

Online Appendix: Citizen Responses to Ethnic Representation

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This appendix provides supporting information to the article and is posted online. Replication data and code for all empirical analysis is posted on the author’s website.

OA.1: Survey Details

- Pre-Survey Questions:

1. Female: 1-Female, 0-Male
2. Age (in years)
3. Married: 1-Yes, 0-No
4. Education: 1-No formal education, 2-Incomplete primary school, 3-Completed primary school, 4-Completed secondary school, 5-Some college, 6-Graduated college, 7-Advanced Degree
5. Albanian: 1-Albanian, 0-Macedonian
6. Income Personal (in EUR): 1-No income, 17-More than 2300 EUR per month
7. Income Household (in EUR): 1-No income, 17-More than 2300 EUR per month
8. Household Size (count)
9. Region: 1-Skopje, 2-North West, 3-South West, 4-East (Region 4 is dropped in Albanian only models due to too few observations)
10. Urban: 1-Yes, 2-No

- Pre-Cabinet Choice Questions:

11. News: “I watch of read the news daily.” (1-strongly disagree to 5-strongly agree)

12. Equal Opportunity: “North Macedonia provides equal opportunities for all individuals to be successful.” (1-strongly disagree to 5-strongly agree)
 13. Authoritarian: “What our country needs most is discipline, with everyone following our leaders in unity.” (1-strongly disagree to 5-strongly agree)
 14. Knowledge: “How many members of parliament are in the Assembly of the Republic of North Macedonia? Is it 75, 100, 120, 140, or 150?” (1-Answered 120, 0-Otherwise)
- Cabinet Profile: “Imagine a cabinet that contains 25 ministers with an ethnic Macedonian Prime Minister. Of the 25 cabinet ministers [ProfileDescriptive] are ethnic Albanians. [ProfileSDSM] [ProfileSubstantive] [ProfileCooperation].”
 - ProfileDescriptive: 0-None, 1-One, 6-Six, 10-Ten.
 - Profile SDSM: 1-“One Albanian minister is from the Social Democratic Alliance (SDSM), the rest are from several Albanian parties.” 0-“The Albanian ministers are from several Albanian parties.”
Note: Option 1 is dropped when ProfileDescriptive=0; code those profiles as 0. Language for option 1 when ProfileDescriptive=1: “One Albanian minister is from the Social Democratic Alliance (SDSM).”
 - ProfileSubstantive: 1-“The cabinet has already passed legislation to increase funding for Albanian issues.” 0-“The composition of the cabinet has received a lot of attention from the media.”
 - ProfileCooperation: 1-“Ministers work well together and have reformed the way the cabinet operates to emphasize forming a consensus when making decisions.” 0-“Ministers stick up for their ethnic background and are unwilling to compromise when making decisions that impact their ethnic group.”
 - Profile: Twenty-eight unique profiles were created with these four attributes; exact profile wordings are available in the replication data.
Note: Respondents were block randomized based on ethnic identification into the twenty-eight unique profiles.
 - Dependent Variables:
 15. Trust: “How likely is it that people from different ethnic groups keep their word and do what is agreed on?” (1-Not likely to 5-Extremely likely)
 16. Equality: “How likely are you to take into account the opinions of people from different ethnic groups when making decisions?” (1-Not likely to 5-Extremely likely)
 17. One Group: “To what extent do you think of Macedonian citizens as one group as opposed to a collection of individuals with different experiences?” (0-Collection of individuals, 1-One group)
 18. Neighbor: “I would be uncomfortable if someone who was a member of a different ethnic group moved in next door to me.” (1-Strongly disagree to 5-Strongly agree)

19. Talkoutgroup: "I would be happy to talk to someone who was a member of a different ethnic group." (1-Strongly disagree to 5-Strongly agree)
 20. Enthusiastic: "How enthusiastic would you feel if the cabinet you read about were in office? (1-Not at all to 5-Extremely)
 21. Angry: "How angry would you feel if this cabinet were in office?" (1-Not at all to 5-Extremely)
 22. Hopeful: "How hopeful would you feel if this cabinet were in office?" (1-Not at all to 5-Extremely)
 23. Resentful: "How resentful would you feel if this cabinet were in office?" (1-Not at all to 5-Extremely)
Note: Resentful in Macedonian and Albanian back-translates to "disappointed" in English.
 24. Cabinet Represent: "How well do you believe that this cabinet represents your interests?" (1-Not at all well to 5-Extremely well)
 25. Cabinet Trust: "How much do you trust this cabinet?" (1-Not at all to 5-An extremely high amount)
 26. Cabinet Model: "How well do you believe that this cabinet would promote positive relationships among Albanians and Macedonians in North Macedonia?" (1-Not at all well to 5-Extremely well)
 27. Benefit You: "If this cabinet took office, how likely do you think it is that policies would be adopted to benefit you or your neighbors?" (1-Not at all likely to 5-Extremely likely)
 28. Benefit Financial: "If this cabinet took office, how likely do you think it is that you or your neighbors would receive new financial benefits from the government?" (1-Not at all likely to 5-Extremely likely)
 29. Represent Satisfied: "Compared to other ethnic groups, how satisfied are you with representation of your ethnic group in this cabinet?" (1-Not at all satisfied to 5-Extremely satisfied)
 30. Minister Personal: "If this cabinet took office, do you think that ministers would work primarily to benefit themselves or the country as a whole?" (1-Themselves, 0-Country as a whole) (reverse coded)
Note: "Themselves" here means the group of cabinet ministers; this was clear in the Albanian and Macedonian translations.
- Post-Treatment Independent Variable:
 31. Party: "Which political party did you support in the last parliamentary election?" (1-Party for Democratic Prosperity (Albanian party); 2-Coalition for Change and Justice (center right Macedonian party); 3-Liberal Party (conservative-liberal party); 4-Levica (left wing party, anti-Albanian); 5-Democratic Party of Albanians (Albanian party); 6-SDSM (center-left party); 7-Besa (Albanian party); 8-Coalition Alliance for Albanians (Albanian coalition); 9-VMRO (nationalist

Macedonian party); 10-Democratic Union for Integration (Albanian party); 11-VMRO-DPMNE coalition (nationalist Macedonian coalition); 12-Did not vote; 13-Under 18 at the time of the election; 14-Voted for another party; 15-Refused) Note: This question generated a large number of refusals and answers that a respondent did not vote. The survey firm was instructed to push for respondents to identify which party they “supported” even if they did not vote.

Vignette Design

In this section, I focus on how the experimental vignette was designed, the relationship between historical context and the vignette design, and how the treatment should be interpreted given this historical context. The main takeaway from this section is that the vignette was designed to align with historical and contemporary context, meaning that the treatment attributes and levels are realistic.

Historical Context

Recent Macedonian history is defined by three notable events: Independence Day in 1991, the Ohrid Agreement in 2001, and the recent change in government leadership in 2016. These events each shaped and defined relationships between ethnic Macedonians and Albanians. Though they also changed other aspects of Macedonian life, I will discuss ethnic relationships here, as they are the focus of this study.

Following independence, political institutions throughout Macedonia were set-up to nominally include both Macedonians and Albanians. Every Macedonian government since independence has included Albanian representation, and Albanians filled non-trivial numbers of seats in Parliament (Hislope, 2003). Despite the image of Albanian inclusion, Albanians have long lacked political power and were subject to both political and social discrimination.

The 2001 insurgency that led to the signing of the Ohrid Agreement resulted partly from Albanians’ longstanding unequal treatment. The 1999 Kosovo War escalated ethnic tensions substantially. First, ethnic Macedonians felt that their ethnic identity was constantly under attack by neighboring countries. Macedonia had a longstanding disagreement with Greece about the name of the country that ethnic Macedonians interpreted as an attack on their ethnic identity. Additionally, Bulgaria and Serbia claimed that Macedonians were not a unique ethnic group and were instead derived from either Bulgarians or Serbs (Ceka, 2018). The Kosovo War added to ethnic Macedonian’s perceived threat because it resulted in a large number of ethnic Albanian refugees crossing the border into Macedonia. Increasing numbers of ethnic Albanians meant renewed calls for more equal political representation and appeared to ethnic Macedonians as yet another attack on their ethnic identity (Adamson and Jovic, 2004; Brunnbauer, 2002).

Thus, in 2001 when Albanian nationalists demanding increased political representation began an armed conflict against the Macedonian army, many thought that this was the beginning of a major war. Fortunately, the conflict was resolved with limited casualties after the implementation of the Ohrid Agreement that promised Albanians increased political rights.

Tensions have continued in the post-Ohrid Agreement period, though they have not escalated into a full scale war (Adamson and Jovic, 2004; Piacentini, 2019a; Vasilev, 2013). Even absent widespread violent confrontations, there have been outbreaks of protests and an increased effort to emphasize the ethnic Macedonian identity (Brunnbauer, 2002; Stefoska and Stojanov, 2017). Decentralization has emerged as a key tool meant to manage ethnic tensions instead of providing for meaningful power-sharing opportunities (Koneska, 2014; Lyon, 2012).

Among these tensions, there has been some wider movement toward increased Albanian representation. One impetus is certainly the international community. The Ohrid Agreement was brokered by NATO and was supported by a wide range of international partners, and it was somewhat successful in implementing consociationalism throughout the Macedonian government, at least on paper (Aleksoska, 2015; Piacentini, 2019b). In addition, the European Union has pushed for Macedonians to increase support for Albanian rights in a move widely thought to have implications for Macedonia’s prospects for EU membership (Ilievski and Taleski, 2009). However, these actions by the international community have prompted backlash, as ethnic Macedonian nationalists have become galvanized in resistance to increased Albanian representation (Stefoska and Stojanov, 2017).

Given the conflicting role that the international community plays in discussions over Albanian representation, it seems puzzling that one of the major Macedonian political parties — the SDSM — adopted a pro-Albanian representation stance when elected to government in 2016. Albanians had been represented and continue to be represented in every Macedonian cabinet, but the SDSM and Prime Minister Zoran Zaev emphasized providing Albanians with non-token representation (Crowther, 2017; Hislope, 2013). Part of the reason that the SDSM won election was their anti-corruption stance, a position formed in direct contrast with the other major party’s — the VMRO-DPMNE — longstanding corruption problems. Providing meaningful representation for both Albanians and Macedonians was, therefore, a priority (Gjuzelov and Hadjievska, 2020).

Descriptive Representation

I now move to discussing the rationale behind each vignette attribute. Each attribute and its corresponding levels were chosen to reflect historical context in a meaningful way.

As previously mentioned, Albanians have been descriptively represented in every governing coalition since 1991 (Crowther, 2017; Hislope, 2013). Inclusion of Albanians occurs regardless of political party, with the VMRO-DPMNE providing for Albanian cabinet representation even though their party platform is right-wing and increasingly nationalist. The vignette describes one of four levels of descriptive representation in a cabinet with 25 ministers: 0 Albanians (0% of the cabinet), 1 Albanian (4%), 6 Albanians (24%), and 10 Albanians (40%). The percentage of Albanians in the Macedonian cabinet from 2001 to 2016 ranged from 23% to 46%. This study was conducted in 2020. At that time, the cabinet had 30 ministers (including the Prime Minister) with approximately 7 Albanians (23%). Therefore, the primary rationale behind choosing the 6 Albanian level was to reflect a typical level of Albanian cabinet inclusion. The treatment level with 10 Albanians represents the upper bound of Albanian cabinet representation.

While recent cabinets have not excluded Albanians, there is frequent discussion about Al-

banian exclusion and token representation in political discourse. Indeed, nationalist Macedonian political parties advocate for completely eliminating Albanian representation (Berisha, 2016; Kelly, 2019; Saveski and Sadiku, 2012). This includes the VMRO-DPMNE (Ceka, 2018; Kelly, 2019). The scenarios with 0 and 1 Albanian ministers are meant to reflect this political discourse, which is credible.

Substantive Representation

The substantive representation treatment describes the cabinet approving legislation to increase funding for Albanian issues. The relevant question here is why I chose to focus on the cabinet's role in increasing funding for Albanian issues instead of highlighting either a specific funding proposal or some other form of substantive representation.

One of the main collective decision-making functions of the cabinet is to propose budget legislation.¹ By choosing to focus on the budget as a form of substantive representation, the treatment vignette highlights both one of the most important cabinet functions and one of the most important forms of substantive representation to the public. Within the cabinet's responsibility for creating and passing budget legislation, the cabinet develops strategic budget priorities, a fiscal strategy, and ceiling budget limits (WorldBank, 2019, 33). This means that the cabinet has the ability to set a priority of increasing funding for Albanian issues or mandating that Albanians receive a fair share of financial or government development programs. However, specific budget line items are left up to the finance ministry and bureaucrats in individual government departments. For this reason, substantive representation is best described as a general provision for more funding for issues of importance to Albanians.

In addition, finance priorities change every year in the budget and change every electoral cycle in the strategic budget plan that the Macedonian government releases. So, it is impossible to be specific about what a particular budget priority might be. If I were to choose an actual budget priority, then respondents would answer based on their actual experience with that priority, not that priority within the context of the other information in the vignette.

The Macedonian government draws their budget priorities from what they term their Operational Program. The 2020 to 2024 Operational Program emphasizes ethnic inclusion as a budgetary priority (Zaev, 2020). As such, the substantive representation treatment reflects the actual budgeting process and is credible.

What is more, Macedonian citizens were particularly interested in substantive representation when the survey was fielded. Government benefits have long been tied to clientelist practices (Crowther, 2017; Piacentini, 2019*b,a*). After gaining office, the SDSM has made reducing corruption and improving government delivery of benefits a priority.

Ministerial Cooperation

I measure cooperation through a cooperation treatment and an SDSM treatment. Cooperation among both members of the public and cabinet ministers is generally lacking. Albanians and Macedonians often view each other as inherently incompatible (Vasilev, 2013) and nationalist parties are working to create an ethnic Macedonian only narrative (Gjuzelov and

¹See the North Macedonian Constitution of 1991 (2011 revisions), Article 91.

Hadjievska, 2020). At the same time, some progress is being made, including the formation of some multi-ethnic political parties (Čeka, 2018). Highlighting the mixed record of cooperation, Reka (2008) finds that 41% of Albanians consider interethnic relations very good or excellent at the same time that 33% are willing to use violence to achieve political objectives.

Therefore, both cooperative and non-cooperative cabinets occur and are plausible to survey respondents. The specific cooperation treatment discusses how well ministers work together. The treatment does not explicitly mention cooperation across ethnic differences; instead, the nature of the cooperation is implied as interethnic cooperation. The control condition describing non-cooperation mentions unwillingness to compromise and provides ethnicity as the reason explaining this lack of cooperation.

This particular treatment and control structure, therefore, manipulates both the level of cooperation and whether ethnicity is used to justify non-cooperation. An alternative treatment and control structure would independently randomize the level of cooperation and whether the cooperation was discussed in ethnic terms or not. The structure of the survey experiment was already complicated given the four treatment attributes, and the sample size lacked power to add another treatment attribute. I therefore chose the two extreme cases for the cooperation treatment and control. The treatment condition reflects cooperation without priming on ethnicity. Adding the term “interethnic cooperation” or “cooperation across ethnic lines” to the treatment condition is likely to generate negative attitudes because cooperation is characterized as occurring between ethnic groups. Gaertner and Dovidio (2000) show that the most powerful form of cooperation occurs when groups merge and form a “common ingroup.” Thus, the cooperation treatment without mentioning ethnicity is likely to maximize the effect of the treatment on outgroup views. Similarly, the control condition that mentions both lack of cooperation and ethnicity is likely to generate the biggest negative reaction and outgroup views from respondents because it both mentions non-cooperation and explains that the non-cooperation occurs because of ethnicity — a particularly salient feature. Future work would do well to focus specifically on disentangling the nature of cooperation and the ways in which cooperation is discussed in a multi-ethnic cabinet setting.

Finally, I randomize whether an Albanian minister is a member of the SDSM. This measures cooperation because the SDSM is traditionally an ethnic Macedonian party that has recently begun outreach to ethnic Albanians. While Albanians traditionally support ethnic Albanian parties, there is a non-trivial percentage who support the SDSM. For example, consider Macedonia’s sixth constituency, which is approximately 72% Albanian according to the 2002 census (MAKSTAT, 2005). In that constituency, 58.27% of voters voted for an Albanian political party and 19.67% voted for the SDSM in the 2020 Parliamentary elections (SEK, 2020). This implies that there are likely between 10 and 15% of ethnic Albanians who support the SDSM.² Albanian support for the SDSM is likely due to their intentional efforts to reach out to Albanian voters (OSCE, 2020; Piacentini, 2019a; Tahiri, 2016).

Within this context, it is plausible that an Albanian minister comes from the SDSM. The Vice-President of the SDSM in 2019 was an ethnic Albanian (Piacentini, 2019a, 282). Therefore, the treatment and control options reflect the current possibility that an ethnic Albanian minister could come from the SDSM.

²More precise exit polling is not available, so these numbers are necessarily approximate.

Use of a Vignette Experiment

Thus far, I have shown that the vignette experiment reflects historical context and that all of the attributes and levels in the vignette are credible. As such, while the vignette experiment is hypothetical, it is also *realistic*, a factor that McDonald (2020) finds is particularly important in ensuring the validity of vignette experiments. One final design choice worth noting is the choice of a vignette experiment in the first place. Even if the vignette experiment is realistic, the experiment still asks respondents to imagine a situation and to respond by reporting their feelings given that situation. It is therefore possible that some respondents are better at imagining these situations than others.

Some literature in political science has addressed this exact question — whether respondents provide answers to vignette experiments that are reliable and that mimic the answers that they would provide if the vignette “came true” and respondents were asked their opinions about an actual event. Steiner, Atzmüller and Su (2016) find that vignette experiments are more realistic than standard survey questions and that the added realism increases validity. Additionally, Hainmueller, Hangartner and Yamamoto (2015) demonstrate that vignette experiments actually reflect reality quite well. By comparing vignette experiment results against a natural experiment, they conclude that vignette experiments can be successfully used to assess respondent attitudes with relatively little deviation from natural experiments. This finding suggests that respondents must be good at envisioning hypothetical scenarios or at least good enough that their preferences are stable between vignette and natural experiments.

It is also worth emphasizing that my regression models control for common demographic variables that may be associated with differences in ability to understand hypothetical scenarios. Added life experience (i.e., age) and education, among other variables, may be systematically related to comfort with processing hypothetical scenarios. Finally, the manipulation check in OA.6 also demonstrates that respondents successfully received the vignette experiment treatment.

Assignment and Preference of Cabinet Ministries

Beyond the historical context regarding *how many* Albanians are typically included in the cabinet, different ministries have different levels of influence. As such, we might be interested in which ministries Albanians are typically appointed to. If these ministries are systematically less powerful than the ministries to which Macedonians are appointed, then Albanians may not respond positively to increased descriptive representation because they do not believe those ministerial positions are important. I address this question in two parts. First, I detail evidence that Albanians have recently been appointed to a wide variety of ministries. Second, I use evidence from the survey experiment to show that Albanians value ministries not traditionally considered powerful. As such, Albanians do not have a token ministerial appointment in mind when they receive the experimental vignette.

Starting with the ministries that Albanians receive when they are appointed to the cabinet, while Albanians have historically been appointed to less influential ministries (Hislope, 2003), this trend has changed as politicians have realized that Albanian political support is important (Crowther, 2017). Prime Minister Zaev has appointed Albanians to particularly

prominent cabinet posts. As a result, Albanians were well represented both in terms of the number of cabinet posts and their apparent influence when this survey experiment was conducted. In 2020, Albanians held the Deputy Prime Minister post along with Economy, Education and Science, Culture, Environment and Physical Planning, Diaspora, and Political System and Inter-Community Relations. Using Krook and O’Brien (2012)’s typology for ministerial prestige, this translates to one high prestige post (Economy), two medium prestige posts (Environment and Physical Planning, and Education and Science), and three low prestige posts (Culture, Diaspora, and Political System and Inter-Community Relations).³ Additionally, while the Deputy Prime Minister does not hold a portfolio, this position is nevertheless important. Taken together, Albanians are not only assigned to token ministries, but also to ministries with prestige and real political power.

In addition, many Albanians believe that what are typically considered “low prestige” ministries are actually the most consequential ministries in their lives. I included one question on the survey asking respondents to “Think about the cabinet ministry that is most consequential to the life of you and your family. What cabinet ministry are you thinking of?” with respondents listing a ministry. The results — broken down by ethnicity — are in Table OA.1.1. I then collapsed these results into four categories, as shown in Table OA.1.2. From these Tables, we can see that Macedonians and Albanians care equally about ministries related to the economy, but that Albanians feel that culture and welfare ministries are more consequential while Macedonians feel that security/international ministries are more consequential. For example, fully 20% of Albanians listed the Education and Science ministry as most consequential. This makes sense because Albanian language education is an important issue. It is certainly possible that Albanians believe that the ministries that are most consequential to them are also the ministries where Albanians are ministers. Table OA.1.1 suggests that this is not entirely the case: Albanians believe that the Health ministry is quite important, for example, even though there is not an Albanian health minister.

These findings suggest that Albanians do not immediately write off descriptive representation because they imagine that Albanians will receive token ministerial appointments. Instead, Albanians expect a wide variety of ministerial appointments. The fact that the empirical results show that Albanians exposed to a vignette with more descriptive representation do not improve their cabinet perceptions or outgroup attitudes means that Albanians (and Macedonians) do not see the cabinet as a powerful or influential enough institution to be able to generate the kinds of changes in outgroup views that many have hoped.

³Education is marked as medium prestige and science is low prestige, so I categorize it in the higher category.

Table OA.1.1: Cabinet Ministry Preferences

	MAC	ALB
Foreign Affairs	0.13	0.02
Health	0.17	0.08
Justice	0.09	0.03
Transport and Communications	0.02	0.00
Economy	0.05	0.28
Agriculture, Forestry, and Water Supply	0.03	0.02
Information Society and Administration	0.03	0.00
Education and Science	0.02	0.20
Local Government	0.02	0.00
Culture	0.00	0.09
Environment and Physical Planning	0.00	0.05
Finance	0.11	0.03
Internal Affairs	0.10	0.01
Labor and Social Policy	0.15	0.01
Communications	0.01	0.00
Diaspora	0.00	0.02
Foreign Investment	0.00	0.01
Foreign Affairs	0.01	0.00
Foreign Investment	0.00	0.02
Regulation	0.00	0.02
Defense	0.06	0.02
Political System and Inter-Community Relations	0.00	0.08

Respondents' preferred ministries by ethnicity. Foreign Affairs and Foreign Investment constitute two ministerial positions and so are repeated.

Table OA.1.2: Cabinet Ministry Preferences By Category

	MAC	ALB
Culture	0.02	0.19
Welfare	0.28	0.37
Security/International	0.30	0.04
Economy	0.40	0.40

Culture (Local Government, Culture, Diaspora, Political System and Inter-Community Relations). Welfare (Health, Justice, Education and Science, Environment and Physical Planning). Security/International (Foreign Affairs, Internal Affairs, Defense). Economy (all other ministries).

OA.2: Randomization and Balance Checks

Table OA.2.1 shows multinomial logistic and logistic regression models where the dependent variable is the vignette attribute and independent variables are respondent demographics. There are only three covariates that predict assignment to vignette attributes, supporting the claim that vignette attributes were successfully randomized across attributes. Wald Tests assess whether the covariates have more combined predictive power than a restricted model with just an intercept. Only Model 2 fails the Wald Test, likely because of the combination of two significant covariates.

Table OA.2.1: Randomization Checks

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	ProfileDescriptive 1 (1)	ProfileDescriptive 6 (2)	ProfileDescriptive 10 (3)	ProfileCooperation (4)	ProfileSDSM (5)	ProfileSubstantive (6)
Female	0.241 (0.236)	0.441* (0.237)	0.249 (0.235)	-0.004 (0.145)	0.178 (0.147)	0.151 (0.145)
Age	-0.007 (0.007)	0.006 (0.007)	0.001 (0.007)	0.002 (0.005)	-0.004 (0.005)	-0.006 (0.005)
Married	-0.146 (0.247)	-0.601** (0.250)	0.042 (0.248)	0.015 (0.152)	-0.233 (0.154)	-0.116 (0.152)
Education	0.096 (0.125)	0.222* (0.124)	0.018 (0.126)	0.065 (0.075)	-0.041 (0.076)	-0.015 (0.075)
Household Size	-0.021 (0.061)	-0.055 (0.063)	0.029 (0.056)	0.068* (0.040)	0.051 (0.038)	0.007 (0.036)
North West	-0.477 (0.308)	-0.171 (0.307)	-0.170 (0.309)	0.123 (0.189)	-0.157 (0.191)	-0.162 (0.189)
South West	0.119 (0.369)	0.075 (0.380)	0.250 (0.374)	-0.132 (0.218)	0.226 (0.219)	-0.057 (0.218)
East	-0.507 (0.353)	-0.354 (0.356)	-0.175 (0.351)	0.001 (0.222)	-0.060 (0.226)	0.041 (0.222)
Urban	-0.238 (0.259)	-0.004 (0.261)	-0.169 (0.258)	0.172 (0.160)	0.045 (0.161)	-0.155 (0.159)
Constant	1.040 (0.791)	-0.027 (0.802)	0.461 (0.785)	-0.770 (0.496)	-0.115 (0.494)	0.424 (0.484)
Wald Test	0.97	2.32**	1.05	0.07	1.16	0.64

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Models 1, 2, and 3 are output from an multinomial logistic regression; reference level is ProfileDescriptive= 0. Models 4, 5, and 6 are logistic regressions.

Table OA.2.2 displays randomization checks for each of the 28 cabinet profiles using a multinomial logistic regression model with profile 1 as the control category. There are only twelve significantly predictive coefficients, again supporting the claim that profiles were randomized successfully.

Table OA.2.2: Randomization Checks All Profiles

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>																										
	2 (1)	3 (2)	4 (3)	5 (4)	6 (5)	7 (6)	8 (7)	9 (8)	10 (9)	11 (10)	12 (11)	13 (12)	14 (13)	15 (14)	16 (15)	17 (16)	18 (17)	19 (18)	20 (19)	21 (20)	22 (21)	23 (22)	24 (23)	25 (24)	26 (25)	27 (26)	28 (27)
Female	0.452 (0.549)	-0.932 (0.574)	-0.577 (0.553)	0.204 (0.546)	-0.009 (0.543)	-0.134 (0.543)	0.336 (0.549)	0.153 (0.542)	0.296 (0.552)	-0.594 (0.553)	-0.160 (0.543)	0.683 (0.554)	-0.229 (0.545)	0.095 (0.543)	0.250 (0.546)	0.218 (0.545)	0.245 (0.545)	0.507 (0.550)	0.011 (0.544)	0.419 (0.549)	-0.824 (0.563)	0.203 (0.545)	0.301 (0.544)	0.121 (0.546)	-0.265 (0.550)	-0.286 (0.545)	0.263 (0.546)
Age	-0.010 (0.018)	-0.003 (0.017)	0.011 (0.017)	-0.010 (0.018)	-0.015 (0.018)	-0.011 (0.018)	0.003 (0.018)	-0.021 (0.018)	0.002 (0.018)	-0.009 (0.017)	-0.006 (0.017)	-0.004 (0.018)	0.008 (0.017)	0.009 (0.017)	0.020 (0.017)	-0.006 (0.017)	0.009 (0.017)	0.010 (0.017)	-0.007 (0.017)	-0.008 (0.017)	-0.011 (0.017)	0.010 (0.017)	0.013 (0.017)	0.003 (0.017)	0.007 (0.017)	-0.007 (0.017)	-0.004 (0.018)
Married	0.573 (0.581)	1.162* (0.595)	0.296 (0.584)	0.062 (0.583)	0.916 (0.586)	0.436 (0.575)	0.234 (0.587)	0.424 (0.572)	-0.158 (0.596)	0.327 (0.577)	0.495 (0.579)	-0.323 (0.592)	-0.005 (0.586)	-0.245 (0.588)	0.543 (0.588)	-0.207 (0.588)	-0.546 (0.599)	0.041 (0.586)	-0.005 (0.588)	0.465 (0.583)	0.995* (0.585)	0.026 (0.590)	0.059 (0.594)	-0.171 (0.596)	1.294** (0.613)	1.104* (0.600)	0.680 (0.582)
Education	0.406 (0.293)	0.028 (0.314)	-0.176 (0.300)	0.299 (0.296)	0.269 (0.297)	0.305 (0.293)	0.374 (0.297)	0.198 (0.296)	0.294 (0.300)	0.114 (0.304)	0.197 (0.301)	0.349 (0.293)	0.465 (0.290)	0.531* (0.286)	0.581** (0.285)	0.212 (0.299)	0.354 (0.295)	0.478* (0.287)	0.071 (0.307)	0.153 (0.302)	0.178 (0.299)	0.306 (0.295)	0.197 (0.297)	-0.084 (0.318)	0.386 (0.298)	-0.141 (0.316)	0.428 (0.293)
Household Size	-0.247 (0.157)	-0.104 (0.142)	-0.083 (0.134)	0.032 (0.093)	-0.323** (0.161)	-0.170 (0.149)	-0.169 (0.143)	-0.159 (0.151)	-0.127 (0.142)	-0.202 (0.150)	-0.047 (0.125)	-0.191 (0.149)	-0.040 (0.115)	-0.064 (0.128)	-0.217 (0.152)	-0.043 (0.125)	-0.260* (0.149)	-0.140 (0.147)	-0.461*** (0.164)	0.001 (0.108)	-0.069 (0.136)	0.031 (0.099)	-0.026 (0.120)	-0.242* (0.145)	-0.087 (0.140)	-0.009 (0.119)	-0.177 (0.150)
North West	-0.079 (0.739)	0.472 (0.739)	-0.351 (0.713)	0.136 (0.744)	-0.619 (0.720)	-0.527 (0.715)	-1.841** (0.792)	0.164 (0.710)	-0.866 (0.770)	0.138 (0.726)	-0.580 (0.730)	-0.260 (0.710)	-0.030 (0.695)	-0.261 (0.712)	0.913 (0.734)	-0.870 (0.735)	-1.022 (0.735)	0.087 (0.742)	0.035 (0.730)	0.058 (0.750)	-0.397 (0.722)	-0.794 (0.733)	0.795 (0.751)	-1.017 (0.725)	0.343 (0.748)	-0.768 (0.759)	0.482 (0.760)
South West	-0.222 (0.849)	-0.585 (0.943)	-0.896 (0.901)	0.458 (0.829)	-0.885 (0.848)	-0.341 (0.795)	-0.896 (0.808)	-0.427 (0.865)	0.242 (0.796)	-0.138 (0.849)	-0.233 (0.811)	-1.206 (0.995)	-1.183 (0.994)	-0.222 (0.831)	-0.372 (0.937)	-0.200 (0.805)	-0.322 (0.800)	0.483 (0.804)	-0.450 (0.878)	0.337 (0.832)	-0.096 (0.790)	-0.161 (0.806)	-0.108 (0.956)	-0.834 (0.854)	-0.608 (0.939)	-0.056 (0.790)	0.265 (0.863)
East	-0.390 (0.808)	-0.365 (0.848)	-0.532 (0.781)	-0.346 (0.868)	-1.036 (0.796)	-1.390 (0.875)	-1.227 (0.786)	-0.739 (0.845)	-0.548 (0.823)	-0.709 (0.859)	-0.671 (0.809)	-0.451 (0.788)	-0.838 (0.838)	-0.813 (0.840)	-0.295 (0.840)	-0.660 (0.804)	-1.128 (0.832)	-0.586 (0.856)	-0.859 (0.862)	-0.177 (0.842)	-1.261 (0.882)	-0.606 (0.802)	0.285 (0.843)	-0.895 (0.805)	-0.105 (0.810)	-0.638 (0.811)	-0.470 (0.890)
Urban	-0.900 (0.599)	-0.498 (0.605)	0.022 (0.615)	-0.709 (0.598)	-0.587 (0.608)	-0.152 (0.618)	-1.063* (0.599)	-0.199 (0.605)	-0.817 (0.601)	-0.476 (0.599)	-0.784 (0.597)	-0.487 (0.603)	-0.574 (0.603)	-0.394 (0.606)	0.388 (0.637)	-0.652 (0.597)	-0.545 (0.605)	0.114 (0.623)	-0.648 (0.600)	-0.739 (0.596)	-0.221 (0.613)	-0.488 (0.600)	0.186 (0.604)	-0.622 (0.597)	-0.772 (0.606)	-0.529 (0.597)	-1.035* (0.602)
Constant	-0.027 (1.897)	0.424 (1.915)	-0.360 (1.854)	-0.741 (1.771)	1.294 (1.886)	0.371 (1.861)	0.298 (1.881)	0.749 (1.861)	-0.028 (1.899)	1.257 (1.886)	0.354 (1.826)	-0.036 (1.876)	-1.252 (1.799)	-1.685 (1.829)	-3.359* (1.947)	0.409 (1.825)	0.295 (1.893)	-2.189 (1.904)	2.415 (1.926)	-0.360 (1.819)	0.350 (1.840)	-1.212 (1.780)	-1.937 (1.879)	2.160 (1.932)	-1.710 (1.904)	1.063 (1.856)	-0.880 (1.912)

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Results from a multinomial logistic regression on the number of the cabinet profile seen by respondents.

Table OA.2.3 displays mean values for each profile attribute as well as a Welch Two Sample *t*-test indicating whether the covariate individually predicts the profile attribute assignment. Only two individual covariates significantly predict profile attribute assignment. Thus, individual covariates were successfully randomized for each profile attribute.

Table OA.2.3: Individual Covariate Balance

	Mean 1	Mean 0	Estimate	Std. Error	<i>p</i> -value
ProfileCooperation					
Female	0.50	0.50	0.00	0.03	1.00
Age	43.25	43.22	0.00	0.00	0.98
Married	0.50	0.50	-0.00	0.04	0.97
Education	4.05	3.98	0.02	0.02	0.30
Household Size	4.28	4.06	0.01	0.01	0.14
Skopje	0.30	0.30	0.01	0.04	0.82
Urban	0.59	0.55	0.04	0.04	0.31
Albanian	0.50	0.50	0.00	0.04	1.00
ProfileSubstantive					
Female	0.52	0.49	0.031	0.04	0.39
Age	42.24	44.23	-0.00	0.00	0.10
Married	0.49	0.51	-0.03	0.04	0.41
Education	4.01	4.02	-0.00	0.02	0.92
Household Size	4.23	4.12	0.01	0.01	0.46
Skopje	0.31	0.29	0.02	0.04	0.70
Urban	0.55	0.59	-0.04	0.04	0.31
Albanian	0.50	0.50	0.00	0.04	1.00
ProfileSDSM					
Female	0.53	0.48	0.04	0.04	0.24
Age	42.33	43.91	-0.00	0.00	0.20
Married	0.47	0.52	-0.05	0.04	0.16
Education	4.00	4.03	-0.01	0.02	0.70
Household Size	4.30	4.07	0.01	0.01	0.12
Skopje	0.31	0.29	0.01	0.04	0.72
Urban	0.57	0.57	-0.00	0.04	0.98
Albanian	0.50	0.50	0.00	0.04	1.00
ProfileDescriptive 0					
Female	0.45	0.51	-0.03	0.03	0.20
Age	44.12	43.09	0.00	0.00	0.56
Married	0.53	0.49	0.02	0.03	0.47
Education	3.95	4.03	-0.00	0.01	0.47
Household Size	4.14	4.17	-0.00	0.01	0.92
Skopje	0.27	0.31	-0.02	0.03	0.43
Urban	0.58	0.57	0.01	0.03	0.79
Albanian	0.50	0.50	0.00	0.03	1.00
ProfileDescriptive 1					
Female	0.50	0.51	-0.01	0.03	0.80
Age	41.21	44.04	-0.00	0.00	0.04
Married	0.51	0.50	0.01	0.03	0.68
Education	4.05	4.00	0.01	0.02	0.56
Household Size	4.20	4.16	0.00	0.01	0.79
Skopje	0.33	0.29	0.04	0.04	0.24
Urban	0.55	0.58	-0.02	0.03	0.59
Albanian	0.50	0.50	-0.00	0.03	1.00
ProfileDescriptive 6					
Female	0.54	0.49	0.04	0.03	0.24
Age	44.14	42.87	0.00	0.00	0.35
Married	0.42	0.53	-0.09	0.03	0.01
Education	4.10	3.98	0.02	0.02	0.15
Household Size	4.00	4.24	-0.01	0.01	0.14
Skopje	0.30	0.30	0.01	0.04	0.88
Urban	0.60	0.56	0.04	0.03	0.23
Albanian	0.50	0.50	-0.00	0.03	1.00
ProfileDescriptive 10					
Female	0.50	0.50	0.00	0.03	0.95
Age	43.90	42.97	0.00	0.00	0.49
Married	0.55	0.48	0.06	0.03	0.07
Education	3.92	4.05	-0.02	0.02	0.14
Household Size	4.32	4.11	0.01	0.01	0.19
Skopje	0.28	0.31	-0.03	0.04	0.48
Urban	0.55	0.58	-0.03	0.03	0.39
Albanian	0.50	0.50	-0.00	0.03	1.00

OLS regressions of each covariate on the specified attribute with standard errors and *p*-values. Mean 1 refers to when the specified attribute was 1, Mean 0 refers to when the specified attribute was 0. OLS *p*-values are equivalent to Welch Two Sample *t*-tests.

To calculate experimental power, I conducted power simulations. The main regression models used in the analysis are linear models with dependent variables standardized between 0 and 1 and independent variables for each experimental attribute. Though I test interaction effects as a robustness check, I am primarily interested in the independent effects of each attribute. Thus, I run a simulation with a linear model set-up in this way. The results indicate that the experiment achieves at least 75% power. Some smaller effects may exist and, therefore, may not be detected by this experimental design. I am primarily interested in substantively relevant effect sizes. Changing from one attribute level in the experimental design to another requires substantial investment on the part of the country leader. For example, it is unlikely that the leader can alter the cabinet environment to move from no cooperation to full cooperation in a short period of time. Therefore, medium and large effect sizes are substantively meaningful, whereas small effect sizes are not. It is worth investigating each attribute further in future research, but this study has sufficient power to make meaningful comparisons between attribute levels and to determine whether any attributes have substantial, substantive effects on the dependent variables.

OA.3: Affect Toward the Cabinet Classification

I present eight different methods for classifying affect toward the cabinet from the four emotion questions that appear post-treatment. According to Gubler and Karpowitz (2019), the factor analysis methods, particularly the minimum residual Bartlett method, are the most accurate. Thus, the main text presents results from the minimum residual Bartlett method.

As a first attempt, I use latent profile analysis (LPA) to determine affect toward the cabinet. To check that the affective state classification was successful, Table OA.3.1 displays the mean value of respondents assigned to each affective state across each emotion question. We can see that the emotion questions load onto affective states as expected, meaning that the LPA classification was successful.

Figure OA.3.1 displays bi-plots for each factor analysis method employed in the analysis. The arrows represent the loadings for each emotion question; in every case, the four emotion questions load onto two dimensions.

Tables OA.3.2 and OA.3.3 display the correlations between each of the seven factor analysis methods and the LPA method. Correlations are broken up between pleasant factors in columns in Table OA.3.2 and unpleasant factors in columns in Table OA.3.3.

Figure OA.3.2 shows these individuals visually with their scores on the pleasant valence questions (enthusiastic and hopeful) on the y axis and for the unpleasant valence questions (angry and resentful) on the x axis. Colors indicate the affective state. As is clear from the Figure, a substantial proportion of respondents have weak or mixed affective states after receiving the vignette.

Table OA.3.4 displays the number of respondents classified into each affective state for each of the eight analysis methods. Here we see that the factor analysis methods are quite consistent, but that LPA classifies many more people into a mixed affective state than do the factor analysis methods.

Table OA.3.5 displays pseudo-correlations between affective state classifications since

affective states are categorical variables.

Figure OA.3.2 shows affective state classifications for the minimum residual Bartlett factor analysis method. Dotted lines separate the affective states. Axes are the factor loadings multiplied by the pleasant (enthusiastic and hopeful) and unpleasant (angry and resentful) emotion question responses.


Figure OA.3.3 displays the same minimum residual Bartlett factor analysis scores, but with the points colored to represent the number of factor analysis methods that classify an individual in the same affective state. As is clear from the Figure, the vast majority of factor analysis methods are consistent and individuals are classified in the same affective state seven times.

Table OA.3.1: Mean Emotion Question Values for Each LPA Affective State

Question	Pleasant	Unpleasant	Weak	Mixed
Hopeful	4.03	1.59	1.95	2.95
Enthusiastic	4.07	1.46	1.95	2.99
Angry	1.21	4.26	2.00	2.73
Resentful	1.16	4.66	1.71	3.05

Latent profile analysis with four classes to produce four affective states. Means for each emotion question (scale from 1 to 5 where 5 is highest) across each affective state.

Figure OA.3.1: FA Dimension Plots



Seven factor analysis methods applied to four emotion questions with two factors. Each emotion question is shown with a blue arrow.

Table OA.3.2: Correlations Between Pleasant Factors

	Minres Reg	Minres Bartlett	Maxlik Reg	Maxlik Bartlett	PA Reg	PA Bartlett	PCA	LPA
Minres Reg	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99
Minres Bartlett	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99
Maxlik Reg	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99
Maxlik Bartlett	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99
PA Reg	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
PA Bartlett	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
PCA	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
LPA	0.99	0.99	0.99	0.99	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Unpl. Minres Reg	-0.45	-0.39	-0.45	-0.39	-0.46	-0.39	-0.39	-0.38
Unpl. Minres Bartlett	-0.45	-0.39	-0.46	-0.39	-0.46	-0.39	-0.39	-0.38
Unpl. Maxlik Reg	-0.46	-0.40	-0.46	-0.40	-0.46	-0.39	-0.39	-0.39
Unpl. Maxlik Bartlett	-0.45	-0.39	-0.45	-0.39	-0.46	-0.39	-0.39	-0.38
Unpl. PA Reg	-0.51	-0.45	-0.51	-0.45	-0.51	-0.44	-0.44	-0.44
Unpl. PA Bartlett	-0.44	-0.38	-0.44	-0.38	-0.44	-0.37	-0.37	-0.37
Unpl. PCA	-0.44	-0.39	-0.44	-0.38	-0.44	-0.37	-0.37	-0.37
Unpl. LPA	-0.44	-0.38	-0.44	-0.38	-0.44	-0.37	-0.37	-0.37

Correlations between eight affective state classification methods; pleasant dimension is unlabeled, Unpl. is the unpleasant dimension.

Table OA.3.3: Correlations Between Unpleasant Factors

	Unpl. Minres Reg	Unpl. Minres Bartlett	Unpl. Maxlik Reg	Unpl. Maxlik Bartlett	Unpl. PA Reg	Unpl. PA Bartlett	Unpl. PCA	Unpl. LPA
Minres Reg	-0.45	-0.45	-0.46	-0.45	-0.51	-0.44	-0.44	-0.44
Minres Bartlett	-0.39	-0.39	-0.40	-0.39	-0.45	-0.38	-0.39	-0.38
Maxlik Reg	-0.45	-0.46	-0.46	-0.45	-0.51	-0.44	-0.44	-0.44
Maxlik Bartlett	-0.39	-0.39	-0.40	-0.39	-0.45	-0.38	-0.38	-0.38
PA Reg	-0.46	-0.46	-0.46	-0.46	-0.51	-0.44	-0.44	-0.44
PA Bartlett	-0.39	-0.39	-0.39	-0.39	-0.44	-0.37	-0.37	-0.37
PCA	-0.39	-0.39	-0.39	-0.39	-0.44	-0.37	-0.37	-0.37
LPA	-0.38	-0.38	-0.39	-0.38	-0.44	-0.37	-0.37	-0.37
Unpl. Minres Reg	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.94	0.94	0.93	0.93
Unpl. Minres Bartlett	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.94	0.94	0.93	0.93
Unpl. Maxlik Reg	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.95	0.95	0.94	0.94
Unpl. Maxlik Bartlett	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.95	0.95	0.94	0.94
Unpl. PA Reg	0.94	0.94	0.95	0.95	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Unpl. PA Bartlett	0.94	0.94	0.95	0.95	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Unpl. PCA	0.93	0.93	0.94	0.94	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00
Unpl. LPA	0.93	0.93	0.94	0.94	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00

Correlations between eight affective state classification methods; pleasant dimension is unlabeled, Unpl. is the unpleasant dimension.

Table OA.3.4: Affective State Classification

Method	Pleasant	Unpleasant	Weak	Mixed
Minres Regression	269	223	126	156
Maxlik Regression	266	227	139	152
Minres Bartlett	254	202	151	177
Maxlik Bartlett	238	217	167	162
Principal Axis Regression	242	202	189	151
Principal Axis Bartlett	242	197	192	153
PCA	242	197	192	153
LPA	112	119	177	376


Affective State classification for eight classification methods.

Table OA.3.5: Cramer's V Correlation Between Categorical Variables

	Minres Reg	Minres Bartlett	Maxlik Reg	Maxlik Bartlett	PA Reg	PA Bartlett	PCA	LPA
Minres Reg	1.00	0.94	0.99	0.94	0.82	0.82	0.82	0.58
Minres Bartlett	0.94	1.00	0.94	0.95	0.80	0.79	0.79	0.60
Maxlik Reg	0.99	0.94	1.00	0.94	0.83	0.82	0.82	0.58
Maxlik Bartlett	0.94	0.95	0.94	1.00	0.85	0.85	0.85	0.61
PA Reg	0.82	0.80	0.83	0.85	1.00	0.99	0.99	0.68
PA Bartlett	0.82	0.79	0.82	0.85	0.99	1.00	1.00	0.68
PCA	0.82	0.79	0.82	0.85	0.99	1.00	1.00	0.68
LPA	0.58	0.60	0.58	0.61	0.68	0.68	0.68	1.00


Pseudo-correlation between eight affective state classifications.

Figure OA.3.2: Minres Bartlett Affective States



Minimum residual Bartlett factor analysis with two factors to produce four affective states. Axes are factor loadings multiplied by pleasant (enthusiastic and hopeful) and unpleasant (angry and resentful) factors. Dashed lines represent separation into affective states. Colors indicate affective states calculated from the factor analysis.

Figure OA.3.3: Number of FA Methods with Same Affective State Classification



Minimum residual Bartlett factor analysis with two factors to produce four affective states. Axes are factor loadings multiplied by pleasant (enthusiastic and hopeful) and unpleasant (angry and resentful) factors. Dashed lines represent separation into affective states. Colors indicate the total number of factor analysis methods (out of seven) that classify an individual in the same affective state.

OA.4: Results for Plots in Main Text

The models in this section are what was used to create the marginal effects plots in the main text. I use linear models with robust standard errors and dependent variables normalized between 0 and 1. This makes interpretation of the marginal effects plots easy. Table OA.4.1 displays results for affect toward the cabinet, Table OA.4.2 displays perceptions of the cabinet, Table OA.4.3 displays overall outgroup attitudes, and Table OA.4.4 displays the additional mechanism questions.

The main findings from this study are that descriptive representation has mixed effects on outgroup views, substantive representation has no effect, and cooperation improves some aspects of cabinet affect and perceptions, but not outgroup attitudes. I employ the Holm p -value adjustment on each set of dependent variables (affect, perceptions, attitudes, and mechanisms) across descriptive and substantive representation and ministerial cooperation. In the p -value adjusted findings, descriptive representation still has mixed effects (with ten Albanian ministers worsening Macedonians' affect, but improving Albanians feeling that ministers are working for them), substantive representation continues to have no effect, and cooperation still has slightly positive effects (with Albanians feeling less unpleasant when cooperation occurs). The p -value adjusted findings are consistent with the main findings, and the interpretation of the results remains the same.

One factor to consider is whether the survey design is strong enough for respondents to meaningfully distinguish between the levels of different attributes. Most of these concerns relate to the current level of ethnic tensions in Macedonia and to the realistic nature of the levels of different attributes, including their specific wording, and are addressed in OA.1. Two additional items are worth considering here: how to interpret null results and the omnibus nature of the survey.

First, the discussion in OA.1 regarding vignette construction concludes that the attributes and levels in the vignette are all plausible and are built based on contemporary conditions in Macedonia. This means that null effects are not due to portions of the vignette appearing not to be credible and, therefore, inducing random responses. Similarly, the robustness checks with respondents' preferences about descriptive and substantive representation (Table OA.6.7) suggest that the null effects are not a result of failure to treat or other design characteristics. Indeed, the effects seen with those variables are *stronger* than the outgroup views dependent variables. This suggests that respondents do take the treatment and do respond to it, but *their outgroup views are just largely unmoved by ethnic representation*.

Second, this survey was fielded as part of an Ipsos omnibus survey. Omnibus survey designs are widely used and recognized as a valid method of survey research. Nevertheless, we should consider whether the nature of the omnibus survey may have influenced respondent behavior. Omnibus surveys can be lengthy and can include many different topics, potentially increasing respondent cognitive load.

I took several steps to address this potential problem. First, I employed an in-person survey design. Krosnik (2010) examines existing literature and concludes that most work on cognitive load and survey length involve self-administered surveys. Enumerators are skilled at administering surveys and maintaining respondent attention. Therefore, the in-person nature of this survey should help combat respondent fatigue.

Additionally, I attempted to limit cognitive load by selectively employing attributes and levels in the vignette. The four selected attributes represent the absolute minimum amount of information that respondents could be provided about the cabinet in order to still make informed assessments regarding their preferences and outgroup attitudes resulting from the cabinet. There are numerous other factors that would have been nice to include in the vignette — chief among them ministries that the Albanian ministers held — but adding additional attributes increases cognitive load and the level of attention required to read a vignette with more attributes is almost certainly higher.

Finally, Ipsos is aware of the potential cognitive load problem and administers surveys that are relatively short (15 to 30 minutes) in an attempt to combat respondent fatigue.

Table OA.4.1: Main Text Results for Cabinet Affect

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Pleasant		Unpleasant		Mixed		Weak	
	MAC (1)	ALB (2)	MAC (3)	ALB (4)	MAC (5)	ALB (6)	MAC (7)	ALB (8)
ProfileDescriptive 1	−0.005 (0.073)	−0.120 (0.081)	−0.033 (0.072)	0.063 (0.067)	0.004 (0.073)	−0.014 (0.072)	0.033 (0.067)	0.071 (0.060)
ProfileDescriptive 6	−0.032 (0.075)	−0.057 (0.081)	0.033 (0.075)	0.061 (0.063)	−0.053 (0.072)	−0.029 (0.070)	0.052 (0.069)	0.025 (0.061)
ProfileDescriptive 10	0.010 (0.075)	−0.048 (0.083)	0.178** (0.077)	0.032 (0.066)	−0.152** (0.067)	0.00003 (0.071)	−0.036 (0.066)	0.016 (0.060)
ProfileSDSM	−0.075* (0.045)	−0.029 (0.051)	0.070 (0.050)	−0.080* (0.042)	−0.016 (0.041)	0.078 (0.048)	0.021 (0.043)	0.031 (0.042)
ProfileSubstantive	0.029 (0.043)	−0.059 (0.048)	−0.028 (0.046)	−0.003 (0.038)	0.010 (0.039)	0.039 (0.044)	−0.011 (0.039)	0.022 (0.038)
ProfileCooperation	0.058 (0.043)	0.099** (0.049)	−0.025 (0.046)	−0.140*** (0.040)	0.012 (0.039)	0.023 (0.044)	−0.045 (0.040)	0.017 (0.039)
Female	0.058 (0.044)	−0.025 (0.049)	0.016 (0.047)	0.021 (0.040)	0.016 (0.039)	0.003 (0.048)	−0.090** (0.040)	0.001 (0.039)
Age	−0.0005 (0.002)	−0.001 (0.002)	−0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.001)	0.002 (0.002)	−0.002 (0.002)	−0.00004 (0.002)	0.002 (0.001)
Married	−0.043 (0.058)	0.022 (0.060)	0.016 (0.064)	0.042 (0.051)	−0.018 (0.054)	−0.050 (0.057)	0.045 (0.057)	−0.013 (0.040)
Education	−0.004 (0.025)	−0.006 (0.026)	−0.017 (0.025)	0.017 (0.020)	0.002 (0.021)	0.009 (0.024)	0.020 (0.020)	−0.020 (0.020)
Household Size	0.009 (0.015)	0.020 (0.015)	−0.018 (0.017)	−0.002 (0.006)	0.018 (0.015)	−0.008 (0.015)	−0.008 (0.016)	−0.010 (0.006)
North West	−0.109 (0.076)	0.125** (0.058)	0.033 (0.081)	−0.081* (0.047)	−0.046 (0.072)	−0.126** (0.055)	0.122* (0.068)	0.082* (0.043)
South West	0.091 (0.067)	−0.017 (0.011)	−0.086 (0.061)	0.017* (0.010)	−0.036 (0.055)	−0.004 (0.011)	0.031 (0.050)	0.003 (0.007)
East	−0.217*** (0.056)		0.083 (0.061)		0.002 (0.053)		0.132** (0.052)	
Urban	0.112** (0.045)	0.139** (0.056)	−0.020 (0.052)	−0.096** (0.044)	−0.049 (0.048)	−0.032 (0.049)	−0.044 (0.044)	−0.011 (0.042)
News	0.040** (0.016)	0.039* (0.022)	0.031* (0.019)	0.003 (0.020)	−0.038*** (0.014)	−0.004 (0.021)	−0.033* (0.017)	−0.038** (0.018)
Equal Opportunity	0.031 (0.020)	0.005 (0.024)	−0.064*** (0.022)	−0.032 (0.023)	0.038** (0.019)	0.040* (0.024)	−0.004 (0.017)	−0.013 (0.016)
Authoritarian	−0.007 (0.015)	−0.043** (0.021)	0.002 (0.017)	0.035* (0.019)	0.012 (0.014)	0.026 (0.020)	−0.007 (0.014)	−0.017 (0.016)
Knowledge	0.042 (0.059)	0.013 (0.054)	0.129** (0.062)	−0.021 (0.044)	−0.030 (0.055)	−0.106** (0.050)	−0.141** (0.060)	0.113*** (0.042)
Constant	0.076 (0.177)	0.356 (0.222)	0.385** (0.184)	0.065 (0.186)	0.168 (0.168)	0.359* (0.213)	0.371** (0.169)	0.220 (0.134)
Observations	391	390	391	390	391	390	391	390

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Linear models with robust standard errors. Dependent variable is 1 if a respondent is a particular affect and 0 otherwise.

Table OA.4.2: Main Text Results for Albanians and Macedonians Cabinet Perceptions

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Cabinet Represent		Cabinet Trust		Cabinet Model	
	MAC	ALB	MAC	ALB	MAC	ALB
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ProfileDescriptive 1	0.031 (0.045)	-0.069* (0.040)	-0.008 (0.044)	-0.052 (0.044)	0.024 (0.047)	-0.039 (0.040)
ProfileDescriptive 6	-0.037 (0.044)	-0.059 (0.040)	-0.017 (0.044)	-0.031 (0.045)	0.039 (0.046)	-0.054 (0.039)
ProfileDescriptive 10	-0.067 (0.042)	-0.062 (0.040)	-0.066 (0.043)	-0.016 (0.045)	0.031 (0.045)	0.020 (0.041)
ProfileSDSM	-0.039 (0.027)	0.039 (0.024)	-0.030 (0.026)	0.047** (0.024)	-0.019 (0.028)	0.049** (0.023)
ProfileSubstantive	0.009 (0.025)	-0.007 (0.022)	0.013 (0.025)	-0.011 (0.023)	0.008 (0.026)	-0.008 (0.022)
ProfileCooperation	0.017 (0.025)	0.032 (0.023)	0.025 (0.025)	0.019 (0.024)	0.018 (0.026)	0.006 (0.023)
Female	0.037 (0.026)	-0.020 (0.023)	0.019 (0.026)	0.014 (0.023)	0.026 (0.027)	-0.016 (0.022)
Age	0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.0002 (0.001)	0.0001 (0.001)	-0.0001 (0.001)	-0.0001 (0.001)
Married	-0.005 (0.033)	0.042 (0.031)	0.035 (0.035)	0.042 (0.031)	-0.028 (0.037)	0.062** (0.029)
Education	0.012 (0.013)	-0.014 (0.013)	0.003 (0.014)	0.011 (0.013)	0.007 (0.015)	-0.017 (0.012)
Household Size	0.002 (0.009)	-0.006 (0.005)	0.005 (0.010)	0.008* (0.004)	0.001 (0.012)	-0.004 (0.004)
North West	-0.057 (0.047)	0.015 (0.027)	-0.024 (0.041)	0.055** (0.027)	0.022 (0.046)	0.019 (0.025)
South West	0.120*** (0.036)	-0.006 (0.006)	0.143*** (0.036)	-0.016** (0.006)	0.164*** (0.037)	-0.020*** (0.006)
East	-0.063* (0.036)		-0.010 (0.032)		0.016 (0.034)	
Urban	0.031 (0.029)	0.098*** (0.026)	0.048* (0.028)	0.076*** (0.026)	0.023 (0.029)	0.096*** (0.025)
News	-0.002 (0.011)	-0.015 (0.011)	-0.004 (0.011)	-0.015 (0.011)	0.009 (0.011)	-0.013 (0.011)
Equal Opportunity	0.074*** (0.013)	0.044*** (0.014)	0.085*** (0.012)	0.053*** (0.014)	0.073*** (0.013)	0.049*** (0.013)
Authoritarian	0.007 (0.010)	-0.026** (0.012)	0.012 (0.009)	-0.017 (0.012)	0.019** (0.010)	-0.036*** (0.012)
Knowledge	-0.060* (0.033)	0.016 (0.025)	-0.022 (0.032)	-0.012 (0.026)	-0.064* (0.035)	0.008 (0.023)
Constant	0.157 (0.100)	0.509*** (0.109)	0.089 (0.104)	0.334*** (0.109)	0.095 (0.119)	0.615*** (0.102)
Observations	391	390	391	390	391	390
<i>Note:</i>				*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01		

Linear models with robust standard errors. All dependent variables normalized between 0 and 1.

Table OA.4.3: Main Text Results for Albanians and Macedonians Outgroup Attitudes

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>									
	Trust		Equality		Neighbor		Talk Outgroup		One Group	
	MAC	ALB	MAC	ALB	MAC	ALB	MAC	ALB	MAC	ALB
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
ProfileDescriptive 1	0.041 (0.054)	−0.061 (0.039)	0.073 (0.053)	−0.034 (0.046)	−0.060 (0.060)	−0.023 (0.047)	0.098* (0.057)	0.023 (0.048)	0.008 (0.080)	−0.123 (0.077)
ProfileDescriptive 6	−0.011 (0.051)	−0.015 (0.039)	0.029 (0.051)	−0.035 (0.046)	−0.094 (0.061)	−0.018 (0.045)	0.081 (0.057)	0.016 (0.048)	0.094 (0.077)	−0.133* (0.078)
ProfileDescriptive 10	−0.013 (0.052)	−0.017 (0.039)	0.010 (0.050)	−0.037 (0.046)	−0.018 (0.059)	−0.031 (0.045)	0.047 (0.056)	0.00001 (0.046)	0.121 (0.076)	−0.156** (0.079)
ProfileSDSM	0.026 (0.033)	−0.016 (0.024)	−0.002 (0.030)	−0.014 (0.025)	−0.051 (0.036)	0.018 (0.027)	−0.026 (0.035)	−0.042 (0.028)	0.042 (0.045)	0.101** (0.050)
ProfileSubstantive	0.028 (0.031)	−0.024 (0.023)	−0.020 (0.028)	−0.002 (0.024)	0.032 (0.034)	0.024 (0.025)	0.047 (0.033)	−0.024 (0.026)	0.009 (0.042)	0.041 (0.046)
ProfileCooperation	−0.014 (0.031)	0.022 (0.023)	−0.010 (0.028)	0.038 (0.025)	−0.004 (0.035)	0.013 (0.026)	−0.038 (0.033)	−0.005 (0.026)	0.062 (0.043)	0.015 (0.046)
Female	0.049 (0.032)	−0.022 (0.023)	0.076*** (0.028)	0.035 (0.025)	−0.009 (0.035)	−0.028 (0.026)	0.054 (0.034)	0.090*** (0.027)	0.0004 (0.044)	−0.021 (0.048)
Age	−0.00005 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	−0.001 (0.001)	−0.0004 (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)	−0.0003 (0.001)	−0.0002 (0.001)	−0.001 (0.001)	−0.0003 (0.002)	0.0002 (0.002)
Married	−0.057 (0.040)	0.034 (0.031)	−0.006 (0.037)	0.027 (0.035)	−0.029 (0.050)	−0.035 (0.033)	−0.047 (0.045)	0.029 (0.032)	−0.043 (0.056)	0.039 (0.057)
Education	0.012 (0.017)	0.0005 (0.014)	0.034** (0.015)	0.017 (0.014)	0.015 (0.020)	0.005 (0.014)	0.024 (0.019)	0.012 (0.014)	0.025 (0.023)	0.018 (0.026)
Household Size	−0.004 (0.012)	0.003 (0.004)	−0.006 (0.012)	−0.002 (0.005)	0.001 (0.014)	0.003 (0.006)	0.002 (0.014)	0.007 (0.007)	0.003 (0.015)	−0.014* (0.008)
North West	−0.017 (0.049)	0.020 (0.026)	0.006 (0.049)	−0.039 (0.028)	−0.068 (0.059)	0.007 (0.032)	−0.112** (0.053)	−0.211*** (0.035)	−0.056 (0.076)	0.337*** (0.055)
South West	0.035 (0.043)	0.001 (0.007)	0.088** (0.036)	0.012 (0.007)	−0.085* (0.047)	0.021*** (0.006)	0.016 (0.044)	−0.015*** (0.005)	−0.071 (0.058)	−0.031*** (0.011)
East	−0.053 (0.040)		0.014 (0.037)		−0.079* (0.047)		0.005 (0.045)		−0.037 (0.053)	
Urban	−0.011 (0.036)	0.045* (0.025)	0.018 (0.034)	0.043 (0.028)	0.030 (0.039)	−0.061** (0.028)	−0.003 (0.037)	0.014 (0.030)	−0.025 (0.048)	−0.049 (0.053)
News	−0.001 (0.012)	0.027** (0.012)	0.045*** (0.012)	0.062*** (0.012)	−0.012 (0.014)	−0.029** (0.014)	0.034** (0.014)	0.060*** (0.013)	0.004 (0.016)	0.046** (0.021)
Equal Opportunity	0.056*** (0.015)	0.065*** (0.013)	0.062*** (0.014)	0.030** (0.015)	−0.047*** (0.016)	−0.008 (0.014)	0.045*** (0.015)	−0.002 (0.013)	−0.034* (0.020)	−0.028 (0.025)
Authoritarian	0.025** (0.012)	−0.018 (0.012)	0.022* (0.011)	0.034*** (0.013)	−0.006 (0.013)	0.004 (0.013)	0.005 (0.012)	0.015 (0.012)	0.017 (0.014)	0.052** (0.021)
Knowledge	0.020 (0.043)	−0.072*** (0.026)	−0.043 (0.041)	−0.026 (0.028)	0.055 (0.050)	−0.114*** (0.029)	0.014 (0.045)	0.040 (0.031)	0.171*** (0.065)	0.038 (0.050)
Constant	0.169 (0.129)	0.225* (0.120)	−0.058 (0.115)	−0.044 (0.129)	0.459*** (0.149)	0.341*** (0.124)	0.220 (0.154)	0.496*** (0.125)	0.496*** (0.174)	0.462** (0.210)
Observations	391	390	391	390	391	390	391	390	391	390

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Linear models with robust standard errors. All dependent variables normalized between 0 and 1.

Table OA.4.4: Main Text Results for Additional Mechanisms

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Benefit You		Benefit Financial		Represent Satisfied		Minister Personal	
	MAC	ALB	MAC	ALB	MAC	ALB	MAC	ALB
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
ProfileDescriptive 1	0.002 (0.040)	0.014 (0.035)	0.038 (0.042)	−0.008 (0.036)	0.048 (0.050)	−0.036 (0.039)	0.131* (0.072)	−0.105 (0.070)
ProfileDescriptive 6	0.004 (0.038)	0.018 (0.035)	0.046 (0.041)	0.011 (0.036)	0.025 (0.049)	−0.002 (0.038)	0.153** (0.071)	−0.126* (0.071)
ProfileDescriptive 10	−0.047 (0.038)	0.052 (0.036)	−0.013 (0.041)	0.012 (0.036)	−0.094** (0.048)	0.046 (0.038)	0.144** (0.072)	−0.195*** (0.072)
ProfileSDSM	−0.016 (0.025)	0.022 (0.021)	−0.017 (0.026)	0.010 (0.024)	−0.018 (0.030)	0.019 (0.022)	−0.035 (0.043)	0.094** (0.047)
ProfileSubstantive	0.014 (0.024)	−0.002 (0.020)	0.037 (0.024)	0.038* (0.022)	−0.032 (0.029)	−0.005 (0.021)	0.043 (0.041)	0.065 (0.043)
ProfileCooperation	0.038 (0.024)	0.026 (0.021)	0.042* (0.025)	0.001 (0.023)	0.060** (0.029)	0.023 (0.022)	−0.088** (0.041)	0.024 (0.044)
Female	0.022 (0.023)	0.002 (0.020)	0.021 (0.024)	0.017 (0.022)	0.031 (0.030)	−0.011 (0.021)	−0.016 (0.042)	−0.036 (0.045)
Age	−0.0005 (0.001)	−0.0003 (0.001)	0.0003 (0.001)	−0.001 (0.001)	0.002 (0.001)	−0.001 (0.001)	−0.0004 (0.002)	0.0004 (0.002)
Married	0.058* (0.033)	0.049* (0.027)	0.031 (0.034)	0.032 (0.031)	0.024 (0.038)	0.002 (0.029)	−0.066 (0.054)	−0.053 (0.052)
Education	0.010 (0.014)	−0.007 (0.011)	−0.001 (0.014)	−0.017 (0.013)	−0.012 (0.015)	−0.015 (0.011)	0.016 (0.023)	0.027 (0.026)
Household Size	−0.001 (0.009)	0.005 (0.005)	0.009 (0.011)	0.009** (0.004)	0.018* (0.010)	−0.002 (0.005)	−0.003 (0.015)	−0.013 (0.011)
North West	−0.016 (0.039)	0.026 (0.024)	−0.038 (0.043)	0.102*** (0.025)	−0.009 (0.047)	0.021 (0.024)	0.076 (0.061)	−0.018 (0.057)
South West	0.085** (0.034)	−0.010* (0.006)	0.071** (0.035)	−0.006 (0.007)	0.169*** (0.042)	−0.018*** (0.006)	−0.082 (0.059)	−0.017* (0.009)
East	−0.020 (0.031)		0.024 (0.031)		0.024 (0.038)		−0.024 (0.054)	
Urban	−0.003 (0.026)	0.046** (0.022)	0.053* (0.029)	0.094*** (0.023)	0.050 (0.032)	0.084*** (0.023)	−0.068 (0.045)	−0.080 (0.053)
News	−0.005 (0.009)	−0.017* (0.010)	−0.002 (0.010)	−0.008 (0.011)	−0.003 (0.012)	−0.011 (0.010)	0.010 (0.015)	0.023 (0.020)
Equal Opportunity	0.094*** (0.011)	0.058*** (0.013)	0.105*** (0.011)	0.074*** (0.015)	0.075*** (0.014)	0.070*** (0.013)	−0.082*** (0.019)	−0.066*** (0.023)
Authoritarian	0.008 (0.009)	−0.032*** (0.011)	0.013 (0.009)	−0.026** (0.012)	0.008 (0.011)	−0.025** (0.011)	−0.044*** (0.015)	0.050*** (0.018)
Knowledge	−0.045 (0.031)	−0.004 (0.022)	−0.079** (0.031)	−0.004 (0.024)	−0.058* (0.035)	0.010 (0.022)	0.134** (0.062)	−0.013 (0.051)
Constant	0.109 (0.102)	0.379*** (0.096)	−0.048 (0.115)	0.243** (0.106)	0.083 (0.119)	0.511*** (0.102)	0.898*** (0.173)	0.875*** (0.177)
Observations	391	390	391	390	391	390	391	390

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Linear models with robust standard errors. All dependent variables normalized between 0 and 1.

OA.5: Ordered Logistic and Logistic Specifications

Here I present ordered logistic and logistic regression results for the dependent variables as originally coded (not normalized). Table OA.5.1 displays the full ordered logistic and logistic regression results for the cabinet perceptions dependent variables, while Table OA.5.2 displays the full ordered logistic and logistic regression results for overall outgroup attitudes dependent variables. Table OA.5.3 presents the results for the additional mechanism dependent variables.

Note that included in these tables are the results from linear hypothesis tests comparing the point estimates for different levels of *ProfileDescriptive* as discussed in the main text.

Table OA.5.1: Full Results for Albanians and Macedonians Cabinet Perceptions

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Cabinet Represent		Cabinet Trust		Cabinet Model	
	MAC	ALB	MAC	ALB	MAC	ALB
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ProfileDescriptive 1	0.212 (0.324)	-0.584* (0.333)	0.022 (0.327)	-0.483 (0.341)	0.142 (0.324)	-0.422 (0.334)
ProfileDescriptive 6	-0.262 (0.324)	-0.472 (0.332)	-0.091 (0.327)	-0.238 (0.341)	0.250 (0.322)	-0.510 (0.331)
ProfileDescriptive 10	-0.437 (0.318)	-0.625* (0.330)	-0.395 (0.324)	-0.219 (0.341)	0.282 (0.318)	0.155 (0.333)
ProfileSDSM	-0.333 (0.203)	0.345* (0.208)	-0.223 (0.202)	0.407** (0.206)	-0.113 (0.202)	0.498** (0.210)
ProfileSubstantive	0.105 (0.188)	-0.018 (0.191)	0.141 (0.188)	-0.093 (0.191)	0.059 (0.187)	-0.104 (0.193)
ProfileCooperation	0.145 (0.190)	0.268 (0.196)	0.179 (0.191)	0.148 (0.195)	0.142 (0.187)	0.018 (0.197)
Female	0.248 (0.195)	-0.208 (0.200)	0.131 (0.194)	0.171 (0.199)	0.193 (0.191)	-0.117 (0.200)
Age	0.009 (0.008)	-0.003 (0.007)	-0.0002 (0.008)	0.002 (0.007)	-0.0001 (0.008)	0.002 (0.007)
Married	-0.044 (0.253)	0.433* (0.251)	0.217 (0.258)	0.418* (0.245)	-0.236 (0.258)	0.665*** (0.246)
Education	0.123 (0.103)	-0.118 (0.106)	0.058 (0.104)	0.092 (0.105)	0.082 (0.104)	-0.110 (0.106)
Household Size	-0.002 (0.071)	-0.057 (0.044)	0.045 (0.073)	0.080** (0.040)	0.021 (0.076)	-0.036 (0.039)
North West	-0.415 (0.339)	0.155 (0.233)	-0.180 (0.332)	0.505** (0.232)	0.145 (0.333)	0.173 (0.230)
South West	0.908*** (0.266)	-0.064 (0.047)	1.128*** (0.270)	-0.137*** (0.047)	1.150*** (0.266)	-0.168*** (0.048)
East	-0.431* (0.255)		-0.056 (0.251)		0.111 (0.247)	
Urban	0.166 (0.215)	0.856*** (0.223)	0.295 (0.215)	0.717*** (0.221)	0.073 (0.211)	0.854*** (0.223)
News	-0.003 (0.076)	-0.127 (0.094)	-0.041 (0.077)	-0.128 (0.093)	0.069 (0.076)	-0.126 (0.095)
Equal Opportunity	0.558*** (0.095)	0.392*** (0.111)	0.650*** (0.095)	0.463*** (0.110)	0.501*** (0.093)	0.422*** (0.108)
Authoritarian	0.019 (0.072)	-0.229** (0.092)	0.082 (0.071)	-0.150* (0.090)	0.134* (0.070)	-0.334*** (0.093)
Knowledge	-0.537** (0.261)	0.085 (0.216)	-0.135 (0.259)	-0.089 (0.218)	-0.404 (0.258)	0.048 (0.214)
Hyp. Test 1 & 6	3.56*	0.18	0.21	0.94	0.19	0.12
Hyp. Test 1 & 10	6.63**	0.03	2.75*	1.11	0.31	5.07**
Hyp. Test 6 & 10	0.49	0.36	1.50	0.01	0.02	6.60**
Observations	391	390	391	390	391	390

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Ordered Logistic regression models on Albanian and Macedonian respondents.

Table OA.5.2: Full Results for Albanians and Macedonians Outgroup Attitudes

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>									
	Trust		Equality		Neighbor		Talkoutgroup		One Group	
	MAC (1)	ALB (2)	MAC (3)	ALB (4)	MAC (5)	ALB (6)	MAC (7)	ALB (8)	MAC (9)	ALB (10)
ProfileDescriptive 1	0.191 (0.317)	-0.517 (0.332)	0.472 (0.325)	-0.202 (0.334)	-0.316 (0.316)	-0.119 (0.339)	0.583* (0.315)	0.210 (0.333)	0.005 (0.391)	-0.607 (0.399)
ProfileDescriptive 6	-0.059 (0.312)	-0.145 (0.329)	0.223 (0.323)	-0.222 (0.334)	-0.520 (0.319)	-0.073 (0.332)	0.515* (0.313)	0.127 (0.330)	0.490 (0.406)	-0.679* (0.397)
ProfileDescriptive 10	-0.112 (0.312)	-0.113 (0.329)	0.147 (0.319)	-0.311 (0.334)	-0.113 (0.313)	-0.109 (0.332)	0.321 (0.311)	-0.017 (0.327)	0.666* (0.404)	-0.777* (0.397)
ProfileSDSM	0.187 (0.199)	-0.153 (0.207)	0.022 (0.200)	-0.107 (0.205)	-0.248 (0.200)	0.121 (0.209)	-0.166 (0.200)	-0.313 (0.211)	0.250 (0.272)	0.488** (0.248)
ProfileSubstantive	0.166 (0.183)	-0.203 (0.191)	-0.119 (0.185)	0.012 (0.190)	0.182 (0.185)	0.247 (0.193)	0.234 (0.184)	-0.164 (0.194)	0.061 (0.247)	0.217 (0.229)
ProfileCooperation	-0.112 (0.185)	0.174 (0.195)	-0.044 (0.186)	0.254 (0.193)	-0.017 (0.187)	0.032 (0.196)	-0.155 (0.185)	-0.048 (0.195)	0.365 (0.249)	0.071 (0.233)
Female	0.285 (0.190)	-0.227 (0.198)	0.467** (0.190)	0.255 (0.198)	-0.041 (0.190)	-0.244 (0.202)	0.325* (0.191)	0.676*** (0.206)	-0.013 (0.254)	-0.090 (0.240)
Age	-0.001 (0.008)	0.012 (0.007)	-0.006 (0.008)	0.002 (0.007)	0.007 (0.008)	-0.0005 (0.007)	0.0004 (0.008)	-0.006 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.010)	0.0004 (0.009)
Married	-0.315 (0.247)	0.415* (0.244)	-0.061 (0.251)	0.281 (0.247)	-0.106 (0.257)	-0.292 (0.245)	-0.333 (0.253)	0.307 (0.241)	-0.249 (0.339)	0.178 (0.286)
Education	0.056 (0.101)	0.054 (0.108)	0.224** (0.100)	0.137 (0.103)	0.077 (0.104)	0.054 (0.109)	0.163 (0.105)	0.053 (0.104)	0.141 (0.138)	0.091 (0.126)
Household Size	-0.021 (0.072)	0.033 (0.040)	-0.035 (0.072)	-0.012 (0.041)	-0.009 (0.073)	0.028 (0.045)	0.031 (0.073)	0.049 (0.045)	0.017 (0.093)	-0.064 (0.052)
North West	0.029 (0.315)	0.285 (0.229)	0.017 (0.321)	-0.256 (0.225)	-0.297 (0.329)	0.165 (0.232)	-0.654** (0.318)	-1.421*** (0.248)	-0.307 (0.429)	1.536*** (0.276)
South West	0.257 (0.254)	0.008 (0.048)	0.553** (0.253)	0.100** (0.048)	-0.374 (0.254)	0.216*** (0.053)	0.051 (0.253)	-0.101** (0.048)	-0.412 (0.342)	-0.136** (0.053)
East	-0.246 (0.244)		0.017 (0.248)		-0.352 (0.247)		0.053 (0.248)		-0.226 (0.340)	
Urban	-0.002 (0.210)	0.357 (0.218)	0.148 (0.213)	0.339 (0.218)	0.240 (0.215)	-0.483** (0.218)	-0.038 (0.211)	0.140 (0.222)	-0.156 (0.280)	-0.217 (0.257)
News	-0.014 (0.074)	0.227** (0.094)	0.305*** (0.077)	0.452*** (0.095)	-0.065 (0.075)	-0.278*** (0.097)	0.201*** (0.075)	0.457*** (0.097)	0.021 (0.099)	0.224** (0.110)
Equal Opportunity	0.384*** (0.090)	0.585*** (0.110)	0.429*** (0.091)	0.301*** (0.107)	-0.251*** (0.091)	-0.047 (0.108)	0.242*** (0.088)	-0.022 (0.105)	-0.194* (0.116)	-0.140 (0.123)
Authoritarian	0.158** (0.070)	-0.201** (0.092)	0.154** (0.072)	0.294*** (0.092)	-0.037 (0.071)	0.043 (0.094)	0.048 (0.069)	0.109 (0.091)	0.094 (0.094)	0.255** (0.106)
Knowledge	0.021 (0.257)	-0.543** (0.219)	-0.266 (0.261)	-0.234 (0.213)	0.257 (0.264)	-0.924*** (0.221)	0.042 (0.255)	0.329 (0.219)	0.917*** (0.324)	0.182 (0.258)
Constant									-0.154 (1.001)	-0.274 (1.028)
Hyp. Test 1 & 6	1.06	2.11	1.05	0.01	0.69	0.03	0.08	0.10	2.22	0.05
Hyp. Test 1 & 10	1.47	2.58	1.68	0.19	0.68	0.00	1.13	0.79	3.93**	0.32
Hyp. Test 6 & 10	0.049	0.016	0.09	0.12	2.67	0.02	0.62	0.32	0.25	0.11
Observations	391	390	391	390	391	390	391	390	391	390

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Ordered Logistic and Logistic regression models on Albanian and Macedonian respondents.

Table OA.5.3: Full Results Albanian and Macedonian Mechanisms

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Benefit You		Benefit Financial		Represent Satisfied		Minister Personal	
	MAC	ALB	MAC	ALB	MAC	ALB	MAC	ALB
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
ProfileDescriptive 1	-0.041 (0.326)	0.193 (0.332)	0.332 (0.332)	-0.100 (0.326)	0.338 (0.322)	-0.411 (0.345)	0.779* (0.423)	-0.627 (0.442)
ProfileDescriptive 6	-0.084 (0.321)	0.258 (0.330)	0.308 (0.331)	0.083 (0.324)	0.200 (0.319)	-0.098 (0.340)	0.970** (0.436)	-0.765* (0.438)
ProfileDescriptive 10	-0.407 (0.322)	0.518 (0.333)	-0.069 (0.327)	0.091 (0.323)	-0.493 (0.316)	0.321 (0.342)	0.882** (0.421)	-1.111*** (0.431)
ProfileSDSM	-0.129 (0.206)	0.219 (0.211)	-0.172 (0.205)	0.083 (0.209)	-0.176 (0.200)	0.142 (0.208)	-0.235 (0.288)	0.484* (0.262)
ProfileSubstantive	0.154 (0.190)	0.012 (0.195)	0.291 (0.191)	0.333* (0.193)	-0.175 (0.187)	-0.068 (0.194)	0.255 (0.260)	0.348 (0.244)
ProfileCooperation	0.260 (0.192)	0.223 (0.198)	0.315 (0.193)	-0.015 (0.196)	0.341* (0.187)	0.222 (0.198)	-0.577** (0.263)	0.108 (0.248)
Female	0.225 (0.193)	0.030 (0.202)	0.127 (0.195)	0.147 (0.199)	0.185 (0.192)	-0.123 (0.201)	-0.106 (0.267)	-0.164 (0.255)
Age	-0.002 (0.008)	-0.002 (0.007)	0.007 (0.008)	-0.003 (0.007)	0.013 (0.008)	-0.011 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.011)	0.0001 (0.009)
Married	0.502* (0.261)	0.534** (0.250)	0.139 (0.262)	0.341 (0.245)	0.088 (0.251)	0.073 (0.248)	-0.503 (0.361)	-0.353 (0.313)
Education	0.092 (0.106)	-0.077 (0.108)	0.005 (0.106)	-0.129 (0.107)	-0.067 (0.102)	-0.135 (0.107)	0.112 (0.144)	0.146 (0.137)
Household Size	-0.008 (0.074)	0.052 (0.044)	0.088 (0.076)	0.070* (0.041)	0.112 (0.069)	-0.026 (0.043)	-0.022 (0.094)	-0.067 (0.049)
North West	-0.224 (0.332)	0.190 (0.234)	-0.201 (0.337)	0.834*** (0.232)	-0.024 (0.321)	0.091 (0.234)	0.578 (0.501)	-0.087 (0.286)
South West	0.690** (0.269)	-0.095** (0.048)	0.616** (0.266)	-0.024 (0.048)	1.189*** (0.268)	-0.175*** (0.049)	-0.509 (0.347)	-0.116* (0.069)
East	-0.199 (0.253)		0.199 (0.253)		0.237 (0.247)		-0.126 (0.349)	
Urban	-0.108 (0.215)	0.413* (0.220)	0.470** (0.221)	0.854*** (0.219)	0.309 (0.212)	0.785*** (0.224)	-0.415 (0.297)	-0.410 (0.277)
News	-0.054 (0.077)	-0.174* (0.095)	-0.022 (0.077)	-0.101 (0.094)	-0.015 (0.076)	-0.138 (0.095)	0.069 (0.106)	0.132 (0.121)
Equal Opportunity	0.768*** (0.098)	0.540*** (0.114)	0.812*** (0.097)	0.654*** (0.116)	0.504*** (0.091)	0.653*** (0.115)	-0.486*** (0.119)	-0.379*** (0.135)
Authoritarian	0.071 (0.071)	-0.288*** (0.093)	0.103 (0.070)	-0.207** (0.093)	0.044 (0.069)	-0.208** (0.093)	-0.277*** (0.096)	0.308** (0.121)
Knowledge	-0.400 (0.260)	-0.060 (0.219)	-0.652** (0.261)	-0.120 (0.214)	-0.435* (0.250)	0.053 (0.217)	0.815** (0.346)	-0.056 (0.274)
Constant							2.182** (1.057)	2.213* (1.201)
Hyp. Test 1 & 6	0.03	0.06	0.01	0.50	0.32	1.47	0.29	0.18
Hyp. Test 1 & 10	2.02	1.59	2.45	0.55	10.97***	8.06***	0.09	2.32
Hyp. Test 6 & 10	1.63	0.99	2.22	0.00	7.78**	2.67	0.06	1.20
Observations	391	390	391	390	391	390	391	390

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Ordered Logistic and Logistic regression models on Albanian and Macedonian respondents.

OA.6: Robustness Checks

The theory, hypotheses, and empirical analysis for this paper were pre-registered with EGAP. All of the analysis specified in the pre-analysis plan was conducted: additional pre-registered analyses not yet mentioned are provided here.

Additionally, I would note that, in comparison to the pre-analysis plan, the original six hypotheses (one each for majority and minority groups) have been condensed to three hypotheses (combined for majority and minority groups). The direction and implications of the hypotheses have not changed, rather the hypotheses were combined for ease of presentation.

The only change to the main analysis was using factor analysis in addition to LPA to classify cabinet affect. This change was made based on advice from the author of this method who was in the process of refining this classification method when the pre-analysis plan was filed. No other changes were made to the pre-analysis plan.

First, I present results dichotomizing Albanian cabinet representation where *ProfileOverZero* is 1 when there is at least one Albanian cabinet minister and 0 otherwise. Table OA.6.1 displays ordered logistic and logistic regression results for cabinet perceptions variables, while Table OA.6.2 displays ordered logistic and logistic regression results for overall outgroup attitudes variables.

Table OA.6.3, Table OA.6.4, and Table OA.6.5 provide the full results pooled across ethnic groups with a dummy variable for Albanians and interactions between the dummy variable and cabinet profile attributes. There are no significant mediation effects, nor do the effects change when using model based exploratory analysis.

Table OA.6.1: ProfileOverZero for Albanians and Macedonians Cabinet Perceptions

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Cabinet Represent		Cabinet Trust		Cabinet Model	
	MAC	ALB	MAC	ALB	MAC	ALB
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ProfileOverZero	−0.180 (0.287)	−0.560* (0.297)	−0.163 (0.292)	−0.312 (0.308)	0.229 (0.287)	−0.264 (0.297)
ProfileSDSM	−0.328 (0.203)	0.347* (0.208)	−0.222 (0.202)	0.408** (0.206)	−0.114 (0.202)	0.498** (0.210)
ProfileSubstantive	0.113 (0.187)	−0.018 (0.191)	0.141 (0.188)	−0.091 (0.191)	0.056 (0.187)	−0.100 (0.192)
ProfileCooperation	0.157 (0.189)	0.262 (0.196)	0.184 (0.190)	0.145 (0.195)	0.141 (0.187)	0.040 (0.196)
Female	0.234 (0.194)	−0.205 (0.200)	0.131 (0.194)	0.174 (0.198)	0.196 (0.191)	−0.128 (0.199)
Age	0.007 (0.008)	−0.003 (0.007)	−0.001 (0.008)	0.002 (0.007)	0.0002 (0.008)	0.003 (0.007)
Married	−0.070 (0.251)	0.408* (0.247)	0.184 (0.257)	0.402* (0.241)	−0.229 (0.256)	0.714*** (0.244)
Education	0.127 (0.103)	−0.113 (0.106)	0.066 (0.104)	0.093 (0.105)	0.082 (0.104)	−0.127 (0.105)
Household Size	−0.023 (0.070)	−0.059 (0.044)	0.032 (0.073)	0.077* (0.039)	0.026 (0.075)	−0.033 (0.039)
North West	−0.365 (0.335)	0.155 (0.232)	−0.178 (0.331)	0.517** (0.231)	0.142 (0.333)	0.169 (0.230)
South West	0.915*** (0.266)	−0.064 (0.047)	1.108*** (0.269)	−0.141*** (0.047)	1.144*** (0.265)	−0.172*** (0.047)
East	−0.428* (0.254)		−0.075 (0.250)		0.116 (0.246)	
Urban	0.182 (0.214)	0.862*** (0.223)	0.288 (0.214)	0.725*** (0.221)	0.071 (0.211)	0.814*** (0.222)
News	0.015 (0.076)	−0.126 (0.094)	−0.029 (0.076)	−0.124 (0.093)	0.066 (0.075)	−0.116 (0.095)
Equal Opportunity	0.539*** (0.094)	0.390*** (0.111)	0.633*** (0.095)	0.464*** (0.110)	0.503*** (0.093)	0.430*** (0.108)
Authoritarian	0.031 (0.072)	−0.232** (0.091)	0.091 (0.071)	−0.161* (0.090)	0.131* (0.070)	−0.336*** (0.093)
Knowledge	−0.480* (0.260)	0.069 (0.214)	−0.084 (0.258)	−0.081 (0.216)	−0.413 (0.257)	0.123 (0.213)
Observations	391	390	391	390	391	390

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

ProfileOverZero is 1 if ProfileDescriptive > 0 and 0 otherwise. Ordered Logistic regression models on Albanian and Macedonian respondents.

Table OA.6.2: ProfileOverZero For Albanians and Macedonians Overall Outgroup Attitudes

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>									
	Trust		Equality		Neighbor		Talkoutgroup		One Group	
	MAC (1)	ALB (2)	MAC (3)	ALB (4)	MAC (5)	ALB (6)	MAC (7)	ALB (8)	MAC (9)	ALB (10)
ProfileOverZero	−0.001 (0.280)	−0.251 (0.295)	0.273 (0.289)	−0.245 (0.301)	−0.304 (0.281)	−0.099 (0.300)	0.466* (0.278)	0.100 (0.295)	0.383 (0.349)	−0.688* (0.357)
ProfileSDSM	0.182 (0.199)	−0.157 (0.207)	0.020 (0.200)	−0.106 (0.205)	−0.251 (0.200)	0.119 (0.208)	−0.169 (0.199)	−0.307 (0.210)	0.245 (0.271)	0.486** (0.248)
ProfileSubstantive	0.165 (0.183)	−0.209 (0.191)	−0.122 (0.185)	0.013 (0.190)	0.175 (0.185)	0.247 (0.193)	0.228 (0.184)	−0.167 (0.194)	0.053 (0.245)	0.215 (0.229)
ProfileCooperation	−0.110 (0.185)	0.172 (0.194)	−0.051 (0.186)	0.254 (0.193)	−0.029 (0.187)	0.032 (0.196)	−0.147 (0.185)	−0.057 (0.195)	0.353 (0.248)	0.068 (0.232)
Female	0.279 (0.189)	−0.229 (0.198)	0.467** (0.190)	0.259 (0.197)	−0.060 (0.189)	−0.242 (0.202)	0.328* (0.191)	0.679*** (0.206)	0.014 (0.252)	−0.087 (0.240)
Age	−0.002 (0.008)	0.012* (0.007)	−0.007 (0.008)	0.002 (0.007)	0.006 (0.008)	−0.0004 (0.007)	0.0001 (0.008)	−0.006 (0.007)	−0.001 (0.010)	0.0001 (0.008)
Married	−0.319 (0.247)	0.397 (0.243)	−0.069 (0.249)	0.274 (0.245)	−0.059 (0.254)	−0.298 (0.243)	−0.358 (0.252)	0.303 (0.239)	−0.225 (0.334)	0.176 (0.283)
Education	0.061 (0.100)	0.055 (0.107)	0.228** (0.100)	0.138 (0.103)	0.064 (0.104)	0.056 (0.108)	0.166 (0.104)	0.056 (0.104)	0.137 (0.137)	0.092 (0.125)
Household Size	−0.028 (0.071)	0.032 (0.040)	−0.046 (0.070)	−0.012 (0.041)	−0.001 (0.073)	0.028 (0.045)	0.020 (0.073)	0.050 (0.046)	0.034 (0.092)	−0.063 (0.052)
North West	0.019 (0.316)	0.305 (0.229)	0.009 (0.321)	−0.257 (0.224)	−0.291 (0.330)	0.168 (0.231)	−0.651** (0.318)	−1.423*** (0.248)	−0.293 (0.424)	1.527*** (0.275)
South West	0.257 (0.254)	0.005 (0.048)	0.548** (0.252)	0.101** (0.048)	−0.368 (0.254)	0.216*** (0.053)	0.045 (0.253)	−0.100** (0.048)	−0.394 (0.339)	−0.135** (0.053)
East	−0.263 (0.243)		−0.004 (0.247)		−0.334 (0.246)		0.034 (0.247)		−0.176 (0.335)	
Urban	0.005 (0.210)	0.370* (0.217)	0.142 (0.213)	0.342 (0.217)	0.238 (0.215)	−0.481** (0.218)	−0.039 (0.211)	0.141 (0.222)	−0.143 (0.278)	−0.217 (0.256)
News	−0.010 (0.073)	0.227** (0.093)	0.316*** (0.076)	0.452*** (0.095)	−0.070 (0.075)	−0.277*** (0.097)	0.210*** (0.075)	0.454*** (0.097)	0.008 (0.098)	0.225** (0.110)
Equal Opportunity	0.376*** (0.089)	0.589*** (0.110)	0.414*** (0.089)	0.300*** (0.107)	−0.238*** (0.090)	−0.048 (0.108)	0.229*** (0.087)	−0.022 (0.105)	−0.173 (0.113)	−0.141 (0.123)
Authoritarian	0.163** (0.070)	−0.209** (0.092)	0.162** (0.072)	0.295*** (0.092)	−0.043 (0.070)	0.041 (0.093)	0.054 (0.069)	0.114 (0.091)	0.080 (0.092)	0.257** (0.106)
Knowledge	0.049 (0.255)	−0.533** (0.217)	−0.243 (0.260)	−0.245 (0.211)	0.225 (0.262)	−0.927*** (0.220)	0.073 (0.253)	0.308 (0.217)	0.867*** (0.319)	0.169 (0.255)
Constant									−0.242 (1.001)	−0.264 (1.028)
Observations	391	390	391	390	391	390	391	390	391	390

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

ProfileOverZero is 1 if ProfileDescriptive > 0 and 0 otherwise. Ordered Logistic and Logistic regression models on Albanian and Macedonian respondents.

Table OA.6.3: Full Results with Interaction Cabinet Perceptions

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>		
	Cabinet Represent	Cabinet Trust	Cabinet Model
	(1)	(2)	(3)
ProfileDescriptive 1	0.279 (0.332)	0.056 (0.335)	0.299 (0.332)
ProfileDescriptive 6	-0.194 (0.330)	-0.059 (0.333)	0.442 (0.330)
ProfileDescriptive 10	-0.384 (0.326)	-0.417 (0.332)	0.377 (0.327)
Albanian	0.246 (0.425)	0.343 (0.437)	0.918** (0.427)
ProfileSDSM	-0.422** (0.207)	-0.287 (0.206)	-0.162 (0.208)
ProfileSubstantive	0.090 (0.192)	0.133 (0.192)	0.098 (0.192)
ProfileCooperation	0.174 (0.193)	0.192 (0.192)	0.123 (0.192)
Female	0.063 (0.136)	0.157 (0.137)	0.053 (0.135)
Age	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)
Married	0.207 (0.147)	0.272* (0.147)	0.201 (0.148)
Education	-0.015 (0.072)	0.044 (0.072)	-0.071 (0.072)
Household Size	-0.039 (0.036)	0.070** (0.035)	-0.013 (0.033)
North West	0.033 (0.182)	0.343* (0.181)	0.146 (0.179)
South West	0.826*** (0.210)	1.201*** (0.216)	1.236*** (0.213)
East	-0.437* (0.230)	0.041 (0.227)	0.184 (0.226)
Urban	0.511*** (0.151)	0.510*** (0.151)	0.465*** (0.149)
News	-0.075 (0.057)	-0.095* (0.057)	-0.042 (0.057)
Equal Opportunity	0.517*** (0.070)	0.595*** (0.070)	0.525*** (0.069)
Authoritarian	-0.082 (0.055)	-0.001 (0.054)	-0.051 (0.054)
Knowledge	-0.125 (0.162)	-0.074 (0.163)	-0.129 (0.160)
ProfileDescriptive 1 x Albanian	-0.870* (0.463)	-0.548 (0.469)	-0.694 (0.460)
ProfileDescriptive 6 x Albanian	-0.291 (0.459)	-0.155 (0.465)	-0.866* (0.456)
ProfileDescriptive 10 x Albanian	-0.208 (0.454)	0.156 (0.466)	-0.238 (0.454)
ProfileSDSM x Albanian	0.702** (0.288)	0.641** (0.287)	0.562* (0.288)
ProfileSubstantive x Albanian	-0.158 (0.266)	-0.266 (0.266)	-0.253 (0.265)
ProfileCooperation x Albanian	0.064 (0.267)	-0.007 (0.268)	-0.109 (0.266)
Observations	781	781	781
<i>Note:</i>		*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01	

Ordered Logistic regression models on all respondents.

Table OA.6.4: Full Results Overall Outgroup Attitudes Albanian Interaction

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>				
	Trust	Equality	Neighbor	Talkoutgroup	One Group
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)
ProfileDescriptive 1	0.293 (0.332)	0.531 (0.333)	-0.378 (0.327)	0.641** (0.324)	0.013 (0.385)
ProfileDescriptive 6	0.008 (0.324)	0.268 (0.330)	-0.630* (0.331)	0.631** (0.322)	0.549 (0.403)
ProfileDescriptive 10	-0.153 (0.326)	0.208 (0.328)	-0.237 (0.326)	0.371 (0.321)	0.652 (0.402)
Albanian	0.493 (0.413)	0.554 (0.426)	-1.094** (0.425)	1.049** (0.413)	-0.068 (0.502)
ProfileSDSM	0.217 (0.209)	0.013 (0.205)	-0.292 (0.209)	-0.154 (0.205)	0.269 (0.271)
ProfileSubstantive	0.262 (0.193)	-0.141 (0.190)	0.167 (0.193)	0.275 (0.189)	0.065 (0.245)
ProfileCooperation	-0.174 (0.193)	-0.033 (0.190)	-0.021 (0.193)	-0.214 (0.189)	0.353 (0.246)
female	0.050 (0.133)	0.363*** (0.134)	-0.092 (0.134)	0.429*** (0.136)	-0.041 (0.168)
Age	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.005 (0.004)	0.006 (0.004)	-0.007 (0.004)	-0.004 (0.005)
Married	-0.081 (0.142)	-0.088 (0.144)	-0.178 (0.145)	0.044 (0.145)	-0.005 (0.180)
Education	0.013 (0.070)	0.180*** (0.070)	0.077 (0.072)	0.102 (0.071)	0.124 (0.089)
Household Size	0.010 (0.034)	-0.006 (0.033)	-0.0004 (0.037)	0.039 (0.035)	-0.067 (0.043)
North West	0.121 (0.173)	-0.091 (0.175)	0.104 (0.177)	-1.171*** (0.184)	0.964*** (0.221)
South West	0.260 (0.208)	0.217 (0.205)	-0.680*** (0.211)	0.291 (0.207)	0.374 (0.250)
East	-0.245 (0.227)	-0.239 (0.231)	-0.380 (0.233)	0.048 (0.230)	0.299 (0.285)
Urban	0.179 (0.147)	0.252* (0.149)	-0.075 (0.148)	0.003 (0.148)	-0.199 (0.184)
News	0.030 (0.056)	0.371*** (0.058)	-0.144** (0.057)	0.312*** (0.057)	0.122* (0.070)
Equal Opportunity	0.496*** (0.068)	0.372*** (0.067)	-0.166** (0.067)	0.137** (0.065)	-0.194** (0.081)
Authoritarian	0.065 (0.054)	0.205*** (0.055)	-0.045 (0.054)	0.092* (0.053)	0.184*** (0.067)
Knowledge	-0.286* (0.160)	-0.208 (0.160)	-0.289* (0.161)	0.164 (0.160)	0.364* (0.194)
ProfileDescriptive 1 x Albanian	-0.752* (0.452)	-0.764* (0.460)	0.353 (0.455)	-0.441 (0.451)	-0.582 (0.541)
ProfileDescriptive 6 x Albanian	-0.153 (0.444)	-0.535 (0.456)	0.595 (0.451)	-0.537 (0.445)	-1.156** (0.552)
ProfileDescriptive 10 x Albanian	0.034 (0.447)	-0.528 (0.456)	0.127 (0.450)	-0.337 (0.445)	-1.347** (0.554)
ProfileSDSM x Albanian	-0.351 (0.283)	-0.122 (0.282)	0.308 (0.284)	-0.050 (0.284)	0.167 (0.360)
ProfileSubstantive x Albanian	-0.488* (0.261)	0.108 (0.261)	0.017 (0.263)	-0.427 (0.261)	0.094 (0.328)
ProfileCooperation x Albanian	0.346 (0.263)	0.250 (0.263)	0.142 (0.265)	0.117 (0.263)	-0.289 (0.331)
Constant					-0.433 (0.701)
Observations	781	781	781	781	781

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Ordered Logistic and Logistic regression models on all respondents.

Table OA.6.5: Full Results with Interaction Mechanisms

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>			
	Benefit You (1)	Benefit Financial (2)	Represent Satisfied (3)	Minister Personal (4)
ProfileDescriptive 1	0.049 (0.334)	0.453 (0.337)	0.373 (0.340)	0.625 (0.404)
ProfileDescriptive 6	0.006 (0.327)	0.427 (0.333)	0.207 (0.336)	0.826** (0.415)
ProfileDescriptive 10	-0.371 (0.332)	0.034 (0.334)	-0.536 (0.336)	0.752* (0.402)
Albanian	-0.132 (0.426)	0.656 (0.427)	0.023 (0.428)	0.494 (0.542)
ProfileSDSM	-0.205 (0.211)	-0.264 (0.208)	-0.275 (0.211)	-0.138 (0.276)
ProfileSubstantive	0.159 (0.194)	0.291 (0.193)	-0.222 (0.196)	0.282 (0.250)
ProfileCooperation	0.299 (0.195)	0.359* (0.194)	0.422** (0.196)	-0.591** (0.252)
Female	0.173 (0.137)	0.167 (0.136)	0.064 (0.135)	-0.163 (0.177)
Age	-0.001 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.004)	0.0004 (0.004)	0.001 (0.006)
Married	0.497*** (0.151)	0.264* (0.148)	0.265* (0.145)	-0.297 (0.191)
Education	-0.027 (0.074)	-0.098 (0.073)	-0.105 (0.071)	0.183* (0.095)
Household Size	0.041 (0.038)	0.070** (0.034)	0.021 (0.036)	-0.063 (0.042)
North West	0.110 (0.182)	0.552*** (0.182)	0.127 (0.177)	-0.055 (0.232)
South West	0.726*** (0.215)	0.523** (0.214)	1.237*** (0.216)	0.016 (0.265)
East	-0.126 (0.231)	0.295 (0.229)	0.237 (0.231)	0.013 (0.299)
Urban	0.159 (0.151)	0.633*** (0.151)	0.509*** (0.150)	-0.409** (0.196)
News	-0.130** (0.057)	-0.076 (0.057)	-0.070 (0.057)	0.157** (0.076)
Equal Opportunity	0.711*** (0.072)	0.764*** (0.072)	0.589*** (0.070)	-0.439*** (0.084)
Authoritarian	-0.070 (0.054)	-0.015 (0.053)	-0.044 (0.053)	-0.021 (0.070)
Knowledge	-0.143 (0.163)	-0.264 (0.161)	-0.100 (0.158)	0.172 (0.207)
ProfileDescriptive 1 x Albanian	0.016 (0.462)	-0.627 (0.461)	-0.727 (0.465)	-1.140* (0.591)
ProfileDescriptive 6 x Albanian	0.176 (0.453)	-0.385 (0.454)	-0.293 (0.458)	-1.560*** (0.594)
ProfileDescriptive 10 x Albanian	0.750 (0.459)	-0.007 (0.455)	0.750 (0.459)	-1.794*** (0.585)
ProfileSDSM x Albanian	0.410 (0.292)	0.345 (0.290)	0.364 (0.286)	0.641* (0.378)
ProfileSubstantive x Albanian	-0.210 (0.269)	-0.068 (0.267)	0.155 (0.266)	0.113 (0.346)
ProfileCooperation x Albanian	-0.062 (0.271)	-0.328 (0.270)	-0.245 (0.267)	0.660* (0.350)
Constant				1.166 (0.732)
Observations	781	781	781	781

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Ordered Logistic and Logistic regression models on all respondents.

Table OA.6.6 subsets to only Macedonians and interacts the cabinet profile attributes with nationalist party membership. I asked a post-treatment question about political party support to isolate Macedonian nationalists (*Nationalist Party*). This question must be asked post-treatment in order to avoid priming respondents on their ethnic identity (Klar, Leeper and Robison, 2020). Ethnic Macedonian nationalist parties support the creation of an ethnically homogeneous state, and their party platforms are strongly opposed to increased Albanian representation. Therefore, we can think of nationalist party membership splitting ethnic Macedonians into two groups: nationalist party members, who are opposed to increased Albanian representation, and non-nationalist party members, who may be ambivalent or potentially sympathetic to increased Albanian representation.

As is shown in the Table, nationalist party members do not differentially react to the cabinet vignette. That is, there are few significant interactions between the different attributes and levels of the cabinet vignette and nationalist party membership. One interesting result is that nationalist party members are more likely to believe that the cabinet operates as *One Group* (in line with their nationalist attitudes valuing unity). The interaction between nationalist party membership and the substantive representation attribute is negative, implying that nationalist party members start to question the unity of the cabinet when it provides substantive representation to Albanians. In general, however, nationalist party membership does not appear to systematically change how Macedonians react to the cabinet vignette.

Table OA.6.6: Macedonians Only Interaction with Nationalist Party Choice

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Trust (1)	Equality (2)	Neighbor (3)	Talk Outgroup (4)	One Group (5)	Cabinet Represent (6)	Cabinet Trust (7)	Cabinet Model (8)
ProfileDescriptive 1	-0.579 (0.609)	0.464 (0.644)	-0.687 (0.637)	1.079 (0.670)	-0.282 (0.855)	0.516 (0.644)	0.059 (0.647)	-0.060 (0.638)
ProfileDescriptive 6	0.009 (0.596)	-0.144 (0.630)	-1.161* (0.670)	0.788 (0.668)	1.117 (0.968)	0.737 (0.672)	0.751 (0.687)	1.396** (0.692)
Profile Number 10	-0.042 (0.564)	0.251 (0.596)	-0.746 (0.600)	1.127* (0.623)	1.020 (0.868)	0.112 (0.604)	-0.088 (0.608)	1.159* (0.621)
Nationalist Party	-1.901** (0.834)	-1.106 (0.817)	-0.598 (0.788)	-0.668 (0.803)	1.840* (1.106)	-0.906 (0.800)	-1.078 (0.818)	-0.579 (0.782)
ProfileSDSM	0.138 (0.417)	0.026 (0.431)	0.119 (0.458)	-0.581 (0.447)	0.685 (0.696)	-0.785* (0.458)	-0.653 (0.455)	-0.065 (0.443)
ProfileSubstantive	0.451 (0.383)	0.418 (0.401)	0.269 (0.400)	-0.242 (0.402)	1.220* (0.629)	0.548 (0.413)	0.408 (0.409)	-0.001 (0.411)
ProfileCooperation	0.029 (0.370)	0.079 (0.382)	-0.037 (0.391)	0.129 (0.389)	0.255 (0.585)	-0.019 (0.396)	0.228 (0.398)	0.172 (0.402)
Female	0.363 (0.278)	0.628** (0.280)	-0.180 (0.274)	0.769*** (0.281)	0.230 (0.402)	0.567** (0.279)	0.260 (0.279)	0.276 (0.280)
Age	-0.011 (0.011)	-0.007 (0.011)	0.001 (0.011)	-0.003 (0.011)	0.003 (0.015)	0.001 (0.011)	-0.003 (0.011)	-0.013 (0.011)
Married	-0.435 (0.366)	-0.171 (0.364)	-0.804** (0.372)	-0.373 (0.360)	-0.779 (0.574)	0.337 (0.371)	0.564 (0.373)	-0.101 (0.364)
Education	-0.083 (0.151)	0.293* (0.152)	-0.090 (0.152)	0.178 (0.157)	0.352 (0.232)	0.327** (0.153)	0.382** (0.152)	0.144 (0.150)
Household Size	0.037 (0.097)	-0.148 (0.100)	-0.102 (0.102)	-0.055 (0.102)	0.149 (0.139)	-0.072 (0.099)	-0.014 (0.102)	0.005 (0.104)
North West	0.497 (0.452)	0.305 (0.462)	-0.265 (0.491)	-0.619 (0.457)	-0.976 (0.702)	-0.337 (0.498)	-0.267 (0.490)	0.336 (0.484)
South West	0.628 (0.389)	0.776** (0.391)	-0.365 (0.396)	0.059 (0.381)	-0.204 (0.625)	1.581*** (0.412)	1.789*** (0.412)	1.831*** (0.412)
East	0.137 (0.362)	0.331 (0.376)	-0.078 (0.368)	0.289 (0.369)	-0.765 (0.582)	-0.074 (0.375)	0.113 (0.373)	0.211 (0.372)
Urban	-0.010 (0.308)	0.354 (0.308)	0.279 (0.308)	0.348 (0.303)	0.613 (0.415)	-0.114 (0.322)	0.008 (0.318)	0.095 (0.311)
News	-0.019 (0.106)	0.397*** (0.110)	-0.074 (0.105)	0.241** (0.106)	-0.090 (0.154)	0.196* (0.110)	0.168 (0.111)	0.251** (0.111)
Equal Opportunity	0.326** (0.138)	0.400*** (0.142)	-0.174 (0.134)	0.192 (0.132)	-0.293 (0.192)	0.594*** (0.142)	0.642*** (0.143)	0.542*** (0.140)
Authoritarian	0.244** (0.104)	0.208* (0.108)	-0.055 (0.102)	0.019 (0.099)	0.099 (0.150)	-0.088 (0.103)	0.038 (0.103)	0.036 (0.102)
Knowledge	0.054 (0.451)	-0.614 (0.467)	0.189 (0.445)	0.011 (0.452)	0.962 (0.627)	-0.810* (0.454)	-0.285 (0.447)	-0.566 (0.454)
ProfileDescriptive 1 x Nationalist Party	2.012** (0.964)	0.732 (0.938)	0.910 (0.921)	-0.855 (0.936)	-0.417 (1.253)	0.445 (0.932)	0.616 (0.942)	0.435 (0.912)
ProfileDescriptive 6 x Nationalist Party	0.915 (0.968)	1.074 (0.950)	1.426 (0.961)	-0.313 (0.946)	-1.563 (1.367)	-0.190 (0.970)	-0.212 (0.989)	-1.089 (0.961)
ProfileDescriptive 10 x Nationalist Party	1.007 (0.941)	0.629 (0.921)	1.233 (0.888)	-1.416 (0.906)	-1.416 (1.265)	0.126 (0.904)	0.465 (0.925)	-0.636 (0.897)
Profile SDSM x Nationalist Party	0.009 (0.584)	-0.128 (0.586)	-0.209 (0.593)	0.469 (0.586)	-0.659 (0.891)	0.216 (0.604)	0.417 (0.604)	-0.007 (0.588)
ProfileSubstantive x Nationalist Party	-0.692 (0.542)	-0.654 (0.548)	0.182 (0.545)	0.555 (0.540)	-2.040** (0.832)	-0.891 (0.556)	-0.115 (0.554)	0.084 (0.552)
ProfileCooperation x Nationalist Party	-0.191 (0.538)	-0.148 (0.540)	0.159 (0.545)	0.141 (0.534)	0.195 (0.793)	-0.274 (0.549)	-0.786 (0.557)	-0.108 (0.547)
Constant					-1.556 (1.826)			
Observations	204	204	204	204	204	204	204	204

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

All models subset to Macedonians with interaction for nationalist party supporters (Levica or VMRO-DPMNE). Ordered logistic and logistic regression models.

We naturally want to make sure that respondents were fully exposed to the cabinet vignette treatment. Fortunately, the in-person nature of this study makes ensuring that the treatment is received relatively straightforward. Survey enumerators used computers or tablets to record survey responses. When respondents were exposed to the cabinet vignette, they were asked to read the vignette from the computer or tablet. Enumerators were specifically trained to ask respondents to read the text carefully. Enumerators told respondents that they would be asked to remember what they read and to use it in following questions. Enumerators provided sufficient time so that the respondent could fully read the vignette and were able to monitor whether the respondent was attentive, due to the in-person nature of the interview.

Post-treatment, the survey asked respondents several questions about the ministry that they identified as most important to them. These questions cover respondents' preferences for descriptive and substantive representation in the ministry.

- Hiring: "The ministry should invest heavily in hiring more employees from my ethnic group." (1-strongly disagree to 5-strongly agree)
- Employee: "The ethnicity of the minister and those who work for the ministry matters a great deal to me." (1-strongly disagree to 5-strongly agree)
- Financial: "The ministry should devote more financial resources to develop programs designed to help my family and my ethnic group." (1-strongly disagree to 5-strongly agree)
- Concerns: "The ministry's ability to respond to the concerns of and provide solutions to challenges my ethnic group faces matters a great deal to me." (1-strongly disagree to 5-strongly agree)

We should expect that respondents' views regarding descriptive and substantive representation are colored by the cabinet vignette to which they are exposed. That is, we can conclude that respondents were fully exposed to the treatment if their preferences for descriptive and substantive representation change based on the cabinet vignette. Table OA.6.7 shows these regression results and supports this argument.

From the Table, we can see that attributes of the cabinet vignette did significantly influence responses to these questions about descriptive and substantive representation in the ways we would expect. When Macedonians were exposed to the substantive representation treatment, they cared less about the ethnicity of ministry employees. This makes sense because the cabinet subsumes the bureaucracy's ability to provide substantive representation in the substantive representation treatment.

Similarly, when Albanian descriptive representation increased, Albanians cared less about ethnic representation in hiring, devoting more financial resources to help their ethnic group, and the ministry's ability to respond to their concerns. With more co-ethnic ministers, Albanians can seek these resources directly from co-ethnic ministers. When Albanians are exposed to the substantive representation attribute, they care more about the demographics of ministry employees, likely because those employees are responsible for implementing substantive representation. Finally, when there was an Albanian minister from the SDSM,

Table OA.6.7: Preferences About Descriptive and Substantive Representation

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>							
	Hiring		Employee		Financial		Concerns	
	MAC (1)	ALB (2)	MAC (3)	ALB (4)	MAC (5)	ALB (6)	MAC (7)	ALB (8)
ProfileDescriptive 1	0.077 (0.227)	-0.438** (0.178)	-0.0002 (0.242)	-0.024 (0.199)	0.206 (0.217)	-0.488** (0.199)	0.136 (0.202)	-0.343* (0.185)
ProfileDescriptive 6	-0.083 (0.221)	-0.397** (0.184)	0.060 (0.236)	-0.247 (0.202)	0.205 (0.215)	-0.357* (0.191)	0.015 (0.205)	-0.373** (0.187)
ProfileDescriptive 10	0.011 (0.225)	-0.485*** (0.188)	0.102 (0.235)	-0.132 (0.202)	0.222 (0.220)	-0.578*** (0.198)	0.012 (0.203)	-0.333* (0.189)
ProfileCooperation	0.040 (0.124)	0.064 (0.107)	0.211 (0.133)	-0.050 (0.112)	0.099 (0.117)	0.035 (0.113)	0.032 (0.113)	0.013 (0.107)
ProfileSDSM	0.037 (0.133)	0.060 (0.113)	-0.067 (0.138)	0.090 (0.121)	-0.165 (0.119)	0.251** (0.120)	0.045 (0.119)	0.042 (0.113)
ProfileSubstantive	-0.110 (0.124)	0.016 (0.107)	-0.361*** (0.130)	0.206* (0.112)	0.020 (0.114)	0.147 (0.112)	-0.076 (0.111)	0.053 (0.107)
Female	0.139 (0.129)	0.105 (0.110)	0.119 (0.131)	0.019 (0.114)	0.173 (0.120)	0.140 (0.115)	0.137 (0.119)	0.152 (0.109)
Age	-0.005 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.004)	-0.007 (0.005)	0.003 (0.005)	-0.001 (0.005)	0.002 (0.004)	0.003 (0.005)	-0.0002 (0.004)
Married	-0.090 (0.170)	-0.067 (0.131)	0.023 (0.175)	0.054 (0.144)	-0.106 (0.165)	0.023 (0.130)	0.048 (0.161)	-0.041 (0.134)
Education	-0.029 (0.069)	0.021 (0.056)	-0.025 (0.068)	0.011 (0.066)	0.080 (0.064)	0.043 (0.064)	0.029 (0.061)	0.059 (0.055)
Household Size	-0.047 (0.048)	0.015 (0.027)	-0.140*** (0.051)	0.042** (0.018)	-0.081* (0.048)	0.021 (0.028)	-0.064 (0.041)	0.021 (0.026)
North West	0.850*** (0.182)	0.074 (0.122)	0.600*** (0.225)	0.021 (0.134)	0.496*** (0.175)	0.174 (0.147)	0.430** (0.169)	-0.018 (0.120)
South West	0.182 (0.166)	-0.110*** (0.023)	0.204 (0.177)	-0.046 (0.029)	0.012 (0.157)	-0.127*** (0.025)	-0.013 (0.155)	-0.108*** (0.023)
East	-0.134 (0.177)		-0.272 (0.177)		0.210 (0.164)		0.194 (0.157)	
Urban	-0.376*** (0.131)	-0.243** (0.122)	-0.364** (0.151)	-0.269** (0.131)	-0.423*** (0.120)	-0.117 (0.136)	-0.290** (0.122)	-0.124 (0.119)
News	0.063 (0.052)	0.319*** (0.052)	-0.001 (0.051)	0.315*** (0.058)	0.083* (0.048)	0.206*** (0.053)	0.053 (0.048)	0.177*** (0.052)
Equal Opportunity	0.115** (0.058)	-0.158*** (0.056)	0.182*** (0.064)	-0.094 (0.065)	0.044 (0.054)	-0.064 (0.060)	0.072 (0.052)	-0.076 (0.058)
Authoritarian	-0.081 (0.050)	-0.023 (0.047)	-0.127** (0.051)	-0.003 (0.056)	-0.050 (0.045)	0.026 (0.055)	-0.008 (0.045)	0.010 (0.050)
Knowledge	0.069 (0.158)	0.099 (0.120)	0.022 (0.174)	-0.021 (0.127)	0.289* (0.167)	0.185 (0.128)	0.052 (0.156)	0.057 (0.123)
Constant	3.990*** (0.533)	3.956*** (0.471)	4.220*** (0.551)	2.352*** (0.529)	3.347*** (0.534)	3.452*** (0.478)	3.591*** (0.471)	3.817*** (0.469)
Observations	391	390	391	390	391	390	391	390

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Linear regression models on Albanian and Macedonian respondents.

Albanians cared more about the ministry devoting financial resources to their group. This finding fits with Albanian skepticism of the SDSM and its positioning as a multi-ethnic party. Given this evidence and the intentionality with which the vignette was administered, we can be assured that respondents were fully exposed to the vignette.

OA.7: Interaction Models

I present models interacting features of the cabinet vignette on key dependent variables.

Table OA.7.1: Interaction with Trust

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Trust					
	Macedonians		Albanians			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ProfileDescriptive 1	-0.153 (0.430)	0.543 (0.427)	0.199 (0.317)	-0.209 (0.454)	-1.057** (0.469)	-0.516 (0.332)
ProfileDescriptive 6	-0.393 (0.424)	0.328 (0.421)	-0.055 (0.312)	0.236 (0.453)	-0.791* (0.470)	-0.148 (0.329)
ProfileDescriptive 10	-0.179 (0.423)	0.217 (0.419)	-0.108 (0.312)	0.305 (0.450)	-0.541 (0.464)	-0.111 (0.329)
ProfileSubstantive	-0.269 (0.496)	0.157 (0.183)	-0.028 (0.262)	0.443 (0.514)	-0.203 (0.192)	-0.314 (0.273)
ProfileSDSM	0.196 (0.199)	0.193 (0.199)	0.192 (0.199)	-0.156 (0.207)	-0.149 (0.207)	-0.153 (0.207)
ProfileCooperation	-0.096 (0.185)	0.549 (0.486)	-0.299 (0.259)	0.180 (0.195)	-0.676 (0.513)	0.063 (0.274)
Female	0.310 (0.192)	0.294 (0.190)	0.304 (0.191)	-0.238 (0.200)	-0.231 (0.200)	-0.233 (0.199)
Age	-0.001 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.008)	0.011 (0.007)	0.012 (0.007)	0.012 (0.007)
Married	-0.310 (0.248)	-0.307 (0.248)	-0.326 (0.248)	0.423* (0.245)	0.438* (0.244)	0.404* (0.245)
Education	0.070 (0.101)	0.068 (0.102)	0.064 (0.101)	0.047 (0.108)	0.042 (0.108)	0.058 (0.108)
Household Size	-0.023 (0.072)	-0.026 (0.072)	-0.025 (0.072)	0.035 (0.041)	0.033 (0.040)	0.032 (0.041)
North West	0.036 (0.315)	0.037 (0.316)	0.009 (0.316)	0.279 (0.231)	0.296 (0.230)	0.282 (0.229)
South West	0.256 (0.254)	0.238 (0.255)	0.245 (0.254)	0.008 (0.048)	0.008 (0.048)	0.008 (0.048)
East	-0.258 (0.244)	-0.249 (0.244)	-0.251 (0.244)			
Urban	0.001 (0.212)	0.009 (0.210)	-0.006 (0.210)	0.348 (0.218)	0.367* (0.218)	0.361* (0.218)
News	-0.017 (0.074)	-0.017 (0.074)	-0.015 (0.074)	0.226** (0.094)	0.224** (0.094)	0.227** (0.094)
Equal Opportunity	0.372*** (0.090)	0.384*** (0.090)	0.373*** (0.090)	0.580*** (0.110)	0.597*** (0.110)	0.584*** (0.110)
Authoritarian	0.166** (0.070)	0.170** (0.070)	0.167** (0.070)	-0.206** (0.092)	-0.207** (0.092)	-0.203** (0.092)
Knowledge	0.045 (0.257)	-0.020 (0.259)	0.033 (0.257)	-0.498** (0.221)	-0.550** (0.220)	-0.549** (0.219)
ProfileDescriptive 1 x ProfileSubstantive	0.704 (0.606)			-0.631 (0.625)		
ProfileDescriptive 6 x ProfileSubstantive	0.679 (0.598)			-0.767 (0.632)		
ProfileDescriptive 10 x ProfileSubstantive	0.148 (0.604)			-0.856 (0.629)		
ProfileDescriptive 1 x ProfileCooperation		-0.767 (0.603)			1.002 (0.628)	
ProfileDescriptive 6 x ProfileCooperation		-0.835 (0.598)			1.201* (0.626)	
ProfileDescriptive 10 x ProfileCooperation		-0.724 (0.591)			0.771 (0.624)	
ProfileCooperation x ProfileSubstantive			0.385 (0.374)			0.220 (0.383)
Observations	391	391	391	390	390	390

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table OA.7.2: Interaction with Equality

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Equality					
	Macedonians			Albanians		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ProfileDescriptive 1	0.618 (0.443)	0.463 (0.449)	0.465 (0.325)	0.029 (0.471)	-0.687 (0.459)	-0.201 (0.334)
ProfileDescriptive 6	0.251 (0.443)	0.614 (0.456)	0.212 (0.323)	-0.251 (0.471)	-0.391 (0.458)	-0.224 (0.334)
ProfileDescriptive 10	0.320 (0.439)	0.429 (0.448)	0.144 (0.320)	-0.248 (0.468)	-1.059** (0.457)	-0.314 (0.334)
ProfileSubstantive	0.088 (0.517)	-0.121 (0.185)	0.097 (0.269)	0.158 (0.530)	-0.001 (0.191)	-0.097 (0.272)
ProfileSDSM	0.022 (0.200)	0.018 (0.200)	0.020 (0.200)	-0.113 (0.205)	-0.110 (0.205)	-0.103 (0.205)
ProfileCooperation	-0.043 (0.186)	0.319 (0.506)	0.161 (0.262)	0.251 (0.193)	-0.583 (0.524)	0.146 (0.272)
Female	0.458** (0.192)	0.477** (0.191)	0.444** (0.191)	0.269 (0.198)	0.202 (0.199)	0.247 (0.198)
Age	-0.007 (0.008)	-0.006 (0.008)	-0.007 (0.008)	0.002 (0.007)	0.002 (0.007)	0.002 (0.007)
Married	-0.044 (0.252)	-0.054 (0.252)	-0.071 (0.251)	0.289 (0.248)	0.293 (0.246)	0.269 (0.248)
Education	0.228** (0.101)	0.239** (0.101)	0.219** (0.100)	0.144 (0.104)	0.133 (0.104)	0.140 (0.103)
Household Size	-0.040 (0.072)	-0.034 (0.072)	-0.033 (0.071)	-0.010 (0.041)	-0.013 (0.041)	-0.013 (0.041)
North West	0.026 (0.321)	0.016 (0.322)	0.027 (0.321)	-0.228 (0.226)	-0.238 (0.227)	-0.257 (0.225)
South West	0.556** (0.253)	0.545** (0.255)	0.564** (0.253)	0.098** (0.049)	0.106** (0.049)	0.100** (0.049)
East	0.018 (0.247)	0.028 (0.249)	0.018 (0.248)			
Urban	0.158 (0.214)	0.162 (0.214)	0.152 (0.213)	0.345 (0.218)	0.342 (0.218)	0.345 (0.218)
News	0.303*** (0.077)	0.306*** (0.077)	0.304*** (0.077)	0.455*** (0.096)	0.448*** (0.096)	0.452*** (0.095)
Equal Opportunity	0.433*** (0.092)	0.433*** (0.091)	0.436*** (0.091)	0.305*** (0.107)	0.316*** (0.107)	0.302*** (0.107)
Authoritarian	0.154** (0.072)	0.163** (0.073)	0.147** (0.072)	0.297*** (0.093)	0.303*** (0.093)	0.293*** (0.093)
Knowledge	-0.258 (0.262)	-0.295 (0.262)	-0.279 (0.261)	-0.244 (0.216)	-0.213 (0.215)	-0.237 (0.213)
ProfileDescriptive 1 x ProfileSubstantive	-0.302 (0.621)			-0.444 (0.631)		
ProfileDescriptive 6 x ProfileSubstantive	-0.062 (0.621)			0.065 (0.637)		
ProfileDescriptive 10 x ProfileSubstantive	-0.351 (0.621)			-0.116 (0.641)		
ProfileDescriptive 1 x ProfileCooperation		0.039 (0.619)			0.993 (0.633)	
ProfileDescriptive 6 x ProfileCooperation		-0.740 (0.620)			0.388 (0.630)	
ProfileDescriptive 10 x ProfileCooperation		-0.543 (0.610)			1.518** (0.633)	
ProfileCooperation x ProfileSubstantive			-0.415 (0.375)			0.214 (0.380)
Observations	391	391	391	390	390	390

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table OA.7.3: Interaction with Neighbor

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Neighbor					
	Macedonians				Albanians	
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ProfileDescriptive 1	-0.218 (0.439)	-0.302 (0.431)	-0.316 (0.317)	-0.237 (0.468)	-0.102 (0.483)	-0.121 (0.339)
ProfileDescriptive 6	-0.549 (0.449)	-0.609 (0.434)	-0.522 (0.320)	-0.713 (0.461)	0.027 (0.475)	-0.074 (0.332)
ProfileDescriptive 10	0.003 (0.437)	-0.232 (0.425)	-0.108 (0.314)	-0.808* (0.459)	0.120 (0.476)	-0.112 (0.332)
ProfileSubstantive	0.295 (0.496)	0.181 (0.185)	-0.068 (0.261)	-0.608 (0.528)	0.246 (0.193)	0.295 (0.275)
ProfileSDSM	-0.244 (0.201)	-0.247 (0.201)	-0.247 (0.200)	0.119 (0.209)	0.132 (0.210)	0.121 (0.209)
ProfileCooperation	-0.019 (0.187)	-0.131 (0.487)	-0.273 (0.266)	0.029 (0.196)	0.220 (0.532)	0.080 (0.277)
Female	-0.045 (0.192)	-0.037 (0.191)	-0.015 (0.191)	-0.203 (0.203)	-0.239 (0.203)	-0.240 (0.202)
Age	0.007 (0.008)	0.007 (0.008)	0.007 (0.008)	0.001 (0.008)	-0.0004 (0.007)	-0.0005 (0.007)
Married	-0.090 (0.258)	-0.103 (0.257)	-0.101 (0.257)	-0.284 (0.246)	-0.301 (0.245)	-0.287 (0.246)
Education	0.077 (0.105)	0.075 (0.105)	0.086 (0.105)	0.083 (0.110)	0.052 (0.109)	0.053 (0.109)
Household Size	-0.013 (0.073)	-0.010 (0.073)	-0.010 (0.073)	0.026 (0.046)	0.030 (0.045)	0.028 (0.045)
North West	-0.298 (0.329)	-0.293 (0.331)	-0.321 (0.330)	0.212 (0.235)	0.180 (0.234)	0.165 (0.232)
South West	-0.375 (0.254)	-0.372 (0.254)	-0.390 (0.254)	0.218*** (0.054)	0.216*** (0.053)	0.217*** (0.053)
East	-0.355 (0.247)	-0.348 (0.248)	-0.363 (0.247)			
Urban	0.246 (0.216)	0.239 (0.216)	0.225 (0.216)	-0.471** (0.220)	-0.484** (0.218)	-0.486** (0.218)
News	-0.066 (0.075)	-0.066 (0.075)	-0.067 (0.075)	-0.277*** (0.097)	-0.274*** (0.097)	-0.278*** (0.097)
Equal Opportunity	-0.250*** (0.092)	-0.252*** (0.091)	-0.259*** (0.091)	-0.031 (0.109)	-0.046 (0.108)	-0.046 (0.108)
Authoritarian	-0.038 (0.071)	-0.040 (0.071)	-0.031 (0.071)	0.062 (0.095)	0.038 (0.094)	0.044 (0.094)
Knowledge	0.268 (0.266)	0.262 (0.264)	0.270 (0.264)	-1.021*** (0.225)	-0.943*** (0.222)	-0.923*** (0.221)
ProfileDescriptive 1 x ProfileSubstantive	-0.199 (0.600)			0.268 (0.636)		
ProfileDescriptive 6 x ProfileSubstantive	0.051 (0.610)			1.255** (0.639)		
ProfileDescriptive 10 x ProfileSubstantive	-0.232 (0.606)			1.430** (0.645)		
ProfileDescriptive 1 x ProfileCooperation		-0.025 (0.597)			-0.018 (0.646)	
ProfileDescriptive 6 x ProfileCooperation		0.178 (0.607)			-0.195 (0.634)	
ProfileDescriptive 10 x ProfileCooperation		0.247 (0.594)			-0.445 (0.639)	
ProfileCooperation x ProfileSubstantive			0.506 (0.373)			-0.095 (0.385)
Observations	391	391	391	390	390	390

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table OA.7.4: Interaction with Talk Outgroup

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Talk Outgroup					
	Macedonians			Albanians		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ProfileDescriptive 1	0.549 (0.438)	0.491 (0.436)	0.584* (0.315)	0.320 (0.467)	-0.438 (0.455)	0.210 (0.333)
ProfileDescriptive 6	0.660 (0.441)	0.332 (0.440)	0.522* (0.313)	0.887* (0.470)	-0.533 (0.451)	0.129 (0.330)
ProfileDescriptive 10	0.126 (0.440)	0.423 (0.432)	0.323 (0.311)	0.402 (0.464)	-0.474 (0.453)	-0.016 (0.327)
ProfileSubstantive	0.184 (0.491)	0.233 (0.184)	0.359 (0.261)	0.553 (0.518)	-0.167 (0.194)	-0.128 (0.274)
ProfileSDSM	-0.168 (0.200)	-0.171 (0.200)	-0.168 (0.200)	-0.306 (0.211)	-0.305 (0.211)	-0.314 (0.211)
ProfileCooperation	-0.152 (0.185)	-0.244 (0.481)	-0.030 (0.262)	-0.015 (0.196)	-1.073** (0.515)	-0.012 (0.277)
Female	0.318* (0.193)	0.309 (0.192)	0.313 (0.192)	0.660*** (0.207)	0.686*** (0.207)	0.678*** (0.206)
Age	0.0002 (0.008)	0.0001 (0.008)	0.0001 (0.008)	-0.006 (0.007)	-0.006 (0.007)	-0.006 (0.007)
Married	-0.362 (0.254)	-0.335 (0.254)	-0.335 (0.254)	0.328 (0.243)	0.333 (0.242)	0.311 (0.241)
Education	0.159 (0.104)	0.162 (0.105)	0.161 (0.104)	0.034 (0.106)	0.026 (0.105)	0.052 (0.105)
Household Size	0.042 (0.074)	0.033 (0.073)	0.033 (0.073)	0.048 (0.044)	0.053 (0.044)	0.049 (0.045)
North West	-0.648** (0.319)	-0.672** (0.318)	-0.640** (0.319)	-1.519*** (0.252)	-1.414*** (0.249)	-1.421*** (0.248)
South West	0.062 (0.254)	0.074 (0.253)	0.067 (0.254)	-0.091* (0.049)	-0.101** (0.048)	-0.101** (0.048)
East	0.063 (0.248)	0.049 (0.249)	0.059 (0.248)			
Urban	-0.048 (0.211)	-0.039 (0.212)	-0.036 (0.211)	0.122 (0.224)	0.170 (0.223)	0.139 (0.223)
News	0.205*** (0.075)	0.203*** (0.075)	0.201*** (0.075)	0.464*** (0.097)	0.455*** (0.097)	0.457*** (0.097)
Equal Opportunity	0.243*** (0.090)	0.241*** (0.088)	0.246*** (0.089)	-0.036 (0.106)	-0.007 (0.106)	-0.022 (0.105)
Authoritarian	0.046 (0.069)	0.044 (0.069)	0.043 (0.069)	0.087 (0.092)	0.106 (0.092)	0.109 (0.091)
Knowledge	0.015 (0.256)	0.044 (0.255)	0.038 (0.255)	0.400* (0.222)	0.326 (0.221)	0.329 (0.219)
ProfileDescriptive 1 x ProfileSubstantive	0.075 (0.595)			-0.190 (0.629)		
ProfileDescriptive 6 x ProfileSubstantive	-0.301 (0.605)			-1.455** (0.634)		
ProfileDescriptive 10 x ProfileSubstantive	0.371 (0.599)			-0.837 (0.632)		
ProfileDescriptive 1 x ProfileCooperation		0.181 (0.593)			1.322** (0.634)	
ProfileDescriptive 6 x ProfileCooperation		0.363 (0.597)			1.335** (0.627)	
ProfileDescriptive 10 x ProfileCooperation		-0.220 (0.588)			0.926 (0.623)	
ProfileCooperation x ProfileSubstantive			-0.251 (0.372)			-0.072 (0.384)
Observations	391	391	391	390	390	390

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table OA.7.5: Interaction with One Group

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	One Group					
	Macedonians			Albanians		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ProfileDescriptive 1	−0.477 (0.543)	−0.498 (0.539)	0.003 (0.393)	−0.813 (0.545)	−0.829 (0.562)	−0.608 (0.399)
ProfileDescriptive 6	0.254 (0.572)	0.151 (0.562)	0.489 (0.408)	−0.693 (0.549)	−0.687 (0.559)	−0.679* (0.397)
ProfileDescriptive 10	0.611 (0.581)	0.227 (0.554)	0.665 (0.406)	−0.868 (0.542)	−1.416** (0.562)	−0.776* (0.397)
ProfileSubstantive	−0.390 (0.608)	0.061 (0.248)	0.373 (0.340)	0.030 (0.634)	0.213 (0.231)	0.094 (0.324)
ProfileSDSM	0.260 (0.274)	0.250 (0.273)	0.251 (0.273)	0.490** (0.248)	0.514** (0.251)	0.490** (0.248)
ProfileCooperation	0.373 (0.251)	−0.366 (0.598)	0.698** (0.355)	0.069 (0.233)	−0.415 (0.634)	−0.049 (0.323)
Female	0.016 (0.257)	−0.019 (0.256)	−0.043 (0.256)	−0.091 (0.242)	−0.137 (0.243)	−0.097 (0.240)
Age	−0.002 (0.010)	−0.003 (0.010)	−0.003 (0.010)	0.0002 (0.009)	0.0002 (0.009)	0.0003 (0.009)
Married	−0.257 (0.342)	−0.254 (0.341)	−0.257 (0.340)	0.173 (0.287)	0.192 (0.288)	0.162 (0.287)
Education	0.154 (0.138)	0.134 (0.140)	0.130 (0.139)	0.086 (0.126)	0.091 (0.127)	0.092 (0.126)
Household Size	0.016 (0.094)	0.025 (0.093)	0.023 (0.094)	−0.065 (0.051)	−0.067 (0.052)	−0.065 (0.051)
North West	−0.304 (0.430)	−0.303 (0.431)	−0.290 (0.431)	1.515*** (0.278)	1.569*** (0.282)	1.534*** (0.276)
South West	−0.414 (0.344)	−0.400 (0.345)	−0.389 (0.344)	−0.134** (0.053)	−0.137** (0.054)	−0.137*** (0.053)
East	−0.226 (0.341)	−0.218 (0.341)	−0.206 (0.341)			
Urban	−0.159 (0.281)	−0.171 (0.282)	−0.144 (0.281)	−0.224 (0.257)	−0.225 (0.259)	−0.209 (0.258)
News	0.027 (0.100)	0.027 (0.100)	0.025 (0.100)	0.225** (0.110)	0.215* (0.112)	0.224** (0.110)
Equal Opportunity	−0.197* (0.116)	−0.198* (0.116)	−0.184 (0.116)	−0.144 (0.123)	−0.138 (0.124)	−0.144 (0.123)
Authoritarian	0.095 (0.094)	0.092 (0.094)	0.085 (0.094)	0.255** (0.106)	0.265** (0.107)	0.255** (0.106)
Knowledge	0.941*** (0.326)	0.947*** (0.326)	0.899*** (0.325)	0.182 (0.261)	0.211 (0.261)	0.178 (0.258)
ProfileDescriptive 1 x ProfileSubstantive	0.974 (0.745)			0.429 (0.764)		
ProfileDescriptive 6 x ProfileSubstantive	0.443 (0.778)			0.037 (0.762)		
ProfileDescriptive 10 x ProfileSubstantive	0.101 (0.786)			0.188 (0.764)		
ProfileDescriptive 1 x ProfileCooperation		1.037 (0.742)			0.427 (0.773)	
ProfileDescriptive 6 x ProfileCooperation		0.685 (0.781)			0.011 (0.758)	
ProfileDescriptive 10 x ProfileCooperation		0.903 (0.776)			1.258* (0.764)	
ProfileCooperation x ProfileSubstantive			−0.670 (0.500)			0.246 (0.459)
Constant	−0.035 (1.037)	0.208 (1.059)	−0.252 (1.007)	−0.135 (1.086)	−0.014 (1.073)	−0.181 (1.042)
Observations	391	391	391	390	390	390

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table OA.7.6: Interaction with Cabinet Represent

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Cabinet Represent					
	Macedonians			Albanians		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ProfileDescriptive 1	0.524 (0.447)	0.435 (0.454)	0.206 (0.324)	-0.506 (0.463)	-1.005** (0.461)	-0.581* (0.333)
ProfileDescriptive 6	0.053 (0.441)	0.115 (0.452)	-0.270 (0.324)	-0.149 (0.463)	-0.923** (0.460)	-0.472 (0.331)
ProfileDescriptive 10	-0.460 (0.436)	0.013 (0.443)	-0.444 (0.318)	0.095 (0.457)	-1.033** (0.460)	-0.625* (0.330)
ProfileSubstantive	0.434 (0.507)	0.098 (0.188)	0.348 (0.268)	0.625 (0.521)	-0.013 (0.192)	-0.086 (0.272)
ProfileSDSM	-0.348* (0.204)	-0.329 (0.204)	-0.341* (0.204)	0.335 (0.208)	0.346* (0.209)	0.347* (0.208)
ProfileCooperation	0.139 (0.190)	0.733 (0.502)	0.385 (0.267)	0.293 (0.196)	-0.448 (0.512)	0.199 (0.279)
Female	0.230 (0.196)	0.233 (0.195)	0.217 (0.197)	-0.264 (0.201)	-0.214 (0.201)	-0.213 (0.200)
Age	0.008 (0.008)	0.008 (0.008)	0.008 (0.008)	-0.004 (0.007)	-0.002 (0.007)	-0.003 (0.007)
Married	-0.059 (0.254)	-0.032 (0.255)	-0.051 (0.254)	0.419* (0.252)	0.432* (0.251)	0.426* (0.252)
Education	0.114 (0.104)	0.131 (0.103)	0.116 (0.103)	-0.139 (0.107)	-0.124 (0.106)	-0.117 (0.106)
Household Size	0.005 (0.071)	-0.005 (0.071)	-0.001 (0.071)	-0.057 (0.044)	-0.058 (0.044)	-0.057 (0.044)
North West	-0.424 (0.339)	-0.423 (0.339)	-0.398 (0.339)	0.128 (0.234)	0.175 (0.235)	0.156 (0.233)
South West	0.908*** (0.266)	0.907*** (0.266)	0.931*** (0.267)	-0.065 (0.047)	-0.066 (0.047)	-0.064 (0.047)
East	-0.430* (0.256)	-0.428* (0.256)	-0.416 (0.255)			
Urban	0.166 (0.216)	0.185 (0.216)	0.174 (0.216)	0.853*** (0.224)	0.863*** (0.224)	0.860*** (0.223)
News	-0.003 (0.076)	-0.003 (0.076)	-0.005 (0.076)	-0.123 (0.094)	-0.126 (0.094)	-0.128 (0.094)
Equal Opportunity	0.566*** (0.095)	0.565*** (0.095)	0.567*** (0.095)	0.392*** (0.111)	0.402*** (0.111)	0.392*** (0.111)
Authoritarian	0.017 (0.072)	0.027 (0.073)	0.011 (0.072)	-0.250*** (0.092)	-0.234** (0.092)	-0.229** (0.092)
Knowledge	-0.559** (0.262)	-0.567** (0.261)	-0.545** (0.262)	0.172 (0.219)	0.094 (0.217)	0.083 (0.216)
ProfileDescriptive 1 x ProfileSubstantive	-0.610 (0.619)			-0.167 (0.629)		
ProfileDescriptive 6 x ProfileSubstantive	-0.634 (0.616)			-0.609 (0.636)		
ProfileDescriptive 10 x ProfileSubstantive	0.051 (0.613)			-1.436** (0.636)		
ProfileDescriptive 1 x ProfileCooperation		-0.420 (0.615)			0.829 (0.628)	
ProfileDescriptive 6 x ProfileCooperation		-0.733 (0.618)			0.885 (0.625)	
ProfileDescriptive 10 x ProfileCooperation		-0.885 (0.607)			0.787 (0.622)	
ProfileCooperation x ProfileSubstantive			-0.486 (0.380)			0.134 (0.383)
Observations	391	391	391	390	390	390

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table OA.7.7: Interaction with Cabinet Trust

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Cabinet Trust					
	Macedonians			Albanians		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ProfileDescriptive 1	0.407 (0.462)	0.165 (0.445)	0.021 (0.327)	-0.504 (0.466)	-0.919* (0.481)	-0.484 (0.341)
ProfileDescriptive 6	0.104 (0.460)	0.460 (0.445)	-0.092 (0.327)	0.178 (0.472)	-0.589 (0.479)	-0.249 (0.341)
ProfileDescriptive 10	-0.451 (0.457)	0.276 (0.439)	-0.397 (0.324)	0.044 (0.468)	-0.657 (0.480)	-0.219 (0.341)
ProfileSubstantive	0.410 (0.522)	0.130 (0.189)	0.175 (0.266)	0.296 (0.550)	-0.091 (0.191)	-0.291 (0.273)
ProfileSDSM	-0.242 (0.203)	-0.231 (0.203)	-0.224 (0.203)	0.405** (0.206)	0.410** (0.207)	0.419** (0.207)
ProfileCooperation	0.174 (0.191)	1.025** (0.520)	0.214 (0.270)	0.167 (0.196)	-0.528 (0.540)	-0.048 (0.274)
Female	0.112 (0.196)	0.118 (0.195)	0.126 (0.197)	0.149 (0.200)	0.150 (0.200)	0.156 (0.199)
Age	-0.001 (0.008)	-0.00002 (0.008)	-0.0003 (0.008)	0.001 (0.007)	0.002 (0.007)	0.001 (0.007)
Married	0.216 (0.259)	0.221 (0.261)	0.217 (0.259)	0.434* (0.246)	0.420* (0.245)	0.395 (0.246)
Education	0.046 (0.105)	0.073 (0.104)	0.057 (0.104)	0.078 (0.106)	0.084 (0.105)	0.098 (0.105)
Household Size	0.046 (0.074)	0.046 (0.074)	0.046 (0.073)	0.078** (0.039)	0.078** (0.040)	0.078** (0.040)
North West	-0.186 (0.333)	-0.212 (0.334)	-0.178 (0.333)	0.464** (0.233)	0.534** (0.234)	0.500** (0.231)
South West	1.121*** (0.270)	1.115*** (0.271)	1.130*** (0.270)	-0.136*** (0.047)	-0.140*** (0.048)	-0.140*** (0.047)
East	-0.057 (0.251)	-0.063 (0.252)	-0.054 (0.251)			
Urban	0.301 (0.215)	0.318 (0.216)	0.296 (0.215)	0.703*** (0.222)	0.730*** (0.222)	0.728*** (0.221)
News	-0.043 (0.077)	-0.046 (0.077)	-0.041 (0.077)	-0.130 (0.093)	-0.135 (0.094)	-0.129 (0.093)
Equal Opportunity	0.654*** (0.096)	0.664*** (0.096)	0.651*** (0.096)	0.451*** (0.110)	0.467*** (0.109)	0.462*** (0.110)
Authoritarian	0.079 (0.071)	0.097 (0.072)	0.081 (0.071)	-0.160* (0.091)	-0.146 (0.091)	-0.153* (0.090)
Knowledge	-0.156 (0.260)	-0.194 (0.261)	-0.136 (0.260)	-0.038 (0.221)	-0.083 (0.218)	-0.097 (0.218)
ProfileDescriptive 1 x ProfileSubstantive	-0.739 (0.630)			0.031 (0.645)		
ProfileDescriptive 6 x ProfileSubstantive	-0.359 (0.629)			-0.825 (0.656)		
ProfileDescriptive 10 x ProfileSubstantive	0.139 (0.626)			-0.548 (0.661)		
ProfileDescriptive 1 x ProfileCooperation		-0.328 (0.630)			0.828 (0.647)	
ProfileDescriptive 6 x ProfileCooperation		-1.160* (0.635)			0.661 (0.644)	
ProfileDescriptive 10 x ProfileCooperation		-1.422** (0.627)			0.829 (0.646)	
ProfileCooperation x ProfileSubstantive			-0.069 (0.381)			0.390 (0.384)
Observations	391	391	391	390	390	390

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Table OA.7.8: Interaction with Cabinet Model

	<i>Dependent variable:</i>					
	Cabinet Model					
	Macedonians			Albanians		
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
ProfileDescriptive 1	0.172 (0.448)	-0.193 (0.441)	0.142 (0.324)	-0.670 (0.468)	-1.108** (0.467)	-0.423 (0.334)
ProfileDescriptive 6	0.142 (0.443)	-0.128 (0.443)	0.249 (0.322)	-0.099 (0.467)	-0.985** (0.462)	-0.511 (0.332)
ProfileDescriptive 10	-0.017 (0.440)	0.346 (0.436)	0.280 (0.318)	0.498 (0.467)	-0.483 (0.463)	0.155 (0.333)
ProfileSubstantive	-0.176 (0.506)	0.059 (0.187)	0.124 (0.266)	0.192 (0.526)	-0.106 (0.193)	-0.141 (0.273)
ProfileSDSM	-0.118 (0.202)	-0.119 (0.202)	-0.112 (0.202)	0.510** (0.210)	0.508** (0.211)	0.499** (0.210)
ProfileCooperation	0.148 (0.187)	-0.241 (0.503)	0.207 (0.265)	0.035 (0.197)	-0.973* (0.515)	-0.020 (0.280)
Female	0.202 (0.192)	0.169 (0.192)	0.187 (0.192)	-0.171 (0.201)	-0.152 (0.201)	-0.120 (0.200)
Age	-0.0004 (0.008)	-0.001 (0.008)	-0.0002 (0.008)	0.0005 (0.007)	0.002 (0.007)	0.002 (0.007)
Married	-0.238 (0.259)	-0.246 (0.258)	-0.238 (0.258)	0.671*** (0.248)	0.662*** (0.246)	0.662*** (0.247)
Education	0.078 (0.104)	0.070 (0.104)	0.081 (0.104)	-0.141 (0.107)	-0.121 (0.105)	-0.110 (0.106)
Household Size	0.027 (0.076)	0.029 (0.076)	0.021 (0.076)	-0.039 (0.039)	-0.040 (0.039)	-0.037 (0.039)
North West	0.142 (0.334)	0.100 (0.334)	0.152 (0.334)	0.104 (0.233)	0.223 (0.232)	0.172 (0.230)
South West	1.157*** (0.267)	1.194*** (0.267)	1.153*** (0.267)	-0.167*** (0.048)	-0.173*** (0.048)	-0.169*** (0.048)
East	0.117 (0.247)	0.117 (0.247)	0.116 (0.247)			
Urban	0.067 (0.211)	0.076 (0.212)	0.074 (0.211)	0.844*** (0.223)	0.867*** (0.223)	0.857*** (0.223)
News	0.068 (0.076)	0.072 (0.076)	0.069 (0.076)	-0.135 (0.095)	-0.140 (0.095)	-0.126 (0.095)
Equal Opportunity	0.499*** (0.093)	0.507*** (0.093)	0.503*** (0.093)	0.410*** (0.108)	0.429*** (0.108)	0.421*** (0.108)
Authoritarian	0.132* (0.070)	0.119* (0.071)	0.132* (0.071)	-0.344*** (0.093)	-0.334*** (0.093)	-0.335*** (0.093)
Knowledge	-0.413 (0.258)	-0.399 (0.258)	-0.407 (0.258)	0.110 (0.218)	0.060 (0.215)	0.046 (0.215)
ProfileDescriptive 1 x ProfileSubstantive	-0.036 (0.613)			0.462 (0.635)		
ProfileDescriptive 6 x ProfileSubstantive	0.227 (0.613)			-0.804 (0.640)		
ProfileDescriptive 10 x ProfileSubstantive	0.612 (0.613)			-0.686 (0.642)		
ProfileDescriptive 1 x ProfileCooperation		0.685 (0.614)			1.324** (0.634)	
ProfileDescriptive 6 x ProfileCooperation		0.772 (0.620)			0.895 (0.624)	
ProfileDescriptive 10 x ProfileCooperation		-0.114 (0.609)			1.231** (0.627)	
ProfileCooperation x ProfileSubstantive			-0.129 (0.376)			0.073 (0.386)
Observations	391	391	391	390	390	390

Note:

*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

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