


This article was downloaded by: [Heriot-Watt University]
On: 02 January 2015, At: 14:06
Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number:
1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street,
London W1T 3JH, UK



The Journal of Slavic Military Studies

Publication details, including instructions for authors and subscription information:

<http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fslv20>

‘The War in Iraq’: An Assessment of Lessons Learned by Russian Military Specialists Through 31 July 2003

TIMOTHY L. THOMAS

Published online: 10 Aug 2010.

To cite this article: TIMOTHY L. THOMAS (2004) ‘The War in Iraq’: An Assessment of Lessons Learned by Russian Military Specialists Through 31 July 2003, The Journal of Slavic Military Studies, 17:1, 153-180, DOI: [10.1080/13518040490440700](https://doi.org/10.1080/13518040490440700)

To link to this article: <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13518040490440700>

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy, completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinions and views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor and Francis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution, reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in any form to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at <http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions>

‘The War in Iraq’: An Assessment of Lessons Learned by Russian Military Specialists Through 31 July 2003

TIMOTHY L. THOMAS

A host of prominent military and civilian specialists critiqued the US led coalition war against Iraq. Their comments reflected a mixture of Cold War thinking on the one hand and a new place to update the Russian armed forces on the other. Those in the latter group demanded that Russian military reform linger no longer, and that lessons learned from what transpired in Iraq be incorporated into Russian threat assessments.

Russian military experts offered varying assessments of the recent US-British led war in Iraq. For most retired members of the military establishment and for several serving officers, the coalition’s techniques represented nothing new and were highly criticized. Derogatory comments were aimed at the coalition’s imprecise use of precision weapons, the inability of the coalition to successfully engage the Iraqi military, and the inaccuracy of coalition reporting. In short, these Soviet or Russian officers did not believe coalition ‘propaganda’ about the low number of casualties or equipment failures (all the while swallowing Arab propaganda without comment), and preferred to highlight coalition failures and Iraqi successes. For the majority of serving officers, however, and a few retired officers and a civilian member of the Duma defense committee, the coalition’s performance was enviable and worthy of admiration.

The difference in commentary was significant, coming as it did at a time of intense debate over military reform in Russia. The debate centered on the ability of the Russian armed forces to switch from a draft to a mixed draft and volunteer force, and to produce a modern, high-tech force capable of defending the country in the

coming years. The implication of the debate was that, from the viewpoint of the retired officers and a few serving officers, not much was needed in the way of military reform. For example, former Defense Minister Igor Rodionov noted that even though the state of the armed forces is worse than critical, any attempt to create a small professional army in Russia is doomed to fail, as the economy is not ready for it.¹ From the viewpoint of a few Duma defense officials and other officers, on the other hand, military reform is not only required but long overdue.

By late July, the ongoing analysis of the war did appear to have nudged the debate over military reform in a positive direction. President Putin noted at the end of July that debate over reform is over, and that three things are required: the technical re-outfitting of the armed force, increasing the capabilities of permanent readiness units and reinforcing the officer and sergeant corps. Russia's strong human and technical potential would ensure the success of military reform, he added.² One wonders of course if, for the umpteenth time, this means that the old guard has won and that military reform will only be a slogan and not seriously implemented. If so, it will not bode well for the future of Russia's military, beset as it is with a long list of problems. Not only are the armed forces mired down in Chechnya against a handful of bandits, they also are constantly fighting: (a) corruption among members of the officer corps; (b) a lack of discipline in the force and a lack of reliable equipment; and (c) a military budget that is less than adequate for the task at hand. Russian military leaders, both past and present, cannot afford to continue along the same path any longer. They are gradually leading the Russian armed forces to ruin. If the armed forces stop progressing then the country's security will eventually pay for this oversight.

That is not to say that there weren't 'lessons learned' from the war in Iraq. In short, lessons were learned from the geopolitical to the tactical albeit not the ones Western experts might have expected. Some of the lessons will stand the scrutiny of time, while others will be discarded immediately. Not unexpectedly, those articulated by former Soviet officers and conservative serving officers differ in both tone and content from those offered by younger Russian officers and civilians now occupying positions from policymakers to journalists. The analysis below is limited to the written opinions of military personnel, civilian members of the Duma Defense Committee and

to the commander in chief of Russia's armed forces, President Vladimir Putin. It does not include the writings of journalists, the group known as the Ramzaj group or the group of journalists and former Department of Military Intelligence (GRU) officers under the web site www.iraqwar.ru.

PROMINENT MILITARY AND CIVILIAN WRITERS

The Russian government, along with other powers, initially opposed US military intervention in Iraq, joining a group against action without a UN Security Council resolution. Russian representatives counseled delay in the start of military operations to give the inspectors more time, and Russian public opinion at the time contained strong anti-US and anti-coalition protests. Military and political elites with ties to the regime used the conflict to once again call for an anti-US stance in Russian foreign policy. After initially condemning the use of force, the Putin administration indicated that a defeat of the US was not in the interest of Russia. This pronouncement came only after several coalition successes.

Not surprisingly, former Soviet officers offered the most vehement comments against coalition actions. However, several Soviet-era officers also offered highly constructive analyses that were as good as many that current officers wrote. On the whole, civilian journalists and Russian-era officers did better in their analyses and predictions of the war's conduct and outcome. Now that the conflict has ended, all military professionals in Russia are offering more measured and insightful assessments. These domestic and military shifts provide the context for the evolution of Russian comments on lessons learned over the course of the conflict. However, one is struck by the array of differing opinions – some Soviet-era officers supported the intervention, and some Russian-era officers opposed it.

A variety of Russian journals were quick to report on the initial impressions of the war, offering the opinions of current and retired officers as well as serving members of the Duma Defense Committee. For example, in addition to the many newspapers reporting on the war, *Zarubezhnoe Voennoe Obozrenie (ZBO)*, or *Foreign Military Review*, reported in issue 4 of 2003 on 'Several Peculiarities of the War in Iraq', and issue 5 contained an article on 'A Chronology of Military Activity by the US Navy in Iraq'. The May/June issue of

Military Parade contained an article on the confrontation of different types of weaponry in Iraq. Issue 4 of *Morskoi Sbornik* (*Navy Journal*), and the journals *Armeyski Sbornik* (*Army Journal*) and *Voennoye Mysl'* (*Military Thought*) also started publishing articles on lessons learned in their June and July issues. In addition to articles, several conferences were quickly organized, perhaps the most thorough and professional being an expanded session of the Russian Academy of Military Sciences Scientific Council, which was reported in the press on 28 June.

Among the prominent number of military writers or members of the Duma Defense Committee who discussed lessons learned in Iraq were the following: retired Major-General Leonid Shershnev, former deputy chief of the USSR Ministry of Defense Special Propaganda Directorate (PSYOP); retired General Major Vladimir Slipchenko, author of several prominent books on future war; former Minister of Defense, retired Marshall of the Soviet Union Dmitri Yazov; retired Major-General Vladimir Dvorkin, doctor of Technical Sciences and former chief of Russian nuclear weapons planning; General of the Army Makhmut Gareyev, president of the Academy of Military Science and long-time advisor to the Ministry of Defense; Andrei Kokoshin, former Assistant Minister of Defense and head of Russia's National Security Council, now serving as a member of the Duma; retired Major-General Aleksandr Vladimirov, vice-president of the College of Military Experts; retired Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov, former head of the Main Directorate of International Military Cooperation; Aleksey Arbatov, current Deputy Chairman of the Duma Defense Committee; and General of the Army Andrey Nikolayev, former chief of the Russian Border Guards and currently Chairman of the State Duma Defense Committee.

There were many other military writers on the subject of the coalition intervention into Iraq and the actions outcome, and some are included in the analysis below. The collection of lessons learned for this article ended on 31 July. Other lessons, more detailed and thoughtful, probably will appear later as more data is accumulated.

In some cases, as with some US and foreign analysts, Soviet/Russian assessments turned out to be totally wrong. Some errors occurred due to the pace of operations and the failure of the Iraqi people to fight while others were caused due to either a Soviet-era mindset or a clear reliance on past experiences and trends.

RETIRED SOVIET AND RUSSIAN-ERA OFFICERS

Retired Major General Leonid Shershnev, a former psychological operations officer, apparently misunderstood or underestimated coalition PSYOP Operations. Shershnev noted on Russian television that two coalition myths – that it would win the war and that it was acting in accordance with UN sanctions – both failed. In fact, he added, the coalition conducted anti-propaganda against itself. Shershnev felt that scary leaflets worked against the Americans, and he viewed the coalition effort as primitive and shocking. He believed this demonstrated that the US had developed no new ideas.³

Shershnev followed up his television appearance with an article that discussed the same issues. He added that for the first time, the coalition PSYOP failures represented an information warfare defeat for the West. Most importantly, Shershnev stated Russia must ‘add the information component into military art’ since whoever wins the electronic mass media wins the war.⁴ How information is managed and by whom is important. The mistake of the Americans, Shershnev concluded, is that no account was taken of the ideological and moral-psychological situation in that country. It was as if the Bush administration did not study Islamic psychology.⁵

Any US PSYOP officer would refute Shershnev’s analysis. They would note that leaflets instructed Iraqi soldiers and civilians what to do and what not to do. This is a different leaflet theme from that which Shershnev expected, it appears. Leaflets informed combatants to go home instead of fight. As coalition forces came upon deserted vehicle after deserted vehicle, it should have been apparent that PSYOP was working! He also did not comprehend how much effort went into studying Islamic psychology before a simple leaflet was prepared. Pre-testing was conducted to ensure that cultural attitudes were taken into account, and so was post-testing of the effect of certain leaflets.

On 17 April 2003, a discussion of Russian expert shortcomings was printed in the Russian newspaper *Novaya Gazeta*. It offered a sharp slap in the face to some of the more prominent Soviet and Russian officers who commented on the war. Author Ilya Kriger noted that:

The trouble is not that the experts misinformed their leadership, just as they did all the rest of the public. Rather, it is that these predictions are unique from the standpoint of psychiatry. In drawing a picture of defeat of the American army for

themselves and for us, domestic prognosticators were first and foremost consoling themselves and us with the latent idea everything is fine in the Russian Army. That we do not need a professional army. That we can make do without equipment and new weapons.⁶

The most prominent Soviet commentator with such a negative view of the US, in Kriger's view, was former Marshall of the USSR and Minister of Defense Dmitriy Yazov, who stated that:

The Iraqis are very reminiscent of us at Stalingrad . . . The moral-psychological, and that means also the combat qualities, of the allied soldiers are dubious. They are much too soft . . . and look at how they are adorned with all kinds of junk! . . . When we went on the attack . . . we threw away our backpacks and our gas masks – everything except our weapons. And we did not do too badly. But here, half-naked Iraqis, fighting lightly clad, are generally tormenting the wonderfully equipped mercenaries.⁷

Yazov most likely would offer an entirely different opinion if he were interviewed today. High-technology equipment and a force trained in that equipment enabled a quick defeat of the Iraqi armed forces. Further, coalition soldiers did not turn out to be as soft as Yazov expected.

Retired Major General Vladimir Slipchenko is one Soviet-era officer who also served in the era of the Russian army. His analysis did not fit the mold of Shershnev and Yazov. He has made a new career out of staying current in his thinking and writing, and has emerged as a highly respected author of contemporary affairs. However, Slipchenko also made mistakes with his predictions of how the war would be conducted. He attempted on several occasions to interject corrections during the course of the war, but only a few of these turned out to be correct.

Before the war, General Slipchenko, author of several works on non-contact (which means stand-off war using precision weapons) and future war, offered several predictions about the emerging conflict. These predictions had worked for the conflicts in Kosovo and Afghanistan. He stated that:

- There will be no ground operations in Iraq.
- The US will enter a burning desert, as the Iraqis will certainly set fire to the oilfields.
- Some 400–500 sea- and air-based precision cruise missiles will be launched every 24 hours.
- At least 500,000 people will be killed.

- There will not be a meeting engagement on the battlefield. The US will wage a non-contact war, using precision missile strikes to destroy all key facilities in Iraq
- New pulse bombs will be used.
- Several new types of precision cruise missiles will be tested, first and foremost attention will be directed to missile launches from submarines.
- The world oil price will fall to \$12–\$15 a barrel.⁸

Slipchenko's analysis might have been off the mark, but it was understandable how he arrived at these calculations. He expected a replay of the Mother of All Battles (as substantiated by US actions in Kosovo some eight years later) this time on Iraqi soil and with an additional ten years of new weaponry. But the battle did not occur as Slipchenko or most analysts expected. This means that attempting to template US campaigns and operations is a risky business. The US is adept at seeking out critical vulnerabilities and peculiarities of an enemy force that are then included in the planning and conduct of such complex operations. Much depends on the situation at hand, and how to go about it in the most efficient way.

Slipchenko was taken to task for his analysis by some prominent Soviet-era authors such as Vasiliy Reznichenko whose works on Soviet tactics and operational art are well known to students of Soviet military art. He believes that a serious study of the phenomenon of war in the modern era still has not been undertaken, and therefore experts such as Slipchenko make mistakes. Reznichenko criticized Slipchenko in particular for trying to introduce US-inspired military reform into the organizational development of Russia's armed forces, and for Slipchenko's statement that by 2010–20 ground forces would become useless. However, Reznichenko did not offer his own view of future war, noting only that Russia must use computer analyses and practical exercises in place of theoretical arguments to make decisions on future force structure. He also warned that politicians must be more involved in analyzing and providing conclusions about military activities of nations worldwide.⁹

In April, Slipchenko wrote that US centralized command and control of the operation had failed and the aims of the military campaign had changed. The overall objective of overthrowing Hussein had been replaced by interim moves, such as taking a specific city, bombing a Saddam bunker, and so on. This indicated to

Slipchenko that leadership had been farmed out to commanding officers at a level lower than the Pentagon. Slipchenko also noted that a number of flying accidents were caused by a lack of training for young pilots. Here again it appears Slipchenko is using his Soviet prism and assuming that US pilots receive little training. This was not the case, as accidents were caused more often than not by something as simple as not turning on the identification signal (friend or foe) of the jet fighter. Air operations remained as complicated as during the Gulf War, and US pilots were more than up to the task of fulfilling their missions. Slipchenko did predict that Shahids or fedayeen would become a serious problem for allied troops, since they would conduct suicide bomber raids and die to fulfill their sacred duty.¹⁰

At the end of April, Slipchenko tried to explain his inaccurate predictions, but came up short. He wrote that Iraq had succeeded in drawing the coalition into contact warfare. This was actually the coalition's decision, not Iraq's, since ground forces were sent into Iraq immediately. He did correctly predict that the US would not use nuclear weapons, a counterpoint he made to a proclamation by a prominent Soviet-era author who predicted the use of nuclear weapons in the Gulf by the coalition.¹¹

After the war had ended, Major General Aleksandr Vladimirov, vice-president of the Collegium of Military Experts, assessed the lessons and threats for Russia from the war in Iraq. Vladimirov was an assistant to the Minister of Defense of the USSR for military reform, and an advisor to the Russian Federation Supreme Soviet. His service, like Slipchenko's, spans both Soviet and Russian times.

Vladimirov noted in a 2 May interview that the war in Iraq ended due to a new strategic paradigm: contract war. By this he meant that the Iraqi leaders were somehow paid off to end the fighting.¹² In a 15 June interview he wrote:

The road to victory was liberally paved with dollars and it was namely that, and not the high-precision weaponry, that brought the Americans success. Note how bravely and stubbornly the defenders of Basra held out. Why? Because they were cut off from the commanders in Baghdad, and did not receive any orders except the initial ones. On the other hand, a major National Guard force in Karbala, a hundred kilometers south of the capital, which could have struck at the rear and flank of the American forces during the dust storm, sat inactive. That is why the military of Iraq did not blow up any bridges or dams.¹³

Vladimirov had other interesting observations as well. He noted that willpower is the main factor in war today, and that the dictatorial regime in Iraq had sapped the Iraqi Arab passion to resist. He also noted that 'Russia is still not ready to concern itself with the problem of dividing up America's legacy' (a reference to an earlier opinion of Vladimirov's that the US will start to fall apart in the next 50 years) and must prevent its own armed forces from falling apart 'by military district'. Finally he stated that Russia needs an army with a new genetic code, one based on an ideology of state, real professionalism and internal ethics. Simultaneously, Vladimirov noted that the Americans do not understand what a professional army is all about, adding 'they consider their own army to be volunteer'.¹⁴ Perhaps he was implying that the US armed forces are a contract force, not a volunteer force. The reader was left with the impression that Vladimirov was confused about the difference in a professional, volunteer, contract and mercenary armed force.

Another analyst of the war whose service spanned both the Soviet and Russian eras is General Vladimir Dvorkin. His analysis focused on four lessons, and offered a most interesting assessment of what the coalition victory meant for Russia's forces, an assessment more realistic than those offered above.

First, he stated that the Russian armed forces needed multi-option planning, along with appropriate computer systems. Professionals must be able, in time of trouble, to react to unpredictable developments and correct current plans.

Second, Russia must urgently try to reduce the technological gap between its armed forces and those in the West. Dvorkin noted that Russia is not years but a whole epoch behind some nations. This will require enormous changes in Russia's military-industrial policy.

The third lesson was that 'it is now necessary not so much to preserve as to reproduce professional cadres' for the Russian armed forces. There is no cadre corps of junior officers, and the proportion of people eligible for the draft has fallen to almost one-tenth of the total draft resource. Dvorkin noted that the present-day Russian draftee would hardly be able to use the personal gear of coalition soldiers in Iraq, crammed as they are with communications and life-support equipment.

Fourth, and most caustically, Dvorkin added that more than ten years of reform time have been ineptly lost, and it is impermissible to continue with today's limp imitation of military reform. These

reforms and new equipment are not needed to fight the West as they might have been in the past, in Dvorkin's view, but rather to participate in coalition groupings on equal terms when countering challenges and threats.¹⁵ Dvorkin's comments appear to be highly appropriate and one of the clearer analyses of the conflict for the future of Russia.

On 7 May, together with Yuri Fyodorov, Deputy Director of the Institute for Applied International Research, Dvorkin wrote a follow-up article. Dvorkin and Fyodorov wrote that a key objective of military reform is to try to bridge the technological gap or to halt its menacing growth. Priority should be placed on precision weaponry integrated with intelligence, control and communication systems, and on creating joint commands. Particular attention also needs to be directed to contingency planning that combines military-strategic, operational and tactical thinking with decision-making support from special complexes of automated information-gathering devices and command and control networks.¹⁶ He and Fyodorov noted that coalition forces had only half as much equipment and men as in the first war, and that many Russian military analysts thus concluded that a quick operation was not possible. This did not turn out to be the case as the technology of the coalition made up for the shortage in numbers.

Finally, Colonel-General Leonid Ivashov, also an officer who served during both the Soviet and Russian eras, wrote on the war's course and outcome. Ivashov was formerly the head of the Main Directorate of International Military Cooperation and was a strong critic of coalition actions in Iraq. He postulated that the coalition would use nuclear weapons in Iraq to maintain control. He offered the following conclusions about armaments in an article in *Military Parade*.

First, traditional weapons systems will remain an element of combat operations, but require upgrades to enhance their defensive effectiveness.

Second, efforts must be focused on developing electronic warfare systems that can 'strangle' links such as satellite to ground objects, aircraft carrier to combat aircraft links, and combat units to armament control systems.

Third, the entire weapon system of Russia has to be rearranged in regard to its defensive task prioritization. Decisions must be made between developing multipurpose combat aircraft and lighter and cheaper aircraft designed to counter enemy attack aircraft. In a

comment unrelated to 'lessons learned' Ivashov added that the battle for Baghdad can be qualified as a loss of troop control and the inability to organize a defense. The Iraqi armed force transformed into a chaotic and confused group with isolated units that apparently became demoralized as a result.¹⁷

CONTEMPORARY SERVING OFFICERS OR CIVILIAN DEFENSE OFFICIALS

Individual serving Russian officers and civilian defense officials of some renown also offered their assessments of the fighting from April to the present. One such author does not meet the criteria of a serving officer or a member of the Duma Defense Committee, but still must be included based on his influence and former jobs. This person is Andrei Kokoshin, former Deputy Minister of Defense for several Defense Ministers in the 1990s and former head of the Russian Security Council, and now a State Duma Deputy. Writing in April 2003, he listed seven surprises for the 'Anglo-Saxons' as he put it. His analysis varied in its accuracy depending on which surprise or element was under consideration. Further, Kokoshin did not mention the biggest surprise of all to the coalition – that no weapons of mass destruction were found.

Kokoshin's first surprise was that the Anglo-Saxons no longer held an overwhelming supremacy in media coverage. CNN provided this superiority in the first conflict. Now, Kokoshin regarded Al-Jazeera as a political-psychological factor both in and beyond the Arab world. The US response to this charge would be that the US adapted to it by embedding Al-Jazeera into its web of reporters. An initial payback to the coalition occurred when the Arab world was able to watch Al-Jazeera's live coverage of the Iraqi joy and bedlam at the fall of the Hussein regime. This was a political-psychological step of the first order for the West. Kokoshin noted that the electronic media would eventually determine the moral and political winners and losers in this conflict.¹⁸

Second, Kokoshin noted that the US was surprised at the behavior of Turkey, considered one of America's most significant allies. The surprise was actually the failure of the Turkish General Staff to influence the Turkish government and parliament. Of course, Turkey recently had a change of government to a more fundamentalist point of view that influenced the situation greatly.

Third, Kokoshin noted that the US was surprised at the ferocity of the Shi'ite fighters in the south. On all three points, Kokoshin appears to have made good arguments.¹⁹

Fourth, Kokoshin noted that the inability of psychological operations troops to hasten the surrender of personnel and weapons on a scale similar to 1991 was a surprise.²⁰ US analysts would contend that Kokoshin was not aware of the different PSYOP goals this time around. The content of the leaflets and the situation had changed greatly since 1991. This required a new type of PSYOP. Iraq is not the desert of Kuwait, and Iraq's troops hadn't been subject to hours of B-52 bombs as they had been in 1991. Further, Iraqis fought for their land this time, which strengthened their will to resist. As expected, there were fewer prisoners of war. Further, most leaflets and PSYOP materials were not designed to cause surrender. In fact, the majority of the leaflets were designed to instruct Iraqis how to passively resist without sparking immediate regime retribution, and to warn Iraqis about the consequences of actions against coalition forces.

There were many examples that PSYOP did work. For example, one report indicated that the operators of an oilfield in southern Iraq primed the station to be blown, as Iraqi authorities there had directed. However, based on a leaflet warning operators about the consequences for Iraq's economy and future generations if the station was blown, the operators turned off the valves for the flow of oil. That is, the operators had satisfied the requirements of both parties! At the start of the conflict, Iraqis were instructed to go home instead of surrender, but this message was subtly changed as the operations wore on and the US continued to receive sniping in the rear area. Therefore Kokoshin's case for a 'surprise' in this case is not as strong. In fact, his analysis was unable to take into account all that was occurring.

Surprise five was that the US was unable to offset the system of state and military control in Iraq. CENTCOM would disagree, since most reports even in the first hours of the conflict indicated that Iraq's military command and control was disrupted. There was no large-scale resistance to the Third Infantry Division, and there appeared to be no coordinated mass and maneuver on the part of the Iraqis. General Vladimirov noted the same in his analysis above. Again, it must be remembered that this battlefield was not the Kuwaiti desert. Baghdad, the command and control center, was

interconnected by a series of underground tunnels, and optical fiber had been laid in the past two years. Thus, the surprise might be that Iraqi command and control didn't last longer!²¹

Surprise six to Kokoshin was the high efficiency of semi-armed formations. Many would agree with Kokoshin, as the Iraqis appeared to do well with harassing and guerrilla actions in the rear of US forces. It is hard to target small arms in the possession of thousands of people wearing civilian clothing, as US forces are finding out daily in their efforts to stabilize Iraq.²²

Finally, Kokoshin noted that Saddam Hussein had changed from a tyrant to a hero in the Arab and Muslim world, one who didn't break under the might of the US military machine. Again the film of people bringing down Hussein's statues and tearing up his pictures would indicate that the Arab and Muslim world had seen another reaction to Hussein's rule.²³ Today, many people in Iraq fear that Hussein is still alive and might make a comeback. The Shia population is happy that Hussein has been deposed, so the Arab and Muslim world may be drawing a different conclusion from the one noted by Kokoshin. At a minimum, the feeling that Hussein is a hero is not universal among Arabs and Muslims.

Kokoshin, like most analysts worldwide, also incorrectly assessed how successful the US would be if it fought in Baghdad and how long it would take to capture the city. Few analysts, if any, were able to predict that Baghdad would be taken so quickly. One of Russia's preeminent military theorists, for example, General of the Army Makhmut Gareyev, also predicted a long siege of Baghdad, and expected the US to disrupt the life support system of the city and issue an ultimatum to the population. As Gareyev noted, many Russian experts had been mistaken in their predictions as to how the coalition would act, and he fell prey to the same problem.²⁴

Finally, Kokoshin predicted that by storming the capital coalition forces would lose their ability to detect and hit an enemy at a larger distance. He also noted that only Israel had spent enough time on urban operations over the past few years. As anyone familiar with US theory would add, this was simply not true. The RAND corporation has published an entire series of documents about urban operations, the Pentagon stood up an urban operations task force a few years ago and the US studied intensely the numerous battles for Grozny (which Kokoshin recommended they do!) and trained fastidiously in urban operations at both JRTC and the National Training

Center (NTC). Kokoshin finished his article by noting that the US will achieve victory but not without huge losses and not as soon as many expected.²⁵

In May Kokoshin expressed his concern that the war had heightened the degree of strategic indeterminacy in the world, as it had provoked the further proliferation of nuclear weapons and other forms of weapons of mass destruction and delivery systems, particularly in sensitive regions of the world. Kokoshin believes that for Russia this will mean improving its system for managing strategic nuclear forces, and reinforcing nuclear containment with pre-nuclear containment opportunities (use of high-precision, long-range weaponry with conventional, non-nuclear equipment against a defined class of military facilities and economic infrastructure objects).²⁶

In regard to the regional issue, Kokoshin pointed to the increased likelihood that North Korea and Iran both see advantages in acquiring nuclear weapons. In particular North Korea's close ties with Pakistan should worry Washington. Both regimes appear to look at US interference in their regions as directed at regime change and not non-proliferation as stated, according to Kokoshin. Ukraine has also indicated it wants to access highly enriched uranium, and one should not forget Al-Qaeda's desire to exploit the proliferation desires of these countries.²⁷

Of course, Kokoshin wasn't the only civilian defense official to address the war in Iraq. Aleksey Arbatov, a well-known civilian Duma Defense Committee member and deputy head of the committee, offered several incisive comments on the war and its impact on military reform in Russia. Arbatov's comments varied drastically from those of General Andrey Nikolayev, the committee's chairman. Instead of criticizing the West, Arbatov criticized the Russian military for both its lack of progress in military reform and for the logic it uses to view developments in the West.

Arbatov noted that the US surprised many strategic analysts with their ability to once again take few casualties and to limit collateral damage. But he also pointed out the lessons for military reform for Russia. He stressed the ability of the US professional (volunteer-contract) army to use the latest military equipment, something Arbatov believes a conscript force cannot do. As he summarized:

Who fights better, a soldier who has voluntarily arrived for military service and who receives a monetary reward from a grateful state for his professional labor and

risk or a conscript who has been driven into the army by force, who doesn't know how to 'evade' and who does not desire to either serve or fight?...Soviet and Russian soldiers and officers' 'mass heroism and self-sacrifice' have too often atoned for the command authorities' lack of talent, the Army's lack of preparation, and the political leadership's irresponsibility.²⁸

Further, Arbatov stated that the Ministry of Defense must now choose between quantity and quality. Quantity is currently at the center of Russian military policy and its force development. For this reason the army's maintenance budget line overwhelms the budget line for training and the development of new arms and equipment. Quality is important. A modern air force, as the Iraqi war demonstrated, is a vital commodity because even a limited number of high tech aircraft can support a ground force. In this sense, Arbatov does not recommend imitating the US but just following its example. He also supported the continued development in Russia of ground-based mobile missile systems that were so hard to find in Iraq.²⁹

Finally Arbatov stated that Russian military specialists too often focus on only one aspect of a budgetary problem. For example, he noted how often Russian military leaders cite the amount of money allocated in the US budget to the military. What those same leaders do not like to cite is that this money is under the strict oversight of the Congress. Appropriations for defense are made public, which also causes a 'hypercritical examination for cost-effectiveness, for the conformity of new technology to operational-tactical concepts, and for the adequacy to actual, and not farfetched, security interests'.³⁰ Arbatov concluded his article by noting that this system of working in secrecy in Russia for the last 40 years has resulted in the majority of Russian defense troubles, including 'the growing technical lag' caused by the archaic decision-making system of the past.³¹

A few weeks later, Arbatov strongly criticized the West for its handling of the situation in Iraq after the war ended. He noted that the US lost its moral high ground and political leadership in the world, as well as the sympathy and support in Western Europe. The US wasted an immense amount of moral and political capital due to 'an intellectually inferior political leadership affected by tunnel vision'.³² As such, a lesson learned was that 'a well-trained army can sometimes make up for the lack of foresight, statesmanship, and responsibility on the part of the political leadership'.³³

SERVING OFFICERS

Some serving officers had little of value to add in the way of lessons learned. Russian air force commanders meeting in the Moscow region on 10 April, after the fight for Baghdad had ended noted that the US did nothing surprisingly new. The success of the effort was, after all, assured by the air force, the commanders added. Commander in Chief of the Air Force, Colonel General Vladimir Mikhaylov, stated the following:

We've analyzed what kinds of ammunition they used and how many sorties they performed. I would say that the number of sorties was excessive, as compared with the situation and the needs of ground troops. Sometimes the Americans were making mistakes and targeting their own troops. To put it briefly, we've thoroughly analyzed all their work.³⁴

General of the Army Andrey Nikolayev, the chairman of the State Duma Defense Committee and Arbatov's boss on the committee, was more caustic in his remarks about the lessons of the war. On 24 April, in an interview with *Pravda*, he noted that US military strength is not accelerating the resolution of political problems, but creating new ones. The US specializes in bombing, detonating, killing and demolishing while leaving 'restoring' to others. The purpose of war for the US is to upgrade its warfare equipment, and the absence of a worthy adversary is creating conditions for the military recklessness of US political forces. Further, he noted that no credible opposition was presented against the US forces in Iraq (no enemy air force, navy, etc.) and that for ten years before the war, the US weakened Iraq economically, politically and militarily.

This, Nikolayev posited, was perhaps the main lesson that the US has taught the world – how to first prepare and then conduct war. Public opinion must be swayed first, then 'sins' of the regime developed, bans and sanctions announced, probing actions taken and potential allies gathered. Only then does military action proceed. A second essential lesson to learn is that the speed of development of military-political situations is outpacing the ability of Russia to create a modern military organization to keep up with the change. Military reform to date has only been to the advantage of those wishing to destroy Russia. Today, military reform that consolidates and doesn't destroy is needed, as well as a clear idea of the current military-political situation and the nature and essence of the state being defended.³⁵

Current Chief of the General Staff Anatoliy Kvashnin was more specific in his comments. Kvashnin, in a 13 May interview, offered the opinion that both coalition troops and the Iraqi armed forces sustained tangible losses, the latter some three to five times higher. More interesting, Kvashnin discussed the fact that a 'system-level operation (*sistemnaya operatsiya*) was carried out in Iraq, which involved firepower, information and psychological pressure'. Coalition forces continued to develop their non-contact war model while also using more traditional weapons as well. Kvashnin cited as Iraqi mistakes the inability to construct necessary fortifications on the ground and the loss of control by the leadership over forces in Baghdad at a crucial time.³⁶ For Kvashnin the main conclusion of the war was that Russia needed to build its own armed forces on the basis of the plan approved by President Putin in 2001.

SERVING OFFICERS WRITE IN PROFESSIONAL JOURNALS: SOME NEGATIVE OBSERVATIONS

The May issue of the Russian military journal *Armeyskiy Sbornik* discussed lessons and conclusions from the blitzkrieg in Iraq. None of the lessons were complimentary toward the coalition and, in fact, even a neutral observer would conclude that some of the author's conclusions were absurd ('the Iraqis acted competently and decisively, the slightest bit of dust disabled an Abrams tank [did he not watch the duststorm?]', etc.). The author, Colonel Sergey Batyushkin, listed eight coalition mistakes and several Iraqi successes. The mistakes were:

- Political and diplomatic-level mistakes, such as the nuances of the geopolitical stance of Turkey. US officials ignored the Kurdish factor, according to Batyushkin.
- Forecasts of a walk in the park did not pan out. US forces were unable to achieve a quick victory. The impression of an Anglo-American army that was well-organized and streamlined evaporated after the first battles.
- US intelligence agencies did not provide accurate information to the military-political leadership. Coalition aircraft were unable to destroy engineering lines, communications lines, radar and air defense assets.

- Iraqi resistance was underestimated, and they forced their own tactical rules on the coalition. Forty per cent of coalition armored vehicle losses were from artillery fire, and the slightest amount of dust disabled coalition tanks according to Batyushkin.
- There were an insufficient number of allied troops for the operation.
- Excessive hopes were placed on technological superiority, especially on high-precision weapons. Troops equipped with such technology often lost tactically to the poorly-armed adversary who acted competently and decisively on the battlefield.
- Non-combat losses were almost equal to combat losses. There was a lack of coordination among coalition troops, and an excessive reliance on electronics.
- Insufficient attention was paid to maintaining the combat morale of the troops, logistical support and the everyday lives of the servicemen. The scarcity of tobacco reduced the low morale of the coalition servicemen even further.³⁷

Batyushkin concluded by noting that the war showed how a poorly-armed adversary can put up stiff resistance, and how camouflage can spare troops from missiles and bomb strikes for a long time. It became clear that air defense is a very important asset in modern war to the Russians based on these and other comments. Batyushkin also concluded that the 'arrogant' Pentagon leaders underestimated the role of the human factor on the field of battle; that America cannot act alone, but needs allies; that aggression is perceived by the local population as an act of violence; and that other nations (North Korea, Iran, Syria) are already being measured for the prison robes of freedom and democracy American-style.³⁸ Batyushkin did not have a single good thing to say about the coalition's war effort, and it is difficult to consider him a scholar who can see both sides of a coin if this article is representative of his thinking.

A second article in *Armeyskiy Sbornik* was hardly critical at all of coalition efforts and in fact did nothing but describe coalition command and control mechanisms during the war. There was no analysis one way or the other as to the good and bad characteristics of the use of these systems. In conclusion, the authors, a Russian colonel and major-general, stated only that there were no clear victors in the war, and that even under near ideal conditions, systems still malfunctioned. Such systems need a separate and detailed analysis, according to the authors.³⁹

In June, the Scientific Council of the Academy of Military Science held a session at which it discussed lessons learned from Iraq. Three long articles on the conference were published in *Red Star*, and a more detailed write-up of the conference was in the July issue of *Military Thought* (not covered in this analysis due to its length, and because this is the first of several installments). This indicates that many more articles are almost sure to appear.

The first of three articles in *Red Star* offered the thinking of both past and present officers on a variety of subjects. Colonel Aleksandr Korabelnikov discussed tactical lessons. He was impressed with how the coalition avoided head-on clashes by destroying the enemy first with combat aviation or helicopters; the effectiveness of intelligence units that allowed even company battalion-level commanders to receive systematized information; and the logistical ability of the coalition to keep replacements down by the timely supply of support to units. Korobelnikov correctly concluded that the real deciding factor in why the coalition achieved their objectives so fast was the lack of any Iraqi aviation, allowing coalition forces a free sky in which to fly. He also added that a permanent global war, with one superpower against the entire world, is being waged by all possible means (political, economic, information and military), and that America is transitioning to a system for deploying permanent mobilization forces, ready to strike without having to be deployed at any moment.⁴⁰

Lieutenant-General Vladimir Barvinenko focused on the important role played by information operations. He noted that superiority was achieved not so much by the quantity and quality of aerial attack weaponry as by the complete information superiority of the coalition and its effective command and control. He cited achievements in information support and systems of rear and technical support. The creation of a joint information-command and control structure has created an information support system built on the functional integration of space-, air-, sea- and land-based information systems (reconnaissance, electronic warfare, communication, navigation, weapon guidance, automated processing, modeling, etc.) according to Barvinenko. These systems rely on the services of global telecommunication networks, both military and civilian. This allows the US to systematically observe a situation anywhere in the world, assess it and aim strike weapons there with precision if necessary. The main lesson for Russia from this war is that it also needs the

ability to conduct joint operations utilizing all of these resources (especially air operations), according to Barvinenko.⁴¹

Other speakers at the session offered their assessments. Colonel-General Anatoliy Nogovitsin was impressed not only with precision weaponry but also with the effectiveness of electronic warfare and electronic intelligence. Major General Valeriy Menshikov added that the creation of a space infrastructure (reconnaissance, navigation, command, control, communications and relay systems) supporting space-based strike resources is a necessity. Since space-based navigation systems played such an important role in this war (the share of Navstar guided weapons was 95 per cent compared with seven per cent in 1991, Menshikov added), it is necessary for Russia to get its orbital groupings of satellites up to the required level.⁴²

The second of the three articles in *Red Star* offered a somewhat more conservative view of the war. The authors included retired Major General Victor Ryabchuk, retired Lieutenant General Vasilii Reznichenko, Major General Valeriy Cheban, Colonel Anatoliy Tsyganok and General of the Army Andrey Nikolayev, the conservative chairman of the State Duma Committee on Defense.

Colonel Tsyganok noted that the war had two phases. The first phase was an active defense by two Iraqi Army corps around Basra, al-Najir, al-Nasiriyah and other cities. The second stage was the so-called 'strange defense of Baghdad'. Tsyganok believed that the coalition took more losses than were reported, that the sand storm consumed equipment and disabled over 100 armored vehicles, thermal imaging devices malfunctioned on over 150 vehicles, and the identification friend or foe system between aircraft and armored vehicles didn't work. Finally, citing Arab reports, Tsyganok stated that the US bribed three Iraqi generals, and over a year ago had concluded a deal that the Republican Guard forces would not participate in engagements. Again, Tsyganok believed the foreign press but not the US press, and formed his opinions based on these sources.⁴³

Retired Major General Ryabchuk, a specialist on systemology, commented briefly on the US information-propaganda support plan, which was used to seize the initiative, and then focused on the US use of information-technical equipment. He wrongly stated that over 70 per cent of precision-guided munitions flew off into the desert. He more correctly determined that decoy targets and radar masking systems were used to some effect by the Iraqis. He concluded by stating that:

I think the experience of this war has once again confirmed the priority of Russia's military science in the development of battlefield command and control theory and the transformation of information rivalry into an intellectual-information rivalry. Sun Tsu's postulate that 'he fights well who controls the enemy and does not permit the enemy to control him' is well developed in our country in military systemology and battlefield and operations command and control theory as single systemic processes... it raises the question that the times of independent operations of the branches and types of troops are receding into the past and that the problem of the command and control of joint operations of inter-branch groupings under single leadership based upon a single concept of operations and planning is becoming the priority.⁴⁴

Ryabchuk concluded by stating that the US competently used a combination of two things: an intellectual-information-navigation-reconnaissance system and an information-psychological aggression plan.⁴⁵

Retired Lieutenant General Reznichenko discussed the series of computer-simulated war games that the US regularly runs with regard to the Caspian region. He cited a TRADOC spokesman (unnamed) as having stated that the Caspian region is the area and theater of war serving as the criterion for reform of the US ground forces as a result of the new geopolitical situation. There were two reasons for citing this comment. First, he was warning the Russian hierarchy that this might be one of the next regions in the Pentagon's sights and, second, he wanted the General Staff to be aware that talk of the uselessness of ground forces and only non-contact war, as advocated by a few retired Russian generals, was nonsense. In particular, he noted that the Russian North Caucasus Military District should prepare forces that are capable of combating US plans for the latter's 'future forces'. Reznichenko also proposed that the Russian president should try to ban precision-guided systems in a speech at the United Nations.⁴⁶

Major General Cheban discussed some of the ideological and psychological components of the US plan. In particular he noted that the US spreads its ideology throughout the world before a conflict begins in order to propagandize the justice and sanctity of US military policy, and to point out the defects of dictatorial regimes. At the same time this policy, in Cheban's opinion, hid Iraqi successes and increased enemy losses while hiding information on friendly fire losses.⁴⁷

Finally, General of the Army Nikolayev stated his opinion on the war. He viewed the war as less than a full-scale test since there

was no organized military resistance, no opposition to the US navy or air force. He felt that the main lesson of the war to be the demonstration of the technology of preparation and conduct of modern war conducted as if on a test range. If a country's economic and military potential and morale fall, then the US is ready to step in and threaten its security. Any country is capable of becoming a test range. Nikolayev noted that these test ranges are 'located without fail in direct proximity to reserves of oil, gas, and bioresources, and have natural and production values, in short, those things that pose an interest for the US's missionary path...'.⁴⁸

The President of the Academy of Military Sciences, General of the Army Makhmut Gareyev, authored the final article of the series. Gareyev's discussion, as usual, was full of important points as well as criticism of the coalition effort.

Gareyev opened his article on the offensive, discussing the military-political impact of the operation. He stated that the goal of the operation was not to find weapons of mass destruction but to obtain oil and to resolve economic problems which thereby would strengthen the US's geopolitical position. He stated that the 'last rites' were bestowed on the multipolar world as a result, that a sort of capitalist colonial ideology is being thrown on the world, and that the operation violated international law, the principle of the inviolability of state sovereignty. The entire operation, Gareyev stated, is buttressed by a US campaign of an information nature to vindicate and justify its expansionist policy. This opinion coincides in many ways with the opinion of Nikolayev.⁴⁹

Gareyev underscored how US policy ascertained that countries must toe the line in response to US desires. For example, he cited how the US limits its trade with Russia, opposes Georgian and Azerbaijani cooperation with Russia in the oil and gas sphere and supports the movement of NATO troops to Russia's border. At the same time, he added, the US financed and armed the Taliban against Russia, and helped Saddam Hussein in the war against Iran. Gareyev noted, 'If we are going to nourish terrorism at the state level and then fight it, the fight will go on forever'.⁵⁰

Gareyev, however, underscored that fact that in spite of these contradictions in US policy, there is still a vital need for the US and Russia to cooperate on the important issues at the end of the day. These include the issues of security, energy resources, terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. He added, 'There

is no better way to spite a friend than to always agree with him'. Thus, he believes it is out of respect for America itself than Russia must speak out without constraint against what it considers adventurism in politics.⁵¹

As regards the US plan for the operation, Gareyev noted that the US command relied on 'subversive actions, bribery and treason of the highest political and military leaders of Iraq, as the most effective type of precision weapon'.⁵² Gareyev clearly believed that the US had conducted secret negotiations with members of the Presidential Guard before the war started in order to avert a prolonged and destructive fight, and that many in the Iraqi military leadership accepted payments for their noninvolvement in the operation.

Gareyev felt the coalition did a great job of reconnaissance before the war started, both from internal agents and from space reconnaissance assets. He also mentioned that reconnaissance helicopters, the E8 JSTARS, and E-3 AWACS, along with tactical radar reconnaissance aircraft and stations, operated well. Aviation was linked to a system of reconnaissance-strike complexes. Night vision instruments and navigational hardware ensured reliable ground operations. Gareyev contended that the man in the link is still the only item that cannot be replaced, since space components still can be neutralized by use of appropriate interference assets.⁵³

When listing US and British casualties, Gareyev listed both figures from US and foreign sources. That is, his analysis appeared to be much more balanced than that of some of his cohorts at the conference. On the other hand, he accused the coalition of deliberately bombing markets, hospitals, hotels and other installations in order to terrify the populace and troops in order to compel capitulation.⁵⁴

Gareyev offered five conclusions in his article.

First, like Nikolayev, he underscored the political-diplomatic, economic, information, psychological and military preparation of a country in order to turn it into a rogue state, ready for intervention with public support.

Second, Gareyev did not see any serious developments in military art, since this was not a war with a strong adversary, noting that the war was as much a unilateral exercise as a war (which anyone who fought there would violently disagree with!). Gareyev did state that the organizational structure of the US forces, lacking a regimental level, did not justify itself, but he offered no reason as to why. Interestingly, he added, 'statements by some of our critics

that the Iraq war dispelled the myth about the precision weapon and the high-tech war, about the professionalism of the American Army, and certain others, appear out of keeping with what actually occurred'. Gareyev believes that US equipment is the strongest feature of the US Army, providing a sense of helplessness and doom to the enemy's will to resist.

Third, he stated that conclusions of so-called experts of the forecasts of future war were not justified. In this sense, Gareyev sensed the greater degree of flexibility in US operations than others apparently sensed. The basics (operation, battle, regrouping, etc.) have not changed, he believed – just the conditions, forms and methods of their implementation. Thus he understood perhaps better than other analysts that not every war has to start with an extended air campaign, but on the conditions and situation at hand.

Fourth, it is clear that the substance of reform of the Russian armed forces must not only be to adapt to terrorism, but also to fulfill defensive tasks. There are many other threats to Russia, for which it needs diverse and powerful regular troops.

Finally, Gareyev believes the US armed forces did not defeat the Russian military system, which Hussein adopted. It is not necessary to adopt the US system as a result. Gareyev asked 'which of the Soviet or Russian tenets of military science and military art did not survive the tests of the Iraqi war?',⁵⁵

CONCLUSIONS

The war in Iraq did result in several important discoveries and lessons learned, according to Russian specialists. In many cases they were not the lessons that the West expected Russia would learn. One specialist decided that the US prepares for an intervention some ten years in advance, preparing the way with an extended economic and psychological operation. Another stated that a new armed forces for Russia must be formed, one with a new 'genetic code'. Yet another specialist wrote that the real lessons lie in the unintended consequence of motivating the further proliferation of nuclear weapons, and in the formation of a new system of international relations. Soviet-minded specialists tended to discount US press accounts and relied more heavily on foreign (even Arab) accounts of the fighting to draw their conclusions regarding casualties, successes and defeats, and so on.

Russian officers seldom mentioned the dissolution of several myths about the US armed forces in their lessons learned. Before the war, these were prominent issues in the press – for example, that coalition forces weren't willing to take casualties, and that US forces always have nuclear weapons at the trigger-ready position. Most important, not a single Russian analyst noted that one should not 'template coalition forces' as many of Russia's top experts attempted to do before the war. Only 80-year-old General of the Army Gareyev stated that conditions, forms and methods would change, but tactics and strategy would not. Thus, Gareyev did not discount coalition flexibility in their application of war plans. Other Russian analysts appeared to rely more on recognized trends from past operations than any creative attempt to predict the form of current operations.

Perhaps the reason for this oversight was that it appeared to be a simple task to predict what course of action coalition forces would take in Iraq. The examples of Kosovo and 'Desert Storm' certainly indicated that a massive air assault would be followed by a quick peace or perhaps the use of ground forces to conduct a peacekeeping action. However, the course of action settled on at CENTCOM and the adaptations they made along the way (operational pause, reaction to attacks in the rear, etc.) came as a surprise not only to US analysts but also to Russian specialists. The surprise was not limited just to the manner in which the war was conducted (more reliance on ground forces than originally thought) but also with regard to the speed of action and the ease with which objectives were taken. For example, it would be difficult to find any analyst worldwide who might have projected a simple drive into Baghdad to secure and take it.

Russian analysts should heed Gareyev's advice and consider in greater detail potential courses of action in future conflicts. This war showed that templating coalition actions wouldn't work. But the analysis of the operation by Russian military specialists highlighted many other lessons that the Russian military took from the conflict. Among many, these included the development of a systems-level operation by US forces (firepower, information, psychological) and – according to several military analysts – the implication that Russian military reform must not linger any longer nor fail to be affected by what has happened in Iraq. The lingering question is: how many of the important and influential military voices believe in true military reform and want to see it implemented?

Throwing off the final vestiges of the old military system (cadres, armaments, etc.) will be difficult. However, Russian military science, superior in many ways to that of any other country in the world, will not change and will always keep Russia potentially strong.

NOTES

The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the official policy or position of the Department of the Army, Department of Defense, or the US government.

The Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO) assesses regional military and security issues through open-source media and direct engagement with foreign military and security specialists to advise army leadership on issues of policy and planning critical to the US Army and the wider military community.

1. Igor Rodionov, 'Reform will Destroy our Army', RosBusinessConsulting, 24 July 2003, article received by email from William O'Malley on 26 July 2003.
2. Vitaliy Denisov, 'Increasing the Effectiveness of the Militarized Bloc', *Red Star*, 30 July 2003, as translated and downloaded from the FBIS website on 30 July 2003.
3. Moscow Channel One TV, 1930 GMT, 1 April 2003, as translated and downloaded from the FBIS website on 1 April 2003.
4. Leonid Shershnev, 'With a Major Plan', *Vremya Novostey*, 9 April 2003, as translated and downloaded from the FBIS website on 9 April 2003.
5. Ibid.
6. Ilya Kriger, 'Equating Saddle to Tank', *Novaya Gazeta*, html version, 17 April 2003 as translated and downloaded from the FBIS website on 17 April 2003.
7. Ibid.
8. Vladimir Slipchenko, 'Incontinent Power. Even the Possible Deaths of Half a Million Iraqis Cannot Stop the Flywheel of War', *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 22 Feb. 2003, as translated and downloaded from the FBIS website on 25 Feb. 2003.
9. V.G. Reznichenko, 'Determining the Character of the Armed Forces', *Voyennaya Mysl*, 14 April 2003, as translated and downloaded from the FBIS website on 5 May 2003.
10. Vladimir Slipchenko, 'Syria Had Better be Afraid', *Rossiyskaya Gazeta*, 3 April 2003, as translated and downloaded from the FBIS website on 3 April 2003.
11. Interview with Vladimir Slipchenko, *Kommercant' Vlast'*, 28 April–4 May 2003, p.39.
12. Interview with Aleksandr Vladimirov, Moscow Informationsnoye Agentstvo Ekho Moskvyy, 1103 GMT, 2 May 2003, as translated and downloaded from the FBIS website on 2 May 2003.
13. Interview with Aleksandr Vladimirov by Maksim Kalashnikov, 'A Baghdad Quiz for Russia', *Russkiy Predprinimatel*, 15 June 2003, as translated and downloaded from the FBIS website on 15 June 2003.
14. Ibid.

15. Vladimir Dvorkin, 'Urgent and Immediate Matters. On Some Preliminary Lessons of the War in Iraq', *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 4 April 2003, p.9, as translated and downloaded from the FBIS website on 7 April 2003.
16. Andrei Lebedev, 'If You Want Peace, Prepare for the Right Kind of War', *Izvestia*, 7 May 2003, p.3 as reported in *The Current Digest* 55/20 (2003) pp.7, 8.
17. Leonid Ivashov, 'War in Iraq: Unequal Struggle of Weapon Systems', *Military Parade*, May/June 2003, pp. 88, 89.
18. Andrei Kokoshin, 'Seven Surprises from the War in Iraq', *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, 7 April 2003.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
23. Ibid.
24. Moscow, *Agentstvo Voyennykh Novostey*, 0907 GMT, 4 April 2003, as translated and downloaded from the FBIS website on 4 April 2003.
25. Kokoshin.
26. Interview with Andrey Kokoshin, 'The Iraq War is Provoking the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons', *Politbyuro* (Internet Version-WWW), 12 May 2003, as translated and downloaded from the FBIS website on 12 May 2003.
27. Andrei Kokoshin, 'Russia's Role in Non-Proliferation: Obstacles and Opportunities', *In the National Interest*, 7 May 2003, from website <<http://www.inthenationalinterest.com>>.
28. Aleksey Arbatov, 'Military Reform in Light of Other People's Error's: The Decision Making System in the Russian Army Lags Behind by Several Generations', *Nezavisimoye Voyennoye Obozreniye*, 23 May 2003, as translated and downloaded from the FBIS website on 23 May 2003.
29. Ibid.
30. Ibid.
31. Ibid.
32. Aleksey Arbatov, 'Iraq Lessons', *Moscow News*, 18–24 June 2003, email from William O'Malley.
33. Ibid.
34. Moscow TVS, 1100 GMT, 10 April 2003, as translated and downloaded from the FBIS website on 14 April 2003.
35. Andrey Nikolayev, 'Fundamental Lessons of the War in Iraq', *Pravda*, 24 April 2003, as translated and downloaded from the FBIS website on 24 April 2003.
36. Moscow RIA-Novosti, 1442 GMT, 13 May 2003, as translated and downloaded from the FBIS website on 13 May 2003.
37. Sergey Batyushkin, 'Just a Few Mistakes . . .', *Armeyskiy Sbornik*, 1 May 2003, as translated and downloaded from the FBIS website on 1 May.
38. Ibid.
39. Vladimir Chernykh and Yevgeniy Kozlov, 'Shock and Awe – No Clear Victor?' *Armeyskiy Sbornik*, 31 May 2003, as translated and downloaded from the FBIS website on 31 May.
40. Oleg Falichev, 'Secret Springs of the War in Iraq', *Krasnaya Zvezda*, 28 June 2003, as translated and downloaded from the FBIS website on 28 June 2003.

41. Ibid.
42. Ibid.
43. Oleg Falichev, 'Secret Springs of the War in Iraq', *Red Star*, 8 July 2003, as translated and downloaded from the FBIS website on 8 July 2003, report of the Russian Academy of Military Sciences on lessons of Iraq war.
44. Ibid.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.
49. Makhmut Gareyev, 'Silent Springs of the Iraq War', *Red Star*, 18 July 2003, p.2.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
55. Ibid.