Elite Responses to Ethnic Diversity

and Interethnic Contact

William O'Brochta*

How do political elites' views of ethnic outgroups change in response to increased elite ethnic diversity and interethnic contact? Political elites serve critical roles as elected representatives and public figures, but we do not know whether existing work on the effects of ethnic diversity and contact among citizens can be extended to include elites. I argue that political elites work in a competitive environment wherein increased ethnic diversity can promote ethnic animosity and worsen outgroup views. Shared interest in maximizing resource distribution leads to positive interethnic contact, improving outgroup views. I test these arguments with original data from municipal government committee members in India. I show that increased committee diversity does not negatively impact elites' views of the outgroup, while interethnic contact improves outgroup views. Increased ethnic diversity is, therefore, a promising avenue for improving elite outgroup views if leaders can encourage elites to engage in interethnic contact.

Keywords: political elites, ethnic diversity, contact, outgroup attitudes, affect.
(12806 Words)

How do political elites respond to ethnic diversity and interethnic contact? To some extent, ethnic diversity seems to take a back seat to political calculations. Sitting around a conference table in Delhi Secretariat, state cabinet ministers and bureaucrats arguing over who to blame for local pollution problems all agreed that the answer was to do anything to shift responsibility to other states, choosing to unify across ethnic differences in the hope that all would electorally benefit. As a prominent scholar of Indian ethnicity told me, "although the ritually symbolic hierarchies [of ethnicity] might be maintained — the ethnic minority elected official might sit on the floor — but sharing the money will be the same."[1] Does having similar political aspirations act to promote meaningful changes to elites' views of ethnic outgroups?

Scholars have long studied the ways in which ethnic diversity and interethnic contact may influence views of ethnic outgroups. In this work, citizens are the unit-of-analysis and the effects of diversity and contact on outgroup views are mixed (Pettigrew et al., 2011; van der Meer and Tolsma, 2014). Political elites are critical actors whose responses to intra-elite ethnic diversity and contact have not previously been studied. Elite interactions provide a real-world substantive test of the contact hypothesis in a highly salient setting where resulting outgroup views can have major impacts for a large number of citizens (Paluck and Green, 2009; Paluck, 2016; Paluck, Green and Green, 2018).

Many international organizations and public policy practitioners make policy recommendations based on the assumption that political elites react to intra-elite diversity and outgroup contact by improving views of the outgroup. Indeed, promoting ethnic representation as a way to improve citizen views of the outgroup works only if elites respond favorably to increased ethnic diversity and opportunities for contact among their ranks (Sisk, 1996). Wilkinson (2000) shows that this is not always the case: in India during the times where elites operated in a consociational coalition, ethnic violence increased (see also Adeney, 2002; Adeney and Swenden, 2019; Lustick, 1997). This push for ethnic representation is not only

---

[1]Respondent 7. 2020. Interviewed by Author. Chennai.

limited to national-level elites. Ethnic diversity and contact also impact the provision of basic services in towns and municipalities (Burgess et al., 2015; Ejdemyr, Kramon and Robinson, 2018; Lehne, Shapiro and Vanden Eynde, 2018; Nathan, 2016).

Previous research has examined the conditions that lead to increased ethnic diversity among elites (e.g., Arriola and Johnson, 2014; Francois, Rainer and Trebbi, 2015) and whether elite ethnic diversity succeeds in preventing the outbreak of large scale civil conflict (e.g., Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003). Instead of focusing on the process or citizen impacts of elite diversity, I study the effects of elite diversity and contact on elite outgroup opinions and behavior. In societies where ethnicity is a salient cleavage, political elites' views of ethnic outgroups factor into their decision-making, resulting in either increased ethnic inclusion and minority-friendly public policies or animosity and exclusionary policies (Habyarimana et al., 2007; Lee, 2018; White, Nathan and Faller, 2015; Zschirnt and Ruedin, 2016).

Understanding how elites react to ethnic diversity and contact is critical for promoting widespread ethnic tolerance. Parry (1969, 13) defines elites as those who "play an exceptionally influential part in political and social affairs." Elites may react to ethnic diversity and contact differently from citizens because elites have different political preferences (e.g., Luna and Zechmeister, 2005; Lupu and Warner, 2017). Elites are calculating political actors who are willing to cooperate with political rivals if doing so can help them achieve their goals (Gilens and Page, 2014). Yet, elites also have stable preferences that mean that they are less likely to be influenced by elite ethnic diversity (Jennings, 1992).

Apart from simply thinking about political issues differently, elites' relationships and the impact of ethnic diversity and contact on their views of the outgroup can influence substantive policy changes impacting thousands of constituents. If elites worsen their views of the outgroup as a result of increased ethnic diversity, grave consequences can follow. Vitriolic elite rhetoric about outgroups can incite unrest and ethnic animosity among citizens (Kaufman, 1996). Citizen support for multi-ethnic parties, minority welfare programs, and collective action are all deeply influenced by how elites act (Chandra, 2000; Perez, 2015).

Hence, diversity and contact among elites must be theorized and tested on its own.

I focus on political elites in legislative committees and study how ethnic diversity among elites and contact between them influence elites' views of ethnic outgroups. While I argue that the level of ethnic diversity — both the number of ethnically diverse elites and whether elites draw attention to committee ethnic diversity — still exacerbates differences between ethnic groups, elite relationships in legislative committees are structured in such a way that contact is likely to improve views of the outgroup. To test these hypotheses, I conduct a survey experiment with municipal legislative committee members in India, the world's largest democracy. The Indian case allows me to sample from a large population of elite politicians with varying levels of diversity present in the committees to which they belong. I focus on how ethnic diversity and contact impact outgroup views as measured by affect toward the committee, perceptions of the committee, and outgroup attitudes. I find that committee diversity does not have the widespread negative effects on elite outgroup views that many have feared. Increased interethnic contact does improve elite outgroup attitudes, but slightly worsens intra-elite committee relationships. Hence, promoting interethnic contact among elites can be an effective way to include diverse ethnic groups in government while reducing the impact on views of the outgroup.

Theory

"The belief in [ethnic] power-sharing as a miracle formula is not rare" (Mehler, 2009, 454). International organizations have long highlighted the important role that ethnic diversity may play in turning ethnic tensions into positive outgroup relationships (Binningsbo, 2013). Practitioners have advocated for increasing elite ethnic diversity in all types of multi-ethnic democracies (Adekanye, 1998; Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003; Rothchild, 1997; Sisk, 1996). For example, the Organization for the Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) proclaims that "States should strive for adequate representation of the diverse groups in their society

. . . in all relevant structures of public administration" in order to provide "a sense of shared belonging" (OSCE, 2012, 18, 46). In essence, the OSCE is calling for increased elite ethnic diversity in order to promote ethnic inclusion (Andeweg, 2000; Lemarchand, 2007; Sullivan, 2005).

A countervailing literature calls into question the effectiveness of elite ethnic diversity in multi-ethnic societies. Scholars have noted the short-lived nature of many multi-ethnic governing bodies (Spears, 2000) and the potentially perverse incentive structures that they promote (Tull and Mehler, 2005). Even in cases where elite ethnic diversity appears to be successful, there are troubling signs that minority groups are still disadvantaged within government (Lemarchand, 2007).

This lack of theoretical clarity calls for a more systematic investigation of the effects of ethnic diversity and contact among elites. Drawing on an extensive literature investigating dynamics of diversity and contact among citizens (e.g., Allport, 1954; Amir, 1969; Laurence, 2014; Laurence, Schmid and Hewstone, 2018; Pettigrew et al., 2011), I argue that elite ethnic diversity alone is not sufficient to promote positive outgroup views. Ethnic diversity instead worsens outgroup views by bringing together ethnic groups whose members believe that they have little in common with one another, reinforcing between group differences and failing to improve outgroup relationships. However, elites have political incentives to engage in cooperative interethnic contact which promotes positive outgroup views because of shared political goals (Gaertner and Dovidio, 2000).

I conceptualize elite ethnic diversity as the equitable distribution of political positions across ethnic groups. In particular, I look at how power is shared among ethnic groups in legislative committees. This emphasizes the results of elite ethnic diversity, instead of studying written agreements that may or may not be adhered to (see Lustick, 1997). Political positions are the currency of ethnic power-sharing: failure to prioritize including minority groups in these positions fundamentally calls into question whether politicians value ethnic diversity (Adekanye, 1998; Spears, 2013). I assume that ethnic distinctions in contexts where

5

ethnic diversity is being changed are at least moderately salient, otherwise the act of sharing power is politically irrelevant.

Elite Responses to Diversity

Though never focused specifically on elite behavior, a long literature has theorized about how diversity may influence views of the outgroup (e.g., van der Meer and Tolsma, 2014). The vast majority of existing scholarship has argued that increasing diversity — absent interethnic contact — worsens outgroup views. There is substantial debate about this finding, with ethnic diversity producing positive effects in some specific contexts (Gundelach, 2014) and many authors arguing that theoretical and methodological (Hooghe et al., 2009) nuance is required to interpret the litany of results.

Elites form a relatively small group in society. Dinesen and Sønderskov (2015) argue that this means that ethnic diversity is particularly likely to worsen outgroup views when the number of group members is small (see also Leigh, 2006; Schaeffer, 2013). But what does ethnic diversity without interethnic contact mean, given a small group size? Absent contact, elites operate independently or in small co-ethnic groups. Indeed, elite ethnic factionalization is a major concern because resource distribution often occurs through ethnic groups (Chandra, 2004). So while I argue later that elites often have incentives to engage in contact, ethnic diversity without contact is a fairly common occurrence.

I argue that ethnic diversity worsens outgroup views through two complimentary mechanisms: lack of familiarity with non-coethnics (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002) and incompatability between ethnic groups (Bobo, 1988). Lack of familiarity with non-coethnics causes individuals to prioritize and promote ingroup identities, essentially turning individuals inward toward their group when they are exposed to diversity (Putnam, 2007; Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Incompatibility of interests means that individuals from different ethnic groups view themselves as distinct (Brief et al., 2005; Koopmans and Veit, 2014; Stolle, Soroka and Johnston, 2008) and see the need to compete for finite resources (Bobo, 1988; Glaser, 1994). Both

6

of these mechanisms exacerbate differences between ethnic groups, and these differences are what breeds negative views of the outgroup. The result is a lack of cooperation among elites and worsened views of the outgroup (Mehler, 2009; Schneckener, 2002).

Elites experience ethnic diversity both through the number of ethnically diverse elites and whether elites draw attention to elite ethnic diversity. Numerical diversity is straightforward: increasing the number of ethnically diverse elites increases perceptions of outgroup differences that lead to negative views of the outgroup. However, perceptions of outgroup differences can also increase when elites choose to draw attention to ethnic diversity by mentioning it explicitly. Elites have reasons to mention ethnic diversity in order to argue for additional resources for their ethnic group (Domke, 2001; McDermott, 1998; Valentino, Hutchings and White, 2002). Introducing ethnic diversity in this way increases the salience of ethnicity (Anderson et al., 2020; Domke et al., 2000; Pittinsky, Shih and Ambady, 2000) and serves to distinguish ethnic groups from one another (Brader, Valentino and Suhay, 2008; Gaertner and Dovidio, 2000; Tajfel and Turner, 1979). Using the same mechanisms as above, I expect that drawing attention to elite ethnic diversity similarly worsens outgroup views.

Hypothesis 1a: As the number of ethnically diverse elites increases, elite views of the outgroup will become less favorable.

Hypothesis 1b: When elites draw attention to ethnic diversity, elite views of the outgroup will become less favorable.

Interethnic Contact

Is there a way for leaders to promote ethnic diversity in order to be inclusive to minority ethnic groups while not suffering from intra-elite animosity? Putnam (2007, 164) suggests that interethnic contact is a way to achieve this type of positive between group interaction.

7

Contact theory originated with the observation that, under certain conditions, interactions between individuals of different ethnicities leads to improved attitudes about outgroup members (Allport, 1954; Amir, 1969). Hundreds of studies have assessed the impact of contact on citizens' attitudes toward outgroup members since the development of the original theory (see Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006; Pettigrew et al., 2011).

Findings among citizens are decidedly mixed. In some cases, contact causes individuals to recognize similarities between ethnic groups, resulting in tightening relationships between ingroup and outgroup members (Brown and Hewstone, 2005; Hewstone and Brown, 1986). Because ingroup members typically have positive views toward their own group (Gaertner, Dovidio and Bachman, 1996; Tajfel and Turner, 1979), these tightened relationships improve views of the outgroup since ingroup members see the outgroup as more similar to themselves (Gaertner et al., 1993; Gaertner and Dovidio, 2005). However, contact can facilitate negative outgroup interactions (Graf and Paolini, 2017; Hayward et al., 2017, 2018), which are unlikely to improve outgroup views (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006). Contact can also exacerbate the negative effects of ethnic diversity on views of the outgroup. If all contact does is reemphasize the presence of outgroup members who are perceived as threatening, then contact moves groups further apart (Laurence, 2014; Thomsen and Rafiqi, 2018).

Additionally, we gain little clarity by assuming that political elites act in ways similar to citizens in workplace groups. While Kokkonen, Esaiasson and Gilljam (2014) find that workplace contact has positive outcomes, Laurence, Schmid and Hewstone (2018) note that workplaces are often locales where negative contact occurs (see also Escandell and Ceobanu, 2009). Hence, it is an open question whether contact among political elites belonging to legislative committees improves or worsens views of the outgroup.

Elite Committees Fostering Positive Contact

Many scholars have investigated the reasons by which interethnic contact promotes positive citizen outgroup interactions. Allport (1954) famously established four criteria — equal

status, cooperative interdependence, common goals, and supportive norms — that help to promote positive citizen interethnic interactions. On the face of it, these criteria seem to be plausibly met among elites working in legislative committees. Each committee member wields some political power (e.g., Strom, 1998), committee members need others' support to approve policies, each committee member wants to win re-election, and committees have norms of behavior (Hasson, 2010; Helmke and Levitsky, 2004).

While committee structure can help shape elite behavior and promote positive interethnic contact, I argue that the political nature of elites makes this result all the more likely. Elites' primary goal is to win re-election, and the main way they go about doing this is by obtaining and distributing resources to their constituents (Stokes et al., 2013). All intra-elite interactions are framed with this goal in mind. While elites may have short-term incentives to fight over resources among themselves, I argue that there are longer-term incentives for elites to cooperate that result in them overlooking outgroup differences in order to maximize resource distribution.

Elites needing short-term political gains to help their re-election chances may be tempted to see committee resources as finite and to compete with other committee members for them. Injecting political patronage into a close re-election race can be an effective strategy (Driscoll, 2018; Kopecký, 2011) and serve to satisfy local power brokers (Baldwin, 2013). However, by viewing committee resources as zero sum and singularly focusing on the short-term, elites reduce the potential for intra-elite collaboration to maximize long-term resource procurement.

Elites can more effectively distribute resources to their constituents if they work together. Indeed, a long line of work in many institutional settings shows that elites who are *more* concerned with re-election increase intra-elite cooperation (Slater and Simmons, 2012; see also Gottlieb, 2015; Lupu and Riedl, 2013). This is because strategic elites know that short-term resource delivery only sometimes works to increase political support (Remmer, 2007; Weitz-Shapiro, 2012). Political terms in office last several years, and politicians and political

9

parties are frequently re-elected. Focusing on short-term resource delivery ignores this this history both because politicians alienate other elites by taking resources for themselves and because politicians wasted the opportunity to work together throughout their term in office.

A more effective method is to establish a stable system of resource delivery in collaboration with other elites. Such a system leverages economies of scale to increase elites' collective ability to distribute resources to constituents. When committee members work together, their reputation improves (Crisp, Kanthak and Leijonhufvud, 2004; Olivella, Kanthak and Crisp, 2017) and productivity increases (Battaglini, Sciabolazza and Patacchini, 2020). Resource distribution is, therefore, no longer zero sum (Brandenberger, 2018; Fong, 2020; Wonka and Haunss, 2020). For example, elites who collaborate can more effectively determine how to distribute resources that benefit multiple constituencies. A road project in one constituency can leverage labor from a key business in another constituency in order for multiple elites to politically benefit.

To cooperate in this way, elites must have contact with one another. Elite contact differs from citizen contact because it is structured by political motivations to maximize resource distribution. The political nature of contact implies that elites are more willing to set aside differences because doing so helps them achieve political goals (Desmarais et al., 2015; Kirkland, 2012; Micozzi, 2014; Muraoka, 2019). By limiting themselves to only working with and having contact with co-ethnics, elites artificially reduce their ability to distribute resources. Even when an ethnic group dominates committee membership, elites collectively profit from politically colluding with minority committee members (Bormann, 2019; Beiser-McGrath and Metternich, 2020) and by maintaining some minimum level of interethnic contact (Kirkland, 2011; Ringe, Victor and Gross, 2013). Therefore, elites' primary goal of ensuring re-election structures intra-elite interactions by providing resource maximizing incentives for elites to cooperate with one another that extend across ethnic lines. That is, while ethnicity remains a salient political cleavage, elites are better off engaging in interethnic cooperation and contact because cooperation improves elites' welfare more than is possible

when working alone or in co-ethnic groups.

As a final step, the political nature of contact means that elite outgroup views are likely to improve. By cooperating with one another, elites recognize that they all share the common goals of re-election and resource maximization. These shared interests form the basis of a common identity, which improves outgroup views by helping elites perceive each other as more alike (Butler and Tavits, 2020; Gaertner and Dovidio, 2000). In essence, intra-elite cooperation shows elites that they are all politicians at heart, providing a common bond that improves outgroup views.

Hypothesis 2: When elite interethnic contact is high, elite views of the outgroup will be more favorable than when elite interethnic contact is low.

Case Selection

I study elite diversity and interethnic contact in municipal legislative committees in India, the world's largest democracy. Since I hypothesize that the effects of interethnic contact on elites apply to democracies more generally, it makes sense to situate the first study of elite interethnic contact in the largest such country. Ethnicity in India is multi-faceted, comprising of caste, religion, region, and language, among other identities. Region and language are geographically defined, whereas caste and religion vary within any one geographic area. For that reason, I focus on ethnicity as the combination of caste and religious categories. Both caste and communal (religious) conflicts and animosity are common across India. Caste discrimination is extremely prevalent (Banerjee and Knight, 1985; Sankaran, Sekerdej and von Hecker, 2017), with political and social movements designed to increase the power of lower castes (Jaffrelot, 2003; Parikh, 1997). Communal violence and prejudice is equally present throughout India (Bhagavatula et al., 2017; Brass, 2011; Parikh, 1998, 2001; Varshney and Wilkinson, 1996; Varshney, 2003; Wilkinson, 2004). Thus, when different caste and

religious groups gain political power, these cleavages are visible to elites.[2]

Second, India has a federal structure where small groups of elites are constituted in similar ways at different levels of government. Since ethnic diversity cannot be experimentally manipulated, I must rely on existing variation in the ethnic diversity of committees. The structure of Indian local government depends on whether the government is in a rural or urban area. Much previous work has studied Panchayats — rural local government (Heller, Harilal and Chaudhuri, 2007; Pal, 2004; Sharma, 2002). I focus instead on India's urban municipal government, as municipal governments are significantly more powerful than Panchayats, urban areas often contain more caste and religious diversity, and politicians elected in municipal governments represent many more constituents than than do Panchayat members (Aijaz, 2008; John, 2007). Indian municipal governments also have similar structures and relatively similar types of responsibilities compared to the national government (Rosenthal, 1970). By doing sub-national research, I am able to control for many contextual factors that are problematic in cross-national research while still achieving significant variation in elite group diversity.

Specifically, I study Indian municipal corporations (MCs). Municipal governance in India is determined by municipality size. All cities with more than 100,000 people are governed by a municipal corporation; there are roughly 200 MCs in India. MCs in India can be as large as states. Mumbai, the largest MC in India, has a population of 14 million, making it larger than twelve states.[3] By using MCs, I capture variation across the amount and salience of ethnic diversity present in different committees without needing to move to cross-national data where ethnic categorizations between countries differ significantly.

Municipal corporations are tasked with many of the same responsibilities as are state governments, though their structure is slightly different (Berenschot, 2010). Corporations are run by both appointed bureaucrats and elected political elites. The municipal commissioner

---

[2]I define the ethnic majority as forward caste members, whereas non-forward castes and members of other religions are ethnic minority groups.

[3]Sikkim, the smallest state, has a population of 600,000 while Lakshadweep, the smallest union territory, has a population of only 65,000.

is the chief bureaucrat in the corporation and is an Indian Administrative Service (IAS) civil servant. Municipal commissioners oversee the executive branch of government. Citizens do elect a mayor as the head of the executive branch, but this role is largely ceremonial.

Citizens also elect the legislature of the corporation which serves as corporation's main decision-making body. To provide elected elites (called corporators or councillors) with further control over day-to-day operations in the MC, corporators constitute three types of committees. First, most corporations have ward committees where corporators representing adjacent geographic areas work with local ward leadership on local issues. Second, corporators elect some of their own to the corporation standing committee.[4] The standing committee is the chief elected body in the corporation, and it is in charge of overseeing all corporation decisions and controlling high level budget and planning functions (Rosenthal, 1970). Third, other committees are often constituted that report to the standing committee (Aijaz, 2008; Datta, 1995). These other committees have specified corporation-wide duties. For example, many corporations have public works committees, garden committees, and solid waste committees. The standing committee gives these other committees authority to make decisions and to manage corporation affairs within the purview of the committee.

Though the exact mechanism differs across corporations and states, both standing committees and other committees are elected by the corporators themselves. These elections occur at the first meeting of the newly elected corporation. Prior to that meeting, corporators are notified about the upcoming election and announce their candidacy for various committee positions (Deshpande, 2020). Political party leaders coordinate their candidates for membership on various committees and negotiate with other parties to create electoral coalitions (FinancialExpress, 2020). Just like corporation elections, committee elections are hotly contested. Elections use secret ballots and generally follow proportional representation with single transferable vote. As such, it is important to emphasize that the composition of corporation committees is a result of strategic political negotiations among both political

---

[4]This committee is sometimes called the executive committee.

13

parties and corporators. It is not the case that committees simply reflect the level of diversity or tolerance among citizens in the corporation. Indeed, the mean range in committee diversity (on a 0 to 1 scale) within corporations surveyed in this study is 0.35.

What does contact among committee members look like? Shared committee membership facilitates at least three types of contact. Most obviously, committee members have opportunities for contact during committee meetings, which occur at least once per month (Oldenburg, 1976).[5] Committee meetings typically have set schedules with opportunities for debate or discussion about a particular issue (Mukhopadhyay, 1996). These meetings provide committee members with space to discuss issues of interest to the committee and to make committee-level decisions.

Apart from the somewhat more formal structure of committee meetings, committee members meet and work with each other on committee related business.[6] For example, if the roads committee is working to identify roads in disrepair, different committee members may be tasked with compiling information from the bureaucracy, non-government organizations, and constituents about their suggested improvements. Such information is best discussed with other committee members outside of a formal committee meeting in order to develop a proposal to bring to the committee meeting. This type of contact is directly related to the business of the committee.

Committee members may have contact for reasons outside of the business of the committee.[7] Shared committee membership can still play a role in fostering contact in these cases. For example, committee members who work closely on a project related to the work of the committee may discover that they have other shared political interests and, therefore, continue to have contact to discuss these issues.[8]

In these three settings, contact among committee members at least partially fulfills All-

---

[5]Respondents 2 and 3. 2019. Interviewed by Author. Delhi.
[6]Respondent 5. 2020. Interviewed by Author. Delhi.
Respondent 12. 2019. Interviewed by Author. Delhi.
Respondent 15. 2020. Interviewed by Author. Delhi.
[7]Respondent 5. 2019. Interviewed by Author. Delhi.
[8]Respondent 14. 2020. Interviewed by Author. Delhi.

port (1954)'s conditions that I argue are the key reason that elite contact improves views of the outgroup.Committee members treat each other as political equals, regardless of their social standing.[9] There is also cooperative interdependence because committee members often control bureaucratic or civil society organizations whose approval is required for municipal projects to be enacted.[10] The common goal of all corporators is re-election and potentially amassing additional political power.[11] Finally, while the local political environment can hardly be called supportive, there are norms of collaboration and collusion to help each other stay in power over the relatively long five year term.[12] To summarize, committee members are elected representatives who chiefly interact and have contact along political lines with common goals and relatively wide ranging impact. For these reasons, interactions among committee members are likely to be cooperative, setting up the opportunity for contact to improve views of the outgroup.

I selected five Indian states in which to conduct experimental and observational work on municipal corporation committee members: Gujarat, Karnataka, Kerala, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal. The 55 municipal corporations in these five states represent more than a quarter of municipal corporations in India and over a third of the population of the country ($\approx$ 500 million). These states also vary significantly in the powers given to municipal corporators, the salience of caste and its important cleavages, and geography. Finally — though this study is the first to collect data on municipal corporation committees — state municipalities acts suggest that these five states contain the most committee members.[13]

---

[9]Respondent 7. 2020. Interviewed by Author. Chennai.
Respondent 11. 2020. Interviewed by Author. Delhi.
[10]Respondent 6. 2019. Interviewed by Author. Chennai.
[11]Respondent 15. 2020. Interviewed by Author. Delhi.
[12]Respondent 12. 2020. Interviewed by Author. Delhi.
[13]Number of committees multiplied by members per committee.

Research Design

To test my hypotheses about the implications of elite diversity and interethnic contact, I collect data on and field a survey experiment among Indian MCs.[14] The first task was to collect new data on Indian municipal corporator committee membership in the five selected states.[15] No centralized information on municipal corporators exists at either the national or state level. This data collection effort resulted in complete contact information for all committee members in 25 municipal corporations, amounting to 872 corporators on 107 committees and representing 55 million constituents. SI.2 discusses the data collection process in detail.

Numerical Committee Diversity

I hypothesize about two different measures of committee diversity: the number of ethnically diverse elites (*Number Diversity*) and the attention elites draw to committee diversity (*Attention Diversity*). I used the lists of corporator committee membership to construct my main measure of numerical committee diversity. Of course, this is an observational measure and corporator committee membership is not randomly assigned. Yet, given the important role that political parties play in whipping votes for committee elections and the fact that committee diversity within corporations varies significantly, it is not the case that a diverse citizenry living in a corporation necessarily produces diverse committees. The political competition for power also subsumes any desire to intentionally prioritize selecting committee members who are the most likely to work well together; maximizing political power is corporators' overriding concern. To ensure that this is not the case, I employ corporation fixed effects to capture citizen-level numeric diversity in the corporation. I also include a robustness check with a control accounting for crimes against minority groups at the corporation

---

[14]In addition to my own fieldwork, Morsel Research and Development undertook the data collection and fielded the survey experiment between November 2019 and June 2020.

[15]The full data collection and experimental protocol was approved by the Institutional Review Board #201910066 and was registered with EGAP. See Supplemental Information (SI) 1 for question wording.

level to capture the overall state of outgroup views in the corporation.[16]

Conceptualizing and measuring numerical ethnic diversity in India is a challenging task. I categorize ethnic diversity into the most salient distinctions: Brahmin, Other Forward (OF), Scheduled Caste (SC), Scheduled Tribe (ST), Other Backward Caste (OBC), and Other Religion.[17] This categorization is used on the largest social survey in India (Desai and Vanneman, 2015).

To identify membership in a particular ethnic category, I use a hybrid archival and surname based classification approach. Though I do ask survey respondents to self-identify their ethnic category, I need to categorize all committee members, not just survey respondents. Further, ethnic self-identification is frequently quite different from how ethnicity is perceived socially. Social perceptions are what matter most for determining how people interact with each other. The hybrid approach uses government data on caste reserved seats, surname classification, full name classification, and archival analysis. All corporators in reserved seats are coded first, followed by surnames and full names clearly discernible to an expert coder (Clark and Landes, 2012; Jayaraman, 2005) and archival investigation that involved contacting local experts who interviewed journalists and collected other local information about ethnic categorization. SI.5 contains additional details about this categorization procedure including robustness checks (SI.7). I define committee ethnic *Diversity* using the Herfindhal-Hirschman index with each of the six categories listed above (Lancee and Dronkers, 2011; Robinson, 2017; Tallman and Li, 1996).[18]

Since the committee-level diversity data is new, it is worth describing it in some detail. There are 146 committees across the 25 municipal corporations. Corporators serve on an average of 1.18 committees, with a maximum of 5 committees. Mean committee size is 7.08 members, with twenty committees having two or fewer members and the Siliguri Borrow

---

[16]See SI.8. The crime measure is the log of corporation crimes against scheduled castes and scheduled tribes in 2017 as reported by the National Crime Record Bureau.

[17]In keeping with colloquial usage, I refer to varnas as castes.

[18]The formula is $1 - \sum_{i=1}^{6} p^2$ where p is the proportion of the committee controlled by a given group (Ajit, Donker and Saxena, 2012; Jensenius and Suryanarayan, 2015).

committee having 32 members.[19]   Jamnagar had the most committees (16), followed by Bangalore (14), Surat (13), and Mysore (12).   Ten corporations had only one committee. Standing committees were most common (16), followed by planning (11), health (10), and welfare committees (9).

Respondents were surveyed about 108 of these committees. On a 0 to 1 scale, the mean level of committee *Number Diversity* was 0.56, with Kanpur's Standing committee as the most diverse (0.79) and three committees in Bangalore (Education, Social, and Tax) with 0 diversity.

Survey Description

I conducted a phone survey experiment with 406 corporators between April and June 2020.[20] Phone is the most common method used to reach corporators (Gaikwad and Nellis, 2016), who typically give out their phone numbers to constituents to call in case they have grievances or need assistance. Since I am interested in contact occurring within committee settings, I asked each corporator about their membership in a single committee.[21]   I also created a call sheet that was block randomized on corporation and caste reserved seat. This ensured that those corporators responding to the survey were representative of the corporation and reservation status diversity of the 872 corporators.

Enumerators went to great lengths to reach all corporators on the call sheet to preserve the quality of the sample. The survey completion rate was 90%, extremely high for an elite survey (Bussell, 2018). Enumerators were native to the state being surveyed, and the survey text was translated and back-translated into Hindi, Gujarati, Bengali, and Kannada.[22]

---

[19]Some committees do actually have only a single member. Committees with only one or two members were excluded.

[20]This provides greater than 80% power to detect effect sizes smaller than 0.2.

[21]Corporators belonging to more than one committee were assigned to be asked about a single committee (see SI.2).

[22]The survey text was prepared in English and translated by a Professor of Hindi who identified words, phrases, and concepts that would be difficult to convey. All translation discrepancies were rectified so that questionnaires had the same meaning across languages.

Interethnic Contact

The survey began by measuring self-reported contact with other committee members. Most existing work on interethnic contact has used surveys to develop measures of self-reported contact similar to those employed here (Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006). One alternative is to observe the actual amount of contact taking place. Since this study examines elite contact, this would mean shadowing elites and recording their interactions with one another (Berenschot, 2010; Bussell, 2020). Both methods can suffer from social desirability bias: respondents are likely to self-report more frequent contact and elites being shadowed are likely to act differently than if no one was shadowing them. According to Pettigrew and Tropp (2006)'s meta-analysis, self-reported contact has a significantly smaller effect on outgroup views than does observed contact. As such, using a measure of self-reported contact should bias against finding an effect of interethnic contact on outgroup views.

As mentioned earlier, corporators can have contact with each other in many different settings. I asked about the frequency of contact among committee members without specifying the exact setting where contact occurs. Each corporation committee operates differently. Some committees meet formally with few opportunities for contact outside of the committee meeting. Other committees rely on informal contact to get things done. For this reason, I did not want to restrict contact to that just occurring in the formal committee setting. Additionally, it is quite difficult to delineate between political and social contact in the Indian municipal corporation setting. Many activities that may seem like social contact — party or dinner invitations for example — are themselves highly choreographed political events.[23] By simply asking about the frequency of contact with other committee members, I can encompass the diverse settings in which politically motivated contact occurs.

Enumerators started measuring self-reported contact by telling respondents that we were interested in their experiences on the committee that I pre-selected. I then chose four members of the committee, block randomized by caste reservation, to ask respondents "how

---

[23]Respondent 5. 2019. Interviewed by Author. Delhi.

19

frequently you talk to [name of committee member]?" (Lowe, 2018). Much existing research asks about contact with a specifically named outgroup. Respondents answered on a 1 to 5 scale where 1 meant never talking to that person and 5 meant talking every day. By asking about contact with individual committee members in a random order, I reduce the cues that may lead to a socially desirable response. Given time constraints and survey fatigue, it was impractical to ask about the frequency of contact with each committee member.

Using these responses, I constructed a measure of outgroup contact by adding up the reported frequency of contact with outgroup members and dividing by the maximum level of contact. For example, if the respondent was Brahmin and the committee members asked about were Brahmin (4), OBC (3), SC (2), and SC (5), then the index used the contact frequency for the latter three corporators or $\frac{3+2+5}{5\times4}$. The SI contains a more detailed description of this measure (SI.5) and robustness checks (SI.7). Outgroup *Contact* ranges from 0 to 1 where 0 means no contact with outgroups and 1 means daily contact with outgroups.[24]

The mean level of outgroup *Contact* at the committee level was 0.62 with a maximum of 0.85 in the Bangalore Architecture and Jamnagar Education committees, whereas the Jamnagar Sanitation, Works, and Slums committees had the lowest levels of contact (under 0.25). Four corporators reported having daily contact with all outgroup members asked about in the survey.

It is also worth noting that 82% of respondents reported having cooperative contact with the members of the committee as opposed to conflictual or neutral contact. This provides some credence to my argument that corporation committees are places where most of the conditions that promote positive interethnic contact occur.

Attention Diversity

After these questions about outgroup contact, I proceeded to measure elites' responses to drawing attention to the level of diversity on the committee. Though the measure of *Number*

---

[24]Only survey respondents who were asked about their contact with at least one outgroup corporator were included in the analysis.

Diversity is inherently observational, I can experimentally manipulate *Attention Diversity* to reflect elites mentioning the diversity of the committee as a way to increase the salience of ethnic diversity.

Respondents were assigned to either a treatment or control condition block randomized based on whether the respondent held a general or reserved legislative seat. Respondents in the treatment condition were primed to think about the ethnic composition of the committee when answering subsequent questions about outgroup views. The purpose of this prime was to draw attention to the ethnic diversity on the committee. By explicitly referencing caste and religious diversity by name, elites emphasize distinctions between ethnic groups. Elites can draw attention to diversity regardless of the numerical level of diversity in the committee. Hence, the prime should inflate perceptions of diversity among elites in both diverse and not diverse committees.

The only difference between the two conditions is that the treatment condition primed respondents directly on "caste and religious differences" while the control condition did not identify the source of said differences (Koopmans and Veit, 2014).[25]

Control: "As you know, committees often contain different types of members. Committee members often have very different viewpoints and policy priorities."

Treatment: "As you know, committees often contain members belonging to different caste and religious groups. Because of caste and religious differences, committee members often have very different viewpoints and policy priorities."

Outgroup Views

Following the administration of a prime, respondents were asked about their views toward the outgroup. I conceptualized outgroup views in three ways: affect toward the committee, perceptions of the committee, and outgroup attitudes.

---

[25]SI.3 contains randomization and balance checks.

The amount of interethnic contact and committee diversity may alter respondents' affect toward working with others on the committee. Affect refers to emotional responses that occur in reaction to an event (Gubler and Karpowitz, 2019).[26] Despite affect's nature as an emotional response, affect plays a critical role in decision-making (Marcus, 2000; e.g., Goodwin, Jasper and Polletta, 2001; Jasper, 2018; Neuman et al., 2007; Ross, 2013). I define four potential affective responses: pleasant, unpleasant, mixed (high pleasant and unpleasant affect), and weak (low pleasant and unpleasant affect).[27] Affect is a key building block of outgroup attitudes (Esses and Dovidio, 2002), as attitudes change through an inextricably linked mix of emotions and cognition (McDermott, 2004; Mercer, 2010). Hence, affective reactions to being on a committee contribute to elites' overall evaluation of the members of the committee and their ethnic affiliations (McDermott, Fowler and Smirnov, 2008; Mercer, 2005; Weyland, 1996). I asked four questions about respondents' affect toward the committee: their *Enthusiasm*, *Anger*, *Hopefulness*, and *Resentfulness*. Using these four emotion questions, I classified respondents into having *Pleasant*, *Unpleasant*, *Mixed*, or *Weak* affect toward the committee (Gubler and Karpowitz, 2019).[28]

Perceptions of the committee refers to a set of scenario-based questions asking respondents about their opinion about other members of the committee. Ethnicity is not mentioned in these questions in order to reduce social desirability bias inherent in directly asking about one's views of others (Letki, 2008; Oberg, Oskarsson and Svensson, 2011; Stolle, Soroka and Johnston, 2008). I developed three questions: one about the likelihood of a committee member *Spending Money Wisely*, one about being willing to take committee members' *Opinions* into account, and one about taking concerns from a committee member "with a different

---

[26]In Jasper (1998)'s conception, affect as defined here is a short term feeling that is universal and tied to an automatic bodily response. Jasper (1998, 2011) calls this concept "emotions" or "reflex emotions."

[27]In most conceptions, affect is dichotomized between pleasant and unpleasant (Jasper, 2011). However, it is possible for some individuals to be indifferent — having low pleasant and low unpleasant affect — or ambivalent — having high pleasant and unpleasant affect (Cacioppo, Gardner and Berntson, 1997). Hence, affect occupies a bivariate rather than a bipolar scale (Cacioppo, Gardner and Berntson, 1997; Thornton, 2011; Yoo, 2010). I call these two affective states "mixed" and "weak" in line with Gubler and Karpowitz (2019).

[28]See SI.4 for a discussion on affect classification.

background and experiences from you" into account (*Valid Concerns*). These questions tap into attitudes about committee member trust (Kasara, 2013; Robinson, 2017) and equality (Jackman, 1977; McIntosh et al., 1995). Finally, I asked if respondents felt that the committee was a collection of individuals or *One Group*.

I then explicitly asked questions about ethnic group membership. First, I asked about the degree to which the respondent trusts committee members from different ethnic groups (*Trust*). I then asked questions about general outgroup attitudes including willingness to live next to an outgroup *Neighbor* and to *Talk* to an outgroup member (Doebler, McAreavey and Shortall, 2018; Sarigil, 2018). These latter two questions were not restricted to the committee context in order to see if committee diversity and contact improve overall outgroup attitudes.

As a final way to measure outgroup attitudes, I included a behavioral measure of policy preferences. The included question (*Donation*) asked if respondents wanted to donate an honorarium to a charity that helps lower caste betterment instead of to a charity that helps with disaster aid (Charnysh, Lucas and Singh, 2015; Mironova and Whitt, 2014).

At the end of the survey, I asked several demographic questions including age, education, caste identification, and previous employment. I also included a question about social media use because social media could increase the salience of caste, decreasing interethnic contact and tolerance.

Empirical Strategy

First, I focus on the relationship between numerical committee diversity and contact and views of the outgroup. Following Hypothesis 1a, I expect that when a respondent belongs to a more numerically diverse committee, their views of the outgroup will worsen compared to respondents in less diverse committees (Koopmans and Veit, 2014). I then assess a dichotomous treatment indicator to evaluate the effect of attention diversity on views of the outgroup. In Hypothesis 1b, I argue that receiving the treatment will worsen outgroup views. After establishing the correlation between committee diversity and views of the outgroup, I

examine the relationship between contact and outgroup views, arguing in Hypothesis 2 that increased interethnic contact will improve said views.

In the main text, I discuss results from linear regression models with fixed effects by corporation and cluster robust standard errors with dependent variables normalized to be between 0 and 1. SI.6 contains full regression results. SI.7 and SI.8 show robustness checks conceptualizing numerical diversity as just forward and backward caste membership, using self-reported numerical diversity, employing state instead of corporation fixed effects, and including a measure of crimes against minority groups. I also present interaction plots for the interaction between numerical and attention-based diversity. Logistic and ordered multilevel models results are also in the SI. SI.9 examines heterogeneous treatment effects. All results are consistent with those presented here.

Results

I start by examining the relationship between ethnic diversity and outgroup views. Figure 1 displays coefficients from regression models on the dependent variables listed. Dependent variables are grouped into affect about the committee, perceptions of the committee, and outgroup attitudes. Both committee diversity (numeric and attention) and contact are included.

Number Diversity largely does not correlate with views of the outgroup including affect, cabinet perceptions, and outgroup attitudes. Respondents in committees that are more numerically diverse do tend to display more pleasant and less unpleasant affect; these variables are significant in some model specifications. However, these results are the opposite of my expectations in Hypothesis 1a: high levels of *Number Diversity* are not associated with negative outgroup views. If anything, numeric committee diversity correlates with higher pleasant affect. Numeric ethnic diversity does not have the expected negative impact on outgroup views.

24

Figure 1: Diversity and Contact

Coefficient estimates from linear regression models with dependent variables normalized between 0 and 1, corporation fixed effects, and cluster robust standard errors.

Turning to *Attention Diversity*, I examine the effect of receiving the treatment on out-group views. Hypothesis 1b expects that when elites receive the treatment drawing their attention to committee diversity, outgroup views will worsen. Here again, Figure 1 shows that this is not the case. In all measures of outgroup views, drawing attention to elite ethnic diversity had either null or *positive* effects on outgroup views. Respondents' willingness to *Talk* to members of the ethnic outgroup increased when they received the prime. Additionally, willingness to have an outgroup *Neighbor* is positive here and is significant in some model specifications. Robustness checks in SI.8 show that these diversity results are not an artifact of corporations whose citizens are more tolerant resulting in corporators with better outgroup views or that interacting numeric and attention-based diversity produces worsened outgroup views.

Moving to Hypothesis 2 and affect toward the committee, increased *Contact* is associated with increased *Mixed* affect and decreased *Weak* affect. *Pleasant* and *Unpleasant* affect are unchanged. This result indicates that respondents who had more frequent contact with their committee members developed relationships with them such that weak affect turned into mixed affect, i.e., they developed stronger preferences about members of the committee. Not only is this finding intuitive, but it suggests that the contact measure is indeed capturing the relationships between committee members.

In terms of perceptions of the committee, respondents who had more contact with other committee members were less likely to believe that committee members would *Spend* money wisely and were less likely to listen to the *Opinions* of other committee members. These effect sizes are relatively modest, and they may be counteracted by increased *Trust*, which is significant in some model specifications. Regardless, more frequent *Contact* is associated with committee members relying at least somewhat more on their own judgment and not valuing those with different perspectives.

However, turning to outgroup attitudes, individuals who had more contact with outgroup

members were more willing to have these individuals as *Neighbors* and to *Talk* with them.[29] The size of these effects are large: 0.25 on a 0 to 1 scale. This indicates that if *Contact* is 1 instead of 0, then willingness to have an outgroup *Neighbor* or to *Talk* to an outgroup member will be more than 1 point higher on a 1 to 5 scale. On balance, Hypothesis 2 is mostly supported: increased contact slightly worsens perceptions of members of the committee, but is also associated with greatly improved outgroup attitudes.

Discussion

The survey and experimental results presented above suggest that contact improves outgroup attitudes while at the same time slightly worsening opinions about other committee members. How can we think about these two results? The scenario-based questions about other committee members were *political* questions based on performance in the committee, whereas outgroup attitudes were *social*. Contact in this case promotes improved social attitudes while slightly worsening political attitudes. The political attitude aspect of this study is unique because previous work has not considered how contact may work among elites. At the citizen level, the ultimate goal of contact is improving outgroup attitudes. For elected representatives, the outgroup attitudes benefits of contact are important for how corporators conduct themselves in public, but these results underline that politicians are skilled at separating political and social attitudes. Committee members can develop improved social attitudes, but still treat outgroup corporators suspiciously within the confines of committee work.

Committee members may make this distinction between political and social contact because the norms of collaboration in committees are not strong enough to overcome electoral motivations. For example, committee members may know that long-term collaboration will help their re-election chances and maximize the goods that they can distribute, but an up-

---

[29]Recall that these models already use corporation fixed effects to control for the overall level of ethnic diversity in the corporation. Results with state fixed effects are substantively the same.

coming election may cause them to abandon this norm and to focus on short-term electoral and resource gains.

It is important to note that the paper thus far has argued that diversity and contact will impact views of the outgroup in general, not a particular outgroup. This essentially means that a Brahmin who has frequent contact with an Other Forward committee member will be treated the same as an Other Forward who has frequent contact with a Scheduled Tribe committee member. Caste is a hierarchical system wherein these two relationships, all else equal, may mean different things. In the former case, contact between two forward castes is not surprising, whereas contact between forward and backward castes may be more likely to go against social norms.

The specific caste structure and social norms of interaction differs dramatically by state, corporation, committee, and committee member. Essentially, every citizen thinks about caste and caste relationships slightly differently, meaning that the two relationships described above should be treated as equal in some situations and different in other situations. To address this issue, I conduct the analysis by grouping ethnic categories together into forward (Brahmin and OF) and backward (SC, ST, OBC, and other religion) and looking at committee diversity and contact between these two groups.

In SI.9, I examine forward caste respondents with committee *Number Diversity* defined as the percentage of non-forward corporators and contact defined as interactions with non-forward committee members. The results for *Contact* are the same as in the overall analysis: outgroup attitudes improve from backward caste contact, but perceptions of committee members slightly worsen. Committee *Number Diversity* may play a larger role when dichotomizing between forward and backward castes as *Pleasant* affect increases while *Unpleasant* affect decreases as the percentage of backward caste members increases. There are slightly negative effects of increased numeric committee diversity on perceptions of the committee, but no effects for *Attention Diversity*. These results suggest that contact has similarly positive effects when incorporating the ranked nature of caste structure in India and examining just

28

forward caste perceptions of backward castes.

Conclusion

Interethnic contact does improve elites views toward the outgroup, while committee diversity in and of itself does not have the negative impacts that many have feared. Yet, this study underlines the fact that increasing elite diversity and contact are not universal ways to improve outgroup views. First, although neither number or attention-based committee diversity produced much backlash, they were largely not associated with improved outgroup views either. Descriptive representation has long been proposed as a way to improve ethnic relations. While these benefits may exist for citizens looking at the ethnic composition of the committee, elites themselves do not alter their views about outgroups on account of simply changing committee diversity.

Of course, changing committee diversity is a much more tangible policy than is increasing elite interethnic contact. Party leaders and municipal corporators will have a more difficult time figuring out how to encourage frequent interethnic contact among committee members. One suggestion that is within the control of these leaders is committee meeting frequency. Though most committees are assigned to meet monthly and to be renewed yearly, evidence from corporator question-asking in Delhi suggests that several committees meet with less regular frequency or hold pro-forma meetings where few members attend. Holding corporators accountable for frequent committee meetings may help encourage both a collaborative working environment and one where opportunities for contact increase.

Municipal corporators remain largely understudied in India, but local government is critical to improving public services and to fostering community engagement. Efforts by nonprofit organizations are underway to better equip and train municipal corporators so that they can improve their job performance and be held publicly accountable for their actions. In this environment, corporators are under pressure to work together to provide solutions to

crippling public service inequalities. Though interethnic contact is by no means the solution to these problems, contact does provide benefits that help improve elites' understanding of outgroups.

Future work would do well to expand these results to other government contexts. Unlike citizen contact, which can be randomized after some degree of difficulty, elite contact is essentially observational and self-reported. The type of contact most likely to be helpful in improving views of the outgroup are long-lasting relationships, not telling a politician that their governing body is diverse or facilitating short-term interactions between political leaders. Local government offers an ideal setting for studying contact because of the mix of important governing responsibilities and a relatively large number of such bodies in any given country, thereby maximizing committee diversity and opportunities for contact. The fact that contact works in this particular case without the expected backlash effect is promising for considering future interventions encouraging contact among elites.

References

Adekanye, J. 'Bayo. 1998. "Power-Sharing in Multi-Ethnic Political Systems." *Security Studies* 29(1):25–36.

Adeney, Katharine. 2002. "Constitutional Centring: Nation Formation and Consociational Federalism in India and Pakistan." *Commonwealth & Comparative Politics* 40(3):8–33.

Adeney, Katharine and Wilfried Swenden. 2019. "Power-Sharing in the World's Largest Democracy: Informal Consociationalism in India (and Its Decline?)." *Swiss Political Science Review* 25(4):450–475.

Aijaz, Rumi. 2008. "Form of Urban Local Government in India." *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 43(2):131–154.

Ajit, D., Han Donker and Ravi Saxena. 2012. "Corporate Boards in India: Blocked by Caste?" *Economic and Political Weekly* 47(32):39–43.

Alesina, Alberto and Eliana La Ferrara. 2002. "Who Trusts Others?" *Journal of Public Economics* 85(2):207–234.

Allport, Gordon W. 1954. *The Nature of Prejudice.* Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company.

Amir, Yehuda. 1969. "Contact Hypothesis in Ethnic Relations." *Psychological Bulletin* 71(5):319–342.

Anderson, Ben, Garrett Bird, Richard Kornrumpf, Maria Macaluso, Natasha Mundkur, Madison Swingholm and Jason Gainous. 2020. "Ethnic Cues, Latino Skin Tone, and Voter Preferences: An Experimental Test." *Social Science Quarterly* Online First.

Andeweg, Rudy B. 2000. "Consociational Democracy." *Annual Review of Political Science* 3:509–536.

Arriola, Leonardo R. and Martha C. Johnson. 2014. "Ethnic Politics and Women's Empowerment in Africa: Ministerial Appointments to Executive Cabinets." *American Journal of Political Science* 58(2):495–510.

Baldwin, Kate. 2013. "Why Vote with the Chief? Political Connections and Public Goods Provision in Zambia." *American Journal of Political Science* 57(4):794–809.

Banerjee, Biswajit and J.B. Knight. 1985. "Caste Discrimination in the Indian Urban Labour Market." *Journal of Development Economics* 17(3):277–307.

Battaglini, Marco, Valerio Leone Sciabolazza and Eleonora Patacchini. 2020. "Effectiveness of Connected Legislators." *American Journal of Political Science* Online First.

Beiser-McGrath, Janina and Nils W. Metternich. 2020. "Ethnic Coalitions and the Logic of Political Survival in Authoritarian Regimes." *Comparative Political Studies* Online First.

Berenschot, Ward. 2010. "Everyday Mediation: The Politics of Public Service Delivery in Gujarat, India." *Development and Change* 41(5):883–905.

Bhagavatula, Suresh, Manaswini Bhalla, Manisha Goel and Balagopal Vissa. 2017. "The Business of Religion and Caste in India.".

Binningsbo, Helga Malmin. 2013. "Power Sharing, Peace and Democracy: Any Obvious Relationships?" *International Area Studies Review* 16(1):89–112.

Bobo, Lawrence. 1988. Group Conflict, Prejudice, and the Paradox of Contemporary Racial Attitudes. In *Eliminating Racism: Profiles in Controversy*. New York: Plenum pp. 85–114.

Bormann, Nils-Christian. 2019. "Uncertainty, Cleavages, and Ethnic Coalitions." *The Journal of Politics* 81(2):471–486.

Brader, Ted, Nicholas A. Valentino and Elizabeth Suhay. 2008. "What Triggers Public Opposition to Immigration? Anxiety, Group Cues, and Immigration Threat." *American Journal of Political Science* 52(4):959–978.

Brandenberger, Laurence. 2018. "Trading Favors—Examining the Temporal Dynamics of Reciprocity in Congressional Collaborations Using Relational Event Models." *Social Networks* 54:238–253.

Brass, Paul. 2011. *The Production of Hindu-Muslim Violence in Contemporary India*. Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press.

Brief, Arthur P., Elizabeth E. Umphress, Joerg Dietz, John W. Burrows, Rebecca M. Butz and Lotte Scholten. 2005. "Community Matters: Realistic Group Conflict Theory and the Impact of Diversity." *Academy of Management Journal* 48(5):830–844.

Brown, Rupert and Miles Hewstone. 2005. "An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Contact." *Advances in Experimental Social Psychology* 37:255–343.

Burgess, Robin, Remi Jedwab, Edward Miguel, Ameet Morjaria and Gerard Padro i Miquel. 2015. "The Value of Democracy: Evidence from Road Building in Kenya." *American Economic Review* 105(6):1817–1851.

Bussell, Jennifer. 2018. "When Do Middlemen Matter? Evidence from Variation in Corruption in India." *Governance* 31(3):465–480.

Bussell, Jennifer. 2020. "Shadowing as a Tool for Studying Political Elites." *Political Analysis* Online First.

Butler, Daniel and Margit Tavits. 2020. "Shared Interests Foster Interethnic Cooperation among Politicians." *Political Science Research and Methods* Online First.

Cacioppo, John T., Wendi L. Gardner and Gary G. Berntson. 1997. "Beyond Bipolar Conceptualizations and Measures: The Case of Attitudes and Evaluative Space." *Personality and Social Psychology Review* 1(1):3–25.

Chandra, Kanchan. 2000. "Elite Incorporation in Multiethnic Societies." *Asian Survey* 40(5):836–865.

Chandra, Kanchan. 2004. *Why Ethnic Parties Succeed: Patronage and Ethnic Head Counts in India.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Charnysh, Volha, Christopher Lucas and Prerna Singh. 2015. "The Ties That Bind: National Identity Salience and Pro-Social Behavior Toward the Ethnic Other." *Comparative Political Studies* 48(3):267–300.

Clark, Gregory and Zach Landes. 2012. "Caste Versus Class: Social Mobility in India, 1860-2012.".

Crisp, Brian F., Kristin Kanthak and Jenny Leijonhufvud. 2004. "The Reputations Legislators Build: With Whom Should Representatives Collaborate?" *American Political Science Review* 98(4):703–716.

Datta, Abhijit. 1995. "Municipal Reform in India: Comparative Models and Processes." *Economic and Political Weekly* 30(38):2395–2398.

Desai, Sonalde and Reeve Vanneman. 2015. "India Human Development Survey-II.".

Deshpande, Swati. 2020. "Elections for Post of Nashik Civic Standing Committee Chairperson Can Be Held on March 6; but Ballots to Be Sent to Court: HC Bench." https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/city/mumbai/election-for-post-of-nashik-civic-standing-committee-chairperson-can-be-held-on-march-6-but-ballots-to-be-sent-to-court-hc-bench/articleshow/74446423.cms.

Desmarais, Bruce A., Vincent G. Moscardelli, Brian F. Schaffner and Michael S. Kowal. 2015. "Measuring Legislative Collaboration: The Senate Press Events Network." *Social Networks* 40:43–54.

Dinesen, Peter Thisted and Kim Mannemar Sønderskov. 2015. "Ethnic Diversity and Social Trust." *American Sociological Review* 80(3):550–573.

Doebler, Stefanie, Ruth McAreavey and Sally Shortall. 2018. "Is Racism the New Sectarianism? Negativity towards Immigrants and Ethnic Minorities in Northern Ireland from 2004 to 2015." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 41(14):2426–2444.

Domke, David. 2001. "Racial Cues and Political Ideology: An Examination of Associative Priming." *Communication Research* 28(6):772–801.

Domke, David, Taso Lagos, Mark Lapointe, Melissa Meade and Michael Xenos. 2000. "Elite Messages and Source Cues: Moving Beyond Partisanship." *Political Communication* 17(4):395–402.

Driscoll, Barry. 2018. "Why Political Competition Can Increase Patronage." *Studies in Comparative International Development* 53(4):404–427.

Ejdemyr, Simon, Eric Kramon and Amanda Lea Robinson. 2018. "Segregation, Ethnic Favoritism, and the Strategic Targeting of Local Public Goods." *Comparative Political Studies* 51(9):1111–1143.

Escandell, Xavier and Alin M. Ceobanu. 2009. "When Contact with Immigrants Matters: Threat, Interethnic Attitudes and Foreigner Exclusionism in Spain's Comunidades Autonomas." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 32(1):44–69.

Esses, Victoria M. and John F. Dovidio. 2002. "The Role of Emotions in Determining Willingness to Engage in Intergroup Contact." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 28(9):1202–1214.

FinancialExpress. 2020. "MCD Standing Committee Election: AAP Claims Big Win after Party Bags 3 Seats, Says BJP Transferred Votes to Congress." https://www.financialexpress.com/india-news/mcd-standing-committee-election-2020-aap-wins-three-seats/2003825/.

Fong, Christian. 2020. "Expertise, Networks, and Interpersonal Influence in Congress." *The Journal of Politics* 82(1):269–284.

Francois, Patrick, Ilia Rainer and Francesco Trebbi. 2015. "How Is Power Shared in Africa?" *Econometrica* 83(2):465–503.

Gaertner, Samuel L. and John Dovidio. 2000. *Reducing Intergroup Bias: The Common Ingroup Identity Model.* Philadelphia, PA: Psychology Press.

Gaertner, Samuel L. and John F. Dovidio. 2005. "Understanding and Addressing Contemporary Racism: From Aversive Racism to the Common Ingroup Identity Model." *Journal of Social Issues* 61(3):615–639.

Gaertner, Samuel L., John F. Dovidio and Betty A. Bachman. 1996. "Revisiting the Contact Hypothesis: The Induction of a Common Ingroup Identity." *International Journal of Intercultural Relations* 20(3-4):271–290.

Gaertner, Samuel L., John F. Dovidio, Phyllis A. Anastasio, Betty A. Bachman and Mary C. Rust. 1993. "The Common Ingroup Identity Model: Recategorization and the Reduction of Intergroup Bias." *European Review of Social Psychology* 4(1):1–26.

Gaikwad, Nikhar and Gareth Nellis. 2016. "Do Politicians Discriminate Against Internal Migrants? Evidence from Nationwide Field Experiments in India.".

Gilens, Martin and Benjamin I. Page. 2014. "Testing Theories of American Politics: Elites, Interest Groups, and Average Citizens." *Perspectives on Politics* 12(3):564–581.

Glaser, James M. 1994. "Back to the Black Belt: Racial Environment and White Racial Attitudes in the South." *The Journal of Politics* 56(1):21–41.

Goodwin, Jeff, James M. Jasper and Francesca Polletta, eds. 2001. *Passionate Politics: Emotions and Social Movements.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Gottlieb, Jessica. 2015. "The Logic of Party Collusion in a Democracy: Evidence from Mali." *World Politics* 67(1):1–36.

Graf, Sylvie and Stefania Paolini. 2017. Investigating Positive and Negative Intergroup Contact. In *Intergroup Contact Theory: Recent Developments and Future Directions*. Current Issues in Social Psychology London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group pp. 92–113.

Gubler, Joshua R. and Christopher F. Karpowitz. 2019. "Mixed Affective States and the Fundamental Challenge of Persuasion.".

Gundelach, Birte. 2014. "In Diversity We Trust: The Positive Effect of Ethnic Diversity on Outgroup Trust." *Political Behavior* 36(1):125–142.

Habyarimana, James, Macartan Humphreys, Daniel N. Posner and Jeremy M. Weinstein. 2007. "Why Does Ethnic Diversity Undermine Public Goods Provision?" *American Political Science Review* 101(4):709–725.

Hartzell, Caroline and Matthew Hoddie. 2003. "Institutionalizing Peace: Power Sharing and Post-Civil War Conflict Management." *American Journal of Political Science* 47(2):318–332.

Hasson, Victoria. 2010. "Rules and Rituals: The Case of South Africa's New Committee System." *The Journal of Legislative Studies* 16(3):366–379.

Hayward, Lydia E., Linda R. Tropp, Matthew J. Hornsey and Fiona Kate Barlow. 2017. "Toward a Comprehensive Understanding of Intergroup Contact: Descriptions and Mediators of Positive and Negative Contact Among Majority and Minority Groups." *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin* 43(3):347–364.

Hayward, Lydia E., Linda R. Tropp, Matthew J. Hornsey and Fiona Kate Barlow. 2018. "How Negative Contact and Positive Contact with Whites Predict Collective Action among Racial and Ethnic Minorities." *British Journal of Social Psychology* 57(1):1–20.

Heller, Patrick, K.N. Harilal and Shubham Chaudhuri. 2007. "Building Local Democracy: Evaluating the Impact of Decentralization in Kerala, India." *World Development* 35(4):626–648.

Helmke, Gretchen and Steven Levitsky. 2004. "Informal Institutions and Comparative Politics: A Research Agenda." *Perspectives on Politics* 2(4):725–740.

Hewstone, Miles and Rupert Brown, eds. 1986. *Contact and Conflict in Intergroup Encounters.* Cambridge, MA: Basil Blackwell.

Hooghe, Marc, Tim Reeskens, Dietlind Stolle and Ann Trappers. 2009. "Ethnic Diversity and Generalized Trust in Europe: A Cross-National Multilevel Study." *Comparative Political Studies* 42(2):198–223.

Jackman, Mary R. 1977. "Prejudice, Tolerance, and Attitudes Toward Ethnic Groups." *Social Science Research* 6(2):145–169.

Jaffrelot, Christophe. 2003. *India's Silent Revolution: The Rise of the Lower Castes in North India.* New York: Columbia University Press.

Jasper, James M. 1998. "The Emotions of Protest: Affective and Reactive Emotions In and Around Social Movements." *Sociological Forum* 13(3):397–424.

Jasper, James M. 2011. "Emotions and Social Movements: Twenty Years of Theory and Research." *Annual Review of Sociology* 37(1):285–303.

Jasper, James M. 2018. *The Emotions of Protest.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Jayaraman, Raja. 2005. "Personal Identity in a Globalized World: Cultural Roots of Hindu Personal Names and Surnames." *The Journal of Popular Culture* 38(3):476–490.

Jennings, M. Kent. 1992. "Ideological Thinking Among Mass Publics and Political Elites." *Public Opinion Quarterly* 56(4):419–461.

Jensenius, F.R. and P. Suryanarayan. 2015. "Fragmentation and Decline in Indias State Assemblies: A Review, 1967-2007." *Asian Survey* 55(5):862–881.

John, Mary E. 2007. "Women in Power? Gender, Caste and the Politics of Local Urban Governance." *Economic and Political Weekly* 42(39):3986–3993.

Kasara, Kimuli. 2013. "Separate and Suspicious: Local Social and Political Context and Ethnic Tolerance in Kenya." *The Journal of Politics* 75(4):921–936.

Kaufman, Stuart J. 1996. "Spiraling to Ethnic War: Elites, Masses, and Moscow in Moldova's Civil War." *International Security* 21(2):108–138.

Kirkland, Justin H. 2011. "The Relational Determinants of Legislative Outcomes: Strong and Weak Ties Between Legislators." *The Journal of Politics* 73(3):887–898.

Kirkland, Justin H. 2012. "Multimember Districts' Effect on Collaboration between U.S. State Legislators: Multimember Districts." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 37(3):329–353.

Kokkonen, Andrej, Peter Esaiasson and Mikael Gilljam. 2014. "Migration-Based Ethnic Diversity and Social Trust: A Multilevel Analysis of How Country, Neighbourhood and Workplace Diversity Affects Social Trust in 22 Countries." *Scandinavian Political Studies* 37(3):263–300.

Koopmans, Ruud and Susanne Veit. 2014. "Ethnic Diversity, Trust, and the Mediating Role of Positive and Negative Interethnic Contact: A Priming Experiment." *Social Science Research* 47:91–107.

Kopecký, Petr. 2011. "Political Competition and Party Patronage: Public Appointments in Ghana and South Africa." *Political Studies* 59(3):713–732.

Lancee, Bram and Jaap Dronkers. 2011. "Ethnic, Religious and Economic Diversity in Dutch Neighbourhoods: Explaining Quality of Contact with Neighbours, Trust in the Neighbourhood and Inter-Ethnic Trust." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 37(4):597–618.

Laurence, James. 2014. "Reconciling the Contact and Threat Hypotheses: Does Ethnic Diversity Strengthen or Weaken Community Inter-Ethnic Relations?" *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 37(8):1328–1349.

Laurence, James, Katharina Schmid and Miles Hewstone. 2018. "Ethnic Diversity, Inter-Group Attitudes and Countervailing Pathways of Positive and Negative Inter-Group Contact: An Analysis Across Workplaces and Neighbourhoods." *Social Indicators Research* 136(2):719–749.

Lee, Alexander. 2018. "Ethnic Diversity and Ethnic Discrimination: Explaining Local Public Goods Provision." *Comparative Political Studies* 51(10):1351–1383.

Lehne, Jonathan, Jacob N. Shapiro and Oliver Vanden Eynde. 2018. "Building Connections: Political Corruption and Road Construction in India." *Journal of Development Economics* 131:62–78.

Leigh, Andrew. 2006. "Trust, Inequality and Ethnic Heterogeneity." *Economic Record* 82(258):268–280.

Lemarchand, Rene. 2007. "Consociationalism and Power Sharing in Africa: Rwanda, Burundi, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo." *African Affairs* 106(422):1–20.

Letki, Natalia. 2008. "Does Diversity Erode Social Cohesion? Social Capital and Race in British Neighbourhoods." *Political Studies* 56(1):99–126.

Lowe, Matt. 2018. "A Field Experiment on Collaborative and Adversarial Caste Integration.".

Luna, Juan P. and Elizabeth J. Zechmeister. 2005. "Political Representation in Latin America: A Study of Elite-Mass Congruence in Nine Countries." *Comparative Political Studies* 38(4):388–416.

Lupu, Noam and Rachel Beatty Riedl. 2013. "Political Parties and Uncertainty in Developing Democracies." *Comparative Political Studies* 46(11):1339–1365.

Lupu, Noam and Zach Warner. 2017. Mass–Elite Congruence and Representation in Argentina. In *Malaise in Representation in Latin American Countries*, ed. Alfredo Joignant, Mauricio Morales and Claudio Fuentes. New York: Palgrave Macmillan pp. 281–302.

Lustick, Ian S. 1997. "Lijphart, Lakatos, and Consociationalism." *World Politics* 50(1):88–117.

Marcus, G E. 2000. "Emotions in Politics." *Annual Review of Political Science* 3:221–250.

McDermott, Monika L. 1998. "Race and Gender Cues in Low-Information Elections." *Political Research Quarterly* 51(4):895–918.

McDermott, Rose. 2004. "The Feeling of Rationality: The Meaning of Neuroscientific Advances for Political Science." *Perspectives on Politics* 2(4):691–706.

McDermott, Rose, James H. Fowler and Oleg Smirnov. 2008. "On the Evolutionary Origin of Prospect Theory Preferences." *The Journal of Politics* 70(2):335–350.

McIntosh, Mary, Martha Abele Mac Iver, Daniel G. Abele and David B. Nolle. 1995. "Minority Rights and Majority Rule: Ethnic Tolerance in Romania and Bulgaria." *Social Forces* 73(3):939–967.

Mehler, Andreas. 2009. "Peace and Power Sharing in Africa: A Not so Obvious Relationship." *African Affairs* 108(432):453–473.

Mercer, Jonathan. 2005. "Prospect Theory and Political Science." *Annual Review of Political Science* 8(1):1–21.

Mercer, Jonathan. 2010. "Emotional Beliefs." *International Organization* 64(1):1–31.

Micozzi, Juan Pablo. 2014. "Alliance for Progress? Multilevel Ambition and Patterns of Cosponsorship in the Argentine House." *Comparative Political Studies* 47(8):1186–1208.

Mironova, Vera and Sam Whitt. 2014. "Ethnicity and Altruism After Violence: The Contact Hypothesis in Kosovo." *Journal of Experimental Political Science* 1(2):170–180.

Mukhopadhyay, Asok. 1996. "Politics and Bureaucracy in Urban Governance: The Indian Experience." *Indian Journal of Public Administration* 42(1):32–47.

Muraoka, Taishi. 2019. "The Cosponsorship Patterns of Reserved Seat Legislators." *Legislative Studies Quarterly* Online First.

Nathan, Noah L. 2016. "Local Ethnic Geography, Expectations of Favoritism, and Voting in Urban Ghana." *Comparative Political Studies* 49(14):1896–1929.

Neuman, W. Russell, George E. Marcus, Ann N. Crigler and Michael Mackuen, eds. 2007. *The Affect Effect: Dynamics of Emotion in Political Thinking and Behavior.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Oberg, Perola, Sven Oskarsson and Torsten Svensson. 2011. "Similarity vs. Homogeneity: Contextual Effects in Explaining Trust." *European Political Science Review* 3(3):345–369.

Oldenburg, Philip. 1976. *Big City Government in India: Councilor, Administrator, and Citizen in Delhi.* Tuscon, AZ: University of Arizona Press.

Olivella, Santiago, Kristin Kanthak and Brian F. Crisp. 2017. "...And Keep Your Enemies Closer: Building Reputations for Facing Electoral Challenges." *Electoral Studies* 46:75–86.

OSCE. 2012. The Ljubljana Guidelines on Integration of Diverse Societies & Explanatory Note. Technical report OSCE High Commisioner on National Minorities The Hague: .

Pal, Mahi. 2004. "Caste and Patriarchy in Panchayats." *Economic and Political Weekly* 39(32):3581–3583.

Paluck, Elizabeth Levy. 2016. "How to Overcome Prejudice." *Science* 352(6282):147.

Paluck, Elizabeth Levy and Donald P. Green. 2009. "Prejudice Reduction: What Works? A Review and Assessment of Research and Practice." *Annual Review of Psychology* 60(1):339–367.

Paluck, Elizabeth Levy, Seth A. Green and Donald P. Green. 2018. "The Contact Hypothesis Re-Evaluated." *Behavioural Public Policy* OnlineFirst:1–30.

Parikh, Sunita. 1997. *The Politics of Preference: Democratic Institutions and Affirmative Action in the United States and India.* Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press.

Parikh, Sunita. 1998. Religion, Reservations, and Riots: The Politics of Ethnic Violence in India. In *Community Conflicts and the State in India.* Delhi: Oxford University Press pp. 33–57.

Parikh, Sunita. 2001. Affirmative Action, Caste, and Party Politics in Contemporary India. In *Color Lines: Affirmative Action, Immigration, and Civil Rights Options for America.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press pp. 297–312.

Parry, Geraint. 1969. *Political Elites.* New York: Praeger.

Perez, Efren O. 2015. "Ricochet: How Elite Discourse Politicizes Racial and Ethnic Identities." *Political Behavior* 37(1):155–180.

Pettigrew, Thomas F. and Linda R. Tropp. 2006. "A Meta-Analytic Test of Intergroup Contact Theory." *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology* 90(5):751–783.

Pettigrew, Thomas F., Linda R. Tropp, Ulrich Wagner and Oliver Christ. 2011. "Recent Advances in Intergroup Contact Theory." *International Journal of Intercultural Relations* 35(3):271–280.

Pittinsky, Todd L, Margaret Shih and Nalini Ambady. 2000. "Will a Category Cue Affect You? Category Cues, Positive Stereotypes and Reviewer Recall for Applicants." *Social Psychology of Education* 4(1):53–65.

Putnam, Robert D. 2007. "E Pluribus Unum: Diversity and Community in the Twenty-First Century The 2006 Johan Skytte Prize Lecture." *Scandinavian Political Studies* 30(2):137–174.

Remmer, Karen L. 2007. "The Political Economy of Patronage: Expenditure Patterns in the Argentine Provinces, 1983–2003." *The Journal of Politics* 69(2):363–377.

Ringe, Nils, Jennifer Nicoll Victor and Justin H. Gross. 2013. "Keeping Your Friends Close and Your Enemies Closer? Information Networks in Legislative Politics." *British Journal of Political Science* 43(3):601–628.

Robinson, Amanda Lea. 2017. "Ethnic Diversity, Segregation and Ethnocentric Trust in Africa." *British Journal of Political Science* OnlineFirst.

Rosenthal, Donald B. 1970. *The Limited Elite: Politics and Government in Two Indian Cities.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Ross, Andrew A.G. 2013. *Mixed Emotions: Beyond Fear and Hatred in International Conflict.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Rothchild, Donald. 1997. *Managing Ethnic Conflict in Africa.* Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.

Sankaran, Sindhuja, Maciek Sekerdej and Ulrich von Hecker. 2017. "The Role of Indian Caste Identity and Caste Inconsistent Norms on Status Representation." *Frontiers in Psychology* 8.

Sarigil, Zeki. 2018. "Ethnic and Religious Prejudices in the Turkish Social Landscape." *European Sociological Review* 34(6):711–727.

Schaeffer, Merlin. 2013. "Can Competing Diversity Indices Inform Us about Why Ethnic Diversity Erodes Social Cohesion? A Test of Five Diversity Indices in Germany." *Social Science Research* 42(3):755–774.

Schneckener, Ulrich. 2002. "Making Power-Sharing Work: Lessons from Successes and Failures in Ethnic Conflict Regulation." *Journal of Peace Research* 39(2):203–228.

Sharma, Mukesh. 2002. *Panchayati Raj System and Empowerment.* Jaipur: Surabhi.

Sisk, Timothy D. 1996. *Power Sharing and International Mediation in Ethnic Conflicts.* Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press.

Slater, Dan and Erica Simmons. 2012. "Coping by Colluding: Political Uncertainty and Promiscuous Powersharing in Indonesia and Bolivia." *Comparative Political Studies* 46(11):1366–1393.

Spears, Ian S. 2000. "Understanding Inclusive Peace Agreements in Africa: The Problems of Sharing Power." *Third World Quarterly* 21(1):105–118.

Spears, Ian S. 2013. "Africa's Informal Power-Sharing and the Prospects for Peace." *Civil Wars* 15(1):37–53.

Stokes, Susan C., Thad Dunning, Marcelo Nazareno and Valeria Brusco. 2013. *Brokers, Voters, and Clientelism: The Puzzle of Distributive Politics.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Stolle, Dietlind, Stuart Soroka and Richard Johnston. 2008. "When Does Diversity Erode Trust? Neighborhood Diversity, Interpersonal Trust and the Mediating Effect of Social Interactions." *Political Studies* 56(1):57–75.

Strom, Kaare. 1998. "Parliamentary Committees in European Democracies." *The Journal of Legislative Studies* 4(1):21–59.

Sullivan, Daniel P. 2005. "The Missing Pillars: A Look at the Failure of Peace in Burundi through the Lens of Arend Lijphart's Theory of Consociational Democracy." *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 43(1):75–95.

Tajfel, Henri and John Turner. 1979. An Integrative Theory of Intergroup Conflict. In *Organizational Identity: A Reader.* Oxford: Oxford University Press pp. 56–65.

Tallman, S. and J. Li. 1996. "Effects of International Diversity and Product Diversity on the Performance of Multinational Firms." *Academy of Management Journal* 39(1):179–196.

Thomsen, Jens Peter Frølund and Arzoo Rafiqi. 2018. "When Does Superficial Intergroup Contact Reduce Anti-Foreigner Sentiment? Negative Contact as an Essential Condition." *International Journal of Comparative Sociology* 59(1):25–43.

Thornton, Judd R. 2011. "Ambivalent or Indifferent? Examining the Validity of an Objective Measure of Partisan Ambivalence: Ambivalent or Indifferent?" *Political Psychology* 32(5):863–884.

Tull, Denis M. and Andreas Mehler. 2005. "The Hidden Costs of Power-Sharing: Reproducing Insurgent Violence in Africa." *African Affairs* 104(416):375–398.

Valentino, Nicholas A., Vincent L. Hutchings and Ismail K. White. 2002. "Cues That Matter: How Political Ads Prime Racial Attitudes During Campaigns." *American Political Science Review* 96(1):75–90.

van der Meer, Tom and Jochem Tolsma. 2014. "Ethnic Diversity and Its Effects on Social Cohesion." *Annual Review of Sociology* 40:459–478.

Varshney, Ashutosh. 2003. *Ethnic Conflict and Civic Life: Hindus and Muslims in India.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Varshney, Ashutosh and Steven Wilkinson. 1996. *Hindu-Muslim Riots 1960-93: New Findings, Possible Remedies.* New Delhi: Rajiv Gandhi Institute for Contemporary Studies.

Weitz-Shapiro, Rebecca. 2012. "What Wins Votes: Why Some Politicians Opt Out of Clientelism." *American Journal of Political Science* 56(3):568–583.

Weyland, Kurt. 1996. "Risk Taking in Latin American Economic Restructuring: Lessons from Prospect Theory." *International Studies Quarterly* 40(2):185–207.

White, Ariel R., Noah L. Nathan and Julie K. Faller. 2015. "What Do I Need to Vote? Bureaucratic Discretion and Discrimination by Local Election Officials." *American Political Science Review* 109(1):129–142.

Wilkinson, Steven. 2004. *Votes and Violence: Electoral Competition and Ethnic Riots in India.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Wilkinson, Steven Ian. 2000. "India, Consociational Theory, and Ethnic Violence." *Asian Survey* 40(5):767–791.

Wonka, Arndt and Sebastian Haunss. 2020. "Cooperation in Networks: Political Parties and Interest Groups in EU Policy-Making in Germany." *European Union Politics* 21(1):130–151.

Yoo, Sung-jin. 2010. "Two Types of Neutrality: Ambivalence versus Indifference and Political Participation." *The Journal of Politics* 72(1):163–177.

Zschirnt, Eva and Didier Ruedin. 2016. "Ethnic Discrimination in Hiring Decisions: A Meta-Analysis of Correspondence Tests 1990–2015." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 42(7):1115–1134.

Supplemental Information: Elite Responses to Ethnic Diversity and Interethnic Contact

The Supplemental Information contains the survey questions used in the experiment (SI.1), a description of the sampling procedure and treatment assignment (SI.2), randomization and balance checks (SI.3), a discussion of how affect was classified (SI.4), a discussion of how committee diversity and contact were coded (SI.5), results from the main text (SI.6), diversity and contact robustness checks (SI.7), treatment robustness checks (SI.8), and heterogeneous treatment effects (SI.9).

Replication data and code for all empirical analysis is posted on the author's website.

SI.1: Survey Questions

- Pre-Survey Questions:

  1. Name of corporator
  2. Female: 1-Female, 0-Male
  3. Caste Reservation: 1-Constituency is caste reserved, 0-Otherwise
  4. State: Gujarat, Karnataka, Kerala, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal
  5. Corporation: Name of corporation
  6. Constituency: A description of the constituency the corporator represents (usually a ward number)
  7. Political Party: Name of corporator's political party. Recoded into BJP: 1-If party is BJP, 0-Otherwise and INC: 1-If party is Indian National Congress, 0-Otherwise
  8. Committees: List of committees the corporator serves on
  9. Number Committees On: Total number of committees the corporator serves on
  10. Times Elected: Number of times elected to the corporation. Recoded into number of years in office and dichotomized for those serving more than 5 years (one term).

11. Corporator phone number (redacted)

12. Committee Asked About: Name of committee each corporator was asked about

13. Committee Diversity: Herfindahl-Hirschman index with six caste categories (Brahmin, OF, SC, ST, OBC, Other Religion) coded using the method described below for each committee.

- Pre-Treatment Questions:

14. UniqueIDFinal: Unique respondent ID

15. Contact: Using the committee asked about, a list of up to four corporators was selected for inclusion in this survey question. A respondent was asked about four corporators if the committee had five or more members; a respondent was asked about the entire committee if there were fewer than five members. Block randomization by caste reserved seat was used to select the four corporators to ask about in committees with more than five members. This helped ensure that each respondent was asked about at least one non-coethnic committee member.

   This question was repeated up to four times, once for each of the selected committee members: "I am going to ask you how frequently you talk to other members on the {name of committee asked about} committee. Please answer on a scale from 1 meaning you never talk to this person to 5 meaning you talk to this person every day. How frequently do you talk to {name of committee member}?"

   Each committee member asked about was then caste coded, and coethnic committee members were excluded. Among non-coethnic committee members, I added up the reported frequency of contact and divided by the total number of committee members asked about. This is the main measure of contact used. I also measured contact between just forward and backward castes where Brahmin and OF are forward castes and all other categories are backward castes.

16. "Would you say that your interactions with other committee members are mostly cooperative, mostly conflictual, or some of both? (Record response where 0-mostly conflictual, 1-some of both, 2-mostly cooperative)"

- Treatment Administration:

   - Control: "As you know, committees often contain different types of members. Committee members often have very different viewpoints and feel that different policies are important."

   - Treatment: "As you know, committees often contain members belonging to different caste and religious groups. Because of caste and religious differences, committee members often have very different viewpoints and feel that different policies are important."

   - Recorded as 1-Treatment administered, 0-Control administered. Block randomized by caste reservation. Enumerators were instructed to read the text slowly and clearly and to wait a few seconds after reading it. Since this was a phone survey, we can ensure that the control or treatment were fully administered.

- Dependent Variables:

17. Spend Wisely: "Suppose a member of the the name of the committee recorded in question 4 committee receives money to work on a policy of great importance to you. How likely is it that they spend the money wisely?" (Record response where 1-not likely to 5-very likely).

18. Opinions: "In general, how likely are you to take the opinions of other member of the committee into account when you make decisions?" (Record response where 1-not likely to 5-very likely).

19. Valid Concerns: "Consider a situation in which a member of the committee who has a different background and experiences from you disagrees with you. How likely are their concerns to be valid?" (Record response where 1-not likely to 5-very likely).

20. One Group: "To what extent do you think of the committee as one group as opposed to a collection of individuals with different experiences?" (Record response where 1-collection of individuals and 5-one group). Note that the initial scale was 0-collection of individuals and 1-one group, but that the survey was implemented with a 1 to 5 scale.

21. Enthusiastic: "How enthusiastic do you feel when working with others on the the name of the committee being asked about committee?" (Record response where 1-not at all to 5-very).

22. Angry: "How angry do you feel when working with others on the the name of the committee being asked about committee?" (Record response where 1-not at all to 5-very).

23. Hopeful: "How hopeful do you feel when working with others on the the name of the committee being asked about committee?" (Record response where 1-not at all to 5-very).

24. Resentful: "How resentful do you feel when working with others on the the name of the committee being asked about committee?" (Record response where 1-not at all to 5-very).

25. Donation: "We would like to give some money to an Indian NGO to thank you for your taking this survey. Would you like us to give to a charity that supports the betterment of lower castes or a charity that helps with disaster aid?" (Record response where 0-disaster relief and 1-caste betterment). Note that I donated to the India Development and Relief Fund and Dalit Solidarity respectively.

26. Caste Trust: "I have just a few more questions for you before we finish. On a scale from 1 to 5 where 1 means very much disagree and 5 means very much agree, how much would you agree with the following statements?" "Members of the the name of the committee asked about committee who are from different caste or religious backgrounds keep their word and do what is agreed on." (Record response where 1- very much disagree to 5- very much agree).

27. Neighbor: "You would be uncomfortable if someone who was a member of a different caste or religious group moved in next door to you." (Record response where 1- very much disagree to 5- very much agree). Reverse coded.

28. Talk: "You would be happy to talk to someone who was a member of a different caste or religious group." (Record response where 1- very much disagree to 5- very much agree).

- Post-Treatment Demographics:

29. Age: "What is your age?" (Enter age in years).

30. Social Media: "Are you never, sometimes, or frequently professionally active on social media?" (0-never, 1-sometimes, 2-frequently). Recoded where 1-Sometimes or frequently and 0-Never

31. Education: "How many standards or years of education have you completed?" (Code response in years where: no formal education-0, 1st class-1, 5th class-5, Secondary-10, Bachelors-15, Above Bachelors-16). Recoded where 1-Completed Bachelors and 0-Otherwise

32. Self-Reported Caste: "Are you: Brahmin, General/Forward, Schedule Caste, Schedule Tribe, Other Backward Class, or non-Hindu/other religion?" (Code response as: Brahmin, General/Forward, Schedule Caste, Schedule Tribe, Other Backward Class, or non-Hindu/other religion).

33. Occupation: "What was your primary occupation before being elected to the municipal corporation?" (Record response).

- Survey Information:

34. Times Called: Number of times the respondent was called before responding to the survey

35. Interview Language: Language of the interview

36. Interviewer: Name of the survey enumerator

37. Date: Date the interview was conducted

Table SI.1.1 lists descriptive statistics for key independent and dependent variables at the individual level, and Table SI.1.2 lists averages grouped by committee. We might be concerned here with floor or ceiling effects. Indeed, the mean values of most dependent variables are in the "agree" range. This is likely because of social desirability bias in the survey. However, there is substantial variation across dependent variables, and a significant number of respondents chose 3 or less on the 1 to 5 scale. Thus, the fact that we still find results with these data suggests that there are no concerns about ceiling effects.

Table SI.1.1: Individual Level Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Min	Max	SD	Mean	Median
Diversity	0.00	0.79	0.15	0.59	0.64
Pct. Not Forward	0.00	1.00	0.26	0.50	0.45
Contact	0.00	1.00	0.15	0.62	0.60
Contact (Forward/Backward)	0.00	1.00	0.18	0.62	0.60
Spend Wisely	1.00	5.00	1.03	4.12	4.00
Opinions	1.00	5.00	0.88	4.31	5.00
Valid Concerns	1.00	5.00	1.32	3.55	4.00
One Group	1.00	5.00	0.87	4.17	4.00
Caste Trust	1.00	5.00	0.93	3.68	4.00
Talk	1.00	5.00	0.90	4.10	4.00
Neighbor	1.00	5.00	1.24	3.66	4.00
Committee Positive Interaction	0.00	1.00	0.38	0.82	1.00
Enthusiastic	1.00	5.00	0.75	4.43	5.00
Angry	1.00	5.00	1.04	1.88	2.00
Hopeful	1.00	5.00	1.44	3.49	4.00
Resentful	1.00	5.00	1.02	1.84	2.00
Donation	0.00	1.00	0.31	0.11	0.00
Age	24.00	70.00	7.72	47.38	48.00
Female	0.00	1.00	0.50	0.44	0.00
Year Elected	1974.00	2019.00	5.73	2012.17	2015.00
Caste Reservation	0.00	1.00	0.40	0.20	0.00
Brahmin	0.00	1.00	0.29	0.09	0.00
OF	0.00	1.00	0.49	0.42	0.00
OBC	0.00	1.00	0.43	0.24	0.00
SC	0.00	1.00	0.30	0.10	0.00
ST	0.00	1.00	0.16	0.03	0.00
Other Religion	0.00	1.00	0.33	0.12	0.00
BJP	0.00	1.00	0.50	0.55	1.00
INC	0.00	1.00	0.35	0.14	0.00
Bachelors Degree	0.00	1.00	0.50	0.55	1.00
Multi-Term	0.00	1.00	0.47	0.33	0.00
Social Media Active	0.00	1.00	0.50	0.43	0.00
Called Three Times	0.00	1.00	0.48	0.36	0.00

Table SI.1.2: Committee Level Descriptive Statistics

Variable	Min	Max	SD	Mean	Median
Committee Size	3.00	32.00	4.13	8.46	8.00
Diversity	0.00	0.79	0.18	0.56	0.61
Pct. Not Forward	0.00	1.00	0.29	0.52	0.50
Contact	0.00	0.85	0.12	0.62	0.63
Contact (Forward/Backward)	0.00	1.00	0.14	0.62	0.64
Spend Wisely	1.00	5.00	0.65	4.11	4.22
Opinions	2.00	5.00	0.57	4.30	4.41
Valid Concerns	1.00	5.00	0.71	3.55	3.67
One Group	2.50	5.00	0.58	4.14	4.14
Caste Trust	2.00	5.00	0.64	3.69	3.67
Talk	2.00	5.00	0.55	4.10	4.00
Neighbor	1.00	5.00	0.73	3.63	3.73
Committee Positive Interaction	0.00	1.00	0.27	0.81	1.00
Enthusiastic	2.00	5.00	0.56	4.39	4.50
Angry	1.00	4.00	0.70	1.93	2.00
Hopeful	1.00	5.00	0.92	3.50	3.67
Resentful	1.00	5.00	0.82	1.87	1.67
Donation	0.00	1.00	0.22	0.12	0.00
Age	36.00	59.00	4.64	47.64	47.75
Female	0.00	1.00	0.31	0.46	0.50
Year Elected	1995.00	2019.00	3.66	2012.21	2013.17
Caste Reservation	0.00	1.00	0.31	0.24	0.05
Brahmin	0.00	1.00	0.18	0.09	0.00
OF	0.00	1.00	0.32	0.39	0.39
OBC	0.00	1.00	0.31	0.26	0.20
SC	0.00	1.00	0.20	0.10	0.00
ST	0.00	1.00	0.16	0.04	0.00
Other Religion	0.00	1.00	0.23	0.12	0.00
BJP	0.00	1.00	0.40	0.56	0.59
INC	0.00	1.00	0.21	0.15	0.00
Bachelors Degree	0.00	1.00	0.29	0.56	0.50
Multi-Term	0.00	1.00	0.30	0.33	0.29
Social Media Active	0.00	1.00	0.30	0.42	0.43
Called Three Times	0.00	1.00	0.33	0.35	0.33
Number Surveyed	1.00	11.00	2.06	3.76	3.50

SI.2: Sampling Procedure and Treatment Assignment

This study relies on data from data from municipal corporations in five Indian states. In this section, I explain the process for selecting the states from which to collect data, the data collection process, the sampling process, and the treatment assignment.

The goal in selecting states in which to conduct the survey was to maximize the number of municipal corporations and municipal corporation committees that I could survey. To achieve this goal, I began by accessing and reading the municipal corporation acts for each of the 27 Indian states. In reading these documents, I determined basic information about the composition of the municipal corporation and the number of committees. States set the structure of their corporations to either include only ward committees or to include one or more general (sometimes called standing) committees usually with ward committees. I excluded all states that only had ward committees with no general committees. I then attempted to calculate the number of committees and the number of councillors on each committee to get an estimate of total sample size. I based this estimate off of available committee lists on the websites of as many municipal corporations as I could access. Most municipal corporations do not list committee membership on their websites, so this is a biased estimate.

As a result of this process, eight states emerged where I estimated that there were many committees with many members on each committee. These states were: Gujarat, Karnataka, Kerala, Orissa, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal. Tamil Nadu was excluded because no elected councillors existed at the time of the survey; elections had been postponed for many years and bureaucrats ran the government. I also excluded Orissa and Rajasthan because they had fewer municipal corporations than other states and because the remaining five states provided good geographic variance, variance in caste salience, and variance in municipal corporation authority.

These five states (Gujarat, Karnataka, Kerala, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal) collec-

7

tively have 55 municipal corporations. Morsel collected contact information for councillors in these 55 corporations from November 2, 2019 through March 27, 2020. The data collection process worked as follows:

- File a Right to Information Act request with each municipal corporation for the list of councillors and their phone numbers.

- Wait one month for the reply to the RTI. If no response, call the corporation secretary and inquire about the RTI status. File a second RTI if necessary.

- If a corporation still did not reply to the RTI (few did), send a trained survey enumerator to each corporation to attempt to collect the information in person. This procedure typically required several visits to the corporation offices and a lot of persistence.

After going through this procedure, Morsel obtained complete contact information for 25 of the 55 municipal corporations. There were three reasons why Morsel was unable to obtain contact information for committee members in a municipal corporation:

- No Committee: Despite the state municipal corporation acts expressly dictating that each corporation contain a certain number of committees, 15 corporations lacked any committee. Hence, no contact information could be obtained.

- Not Available: In 9 corporations, data is theoretically available, but could not be collected. Part of the data collection occurred during the coronavirus pandemic. Though Morsel was able to complete contact information collection in most corporations before the March 24, 2020 Government of India lockdown, some corporations still had not responded by that date. For this reason, these corporations were necessarily excluded.

- No Authority: Many corporations in West Bengal claimed that Morsel did not have proper authority to obtain contact information for municipal councillors and that permission was needed from the Chief Minister or litigation was required. Neither of these options were feasible.

Table SI.2.1 lists each corporation with its status and Figure SI.2.1 displays a map with the same information where the size of a given point represents the population of the corporation.

Table SI.2.1: Municipal Corporation Data Collection

	UP	WB	Karnataka	Gujarat	Kerala
Included	Agra, Aligarh, Allahbad, Ayodhya, Bareily, Gorakhpur, Jhansi, Kanpur, Morabad, Saharanpur, Varanasi	Siliguri	Bangalore, Mysore	Ahmedabad, Surat, Vadodra, Rajkot, Bhavnagar, Jamnagar	Kollam, Thrissur, Kochi, Kozhikode, Thiruvananthapuram
No Committee	Faizabad, Lucknow, Meerut, Mathura, Shahjahanpur, Ghaziabad	English Bazar, Maheshtala, Barasat, Dum Dum, Baharampur	Mangaluru, Tumkuru, Shivamogga		
Not Available			Hubbali, Kalaburgi, Belagavi, Davangere, Ballari, Vijaypura	Junagdh, Gandhinagar	Kannur
No Authority		Kolkata, Asansol, Durgapur, Bidhannagar-Rajarhat, Serampore, Chandannagar, Barrackpore			

List of 55 Municipal Corporations with data collection status.

Upon obtaining the names and phone numbers for each corporator, Morsel phoned each

Figure SI.2.1: Map of Municipal Corporations Where Data Collection Occurred

Map of India with points representing each municipal corporation with its data collection status. Point sizes reflect population in the corporation.

corporator and asked the pre-survey questions. This was done to ensure that the corporator had a working phone number and to collect information about corporators whose phone numbers did not work. For example, Morsel asked other corporators in the corporation to verify information about a corporator who could not be reached via phone.

As a result of this process, Morsel collected contact information for 872 corporators. I took this contact information and assigned Morsel to ask each corporator about a specific committee to which they were a member. There are 146 committees across the 25 municipal corporations. I only asked corporators about committees with at least three members, as two members constitute a pair, not a committee. In Uttar Pradesh (except Muradabad), Karnataka, Kerala, and West Bengal, each corporator belonged to only one committee, so I asked about that committee. In Gujarat, each corporator belonged to up to five committees. I assigned each corporator to a committee to maximize the number of committees I asked about in the survey.

I then prepared a call sheet for Morsel to use to complete the survey consisting of half of the total corporators. Corporators were block randomized into the call sheet based on whether the corporator's seat was reserved or not. The call sheet was then purely randomized. Morsel was instructed to survey each person on the call sheet so as not to only collect information from those who answered their phone the first time Morsel called. Indeed, respondents were called up to ten times in order to get them to complete the survey. After completing the call sheet, Morsel contacted 45 additional respondents from the other half of the total corporators, starting with those at the top of the list of remaining corporators.

Only 48 of 455 respondents contacted did not participate for a completion rate of 90%.[1] This completion rate is incredibly high, so there is no concern about selection bias for only surveying those available or willing to participate. Of those who refused, the most common reasons were not being interested or not having time.

---

[1]Twenty-eight of the 45 respondents from the other half of the corporators responded; no data is recorded for the remaining 17 respondents.

SI.3: Randomization and Balance Checks

Table SI.3.1 shows a multinomial logistic regression model where the dependent variable is the treatment indicator. Only age predicts assignment to the treatment, supporting the claim that the treatment was randomly assigned. The Wald Test assesses whether the covariates have more combined predictive power than a restricted model with just an intercept; it is not significant.

Table SI.3.1: Randomization Check

	Dependent variable:
	Treated
Female	−0.109
	(0.227)
Age	0.037**
	(0.015)
Social Media Active	0.382
	(0.236)
Bachelors Degree	−0.119
	(0.239)
Multi-Term	−0.281
	(0.244)
BJP	−0.468
	(0.358)
INC	−0.129
	(0.383)
Called Three Times	0.139
	(0.252)
Caste Reservation	−0.063
	(0.311)
Constant	−0.298
	(1.098)
Wald Test	1.27
Corporation Fixed Effects	✓
Note:	*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Multinomial logistic regression.

Table SI.3.2 displays mean values for treated and control units as well as a Welsh Two Sample t-test indicating whether the covariate individually predicts the profile attribute assignment. Only two individual covariates significantly predict profile attribute assignment. Thus, individual covariates were successfully randomized for each profile attribute.

Table SI.3.2: Individual Covariate Balance

	Mean 1	Mean 0	Estimate	Std. Error	p-value
Female	0.42	0.42	-0.04	0.05	0.48
Age	48.46	46.69	0.01	0.00	0.01
Social Media	0.48	0.50	0.10	0.05	0.06
Education	0.55	0.60	0.00	0.05	0.99
Years Served	0.31	0.34	-0.07	0.05	0.22
BJP	0.49	0.55	-0.12	0.05	0.01
INC	0.15	0.18	0.03	0.07	0.64
Times Called	0.34	0.37	-0.05	0.05	0.34
Reserved	0.19	0.23	-0.05	0.06	0.42
Brahmin	0.08	0.11	-0.08	0.09	0.32
OF	0.40	0.40	-0.03	0.05	0.54
SC	0.09	0.11	-0.01	0.08	0.89
ST	0.03	0.03	-0.04	0.15	0.77
OBC	0.26	0.25	0.05	0.06	0.39
Other Religion	0.14	0.10	0.07	0.08	0.35

OLS regressions of each covariate on the specified attribute with standard errors and p-values. Mean 1 refers to when the specified attribute was 1, Mean 0 refers to when the specified attribute was 0. OLS p-values are equivalent to Welch Two Sample t-tests.

SI.4: Affect Toward the Cabinet Classification

I present seven different methods for classifying affect toward the cabinet from the four emotion questions that appear post-treatment. According to Gubler and Karpowitz (2019), the minimum residual Bartlett method is the most accurate. Thus, the main text presents results from the minimum residual Bartlett method.

Figure SI.4.1 displays bi-plots for each factor analysis method employed in the analysis. The arrows represent the loadings for each emotion question. Interestingly, the four emotion questions do load onto two dimensions, but with one question contributing to both dimensions.

Tables SI.4.1 and SI.4.2 display the correlations between each of the seven factor analysis methods and the LPA method. Correlations are broken up between pleasant factors in columns in Table SI.4.1 and unpleasant factors in columns in Table SI.4.2.

Figure SI.4.2 shows these individuals visually with their scores on the pleasant valence questions (enthusiastic and hopeful) on the y axis and for the unpleasant valence questions (angry and resentful) on the x axis. Colors indicate the affective state. As is clear from the Figure, a substantial proportion of respondents have weak or mixed affective states.

Table SI.4.3 displays the number of respondents classified into each affective state for each of the seven analysis methods. Here we see that the factor analysis methods are quite consistent.

Table SI.4.4 displays pseudo-correlations between affective state classifications since affective states are categorical variables.

Figure SI.4.2 shows affective state classifications for the minimum residual Bartlett factor analysis method. Dotted lines separate the affective states. Axes are the factor loadings multiplied by the pleasant (enthusiastic and hopeful) and unpleasant (angry and resentful) emotion question responses.

Figure SI.4.3 displays the same minimum residual Bartlett factor analysis scores, but

with the points colored to represent the number of factor analysis methods that classify an individual in the same affective state. As is clear from the Figure, the vast majority of factor analysis methods are consistent and individuals are classified in the same affective state seven times.

Figure SI.4.1: FA Dimension Plots

Seven factor analysis methods applied to four emotion questions with two factors. Each emotion question is shown with a blue arrow.

Table SI.4.1: Correlations Between Pleasant Factors

	Minres Reg	Minres Bartlett	Maxlik Reg	Maxlik Bartlett	PA Reg	PA Bartlett	PCA
Minres Reg	1.00	0.93	1.00	0.93	0.98	0.89	0.96
Minres Bartlett	0.93	1.00	0.90	1.00	0.98	1.00	0.94
Maxlik Reg	1.00	0.90	1.00	0.91	0.96	0.86	0.95
Maxlik Bartlett	0.93	1.00	0.91	1.00	0.98	0.99	0.95
PA Reg	0.98	0.98	0.96	0.98	1.00	0.97	0.95
PA Bartlett	0.89	1.00	0.86	0.99	0.97	1.00	0.90
PCA	0.96	0.94	0.95	0.95	0.95	0.90	1.00
Unpl. Minres Reg	0.51	0.14	0.56	0.17	0.32	0.07	0.37
Unpl. Minres Bartlett	0.38	0.00	0.44	0.03	0.19	-0.07	0.24
Unpl. Maxlik Reg	0.50	0.14	0.55	0.16	0.32	0.06	0.37
Unpl. Maxlik Bartlett	0.37	-0.01	0.42	0.01	0.18	-0.09	0.23
Unpl. PA Reg	0.52	0.16	0.57	0.18	0.34	0.08	0.38
Unpl. PA Bartlett	0.43	0.06	0.49	0.09	0.25	-0.02	0.30
Unpl. PCA	0.30	-0.08	0.36	-0.05	0.11	-0.16	0.16

Correlations between seven affective state classification methods; pleasant dimension is unlabeled, Unpl. is the unpleasant dimension.

Table SI.4.2: Correlations Between Unpleasant Factors

	Unpl. Minres Reg	Unpl. Minres Bartlett	Unpl. Maxlik Reg	Unpl. Maxlik Bartlett	Unpl. PA Reg	Unpl. PA Bartlett	Unpl. PCA
Minres Reg	0.51	0.38	0.50	0.37	0.52	0.43	0.30
Minres Bartlett	0.14	0.00	0.14	-0.01	0.16	0.06	-0.08
Maxlik Reg	0.56	0.44	0.55	0.42	0.57	0.49	0.36
Maxlik Bartlett	0.17	0.03	0.16	0.01	0.18	0.09	-0.05
PA Reg	0.32	0.19	0.32	0.18	0.34	0.25	0.11
PA Bartlett	0.07	-0.07	0.06	-0.09	0.08	-0.02	-0.16
PCA	0.37	0.24	0.37	0.23	0.38	0.30	0.16
Unpl. Minres Reg	1.00	0.99	1.00	0.99	1.00	1.00	0.97
Unpl. Minres Bartlett	0.99	1.00	0.99	1.00	0.99	1.00	0.99
Unpl. Maxlik Reg	1.00	0.99	1.00	0.99	1.00	1.00	0.97
Unpl. Maxlik Bartlett	0.99	1.00	0.99	1.00	0.99	1.00	0.99
Unpl. PA Reg	1.00	0.99	1.00	0.99	1.00	1.00	0.97
Unpl. PA Bartlett	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	1.00	0.98
Unpl. PCA	0.97	0.99	0.97	0.99	0.97	0.98	1.00

Correlations between seven affective state classification methods; pleasant dimension is unlabeled, Unpl. is the unpleasant dimension.

Table SI.4.3: Affective State Classification

Method	Pleasant	Unpleasant	Mixed	Weak
Minres Regression	91	53	146	116
Maxlik Regression	91	50	149	116
Minres Bartlett	108	96	102	96
Maxlik Bartlett	108	99	103	96
Principal Axis Regression	102	69	130	105
Principal Axis Bartlett	109	97	102	98
PCA	112	77	126	91

Affective State classification for seven classification methods.

Table SI.4.4: Cramer's V Correlation Between Categorical Variables

	Minres Reg	Minres Bartlett	Maxlik Reg	Maxlik Bartlett	PA Reg	PA Bartlett	PCA
Minres Reg	1.00	0.82	0.99	0.82	0.91	0.83	0.83
Minres Bartlett	0.82	1.00	0.82	1.00	0.89	0.98	0.86
Maxlik Reg	0.99	0.82	1.00	0.82	0.90	0.82	0.83
Maxlik Bartlett	0.82	1.00	0.82	1.00	0.89	0.98	0.86
PA Reg	0.91	0.89	0.90	0.89	1.00	0.90	0.84
PA Bartlett	0.83	0.98	0.82	0.98	0.90	1.00	0.84
PCA	0.83	0.86	0.83	0.86	0.84	0.84	1.00

Pseudo-correlation between seven affective state classifications.

Figure SI.4.2: Minres Bartlett Affective States

Minimum residual Bartlett factor analysis with two factors to produce four affective states. Axes are factor loadings multiplied by pleasant (enthusiastic and hopeful) and unpleasant (angry and resentful) factors. Dashed lines represent separation into affective states. Colors indicate affective states calculated from the factor analysis.

Figure SI.4.3: Number of FA Methods with Same Affective State Classification

Number of FA Methods with Same Affective State Classification

Minimum residual Bartlett factor analysis with two factors to produce four affective states. Axes are factor loadings multiplied by pleasant (enthusiastic and hopeful) and unpleasant (angry and resentful) factors. Dashed lines represent separation into affective states. Colors indicate the total number of factor analysis methods (out of seven) that classify an individual in the same affective state.

SI.5:   Committee Diversity and Contact Coding

The measures of committee diversity and contact used in this analysis rely on identifying the ethnicity of municipal corporators. The committee diversity measure uses ethnic group membership directly by aggregating ethnicity at the committee level. The contact measure captures contact by retaining only the frequency of contact with outgroup members and, thus, relies on successfully identifying members of the outgroup.

The first step is to decide on the appropriate ethnic categories used to categorize municipal corporators. In the United States, ethnic categorization has become relatively standardized because social and political ethnic categories tend to align. In India, no such consensus exists because caste groupings are socially constructed in different ways in the social and political sphere and across cities and states. Therefore, I need to be precise in my conceptualization of politically relevant caste groupings, as the categorization system I choose will necessarily impact the results I obtain.

I define ethnic categorization as the combination of caste and religion. The term "caste" traditionally refers to jatis or sub-jatis of which there are thousands of such groups. Much of the political conversation surrounding caste occurs at the varna level, where each varna comprises a large number of jatis. Castes are typically classified into one of four varnas as dictated by the Rig Veda: Brahmin, Kshatriya, Vaishya, and Shudra. Some individuals are termed Backward Classes and are granted special provisions — or reservations — by the government. Castes and tribes may petition the government to be included as a member of a Scheduled Caste (SC), Scheduled Tribe (ST), or Other Backward Class (OBC). Those not included in reservations are considered forward castes and are typically separated into Brahmins and other forward castes (OF).

I am interested in classifying individuals into salient, caste-based political groups that are relevant across Indian states. As such, my focus is on caste categories, not on jatis or sub-jatis. I group individuals into six caste categories: Brahmin, OF, SC, ST, OBC,

21

and Other Religion (Muslim, Christian, Sikh, et. cetera). These categories represent the most politically salient ethnic distinctions that are relevant across Indian states. Political representation of SCs, STs, and OBCs in legislatures and cabinets is an ongoing topic of conversation throughout India. The distinction between Brahmins and all other forward caste members reflects the traditional predominance of Brahmins in politics and the low salience of the other varnas with respect to one another. [2]

Ethnicity coding is an incredibly complex topic, and there is no method that guarantees accuracy. There are two existing approaches: name classification and archival research.

Name classification involves making an educated guess about caste or religious membership based on the corporator's name. The basic intuition is that names have been historically linked to particular caste categories such that hearing a given name will trigger an association with a caste category (Banerjee et al., 2009; Jayaraman, 2005). Experts (Mateos, Webber and Longley, 2007), online workers on crowdsourcing sites (Shah and Davis, 2017), and many different algorithms can be used to classify names. Algorithmic classification is becoming increasingly popular to code caste, and the typically algorithmic method uses training data from matrimonial website profiles (Bhagavatula et al., 2017; Chen, Chittoor and Vissa, 2015; Vissa, 2011).

An alternative to name classification is to conduct archival research. Archival research entails trying to find caste information about specific individuals, not just those who happen to share a person's name (Narain and Sharma, 1972). As such, if we are trying to classify Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi we would need to find information stating Modi's caste category; we would not rely on any signal that the surname Modi provided or our knowledge of the caste category of other people named Narendra Modi.

Finally, corporators could be asked to reveal their caste on a survey. Though caste membership is a common political topic, asking for caste identification on a survey is relatively rare.

---

[2]Another reason for adopting these six categories is replicability and comparability; the largest social survey in India (Desai and Vanneman, 2015) uses these categories.

Accuracy is an important question to consider when employing any of these methods. One concern is social desirability bias. Social desirability bias can occur whenever individuals are asked to self-report their caste or religious membership. Matrimonial website data severely under-reports individuals from lower castes likely due in part to users mis-representing or hiding their caste membership (Bhagavatula et al., 2017; Rajadesingan, Mahalingam and Jurgens, 2019).

Similarly, ethnic categorization is a contentious topic, and asking individuals to self-identify may produce socially desirable responses. The ethnic categorization question on this survey experiment appears at the very end to eliminate any treatment contamination. As a result, respondents have been asked a number of questions about inter-ethnic relations including a donation question that explicitly asks respondents to donate to backward caste welfare. Socially desirable responses in this context are both those wherein a backward caste respondent affiliates with a forward caste and where a forward caste respondent affiliates with a backward caste. In the former case, the respondent is cued on caste and does not wish to reveal her backward caste status and, therefore, claims forward caste membership. However, in the latter case, the respondent learns from the content of the survey that the questions are directed toward backward caste welfare and identifies as that group because they believe that is what the survey enumerator wants.

Second, there are often differences between ways in which caste or religion are employed. Caste (and to a lesser extent religious) categories can be constructed in at least four ways: self-identification, government identification, political construction, and social construction. Self-identification refers to how individuals classify themselves. These self-categorizations may change depending on the context in which the question is asked or based on events and life experiences. Government identification in India refers mostly to caste categories that need to register in order to obtain certain government benefits. Political construction is based on how caste and caste identity is portrayed in politics. A political party can target a certain group of people and assert that they are part of a shared caste category,

for example. Finally, social caste relations are based on relationships among citizens and the caste categories citizens perceive each other belonging to. These four ways that caste is employed often align, but sometimes diverge.

For the purposes of this study, I am most interested in how others perceive someone's caste or religious category, not necessarily how people self-identify. Outward perceptions of ethnicity are wrapped up in government, political, and social conceptions of caste and religion. For example, if someone holds a reserved seat in the corporation, then I argue that this person will be outwardly perceived as belonging to the caste category associated with that reserved seat, even if the person self-identifies differently. Similarly, cues about a person's caste categorization — like their name or what local people think their caste categorization is — are more influential for how others perceive them and their caste compared to self-identification.

Classification Approach

To classify the caste of these corporators, I first cross-reference corporator names with official Indian election results and code all corporators who won seats reserved for SCs, STs, or OBCs. The caste coding for these individuals is exact: we know for certain that a corporator is a SC, ST, or OBC if they were elected in such a constituency (even if they may self-identify otherwise).

Of course not all individuals who are SCs, STs, or OBCs run in reserved constituencies, and public records do little to help classify individuals into other ethnic categories. Absent a coding based on electoral lists, I moved to expert name classification. Local knowledge is key to successful name-caste or religious coding: I employed a specially trained native Indian coder to perform the coding and provided detailed instructions about how the coding should proceed. First, I provided the coder with a list of all unique surnames that remained to be coded in the dataset. The coder was instructed to only classify surnames where the surname clearly indicated caste or religious affiliation. Each name coding was accompanied

24

by a confidence level of high (90%+ confident), medium (75%-90% confident), or low (less than 75% confident). I then manually reviewed each surname coding and compared it to both local knowledge and archival research conducted on approximately 5% of the sample. I deemed a surname coding accurate when it was coded with either high or medium confidence and passed the manual review.

After completing surname classification, I took all remaining names and provided the coder with the full name of the corporator, their state of residence, gender, and the name of the corporation. This information helped her classify names that often belong to different castes depending on state. It also enabled her to perform basic Internet research on the history of certain surnames similar to Damaraju and Makhija (2018)'s approach. Again, the coder provided confidence levels for her coding and we conducted a spot check of 5% of the sample. All names not classified with at least a medium level of confidence were left for more intensive review.

Remaining surnames were subjected to a more intensive evaluation of archival records.[3] First, additional Internet research was performed in order to try to find available caste or religious information about specific corporators. If this failed, an expert coder contacted journalists and local sources in the corporator's municipal corporation to obtain an exact coding.

This classification approach is used in the main analysis.

Self-Coding Classification

In addition to the classification approach discussed above, corporators that participated in the survey experiment were asked to self-identify their ethnic category. This question was necessarily included at the very end of the survey as a post-treatment demographic variable.

Apart from the issues with ethnic self-identification described above, the post-treatment nature of this question meant that respondents were fully aware that the survey was about

---

[3]In previous work, I have used the *People of India Project* (Singh, 1996) book to provide further surname classification, but this book has proved to have limited use.

ethnic relationships and even, based on the donation question, that the survey was asking about their experiences with lower caste individuals. Thus, social desirability bias is likely extremely high in this situation.

Further, I would highlight that the survey took place on the phone which is more impersonal than a face-to-face interview, so corporators are freer to self-identify with whatever ethnicity they so choose without fear of retribution.

As a robustness check, I substituted the available ethnic self-identification for the main classification method. The particular method used did not substantively impact the results.

Calculating Diversity

The diversity measure is the Herfindahl-Hirschman index, written as $1 - \sum_{i=1}^{p} x_i^2$ where x_i represents the percentage of each of the ethnic categories present in a given committee and p is the number of caste categories (6) (Jensenius and Suryanarayan, 2015; Lancee and Dronkers, 2011; Tallman and Li, 1996).[1] If one caste category dominates the committee, the index is low (close to 0); if groups are relatively equal in size, the index is high (close to 1) (Harrison and Klein, 2007).

Comparing Classification Methods

Since there are two ethnic classification methods available for use in this study, it is worth comparing them in an attempt to figure out why discrepancies between the two methods might exist.

First, Figures SI.5.1 and SI.5.2 compare the relationship between coded and self-reported diversity and contact. It is clear from both Figures that the correlation between the two ways of measuring caste is strong, especially for contact where the correlation exceeds 0.75. These strong relationships likely explain why I obtain consistent results across measures.

Beyond correlating these two measures, I wanted to investigate specific discrepancies that occurred in the ethnicity coding to better understand why these discrepancies took place.

Figure SI.5.1: Committee Diversity Comparison

Coded and Self−Reported Diversity

Points represent coded diversity compared to self-reported diversity for each respondent. Regression line shown with 95% confidence intervals.

Figure SI.5.2: Contact Comparison

Coded and Self−Reported Contact

Points represent coded contact and self-reported contact with outgroups. Regression line shown with 95% confidence intervals.

Table SI.5.1 shows the overall number of corporators coded in a given state and the number of discrepancies identified in a given state. There are slight differences, but in general, the percentage of discrepancies is in line with the percentage of corporators in each state.

Table SI.5.1: Overall and Discrepancies by State

Method	Overall (Pct.)	Discrepancies (Pct.)
Gujarat	323 (0.37)	116 (0.46)
Karnataka	85 (0.10)	17 (0.07)
Kerala	317 (0.36)	91 (0.36)
Uttar Pradesh (0.13)	114	23 (0.09)
West Bengal	33 (0.04)	6 (0.03)

Table SI.5.2 shows the overall number of corporators coded with a given method and the number of discrepancies identified with this method. As is evident from the table, discrepancies do not occur based on the coding method. What is also interesting to note is that a quarter of the discrepancies that occurred resulted from corporator names coded using reservation status. There is almost no error in coding reservation status — either a seat is reserved for a particular caste or it is not. So these discrepancies are all individuals who contradict publicly available caste information. Additionally, archival work was just as precise. My experts used local sources to code ethnicity and described both the method used and why each coding was appropriate. Yet, a fifth of the discrepancies came from archival coded names. These two facts reinforce some of the potential issues with coding ethnicity using self-identification in survey responses. Neither ethnic coding method produces "wrong" results, but self-identification may not match the public perceptions of ethnicity that are important for characterizing committee diversity and contact.

Table SI.5.2: Overall and Discrepancies by Coding Type

Method	Overall (Pct.)	Discrepancies (Pct.)
Reservation	188 (0.22)	61 (0.24)
Surname	323 (0.37)	96 (0.38)
Full Name	172 (0.20)	45 (0.18)
Archival	179 (0.21)	47 (0.19)
Guess	10 (0.01)	4 (0.02)

With this in mind, I move to discussing the specific discrepancies. For each discrepancy, I first consulted with experts about the specific discrepancy and why it might be occurring. Second, I conducted archival research on ethnic categorization in each state to determine the likelihood of this discrepancy occurring. The goal was to provide some rationale for why each discrepancy might exist. I coded each discrepancy on a two point scale: 1 indicated that there was no reason to doubt the ethnicity coding method, whereas 0 indicated that the accuracy of the ethnicity coding method was in question. Based on these criteria, a discrepancy was coded "0" when the difference between the ethnicity coding and self-identification was not plausible or when the self-identification method was most likely correct. When the discrepancy made sense or the ethnicity coding method was most likely correct, the discrepancy was coded as "1."

Starting in Gujarat, of the 116 discrepancies, 100 were coded as 1 and 16 were coded as 2, meaning that 86% of the ethnicity codings in Gujarat made sense. Most of the discrepancies that were coded as "1" were the result of corporators who were coded as OF claiming to be SC, ST, or OBC. There are widespread movements occurring in Gujarat to redefine OF as a backward caste in order to obtain reservations. On the other hand, there is still a stigma associated with claiming to be a member of a reserved caste category, so a number of SC, ST, or OBC members may be claiming to be OF for this reason.

Of the 17 discrepancies in Karnataka, 15 were coded as 1 and 2 were coded as 0. That is, 88% of Karnataka ethnicity codings made sense and were likely correct after further investigation. Most discrepancies in Karnataka occurred in reserved constituencies, where OBCs tended to self-report that they were OF. This is quite a common type of discrepancy which indicates an unwillingness to reveal ones' actual ethnic category either because of social desirability or potential discrimination.

Moving to Kerala, of the 91 discrepancies 86 were coded as 1 and 5 were coded as 0. Hence, 95% of Kerala ethnicity codings made sense and were likely correct after further investigation. An investigation of the 86 names where ethnicity coding was likely correct

revealed several patterns. First, many corporators were ethnicity coded as a backward caste, but self-reported belonging to OF. This is again due to an unwillingness to reveal their actual ethnic category and confusion over the reservations system in Kerala. Toward the latter point, a number of jatis receive reservations, but consider themselves to be OF. Additionally, a large number of corporators self-reported belonging to OF when they were categorized as other religion. This is because Muslims and Christians often place themselves into a caste category (usually OF) instead of identifying only with their religion.

In Uttar Pradesh, of the 23 discrepancies, 20 were coded as 1 and 3 as 0. This represents 87% of ethnicity codings in Uttar Pradesh that made sense and were likely correct after further investigation. The discrepancies that were likely correct were mostly individuals categorized as OF who identified as a backward caste. Recent BJP actions in Uttar Pradesh have sought to include new groups in the OBC list and to move OBCs to the SC reservation list, meaning that there are incentives for forward caste members to self-identify as backward castes.

Finally, of the 6 discrepancies in West Bengal, 4 were coded as 1 and 2 as 0. This is a relatively low percentage of discrepancies that made sense and were likely correct (67%), but there are few cases to examine.

All told, 225 of the 253 discrepancies (89%) could be explained and justified. 28 discrepancies (11%) were most likely errors in ethnicity coding. Most of the discrepancies that could be justified resulted from differences in the ways in which each coding procedure conceptualized caste and caste identity. Self-identification allowed respondents to profess the caste identity that they felt connected to, regardless of whether it matched their reservation status or the way they are treated in society. Caste groups trying to redefine themselves can do so in the self-identification measure, whereas the caste coding measure attempts to classify individuals based on the prevailing political understanding of their caste. As shown below, robustness checks using either measure do not influence the results. In the main text, I prioritize ethnicity coding over self-identification because the procedure used to arrive at

the ethnicity coding is consistent and ethnicity coding better reflects political realities of how diversity and contact are viewed within a state.

SI.6: Results in the Main Text

Figure SI.6.1 shows the correlation between diversity and contact.

Table SI.6.1 displays regression results for diversity and contact, whereas Table SI.6.2 displays ordinal multilevel model results for these same variables.

Table SI.6.3 displays regression results for the treatment alongside diversity and contact, whereas Table SI.6.4 displays ordinal multilevel model results for these same variables.

Figure SI.6.1: Measuring Diversity and Contact

Correlation between contact and diversity using caste category measure and foward/backward measure. Regression line and 95% confidence intervals shown.

Table SI.6.1: Diversity and Contact

	Dependent variable:											
	Pleasant	Unpleasant	Mixed	Weak	Spend Wisely	Opinions	Valid Concerns	One Group	Caste Trust	Neighbor	Talk	Donation
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Contact	−0.006	0.099	0.421**	−0.513**	−0.106	−0.103	0.053	0.022	0.133*	0.246**	0.234***	0.098
	(0.144)	(0.192)	(0.188)	(0.204)	(0.109)	(0.074)	(0.137)	(0.086)	(0.078)	(0.108)	(0.078)	(0.151)
Diversity	0.402*	−0.371	0.167	−0.198	0.008	−0.015	−0.070	−0.001	0.027	0.017	0.002	−0.124
	(0.225)	(0.243)	(0.174)	(0.260)	(0.096)	(0.080)	(0.172)	(0.076)	(0.132)	(0.158)	(0.076)	(0.187)
Female	0.011	0.007	0.017	−0.035	−0.006	0.013	−0.022	0.001	0.008	0.002	0.019	0.013
	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.037)	(0.040)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.039)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.029)	(0.020)
Age	0.004	0.003	0.003	−0.010***	−0.002	−0.002	−0.002	−0.002	0.0002	0.006**	0.004***	−0.002
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Social Media Active	0.159**	−0.010	0.028	−0.177***	−0.037	0.002	−0.087*	−0.038*	0.066**	0.063	0.098***	−0.002
	(0.065)	(0.034)	(0.043)	(0.049)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.047)	(0.021)	(0.031)	(0.047)	(0.027)	(0.045)
Bachelor Degree	−0.032	0.062	0.050	−0.080	−0.039**	−0.050*	−0.040	−0.050**	0.018	0.087***	−0.005	0.033
	(0.044)	(0.058)	(0.037)	(0.053)	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.038)	(0.025)	(0.014)	(0.033)	(0.019)	(0.025)
Multi-Term	−0.014	−0.012	0.020	0.006	−0.030	−0.025	−0.036	0.010	−0.029	−0.075***	−0.004	0.059**
	(0.036)	(0.042)	(0.049)	(0.043)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.038)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.027)
BJP	−0.013	0.053	−0.064*	0.025	−0.009	−0.003	−0.019	0.009	−0.021	0.064	−0.058*	0.047
	(0.069)	(0.065)	(0.035)	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.030)	(0.054)	(0.024)	(0.033)	(0.046)	(0.032)	(0.043)
INC	−0.037	0.168**	−0.084	−0.047	0.012	−0.066*	0.001	−0.043	−0.032	0.106***	−0.025	0.072
	(0.066)	(0.078)	(0.068)	(0.038)	(0.044)	(0.034)	(0.042)	(0.027)	(0.033)	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.055)
Called Three Times	−0.110	0.051	0.024	0.035	0.012	−0.004	0.114***	−0.017	−0.045**	0.002	−0.023	−0.091**
	(0.070)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.035)	(0.032)	(0.027)	(0.037)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.036)	(0.031)	(0.041)
Caste Reservation	0.042	−0.006	−0.069	0.034	0.009	0.002	0.006	0.021	−0.043	0.073**	0.006	−0.045**
	(0.063)	(0.045)	(0.061)	(0.047)	(0.043)	(0.023)	(0.071)	(0.024)	(0.043)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.022)
Constant	−0.179	0.273	−0.215	1.121***	0.714***	1.005***	0.598***	0.969***	0.707***	0.257*	0.529***	0.232
	(0.214)	(0.189)	(0.190)	(0.313)	(0.104)	(0.083)	(0.154)	(0.083)	(0.141)	(0.137)	(0.060)	(0.144)
Observations	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Linear regression models with dependent variables standardized between 0 and 1, corporation fixed effects, and cluster robust standard errors.

Table SI.6.2: Diversity and Contact Multilevel

	Dependent variable:											
	Pleasant	Unpleasant	Mixed	Weak	Spend Wisely	Opinions	Valid Concerns	One Group	Caste Trust	Neighbor	Talk	Donation
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
(Intercept)	−3.01***	−1.82	−5.50***	4.59***								−2.29
	(1.13)	(1.15)	(1.32)	(1.30)								(1.61)
Contact	−0.33	0.70	3.48***	−3.27***	−2.00***	−1.84**	0.65	−0.46	0.81	1.46**	1.70**	1.44
	(0.86)	(0.90)	(1.00)	(1.02)	(0.75)	(0.77)	(0.65)	(0.74)	(0.69)	(0.68)	(0.73)	(1.27)
Diversity	1.57	−1.55	1.31	−1.18	0.33	−0.39	−0.56	−0.27	0.05	0.81	0.14	−1.36
	(1.00)	(1.02)	(1.05)	(1.03)	(0.80)	(0.79)	(0.67)	(0.82)	(0.78)	(0.69)	(0.80)	(1.37)
Female	−0.05	0.10	0.15	−0.26	−0.09	0.02	−0.02	−0.01	0.00	0.01	0.24	0.20
	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.30)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.37)
Age	0.01	0.02	0.03*	−0.07***	−0.02*	−0.03*	−0.00	−0.03**	−0.00	0.03**	0.03*	−0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Social Media Active	0.86***	−0.00	0.20	−1.39***	−0.29	−0.01	−0.46**	−0.44**	0.67***	0.50**	0.90***	0.07
	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.35)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.38)
Bachelors Degree	−0.22	0.38	0.42	−0.60*	−0.50**	−0.74***	−0.33	−0.55**	0.24	0.43**	−0.05	0.40
	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.32)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.20)	(0.23)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.40)
Multi-Term	0.08	−0.26	0.09	0.02	−0.10	−0.20	−0.28	0.20	−0.18	−0.54**	0.13	0.65*
	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.27)	(0.33)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.38)
BJP	0.71**	−0.52	−0.82**	1.00**	0.18	0.78***	−0.33	0.72**	0.14	0.44*	−0.14	0.88
	(0.36)	(0.38)	(0.34)	(0.43)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.21)	(0.34)	(0.30)	(0.24)	(0.32)	(0.54)
INC	0.28	0.47	−0.71*	0.08	0.19	−0.12	−0.14	−0.14	−0.13	0.61*	−0.03	0.91
	(0.43)	(0.39)	(0.41)	(0.55)	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.29)	(0.34)	(0.33)	(0.31)	(0.33)	(0.66)
Called Three Times	−0.40	0.04	−0.05	0.48	−0.02	0.14	0.42**	0.01	−0.33	0.03	−0.13	−0.99**
	(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.21)	(0.25)	(0.23)	(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.42)
Caste Reservation	0.32	−0.03	−0.32	0.10	−0.12	0.05	0.04	−0.17	−0.45	0.23	0.06	−0.73
	(0.31)	(0.34)	(0.35)	(0.37)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.23)	(0.29)	(0.28)	(0.25)	(0.28)	(0.55)
Observations	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Ordered and logistic multilevel regression models with corporation random effects.

Table SI.6.3: Treatment Effect

	Pleasant	Unpleasant	Mixed	Weak	Spend Wisely	Opinions	Valid Concerns	One Group	Caste Trust	Neighbor	Talk	Donation
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Treated	−0.025	−0.018	0.006	0.038	−0.020	0.032	−0.022	0.024	0.018	0.053	0.064***	0.009
	(0.046)	(0.041)	(0.045)	(0.054)	(0.038)	(0.026)	(0.034)	(0.046)	(0.026)	(0.034)	(0.023)	(0.021)
Diversity	0.409*	−0.365	0.166	−0.210	0.015	−0.024	−0.063	−0.009	0.022	0.001	−0.017	−0.127
	(0.233)	(0.241)	(0.174)	(0.256)	(0.094)	(0.077)	(0.169)	(0.233)	(0.133)	(0.157)	(0.074)	(0.190)
Contact	−0.005	0.100	0.420**	−0.515**	−0.105	−0.104	0.054	0.021	0.132*	0.244**	0.231***	0.097
	(0.145)	(0.192)	(0.188)	(0.204)	(0.110)	(0.074)	(0.136)	(0.145)	(0.076)	(0.111)	(0.082)	(0.152)
Female	0.010	0.007	0.017	−0.034	−0.006	0.013	−0.022	0.002	0.008	0.003	0.020	0.013
	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.039)	(0.048)	(0.021)	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.020)
Age	0.004	0.003	0.003	−0.010***	−0.001	−0.002	−0.002	−0.002	0.00005	0.005**	0.003**	−0.002
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Social Media Active	0.161**	−0.009	0.028	−0.180***	−0.036	−0.0005	−0.085*	−0.040	0.064**	0.059	0.093***	−0.003
	(0.065)	(0.034)	(0.044)	(0.049)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.047)	(0.065)	(0.030)	(0.047)	(0.025)	(0.045)
Bachelors Degree	−0.033	0.061	0.050	−0.078	−0.040**	−0.049*	−0.041	−0.050	0.018	0.089***	−0.003	0.033
	(0.044)	(0.058)	(0.036)	(0.052)	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.038)	(0.044)	(0.014)	(0.034)	(0.020)	(0.025)
Multi-Term	−0.016	−0.014	0.021	0.009	−0.031	−0.023	−0.037	0.012	−0.027	−0.071***	0.001	0.060**
	(0.037)	(0.042)	(0.050)	(0.044)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.040)	(0.037)	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.028)
BJP	−0.016	0.050	−0.063*	0.029	−0.011	0.001	−0.021	0.011	−0.019	0.070	−0.051	0.048
	(0.068)	(0.065)	(0.036)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.032)	(0.054)	(0.068)	(0.033)	(0.045)	(0.032)	(0.043)
INC	−0.038	0.167**	−0.084	−0.045	0.011	−0.065*	0.0002	−0.041	−0.031	0.108***	−0.022	0.072
	(0.065)	(0.078)	(0.067)	(0.039)	(0.045)	(0.034)	(0.042)	(0.065)	(0.034)	(0.040)	(0.035)	(0.055)
Called Three Times	−0.109	0.051	0.024	0.034	0.013	−0.005	0.114***	−0.018	−0.045**	0.001	−0.025	−0.091**
	(0.071)	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.036)	(0.031)	(0.027)	(0.037)	(0.071)	(0.022)	(0.035)	(0.030)	(0.041)
Caste Reservation	0.042	−0.006	−0.069	0.034	0.009	0.002	0.005	0.021	−0.043	0.074**	0.007	−0.045**
	(0.063)	(0.045)	(0.061)	(0.048)	(0.044)	(0.023)	(0.071)	(0.063)	(0.044)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.022)
Constant	−0.174	0.277	−0.216	1.113***	0.718***	0.998***	0.602***	0.964***	0.704***	0.247*	0.516***	0.230
	(0.211)	(0.186)	(0.192)	(0.311)	(0.107)	(0.083)	(0.156)	(0.211)	(0.142)	(0.131)	(0.059)	(0.143)
Observations	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Linear regression models with dependent variables standardized between 0 and 1, corporation fixed effects, and cluster robust standard errors.

Table SI.6.4: Treatment MLM

	Pleasant	Unpleasant	Mixed	Weak	Spend Wisely	Opinions	Valid Concerns	One Group	Caste Trust	Neighbor	Talk	Donation
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
(Intercept)	−3.02***	−1.83	−5.49***	4.65***								−2.48
	(1.13)	(1.15)	(1.32)	(1.30)								(1.59)
Treated	−0.13	−0.14	0.12	0.27	−0.22	0.22	−0.11	0.18	0.15	0.30	0.59***	0.32
	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.30)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.37)
Diversity	1.60	−1.49	1.28	−1.23	0.40	−0.44	−0.56	−0.32	0.01	0.73	0.04	−1.38
	(1.00)	(1.02)	(1.05)	(1.04)	(0.80)	(0.79)	(0.67)	(0.82)	(0.78)	(0.70)	(0.80)	(1.34)
Contact	−0.31	0.72	3.49***	−3.34***	−1.99***	−1.86**	0.68	−0.46	0.81	1.40**	1.67**	1.23
	(0.86)	(0.90)	(1.00)	(1.02)	(0.75)	(0.77)	(0.65)	(0.74)	(0.69)	(0.68)	(0.73)	(1.27)
Female	−0.05	0.09	0.15	−0.26	−0.09	0.02	−0.03	−0.01	0.01	0.02	0.25	0.26
	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.31)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.37)
Age	0.01	0.02	0.03*	−0.07***	−0.02*	−0.03**	−0.00	−0.04**	−0.00	0.03**	0.02	−0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Social Media Active	0.88***	0.01	0.19	−1.42***	−0.27	−0.03	−0.45**	−0.46**	0.66***	0.48**	0.86***	−0.00
	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.36)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.38)
Bachelors Degree	−0.22	0.38	0.43	−0.59*	−0.50**	−0.74***	−0.33	−0.55**	0.25	0.44**	−0.04	0.40
	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.32)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.20)	(0.23)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.40)
Multi-Term	0.07	−0.28	0.11	0.02	−0.12	−0.17	−0.29	0.21	−0.17	−0.51**	0.17	0.66*
	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.27)	(0.33)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.38)
BJP	0.69*	−0.55	−0.81**	1.01**	0.16	0.80***	−0.34	0.73**	0.16	0.47*	−0.07	0.90*
	(0.36)	(0.39)	(0.34)	(0.44)	(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.22)	(0.33)	(0.30)	(0.25)	(0.33)	(0.53)
INC	0.27	0.46	−0.71*	0.08	0.19	−0.12	−0.14	−0.14	−0.13	0.61*	−0.00	0.89
	(0.44)	(0.39)	(0.40)	(0.55)	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.29)	(0.34)	(0.33)	(0.31)	(0.34)	(0.64)
Called Three Times	−0.40	0.05	−0.06	0.48	−0.01	0.13	0.42**	−0.00	−0.34	0.02	−0.13	−0.99**
	(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.21)	(0.25)	(0.23)	(0.21)	(0.24)	(0.42)
Caste Reservation	0.32	−0.03	−0.32	0.11	−0.13	0.05		−0.16	−0.45	0.25	0.06	
	(0.31)	(0.34)	(0.35)	(0.37)	(0.27)	(0.27)		(0.29)	(0.28)	(0.25)	(0.28)	
Observations	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Ordered and logistic multilevel regression models with corporation random effects.

SI.7: Diversity and Contact Robustness Checks

I start by measuring diversity as the Percent Not Forward and contact between only forward and backward castes. Figure SI.7.1 displays coefficient point estimates for linear regression models with dependent variables normalized to between 0 and 1, corporation fixed effects, and cluster robust standard errors by corporation.

Table SI.7.1 displays regression results for diversity and contact, whereas Table SI.7.2 displays ordinal multilevel model results for these same variables.

I then measure ethnicity using self-reported information where available. Figure SI.7.2 displays coefficient point estimates for linear regression models with dependent variables normalized to between 0 and 1, corporation fixed effects, and cluster robust standard errors by corporation.

Table SI.7.3 displays regression results for diversity and contact, whereas Table SI.7.4 displays ordinal multilevel model results for these same variables.

Figure SI.7.3 displays coefficient point estimates for linear regression models with dependent variables normalized to between 0 and 1, state fixed effects, and cluster robust standard errors by state.

Table SI.7.5 displays regression results for diversity and contact, whereas Table SI.7.6 displays ordinal multilevel model results for these same variables.

Finally, Figure SI.7.4 displays coefficient point estimates for linear regression models with dependent variables normalized to between 0 and 1, corporation fixed effects, and cluster robust standard errors by corporation. These models include an additional variable, *Crime*, that is the logged total crimes committed against SCs and STs in 2017 as reported by the National Crime Records Bureau for a given corporation. Note that the crime figures for Siliguri include both the Darjeeling and Jalpaiguri districts, since Siliguri is located partly in both districts.

Table SI.7.7 displays regression results for diversity and contact, whereas Table SI.7.8

displays ordinal multilevel model results for these same variables.

Figure SI.7.1: Diversity and Contact Forward Backward

Coefficient estimates for diversity and contact on normalized dependent variables where estimates are from linear regression models with corporation fixed effects with cluster robust standard errors by corporation.

Figure SI.7.2: Self-Reported Diversity and Contact

Coefficient estimates for diversity and contact on normalized dependent variables where estimates are from linear regression models with corporation fixed effects with cluster robust standard errors by corporation.

Figure SI.7.3: Diversity and Contact State Fixed Effects

Coefficient estimates for diversity and contact on normalized dependent variables where estimates are from linear regression models with state fixed effects with cluster robust standard errors by state.

Figure SI.7.4: Diversity and Contact with Crime

Coefficient estimates for diversity and contact on normalized dependent variables where estimates are from linear regression models with corporation fixed effects with cluster robust standard errors by corporation.

Table SI.7.1: Diversity and Contact Forward Backward

	Pleasant	Unpleasant	Mixed	Weak	Spend Wisely	Opinions	Valid Concerns	One Group	Caste Trust	Neighbor	Talk	Donation
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Contact	0.005	0.199	0.247	−0.450***	−0.173*	−0.120**	−0.055	0.097	0.114*	0.217**	0.151*	0.154
	(0.162)	(0.197)	(0.170)	(0.149)	(0.091)	(0.060)	(0.123)	(0.080)	(0.059)	(0.101)	(0.077)	(0.144)
Pct. Not Forward	0.460**	−0.164	−0.147	−0.149	−0.149	−0.061	−0.103	0.018	−0.033	0.142	−0.013	0.011
	(0.232)	(0.166)	(0.092)	(0.203)	(0.126)	(0.077)	(0.085)	(0.092)	(0.076)	(0.117)	(0.109)	(0.178)
Female	0.043	0.047	−0.010	−0.080*	−0.013	0.015	−0.043	−0.004	0.022	0.034*	0.034	0.009
	(0.051)	(0.067)	(0.057)	(0.047)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.046)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.031)	(0.024)
Age	0.005**	0.003**	0.003	−0.012***	−0.001	−0.002	−0.004	−0.002	0.001	0.007***	0.004***	−0.002
	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Social Media Active	0.167**	−0.023	0.036	−0.180***	−0.042	0.001	−0.104**	−0.050**	0.070**	0.052	0.092***	−0.013
	(0.066)	(0.035)	(0.047)	(0.052)	(0.030)	(0.025)	(0.050)	(0.025)	(0.033)	(0.049)	(0.031)	(0.047)
Bachelors Degree	−0.021	0.049	0.055	−0.083	−0.026	−0.029	−0.016	−0.049*	0.024	0.095**	0.004	0.039
	(0.051)	(0.061)	(0.049)	(0.057)	(0.021)	(0.028)	(0.040)	(0.027)	(0.018)	(0.037)	(0.025)	(0.029)
Multi-Term	−0.034	−0.021	0.049	0.007	−0.033	−0.043*	−0.027	0.007	−0.031	−0.122***	−0.026	0.055**
	(0.036)	(0.046)	(0.054)	(0.043)	(0.034)	(0.025)	(0.036)	(0.028)	(0.028)	(0.034)	(0.028)	(0.025)
BJP	−0.002	−0.026	−0.053	0.081*	0.014	−0.017	0.028	−0.028	−0.003	0.067	−0.073**	0.005
	(0.064)	(0.076)	(0.043)	(0.046)	(0.061)	(0.028)	(0.047)	(0.030)	(0.037)	(0.058)	(0.030)	(0.053)
INC	−0.027	0.075	−0.042	−0.006	0.037	−0.082**	0.065*	−0.093***	−0.046	0.122**	−0.048	−0.005
	(0.071)	(0.110)	(0.101)	(0.031)	(0.053)	(0.036)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.053)	(0.036)	(0.074)
Called Three Times	−0.096	0.065	0.032	−0.001	−0.008	−0.011	0.094**	−0.029	−0.034	0.045	−0.004	−0.078**
	(0.076)	(0.048)	(0.053)	(0.033)	(0.038)	(0.027)	(0.043)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.037)	(0.031)	(0.030)
Caste Reservation	0.036	−0.014	−0.021	−0.001	0.010	−0.015	−0.009	0.011	−0.040	0.072*	0.003	−0.065**
	(0.075)	(0.058)	(0.074)	(0.051)	(0.049)	(0.026)	(0.073)	(0.029)	(0.052)	(0.039)	(0.032)	(0.027)
Constant	−0.188	0.071	0.017	1.100***	0.781***	1.063***	0.698***	0.959***	0.699***	0.167	0.552***	0.112
	(0.192)	(0.170)	(0.163)	(0.253)	(0.121)	(0.079)	(0.185)	(0.071)	(0.106)	(0.121)	(0.096)	(0.095)
Observations	333	333	333	333	333	333	333	333	333	333	333	333

Dependent variable:

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Linear regression models with dependent variables standardized between 0 and 1, corporation fixed effects, and cluster robust standard errors.

44

Table SI.7.2: Diversity and Contact Forward Backward Multilevel

	Pleasant	Unpleasant	Mixed	Weak	Spend Wisely	Opinions	Valid Concerns	One Group	Caste Trust	Neighbor	Talk	Donation
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
(Intercept)	−2.68**	−3.62***	−4.10***	5.33***								−3.28**
	(1.07)	(1.16)	(1.14)	(1.38)								(1.56)
Contact	−0.40	1.33	1.92**	−3.31***	−2.19***	−1.90***	0.18	0.22	0.58	1.36**	1.11*	2.44*
	(0.81)	(0.85)	(0.83)	(1.07)	(0.65)	(0.68)	(0.63)	(0.68)	(0.65)	(0.64)	(0.60)	(1.25)
Pct. Not Forward	0.98	0.74	0.65	−2.53**	−2.03***	−1.29**	0.29	−1.67**	−0.75	0.45	−0.85*	−1.32
	(0.86)	(0.82)	(0.75)	(1.06)	(0.57)	(0.59)	(0.57)	(0.77)	(0.66)	(0.62)	(0.51)	(1.25)
Female	0.05	0.31	−0.05	−0.49	−0.10	−0.01	−0.03	−0.12	0.09	0.19	0.28	0.23
	(0.28)	(0.29)	(0.28)	(0.36)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.41)
Age	0.01	0.03	0.03*	−0.08***	−0.02	−0.03**	−0.01	−0.04**	0.00	0.04***	0.02*	−0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)
Social Media Active	0.97***	−0.12	0.25	−1.59***	−0.28	0.05	−0.55**	−0.56**	0.71***	0.46**		−0.07
	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.28)	(0.42)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.23)		(0.42)
Bachelors Degree	−0.14	0.29	0.48	−0.50	−0.44*	−0.65***	−0.23	−0.44*	0.36	0.51**	0.35	0.49
	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.38)	(0.23)	(0.25)	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.46)
Multi-Term	−0.05	−0.34	0.23	−0.08	−0.05	−0.40*	−0.22	0.22	−0.20	−0.85***	−0.00	0.61
	(0.29)	(0.31)	(0.29)	(0.37)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.42)
BJP	0.90**	−0.91**	−0.87**	1.23**	0.23	0.75***	−0.14	0.71**	0.41	0.48*	0.27	0.36
	(0.42)	(0.37)	(0.36)	(0.52)	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.25)	(0.36)	(0.30)	(0.28)	(0.24)	(0.58)
INC	0.45	0.03	−0.62	0.40	0.23	−0.21	0.14	−0.31	−0.15	0.73**	0.00	0.10
	(0.49)	(0.41)	(0.42)	(0.65)	(0.33)	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.36)	(0.36)	(0.34)	(0.32)	(0.74)
Called Three Times	−0.26	0.19	−0.11	0.12	−0.24	−0.02	0.36	−0.08	−0.24	0.32		−1.00**
	(0.31)	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.36)	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.23)	(0.26)	(0.24)	(0.23)		(0.48)
Caste Reservation		−0.09	−0.24	0.31	−0.02	0.10	−0.07	−0.09	−0.35	0.34		−0.35
		(0.39)	(0.38)	(0.45)	(0.28)	(0.30)	(0.28)	(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.29)		(0.61)
Observations	333	333	333	333	333	333	333	333	333	333	333	333

Dependent variable:

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Ordered and logistic multilevel regression models with corporation random effects.

Table SI.7.3: Diversity and Contact Self-Reported

	Pleasant	Unpleasant	Mixed	Weak	Spend Wisely	Opinions	Valid Concerns	One Group	Caste Trust	Neighbor	Talk	Donation
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Contact	0.188	0.200	0.350**	−0.737***	−0.094	−0.014	−0.124	−0.075	0.192*	0.341**	0.360***	0.090
	(0.165)	(0.161)	(0.156)	(0.223)	(0.105)	(0.078)	(0.115)	(0.107)	(0.099)	(0.154)	(0.067)	(0.171)
Diversity Self-Reported	0.011	0.210	−0.095	−0.126	−0.157	−0.171*	−0.135	−0.056	−0.001	0.067	−0.026	0.063
	(0.198)	(0.226)	(0.209)	(0.194)	(0.165)	(0.089)	(0.137)	(0.067)	(0.084)	(0.179)	(0.121)	(0.138)
Female	0.023	0.014	0.017	−0.055	−0.017	0.002	−0.029	−0.004	0.020	0.011	0.025	0.034
	(0.053)	(0.046)	(0.034)	(0.042)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.039)	(0.020)	(0.019)	(0.024)	(0.027)	(0.025)
Age	0.004*	0.003	0.003	−0.010***	−0.003	−0.002	−0.002	−0.002	0.0003	0.006**	0.003***	−0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Social Media Active	0.148**	−0.021	0.034	−0.161***	−0.041	0.007	−0.079*	−0.034*	0.062*	0.058	0.087***	0.009
	(0.062)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.047)	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.046)	(0.018)	(0.033)	(0.045)	(0.026)	(0.040)
Bachelors Degree	−0.017	0.063	0.051	−0.097**	−0.033*	−0.068**	−0.039	−0.049**	0.018	0.087***	−0.004	0.014
	(0.035)	(0.054)	(0.035)	(0.049)	(0.019)	(0.028)	(0.038)	(0.022)	(0.014)	(0.031)	(0.018)	(0.027)
Multi-Term	−0.020	−0.013	0.038	−0.004	−0.029	−0.030	−0.024	0.010	−0.020	−0.071***	0.003	0.054**
	(0.033)	(0.044)	(0.051)	(0.043)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.041)	(0.023)	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.025)
BJP	0.011	0.050	−0.070*	0.009	−0.005	−0.008	−0.026	0.010	−0.027	0.067	−0.048*	0.033
	(0.077)	(0.061)	(0.036)	(0.053)	(0.046)	(0.030)	(0.052)	(0.024)	(0.031)	(0.043)	(0.026)	(0.049)
INC	−0.031	0.158**	−0.074	−0.053	0.026	−0.069**	0.011	−0.041	−0.023	0.103***	−0.027	0.044
	(0.065)	(0.080)	(0.066)	(0.038)	(0.044)	(0.031)	(0.041)	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.039)	(0.037)	(0.062)
Called Three Times	−0.120*	0.051	0.016	0.053	0.007	0.001	0.112***	−0.012	−0.050**	−0.001	−0.023	−0.076*
	(0.066)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.028)	(0.036)	(0.021)	(0.022)	(0.037)	(0.028)	(0.039)
Caste Reservation	0.059	−0.009	−0.061	0.011	0.006	−0.003	0.005	0.018	−0.043	0.081**	0.015	−0.045*
	(0.062)	(0.043)	(0.051)	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.023)	(0.070)	(0.024)	(0.045)	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.025)
Constant	−0.055	−0.191	0.019	1.226***	0.853***	1.074***	0.750***	1.057***	0.695***	0.169	0.473***	0.079
	(0.212)	(0.165)	(0.189)	(0.268)	(0.122)	(0.090)	(0.190)	(0.081)	(0.100)	(0.157)	(0.078)	(0.163)
Observations	402	402	402	402	402	402	402	402	402	402	402	402

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Linear regression models with dependent variables standardized between 0 and 1, corporation fixed effects, and cluster robust standard errors.

Table SI.7.4: Diversity and Contact Self-Reported Multilevel

	Dependent variable:											
	Pleasant	Unpleasant	Mixed	Weak	Spend Wisely	Opinions	Valid Concerns	One Group	Caste Trust	Neighbor	Talk	Donation
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
(Intercept)	−3.14**	−3.35**	−3.06**	4.12**								−3.58**
	(1.26)	(1.45)	(1.43)	(1.61)								(1.74)
Contact	0.73	1.20	2.72***	−5.12***	−1.66**	−1.09	−0.53	−1.49*	1.19*	1.96***	2.74***	0.80
	(0.86)	(0.91)	(0.91)	(1.13)	(0.74)	(0.76)	(0.63)	(0.76)	(0.72)	(0.70)	(0.76)	(1.18)
Diversity Self-Reported	0.68	0.03	−1.60	1.22	0.30	−0.29	−1.00	−0.03	0.25	0.56	0.30	0.71
	(1.23)	(1.35)	(1.34)	(1.61)	(1.19)	(1.29)	(0.89)	(1.16)	(1.06)	(0.96)	(1.10)	(1.72)
Female	0.04	0.13	0.15	−0.32	−0.16	−0.06	−0.09	−0.09	0.13	0.04	0.32	0.40
	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.30)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.34)
Age	0.01	0.03	0.03	−0.07***	−0.03**	−0.03*	−0.00	−0.03**	0.00	0.03***	0.03**	−0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Social Media Active	0.79***	−0.05	0.20	−1.30***	−0.29	0.05		−0.39*	0.64***	0.50**	0.85***	0.11
	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.26)	(0.36)	(0.21)	(0.22)		(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.36)
Bachelors Degree	−0.15	0.42	0.47*	−0.62**	−0.48**	−0.92***	−0.45**	−0.56**	0.23	0.45**	−0.04	0.25
	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.32)	(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.37)
Multi-Term	0.05	−0.26	0.19	0.00	−0.13	−0.27	−0.21	0.20	−0.11	−0.52**	0.19	0.52
	(0.26)	(0.28)	(0.26)	(0.32)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.35)
BJP	0.78**	−0.55	−0.90***	0.99**	0.26	0.67**	−0.32	0.72**	0.07	0.46*	−0.11	0.75
	(0.34)	(0.38)	(0.32)	(0.44)	(0.30)	(0.33)	(0.21)	(0.33)	(0.30)	(0.25)	(0.31)	(0.48)
INC	0.25	0.45	−0.66*	0.12	0.28	−0.15	−0.03	−0.14	−0.05	0.59*	−0.09	0.53
	(0.43)	(0.39)	(0.39)	(0.54)	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.29)	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.31)	(0.33)	(0.60)
Called Three Times	−0.45	0.07	−0.12	0.62**	−0.02	0.16	0.49**	0.07	−0.38*	−0.02	−0.15	−0.79**
	(0.28)	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.30)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.20)	(0.25)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.38)
Caste Reservation	0.31	−0.01	−0.24	−0.05	−0.19	−0.02		−0.23	−0.45*	0.25	0.10	−0.48
	(0.30)	(0.33)	(0.32)	(0.38)	(0.27)	(0.27)		(0.29)	(0.27)	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.48)
Observations	402	402	402	402	402	402	402	402	402	402	402	402

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Ordered and logistic multilevel regression models with corporation random effects.

Table SI.7.5: Diversity and Contact State Fixed Effects

	Pleasant	Unpleasant	Mixed	Weak	Spend Wisely	Opinions	Valid Concerns	One Group	Caste Trust	Neighbor	Talk	Donation
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Contact	−0.002	0.013	0.450**	−0.460***	−0.094	−0.052	0.073	0.027	0.151**	0.301*	0.232***	0.124
	(0.109)	(0.284)	(0.229)	(0.168)	(0.064)	(0.084)	(0.128)	(0.040)	(0.075)	(0.177)	(0.069)	(0.181)
Diversity	0.366**	−0.299**	0.080	−0.147*	0.058	0.023	−0.098	−0.015	−0.022	0.071	0.008	−0.072
	(0.149)	(0.130)	(0.070)	(0.087)	(0.106)	(0.073)	(0.084)	(0.033)	(0.067)	(0.062)	(0.036)	(0.095)
Female	0.009	0.011	0.020	−0.040	−0.021	0.011	−0.023	0.003	0.010	−0.003	0.017	0.014
	(0.042)	(0.034)	(0.024)	(0.030)	(0.020)	(0.032)	(0.023)	(0.019)	(0.021)	(0.030)	(0.031)	(0.018)
Age	0.004	0.003	0.003	−0.010***	−0.002	−0.001	−0.002	−0.002*	0.001	0.006***	0.003***	−0.002
	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.003)
Social Media Active	0.162*	−0.011	0.031	−0.182**	−0.047***	0.014	−0.087	−0.039***	0.075*	0.078	0.102***	0.013
	(0.089)	(0.049)	(0.042)	(0.088)	(0.018)	(0.026)	(0.073)	(0.009)	(0.040)	(0.073)	(0.036)	(0.056)
Bachelors Degree	−0.043	0.080	0.057	−0.095	−0.043***	−0.070***	−0.040	−0.051*	0.018	0.076***	−0.010	0.019
	(0.040)	(0.082)	(0.046)	(0.100)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.028)	(0.018)
Multi-Term	0.002	−0.027	0.019	0.006	−0.012	−0.033	−0.029*	0.009	−0.038	−0.092***	−0.015	0.048
	(0.021)	(0.050)	(0.014)	(0.037)	(0.034)	(0.035)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.025)	(0.015)	(0.016)	(0.047)
BJP	−0.035	0.018	−0.027	0.044	0.0004	0.012	−0.013	0.020*	−0.031***	0.045**	−0.031	0.038
	(0.068)	(0.057)	(0.032)	(0.036)	(0.042)	(0.016)	(0.035)	(0.011)	(0.012)	(0.018)	(0.019)	(0.046)
INC	−0.023	0.122***	−0.058**	−0.040	0.013	−0.062**	−0.006	−0.051*	−0.027***	0.099***	−0.007	0.054
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.025)	(0.029)	(0.018)	(0.030)	(0.048)	(0.028)	(0.009)	(0.038)	(0.009)	(0.076)
Called Three Times	−0.092	0.037*	0.019	0.036	0.007	−0.004	0.103*	−0.017	−0.052	0.004	−0.019	−0.084***
	(0.100)	(0.021)	(0.067)	(0.068)	(0.017)	(0.026)	(0.059)	(0.029)	(0.042)	(0.047)	(0.026)	(0.021)
Caste Reservation	0.057	−0.011	−0.072	0.025	−0.006	0.010	−0.014	0.010	−0.024***	0.069**	0.010	−0.066***
	(0.061)	(0.031)	(0.046)	(0.032)	(0.028)	(0.016)	(0.029)	(0.018)	(0.007)	(0.028)	(0.010)	(0.012)
Constant	−0.028	0.103	−0.347***	1.273***	0.995***	1.004***	0.742***	0.999***	0.660***	0.108***	0.505***	0.181***
	(0.132)	(0.187)	(0.116)	(0.215)	(0.053)	(0.098)	(0.056)	(0.048)	(0.084)	(0.031)	(0.057)	(0.051)
Observations	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Linear regression models with dependent variables standardized between 0 and 1, state fixed effects, and cluster robust standard errors.

Table SI.7.6: Diversity and Contact State Fixed Effects MLM

	Pleasant	Unpleasant	Mixed	Weak	Spend Wisely	Opinions	Valid Concerns	One Group	Caste Trust	Neighbor	Talk	Donation
	Dependent variable:											
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
(Intercept)	−3.24***	−1.71	−5.01***	4.15***								−1.75
	(1.18)	(1.19)	(1.38)	(1.34)								(1.59)
Contact	−0.07	0.28	3.32***	−2.94***	−2.02***	−1.55**	0.65	−0.13	0.93	1.52**	1.87***	1.55
	(0.87)	(0.91)	(1.01)	(1.03)	(0.75)	(0.77)	(0.65)	(0.73)	(0.68)	(0.68)	(0.71)	(1.25)
Diversity	1.79*	−1.67*	0.93	−0.87	0.56	−0.08	−0.56	−0.08	−0.20	0.69	0.35	−0.95
	(0.98)	(0.95)	(1.05)	(1.02)	(0.74)	(0.80)	(0.67)	(0.77)	(0.71)	(0.69)	(0.73)	(1.27)
Female	0.01	0.07	0.15	−0.32	−0.16	0.02	−0.02	0.02	0.05	−0.01	0.28	0.17
	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.31)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.37)
Age	0.02	0.02	0.03	−0.06***	−0.02*	−0.02*	−0.00	−0.03**	0.00	0.03**	0.03**	−0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Social Media Active	0.91***	−0.03	0.21	−1.41***	−0.30	0.01	−0.46**	−0.45**	0.69***	0.51**	0.90***	0.18
	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.35)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.38)
Bachelors Degree	−0.28	0.44	0.42	−0.60*	−0.52**	−0.80***	−0.33	−0.57**	0.27	0.44**	−0.07	0.31
	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.32)	(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.40)
Multi-Term	0.01	−0.22	0.13	−0.03	−0.05	−0.26	−0.28	0.17	−0.26	−0.54**	0.06	0.58
	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.27)	(0.33)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.37)
BJP	0.12	−0.08	−0.39	0.59	0.01	0.33	−0.33	0.37	−0.19	0.37	−0.27	0.55
	(0.41)	(0.37)	(0.40)	(0.50)	(0.28)	(0.31)	(0.21)	(0.30)	(0.29)	(0.27)	(0.29)	(0.58)
INC	0.07	0.55	−0.49	−0.19	0.09	−0.31	−0.14	−0.33	−0.19	0.61**	−0.03	0.74
	(0.44)	(0.37)	(0.41)	(0.58)	(0.31)	(0.33)	(0.29)	(0.33)	(0.32)	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.64)
Called Three Times	−0.50*	0.19	0.07	0.35	−0.10	−0.01	0.42**	−0.18	−0.44**	0.03	−0.19	−0.96**
	(0.28)	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.21)	(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.41)
Caste Reservation	0.34	−0.10	−0.39	0.21	−0.06	0.16	0.04	−0.04	−0.25	0.35	0.08	−0.84
	(0.31)	(0.33)	(0.35)	(0.37)	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.23)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.55)
Observations	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Ordered and logistic multilevel regression models with state random effects.

Table SI.7.7: Diversity and Contact with Crime

	Pleasant	Unpleasant	Mixed	Weak	Spend Wisely	Opinions	Valid Concerns	One Group	Caste Trust	Neighbor	Talk	Donation
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Contact	−0.006	0.099	0.421**	−0.513**	−0.106	−0.103	0.053	0.022	0.133*	0.246**	0.234***	0.098
	(0.144)	(0.192)	(0.188)	(0.204)	(0.109)	(0.074)	(0.137)	(0.086)	(0.078)	(0.108)	(0.078)	(0.151)
Diversity	0.402*	−0.371	0.167	−0.198	0.008	−0.015	−0.070	−0.001	0.027	0.017	0.002	−0.124
	(0.225)	(0.243)	(0.174)	(0.260)	(0.096)	(0.080)	(0.172)	(0.076)	(0.132)	(0.158)	(0.076)	(0.187)
Female	0.011	0.007	0.017	−0.035	−0.006	0.013	−0.022	0.001	0.008	0.002	0.019	0.013
	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.037)	(0.040)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.039)	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.025)	(0.029)	(0.020)
Age	0.004	0.003	0.003	−0.010***	−0.002	−0.002	−0.002	−0.002	0.0002	0.006**	0.004***	−0.002
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Social Media Active	0.159**	−0.010	0.028	−0.177***	−0.037	0.002	−0.087*	−0.038*	0.066**	0.063	0.098***	−0.002
	(0.065)	(0.034)	(0.043)	(0.049)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.047)	(0.021)	(0.031)	(0.047)	(0.027)	(0.045)
Bachelors Degree	−0.032	0.062	0.050	−0.080	−0.039**	−0.050*	−0.040	−0.050**	0.018	0.087***	−0.005	0.033
	(0.044)	(0.058)	(0.037)	(0.053)	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.038)	(0.025)	(0.014)	(0.033)	(0.019)	(0.025)
Multi-Term	−0.014	−0.012	0.020	0.006	−0.030	−0.025	−0.036	0.010	−0.029	−0.075***	−0.004	0.059**
	(0.036)	(0.042)	(0.049)	(0.043)	(0.028)	(0.027)	(0.038)	(0.025)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.027)
BJP	−0.013	0.053	−0.064*	0.025	−0.009	−0.003	−0.019	0.009	−0.021	0.064	−0.058*	0.047
	(0.069)	(0.065)	(0.035)	(0.048)	(0.047)	(0.030)	(0.054)	(0.024)	(0.033)	(0.046)	(0.032)	(0.043)
INC	−0.037	0.168**	−0.084	−0.047	0.012	−0.066*	0.001	−0.043	−0.032	0.106***	−0.025	0.072
	(0.066)	(0.078)	(0.068)	(0.038)	(0.044)	(0.034)	(0.042)	(0.027)	(0.033)	(0.040)	(0.038)	(0.055)
Called Three Times	−0.110	0.051	0.024	0.035	0.012	−0.004	0.114***	−0.017	−0.045**	0.002	−0.023	−0.091**
	(0.070)	(0.045)	(0.045)	(0.035)	(0.032)	(0.027)	(0.037)	(0.021)	(0.023)	(0.036)	(0.031)	(0.041)
Caste Reservation	0.042	−0.006	−0.069	0.034	0.009	0.002	0.006	0.021	−0.043	0.073**	0.006	−0.045**
	(0.063)	(0.045)	(0.061)	(0.047)	(0.043)	(0.023)	(0.071)	(0.024)	(0.043)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.022)
Crime	0.503***	−0.925***	−0.580***	1.002***	0.695***	0.455***	0.388***	0.293***	−0.397***	−0.828***	−0.081	−0.354***
	(0.156)	(0.103)	(0.124)	(0.155)	(0.107)	(0.064)	(0.093)	(0.048)	(0.063)	(0.127)	(0.099)	(0.090)
Constant	−2.798***	5.092***	2.806***	−4.100***	−2.907***	−1.368***	−1.422**	−0.555*	2.773***	4.571***	0.952*	2.078***
	(0.956)	(0.636)	(0.775)	(1.050)	(0.601)	(0.325)	(0.573)	(0.303)	(0.446)	(0.698)	(0.536)	(0.570)
Observations	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Linear regression models with dependent variables standardized between 0 and 1, corporation fixed effects, and cluster robust standard errors.

Table SI.7.8: Diversity and Contact with Crime MLM

	Pleasant	Unpleasant	Mixed	Weak	Spend Wisely	Opinions	Valid Concerns	One Group	Caste Trust	Neighbor	Talk	Donation
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
(Intercept)	−4.53***	0.11	−4.83***	3.35**								−1.03
	(1.38)	(1.38)	(1.52)	(1.52)								(2.06)
Contact	−0.27	0.62	3.43***	−3.11***	−2.02***	−1.80**	0.66	−0.41	0.83	1.62**	1.72**	1.39
	(0.87)	(0.90)	(1.00)	(1.01)	(0.75)	(0.77)	(0.65)	(0.74)	(0.69)	(0.66)	(0.73)	(1.27)
Diversity	1.48	−1.23	1.30	−1.22	0.34	−0.39	−0.56	−0.32	0.03	0.89	0.12	−1.37
	(1.00)	(1.03)	(1.05)	(1.01)	(0.80)	(0.78)	(0.67)	(0.81)	(0.78)	(0.68)	(0.80)	(1.37)
Female	0.01	0.02	0.13	−0.19	−0.09	0.05	−0.02	0.02	0.02	0.00	0.26	0.15
	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.31)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.37)
Age	0.02	0.02	0.03*	−0.06***	−0.02*	−0.02*	−0.00	−0.03**	0.00	0.03**	0.03**	−0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Social Media Active	0.88***	−0.00	0.20	−1.37***	−0.29	−0.01	−0.46**	−0.44**	0.67***		0.90***	0.06
	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.35)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.21)		(0.22)	(0.39)
Bachelors Degree	−0.23	0.36	0.42	−0.62*	−0.50**	−0.74***	−0.33	−0.55**	0.25	0.55***	−0.05	0.41
	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.32)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.20)	(0.23)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.41)
Multi-Term	0.02	−0.21	0.12	−0.04	−0.09	−0.22	−0.28	0.17	−0.19	−0.49**	0.10	0.68*
	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.27)	(0.33)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.38)
BJP	0.56	−0.45	−0.73**	0.93**	0.21	0.69**	−0.33	0.64*	0.11	0.60**	−0.19	1.06*
	(0.35)	(0.37)	(0.35)	(0.44)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.23)	(0.33)	(0.30)	(0.24)	(0.32)	(0.58)
INC	0.20	0.49	−0.67	0.03	0.20	−0.18	−0.14	−0.18	−0.15	0.72**	−0.05	1.05
	(0.43)	(0.39)	(0.41)	(0.55)	(0.33)	(0.32)	(0.30)	(0.34)	(0.33)	(0.31)	(0.33)	(0.68)
Called Three Times	−0.45	0.05	−0.02	0.43	−0.02	0.12	0.42**	−0.02	−0.35	0.03	−0.14	−0.97**
	(0.29)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.21)	(0.25)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.43)
Caste Reservation	0.33	−0.08	−0.33	0.09	−0.13	0.06	0.04	−0.16	−0.45	0.21	0.06	−0.74
	(0.31)	(0.33)	(0.35)	(0.37)	(0.27)	(0.26)	(0.23)	(0.29)	(0.27)	(0.24)	(0.27)	(0.55)
Crime	0.36**	−0.45**	−0.15	0.26	−0.06	0.15	0.01	0.30	0.15	−0.25**	0.25	−0.30
	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.17)	(0.13)	(0.11)	(0.19)	(0.19)	(0.12)	(0.19)	(0.32)
Observations	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Ordered and logistic multilevel regression models with corporation random effects.

SI.8: Treatment Robustness Checks

Table SI.8.1 displays regression results for the treatment variable plus diversity and contact among just forward and backward groups. Table SI.8.2 displays the same results with logistic and ordered logistic multilevel models.

Table SI.8.3 displays regression results for the treatment variable plus diversity and contact using self-reported ethnic identification. Table SI.8.4 displays the same results with logistic and ordered logistic multilevel models.

Table SI.8.4 displays regression results for the treatment variable plus diversity and contact using state level fixed effects. Table SI.8.6 displays the same results with logistic and ordered logistic multilevel models.

Figure SI.8.1 displays marginal effects plots for each of the main dependent variables.

Table SI.8.9 displays regression results for the interaction between the treatment indicator and committee diversity. Table SI.8.10 displays ordinal multilevel model results for this same interaction.

Figure SI.8.2 displays marginal effects plots for each of the main dependent variables with forward and backward caste.

Table SI.8.11 displays regression results for the interaction between the treatment indicator and committee diversity with forward and backward caste. Table SI.8.12 displays ordinal multilevel model results for this same interaction.

Figure SI.8.3 displays marginal effects plots for each of the main dependent variables with self-reported caste.

Table SI.8.13 displays regression results for the interaction between the treatment indicator and committee diversity with self-reported caste. Table SI.8.14 displays ordinal multilevel model results for this same interaction.

Figure SI.8.4 displays marginal effects plots for each of the main dependent variables with state fixed effects.

Table SI.8.15 displays regression results for the interaction between the treatment indicator and committee diversity with state fixed effects. Table SI.8.16 displays ordinal multilevel model results for this same interaction.

Figure SI.8.5 displays marginal effects plots for each of the main dependent variables with the crime variable included.

Table SI.8.17 displays regression results for the interaction between the treatment indicator and committee diversity with the crime variable included. Table SI.8.18 displays ordinal multilevel model results for this same interaction.

Table SI.8.1: Treated Just Forward Backward

	Dependent variable:											
	Pleasant	Unpleasant	Mixed	Weak	Spend Wisely	Opinions	Valid Concerns	One Group	Caste Trust	Neighbor	Talk	Donation
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Treated	−0.021	−0.018	−0.009	0.048	−0.037	0.024	−0.016	0.040	0.008	0.036	0.056**	−0.001
	(0.047)	(0.043)	(0.045)	(0.060)	(0.044)	(0.023)	(0.041)	(0.047)	(0.028)	(0.038)	(0.024)	(0.025)
Contact	0.005	0.199	0.247	−0.451***	−0.173*	−0.120**	−0.055	0.096	0.114**	0.217**	0.150*	0.154
	(0.162)	(0.196)	(0.170)	(0.147)	(0.092)	(0.059)	(0.123)	(0.162)	(0.058)	(0.103)	(0.077)	(0.144)
Diversity	0.462**	−0.162	−0.146	−0.155	−0.145	−0.063	−0.101	0.014	−0.034	0.138	−0.020	0.011
	(0.231)	(0.165)	(0.093)	(0.201)	(0.124)	(0.079)	(0.085)	(0.231)	(0.076)	(0.118)	(0.107)	(0.178)
Female	0.043	0.047	−0.010	−0.079*	−0.014	0.015	−0.043	−0.003	0.022	0.034*	0.035	0.009
	(0.051)	(0.067)	(0.057)	(0.047)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.046)	(0.051)	(0.024)	(0.019)	(0.031)	(0.024)
Age	0.006**	0.003**	0.004	−0.013***	−0.001	−0.003*	−0.004	−0.002	0.001	0.007**	0.004***	−0.002
	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Social Media Active	0.168**	−0.021	0.037	−0.184***	−0.039	−0.001	−0.102**	−0.053	0.070**	0.049	0.087***	−0.013
	(0.066)	(0.035)	(0.048)	(0.052)	(0.028)	(0.025)	(0.050)	(0.066)	(0.032)	(0.049)	(0.029)	(0.047)
Bachelors Degree	−0.021	0.049	0.055	−0.083	−0.026	−0.029	−0.016	−0.049	0.024	0.096***	0.005	0.039
	(0.051)	(0.061)	(0.049)	(0.057)	(0.020)	(0.028)	(0.040)	(0.051)	(0.018)	(0.037)	(0.025)	(0.029)
Multi-Term	−0.037	−0.023	0.048	0.012	−0.036	−0.040	−0.029	0.012	−0.031	−0.118***	−0.020	0.055**
	(0.036)	(0.045)	(0.055)	(0.045)	(0.032)	(0.025)	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.030)	(0.033)	(0.028)	(0.025)
BJP	−0.004	−0.027	−0.053	0.084*	0.012	−0.015	0.027	−0.025	−0.002	0.069	−0.069**	0.005
	(0.063)	(0.077)	(0.043)	(0.047)	(0.063)	(0.028)	(0.047)	(0.063)	(0.037)	(0.057)	(0.029)	(0.053)
INC	−0.027	0.075	−0.042	−0.005	0.036	−0.081**	0.064*	−0.092	−0.045	0.123**	−0.046	−0.005
	(0.070)	(0.110)	(0.100)	(0.031)	(0.052)	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.070)	(0.035)	(0.052)	(0.033)	(0.074)
Called Three Times	−0.095	0.066	0.032	−0.003	−0.006	−0.012	0.094**	−0.030	−0.035	0.044	−0.006	−0.078**
	(0.076)	(0.048)	(0.054)	(0.033)	(0.036)	(0.028)	(0.042)	(0.076)	(0.025)	(0.036)	(0.029)	(0.031)
Caste Reservation	0.035	−0.015	−0.022	0.001	0.008	−0.014	−0.009	0.012	−0.039	0.074*	0.005	−0.065**
	(0.076)	(0.059)	(0.074)	(0.052)	(0.050)	(0.025)	(0.074)	(0.076)	(0.053)	(0.038)	(0.034)	(0.027)
Constant	−0.182	0.076	0.019	1.086***	0.792***	1.056***	0.702***	0.948***	0.696***	0.157	0.536***	0.112
	(0.195)	(0.170)	(0.166)	(0.251)	(0.128)	(0.078)	(0.181)	(0.195)	(0.109)	(0.115)	(0.096)	(0.095)
Observations	333	333	333	333	333	333	333	333	333	333	333	333

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Linear regression models with dependent variables standardized between 0 and 1, corporation fixed effects, and cluster robust standard errors.

Table SI.8.2: Treated Just Forward Backward MLM

	Pleasant	Unpleasant	Mixed	Weak	Spend Wisely	Opinions	Valid Concerns	One Group	Caste Trust	Neighbor	Talk	Donation
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
(Intercept)	−2.69**	−3.62***	−4.09***	5.33***								−3.26**
	(1.07)	(1.16)	(1.16)	(1.39)								(1.54)
Treated	−0.15	−0.15	0.12	0.41	−0.38*	0.18	−0.06	0.26	0.03	0.19	0.49**	0.24
	(0.27)	(0.29)	(0.51)	(0.35)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.21)	(0.24)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.43)
Contact	−0.43	1.35	1.92**	−3.36***	−2.17***	−1.93***	0.19	0.27	0.58	1.34**	0.77	2.41*
	(0.81)	(0.84)	(0.83)	(1.07)	(0.65)	(0.68)	(0.63)	(0.69)	(0.65)	(0.64)	(0.61)	(1.25)
Diversity	0.91	0.75	0.70	−2.57**	−2.01***	−1.31**	0.29	−1.57*	−0.75	0.44	−1.06*	−1.37
	(0.87)	(0.82)	(1.01)	(1.07)	(0.57)	(0.59)	(0.57)	(0.81)	(0.66)	(0.62)	(0.54)	(1.24)
Female	0.06	0.30	−0.05	−0.49	−0.12	−0.01	−0.04	−0.11	0.09	0.19	0.22	0.23
	(0.28)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.37)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.41)
Age	0.01	0.03	0.03*	−0.08***	−0.02	−0.03**	−0.01	−0.04***	0.00	0.04***	0.02	−0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.03)
Social Media Active	0.98***	−0.11	0.24	−1.65***	−0.25	0.04	−0.55**	−0.59**	0.71***	0.44*	0.77***	−0.09
	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.28)	(0.43)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.43)
Bachelors Degree	−0.15	0.29	0.48	−0.50	−0.44*	−0.64***	−0.23	−0.45*	0.36	0.52**	0.10	0.50
	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.38)	(0.23)	(0.25)	(0.22)	(0.25)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.46)
Multi-Term	−0.07	−0.37	0.26	−0.07	−0.10	−0.36	−0.23	0.23	−0.19	−0.83***	0.09	0.64
	(0.29)	(0.32)	(0.36)	(0.38)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.23)	(0.42)
BJP	0.87**	−0.93**	−0.88	1.26**	0.18	0.77***	−0.15	0.65*	0.42	0.49*	0.27	0.42
	(0.42)	(0.37)	(0.60)	(0.52)	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.25)	(0.38)	(0.30)	(0.28)	(0.26)	(0.58)
INC	0.43	0.02	−0.63	0.38	0.22	−0.20	0.14	−0.35	−0.15	0.73**	0.03	0.11
	(0.49)	(0.41)	(0.42)	(0.66)	(0.33)	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.38)	(0.36)	(0.34)	(0.32)	(0.73)
Called Three Times	−0.26	0.19	−0.15	0.12	−0.23	−0.03	0.36	−0.13	−0.25	0.30	0.13	−1.01**
	(0.31)	(0.33)	(0.62)	(0.36)	(0.24)	(0.25)	(0.23)	(0.27)	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.47)
Caste Reservation	0.19	−0.11	−0.25	0.34	−0.02	0.10	−0.07		−0.35	0.35	0.06	−0.34
	(0.35)	(0.39)	(0.44)	(0.45)	(0.28)	(0.30)	(0.28)		(0.30)	(0.29)	(0.28)	(0.62)
Observations	333	333	333	333	333	333	333	333	333	333	333	333

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Ordered and logistic multilevel regression models with corporation random effects.

Table SI.8.3: Treatment Self Reported

	Pleasant	Unpleasant	Mixed	Weak	Spend Wisely	Opinions	Valid Concerns	One Group	Caste Trust	Neighbor	Talk	Donation
						Dependent variable:						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Treated	−0.023	−0.025	0.002	0.046	−0.014	0.037	−0.021	0.028	0.017	0.043	0.057***	0.007
	(0.039)	(0.036)	(0.042)	(0.051)	(0.040)	(0.025)	(0.034)	(0.039)	(0.024)	(0.032)	(0.022)	(0.022)
Contact	0.189	0.201	0.349**	−0.739***	−0.093	−0.015	−0.123	−0.076	0.191**	0.339**	0.357***	0.090
	(0.167)	(0.161)	(0.156)	(0.222)	(0.107)	(0.077)	(0.115)	(0.167)	(0.096)	(0.157)	(0.071)	(0.172)
Diversity	0.013	0.211	−0.095	−0.129	−0.156	−0.174**	−0.134	−0.058	−0.002	0.064	−0.029	0.062
	(0.195)	(0.226)	(0.211)	(0.189)	(0.167)	(0.082)	(0.136)	(0.195)	(0.081)	(0.169)	(0.123)	(0.139)
Female	0.022	0.014	0.018	−0.053	−0.017	0.003	−0.029	−0.003	0.021	0.012	0.027	0.034
	(0.052)	(0.047)	(0.034)	(0.041)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.039)	(0.052)	(0.019)	(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.025)
Age	0.004*	0.003	0.003	−0.011***	−0.002	−0.002	−0.002	−0.002	0.0001	0.006**	0.003**	−0.001
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Social Media Active	0.150**	−0.019	0.034	−0.165***	−0.040	0.004	−0.077*	−0.036	0.060*	0.054	0.082***	0.008
	(0.061)	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.047)	(0.025)	(0.029)	(0.046)	(0.061)	(0.032)	(0.045)	(0.024)	(0.040)
Bachelors Degree	−0.018	0.062	0.051	−0.096**	−0.033*	−0.067**	−0.040	−0.048	0.019	0.088***	−0.002	0.015
	(0.035)	(0.053)	(0.035)	(0.049)	(0.019)	(0.028)	(0.038)	(0.035)	(0.014)	(0.031)	(0.018)	(0.027)
Multi-Term	−0.022	−0.015	0.038	−0.001	−0.029	−0.027	−0.026	0.012	−0.019	−0.068***	0.006	0.055**
	(0.034)	(0.045)	(0.052)	(0.044)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.043)	(0.034)	(0.027)	(0.024)	(0.027)	(0.025)
BJP	0.009	0.047	−0.069*	0.014	−0.006	−0.003	−0.028	0.013	−0.025	0.072*	−0.041	0.033
	(0.077)	(0.062)	(0.036)	(0.054)	(0.046)	(0.032)	(0.053)	(0.077)	(0.031)	(0.041)	(0.026)	(0.049)
INC	−0.032	0.157*	−0.074	−0.051	0.025	−0.068**	0.010	−0.040	−0.023	0.105***	−0.025	0.044
	(0.064)	(0.080)	(0.066)	(0.038)	(0.045)	(0.032)	(0.041)	(0.064)	(0.029)	(0.040)	(0.035)	(0.062)
Called Three Times	−0.119*	0.052	0.016	0.052	0.008	−0.001	0.112***	−0.012	−0.051**	−0.003	−0.025	−0.076*
	(0.067)	(0.044)	(0.043)	(0.033)	(0.030)	(0.028)	(0.036)	(0.067)	(0.021)	(0.036)	(0.027)	(0.040)
Caste Reservation	0.058	−0.009	−0.061	0.011	0.006	−0.002	0.005	0.019	−0.043	0.082**	0.016	−0.045*
	(0.062)	(0.043)	(0.051)	(0.042)	(0.043)	(0.024)	(0.070)	(0.062)	(0.046)	(0.034)	(0.032)	(0.025)
Constant	−0.047	−0.182	0.019	1.210***	0.858***	1.061***	0.757***	1.047***	0.689***	0.154	0.452***	0.077
	(0.210)	(0.165)	(0.187)	(0.255)	(0.121)	(0.083)	(0.190)	(0.210)	(0.097)	(0.145)	(0.082)	(0.160)
Observations	402	402	402	402	402	402	402	402	402	402	402	402

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Linear regression models with dependent variables standardized between 0 and 1, corporation fixed effects, and cluster robust standard errors.

Table SI.8.4: Treated Self Reported MLM

	Pleasant	Unpleasant	Mixed	Weak	Spend Wisely	Opinions	Valid Concerns	One Group	Caste Trust	Neighbor	Talk	Donation
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
(Intercept)	−3.09**	−3.30**	−3.01**	4.14**								−3.68**
	(1.26)	(1.45)	(1.49)	(1.62)								(1.75)
Treated	−0.14	−0.18	0.12	0.37	−0.17	0.27	−0.13	0.25	0.14	0.30	0.55***	0.26
	(0.24)	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.30)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.18)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.35)
Contact	0.73	1.21	2.72***	−5.24***	−1.64**	−1.08	−0.56	−1.52**	1.18*	1.92***	2.71***	0.81
	(0.86)	(0.90)	(0.91)	(1.14)	(0.74)	(0.76)	(0.62)	(0.76)	(0.72)	(0.70)	(0.76)	(1.19)
Diversity	0.65	0.01	−1.68	1.21	0.32	−0.38	−0.83	−0.07	0.25	0.57	0.32	0.73
	(1.23)	(1.35)	(1.42)	(1.64)	(1.19)	(1.29)	(0.87)	(1.17)	(1.06)	(0.96)	(1.11)	(1.72)
Female	0.03	0.12	0.15	−0.31	−0.16	−0.05	−0.09	−0.08	0.13	0.05	0.35*	0.41
	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.31)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.18)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.34)
Age	0.01	0.03*	0.03	−0.07***	−0.03**	−0.03**	−0.00	−0.04**	−0.00	0.03**	0.02*	−0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Social Media Active	0.81***	−0.02	0.18	−1.33***	−0.28	0.02		−0.42*	0.63***	0.48**	0.81***	0.07
	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.36)	(0.21)	(0.22)		(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.37)
Bachelors Degree	−0.15	0.41	0.49*	−0.62*	−0.49**	−0.92***	−0.46**	−0.55**	0.24	0.47**	−0.03	0.27
	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.32)	(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.37)
Multi-Term	0.04	−0.29	0.21	0.00	−0.14	−0.24		0.22	−0.10	−0.50**	0.22	0.55
	(0.26)	(0.28)	(0.27)	(0.33)	(0.22)	(0.22)		(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.35)
BJP	0.76**	−0.59	−0.90***	1.01**	0.24	0.69**	−0.18	0.75**	0.09	0.49*	−0.03	0.81*
	(0.34)	(0.39)	(0.32)	(0.45)	(0.30)	(0.33)	(0.20)	(0.33)	(0.30)	(0.26)	(0.32)	(0.49)
INC	0.24	0.43	−0.66*	0.12	0.28	−0.14	0.06	−0.14	−0.04	0.60*	−0.07	0.55
	(0.43)	(0.39)	(0.39)	(0.55)	(0.32)	(0.33)	(0.28)	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.31)	(0.33)	(0.60)
Called Three Times	−0.44	0.07	−0.15	0.61**	−0.01	0.14		0.04	−0.38*	−0.04	−0.17	−0.80**
	(0.28)	(0.30)	(0.33)	(0.30)	(0.23)	(0.24)		(0.25)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.38)
Caste Reservation	0.31	−0.02	−0.23	−0.03	−0.20	−0.02		−0.21	−0.45*	0.28	0.13	−0.49
	(0.30)	(0.33)	(0.32)	(0.38)	(0.27)	(0.27)		(0.29)	(0.27)	(0.26)	(0.28)	(0.48)
Observations	402	402	402	402	402	402	404	402	402	402	402	402

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Ordered and logistic multilevel regression models with corporation random effects.

Table SI.8.5: Treatment State FE

	Dependent variable:											
	Pleasant	Unpleasant	Mixed	Weak	Spend Wisely	Opinions	Valid Concerns	One Group	Caste Trust	Neighbor	Talk	Donation
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Treated	−0.021	−0.021	0.002	0.041**	−0.023	0.030**	−0.021	0.023	0.014	0.066*	0.062***	0.022
	(0.041)	(0.038)	(0.029)	(0.018)	(0.014)	(0.012)	(0.017)	(0.041)	(0.012)	(0.039)	(0.022)	(0.032)
Diversity	0.372***	−0.293**	0.079	−0.158*	0.064	0.015	−0.093	−0.021	−0.026	0.054	−0.008	−0.077
	(0.142)	(0.131)	(0.067)	(0.088)	(0.109)	(0.073)	(0.079)	(0.142)	(0.069)	(0.050)	(0.030)	(0.094)
Contact	0.001	0.016	0.449**	−0.466***	−0.091	−0.056	0.076	0.024	0.149*	0.292	0.224***	0.121
	(0.107)	(0.291)	(0.227)	(0.174)	(0.061)	(0.087)	(0.129)	(0.107)	(0.077)	(0.178)	(0.072)	(0.179)
Female	0.009	0.010	0.020	−0.039	−0.021	0.011	−0.023	0.004	0.011	−0.002	0.018	0.015
	(0.042)	(0.034)	(0.024)	(0.029)	(0.020)	(0.032)	(0.023)	(0.042)	(0.021)	(0.031)	(0.031)	(0.018)
Age	0.004	0.003	0.003	−0.010***	−0.002	−0.002	−0.001	−0.002	0.0004	0.005**	0.003***	−0.002
	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.003)
Social Media Active	0.164*	−0.009	0.031	−0.186**	−0.045**	0.011	−0.085	−0.041	0.074*	0.071	0.096**	0.011
	(0.090)	(0.046)	(0.044)	(0.090)	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.074)	(0.090)	(0.039)	(0.076)	(0.038)	(0.056)
Bachelors Degree	−0.044	0.079	0.057	−0.093	−0.044***	−0.068***	−0.041	−0.050	0.018	0.079***	−0.006	0.020
	(0.040)	(0.080)	(0.047)	(0.099)	(0.014)	(0.011)	(0.028)	(0.040)	(0.012)	(0.012)	(0.029)	(0.018)
Multi-Term	−0.001	−0.029	0.019	0.010	−0.014	−0.029	−0.032*	0.012	−0.036	−0.085***	−0.009	0.050
	(0.020)	(0.052)	(0.015)	(0.037)	(0.035)	(0.035)	(0.019)	(0.020)	(0.025)	(0.015)	(0.020)	(0.045)
BJP	−0.038	0.016	−0.027	0.049	−0.002	0.015	−0.015	0.022	−0.030**	0.053**	−0.023	0.041
	(0.066)	(0.058)	(0.034)	(0.038)	(0.043)	(0.018)	(0.037)	(0.066)	(0.012)	(0.022)	(0.018)	(0.043)
INC	−0.024	0.121***	−0.058**	−0.039	0.012	−0.061**	−0.007	−0.050	−0.027***	0.102***	−0.005	0.054
	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.025)	(0.030)	(0.019)	(0.031)	(0.049)	(0.043)	(0.009)	(0.039)	(0.014)	(0.075)
Called Three Times	−0.091	0.038*	0.019	0.034	0.008	−0.005	0.104*	−0.018	−0.052	0.001	−0.022	−0.085***
	(0.102)	(0.020)	(0.068)	(0.069)	(0.017)	(0.025)	(0.060)	(0.102)	(0.043)	(0.043)	(0.023)	(0.022)
Caste Reservation	0.056	−0.012	−0.072	0.027	−0.007	0.012	−0.015	0.011	−0.023***	0.072***	0.014	−0.064***
	(0.062)	(0.032)	(0.047)	(0.030)	(0.029)	(0.014)	(0.029)	(0.062)	(0.006)	(0.024)	(0.013)	(0.012)
Constant	−0.031	0.100	−0.347***	1.277***	0.993***	1.008***	0.740***	1.002***	0.661***	0.116***	0.513***	0.183***
	(0.135)	(0.191)	(0.113)	(0.220)	(0.051)	(0.096)	(0.057)	(0.135)	(0.083)	(0.030)	(0.054)	(0.053)
Observations	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Linear regression models with dependent variables standardized between 0 and 1, state fixed effects, and cluster robust standard errors.

Table SI.8.6: Treated State Fixed Effects MLM

	Dependent variable:											
	Pleasant	Unpleasant	Mixed	Weak	Spend Wisely	Opinions	Valid Concerns	One Group	Caste Trust	Neighbor	Talk	Donation
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
(Intercept)	−3.25***	−1.71	−5.02***	4.19***								−1.85
	(1.18)	(1.19)	(1.38)	(1.35)								(1.59)
Treated	−0.14	−0.14	0.08	0.32	−0.24	0.22	−0.11	0.22	0.14	0.36*	0.55***	0.36
	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.30)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.37)
Diversity	1.82*	−1.62*	0.92	−0.93	0.63	−0.13	−0.55	−0.15	−0.24	0.58	0.24	−1.03
	(0.98)	(0.95)	(1.06)	(1.02)	(0.75)	(0.80)	(0.67)	(0.77)	(0.72)	(0.69)	(0.73)	(1.28)
Contact	−0.05	0.30	3.33***	−3.01***	−2.00***	−1.57**	0.67	−0.15	0.92	1.46**	1.83**	1.56
	(0.87)	(0.91)	(1.01)	(1.04)	(0.75)	(0.77)	(0.65)	(0.73)	(0.68)	(0.68)	(0.71)	(1.26)
Female	0.01	0.06	0.15	−0.32	−0.16	0.02	−0.03	0.02	0.05	−0.02	0.28	0.18
	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.31)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.37)
Age	0.02	0.02	0.03	−0.07***	−0.02*	−0.03*	−0.00	−0.03**	0.00	0.03**	0.02*	−0.03
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Social Media Active	0.92***	−0.01	0.20	−1.45***	−0.28	−0.01	−0.45**	−0.47**	0.68***	0.48**	0.86***	0.15
	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.36)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.38)
Bachelors Degree	−0.29	0.43	0.42	−0.58*	−0.52**	−0.79***	−0.33	−0.55**	0.27	0.46**	−0.05	0.34
	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.32)	(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.40)
Multi-Term	−0.00	−0.24	0.14	−0.02	−0.08	−0.23	−0.29	0.19	−0.24	−0.50**	0.11	0.63*
	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.33)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.37)
BJP	0.10	−0.10	−0.38	0.58	−0.02	0.36	−0.34	0.40	−0.17	0.41	−0.19	0.63
	(0.41)	(0.37)	(0.40)	(0.50)	(0.29)	(0.32)	(0.22)	(0.30)	(0.29)	(0.28)	(0.29)	(0.58)
INC	0.06	0.54	−0.49	−0.21	0.09	−0.30	−0.14	−0.32	−0.19	0.62**	−0.01	0.76
	(0.44)	(0.37)	(0.41)	(0.58)	(0.31)	(0.33)	(0.29)	(0.33)	(0.32)	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.64)
Called Three Times	−0.49*	0.19	0.06	0.34	−0.09	−0.02	0.42**	−0.20	−0.45**	0.01	−0.21	−0.97**
	(0.28)	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.21)	(0.24)	(0.23)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.41)
Caste Reservation	0.34	−0.11	−0.39	0.23	−0.07	0.16	0.03	−0.02	−0.25	0.40	0.11	−0.86
	(0.31)	(0.33)	(0.35)	(0.38)	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.23)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.55)
Observations	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Ordered and logistic multilevel regression models with state random effects.

Table SI.8.7: Treated and Diversity Crime

	Dependent variable:											
	Pleasant	Unpleasant	Mixed	Weak	Spend Wisely	Opinions	Valid Concerns	One Group	Caste Trust	Neighbor	Talk	Donation
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Treated	−0.025	−0.018	0.006	0.038	−0.020	0.032	−0.022	0.024	0.018	0.053	0.064***	0.009
	(0.046)	(0.041)	(0.045)	(0.054)	(0.038)	(0.026)	(0.034)	(0.046)	(0.026)	(0.034)	(0.023)	(0.021)
Diversity	0.409*	−0.365	0.166	−0.210	0.015	−0.024	−0.063	−0.009	0.022	0.001	−0.017	−0.127
	(0.233)	(0.241)	(0.174)	(0.256)	(0.094)	(0.077)	(0.169)	(0.233)	(0.133)	(0.157)	(0.074)	(0.190)
Contact	−0.005	0.100	0.420**	−0.515**	−0.105	−0.104	0.054	0.021	0.132*	0.244**	0.231***	0.097
	(0.145)	(0.192)	(0.188)	(0.204)	(0.110)	(0.074)	(0.136)	(0.145)	(0.076)	(0.111)	(0.082)	(0.152)
Female	0.010	0.007	0.017	−0.034	−0.006	0.013	−0.022	0.002	0.008	0.003	0.020	0.013
	(0.048)	(0.049)	(0.037)	(0.039)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.039)	(0.048)	(0.021)	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.020)
Age	0.004	0.003	0.003	−0.010***	−0.001	−0.002	−0.002	−0.002	0.00005	0.005**	0.003**	−0.002
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Social Media Active	0.161**	−0.009	0.028	−0.180***	−0.036	−0.0005	−0.085*	−0.040	0.064**	0.059	0.093***	−0.003
	(0.065)	(0.034)	(0.044)	(0.049)	(0.024)	(0.025)	(0.047)	(0.065)	(0.030)	(0.047)	(0.025)	(0.045)
Bachelors Degree	−0.033	0.061	0.050	−0.078	−0.040**	−0.049*	−0.041	−0.050	0.018	0.089***	−0.003	0.033
	(0.044)	(0.058)	(0.036)	(0.052)	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.038)	(0.044)	(0.014)	(0.034)	(0.020)	(0.025)
Multi-Term	−0.016	−0.014	0.021	0.009	−0.031	−0.023	−0.037	0.012	−0.027	−0.071***	0.001	0.060**
	(0.037)	(0.042)	(0.050)	(0.044)	(0.027)	(0.027)	(0.040)	(0.037)	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.028)
BJP	−0.016	0.050	−0.063*	0.029	−0.011	0.001	−0.021	0.011	−0.019	0.070	−0.051	0.048
	(0.068)	(0.065)	(0.036)	(0.048)	(0.048)	(0.032)	(0.054)	(0.068)	(0.033)	(0.045)	(0.032)	(0.043)
INC	−0.038	0.167**	−0.084	−0.045	0.011	−0.065*	0.0002	−0.041	−0.031	0.108***	−0.022	0.072
	(0.065)	(0.078)	(0.067)	(0.039)	(0.045)	(0.034)	(0.042)	(0.065)	(0.034)	(0.040)	(0.035)	(0.055)
Called Three Times	−0.109	0.051	0.024	0.034	0.013	−0.005	0.114***	−0.018	−0.045**	0.001	−0.025	−0.091**
	(0.071)	(0.045)	(0.046)	(0.036)	(0.031)	(0.027)	(0.037)	(0.071)	(0.022)	(0.035)	(0.030)	(0.041)
Caste Reservation	0.042	−0.006	−0.069	0.034	0.009	0.002	0.005	0.021	−0.043	0.074**	0.007	−0.045**
	(0.063)	(0.045)	(0.061)	(0.048)	(0.044)	(0.023)	(0.071)	(0.063)	(0.044)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.022)
Crime	0.483***	−0.940***	−0.575***	1.032***	0.679***	0.481***	0.370***	0.312**	−0.382***	−0.786***	−0.030	−0.347***
	(0.154)	(0.088)	(0.124)	(0.147)	(0.108)	(0.074)	(0.093)	(0.154)	(0.062)	(0.122)	(0.109)	(0.090)
Constant	−2.689***	5.173***	2.782***	−4.266***	−2.818***	−1.508***	−1.325**	−0.661	2.694***	4.339***	0.674	2.038***
	(0.932)	(0.551)	(0.782)	(1.017)	(0.620)	(0.381)	(0.575)	(0.932)	(0.448)	(0.653)	(0.585)	(0.559)
Observations	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Linear regression models with dependent variables standardized between 0 and 1, state fixed effects, and cluster robust standard errors.

Table SI.8.8: Treated and Diversity Crime MLM

	Pleasant	Unpleasant	Mixed	Weak	Spend Wisely	Opinions	Valid Concerns	One Group	Caste Trust	Neighbor	Talk	Donation
						Dependent variable:						
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
(Intercept)	−4.56***	0.08	−4.82***	3.43**								−2.48
	(1.38)	(1.38)	(1.51)	(1.54)								(1.59)
Treated	−0.15	−0.14	0.13	0.26	−0.22	0.21	−0.15	0.17	0.14	0.31	0.58***	0.32
	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.30)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.37)
Diversity	1.52	−1.16	1.27	−1.27	0.40	−0.45	−0.78	−0.36	−0.01	0.65	0.03	−1.38
	(1.00)	(1.04)	(1.05)	(1.02)	(0.80)	(0.79)	(0.66)	(0.82)	(0.78)	(0.66)	(0.80)	(1.34)
Contact	−0.26	0.64	3.43***	−3.20***	−2.01***	−1.81**	0.37	−0.41	0.82	1.30**	1.70**	1.23
	(0.86)	(0.90)	(1.00)	(1.02)	(0.76)	(0.77)	(0.63)	(0.74)	(0.69)	(0.66)	(0.73)	(1.27)
Female	0.01	0.02	0.13	−0.19	−0.10	0.05	−0.03	0.02	0.02	−0.03	0.27	0.26
	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.31)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.37)
Age	0.02	0.02	0.03	−0.07***	−0.02*	−0.03*	−0.00	−0.03**	−0.00	0.02*	0.02*	−0.02
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Social Media Active	0.90***	0.01	0.19	−1.40***	−0.27	−0.03		−0.46**	0.67***	0.47**	0.87***	−0.00
	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.35)	(0.21)	(0.22)		(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.38)
Bachelors Degree	−0.23	0.36	0.43	−0.61*	−0.50**	−0.74***	−0.44**	−0.55**	0.25	0.45**	−0.04	0.40
	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.32)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.19)	(0.23)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.40)
Multi-Term	0.00	−0.23	0.14	−0.04	−0.11	−0.20	−0.25	0.18	−0.18	−0.45**	0.15	0.66*
	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.33)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.38)
BJP	0.54	−0.48	−0.72**	0.93**	0.18	0.71**	−0.27	0.65**	0.13	0.63***	−0.12	0.90*
	(0.35)	(0.37)	(0.35)	(0.44)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.22)	(0.33)	(0.30)	(0.24)	(0.32)	(0.53)
INC	0.19	0.48	−0.66	0.03	0.20	−0.17	−0.07	−0.18	−0.14	0.75**	−0.03	0.89
	(0.43)	(0.39)	(0.41)	(0.55)	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.29)	(0.34)	(0.33)	(0.30)	(0.34)	(0.64)
Called Three Times	−0.44	0.05	−0.04	0.42	−0.01	0.11		−0.03	−0.35	0.09	−0.15	−0.99**
	(0.29)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.24)	(0.24)		(0.25)	(0.23)	(0.21)	(0.24)	(0.42)
Caste Reservation	0.34	−0.09	−0.33	0.10	−0.13	0.06		−0.15	−0.45		0.07	
	(0.31)	(0.33)	(0.35)	(0.37)	(0.27)	(0.27)		(0.29)	(0.28)		(0.28)	
Crime	0.36**	−0.45**	−0.15	0.26	−0.05	0.15	0.06	0.31	0.15	−0.26**	0.24	
	(0.17)	(0.18)	(0.18)	(0.19)	(0.17)	(0.14)	(0.11)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.11)	(0.20)	
Observations	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388	388

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Ordered and logistic multilevel regression models with state random effects.

61

Figure SI.8.1: Interactions Between Treatment and Diversity

Plots of dependent variable marginal effects plots for the effect of the treatment on the dependent variable at given levels of diversity.

Figure SI.8.2: Interactions Forward Backward

Plots of dependent variable marginal effects plots for the effect of the treatment on the dependent variable at given levels of diversity where diversity is percent not forward.

Figure SI.8.3: Self-Reported Interactions

Plots of dependent variable marginal effects plots for the effect of the treatment on the dependent variable at given levels of diversity where diversity includes self-reported information.

Figure SI.8.4: Diversity and Contact State Fixed Effects

Plots of dependent variable marginal effects plots for the effect of the treatment on the dependent variable at given levels of diversity where diversity includes self-reported information.

Figure SI.8.5: Interactions with Crime

Plots of dependent variable marginal effects plots for the effect of the treatment on the dependent variable at given levels of diversity including crime variable.

Table SI.8.9: Treatment and Diversity Regression Results

	\multicolumn{12}{c}{*Dependent variable:*}											
	Pleasant	Unpleasant	Mixed	Weak	Spend Wisely	Opinions	Valid Concerns	One Group	Caste Trust	Neighbor	Talk	Donation
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Treated	−0.117	−0.077	−0.087	0.281	0.005	0.051	0.007	0.058	0.165*	−0.106	0.109	0.078
	(0.147)	(0.142)	(0.113)	(0.182)	(0.150)	(0.102)	(0.123)	(0.147)	(0.091)	(0.111)	(0.078)	(0.089)
Diversity	0.262	−0.297	0.125	−0.090	−0.024	−0.013	−0.036	0.028	0.048	−0.113	0.015	−0.053
	(0.226)	(0.214)	(0.181)	(0.242)	(0.137)	(0.081)	(0.153)	(0.226)	(0.139)	(0.108)	(0.067)	(0.217)
Female	0.027	0.004	0.016	−0.047	−0.016	0.008	−0.028	−0.002	0.018	0.009	0.023	0.032
	(0.050)	(0.047)	(0.036)	(0.042)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.039)	(0.050)	(0.019)	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.022)
Age	0.004*	0.003	0.004*	−0.012***	−0.002	−0.002	−0.002	−0.002	0.001	0.006**	0.004***	−0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Social Media Active	0.151**	−0.003	0.055	−0.202***	−0.041*	0.001	−0.082*	−0.040	0.072**	0.071	0.102***	0.014
	(0.066)	(0.030)	(0.041)	(0.058)	(0.024)	(0.028)	(0.049)	(0.066)	(0.031)	(0.049)	(0.028)	(0.047)
Bachelors Degree	−0.013	0.066	0.055	−0.107*	−0.036*	−0.062**	−0.041	−0.049	0.023	0.097***	0.006	0.018
	(0.032)	(0.058)	(0.035)	(0.056)	(0.020)	(0.028)	(0.037)	(0.032)	(0.015)	(0.032)	(0.019)	(0.026)
Multi-Term	−0.017	−0.011	0.040	−0.012	−0.031	−0.027	−0.027	0.010	−0.025	−0.060**	0.005	0.053**
	(0.036)	(0.042)	(0.048)	(0.038)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.041)	(0.036)	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.025)
BJP	−0.0002	0.056	−0.089***	0.033	−0.006	0.001	−0.021	0.013	−0.032	0.071*	−0.048	0.034
	(0.069)	(0.068)	(0.034)	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.030)	(0.053)	(0.069)	(0.032)	(0.042)	(0.032)	(0.047)
INC	−0.038	0.165**	−0.088	−0.039	0.024	−0.066**	0.013	−0.040	−0.025	0.105***	−0.028	0.047
	(0.064)	(0.080)	(0.063)	(0.044)	(0.046)	(0.032)	(0.043)	(0.064)	(0.030)	(0.039)	(0.036)	(0.062)
Called Three Times	−0.115*	0.052	0.022	0.040	0.007	−0.001	0.110***	−0.014	−0.050**	0.002	−0.023	−0.076*
	(0.066)	(0.041)	(0.045)	(0.035)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.038)	(0.066)	(0.022)	(0.035)	(0.028)	(0.041)
Caste Reservation	0.050	−0.004	−0.069	0.023	0.006	−0.001	0.006	0.019	−0.040	0.079**	0.016	−0.041*
	(0.059)	(0.046)	(0.053)	(0.041)	(0.044)	(0.024)	(0.072)	(0.059)	(0.045)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.024)
Treated x Diversity	0.147	0.108	0.132	−0.387	−0.034	−0.024	−0.042	−0.052	−0.246*	0.255	−0.082	−0.114
	(0.249)	(0.198)	(0.158)	(0.260)	(0.248)	(0.141)	(0.186)	(0.249)	(0.140)	(0.175)	(0.126)	(0.147)
Constant	−0.119	0.246*	0.027	0.846***	0.723***	0.939***	0.635***	0.956***	0.750***	0.417***	0.590***	0.196
	(0.187)	(0.132)	(0.154)	(0.272)	(0.131)	(0.089)	(0.128)	(0.187)	(0.131)	(0.129)	(0.054)	(0.160)
Observations	404	404	404	404	404	404	404	404	404	404	404	404

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Linear regression models with dependent variables standardized between 0 and 1, corporation fixed effects, and cluster robust standard errors.

Table SI.8.10: Treatment and Diversity Multilevel Models

	Pleasant (1)	Unpleasant (2)	Mixed (3)	Weak (4)	Spend Wisely (5)	Opinions (6)	Valid Concerns (7)	One Group (8)	Caste Trust (9)	Neighbor (10)	Talk (11)	Donation (12)
					Dependent variable:							
(Intercept)	−2.75***	−1.98*	−3.07***	2.72**								−2.07
	(1.05)	(1.11)	(1.14)	(1.27)								(1.41)
Treated	−0.79	−0.49	−0.62	2.27**	−0.18	0.48	0.06	0.84	1.31	−0.45	0.61	0.63
	(1.07)	(1.06)	(1.10)	(1.15)	(0.83)	(0.89)	(0.75)	(0.87)	(0.82)	(0.75)	(0.80)	(1.23)
Diversity	0.65	−1.14	0.40	−0.01	−0.09	−0.29	−0.39	0.36	0.33	0.18	0.16	−1.14
	(1.03)	(1.11)	(1.11)	(1.18)	(0.87)	(0.90)	(0.74)	(0.86)	(0.85)	(0.74)	(0.82)	(1.38)
Female	0.05	0.09	0.16	−0.34	−0.16	−0.01	−0.07	−0.06	0.11	0.07	0.27	0.41
	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.30)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.34)
Age	0.01	0.03*	0.04**	−0.09***	−0.03**	−0.03**	−0.00	−0.04***	0.00	0.04***	0.03*	−0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Social Media Active	0.82***	0.06	0.33	−1.67***	−0.36*	−0.05	−0.40**	−0.48**	0.73***	0.59***	0.93***	0.13
	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.26)	(0.35)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.36)
Bachelors Degree	−0.13	0.41	0.47*	−0.77**	−0.53**	−0.89***	−0.32	−0.58***	0.24	0.50**	0.02	0.31
	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.31)	(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.37)
Multi-Term	0.06	−0.26	0.17	−0.14	−0.16	−0.24	−0.24	0.18	−0.11	−0.45**	0.23	0.57
	(0.26)	(0.28)	(0.27)	(0.32)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.35)
BJP	0.76**	−0.52	−0.83**	1.09**	0.24	0.71**	−0.35*	0.70**	0.03	0.46*	0.03	0.79*
	(0.35)	(0.40)	(0.33)	(0.44)	(0.29)	(0.31)	(0.21)	(0.33)	(0.30)	(0.24)	(0.32)	(0.47)
INC	0.26	0.46	−0.61	0.24	0.28	−0.13	−0.07	−0.16	−0.08	0.64**	−0.05	0.50
	(0.43)	(0.39)	(0.40)	(0.54)	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.29)	(0.34)	(0.32)	(0.30)	(0.33)	(0.59)
Called Three Times	−0.43	0.09	−0.09	0.57*	−0.02	0.13	0.40**	0.02	−0.37*	0.02	−0.09	−0.78**
	(0.28)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.20)	(0.25)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.38)
Caste Reservation	0.35	−0.04	−0.19	−0.07	−0.21	−0.03		−0.19	−0.42	0.31	0.14	−0.48
	(0.30)	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.37)	(0.27)	(0.28)		(0.29)	(0.27)	(0.25)	(0.27)	(0.48)
Treated x Diversity	1.04	0.65	1.05	−3.36*	−0.04	−0.35	−0.24	−1.00	−1.95	1.26	−0.09	−0.54
	(1.71)	(1.71)	(1.75)	(1.90)	(1.34)	(1.42)	(1.21)	(1.41)	(1.33)	(1.24)	(1.31)	(2.08)
Observations	404	404	404	404	404	404	404	404	404	404	404	404

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Ordered and logistic multilevel regression models with corporation random effects.

Table SI.8.11: Treatment and Diversity Forward Backward

	Pleasant	Unpleasant	Mixed	Weak	Spend Wisely	Opinions	Valid Concerns	One Group	Caste Trust	Neighbor	Talk	Donation
	Dependent variable:											
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Treated	0.092	−0.047	0.053	−0.098	0.025	−0.013	−0.085	−0.016	0.041	0.032	0.032	0.094*
	(0.084)	(0.086)	(0.092)	(0.153)	(0.074)	(0.069)	(0.071)	(0.084)	(0.060)	(0.066)	(0.049)	(0.057)
Pct. Not Forward	0.496***	−0.220	−0.130	−0.146	−0.084	−0.112	−0.138	−0.075	0.009	0.161	−0.024	−0.046
	(0.164)	(0.194)	(0.147)	(0.179)	(0.137)	(0.105)	(0.100)	(0.164)	(0.079)	(0.112)	(0.089)	(0.155)
Female	0.024	0.008	0.015	−0.047	−0.015	0.008	−0.028	−0.003	0.018	0.010	0.023	0.033
	(0.052)	(0.048)	(0.037)	(0.041)	(0.023)	(0.024)	(0.039)	(0.052)	(0.020)	(0.025)	(0.029)	(0.025)
Age	0.004*	0.003	0.004*	−0.012***	−0.002	−0.002	−0.002	−0.002	0.001	0.006**	0.004***	−0.001
	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Social Media Active	0.150**	−0.006	0.059	−0.203***	−0.041*	0.002	−0.081*	−0.039	0.073**	0.067	0.102***	0.014
	(0.063)	(0.031)	(0.038)	(0.056)	(0.024)	(0.027)	(0.047)	(0.063)	(0.031)	(0.048)	(0.027)	(0.045)
Bachelors Degree	−0.017	0.068	0.061*	−0.111**	−0.034*	−0.061**	−0.040	−0.049	0.021	0.095***	0.005	0.019
	(0.036)	(0.059)	(0.035)	(0.055)	(0.019)	(0.027)	(0.037)	(0.036)	(0.015)	(0.034)	(0.019)	(0.026)
Multi-Term	−0.029	−0.011	0.038	0.001	−0.030	−0.023	−0.023	0.014	−0.020	−0.068***	0.008	0.054**
	(0.035)	(0.043)	(0.051)	(0.041)	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.041)	(0.035)	(0.027)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.024)
BJP	0.020	0.042	−0.083**	0.022	−0.007	−0.003	−0.027	0.012	−0.030	0.069	−0.049	0.034
	(0.073)	(0.065)	(0.036)	(0.046)	(0.048)	(0.032)	(0.053)	(0.073)	(0.031)	(0.044)	(0.033)	(0.048)
INC	−0.035	0.160*	−0.085	−0.040	0.022	−0.064*	0.014	−0.038	−0.027	0.105**	−0.027	0.041
	(0.062)	(0.085)	(0.062)	(0.038)	(0.045)	(0.033)	(0.043)	(0.062)	(0.030)	(0.044)	(0.035)	(0.062)
Called Three Times	−0.106	0.049	0.019	0.039	0.006	−0.004	0.107***	−0.016	−0.048**	0.003	−0.023	−0.074*
	(0.066)	(0.042)	(0.047)	(0.034)	(0.030)	(0.027)	(0.039)	(0.066)	(0.023)	(0.034)	(0.028)	(0.039)
Caste Reservation	0.029	0.006	−0.052	0.017	0.012	0.004	0.011	0.022	−0.043	0.070**	0.015	−0.038
	(0.063)	(0.046)	(0.049)	(0.042)	(0.045)	(0.025)	(0.070)	(0.063)	(0.044)	(0.033)	(0.033)	(0.028)
Treated x Pct. Not Forward	−0.227	0.057	−0.107	0.277	−0.081	0.097	0.128	0.085	−0.048	0.025	0.054	−0.169*
	(0.152)	(0.156)	(0.171)	(0.206)	(0.103)	(0.092)	(0.101)	(0.152)	(0.083)	(0.125)	(0.106)	(0.091)
Constant	−0.162	0.153	0.152	0.857***	0.735***	0.980***	0.674***	1.007***	0.769***	0.290**	0.610***	0.169
	(0.168)	(0.126)	(0.155)	(0.215)	(0.117)	(0.065)	(0.136)	(0.168)	(0.094)	(0.122)	(0.076)	(0.106)
Observations	404	404	404	404	404	404	404	404	404	404	404	404

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Linear regression models with dependent variables standardized between 0 and 1, corporation fixed effects, and cluster robust standard errors.

Table SI.8.12: Treatment and Diversity Forward Backward Multilevel

	Pleasant	Unpleasant	Mixed	Weak	Spend Wisely	Opinions	Valid Concerns	One Group	Caste Trust	Neighbor	Talk	Donation
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
(Intercept)	−2.77***	−2.72***	−3.13***	3.84***								−2.52**
	(0.91)	(0.98)	(0.98)	(1.10)								(1.19)
Treated	0.48	−0.48	0.40	−0.52	−0.02	0.06	−0.62	−0.18	0.51	0.15	0.57	1.40**
	(0.53)	(0.60)	(0.59)	(0.60)	(0.45)	(0.47)	(0.41)	(0.47)	(0.43)	(0.41)	(0.45)	(0.69)
Pct. Not Forward	0.99	0.47	0.71	−2.67***	−1.31**	−1.42**	−0.06	−2.11***	−0.36	−0.20	−0.33	−0.85
	(0.80)	(0.78)	(0.81)	(0.96)	(0.61)	(0.62)	(0.50)	(0.66)	(0.64)	(0.61)	(0.66)	(1.00)
Female	0.05	0.09	0.15	−0.36	−0.13	−0.01	−0.07	−0.07	0.11	0.06	0.26	0.48
	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.25)	(0.29)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.18)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.34)
Age	0.01	0.03*	0.03**	−0.08***	−0.03**	−0.03**	−0.00	−0.04***	0.00	0.04***	0.02*	−0.00
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Social Media Active	0.82***	0.05	0.34	−1.62***	−0.35*	−0.04		−0.45**	0.73***	0.60***	0.93***	0.11
	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.35)	(0.20)	(0.21)		(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.36)
Bachelors Degree	−0.13	0.39	0.47*	−0.74**	−0.52**	−0.89***	−0.46**	−0.56**	0.26	0.51**	0.03	0.38
	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.31)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.38)
Multi-Term	0.04	−0.31	0.16	−0.06	−0.11	−0.20	−0.24	0.25	−0.09	−0.47**	0.24	0.51
	(0.26)	(0.28)	(0.27)	(0.32)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.35)
BJP	0.81**	−0.65*	−0.81**	0.89**	0.21	0.68***	−0.29	0.82***	0.09	0.43	0.06	0.68
	(0.36)	(0.37)	(0.33)	(0.43)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.22)	(0.29)	(0.29)	(0.26)	(0.34)	(0.44)
INC	0.22	0.37	−0.64	0.22	0.26	−0.13	0.01	−0.07	−0.06	0.62**	−0.04	0.49
	(0.43)	(0.38)	(0.39)	(0.53)	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.29)	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.30)	(0.33)	(0.57)
Called Three Times	−0.40	0.06	−0.07	0.45	−0.05	0.12	0.49**	0.05	−0.36	−0.01	−0.09	−0.92**
	(0.28)	(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.22)	(0.23)	(0.21)	(0.25)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.24)	(0.39)
Caste Reservation	0.25	−0.16	−0.28	0.24	0.01	0.21		−0.03	−0.37	0.32	0.18	0.06
	(0.32)	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.40)	(0.26)	(0.28)		(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.26)	(0.28)	(0.48)
Treated x Pct. Not Forward	−1.22	0.62	−0.64	1.90	−0.39	0.34	0.94	0.67	−0.75	0.35	−0.03	−2.65*
	(0.96)	(0.98)	(0.98)	(1.25)	(0.76)	(0.80)	(0.70)	(0.79)	(0.75)	(0.74)	(0.79)	(1.45)
Observations	404	404	404	404	404	404	404	404	404	404	404	404

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Ordered and logistic multilevel regression models with corporation random effects.

Table SI.8.13: Treated and Diversity Self-Reported

	Pleasant	Unpleasant	Mixed	Weak	Spend Wisely	Opinions	Valid Concerns	One Group	Caste Trust	Neighbor	Talk	Donation
	Dependent variable:											
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Treated	−0.190	−0.279	0.015	0.454**	0.075	−0.069	0.029	0.179	0.091	−0.084	−0.012	0.051
	(0.223)	(0.217)	(0.166)	(0.204)	(0.154)	(0.112)	(0.130)	(0.223)	(0.138)	(0.125)	(0.125)	(0.228)
Diversity Self-Reported	−0.079	0.038	−0.031	0.071	−0.100	−0.234**	−0.124	0.034	0.063	0.013	−0.050	0.099
	(0.230)	(0.258)	(0.220)	(0.217)	(0.148)	(0.114)	(0.190)	(0.230)	(0.135)	(0.161)	(0.136)	(0.285)
Female	0.024	0.011	0.014	−0.049	−0.018	0.006	−0.030	−0.004	0.018	0.012	0.023	0.034
	(0.051)	(0.047)	(0.036)	(0.041)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.039)	(0.051)	(0.020)	(0.025)	(0.029)	(0.025)
Age	0.004*	0.004	0.004*	−0.012***	−0.002	−0.002	−0.002	−0.002	0.001	0.006**	0.004***	−0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Social Media Active	0.156**	−0.008	0.057	−0.205***	−0.043*	−0.0003	−0.083*	−0.039	0.073**	0.070	0.102***	0.013
	(0.066)	(0.030)	(0.040)	(0.059)	(0.025)	(0.028)	(0.049)	(0.066)	(0.032)	(0.049)	(0.027)	(0.046)
Bachelors Degree	−0.009	0.067	0.057	−0.114**	−0.038*	−0.064**	−0.044	−0.051	0.021	0.099***	0.005	0.017
	(0.033)	(0.056)	(0.036)	(0.054)	(0.019)	(0.028)	(0.037)	(0.033)	(0.016)	(0.032)	(0.019)	(0.027)
Multi-Term	−0.021	−0.017	0.038	−0.001	−0.030	−0.027	−0.026	0.013	−0.019	−0.067***	0.006	0.055**
	(0.034)	(0.043)	(0.051)	(0.040)	(0.025)	(0.027)	(0.042)	(0.034)	(0.027)	(0.024)	(0.027)	(0.024)
BJP	0.009	0.044	−0.084**	0.031	−0.007	−0.002	−0.024	0.015	−0.030	0.067	−0.049	0.032
	(0.071)	(0.067)	(0.033)	(0.047)	(0.048)	(0.032)	(0.053)	(0.071)	(0.032)	(0.044)	(0.032)	(0.050)
INC	−0.032	0.154*	−0.082	−0.040	0.025	−0.067**	0.012	−0.038	−0.025	0.103***	−0.029	0.044
	(0.062)	(0.084)	(0.064)	(0.041)	(0.046)	(0.032)	(0.042)	(0.062)	(0.030)	(0.039)	(0.035)	(0.061)
Called Three Times	−0.117*	0.054	0.020	0.043	0.007	−0.0002	0.111***	−0.014	−0.049**	0.001	−0.022	−0.075*
	(0.065)	(0.043)	(0.045)	(0.032)	(0.029)	(0.028)	(0.038)	(0.065)	(0.022)	(0.034)	(0.029)	(0.041)
Caste Reservation	0.057	−0.012	−0.063	0.018	0.007	−0.002	0.006	0.020	−0.043	0.080**	0.014	−0.045*
	(0.062)	(0.045)	(0.050)	(0.039)	(0.043)	(0.023)	(0.071)	(0.062)	(0.046)	(0.033)	(0.031)	(0.024)
Treated x Diversity Self-Reported	0.272	0.417	−0.029	−0.661*	−0.148	0.170	−0.079	−0.245	−0.120	0.209	0.115	−0.070
	(0.363)	(0.355)	(0.233)	(0.355)	(0.261)	(0.182)	(0.209)	(0.363)	(0.221)	(0.212)	(0.189)	(0.381)
Constant	0.093	0.024	0.130	0.753***	0.781***	1.087***	0.699***	0.956***	0.735***	0.336**	0.628***	0.095
	(0.184)	(0.214)	(0.189)	(0.222)	(0.108)	(0.123)	(0.180)	(0.184)	(0.110)	(0.162)	(0.082)	(0.215)
Observations	404	404	404	404	404	404	404	404	404	404	404	404

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Linear regression models with dependent variables standardized between 0 and 1, corporation fixed effects, and cluster robust standard errors.

Table SI.8.14: Treated and Diversity Self-Reported Multilevel

	Pleasant	Unpleasant	Mixed	Weak	Spend Wisely	Opinions	Valid Concerns	One Group	Caste Trust	Neighbor	Talk	Donation
					Dependent variable:							
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
(Intercept)	−2.36*	−1.79	−1.86	0.32								−3.52*
	(1.31)	(1.48)	(1.43)	(1.85)								(1.91)
Treated	−1.11	−1.80	0.29	3.07*	0.06	−1.39	0.83	1.43	0.48	−1.01	−0.45	0.72
	(1.47)	(1.56)	(1.48)	(1.77)	(1.17)	(1.26)	(1.08)	(1.26)	(1.16)	(1.09)	(1.16)	(2.02)
Diversity Self-Reported	0.00	−1.28	−1.30	3.50	0.51	−1.44	−0.35	0.57	0.52	−0.49	−0.09	1.09
	(1.55)	(1.70)	(1.71)	(2.29)	(1.44)	(1.51)	(1.18)	(1.42)	(1.31)	(1.20)	(1.29)	(2.28)
Female	0.05	0.11	0.13	−0.25	−0.16	−0.00	−0.09	−0.07	0.11	0.07	0.28	0.43
	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.30)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.34)
Age	0.01	0.03*	0.03**	−0.08***	−0.03**	−0.03**	−0.00	−0.04***	0.00	0.03***	0.03*	−0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Social Media Active	0.84***	0.04	0.33	−1.65***	−0.36*	−0.07	−0.42**	−0.48**	0.72***	0.61***	0.94***	0.11
	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.26)	(0.35)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.36)
Bachelors Degree	−0.12	0.41	0.46*	−0.75**	−0.53**	−0.89***	−0.34*	−0.59***	0.24	0.51**	0.03	0.31
	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.30)	(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.37)
Multi-Term	0.05	−0.30	0.18	−0.08	−0.16	−0.24	−0.22	0.20	−0.08	−0.49**	0.22	0.56
	(0.26)	(0.28)	(0.27)	(0.32)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.35)
BJP	0.77**	−0.61	−0.90***	1.21***	0.25	0.74**	−0.32	0.69**	0.07	0.43*	0.06	0.81*
	(0.34)	(0.39)	(0.32)	(0.47)	(0.30)	(0.34)	(0.21)	(0.33)	(0.30)	(0.24)	(0.33)	(0.48)
INC	0.27	0.42	−0.64	0.30	0.29	−0.12	−0.04	−0.15	−0.06	0.61**	−0.04	0.56
	(0.43)	(0.39)	(0.39)	(0.54)	(0.32)	(0.33)	(0.29)	(0.34)	(0.32)	(0.30)	(0.33)	(0.59)
Called Three Times	−0.43	0.06	−0.11	0.60**	−0.02	0.16	0.43**	0.01	−0.36	0.00	−0.07	−0.79**
	(0.28)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.23)	(0.25)	(0.20)	(0.25)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.38)
Caste Reservation	0.34	−0.01	−0.18	−0.13	−0.22	−0.03	0.04	−0.18	−0.45*	0.30	0.12	−0.46
	(0.30)	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.37)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.22)	(0.29)	(0.27)	(0.25)	(0.27)	(0.48)
Treated x Contact Self-Reported	1.58	2.71	−0.38	−4.40	−0.44	2.68	−1.52	−1.94	−0.56	2.17	1.64	−0.74
	(2.31)	(2.50)	(2.40)	(2.73)	(1.89)	(2.02)	(1.74)	(2.01)	(1.85)	(1.75)	(1.86)	(3.18)
Observations	404	404	404	404	404	404	404	404	404	404	404	404

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Ordered and logistic multilevel regression models with corporation random effects.

Table SI.8.15: Treated and Diversity State FE

	Pleasant	Unpleasant	Mixed	Weak	Spend Wisely	Opinions	Valid Concerns	One Group	Caste Trust	Neighbor	Talk	Donation
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Treated	−0.124	−0.078**	−0.095*	0.297**	0.001	0.041	0.051	0.061	0.150*	−0.090	0.078	0.079*
	(0.101)	(0.039)	(0.055)	(0.122)	(0.117)	(0.045)	(0.054)	(0.101)	(0.079)	(0.107)	(0.089)	(0.045)
Diversity	0.221	−0.249	0.039	−0.011	0.028	0.014	−0.033	0.011	0.026	−0.073	0.008	−0.006
	(0.151)	(0.166)	(0.094)	(0.094)	(0.112)	(0.052)	(0.038)	(0.151)	(0.043)	(0.119)	(0.072)	(0.146)
Female	0.025	0.010	0.018	−0.053	−0.029	0.006	−0.031	−0.0005	0.020	0.003	0.023	0.031*
	(0.049)	(0.039)	(0.027)	(0.036)	(0.018)	(0.030)	(0.019)	(0.049)	(0.023)	(0.034)	(0.034)	(0.017)
Age	0.004	0.003	0.004	−0.012***	−0.003	−0.002	−0.002	−0.002	0.001	0.006***	0.003***	−0.001
	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Social Media Active	0.158*	−0.005	0.058	−0.211*	−0.048**	0.011	−0.080	−0.042	0.082**	0.085	0.107**	0.021
	(0.091)	(0.037)	(0.043)	(0.111)	(0.021)	(0.033)	(0.072)	(0.091)	(0.039)	(0.086)	(0.045)	(0.065)
Bachelors Degree	−0.026	0.078	0.063	−0.115	−0.044***	−0.078***	−0.040	−0.048*	0.022*	0.089***	0.001	0.014
	(0.027)	(0.086)	(0.045)	(0.105)	(0.014)	(0.015)	(0.035)	(0.027)	(0.012)	(0.016)	(0.029)	(0.019)
Multi-Term	0.001	−0.028	0.038**	−0.010	−0.014	−0.031	−0.024	0.011	−0.032	−0.072***	−0.003	0.045
	(0.018)	(0.048)	(0.018)	(0.031)	(0.033)	(0.034)	(0.025)	(0.018)	(0.026)	(0.016)	(0.017)	(0.044)
BJP	−0.018	0.011	−0.043***	0.050*	0.006	0.014	−0.012	0.027	−0.039***	0.059**	−0.021	0.026
	(0.060)	(0.057)	(0.012)	(0.027)	(0.045)	(0.017)	(0.031)	(0.060)	(0.007)	(0.024)	(0.013)	(0.042)
INC	−0.024	0.114***	−0.055***	−0.035	0.021	−0.061**	0.006	−0.046	−0.023***	0.103**	−0.011	0.031
	(0.041)	(0.040)	(0.021)	(0.026)	(0.026)	(0.028)	(0.041)	(0.041)	(0.008)	(0.041)	(0.018)	(0.091)
Called Three Times	−0.098	0.038**	0.018	0.041	0.005	−0.003	0.103	−0.015	−0.057	0.00003	−0.021	−0.077***
	(0.100)	(0.016)	(0.066)	(0.060)	(0.018)	(0.025)	(0.063)	(0.100)	(0.038)	(0.039)	(0.018)	(0.025)
Caste Reservation	0.060	−0.007	−0.065	0.011	−0.015	0.008	−0.017	0.009	−0.023**	0.080***	0.023*	−0.056***
	(0.061)	(0.030)	(0.045)	(0.022)	(0.031)	(0.014)	(0.028)	(0.061)	(0.011)	(0.024)	(0.012)	(0.017)
Treated x Diversity	0.164	0.110	0.146	−0.419**	−0.033	−0.012	−0.112	−0.061	−0.229*	0.248*	−0.030	−0.102**
	(0.145)	(0.111)	(0.100)	(0.214)	(0.173)	(0.071)	(0.087)	(0.145)	(0.123)	(0.133)	(0.129)	(0.051)
Constant	0.015	0.049	−0.099	1.034***	1.001***	0.985***	0.765***	1.003***	0.694***	0.310***	0.586***	0.174
	(0.166)	(0.113)	(0.168)	(0.215)	(0.114)	(0.094)	(0.077)	(0.166)	(0.090)	(0.098)	(0.051)	(0.106)
Observations	404	404	404	404	404	404	404	404	404	404	404	404

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Linear regression models with dependent variables standardized between 0 and 1, state fixed effects, and cluster robust standard errors.

Table SI.8.16: Treated and Diversity State FE MLM

	Pleasant (1)	Unpleasant (2)	Mixed (3)	Weak (4)	Spend Wisely (5)	Opinions (6)	Valid Concerns (7)	One Group (8)	Caste Trust (9)	Neighbor (10)	Talk (11)	Donation (12)
					Dependent variable:							
(Intercept)	−2.84***	−2.06*	−2.62**	2.19*								−1.71
	(1.10)	(1.15)	(1.21)	(1.33)								(1.44)
Treated	−0.82	−0.52	−0.62	2.38**	−0.22	0.41	0.06	0.87	1.24	−0.48	0.45	0.58
	(1.06)	(1.04)	(1.08)	(1.16)	(0.80)	(0.87)	(0.75)	(0.85)	(0.79)	(0.75)	(0.77)	(1.25)
Diversity	0.85	−1.33	0.29	0.34	0.13	−0.11	−0.39	0.32	0.19	−0.03	0.27	−0.46
	(1.02)	(1.05)	(1.10)	(1.18)	(0.84)	(0.88)	(0.74)	(0.83)	(0.81)	(0.77)	(0.79)	(1.37)
Female	0.11	0.06	0.13	−0.40	−0.22	−0.01	−0.07	−0.03	0.14	0.04	0.31	0.36
	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.30)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.35)
Age	0.02	0.02	0.03*	−0.08***	−0.03**	−0.03**	−0.00	−0.03**	0.01	0.03***	0.03**	−0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Social Media Active	0.87***	0.02	0.33	−1.70***	−0.36*	−0.02	−0.40**	−0.50**	0.75***	0.58***	0.94***	0.24
	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.26)	(0.35)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.37)
Bachelors Degree	−0.18	0.45*	0.46*	−0.73**	−0.56***	−0.93***	−0.32	−0.56***	0.27	0.52**	0.02	0.23
	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.31)	(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.37)
Multi-Term	0.00	−0.23	0.23	−0.21	−0.12	−0.28	−0.24	0.17	−0.19	−0.44**	0.18	0.51
	(0.26)	(0.28)	(0.27)	(0.32)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.35)
BJP	0.21	−0.13	−0.37	0.54	0.07	0.30	−0.35*	0.44	−0.27	0.43	−0.14	0.37
	(0.40)	(0.37)	(0.37)	(0.48)	(0.28)	(0.31)	(0.21)	(0.30)	(0.29)	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.55)
INC	0.07	0.52	−0.39	−0.17	0.18	−0.35	−0.07	−0.31	−0.16	0.65**	−0.09	0.34
	(0.44)	(0.37)	(0.40)	(0.56)	(0.30)	(0.32)	(0.29)	(0.32)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.62)
Called Three Times	−0.51*	0.21	0.06	0.36	−0.09	−0.01	0.40**	−0.17	−0.48**	0.02	−0.18	−0.80**
	(0.28)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.23)	(0.24)	(0.20)	(0.24)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.38)
Caste Reservation	0.37	−0.09	−0.33	0.14	−0.17	0.11		−0.05	−0.25	0.42	0.19	−0.64
	(0.30)	(0.33)	(0.34)	(0.38)	(0.25)	(0.27)		(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.25)	(0.51)
Treated x Diversity	1.07	0.70	1.00	−3.45*	0.01	−0.24	−0.24	−1.02	−1.87	1.36	0.12	−0.57
	(1.70)	(1.67)	(1.72)	(1.92)	(1.30)	(1.40)	(1.21)	(1.37)	(1.29)	(1.23)	(1.26)	(2.11)
Observations	404	404	404	404	404	404	404	404	404	404	404	404

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Ordered and logistic multilevel regression models with state random effects.

Table SI.8.17: Treated and Diversity Crime

	Dependent variable:											
	Pleasant	Unpleasant	Mixed	Weak	Spend Wisely	Opinions	Valid Concerns	One Group	Caste Trust	Neighbor	Talk	Donation
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Treated	−0.117	−0.077	−0.087	0.281	0.005	0.051	0.007	0.058	0.165*	−0.106	0.109	0.078
	(0.147)	(0.142)	(0.113)	(0.182)	(0.150)	(0.102)	(0.123)	(0.147)	(0.091)	(0.111)	(0.078)	(0.089)
Diversity	0.262	−0.297	0.125	−0.090	−0.024	−0.013	−0.036	0.028	0.048	−0.113	0.015	−0.053
	(0.226)	(0.214)	(0.181)	(0.242)	(0.137)	(0.081)	(0.153)	(0.226)	(0.139)	(0.108)	(0.067)	(0.217)
Female	0.027	0.004	0.016	−0.047	−0.016	0.008	−0.028	−0.002	0.018	0.009	0.023	0.032
	(0.050)	(0.047)	(0.036)	(0.042)	(0.022)	(0.024)	(0.039)	(0.050)	(0.019)	(0.026)	(0.029)	(0.022)
Age	0.004*	0.003	0.004*	−0.012***	−0.002	−0.002	−0.002	−0.002	0.001	0.006**	0.004***	−0.001
	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.001)	(0.002)
Social Media Active	0.151**	−0.003	0.055	−0.202***	−0.041*	0.001	−0.082*	−0.040	0.072**	0.071	0.102***	0.014
	(0.066)	(0.030)	(0.041)	(0.058)	(0.024)	(0.028)	(0.049)	(0.066)	(0.031)	(0.049)	(0.028)	(0.047)
Bachelors Degree	−0.013	0.066	0.055	−0.107*	−0.036*	−0.062**	−0.041	−0.049	0.023	0.097***	0.006	0.018
	(0.032)	(0.058)	(0.035)	(0.056)	(0.020)	(0.028)	(0.037)	(0.032)	(0.015)	(0.032)	(0.019)	(0.026)
Multi-Term	−0.017	−0.011	0.040	−0.012	−0.031	−0.027	−0.027	0.010	−0.025	−0.060**	0.005	0.053**
	(0.036)	(0.042)	(0.048)	(0.038)	(0.025)	(0.025)	(0.041)	(0.036)	(0.026)	(0.024)	(0.026)	(0.025)
BJP	−0.0002	0.056	−0.089***	0.033	−0.006	0.001	−0.021	0.013	−0.032	0.071*	−0.048	0.034
	(0.069)	(0.068)	(0.034)	(0.049)	(0.048)	(0.030)	(0.053)	(0.069)	(0.032)	(0.042)	(0.032)	(0.047)
INC	−0.038	0.165**	−0.088	−0.039	0.024	−0.066**	0.013	−0.040	−0.025	0.105***	−0.028	0.047
	(0.064)	(0.080)	(0.063)	(0.044)	(0.046)	(0.032)	(0.043)	(0.064)	(0.030)	(0.039)	(0.036)	(0.062)
Called Three Times	−0.115*	0.052	0.022	0.040	0.007	−0.001	0.110***	−0.014	−0.050**	0.002	−0.023	−0.076*
	(0.066)	(0.041)	(0.045)	(0.035)	(0.029)	(0.029)	(0.038)	(0.066)	(0.022)	(0.035)	(0.028)	(0.041)
Caste Reservation	0.050	−0.004	−0.069	0.023	0.006	−0.001	0.006	0.019	−0.040	0.079**	0.016	−0.041*
	(0.059)	(0.046)	(0.053)	(0.041)	(0.044)	(0.024)	(0.072)	(0.059)	(0.045)	(0.033)	(0.032)	(0.024)
Crime	0.469***	−0.882***	−0.598***	1.012***	0.677***	0.477***	0.367***	0.316**	−0.430***	−0.796***	−0.042	−0.359***
	(0.140)	(0.095)	(0.118)	(0.144)	(0.098)	(0.063)	(0.080)	(0.140)	(0.058)	(0.115)	(0.101)	(0.108)
Treated x Diversity	0.147	0.108	0.132	−0.387	−0.034	−0.024	−0.042	−0.052	−0.246*	0.255	−0.082	−0.114
	(0.249)	(0.198)	(0.158)	(0.260)	(0.248)	(0.141)	(0.186)	(0.249)	(0.140)	(0.175)	(0.126)	(0.147)
Constant	−2.560***	4.842***	3.142***	−4.425***	−2.802***	−1.544***	−1.279***	−0.690	2.989***	4.564***	0.810	2.068***
	(0.853)	(0.555)	(0.687)	(0.947)	(0.556)	(0.322)	(0.489)	(0.853)	(0.405)	(0.607)	(0.518)	(0.678)
Observations	404	404	404	404	404	404	404	404	404	404	404	404

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Linear regression models with dependent variables standardized between 0 and 1, corporation fixed effects, and cluster robust standard errors.

Table SI.8.18: Treated and Diversity Crime

	Pleasant	Unpleasant	Mixed	Weak	Spend Wisely	Opinions	Valid Concerns	One Group	Caste Trust	Neighbor	Talk	Donation
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
(Intercept)	−4.34***	0.14	−2.20	1.33								−0.91
	(1.31)	(1.36)	(1.41)	(1.55)								(1.76)
Treated	−0.75	−0.54	−0.64	2.34**	−0.18	0.50	0.05	0.87	1.32	−0.40	0.62	0.57
	(1.07)	(1.05)	(1.10)	(1.14)	(0.83)	(0.89)	(0.75)	(0.87)	(0.82)	(0.74)	(0.80)	(1.23)
Diversity	0.64	−0.96	0.36	0.05	−0.09	−0.27	−0.38	0.37	0.33	0.25	0.18	−1.22
	(1.02)	(1.10)	(1.12)	(1.17)	(0.87)	(0.90)	(0.74)	(0.86)	(0.85)	(0.69)	(0.81)	(1.37)
Female	0.12	0.01	0.13	−0.28	−0.16	0.01	−0.07	−0.03	0.12	0.01	0.29	0.37
	(0.25)	(0.26)	(0.26)	(0.30)	(0.20)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.20)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.34)
Age	0.02	0.02	0.03**	−0.08***	−0.03**	−0.03**	−0.00	−0.04**	0.00	0.03**	0.03**	−0.01
	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.01)	(0.02)
Social Media Active	0.84***	0.06	0.32	−1.66***	−0.36*	−0.05	−0.40**	−0.48**	0.73***		0.94***	0.13
	(0.26)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.35)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.19)	(0.22)	(0.21)		(0.21)	(0.37)
Bachelors Degree	−0.14	0.40	0.47*	−0.78**	−0.53**	−0.89***	−0.33*	−0.58***	0.24	0.67***	0.02	0.31
	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.31)	(0.21)	(0.23)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.21)	(0.37)
Multi-Term	−0.00	−0.21	0.21	−0.20	−0.16	−0.27	−0.24	0.15	−0.13	−0.40*	0.21	0.61*
	(0.27)	(0.28)	(0.27)	(0.32)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.21)	(0.21)	(0.22)	(0.36)
BJP	0.60*	−0.47	−0.72**	0.97**	0.23	0.62*	−0.36	0.62*	−0.00	0.65***	−0.03	0.97*
	(0.35)	(0.39)	(0.35)	(0.45)	(0.30)	(0.32)	(0.23)	(0.32)	(0.30)	(0.23)	(0.32)	(0.51)
INC	0.18	0.48	−0.56	0.15	0.28	−0.18	−0.07	−0.20	−0.09	0.76**	−0.08	0.63
	(0.43)	(0.39)	(0.40)	(0.55)	(0.32)	(0.33)	(0.29)	(0.34)	(0.33)	(0.30)	(0.33)	(0.61)
Called Three Times	−0.47*	0.09	−0.05	0.51*	−0.02	0.11	0.40*	−0.01	−0.39*		−0.11	−0.76**
	(0.28)	(0.31)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.24)	(0.24)	(0.21)	(0.25)	(0.22)		(0.23)	(0.39)
Caste Reservation	0.37	−0.09	−0.20	−0.08	−0.21	−0.02		−0.18	−0.42		0.15	−0.50
	(0.30)	(0.33)	(0.35)	(0.38)	(0.27)	(0.28)		(0.29)	(0.27)		(0.27)	(0.48)
Crime	0.37**	−0.48***	−0.20	0.30	0.02	0.17	0.01	0.32	0.12	−0.28**	0.19	−0.28
	(0.17)	(0.19)	(0.20)	(0.20)	(0.17)	(0.16)	(0.11)	(0.21)	(0.19)	(0.11)	(0.18)	(0.26)
Treated x Diversity	0.95	0.71	1.09	−3.49*	−0.04	−0.39	−0.24	−1.07	−1.96	1.24	−0.11	−0.45
	(1.72)	(1.69)	(1.75)	(1.89)	(1.34)	(1.42)	(1.21)	(1.41)	(1.33)	(1.22)	(1.31)	(2.08)
Observations	404	404	404	404	404	404	404	404	404	404	404	404

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Ordered and logistic multilevel regression models with corporation random effects.

SI.9: Heterogeneous Treatment Effects

I restrict the analysis to only forward caste respondents to examine whether the effects depend on the caste category of the respondent. Figure SI.9.1 displays coefficient point estimates for linear regression models with dependent variables normalized to between 0 and 1, corporation fixed effects, and cluster robust standard errors by corporation.

Table SI.9.1 displays regression results for diversity and contact, whereas Table SI.9.2 displays ordinal multilevel model results for these same variables.

Table SI.9.3 displays regression results for the treatment with diversity and contact included, whereas Table SI.9.4 displays ordinal multilevel model results for these same variables.

Figure SI.9.2 displays marginal effects plots for each of the main dependent variables.

Table SI.9.5 displays regression results for the interaction between the treatment indicator and committee diversity. Table SI.9.6 displays ordinal multilevel model results for this same interaction.

Figure SI.9.1: Diversity and Contact Just Forward

Coefficient estimates for diversity and contact on normalized dependent variables where estimates are from linear regression models with corporation fixed effects with cluster robust standard errors by corporation.

Table SI.9.1: Diversity and Contact Just Forward

	Pleasant	Unpleasant	Mixed	Weak	Spend Wisely	Opinions	Valid Concerns	One Group	Caste Trust	Neighbor	Talk	Donation
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Contact	0.124	0.201	0.207	−0.533***	−0.174	−0.013	0.033	0.111	0.166	0.275	0.198**	0.025
	(0.210)	(0.158)	(0.280)	(0.160)	(0.142)	(0.064)	(0.172)	(0.093)	(0.104)	(0.174)	(0.100)	(0.260)
Pct. Not Forward	0.619**	−0.531*	0.051	−0.139	−0.198	−0.086	−0.279**	0.092	0.102	0.059	0.041	−0.002
	(0.261)	(0.294)	(0.277)	(0.247)	(0.197)	(0.134)	(0.114)	(0.117)	(0.117)	(0.139)	(0.133)	(0.324)
Female	0.046	−0.052	0.105	−0.099	−0.022	0.036	−0.066	−0.043	0.059	0.048	0.055	−0.056
	(0.082)	(0.134)	(0.075)	(0.062)	(0.038)	(0.036)	(0.098)	(0.030)	(0.037)	(0.033)	(0.055)	(0.041)
Age	0.006	0.007*	0.008	−0.022***	−0.002	−0.001	−0.009*	−0.006***	0.003	0.006*	0.006***	0.003
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Social Media Active	0.249***	−0.059	0.015	−0.205***	−0.052	−0.027	−0.121***	−0.002	0.036	0.071	0.075**	0.031
	(0.080)	(0.072)	(0.069)	(0.059)	(0.073)	(0.031)	(0.047)	(0.039)	(0.035)	(0.067)	(0.033)	(0.064)
Bachelors Degree	−0.088	0.121	0.113	−0.145	−0.016	−0.064***	0.009	−0.092**	0.075**	0.090*	0.025	0.050
	(0.072)	(0.101)	(0.090)	(0.091)	(0.046)	(0.025)	(0.059)	(0.040)	(0.031)	(0.047)	(0.028)	(0.045)
Multi-Term	−0.033	−0.034	0.107*	−0.040	−0.019	−0.019	−0.068	0.006	0.026	−0.147***	0.008	0.080
	(0.079)	(0.047)	(0.063)	(0.064)	(0.053)	(0.038)	(0.078)	(0.027)	(0.042)	(0.055)	(0.039)	(0.050)
BJP	0.081	−0.011	−0.107	0.037	0.006	0.001	−0.084	−0.079	0.064	0.070	−0.073	−0.002
	(0.161)	(0.159)	(0.072)	(0.071)	(0.074)	(0.047)	(0.129)	(0.087)	(0.075)	(0.157)	(0.045)	(0.085)
INC	0.010	0.155	−0.063	−0.102	−0.019	0.006	−0.057	−0.110	0.139*	0.097	0.011	−0.062
	(0.193)	(0.233)	(0.133)	(0.109)	(0.125)	(0.044)	(0.159)	(0.096)	(0.082)	(0.144)	(0.063)	(0.072)
Called Three Times	−0.037	0.024	0.061	−0.048	−0.002	0.038	0.014	−0.064*	0.021	0.060	−0.017	−0.104***
	(0.080)	(0.068)	(0.084)	(0.057)	(0.047)	(0.045)	(0.083)	(0.035)	(0.042)	(0.072)	(0.035)	(0.037)
Constant	−0.432*	−0.024	−0.318	1.774***	0.926***	1.020***	1.158***	1.176***	0.394***	0.098	0.482***	0.070
	(0.231)	(0.265)	(0.263)	(0.264)	(0.125)	(0.084)	(0.363)	(0.118)	(0.098)	(0.187)	(0.107)	(0.140)
Observations	170	170	170	170	170	170	170	170	170	170	170	170

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Linear regression models with dependent variables standardized between 0 and 1, corporation fixed effects, and cluster robust standard errors.

Table SI.9.2: Diversity and Contact Just Forward Multilevel

	Pleasant	Unpleasant	Mixed	Weak	Spend Wisely	Opinions	One Group	Caste Trust	Neighbor	Talk	Donation
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)
(Intercept)	−4.60***	−4.28**	−5.59***	8.61***							−4.91**
	(1.66)	(1.69)	(1.77)	(2.17)							(2.46)
Contact	−0.34	1.49	1.64	−2.71*	−2.53***	−1.33	1.27	0.61	1.83**	1.37	1.18
	(1.24)	(1.26)	(1.27)	(1.53)	(0.97)	(1.00)	(1.01)	(0.87)	(0.92)	(0.93)	(1.69)
Pct. Not Forward	2.03*	−2.02	1.11	−2.98**	−1.66*	−0.26	−1.44	−0.01	−0.13	−0.65	−3.03
	(1.21)	(1.40)	(1.16)	(1.50)	(0.93)	(0.96)	(1.23)	(0.85)	(0.91)	(0.92)	(2.02)
Female	0.09	−0.03	0.22	−0.53	−0.21	0.08	−0.30	0.52*	0.25	0.20	−0.77
	(0.43)	(0.43)	(0.41)	(0.47)	(0.32)	(0.33)	(0.38)	(0.30)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.66)
Age	0.01	0.06**	0.06**	−0.14***	−0.02	−0.02	−0.09***	0.01	0.04*	0.03	0.05
	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Social Media Active	1.50***		0.31		−0.22	−0.05	−0.24	0.49	0.49	0.81**	0.53
	(0.46)		(0.42)		(0.34)	(0.35)	(0.36)	(0.33)	(0.34)	(0.33)	(0.64)
Bachelors Degree	−0.08		0.77*	−1.60***	−0.46	−0.92**	−0.98**	0.97***	0.49	0.35	0.57
	(0.47)		(0.46)	(0.48)	(0.34)	(0.36)	(0.40)	(0.34)	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.72)
Multi-Term	0.03		0.57	−0.23	0.10	−0.12	0.41	0.22	−1.10***	0.25	0.63
	(0.46)		(0.42)	(0.53)	(0.36)	(0.35)	(0.40)	(0.32)	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.62)
BJP	1.79**	−0.66	−1.31***	0.85	0.17	1.13***	0.54	1.14***	0.32	0.25	0.51
	(0.71)	(0.53)	(0.45)	(0.68)	(0.42)	(0.39)	(0.62)	(0.38)	(0.41)	(0.39)	(0.78)
INC	1.73*	0.30	−1.24	0.23	0.27	0.73	−0.05	1.76***	0.27	0.84	−0.35
	(0.93)	(0.76)	(0.78)	(0.89)	(0.61)	(0.58)	(0.79)	(0.57)	(0.55)	(0.65)	(1.35)
Called Three Times	0.03		0.01	0.01	−0.15	0.30	−0.53	0.13	0.45	0.04	−1.13
	(0.43)		(0.42)	(0.47)	(0.33)	(0.34)	(0.40)	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.35)	(0.72)
Observations	170	170	170	170	170	170	170	170	170	170	170

Dependent variable:

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Ordered and logistic multilevel regression models with corporation random effects.

Table SI.9.3: Treated Just Forward

	Dependent variable:											
	Pleasant	Unpleasant	Mixed	Weak	Spend Wisely	Opinions	Valid Concerns	One Group	Caste Trust	Neighbor	Talk	Donation
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Treated	0.005	0.025	−0.112	0.082	−0.040	0.021	−0.003	0.019	−0.025	−0.028	0.041	0.015
	(0.059)	(0.067)	(0.073)	(0.096)	(0.091)	(0.031)	(0.093)	(0.059)	(0.057)	(0.055)	(0.033)	(0.048)
Contact	0.125	0.203	0.199	−0.527***	−0.177	−0.012	0.033	0.113	0.164	0.273	0.201*	0.026
	(0.210)	(0.158)	(0.265)	(0.150)	(0.140)	(0.061)	(0.173)	(0.210)	(0.108)	(0.173)	(0.107)	(0.261)
Diversity	0.617**	−0.541*	0.094	−0.171	−0.182	−0.094	−0.278**	0.084	0.111	0.070	0.025	−0.008
	(0.262)	(0.280)	(0.256)	(0.229)	(0.208)	(0.137)	(0.134)	(0.262)	(0.107)	(0.135)	(0.133)	(0.331)
Female	0.046	−0.051	0.100	−0.095	−0.024	0.037	−0.066	−0.042	0.058	0.047	0.057	−0.055
	(0.081)	(0.133)	(0.074)	(0.060)	(0.040)	(0.037)	(0.098)	(0.081)	(0.038)	(0.033)	(0.055)	(0.041)
Age	0.006	0.007**	0.009*	−0.022***	−0.001	−0.001	−0.009	−0.006	0.003	0.006**	0.005***	0.003
	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.006)	(0.003)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.006)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.004)
Social Media Active	0.249***	−0.060	0.021	−0.210***	−0.050	−0.028	−0.121**	−0.003	0.037	0.073	0.073**	0.030
	(0.082)	(0.073)	(0.068)	(0.060)	(0.067)	(0.031)	(0.050)	(0.082)	(0.036)	(0.068)	(0.035)	(0.066)
Bachelors Degree	−0.089	0.119	0.121	−0.151	−0.013	−0.066***	0.009	−0.094	0.076**	0.092**	0.022	0.049
	(0.070)	(0.099)	(0.093)	(0.094)	(0.046)	(0.024)	(0.057)	(0.070)	(0.032)	(0.047)	(0.026)	(0.046)
Multi-Term	−0.032	−0.029	0.085	−0.024	−0.027	−0.015	−0.069	0.010	0.021	−0.153***	0.016	0.083*
	(0.074)	(0.041)	(0.069)	(0.067)	(0.048)	(0.038)	(0.090)	(0.074)	(0.047)	(0.051)	(0.039)	(0.046)
BJP	0.082	−0.005	−0.133*	0.056	−0.003	0.006	−0.085	−0.074	0.059	0.064	−0.063	0.002
	(0.155)	(0.157)	(0.075)	(0.072)	(0.078)	(0.047)	(0.135)	(0.155)	(0.075)	(0.157)	(0.045)	(0.086)
INC	0.010	0.157	−0.073	−0.094	−0.023	0.008	−0.057	−0.109	0.137*	0.094	0.015	−0.060
	(0.190)	(0.234)	(0.137)	(0.113)	(0.130)	(0.044)	(0.159)	(0.190)	(0.083)	(0.145)	(0.063)	(0.072)
Called Three Times	−0.037	0.024	0.062	−0.049	−0.002	0.037	0.014	−0.064	0.021	0.060	−0.018	−0.104***
	(0.080)	(0.067)	(0.079)	(0.055)	(0.046)	(0.046)	(0.083)	(0.080)	(0.042)	(0.073)	(0.035)	(0.037)
Constant	−0.432*	−0.026	−0.310	1.769***	0.929***	1.019***	1.159***	1.174***	0.396***	0.100	0.480***	0.068
	(0.231)	(0.269)	(0.270)	(0.259)	(0.125)	(0.086)	(0.364)	(0.231)	(0.100)	(0.190)	(0.112)	(0.141)
Observations	170	170	170	170	170	170	170	170	170	170	170	170

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Linear regression models with dependent variables standardized between 0 and 1, corporation fixed effects, and cluster robust standard errors.

Table SI.9.4: Treated Just Forward MLM

	Dependent variable:											
	Pleasant	Unpleasant	Mixed	Weak	Spend Wisely	Opinions	Valid Concerns	One Group	Caste Trust	Neighbor	Talk	Donation
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
(Intercept)	−4.60***	−2.26**	−5.73***	9.01***								−4.88**
	(1.66)	(0.98)	(1.80)	(1.38)								(2.46)
Treated	−0.01	0.59	−0.60	0.63	−0.06	0.11	0.10	0.27	−0.22	−0.23	0.30	0.56
	(0.44)	(0.42)	(0.44)	(0.51)	(0.33)	(0.34)	(0.32)	(0.36)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.32)	(0.65)
Contact	−0.35	2.19*	1.65	−2.48	−2.53***	−1.38	0.99	1.28	0.61	1.85**	1.39	1.24
	(1.24)	(1.22)	(1.27)	(1.61)	(0.97)	(0.99)	(0.90)	(1.01)	(0.91)	(0.92)	(0.93)	(1.70)
Diversity	2.03*	−2.39	1.30	−2.03	−1.64*	−0.46	−1.09	−1.50	0.06	−0.05	−0.74	−3.33
	(1.22)	(1.61)	(1.18)	(1.62)	(0.95)	(0.94)	(1.05)	(1.23)	(0.89)	(0.91)	(0.93)	(2.04)
Female	0.09		0.22	−0.41	−0.21	0.06	−0.03	−0.31	0.51*	0.25	0.21	−0.74
	(0.43)		(0.41)	(0.53)	(0.32)	(0.33)	(0.32)	(0.38)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.66)
Age	0.01		0.07**	−0.15***	−0.02	−0.02	−0.05***	−0.10***	0.02	0.04*	0.03	0.04
	(0.03)		(0.03)	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.00)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.04)
Social Media Active	1.50***		0.37	−1.80***	−0.23		−0.67**	−0.26	0.49	0.49	0.78**	0.53
	(0.47)		(0.42)	(0.62)	(0.34)		(0.33)	(0.36)	(0.33)	(0.34)	(0.33)	(0.65)
Bachelors Degree	−0.08		0.80*	−1.14**	−0.46	−0.91***	−0.21	−1.00**	0.98***	0.51	0.33	0.50
	(0.47)		(0.46)	(0.55)	(0.34)	(0.34)	(0.35)	(0.40)	(0.34)	(0.33)	(0.33)	(0.74)
Multi-Term	0.03		0.40	−0.51	0.08	−0.06	−0.38	0.47	0.17	−1.16***	0.33	0.76
	(0.48)		(0.44)	(0.61)	(0.37)	(0.36)	(0.35)	(0.41)	(0.34)	(0.35)	(0.35)	(0.64)
BJP	1.79**		−1.50***	0.96	0.15	1.23***	−0.29	0.59	1.09***	0.27	0.34	0.74
	(0.73)		(0.48)	(0.77)	(0.44)	(0.39)	(0.44)	(0.62)	(0.40)	(0.42)	(0.40)	(0.81)
INC	1.73*		−1.26	−0.25	0.27	0.78	−0.19	−0.06	1.75***	0.27	0.86	−0.24
	(0.93)		(0.79)	(1.01)	(0.61)	(0.58)	(0.63)	(0.78)	(0.58)	(0.55)	(0.66)	(1.38)
Called Three Times	0.03		0.08	−0.20	−0.15		0.05	−0.56	0.14	0.48	0.01	−1.18
	(0.43)		(0.43)	(0.52)	(0.33)		(0.32)	(0.40)	(0.32)	(0.32)	(0.35)	(0.75)
Observations	170	172	170	170	170	170	170	170	170	170	170	170

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Ordered and logistic multilevel regression models with corporation random effects.

Figure SI.9.2: Interactions Just Forward

Plots of dependent variable marginal effects plots for the effect of the treatment on the dependent variable at given levels of diversity where diversity is percent not forward.

Table SI.9.5: Treated and Diversity Just Forward

	Pleasant	Unpleasant	Mixed	Weak	Spend Wisely	Opinions	Valid Concerns	One Group	Caste Trust	Neighbor	Talk	Donation
	*Dependent variable:*										
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Treated	0.128	−0.011	0.050	−0.167	0.012	0.020	−0.096	−0.002	0.090	0.015	0.093*	0.138*
	(0.146)	(0.114)	(0.149)	(0.217)	(0.068)	(0.088)	(0.110)	(0.146)	(0.073)	(0.086)	(0.053)	(0.080)
Pct. Not Forward	0.556**	−0.442***	0.111	−0.225	−0.191	−0.006	−0.256	0.015	0.201*	0.098	0.105	−0.162
	(0.260)	(0.141)	(0.240)	(0.234)	(0.156)	(0.176)	(0.213)	(0.260)	(0.115)	(0.170)	(0.140)	(0.195)
Female	0.065	−0.109	0.095*	−0.050	−0.031	0.032	−0.051	−0.029	0.053	0.027	0.047	−0.001
	(0.076)	(0.113)	(0.057)	(0.062)	(0.023)	(0.028)	(0.077)	(0.076)	(0.037)	(0.037)	(0.041)	(0.035)
Age	0.005	0.007**	0.009**	−0.022***	−0.004*	−0.0003	−0.007	−0.005	0.002	0.007***	0.006***	0.003
	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.004)	(0.003)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.005)	(0.004)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.002)	(0.003)
Social Media Active	0.253***	−0.034	0.066	−0.284***	−0.030	−0.044	−0.138***	−0.002	0.058**	0.094*	0.107***	0.063
	(0.071)	(0.062)	(0.062)	(0.054)	(0.046)	(0.028)	(0.043)	(0.071)	(0.027)	(0.055)	(0.029)	(0.057)
Bachelors Degree	−0.068	0.157*	0.082	−0.171**	−0.026	−0.072***	−0.009	−0.077	0.069**	0.078*	0.003	0.015
	(0.065)	(0.088)	(0.068)	(0.075)	(0.038)	(0.018)	(0.043)	(0.065)	(0.030)	(0.044)	(0.022)	(0.043)
Multi-Term	−0.026	−0.020	0.047	−0.001	0.002	−0.001	−0.083	0.004	0.032	−0.118***	0.019	0.068*
	(0.065)	(0.048)	(0.069)	(0.048)	(0.034)	(0.038)	(0.086)	(0.065)	(0.033)	(0.040)	(0.034)	(0.035)
BJP	0.192	−0.044	−0.126*	−0.022	0.013	0.006	−0.160	−0.021	0.049	0.046	−0.057	0.089
	(0.168)	(0.156)	(0.075)	(0.082)	(0.067)	(0.047)	(0.136)	(0.168)	(0.077)	(0.141)	(0.037)	(0.075)
INC	0.171	0.054	−0.088	−0.137	0.023	−0.018	−0.123	−0.028	0.151*	0.064	−0.009	0.059
	(0.193)	(0.221)	(0.098)	(0.125)	(0.117)	(0.044)	(0.143)	(0.193)	(0.079)	(0.129)	(0.072)	(0.087)
Called Three Times	−0.051	−0.001	0.043	0.008	0.007	0.036	0.039	−0.035	−0.012	0.002	−0.035	−0.096*
	(0.073)	(0.054)	(0.052)	(0.047)	(0.034)	(0.037)	(0.084)	(0.073)	(0.034)	(0.053)	(0.031)	(0.050)
Treated x Pct. Not Forward	−0.195	−0.010	−0.316	0.521	−0.046	0.040	0.177	0.027	−0.236**	−0.003	−0.129	−0.219
	(0.316)	(0.358)	(0.349)	(0.317)	(0.196)	(0.203)	(0.235)	(0.316)	(0.116)	(0.191)	(0.151)	(0.169)
Constant	−0.429*	0.068	−0.192	1.553***	0.918***	0.942***	1.151***	1.160***	0.496***	0.247	0.560***	0.067
	(0.234)	(0.195)	(0.236)	(0.232)	(0.088)	(0.105)	(0.264)	(0.234)	(0.106)	(0.176)	(0.098)	(0.166)
Observations	205	205	205	205	205	205	205	205	205	205	205	205

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Linear regression models with dependent variables standardized between 0 and 1, corporation fixed effects, and cluster robust standard errors.

Table SI.9.6: Treated and Diversity Just Forward Multilevel

	Dependent variable:											
	Pleasant	Unpleasant	Mixed	Weak	Spend Wisely	Opinions	Valid Concerns	One Group	Caste Trust	Neighbor	Talk	Donation
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
(Intercept)	−4.74***	−3.40**	−4.77***	7.44***								−3.69**
	(1.49)	(1.42)	(1.48)	(1.79)								(1.73)
Treated	0.40	0.07	0.28	−0.35	−0.29	0.42	−0.45	0.31	1.00*	0.15	1.08*	1.12
	(0.79)	(0.81)	(0.84)	(0.81)	(0.62)	(0.65)	(0.55)	(0.66)	(0.57)	(0.56)	(0.58)	(0.93)
Pct. Not Forward	1.36	−1.46	1.86	−2.41*	−2.20**	0.26	−1.02	−1.92*	0.46	−0.44	0.02	−3.55*
	(1.37)	(1.68)	(1.31)	(1.44)	(1.05)	(1.09)	(0.88)	(0.99)	(0.92)	(1.05)	(0.97)	(1.93)
Female	0.30	−0.36	0.37	−0.42	−0.12	0.14	−0.17	−0.05	0.52*	0.11	0.28	−0.23
	(0.39)	(0.40)	(0.37)	(0.41)	(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.26)	(0.29)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.27)	(0.50)
Age	0.01	0.06**	0.07***	−0.15***	−0.04**	−0.01	−0.03*	−0.08***	0.01	0.04**	0.03*	0.03
	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.03)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.02)	(0.03)
Social Media Active	1.44***		0.42	−1.92***	−0.30			−0.16	0.65**	0.72**	1.02***	0.73
	(0.41)		(0.39)	(0.50)	(0.30)			(0.31)	(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.52)
Bachelors Degree	−0.14		0.64	−1.12**	−0.63**	−1.09***	−0.44*	−0.84***	0.86***	0.46	0.18	0.17
	(0.42)		(0.41)	(0.44)	(0.31)	(0.30)	(0.26)	(0.32)	(0.30)	(0.29)	(0.30)	(0.54)
Multi-Term	0.15		0.16	−0.34	0.27		−0.42	0.51	0.31	−0.83***	0.35	0.54
	(0.43)		(0.40)	(0.48)	(0.33)		(0.29)	(0.34)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.31)	(0.51)
BJP	2.18***	−0.62	−1.49***	0.78	0.24	1.13***	−0.53	1.33***	1.03***	0.40	0.35	1.15
	(0.72)	(0.50)	(0.44)	(0.59)	(0.40)	(0.37)	(0.34)	(0.38)	(0.37)	(0.39)	(0.37)	(0.76)
INC	2.10**	−0.06	−1.40*	0.09	0.44	0.66	−0.20	0.96*	1.76***	0.29	0.60	0.49
	(0.88)	(0.72)	(0.74)	(0.77)	(0.56)	(0.54)	(0.50)	(0.55)	(0.52)	(0.50)	(0.54)	(1.05)
Called Three Times	−0.24		0.08	0.25	0.07	0.44	0.22	−0.14	−0.17	−0.06	−0.17	−0.93*
	(0.38)		(0.39)	(0.41)	(0.30)	(0.30)	(0.27)	(0.31)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.28)	(0.51)
Treated x Pct. Not Forward	−0.30	0.06	−1.87	1.97	1.09	−0.77	0.94	−0.42	−2.57*	−0.05	−1.88	−1.58
	(1.83)	(1.98)	(1.88)	(2.03)	(1.43)	(1.53)	(1.27)	(1.45)	(1.36)	(1.37)	(1.36)	(2.74)
Observations	205	207	205	205	205	207	205	205	205	205	205	205

Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01

Ordered and logistic multilevel regression models with corporation random effects.

References

Banerjee, Abhijit, Marianne Bertrand, Saugato Datta and Sendhil Mullainathan. 2009. "Labor Market Discrimination in Delhi: Evidence from a Field Experiment." *Journal of Comparative Economics* 37(1):14–27.

Bhagavatula, Suresh, Manaswini Bhalla, Manisha Goel and Balagopal Vissa. 2017. "The Business of Religion and Caste in India.".

Chen, Guoli, Raveendra Chittoor and Balagopal Vissa. 2015. "Modernizing without Westernizing: Social Structure and Economic Action in the Indian Financial Sector." *Academy of Management Journal* 58(2):511–527.

Damaraju, Naga Lakshmi and Anil K. Makhija. 2018. "The Role of Social Proximity in Professional CEO Appointments: Evidence from Caste/Religion-Based Hiring of CEOs in India." *Strategic Management Journal* 39(7):2051–2074.

Desai, Sonalde and Reeve Vanneman. 2015. "India Human Development Survey-II.".

Gubler, Joshua R. and Christopher F. Karpowitz. 2019. "Mixed Affective States and the Fundamental Challenge of Persuasion.".

Harrison, David A. and Katherine J. Klein. 2007. "What's the Difference? Diversity Constructs as Separation, Variety, or Disparity in Organizations." *Academy of Management Review* 32(4):1199–1228.

Jayaraman, Raja. 2005. "Personal Identity in a Globalized World: Cultural Roots of Hindu Personal Names and Surnames." *The Journal of Popular Culture* 38(3):476–490.

Jensenius, F.R. and P. Suryanarayan. 2015. "Fragmentation and Decline in Indias State Assemblies: A Review, 1967-2007." *Asian Survey* 55(5):862–881.

Lancee, Bram and Jaap Dronkers. 2011. "Ethnic, Religious and Economic Diversity in Dutch Neighbourhoods: Explaining Quality of Contact with Neighbours, Trust in the Neighbourhood and Inter-Ethnic Trust." *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 37(4):597–618.

Mateos, Pablo, Richard Webber and P. A. Longley. 2007. The Cultural, Ethnic and Linguistic Classification of Populations and Neighbourhoods Using Personal Names. Technical Report 116 University College London London: .

Narain, Iqbal and Mohan Lal Sharma. 1972. "Election Politics, Secularization and Political Development: The 5th Lok Sabha Elections in Rajasthan." *Asian Survey* 12(4):294–309.

Rajadesingan, Ashwin, Ramaswami Mahalingam and David Jurgens. 2019. Smart, Responsible, and Upper Caste Only: Measuring Caste Attitudes through Large-Scale Analysis of Matrimonial Profiles. In *Proceedings of the International AAAI Conference on Web and Social Media*. Vol. 13 pp. 393–404.

Shah, Paru R. and Nicholas R. Davis. 2017. "Comparing Three Methods of Measuring Race/Ethnicity." *The Journal of Race, Ethnicity, and Politics* 2(1):124–139.

Singh, K.S. 1996. *Communities, Segments, Synonyms, Surnames, and Titles*. Delhi: Oxford University Press.

Tallman, S. and J. Li. 1996. "Effects of International Diversity and Product Diversity on the Performance of Multinational Firms." *Academy of Management Journal* 39(1):179–196.

Vissa, Balagopal. 2011. "A Matching Theory of Entrepreneurs' Tie Formation Intentions and Initiation of Economic Exchange." *Academy of Management Journal* 54(1):137=158.