 55 % of the sample). Monthly income has sixteen response categories; the mean is about US$1575 according to the 2004 currency conversion rate. The logged monthly income was employed in the supplementary analysis to moderate the skewedness of the original measure ("Appendix 1", Table 5). According to the results, both primary and secondary affiliations were related to income in the first step. However, in the full model only the secondary affiliation was associated with monthly income when the dual affiliation was considered, thus depreciating the value of the primary affiliation. I acknowledge that this supplementary analysis is not enough to resolve endogeneity because institutional affiliations and income were measured at the same time when the survey was administered.

Regarding the measures of institutional affiliations, the categorization of primary and secondary affiliations may not be ideal. Although the confirmatory factor analysis of voluntary associations corroborated the two types of institutional affiliation, religious association lacked a strong loading on the primary affiliation (Table 1). It thus requires a supplementary analysis in which the primary affiliation count variable omits religious association. "Appendix 2" presents the full model results from the two sets of multivariate regressions. The regression of occupational status informs that no significant change was made to the results by the recategorization of primary affiliation; both the primary and secondary affiliations are related to occupational status while the dual affiliation is negatively associated with it. The next column presents the regression outcome of civic actions. As identified in Table 4, the secondary affiliation is positively related to the number of civic actions whereas the primary affiliation is unrelated to it. Additionally, the dual affiliation is negatively associated with civic actions, denoting that a mixture between primary and secondary affiliations does not exert any further positive influence on civic

actions. Another limitation in regard to the measures of institutional affiliations is that the length of membership in each association was not specified. Considering these weaknesses, it is necessary to develop more refined measures of institutional affiliations in future studies.

In conclusion, the study suggests that the institutional affiliations that reflect socially contextualized patterns of group belonging are a form of organizational social capital. This conceptualization and measurement of institutional affiliations can offer an alternative to the summated scale of total number of memberships in voluntary associations, a customary measure of organizational social capital in the literature. A crucial concern regarding the summated scale, among others, is that it treats all social groups alike irrespective of cultural and historical differences across societies and their plausible structuralized linkages with varied voluntary associations. Therefore individuals' seemingly free choices regarding memberships in voluntary groups may to some significant extent be precontextualized by institutional contingencies, which is hard to detect by a global measure of memberships in voluntary organizations. This study used the two measures of institutional affiliation—primary and secondary—considering the developmental trajectory of Korea from a traditional to a modern society. Still, this does not necessarily mean that this dichotomous categorization of voluntary associations can be applied to other countries without alteration. Rather, the present study based on a single case country calls attention to a research agendum regarding why it is necessary to formulate culturally sensitive indicators of organizational social capital and how this can be done.

Appendix 1

See Table 5.

Table 5 OLS regression of logged monthly income on institutional affiliation

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Institutional affiliation			
Primary	0.13 (0.03)***	0.03 (0.03)	0.03 (0.03)
Secondary	0.31 (0.09)**	0.12 (0.07)	0.19 (0.08)*
Dual (primary × secondary)	–	–	−0.09 (0.05)
Other organizations	0.12 (0.09)	0.13 (0.07)	0.13 (0.07)
Individual social networks			
Number of family members	−0.01 (0.03)	−0.05 (0.03)	−0.05 (0.03)
Co-workers	0.01 (0.00)**	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Neighborhood friends	−0.03 (0.00)***	−0.01 (0.00)**	−0.01 (0.00)**
Other friends	0.01 (0.00)**	0.00 (0.00)	0.00 (0.00)
Sociodemographic features			
Age	–	0.18 (0.02)***	0.18 (0.12)***
Age^2	–	−0.00 (0.00)***	−0.00 (0.00)***
Female	–	−0.12 (0.12)	−0.13 (0.12)
Married	–	0.33 (0.11)**	0.32 (0.11)**
Female × married	–	−0.99 (0.14)***	−0.98 (0.14)***
Education	–	0.19 (0.03)***	0.19 (0.03)***

Table 5 continued

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Geographic controls (reference: Seoul)			
Gyeong-gi	–	−0.23 (0.09)*	−0.23 (0.09)*
Gang-won	–	−0.20 (0.19)	−0.19 (0.19)
Chung-cheong	–	−0.56 (0.12)***	−0.56 (0.13)***
Gyeong-sang	–	−0.21 (0.09)*	−0.20 (0.09)*
Jeolla	–	−0.26 (0.11)*	−0.25 (0.11)*
Je-ju	–	−0.57 (0.27)*	−0.56 (0.27)*
Intercept	13.94 (0.11)***	10.14 (0.41)***	10.08 (0.41)***
N	718	717	717
Adjusted R^2	0.10	0.44	0.44

OLS unstandardized estimates are reported. Robust standard errors are in parentheses

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed test)

Appendix 2

See Table 6.

Table 6 Regression of occupational status/number of civic actions on institutional affiliation

	Occupational status (OLS)	Civic actions (zero-inflated Poisson)
Institutional affiliation		
Primary (new)[a]	1.14 (0.34)**	0.07 (0.04)
Secondary	5.60 (1.74)**	0.71 (0.15)***
Dual [primary (new) × secondary]	−1.96 (0.68)**	−0.18 (0.06)**
Other organizations[b]	0.68 (0.76)	0.13 (0.09)
Individual social networks		
Number of family members	−0.12 (0.31)	0.05 (0.04)
Co-workers	0.18 (0.04)***	0.00 (0.00)
Neighborhood friends	−0.06 (0.04)	−0.01 (0.00)*
Other friends	−0.02 (0.03)	0.00 (0.00)
Sociodemographic features		
Age	0.24 (0.17)	0.01 (0.03)
Age^2	−0.00 (0.00)	−0.00 (0.00)
Female	3.02 (1.30)*	−0.07 (0.14)
Married	6.15 (1.31)***	−0.07 (0.15)
Female × married	−4.26 (1.62)**	0.02 (0.18)
Education	5.20 (0.32)***	0.11 (0.04)**
Geographic controls (reference: Seoul)		
Gyeong-gi	−1.84 (1.08)	−0.06 (0.13)
Gang-won	−2.97 (2.29)	−0.07 (0.32)
Chung-cheong	−2.43 (1.45)	−0.26 (0.18)
Gyeong-sang	−1.64 (1.05)	0.10 (0.13)

Table 6 continued

	Occupational status (OLS)	Civic actions (zero-inflated Poisson)
Jeolla	−2.69 (1.28)*	0.28 (0.14)*
Je-ju	0.98 (3.15)	0.16 (0.33)
Intercept	9.41 (4.18)*	−0.44 (0.55)
N	1154	1305
Adjusted R^2	0.32	–
Number of zero observations	–	773
Likelihood Ratio χ^2	–	64.19***

[a] Primary affiliation (new) includes alumni group, regional association, informal social gathering, and sports groups dropping religious association

[b] Other organizations absorbs religious association

* $p < .05$; ** $p < .01$; *** $p < .001$ (two-tailed test)

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