

# **Universal Stochastic Predictor**

## **Phase 4: IO Layer Initiation**

Implementation Team

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# Chapter 1

## Phase 4: IO Layer Initiation Overview

Phase 4 introduces the asynchronous I/O layer for snapshots, streaming, and telemetry export. The primary design goal is to preserve JAX/XLA throughput by decoupling compute from disk or network latency.

### 1.1 Scope

Phase 4 covers:

- **Telemetry Buffering:** Non-blocking emission of telemetry snapshots
- **Deterministic Logging:** Hash-based parity checks for CPU/GPU validation
- **Snapshot Strategy:** Atomic persistence of predictor state
- **Ingestion and Validation:** Input filtering, staleness policy, frozen signal detection
- **Security Enforcement:** Credential injection and secret exclusion
- **IO Modules:** validators, loaders, telemetry, snapshots, credentials

### 1.2 Design Principles

- **No Compute Stalls:** JAX compute threads never block on I/O
- **Determinism:** Logs capture reproducible hashes instead of raw state dumps
- **Security:** No raw signals or secrets in logs
- **Configurability:** Logging intervals and destinations injected via config
- **Integrity:** Snapshots and parity logs are hash-verified

## Chapter 2

# Ingestion and Validation

### 2.1 Implementation Modules

Phase 4 IO introduces the following modules:

- `io/validators.py`: Outlier, frozen signal, and staleness checks
- `io/loaders.py`: Ingestion gate and decision flags
- `io/telemetry.py`: Non-blocking telemetry buffer and parity hashes
- `io/snapshots.py`: Binary snapshots, hash verification, atomic writes
- `io/credentials.py`: Environment-based credential injection helpers

### 2.2 Catastrophic Outlier Filter

Input validation must reject catastrophic outliers when  $|y_t| > 20\sigma$  relative to historical normalization. In this case, the system must preserve inertial state and emit a critical alert without advancing the transport update.

- Reject observation and keep current state unchanged.
- Emit a critical alert for audit visibility.
- Do not update JKO/Sinkhorn weights for the rejected step.

#### 2.2.1 Implementation Notes

Outlier detection is implemented as a pure function with configuration-driven thresholds. The ingestion gate returns a decision object that preserves inertial state when an outlier is detected.

### 2.3 Frozen Signal Alarm

If the exact same value is observed for  $N_{freeze} \geq 5$  consecutive steps, emit a `FrozenSignalAlarmEvent`. This invalidates the multifractal spectrum and requires:

- Freeze the topological branch (Kernel D).
- Switch to degraded inference mode.
- Continue monitoring until signal variation resumes.

### 2.3.1 Recovery Criteria

The frozen signal lock is released after the variance exceeds a configurable ratio of historical variance for a configurable number of consecutive steps.

## 2.4 Staleness Policy (TTL)

Every observation must carry a timestamp for TTL evaluation. If the target delay exceeds  $\Delta_{max}$ , the JKO update must be suspended immediately.

- Compute staleness as  $\Delta_t = t_{now} - t_{obs}$ .
- If  $\Delta_t > \Delta_{max}$ , skip the transport update.
- Preserve state and record a staleness warning event.

### 2.4.1 Implementation Notes

Staleness is computed as the difference between current time and observation timestamp. The ingestion decision flags a suspended JKO update when the TTL is exceeded.

## Chapter 3

# Telemetry Abstraction

### 3.1 TelemetryBuffer Emission

The JKO orchestrator should emit a `TelemetryBuffer` at the end of each step. This buffer is consumed by a dedicated process outside the JAX execution thread.

- The buffer contains summary metrics (CUSUM, entropy, regime flags, OT cost).
- The compute path only enqueues the buffer and continues.
- The consumer is responsible for serialization and persistence.

#### 3.1.1 Implementation Notes

The telemetry buffer is a bounded, thread-safe queue. Parity hashes are emitted on a configurable interval and derived from canonical float64 serialization.

### 3.2 No Compute Stalls

JAX compute threads must never block on I/O. Telemetry buffers must be non-blocking and consumed by a separate process or thread outside the JAX execution path.

## Chapter 4

# Deterministic Logging

### 4.1 Hash-Based Parity Checks

For hardware parity audits, the logger records SHA-256 hashes of the weight vector  $\rho$  and the OT cost at configurable intervals. This permits CPU/GPU parity validation without dumping VRAM data.

- Hash interval configured per deployment.
- Hashes derived from canonical float64 serialization.
- Logs are append-only and immutable.

### 4.2 Audit Hashes

Parity audits must log SHA-256 hashes of  $\rho$  and OT cost at configured intervals. Hash input must be derived from canonical float64 serialization to ensure reproducibility across CPU and GPU.



# Chapter 5

## Snapshot Strategy

### 5.1 Atomic Persistence

Snapshots must be persisted atomically to prevent partial writes. The IO layer is responsible for:

- Writing to temporary files and renaming atomically.
- Optional compression configured by policy.
- Coordinating snapshot cadence with telemetry output.

### 5.2 Binary Serialization

Text formats (JSON, XML) are prohibited for critical snapshots due to latency and ambiguity. Use dense binary formats such as Protocol Buffers or MessagePack.

- Encode all fields deterministically.
- Preserve float64 for numerical fidelity.

#### 5.2.1 Implementation Notes

The snapshot serializer uses MessagePack as the default binary format. Hash verification is performed before state injection.

### 5.3 Integrity Verification

Each snapshot  $\Sigma_t$  must include a hash footer (SHA-256 or CRC32c). The load routine must verify the hash before injecting state into memory.

- Fail closed if hash verification fails.
- Log integrity failures at critical severity.

### 5.4 Atomic Write Protocol

To avoid partial writes, persist snapshots to a temporary file and then atomically rename to the target path. The rename step must be the only visible operation to consumers.

- Use a unique temporary filename per snapshot.
- Ensure the target file is replaced atomically.

### 5.4.1 Implementation Notes

Snapshots are written to a unique temporary file and moved into place using atomic rename. Optional fsync ensures persistence across power loss.

## Chapter 6

# Security Policies

### 6.1 Credential Injection

Tokens and API keys must not appear in source code. Credentials must be injected at runtime via environment variables or `.env` files.

#### 6.1.1 Implementation Notes

Credential helpers read from environment variables or `.env` files and raise explicit errors on missing values.

### 6.2 Version Control Exclusion

The repository must exclude `.env` files and credential directories via `.gitignore`. Secrets must never be committed.

## Chapter 7

# Orchestrator Integration

### 7.1 Ingestion Gate in `orchestrate_step()`

The core orchestration pipeline now integrates ingestion validation as a pre-kernel gate. The `orchestrate_step()` function signature is extended to accept observation metadata:

```
1 def orchestrate_step(  
2     signal: Float[Array, "n"],  
3     timestamp_ns: int,  
4     state: InternalState,  
5     config: PredictorConfig,  
6     observation: ProcessState,  
7     now_ns: int,  
8 ) -> OrchestrationResult:  
9     """Run a single orchestration step with IO ingestion validation."""
```

#### 7.1.1 Execution Flow

The ingestion gate operates as follows:

1. **Input Validation:** Standard signal length and dtype checks.
2. **Ingestion Decision:** Call `evaluate_ingestion()` with current state, observation, and configuration.
3. **Rejection Logic:** If `accept_observation == False`, reject the entire observation without state update (emergency mode).
4. **Degradation Flags:** Apply `suspend_jko_update` and `freeze_kernel_d` flags to control fusion behavior.
5. **Kernel Execution:** Run kernels A-D; if `freeze_kernel_d == True`, mark kernel D output as frozen.
6. **Fusion Selection:** Skip JKO/Sinkhorn if degraded mode or `suspend_jko_update` is set.
7. **State Update:** Only update `InternalState` if observation is accepted.

#### 7.1.2 Flag Semantics

The `IngestionDecision` object carries the following flags:

- **`accept_observation`:** If `False`, reject and preserve inertial state.

- **suspend\_jko\_update**: If True, freeze weights and skip Sinkhorn.
- **degraded\_mode**: If True, emit degraded inference mode prediction.
- **freeze\_kernel\_d**: If True, mark kernel D output as frozen (no weight update).
- **staleness\_ns**: Staleness in nanoseconds for audit logging.
- **events**: Emitted validation events (outliers, frozen signals, staleness alarms).

### 7.1.3 Early Return on Rejection

If an observation is rejected (catastrophic outlier), the orchestrator returns a degraded result without advancing the state:

```

1 # If observation is rejected, skip state update entirely
2 if reject_observation:
3     updated_state = state
4 else:
5     updated_state = atomic_state_update(...)
```

## 7.2 PRNG Constant

To eliminate magic numbers in PRNG splitting, we introduce a module-level constant:

```

1 RNG_SPLIT_COUNT = 2
2 rng_key = jax.random.split(state.rng_key, RNG_SPLIT_COUNT)[1]
```

This ensures clarity and maintainability.

## Chapter 8

# Compliance Checklist

- **No Compute Stalls:** All logging is asynchronous
- **Binary Format:** Protocol Buffers or MessagePack for snapshots
- **Atomic Snapshots:** Write-then-rename protocol
- **Deterministic Hashing:** SHA-256 on  $\rho$  and OT cost
- **Security:** No raw signals, VRAM dumps, or secrets
- **Integrity:** Snapshot hashes verified before load
- **Config-Driven:** Intervals and destinations are injected
- **Module Coverage:** IO helpers implemented for validation, telemetry, snapshots, and credentials
- **Orchestrator Integration:** IO ingestion gate integrated into `orchestrate_step()`
- **PRNG Constants:** Named constants replace magic numbers

## Chapter 9

# Phase 4 Summary

Phase 4 introduces a non-blocking I/O architecture that preserves deterministic compute while enabling telemetry, logging, and atomic snapshot persistence.