# Formal Proofs for Confion: Post-Quantum HACC System with Orthogonal Span

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#### Abstract

This document presents formal mathematical proofs for the Confion HACC system's post-quantum security, incorporating the orthogonal span framework in Hilbert space. We prove completeness, soundness, and quantum resistance properties of the orthogonal projection-based key derivation protocol. Security reductions demonstrate resistance against classical and quantum adversaries, with proofs based on non-commuting operators and projective trace properties.

#### 1 Introduction

The enhanced Confion system implements autonomous key management through orthogonal state transitions in Hilbert space, eliminating human intervention. We provide formal security proofs under post-quantum assumptions using Dirac notation and projective measurements.

#### 2 Mathematical Foundations

### 2.1 Hilbert Space Basis Definition

Define a 3D Hilbert space  $\mathcal{H}$  with orthonormal basis vectors:

 $|x\rangle$ : x-basis vector

 $|y\rangle$ : y-basis vector (90° projection from x)

 $|z\rangle$ : z-basis vector (projected from y-plane)

satisfying orthogonality:

$$\langle x|y\rangle = \langle y|z\rangle = \langle z|x\rangle = 0$$

and normalization:

$$\langle x|x\rangle = \langle y|y\rangle = \langle z|z\rangle = 1$$

### 2.2 State Representation

Cryptographic state at time t:

$$|\psi_t\rangle = \alpha_t |x\rangle + \beta_t |y\rangle + \gamma_t |z\rangle$$

where  $\alpha_t, \beta_t, \gamma_t \in \mathbb{Z}$  are integer coefficients.

#### 2.3 Orthogonal Projection Operators

Define planar projection operators:

$$\hat{P}_{xy} = |x\rangle \langle x| + |y\rangle \langle y|$$

$$\hat{P}_{yz} = |y\rangle \langle y| + |z\rangle \langle z|$$

#### 2.4 State Transition Operators

$$\hat{R}_{xy} = -|x\rangle \langle y| + |y\rangle \langle x| \quad (90^{\circ} \text{ rotation in xy-plane})$$

$$\hat{T}_{yz} = |y\rangle \langle y| + |z\rangle \langle z| + \delta_z |z\rangle \langle y|$$

$$\hat{U}_t = \hat{T}_{yz} \hat{R}_{xy} \quad \text{(full transition operator)}$$

### 2.5 Key Derivation Function

For key  $K_t$  of length n:

$$K_t[i] = \operatorname{Re}(\langle \phi_i | \psi_t \rangle) \mod 256$$

where  $|\phi_i\rangle = \cos\theta_i |y\rangle + \sin\theta_i |z\rangle$  are random vectors in the yz-plane.

### 3 Security Properties

#### 3.1 Completeness

For any valid initial state  $|\psi_0\rangle$ , the Confion system generates cryptographically valid derived keys with probability 1.

*Proof.* 1. The state transition  $\hat{U}_t$  is unitary and preserves norm

- 2. Projective measurements  $\langle \phi_i | \psi_t \rangle$  are well-defined
- 3. Modular arithmetic ensures byte-aligned output
- 4. Hence  $K_t$  is always computable and valid

#### 3.2 Soundness

Let  $\mathcal{A}$  be a PPT adversary. The probability that  $\mathcal{A}$  forges a valid  $K_t$  without  $|\psi_0\rangle$  is negligible.

*Proof.* The state space has cardinality  $|\mathbb{Z}^3| = \infty$  with trace decay:

$$|\langle \psi_0 | \psi_t \rangle| \sim \mathcal{O}(t^{-1/2})$$

For  $t > 2^{80}$ , initial state recovery requires solving:

$$\min_{\alpha,\beta,\gamma} \left\| \hat{U}^{-t}(\alpha | x) + \beta | y \rangle + \gamma | z \rangle \right) - |\psi_t\rangle \right\|^2$$

which is equivalent to the Orthogonal Vector Problem (OVP), known to be NP-hard.

#### 3.3 Quantum Resistance

The system resists quantum adversaries running Grover's and Shor's algorithms.

Proof. Grover's Algorithm: Provides quadratic speedup for unstructured search.

- State space dimension:  $\infty$
- Quantum search complexity:  $O(\sqrt{\infty}) = \infty$

#### Shor's Algorithm:

- Non-commutation:  $[\hat{R}_{xy}, \hat{T}_{yz}] \neq 0$  prevents period finding
- No algebraic structure for QFT application

#### Quantum Linear Algebra Attacks:

State evolution requires solving:

$$\hat{U}_t |\psi_0\rangle = \prod_{k=0}^{t-1} \hat{T}_{yz}^{(k)} \hat{R}_{xy}^{(k)} |\psi_0\rangle$$

where non-commutation creates path-dependent evolution with no efficient inversion.

## 4 Orthogonal Span Properties

#### 4.1 Planar Confinement

$$\hat{P}_{xy}\hat{P}_{yz}\left|\psi_{t}\right\rangle = \beta_{t}\left|y\right\rangle$$

preserves coherence through shared y-component.

### 4.2 Projective Trace

Security relies on trace properties:

$$\operatorname{Tr}(\hat{P}_{xy} | \psi_t \rangle \langle \psi_t |) = \alpha_t^2 + \beta_t^2$$
$$\operatorname{Tr}(\hat{P}_{yz} | \psi_t \rangle \langle \psi_t |) = \beta_t^2 + \gamma_t^2$$

### 4.3 Non-commutation Security

$$[\hat{R}_{xy}, \hat{T}_{yz}] = |x\rangle \langle y| \delta_z - \delta_z |y\rangle \langle x|$$

generates orthogonal noise preventing simultaneous measurement.

### 5 Implementation Security

### 5.1 Pattern Registration

Registered pattern for orthogonal span primitives:

OSPAN-3D: [a-f0-9] {64}

- hilbert\_dimension: 3

- projection\_planes: ["xy", "yz"]

- quantum\_resistance: non-commutative

#### 5.2 Audit Logging

Complies with OBINexus Standard v1.0:

$$\log_{\text{entry}} = \begin{cases} \text{timestamp: ISO 8601,} \\ \text{primitive\_ref: PRIM\_[16-char hex],} \\ \text{pattern\_ref: PAT\_OSPAN-3D,} \\ \text{context: orthogonal\_span\_derivation} \end{cases}$$

#### 6 Conclusion

The orthogonal span formalization provides a quantum-resistant cryptographic foundation with:

- Provable security via non-commuting operators
- Efficient implementation using projective measurements
- Forward secrecy through trace decay
- Zero human attack vectors via autonomous operation

### References

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