


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### 'Smart' Defense From New Threats: Future War From a Russian Perspective: Back to the Future After the War on Terror

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## **‘Smart’ Defense From New Threats: Future War From a Russian Perspective: Back to the Future After the War on Terror**

JACOB W. KIPP  
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*In 2012 Vladimir Putin pledged that Russia would over the next decade invest in a smart defense, embracing new technologies to modernize its conventional forces and its strategic nuclear arsenal to ensure strategic stability in Eurasia. At the core of the demands for Russian military modernization is a very pessimistic appraisal of the current capabilities of Russia’s conventional forces and the future deterrence power of its strategic nuclear forces in the face of emergence US ballistic missile defenses and global precision-strike conventional systems. Driving the Russia’s notion of future war is threat environment that is complex and raises risks of local crises leading to foreign military intervention. These threats include a persistent terrorism within its own territories and Central Asia, an*

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*ideological fear of psychological subversion from the “color revolutions” of the last decade, the geopolitical threat of NATO expansion into Post-Soviet territory, and the stated fear that US military modernization will undermine the credibility of Russia’s conventional and nuclear forces. Finally, in spite of the Sino-Russian strategic partnership, there is also an unspoken fear that an emergent China could some day become a threat to Russia’s Eastern Siberia and the Far East.*

## INTRODUCTION

This article combines ‘something old, something new, and something borrowed and something blue’ in keeping with the season and the times. The something old is the very concept of ‘future war’ as an intellectual category of concern to statesmen, soldiers and citizens, especially citizens, since it is their blood and treasure that would be affected by the merits and costs of the state’s preparations for a future conflict. The concept ‘future war’ is a product of the Industrial Revolution, when technology began to rapidly reshape the instruments of war and make them available on a scale to make mass war possible. In that sense, it embodies what Harold R. Winton and David R. Mets have called the ‘challenge of change’, by which they mean the necessity of adapting force structure, training and technology to the forces driving the evolution of the military instrument. The shift from industrial economies to information economies has accelerated the transformation of warfare to the point where the constraints on the prospects of general war, which were imposed by nuclear parity between the Cold War superpowers, may not deter. Today, there is little prospect of such a general war, but the number of local conflicts has increased since the end of the Cold War, and military intervention has frequently turned local conflicts into regional wars with increased risks of other powers intervening. No-contact wars in the form of drone attacks and cyber strikes have become routine events.

The new, albeit borrowed from the West, term is *setetsentricheskaia voina* (network-centric warfare). Russian defense intellectuals have borrowed this term, which covers C4ISR as a critical aspect of information-age warfare, from the work of the late Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski (U.S. Navy) and John Garstka.<sup>1</sup> In Russia, the use of the term is connected with the current reform effort within the Russian Ministry of Defense promising an Armed Forces with a *novyi oblik* (new look). It recalls the Eisenhower administration’s New Look defense policy with its reliance on massive nuclear retaliation. In the Russian case, however, the New Look is focused on giving

<sup>1</sup> A. E. Kondrat’ev, ‘Obshchaia kharakteristika setevykh arkhitektur, primeniaemykh pri realizatsii perspektivnykh setetsentricheskikh kontseptsii vedushchikh zarubezhnykh stran’, *Voennaia mysl’* 12 (December 2008), pp. 63–74.

Russia a credible modern conventional force for the information age. In the absence of such a force, Russia has had a declaratory policy of first use of nonstrategic (and possibly strategic) nuclear weapons in case its conventional forces could not mount a credible defense since 1999, or in the aftermath of NATO's first out-of area combat operations in Yugoslavia.<sup>2</sup> This has gone hand-in-hand with a continuing emphasis on the role of strategic nuclear weapons in maintaining strategic stability in the post-Cold War world. In a recent article, Russian authors underscored the different functions of conventional and strategic nuclear arms without ever mentioning nonstrategic nuclear arms. 'Conventional weapons are designed for the conduct of war. Strategic weapons are designed not for the conduct but for the prevention of nuclear war.'<sup>3</sup> At the same time, Russian authors worry that nuclear arms talks aimed at nonstrategic nuclear weapons might rob the Russian Federation of certain military advantages in the case of bilateral negotiations with the United States. They recommended a set of conditions for such talks that would take into account Russia's geostrategic situation and its military-technical requirements. However, before undertaking such negotiations Russia has to achieve certain basic military requirements:

Questions regarding the limitation and reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons should be addressed on the international level only after military reform is completed and the basic parameters and direction of the development of the A[rmed] F[orces] of the R[ussian] F[ederation] and the potential of non-nuclear conventional forces of Russia permit (even in the foreseeable future) to effectively parry military threats and maintain regional stability.<sup>4</sup>

From this circumstance, we derive 'the something blue.' It refers to the depressing fact that differences in national strategic cultures among the major players in the current multipolar international system are leading to potential local conflicts with grave risks of escalation in directions that no player fully comprehends or can control. New means of warfare put into old forms have very often brought about results very different from those intended. The dialectical interactions of the opposing sides prove difficult to foresee in the planning of military operations. Political leaders turn to their military leaders who apply kinetic means to complex, nonlinear problems without fully understanding the chain of consequences that may ensue from the use of those means.

<sup>2</sup> Vladimir Grigor'ev, 'Koridory vlasti: Uprezhdaiushchii iadernyi udar,' *Profil* (12 July 1999); 'Rossiia planiruet brat' Zapad na ispug,' *Kommersant* (10 July 1999); and Jacob W. Kipp, 'Russian Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons,' *Military Review* 81(3) (May-June 2001), pp. 27-38.

<sup>3</sup> Yuri Grigor'ev, 'Kontseptsia otvetnogo iadernogo udara,' *Armetiskii Vestnik* (April 2012).

<sup>4</sup> Varfolomei Korobushin and Viktor Kovalev, 'Na ocheredi—takicheskoe iadernoe oruzhie?', *Natsional'naiia oborona* 5 (May 2012).

Strategic culture has been a topic of scholarly research and policy discussion dating back to the 1970s. Much of the field was devoted to the interactions between American and Soviet strategic cultures.<sup>5</sup> It remains a useful analytical device.<sup>6</sup> A nation's strategic culture has its sources in the nation's geostrategic setting and economic order, history and experience, and social and political systems. It is rooted in the tendency of leaders to draw on those principles that have brought the state success in the past.<sup>7</sup> The extensive literature on national 'ways of war' confirms scholarly appreciation of the utility of strategic culture in constructing a narrative of national military history.<sup>8</sup>

One of the problems involved in the study of strategic culture is that it frequently does not address the international context in which national strategy is formed and military power exercised. As Ken Booth has pointed out, there is particular danger of engaging in ethnocentrism when assessing that international environment, especially with reference to potential adversaries.<sup>9</sup> In this realm, problems of cross-cultural perception, semiotics and bureaucratic politics impose special demands on both analyst and the consumer of intelligence. Asking 'blue' questions of 'Red' materials has a tendency to result in false assumptions about an opponent's decision-making. The late Adda Bozeman and the late Robert Bathurst made important contributions on these issues.<sup>10</sup> Bozeman, a distinguished professor of political science and international affairs and a frequent consultant on national security issues, and Bathurst, a naval officer, expert on Russian culture and analyst of Soviet naval affairs, both emphasized cultural context in intelligence. Vitaly Shlykov, a Colonel of the Soviet General Staff's Main Intelligence Directorate, also recognized the problem of cultural bias and bureaucratic politics in the assessment process. Gaining a monopoly on military-economic assessment of probable adversaries, the Soviet General Staff applied to the U.S. economy a model for wartime mobilization taken from Soviet experience to grossly

<sup>5</sup> Jack L. Snyder, *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Limited Nuclear Operations*, Santa Monica, RAND Corporation, 1977. See also Carl Jacobsen et al., ed., *Strategic Power: USA/USSR*, London, Macmillan, 1990.

<sup>6</sup> Ken Booth, 'The Concept of Strategic Culture Affirmed', in Carl Jacobson et al., *Strategic Power: USA/USSR*, pp. 121–128.

<sup>7</sup> Thomas G. Mahnken, *United States Strategic Culture*, Defense Threat Reduction Agency, 13 November 2006, p. 1. [http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dtra/mahnken\\_strat\\_culture.pdf](http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dtra/mahnken_strat_culture.pdf). (accessed 15 July 2012).

<sup>8</sup> Russell F. Weigley, *The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy and Policy*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1977; Richard Harrison, *The Russian Way of War: Operational Art, 1904–1940*, Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 2001; Robert Michael Citino, *The German Way of War: From the Thirty Years War to the Third Reich*, Lawrence, University Press of Kansas, 2005; David Stone, *A Military History of Russia: From Ivan the Terrible to the War in Chechnya*, Westport, CT, Praeger Security International, 2006; and Thomas G. Mahnken, *Technology and the American Way of War Since 1945*, New York, Columbia University Press, 2008.

<sup>9</sup> Ken Booth, *Strategy and Ethnocentrism*, London, Croom Helm, 1979, pp. 10–15.

<sup>10</sup> Adda B. Bozeman, *Strategic Intelligence and Statecraft: Selected Essays*, Washington, DC, Brassey's, 1992; and Robert B. Bathurst, *Intelligence and the Mirror: On Creating an Enemy*, London, Newbury Park, Sage, 1993.

overestimate what the U.S. could produce in the first year of a general war.<sup>11</sup> Overestimation of U.S. defense capacity justified the Soviet system of total mass mobilization at the expense of non-defense sectors of the Soviet economy, which brought about the collapse of the national economy and the state itself.<sup>12</sup>

When the Soviet Union disappeared and the centrally planned economy collapsed, there were hopes that Russia would evolve into 'an ordinary country'. The era of a bipolar world was over. Russia did evolve over the last two decades and has emerged with a market economy under a strong centralized state under Vladimir Putin. Putin's Russia inherited a strategic culture rooted in its Eurasian setting, committed to its great power status and defined by persistent concerns about foreign intervention in its periphery, which Moscow sees as unstable. Russian threat assessments are different from those of the Soviet Union. They emphasize that strategic nuclear war is unlikely but point to the numerous local conflicts that, over the last two decades, have evolved into local wars with foreign military interventions. Such a view of the international security environment puts a premium on defining the nature of future wars and identifying the potential adversaries. General Makhmut Gareev, the president of the Russian Academy of Military Sciences, has labeled the forecasting of future war a 'labor of Sisyphus', i.e., necessary, difficult, repeated and always incomplete.<sup>13</sup> In looking at the problem of future war, Russian analysts have persisted in seeing the United States as the chief military threat because of its drive to maintain military dominance and geopolitical hegemony. Confronted by demands to create a military for the information age, Russia has focused on lessons learned by U.S. forces, but the analysis has emphasized asymmetric responses to what are perceived to be U.S. military-technical advantages in conducting what Russian analysts refer to as 'sixth generation warfare.' This term has also come to include ideological subversion aimed at undermining the Russian state and society. As Timur Latypov asserted in 2009,

A war is being conducted against Russia. It is being done without the use of conventional armaments. This is network warfare. Kosovo, the Rose Revolution in Georgia, the Orange Revolution in Ukraine allows one to say that US policy is directed towards the escalation of conflicts

<sup>11</sup> V. Shlykov, 'Rokovye proshchety amerikanskoi i sovetskoi razvedok: Gonka vooruzhennii i ekonomika', *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'* No. (September 1996) and No. 4 (April 1997); and Mikhail Lukanin, 'Voennoe protivostoianie razorilo SSSR', *Trud* (6 December 2010), p. 9.

<sup>12</sup> Vitaly Shlykov, 'Chto pogubilo Sovetskii Soiuz? Amerikanskaia razvedka o sovetskikh voennykh rashodakh', *Voennyi vestnik, Mezhdregional'nyi fond informatsionnykh tekhnologii* 8 (April 2001), [http://www.mfit.ru/defensive/vestnik/vestnik8\\_1.html](http://www.mfit.ru/defensive/vestnik/vestnik8_1.html) (accessed 15 April 2012); and 'Chto pogubilo Sovetskii Soiuz? Genshtab i ekonomika', *Voennyi vestnik, Mezhdregional'nyi fond informatsionnykh tekhnologii* 9 (September 2002), <http://www.mfit.ru/defensive/vestnik/vestnik9.pdf> (accessed 15 April 2012).

<sup>13</sup> M. A. Gareev, *Esli zavrta voina? Chto izmenitsia v kharaktere vooruzhennoi bor'by v blizhaishie 20-25 let*, Moscow, 'VlaDar,' 1995, pp. 5–6.



internationally and on a regional basis across Eurasia. Everywhere the States uses the latest technology to conduct this war—'sixth generation warfare' or 'network warfare'.<sup>14</sup>

And this is certainly true about the current efforts of the militaries of the great powers to come to grips with the probable threats for which they should be preparing. Gareev, a veteran of the Great Patriotic War and the Cold War, was closely involved in the changes that recast warfare in the last quarter of the 20th century, including serving as military adviser to Egyptian Armed Forces before the Yom Kippur War of 1973, and was one of the last Soviet military advisers to the Armed Forces of the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan following the withdrawal of the Soviet 40th Army in February 1989. Gareev was also one of the circle of military analysts who shaped the concept of Revolution in Military Affairs as outlined by Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov, who looked to the radical recasting of conventional military operations as a result of precision fires and strikes and the development of automated command and control systems. The potential costs of this revolution, much more than the hoped-for triumph of strategic defensive systems over offensive strategic nuclear weapons, created the immediate political-economic crisis, which pushed the USSR under Gorbachev towards reforms that finally brought about loss of the Soviet Empire and collapse of the Soviet state. A military technical question, which stood at the very center of Soviet mass-mobilization warfare state, called into question the very logic of that edifice.

In the two decades since the end of the Cold War, the pace of military-technical transformation has accelerated largely as a result of developments in the civilian economy associated with its 'informatization.' The nature of global threats has evolved as a result of the growing role of non-state actors, the rise of terrorism and the general increase in instability associated with the global economic crisis. All this has made military forecasting more difficult.

The borrowed item is 'Smart Defense', which has appeared in NATO's commitment to a 'smart defense' in the 'current environment of austerity.' This seems to mean doing more with less in the face of crisis requiring humanitarian intervention by the alliance,<sup>15</sup> and 'smart defense' against 'new threats' as used by Vladimir Putin. Writing on defense issues as part of his election campaign, Putin's primary point was simple: 'Being Strong: The Guarantee of National Security for Russia'. Putin's 'new threats' arose out of military-technical developments enhancing conventional military capabilities where they could call into question the deterrent power of strategic offensive nuclear weapons. Faced by the same challenges of austerity that confront

<sup>14</sup> Timur Latypov, 'Voina shestogo pokoleniia,' *Vremia i den'gi* (17 July 2009).

<sup>15</sup> North Atlantic Council, 'NATO Summit Declaration, May 2012' (Chicago), <http://www.cfr.org/nato/nato-summit-declaration-may-2012/p28311> (accessed 20 June 2012).



NATO, Putin announced that his next term as president of Russia would be devoted to the transformation of the Russian military and defense industry to meet this new challenge. This would involve the recasting of Russian defense industry to meet the challenge of 'weapons based on new physical principles' and involving warfare in space, information warfare and cybernetics. Putin emphasized the warfighting capabilities of these new technologies. 'Such hi-tech weapons systems will be comparable in effect to nuclear weapons but will be more 'acceptable' in terms of political and military ideology. In this sense, the strategic balance of nuclear forces will play a gradually diminishing role in deterring aggression and chaos'.<sup>16</sup>

Russian literature on the nature of future war is both extensive and focused primarily on the United States as the probable opponent on the basis of the perception of the U.S. as a superpower striving for global hegemony and as the leading military power in the world. Russian analysts use their own vocabulary to describe the transformation of warfare in the 21st century, which they see as dominated by the 'informatization of warfare' and the centrality of systems-of-systems in its conduct. Sixth-generation warfare, no-contact warfare, long-range no-contact warfare and information warfare have been used to refer to the directions of the evolution of warfare in all spheres. These works have stressed the diminishing role of strategic nuclear weapons in maintaining strategic stability in the future.<sup>17</sup>

A decade ago, the U.S. Department of Defense held out the promise of what the transformation of warfare would bring to U.S. national security. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld wrote in the spring of 2002 with enthusiasm of the promise of transformation, which the world had witnessed at Mazar-i-Sharif, Afghanistan, during 'the first cavalry charge of the 21st century'. He was very specific about what had delivered victory: 'ingenuity of the U.S. special forces; the most advanced, precision-guided munitions in the U.S. arsenal, delivered by U.S. Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps crews; and the courage of valiant, one-legged Afghan fighters on horseback'.<sup>18</sup> The Secretary left no doubt that the future belonged to those advanced weapons in the U.S. arsenal. Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz spoke to

<sup>16</sup> Vladimir Putin, 'Byt' sil'nymi: Garantii natsional'noi bezopasnosti dlia Rossii', *Rossiiskaia gazeta* (20 February 2012), <http://www.rg.ru/2012/02/20/putin-armiya.html> (accessed 21 February 2012).

<sup>17</sup> V. D. Riabchuk et al., *Elementy voennoi sistemologii primenitel'no k resheniiu problem operativnogo iskusstva i taktiki obshevoiskovykh ob'edinenii i chastei: Voenno-teoreticheskii trud*, Moscow, Izdatel'stvo Voennoi Akademii imeni M. V. Frunze, 1995; Vladimir Slipchenko, *Voina budushchego*, Moscow, Moskovskii Obshchestvennyi Nauchnyi Fond, 1999; Vladimir Slipchenko, *Beskontaktnye voiny*, Moscow, Izdatel'skii dom, Gran-Press, 2001; I. M. Kapitanets, *Flot v voynakh shestogo pokoleniia: Avianosnye udarnye gruppy, vozdushno-kosmicheskie sistemy, vysokotochnoe oruzhie*, Moscow, Veche, 2003; Vladimir Slipchenko, *Voiny novogo pokoleniia: distantsionnye beskontaktnye*, Moscow, OLMA-Press, 2004; and Makhmut Gareev and Vladimir Slipchenko, *Budushchaia voina*, Moscow, OGI, 2005.

<sup>18</sup> Donald Rumsfeld, 'Transforming the Military', *Foreign Affairs* (May-June 2002), <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/58020/donald-h-rumsfeld/transforming-the-military?page=show> (accessed 20 October 2009).

the Senate Armed Services Committee on all the dimensions of transformation in 2002. Only seven months after 9/11 and only a few months after the route of the Taliban in Afghanistan, Wolfowitz promised that the United States could fight the War on Terror and transform its armed forces:

Even as we fight this war on terror, potential adversaries scrutinize our methods, they study our capabilities, they seek our weaknesses. They plan for how they might take advantage of what they perceive as our vulnerabilities. So, as we take care of today, we are investing in tomorrow. We are emphasizing multiple transformations that, combined, will fundamentally change warfare, in ways that could give us important advantages that can help us secure the peace. We realize that achieving this goal requires transforming our culture and the way we think. We must do this even as we fight this difficult war on terrorism. We cannot afford to wait.<sup>19</sup>

Wolfowitz spoke of the challenge such capabilities posed and not specific enemy threats, thereby justifying sustained defense spending to fight both the War on Terror and to carry transformation forward. Behind this dual track was the desire to use defense transformation as a means to preclude the emergence of a peer competitor to the United States, thereby sustaining U.S. hegemony on a unipolar international system.<sup>20</sup> Prior to the War on Terrorism, official Washington had been very confident that the emergence of a peer competitor was a matter for the distant future. Former Secretary of Defense William Cohen had said in early 2001, 'There is no peer competitor—and there is unlikely to be any peer competitor any time soon.'

In fact, Wolfowitz's analysis did not take into account the protracted combat operations that would emerge after the occupation of Iraq and with the recovery of the Taliban in Afghanistan. New requirements that emerged out of each theater and the demands of counterinsurgency came to include both regular defense spending and the additional operational costs of two protracted wars funded by annual supplemental appropriations. In 2002, there had been no mention of countering improvised explosive devices (IEDs), the weapon of choice of the Iraqi insurgents. Neither had there been much attention to the requirements of mountain warfare that defined much of the fighting in Afghanistan. By 2006, it was very clear to readers of the *Quadrennial Defense Review* that transformation as a bet on the future was dead, buried in the ongoing costs of protracted wars in two theaters and very different operational-tactical requirements.<sup>21</sup> The gamble on using

<sup>19</sup> 'Prepared Statement for the Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing on Military Transformation', by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz, Washington, DC, 9 April 2002. <http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/dod/transformation-wolfowitz-9apr02.htm>.

<sup>20</sup> Thomas S. Szayna et al., *The Emergence of Peer Competitors: A Framework for Analysis*, Santa Monica, RAND Corporation, 2001.

<sup>21</sup> David Von Drehle, 'Rumsfeld's Transformation', *Washington Post* (12 February 2006).

defense modernization to intimidate any potential 'peer competitor' had by 2009, run into the global economic crisis, which demanded reductions in defense spending in DC. As Magnus Nordenman wrote, Robert Gates in his proposed defense budget for 2009 had put his bet on COIN to deal with the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan and at the expense of advanced systems designed to discourage potential peer competitors.<sup>22</sup>

The United States has continued to outspend the rest of the world. In 2011, the U.S. share of global defense spending was 41 percent in comparison with the shares of the next two leading spenders, China at 8.2 percent and Russia at 4.1 percent.<sup>23</sup> This year the global economic crisis threatens to bring cuts in U.S. defense spending. The Obama administration has announced both a leaner look, de-emphasizing the Army and Marine Corps, and a strategic 'pivot' toward the Asia-Pacific region with China as the chief focus. This actually represents a return to the defense priorities of the first Bush administration before the War on Terror disrupted those plans. In a meeting in the Pentagon with Secretary of Defense Leon Panetta and the Joint Chiefs, Obama proclaimed, 'Yes our military will be leaner, but the world must know the United States is going to maintain our military superiority with armed forces that are agile, flexible and ready for the full range of contingencies and threats.'<sup>24</sup> Secretary of Defense Panetta took the occasion of a speech in Singapore to elaborate on the strategic shift, saying that move had been long forecast and was the result of the raise of the importance of the Asia-Pacific region. On that occasion, Panetta did note China's growing economy but stressed the shift was in no way aimed against China.<sup>25</sup> That topic, however, has been the subject of serious debate in Washington. 'Air-Sea Battle,' not to be confused with AirLand Battle of the 1980s, has now emerged as the driver of defense transformation for the Asia-Pacific pivot. In contrast to the first decade of the 21st century when defense spending went heavily to the Army and Marine Corps, which were the primary instruments of COIN, 'Air-Sea Battle' has its focus on using systems of systems in defeating deeply echeloned systems of precision-strike missiles like those of a potential peer competitor.<sup>26</sup> Indeed, the military leadership of the People's Liberation Army has labeled the concept the strategy for a future war with

<sup>22</sup> Magnus Nordenman, 'Pentagon Bets on COIN, Against Peer Competitor', *Atlanticist* (7 April 2009), [http://www.acus.org/new\\_atlanticist/pentagon-bets-coin-against-peer-competitor](http://www.acus.org/new_atlanticist/pentagon-bets-coin-against-peer-competitor) (accessed 20 July 2012).

<sup>23</sup> 'Global Distribution of Military Expenditures in 2011', *SIPRI Military Expenditure Database 2012*, <http://milexdata.spiri.org>.

<sup>24</sup> Ed Pilkington, 'Barack Obama Sets Out Plans for a Leaner Military in Historic Strategy Shift', *The Guardian* (5 January 2012), <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/jan/05/barack-obama-plans-leaner-military>.

<sup>25</sup> Jim Garamone, 'Panetta Describes U. S. Shift in Asia-Pacific', *Armed Forces Press Service* (1 June 2012), <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=116591>.

<sup>26</sup> Sam LaGrone, 'Pentagon's "Air-Sea Battle" Plan Explained. Finally', *Danger Room* (6 August 2012), <http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2012/08/air-sea-battle-2> (accessed 7 August 2012). Air-Sea Battle is not a scenario-specific set of systems, but it has certainly been touted as a key part of the strategic pivot to the Asia-Pacific region.

China and talked about its strategic counter-moves. 'If the U.S. military develops Air-Sea Battle to deal with the [People's Liberation Army], the PLA will be forced to develop anti-Air-Sea Battle', Colonel Gaoyue Fan asserted last year in a debate sponsored by the Center for Strategic and International Studies, a defense think tank.<sup>27</sup> While still seeing China as an emerging regional power, the Obama administration has sought to portray its Asian pivot as not directed against the People's Republic of China. The debate in Washington has come down to defense spending priorities with the Navy and Air Force seeing Air-Sea Battle as the justification for their advanced combat systems. For the Marines and the Army, facing cuts with the ends of operational deployments, it could mean another decade like the 1950s, when ground forces were deemed of marginal value.

However, at the core of Air-Sea Battle concept and its high-technology promise is the nasty problem of thermonuclear weapons. The best open-source estimates of China's nuclear arsenal in 2010 put the total number of nuclear weapons at 150 warheads with 50 deployed on ICBMs, and other warheads have also been deployed on Jin Class SSBNs. Up until now, Chinese nuclear weapons have been seen as a retaliatory force.<sup>28</sup> China can decide to treat advanced conventional systems as the strategic equivalent of nuclear weapons and expand its nuclear arsenal. The geostrategic pivot to the Asia-Pacific region has complicated U.S.–Chinese relations and will likely increase tensions, including those associated with nuclear weapons. The State Department's International Security Advisory Board under the chairmanship of former Secretary of Defense William Perry prepared a report on strategic nuclear stability between the U.S. and China. In response to China's efforts to modernize its strategic nuclear forces and in the face of what China's leadership considers U.S. intentions with regard to missile defense, nuclear and precision conventional strike capabilities, the panel recommended: 'Accordingly, mutual nuclear vulnerability should be considered as a fact of life for both sides.'<sup>29</sup> The subtext to the report was that the

<sup>27</sup> Greg Jaffe, 'U.S. Model for a Future War Fans Tensions with China and Inside Pentagon', *Washington Post* (1 August 2012). [http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-model-for-a-future-war-fans-tensions-with-china-and-inside-pentagon/2012/08/01/gJQAC6F8PX\\_story.html](http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-model-for-a-future-war-fans-tensions-with-china-and-inside-pentagon/2012/08/01/gJQAC6F8PX_story.html) (accessed 1 August 2012).

<sup>28</sup> Gregory Kulacki, 'China's Nuclear Arsenal: Status and Evolution', *Union of Concerned Scientists* (October 2011), <http://www.ucsusa.org/assets/documents/nwgs/UCS-Chinese-nuclear-modernization.pdf> (accessed 20 July 2012). These figures do not address China's arsenal of MRBM and SRBM, which are the subject of much debate. Since the INF Treaty, neither the U.S. or Russia has possessed any intermediate range ballistic missiles with a range of greater than 300 miles. China, North Korea, Pakistan India, Saudi Arabia and Israel have IRMs. All of these states, except Saudi Arabia, are considered to be de facto nuclear powers.

<sup>29</sup> 'Draft Report Urges Accepting Mutual Nuclear Vulnerability With China', *Inside Defense* (25 July 2012), <http://insidedefense.com/201207262405649/Inside-Defense-General/Public-Articles/draft-report-urges-accepting-mutual-nuclear-vulnerability-with-china/menu-id-926.html> (accessed 1 August 2012).

strategic pivot did not mean that Washington wanted a military confrontation with China.

Between the Rumsfeld era and the current situation of strategic redeployment and potential defense cuts, there is another era dominated by the demands of two protracted wars, which required that the United States focus both its military policy and national strategy on the management of conflict termination. Without the successes achieved in the last years of the Bush administration and the first years of the Obama administration, neither defense cuts nor strategic refocusing would have been possible. The largest thread of continuity through that period was the tenure of Robert Gates as Secretary of Defense. Under Gates, the Department of Defense freely acknowledged the importance of other elements of national power, including soft power, in achieving strategic outcomes, thereby broadening the vocabulary used to discuss ways, ends and means. Secretary Gates frankly acknowledged the importance of defense transformation, but he was also candid about its origins and very specific in its shift in focus by acknowledging the impact on ongoing operations in defining procurement requirements. He addressed this issue in October 2007 during an address to the students of the Academy of the General Staff of the Russian Armed Forces. The geostrategic context in which he spoke was the deteriorating relations between Russia and the U.S. and NATO. President Vladimir Putin had used the Munich Conference on Security Policy to deliver a polemical address outlining Russia's complaints about the U.S. effort to establish a unipolar world after the Cold War. Putin emphasized both his opposition to unipolarity and the trends supporting the emergence of a multipolar world with new geostrategic centers, especially in Asia. Putin also stressed Russia's intension to counter any 'new, de-stabilizing high-tech weapons' or the extension of the arms race into space. Russia, he promised, would maintain its tradition of an independent foreign policy while taking into account 'how the world has changed' and 'a realistic sense of our own opportunities and potential'.<sup>30</sup> In July 2007, Putin's government put its own interpretation on the direction of such changes by announcing the suspension of its compliance with the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty and stating that 'exceptional circumstances' dictated the decision. These circumstances were connected to Russia's objections to a U.S.-sponsored missile defense system for Europe and NATO's drive to embrace Georgia and Ukraine, both with governments brought to power by 'color revolutions' and hostile to Russia. Under the renegotiated Adapted CFE Treaty signed at the OSCE meeting in Istanbul, Turkey, in 1999 Russia had agreed in the 'Istanbul Commitments' to the withdrawal of Russian forces from Georgia, including the disputed

<sup>30</sup> 'Putin's Prepared Remarks at 43rd Munich Conference on Security', *Washington Post* (12 February 2007). <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/02/12/AR2007021200555.html> (accessed 15 May 2012).

territory of Abkhazia and the Transdniester Region of Moldova. The Russian suspension was one more way of objecting to Georgia's efforts to join NATO.

In October 2007, Robert Gates, the successor to Rumsfeld at the Pentagon, offered his own response to Putin's remarks in Munich. In an address at the Academy of the General Staff in Moscow, he spoke of U.S.–Russian common security challenges and the need to find ways to meet them. Gates drew attention to the fact that the militaries of both Russia and the United States faced the challenge of 'transformation'. In Gates's case, however, he acknowledged the connection between transformation of the Rumsfeld era and the revolution in military affairs as forecast by Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov in the late 1970s and early 1980s when he was Chief of the Soviet General Staff. Gates emphasized that combat experience has been a major driver in military transformation in the United States, and he pointed out the impact that the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan were having on the U.S. military. He held out the prospect of contacts to share lessons learned in recent conflicts to create 'a climate of trust and transparency'.<sup>31</sup>

Developments over the next year made prospects for U.S. military cooperation seem very remote. The Bush administration continued to push Membership Action Plans for Georgia and Ukraine in order to expedite their admissions to NATO in the face of Russian objections and warning. In its declaration at the NATO Summit in Bucharest in April 2008, the North Atlantic Council agreed that both Georgia and Ukraine would become members of NATO, noting the progress of both countries. The Council announced its 'support' of their applications for MAP and stated that the Council had asked the Foreign Ministers to make a first assessment of progress at their meeting in December 2008. At the same summit, the Council addressed the NATO–Russia partnership 'as a strategic element in fostering security in the Euro-Atlantic area' but called attention to 'recent Russian statements and actions on key security issues of mutual concern'. The Council left the issues of CFE suspension and European missile defense in the hands of bilateral U.S.–Russian negotiations but did categorize theater missile defense as one area of possible military-to-military cooperation. It also took positive note of 'Russia's readiness to support NATO's ISAF mission in Afghanistan by facilitating transit through Russian territory'.<sup>32</sup>

By the time of the meeting of NATO Foreign Ministers in December 2008, events had overtaken the issue of granting Georgia a MAP. In early August, after an escalation of local fighting along the border between Georgia and the breakaway province of South Ossetia, Georgian Army units crossed into South Ossetia and advanced toward its capital Tskhinvali, which they

<sup>31</sup> Linda Kozaryn, 'Gates: U.S. Prepared to Work with Russian Military', *American Forces Press Service* (13 October 2007), <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=47787> (accessed 10 May 2012).

<sup>32</sup> NATO, 'Bucharest Summit Declaration, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bucharest on 3 April 2007', [http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official\\_texts\\_8443.htm](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm).



entered on the morning of 8 August 2008. This was the last Georgian military success in what Russia's military came to call the 'Five-Day War'. Regular Russian forces advanced into South Ossetia to support Russian peacekeepers already deployed there and defeated the Georgia Army, forcing it back across the border into Georgia proper.

Russian military success, while complete, exposed a range of problems in the conduct of modern, information-intense operations and set off a push for military reform in the Russian Ministry of Defense under the banner of the 'New Look'.<sup>33</sup> Only recently has President Putin admitted that since 2006 Russia's General Staff had been drafting a war plan in case of a Georgia attack, which counted on South Ossetia militia to slow the Georgian advance, while Russian regular forces would deploy from the north to reinforce Russian peacekeepers and South Ossetian militia. Putin said that he had endorsed the plan in 2007 as president and remarked that the local militia had performed better than had been expected.<sup>34</sup> In international affairs, the Five-Day War announced the emergence of the Medvedev-Putin Tandem as a set of actors with which to be reckoned. The recent circulation of the video 'The Lost Day' (*Poteriannyi den'*) on social media to coincide with the fourth anniversary of the Russo-Georgian War has called into question the Tandem's leadership during that crisis. The senior retired Russian generals interviewed in the film claim that from 2006 the Russian General Staff had worked out a war plan to deal with a possible Georgian offensive against South Ossetia. Moreover, they claim that there was significant evidence of the Georgian offensive already on August 7 and that President Medvedev's delay in authorizing the execution of the General Staff's operational plan cost the defenders of population of South Ossetia 1,000 dead and many more wounded.<sup>35</sup> The appearance of General Yuri Baluevsky (Russian Army retired) in the film and his comments as the former Chief of the Russian General Staff gave added weight to the film's message. Baluevsky since his retirement has been a member of the Russian Security Council. The film

<sup>33</sup> The best book on the Georgian-Russian War in English is Ronald D. Asmus, *A Little War that Shook the World: Georgia, Russia and the Future of the West*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010. Asmus, who combined scholarship and policy, served as U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs from 1997 to 2000 and played a key role in U.S. policy on NATO expansion, subsequently serving as Executive Director of the Brussels-based Transatlantic Center. He was also responsible for strategic planning at the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Asmus saw the war as a fundamental challenge to the values that had underpinned the post-Cold War order in Europe. The best Russian studies of the conflict are Mikhail Barabanov, Anton Lavrov, Viacheslav Tseluiko, *Tanki avgusta: Sbornik statei*, Moscow, Tsentr analiza strategii i tekhnologii, 2009, [www.cast.ru/comments/](http://www.cast.ru/comments/) (accessed 15 December 2010); and Igor Dzhadan, *Piatidnevnaia voina: Rossiia prinuzhdaet k miru*, Moscow, Izdatel'stvo 'Evropa,' 2008. Dzhadan's book underscored the Russian purpose in intervening 'to impose peace', as the subtitle states. *Tanki avgusta* focused on military-technical aspects of the conflict and provided an explanation for the push for the 'New Look' by the Ministry of Defense.

<sup>34</sup> 'Putin Admits Russia Planned Response to Georgian Aggression Beforehand', *ITAR-TASS* (8 August 2012).

<sup>35</sup> Alan Biragov, 'Poteriannyi den': *Vsia pravda o voine*' (8 August 2012), <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=sYQeeFXhOQw> (accessed 10 August 2012).



asserts that the Georgian attack had begun at 2 PM on August 7 with the commitment of heavy artillery against the positions of Russian peacekeepers deployed around Tskhinvali and not later that evening.

The film suggests that if Putin had been president, the response would have been more rapid and decisive. Medvedev is criticized for discussing the events in Georgia with other international leaders, suggesting that a political leader must act immediately and decisively in the face of threats, paying no attention to the political context of the crisis or political objectives that the military actions would be directed to achieve. In the spirit of 1914, the retired Russian officers effectively want the political leadership to surrender its authority to those who would conduct combat operations, even if there are risks of horizontal escalation and vertical escalation. The inherent restraint that strategic nuclear arsenals had imposed on conflict escalation simply does not apply. The film compares the slow response of Medvedev to this crisis to the rapid deployment of Russian forces from SFOR to Pristina following the NATO-Yugoslav War over Kosovo in June 1999. The press response to these events has been to suggest a conflict between Putin and Medvedev, with Putin stealing Medvedev's laurel wreath of victory.<sup>36</sup> That, however, did not reflect President Putin's thinking on the subject. In 2008, Putin was prime minister and out of the country at the Beijing Olympics. When asked recently about the impact of any delay in the deployment of Russian forces, Putin suggested that the crisis had actually begun on August 4–5 with cross-border firing. He then stated:

A decision to use the armed forces is a very serious matter indeed, because it amounts to an order to begin military operations, which means there will be shooting and loss of life. You need to think ever so carefully before making such a decision. This is a very difficult and responsible matter.<sup>37</sup>

The impact of the Georgian War on U.S.–Russian relations, which loomed large in August, had declined significantly by the fall of 2008. Senator John McCain, the Republican nominee, denounced Russia's military intervention and pledged assistance to the Georgian government. On 12 August, as the fighting was ending, McCain proclaimed, 'Today, we are all Georgians.'<sup>38</sup> The Bush administration and Congress did vote funds to speed Georgia's recovery from the war. However, in the presidential election campaign the global financial crisis took center stage and became the chief focus of the Bush administration and the incoming Obama administration. Among those

<sup>36</sup> Yuri Nersesov, 'Tskhikhinval'skaia zhertva Aifonchika', *Agentstvo pechati novosti* (10 August 2012).

<sup>37</sup> President of Russia, 'Vladimir Putin Answered Journalists' Questions During His Working Trip to Leningrad Region' (7 August 2012), <http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/4269> (accessed 10 August 2012).

<sup>38</sup> Robert Barnes, 'McCain to Georgian President: Today, We Are All Georgians', *Washington Post* (12 August 2012), <http://voices.washingtonpost.com/44/2008/08/mccain-to-georgian-president-t.html> (accessed 10 May 2012).

advising candidate Obama, there were those who favored a re-engagement with Russia but in terms of using leverage to promote the democratization of Russian society, even at the expense of strained relations with the Russian government. Stanford Professor Michael McFaul, who served as a campaign adviser on Russian affairs and went on to be a national security adviser and then ambassador to Moscow, spoke in such terms:

In dealing with countries like Russia, Democrats should seek to engage both the state but also societal leaders and organizations advocating democracy, human rights, and the rule of law. Championing values of freedom, justice, and equality is an old Democratic tradition that now needs to be recaptured and pursued more pragmatically, humbly, and strategically, and not abandoned in kneejerk reaction to eight years of failed Bush policies.<sup>39</sup>

When the Obama administration arrived in Washington, the idea of a fresh start in relations with Russia appealed to President Barack Obama and to Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who in early 2009 announced a 'reset' in U.S.–Russian relations. That the original presentation of the concept to Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov by Secretary of State Clinton involved a red button labeled *peregruzka* (Overload) as opposed to one labeled *perezagruzka* (Reset) made the initial presentation more farce than drama. The promise of the reset was progress across the board in U.S.–Russian relations, but the initial single large payoff was START 3, a new bilateral Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty covering offensive nuclear weapons. When the treaty was signed in Prague in April 2010, President Obama said, 'This ceremony is a testament to the truth that old adversaries can forge new partnerships.'<sup>40</sup> The Obama administration initially linked the negotiations to the larger campaign, Global Zero, which called for some future abolition of nuclear weapons. The Russians treated the negotiations of the treaty as useful in confirming Russia's status and for managing reduction in strategic nuclear arms, while Russia's government pursued the modernization of its strategic nuclear forces. The treaty was finally ratified by both states in December 2010 by the U.S. Senate and in January 2011 by the Russian State Duma.

If both sides believed that further reductions of offensive nuclear weapons would enhance strategic stability, they grossly misread the significance of such weapons in the post-Cold War world. In the decade

<sup>39</sup> Paul Craft, 'Stanford Professor Michael McFaul Pushes for Democracy in Russia Policy', *The Stanford Review* (17 April 2009), <http://stanfordreview.org/article/stanford-professor-michael-mcfaul-pushes-democracy> (accessed 2 August 2012).

<sup>40</sup> 'Remarks by President Obama and President Medvedev of Russia at New START Treaty Signing Ceremony and Press Conference', The White House (8 April 2010), <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-obama-and-president-medvedev-russia-new-start-treaty-signing-cere> (accessed 21 April 2010).

immediately following the end of the Cold War, the United States had emerged as a global hegemon in a unipolar international order. This order offered stability and the triumph of open, secular societies with market economies and political democracies. The second decade was unkind to this new order. Other sources of instability made their appearance in the form of terrorism, religious extremism and the global financial crisis. Russia only briefly seemed to be at peace with U.S. hegemony in the early 1990s under Yeltsin, but that was dead by the late 1990s, buried in the ruble crisis of 1998 in Russia and the ruble in Yugoslavia, when NATO embarked upon peace enforcement to resolve the Kosovo crisis in 1999. Putin briefly flirted with an antiterrorism partnership after 9/11, but the U.S. invasion of Iraq buried that opening. On the U.S. side, Russia appeared to be a regional power seeking to establish a sphere of influence on its periphery and to oppose the export of political democracy if it called into question Russia's preeminence in its periphery. Putin's Russia began to speak and act like a great power located in Eurasia, just as a fundamental shift in the balance of geostrategic power was taking place with the vector pointing toward an Asian-Pacific century. Putin had assumed that energy diplomacy in both Europe and Asia would assure Russia's influence, but after 2008 the global financial crisis made clear the vulnerability of extractive economies to falls in commodity prices. When the Arab Spring turned into the summer and fall of revolts, riots and civil wars, both the United States and Russia had to respond to a crisis that neither had created nor could control.

Within less than a year after the ratification of the treaty, it appeared increasingly unlikely that NATO and Russia would come to agreement on a joint missile defense system for Europe. It seemed certain that the U.S.–Russian reset was in serious trouble. The successful negotiations that led to START 3 and reduction of U.S. and Russian strategic offensive nuclear arsenals, which were the high point of the reset, have not led to progress in other areas of arms control and security arrangements. If the strategic nuclear arsenals have been the backbone of deterrence and strategic stability for the last half-century, it appears that they are no longer sufficient to set the general line of relations, in part because of the reduced threat perceptions of each side but also because other military capabilities have taken on greater importance. These include missile defense, nonstrategic nuclear weapons, conventional systems for real-time strategic offensive strikes and the transformation of conventional military forces under the impact on developments in C4ISR (command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance). Military transformation in Russia and NATO is not necessarily directed against each other, but there is no existing mechanism to deal with the diverse security challenges across Eurasia in such a fashion as to make arms control a viable option. Talk about Global Zero, which was loud a few years ago, is but a faint echo today. International instability drives the great powers to intervene as crisis managers but without any long-term

vision of an emerging system after the crises. Balkan ghosts haunt the Middle East and Central Asia.

## FUTURE WAR AS A CORE SOURCE OF CONFLICT BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE WEST

In the West, the transformation of warfare has been the product of social, economic and political change within society, to which military institutions respond. The pace of change creates the challenge since it can be very rapid and radically alter the means, ways and ends of war. Winton and Mets focused on the interwar years of the 20th century leading up to the mechanization of warfare.<sup>41</sup> The core argument over future war has been between those who see war as a timeless struggle dictated by human nature and conflict against those who see it as an evolving institution shaped by the institutions and instruments men use to fight them. The act of trying to forecast the nature of future war is what General Makhmut A. Gareev called it—‘a labor of Sisyphus’—since it must constantly involve reassessment given the complexity of the issues under consideration, making the challenge of change all the more difficult to address, especially as the processes of change accelerate.<sup>42</sup>

Western military scholars speak of a military revolution in the 16th and 17th centuries, which reshaped the instruments of war, the profession of arms, military and the relationship between the state and warfare.<sup>43</sup> But already the wars of the French Revolution and Napoleon were pointing to other profound changes in the art of war, which would accelerate during the next century to make the challenge of change the key problem for soldiers and statesmen as they prepared for war.<sup>44</sup> The great student of warfare, Karl von Clausewitz, argued that war was the continuation of politics by other means, enshrining war as an inherent part of Europe’s Post-Westphalian Order. A third strand can also be identified, which at various times has seen technological change imposing such risks upon states and societies as to make modern, mass, industrial war unthinkable as state policy. Jan Bloch, writing in the late nineteenth century, depicted mass, industrial war as leading toward a stalemate between offense and defense, which would create

<sup>41</sup> Harold R. Winton and David R. Mets, eds., *The Challenge of Change: Military Institutions and New Realities, 1918–1941*, Lincoln, University of Nebraska Press, 2000.

<sup>42</sup> M. A. Gareev, *If War Comes Tomorrow? The Content of Future Armed Conflict*, London, Frank Cass, 1998. See also Jacob W. Kipp, ‘The Labor of Sisyphus: Forecasting the Revolution in Military Affairs During Russia’s Time of Troubles’, in Thierry Gongora and Harold von Riekhoff, eds., *Toward a Revolution in Military Affairs?*, Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 2000, pp. 87–104.

<sup>43</sup> Geoffrey Parker, *The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500–1800*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988.

<sup>44</sup> Thomas Waugh, Michael Brendan Baker and Ezra Winton, eds., *Challenge of Change: Military Institutions and New Realities, 1918–1941*, Montréal, McGill-Queen’s University Press, 2010.

the butchery of trench warfare as more and more men and materiel were thrown into the deadlock. This waste of men and materiel would serve to disrupt society, lead to unrest, and bring social revolution. War and revolution to Bloch were joined in case of a general European war.<sup>45</sup> Bloch died before the Russo-Japanese War and so did not witness the operational stalemate in that conflict that previewed World War I. But he did comment on the Anglo-Boer War, where Boer resistance had proven so stubborn against the British Army. As a pacifist, Bloch pled for an end to war before the burdens of preparations either broke the social fabric or lead to the 'sudden destruction in the cataclysm of universal war.'<sup>46</sup>

Where Bloch, the liberal banker and investor, was frightened by the prospect of revolution, there were others who saw such a war as the necessary 'catalyst' for a revolutionary process that they longed for and embraced. Such was the view of V. I. Lenin in response to the Russo-Japanese War and to World War I. Lenin, the leader of the Bolshevik Party in Tsarist Russia, saw in the chaos of revolution the possibility of telescoping Marxism's schema of social development. In this view, war and revolution were linked to imperialism and the crisis of capitalism. The eschatological element at the heart of this view was that the revolutionary process would rapidly become global and sweep away the state. The Bolsheviks seized power but then found themselves isolated and in a battle for survival against counter-revolution and foreign intervention. Determined to remain in power, the Bolsheviks practiced the diplomacy of survival, created their own state, and formed a new army out of the old tsarist Army and worker cadres.<sup>47</sup> Lenin's appreciation of Clausewitz ran counter to that among tsarist officers, in part because the first translation of *On War* had been badly done and gave the Prussian the reputation of being a dense and complex author and inferior to Jomini in every way.<sup>48</sup>

Between Bloch's forecast of future war at the end of the 19th century and Lenin's adaptation of Clausewitz to describe the relationship between war and revolution in the 20th century, Russian soldiers had to confront the reality of modern industrial war. The experience of war in Manchuria led many Russian military theorists to address the exact nature of the 'modern

<sup>45</sup> Ivan. S. Bliokh, *Budushchaia voina v tekhnicheskome, politicheskom i ekonomicheskom otnosheniiakh*, six volumes, St. Petersburg, Tipografiia I. A. Efrona, 1898. On Bloch's significance, see Jacob W. Kipp, 'Soldiers and Civilians Confronting Future War: Lev Tolstoy, Jan Bloch and Their Russian Military Critics', in Stephen D. Chiabotti, ed., *Tooling for War: Military Transformation in the Industrial Age*, Chicago, Imprint Publications, 1996, pp. 189–230; and Ryszard Kolodziejczyk, *Jan Bloch: Szkic do portretu 'krola polskich kolei'*, Warsaw, Panstwowy Instytut Wydawniczy, 1983.

<sup>46</sup> Jean de Bloch, 'South Africa and Europe', *North American Review* 174 (April 1902), p. 504.

<sup>47</sup> V. I. Lenin, *Zamechaniia na knigu Klauzevitsa 'O voine i vedenii voim'*, Moscow, Partiinoe izdatel'stvo, 1933. See also Jacob W. Kipp, 'Lenin and Clausewitz: The Militarization of Marxism', *Military Affairs* 49(4) (December 1985), pp. 184–191; and K. Klauzevits, *O Voine*, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1934.

<sup>48</sup> I. S. Danilenko, 'O sud'be rukopisi i ee avtora', in A. E. Snesev, *Zbizi i trudy Klauzevitsa*, Moscow, Kuchovo Pole, 2007, pp. 23–25.

war,' which they had faced there and to seek to adapt military art to this new reality.<sup>49</sup> In the aftermath of that war, reform-minded Russian officers began to address the nature of modern war, the role of the conduct of operations in such wars, and the need for the creation of a military doctrine to prepare the state. At the core of this approach were two basic assumptions: first, that technological change was leading to the evolution of military art and that commanders need to grasp this process of change in order to guide the raising, training and equipping of the force, and second, that military doctrine had to address the political context of war, i.e., the probable opponents and their war aims.<sup>50</sup> In the end, however, Nicholas II as autocrat retained the right to define military doctrine.

Following the overthrow of the tsarist regime during World War I, the issue of military doctrine regained prominence among tsarist officers serving in the newly created Red Army. Between late 1918 and early 1920, this discussion was confined to military circles.<sup>51</sup> In the spring of 1920, the debate over military doctrine was taken up by the Bolsheviks themselves. Lev Trotsky, the Commissar of War, who had directed the Red Army during the Civil War, dismissed the calls for a military doctrine by labeling such efforts attempts to create a 'psuedo-military dotrinairianism' (*mnimo-voennoe doktrinerstvo*). A few months later, Mikhail Frunze, Red Commander the hero of the Crimea, answered Trotsky with a call for a 'unified military doctrine'.<sup>52</sup> The tsarist military specialists still had a leading role in making Clausewitz relevant to the Red Army. Aleksandr Svechin, senior professor at the Military Academy, did this in his book *Strategy*, which involved a synthesis of Clausewitz and Hans Delbruck, a leading German military historian. Svechin made the case for the need for an integral commander bringing together expertise on politics, military art and economics in order to conduct modern war.<sup>53</sup> In collaboration with his colleague A. E. Snesev, Svechin initiated the publication of the first serious translation of Clausewitz's *On War*, which would not appear until 1934. One year later, Svechin's appreciation of Clausewitz as a military theorist appeared but carried no mention of his

<sup>49</sup> Bruce Menning, *Bayonets Before Bullets: The Imperial Russian Army 1861–1914*, Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1999; John Steinberg, 'Prichiny porazheniia russkoi armii v Russo-iaponskoi voine: Operativnaia tochka zreniia', in O. Airapetov, ed., *Russko-iaponskaia voina, 1904–1905: Vzgliaad cherez stoletie*, Moscow, Modest Kolerov i Izdael'stvo 'Tri Kvadrata,' 2004.

<sup>50</sup> V. Apushkin, 'O voenno-politicheskoi doktrine,' *Novoe zveno* (January 1913), no. 1, pp. 14–15, and (February 1913), no. 2, pp. 46–47.

<sup>51</sup> A. Neznamov, 'Voennaia doktrina', *Voennoe delo* (December 1918), no. 12, p. 2; A. Svechin, 'Osnovy voennoi doktriny', *Voennoe delo* (April 1920), no. 2, pp. 38–41; and A. Neznamov, 'Voennaia doktrina, *Voennoe delo*' (April 1920), no. 4, pp. 97–99.

<sup>52</sup> L. Trotskii, 'Voennaia doktrina ili mnimo-voennoe doktrinerstvo', *Voennaia nauka i revoliutsiia*, Bk. 2, pp. 204–234; and M. Frunze, 'Edinaia voennaia doktrina i Krasnaia Armia', *Voennaia nauka i revoliutsiia* (July–August), pp. 30–46.

<sup>53</sup> A. A. Svechin, *Strategiia*, 2nd edition, Moscow, Gosvoenizdat, 1926. See also Jacob W. Kipp, 'General-Major A. A. Svechin and Modern War: Military History and Military Theory', in Aleksandr A. Svechin, *Strategy*, Minneapolis, East View Publications, 1992, pp. 23–60.

colleague, Snesev, because he had been purged in 1930.<sup>54</sup> In 1938, Svechin himself was repressed as a counter-revolutionary who trained terrorists.

The dominant Soviet view on future war, which emerged when Frunze became Commissar of War, was shaped by the victory of Marxism-Leninism as it emerged under Stalin, which emphasized the relationship between the ideology, the leading role of the Party, and the notion of dialectical materialism as a general systems theory, which could be applied to military science and provide a credible means for political and military foresight and forecasting. Tsarist specialists like Svechin and Snesev were purged in the 1930s for ideological deviation. The leading military journal, which had been called *Voennyi sbornik* [Military Digest] since its founding in 1858, became *Voennoe delo* [Military Affairs] after the Bolshevik Revolution and went through a series of name changes in the 1920 and early 1930s, from *Voennaia nauka i revoliutsiia* [Military Science and Revolution], *Voennaia mysl' i revoliutsiia* [Military Thought and Revolution], and then *Voina i revoliutsiia* [War and Revolution], until 1937 when it became *Voennaia mysl'* [Military Thought], as it is known today.<sup>55</sup>

Future war remained a critical concept for Soviet military officers and force planners. In 1928, the GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate) of the Red Army Staff completed a major study on the prospects of future war with Poland and Romania as the main opponents supported by the British and French. Leading military theorists took an active part in the study, including the military specialist and former tsarist officer Aleksandr Svechin and the young Red Commander and proponent of mechanized warfare Mikhail Tukhachevsky.<sup>56</sup> In this case, the study was meant to provide guidance for military planning under the Five-Year Plan and address the probable opponents, the political objectives of the opponents, the likely means that would be employed, and the war aims of the opposing sides. The debate over strategy for such a general war with the encircling capitalist world pitted Svechin as a proponent of protracted war against Tukhachevsky as the champion of a war of annihilation employing mass mechanized forces and tactical aviation. Stalin, who had been critical of Tukhachevsky's call for creation of an

<sup>54</sup> I. S. Danilenko, 'O sud'be rukopisi i ee avtora', in Snesev, *Zhizn' i trudy Klauzevitsa*, p. 24.

<sup>55</sup> It is a great irony that preparations for war, rather than general war itself, brought about the collapse of the USSR when the burdens of those preparations broke the national economy. In a society supposedly dominated by long-range, rational, central planning, this revealed glaring flaws in the edifice of 'mature socialism'. N. N. Moiseev, former head of the Academy of Sciences Computing Center and a leader in Soviet military simulation work, observed that ideological dogmatism, careerism and bureaucratic inertia precluded a timely and effective response to this pressing challenge. The command system that had worked during the Stalin industrialization, the Great Patriotic War, and even the period of nuclear and space challenges, would not meet this new challenge. Cybernetics and the challenge of creating an information society posed problems that the Stalinist model, even in a less repressive form, could not provide an answer. Mass war was no longer sufficient either to win wars or to guide a society and economy.

<sup>56</sup> USSR, RKKA, IV Upravlenie Shtaba, *Budushchaia voina*, Moscow, 1928.



industrial base to support a modern Red Army, now embraced these ideas. This was the point where the concept of deep operations was actively joined with the means to create the instruments for such operations.

As Commissar of Armaments, Tukhachevsky played a critical role in defining the relationship between military doctrine and economic planning in this key period of Soviet economic transformation during Stalin's revolution from above.<sup>57</sup> By the early 1930s, Soviet threat analysis included Imperial Japan after its occupation of Manchuria and the establishment of the puppet-state, Manchukuo. By the mid-1930s, political events were driving a reassessment of the threat environment in Europe. By 1934, Hitler's Germany had signed a nonaggression pact with Poland, raising the prospect of a German-Polish threat to the Soviet Union. In 1935, Tukhachevsky published an article addressing the emerging threat of Nazi Germany and its expanding Wehrmacht. Stalin edited the text before it was published in *Pravda* on March 31, 1935. Tukhachevsky's version bore the title 'Hitler's Military Plans', but Stalin changed it to 'The Military Plans of Today's Germany'.<sup>58</sup> Stalin would soon take over the role of defining the political and military threats to the Soviet Union after the purge of the Soviet officer corps in 1937. The choice of a model of future war as demanding mass mechanized forces led the USSR toward the militarization of the entire national economy at the expense of innovation in the civil economy and imposed under-consumption upon the population. This feature persisted even after the appearance of nuclear weapons and the emergence of strategic parity in the 1970s between the USSR and the U.S.

Military commentators would have to wait until de-Stalinization. Then, under Nikita Khrushchev, the Communist Party undertook a process of selectively criticizing the excesses of the Stalin era while preserving the leading role of the Party in defining the correct ideological line for the Soviet Union and for Communism. In military affairs, Khrushchev actively promoted the 'study' of future war as it was being shaped by the development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. In a discussion of the periodization of the history operational art, General-Major V. K. Kopytko, the former deputy chief of the Chair of Operational Art at the Academy of the General Staff, treated the entire period from 1954 to 1985 as a single whole dominated by the appearance of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. These weapons became the primary means for the destruction of the enemy, but their use

<sup>57</sup> Lennart Samuelson and Vitaly Shlykov, *Plans for Stalin's War Machine: Tukhachevskii and Military-Economic Planning, 1925–1941*, New York, St. Martin's Press, 2000, pp. 4–8.

<sup>58</sup> 'Doklad zamestitelia narkoma oborony SSSR M. N. Tukhachevskogo Narkomu K. E. Voroshilovu o neobkhodimosti izmeneniia strategicheskogo plana vedeniia voiny na Zapade, 25 fevralia 1935 g', in Rossiiskii Gosudarstvennyi Voennyi Arkhiv, Marshal M. N. Tukhachevskii (1893–1937 gg.): Komplekt dokumentov iz fondov RGVA, delo 18/1-11, and M. N. Tukhachevsky, 'Rukopis' stat'i M. N. Tukhachevskogo 'Voennye plany Gitlera's pravkoi I. V. Stalina 29 marta 1935 g,' in 'Iz arkhivov partii,' *Izvestiia TsK KPSS*, no. 1 (January 1990), p. 169.

was increasingly seen as catastrophic and operationally counterproductive. Colonel-General Adrian Danilevich, who was a senior special assistant to the Chief of the Operations Directorate of the General Staff in the 1970s and early 1980s, speaks of this period in slightly different terms and refers to 1950–1960 as the period of the acquisition of nuclear weapons, which was followed by the era of ‘nuclear euphoria’ from 1960–1965.<sup>59</sup> By the late 1950s, under the leadership of Khrushchev, the Soviet Union embarked upon the Military-Technical Revolution in which nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles were seen as the new definition of national power. Since the Soviet Union was undergoing a demographic crisis because of the low birth rate during the war, this revolution was supposed to provide security while the number of ground, air and naval forces were reduced. The strategic concept for such a military posture was laid out in the three editions of Marshal V. D. Sokolovsky’s *Military Strategy* between 1962 and 1968 and focused on nuclear warfighting as the dominant characteristic of modern war.<sup>60</sup>

The euphoria was followed by what Danilevich called a ‘descent to earth’ after the ouster of Khrushchev and a growing realism on the limited utility of nuclear weapons, which lasted from 1965 to 1975. It was during this period that the General Staff began to consider a first conventional phase to a NATO-WTO war. Originally thought of as a matter of a few hours, by the end of the period it was considered possible that the conventional period could last as long as 6–7 days.<sup>61</sup> Operational art during this period made its reappearance as a relevant part of military art during the initial period of war. However, it was still nuclear-armed missile forces that fundamentally shaped the nature of future war and expanded the effects that could be achieved. The deployment of forces under the conditions of the possible employment of nuclear weapons demanded greater mobility and protective systems against radiation for armor combat systems. The forces developed for this operational environment were designed to conduct operations for which there was no practical experience. Troops could exercise the doctrine and operations research professionals might find ways to simulate the conduct of operations, but the actual impact of nuclear weapons on the conduct of operations simply lacked any empirical test to evaluate theory and correct doctrine. Modeling a NATO-WTO conflict that included the prospective linkage of conventional, theater-nuclear and strategic forces posed a profoundly difficult problem.

Soviet military specialists, led by Danilevich, began to examine the possibility of an extended conventional phase of a NATO-WTO war.<sup>62</sup> This was

<sup>59</sup> John G. Hines, Ellis M. Mishulovich and John F. Shull, *Soviet Intentions, 1965–1985: Soviet Post-Cold War Testimonial Evidence*, Washington, DC, BDM Federal, 1995, pp. 54–55.

<sup>60</sup> V. D. Sokolovskii, ed. *Voennaia strategia*, Moscow, Voenizdat, 1962, 1963, 1968.

<sup>61</sup> John G. Hines, Ellis Mishulovich and John F. Shull, *Soviet Intentions, 1965–1985: Soviet Post-Cold War Testimonial Evidence*, pp. 55–56.

<sup>62</sup> *Ibid.*, pp. 19–20.

undertaken in the context of strategic nuclear parity and modernized theater nuclear arsenals, particularly the solid-fuel SS-20 IRBM. In the early 1970s, the General Staff assumed that nuclear first-use by NATO might occur at first at the main defensive line in Germany, and that NATO would always use nuclear weapons to defend the Rhine barrier.<sup>63</sup> When Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov became Chief of the General Staff in 1977, the conventional phase of NATO-WTO conflict was expected to last 5–6 days. By 1979, the General Staff had concluded that the conventional phase of the strategic operation could extend into France. And by 1980–1981, the General Staff's expectations were for the entire NATO-WTO war to remain conventional. The logic of this conclusion was based on the assumption that by 1981, nuclear use would be catastrophic and operationally counterproductive.<sup>64</sup> The Soviet General Staff concluded that a theater-strategic offensive based on a modernized concept of deep operations could be effective in case of a NATO-WTO war. This option did not exclude theater nuclear use but assumed NATO would initiate such use. The model of the conventional operation was the Manchurian Strategic Offensive, but it assumed a NATO attack and an immediate WTO counteroffensive, which would seek to encircle and annihilate large portions of NATO forces and advance to the Rhine, a crossing of which the General Staff assumed would trigger NATO tactical nuclear use.<sup>65</sup>

From 1979 forward, the General Staff also began to examine the possibility of escalation control after nuclear use and addressed the idea of intrawar termination of nuclear use. To be decisive, the Soviet conventional strategic operation depended on quantitative advantages in men and materiel. As Danilevich admitted, 'the Soviets did not win the Great Patriotic War because Soviet generalship and fighting skills were superior to those of the Germans. The Soviet Armed Forces simply overwhelmed the Germans with superior numbers of airplanes, men, tanks, and artillery'.<sup>66</sup> In a general conventional offensive, Soviet forces might commit 40,000 tanks in multiple echelons and at the end of the war have only 5,000 left.

By the early 1980s, the GRU was aware of qualitative improvements in U.S. theater-nuclear forces (ground launched cruise missiles [GLCMs] and Pershing IIs) and emerging enhanced conventional capabilities associated with better command and control and precision strike, by which the United

<sup>63</sup> For a look at how the Voroshilov General Staff Academy taught the theater-strategic operations to foreign officers in the mid-1970s, see Ghulam Dastagir Wardak, *The Voroshilov Lectures: Materials from the Soviet General Staff Academy*, Washington, DC, National Defense University Press, 1989, vol. I, pp. 257–313.

<sup>64</sup> Hines, Mishulovich and Shull, *Soviet Intentions, 1965–1985: Soviet Post-Cold War Testimonial Evidence*, p. 23.

<sup>65</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 24. On Western analysis of this option, see P. H. Vigor, *Soviet Blitzkrieg Theory*, Hong Kong, MacMillan Press, 1985, pp. 183–205.

<sup>66</sup> Hines, Mishulovich and Shull, *Soviet Intentions, 1965–1985: Soviet Post-Cold War Testimonial Evidence, ibid.*, p. 25.

States was seeking to counter Soviet quantity with qualitatively superior conventional weapons systems. What was reemerging was the necessity for reflection [*razmysblenie*] upon strategic choices based on an assessment of the probable war confronting the state and the economic means available to prepare for and conduct such a war. Marshal Ogarkov took seriously the role of the General Staff as the brain of the army with an unblinking eye on the future evolution of warfare. He began to call attention to an emerging revolution in military affairs, which was affecting conventional forces through automated command and control, informatization, precision, and weapons based on new physical principles.<sup>67</sup> He championed the professionalization of the military, greater control by the General Staff over weapons development, and force structure changes, including the abolition of National Air Defense Forces (*PVO Strany*). To counter NATO's emerging theater nuclear and conventional capabilities, Ogarkov embraced a new organizational concept, which Gareev had proposed: the Operational Maneuver Group as a countermeasure to NATO's emerging capabilities. High maneuverability of specially designed brigades would permit penetration and raiding on an operational scale and would make enemy counterstrikes more difficult.<sup>68</sup>

These trends posed a profound challenge to the dominant concept regarding the desirability and even necessity of seizing the strategic initiative and mounting offensive operations in the initial period of war. In his discussion of Soviet strategic command and control (*upravlenie*) in the postwar period, Andrei Kokoshin has called attention to the ossification of the system of command and control under the leadership of a Ministry of Defense, charged with managing all functions connected with the raising and training of operational formations. In this context, the General Staff lost its function as the brain of the army. There was an obvious conflict between the defense manager Marshal Dmitri Ustinov and the Chief of the General Staff, Marshal Nikolai Ogarkov. Ogarkov was positing an RMA that would demand a profound transformation of the Soviet military because of the appearance of new weapon systems based on automated command and control, electronic warfare, and weapons based on new physical principles, which was reshaping conventional warfare. In the struggle between Ustinov and Ogarkov, the former won because of his membership in the Politburo, and Ogarkov was removed as Chief of the General Staff.<sup>69</sup> Shortly thereafter, Ustinov himself died in December 1984.

<sup>67</sup> Jacob W. Kipp, 'The Labor of Sisyphus: Forecasting the Revolution in Military Affairs During Russia's Time of Troubles', in Thierry Gongora and Harold von Riekhoff, eds., *Toward a Revolution in Military Affairs?*, Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 2000, pp. 87–104.

<sup>68</sup> Hines, Mishulovich and Shull, *Soviet Intentions, 1965–1985: Soviet Post-Cold War Testimonial Evidence*, pp. 72–73.

<sup>69</sup> A. A. Kokoshin, *Strategicheskoe upravlenie: Teoriia, istoricheskii opyt, sravnitel'nyi analiz, zadachi dlia Rossii*, Moscow, ROSSPEN, 2003, pp. 240–246.

Following Ustinov's death, a new leader emerged within the Politburo who embraced the idea of profound systemic changes in order to bring life back into the ossified system of 'mature socialism'. Mikhail Gorbachev's campaign for reform known as *perestroika* called into question the defense-industrial system that was the heart of the Soviet planned economy. Faced by a need for economic reform and confronted by threats in Europe and Asia, Gorbachev set out to recast the Soviet Union's national security environment. Intent on removing the sources of the militarized conflict that had divided Europe from 1945, Gorbachev set in motion processes that brought about the end of the Cold War but, at the same time, fostered other process that he could not control and that led to the collapse of pro-Soviet governments in Eastern Europe, demands for national self-determination among the nations that made up the USSR, and even stimulated the rekindling of a Russian nationalism, which sought to redefine Russia's place in the USSR. Russian military leaders were prominent among those who supported the coup in August 1991, which sought to restore Soviet power. That effort failed, and in December 1991 Gorbachev announced the end of the USSR. Reform, not war, had undone the state created by Lenin and built by Stalin. The rapid collapse of the Soviet state and the largely passive role of its armed forces in that collapse came as a shock to many inside the Soviet Union and without.<sup>70</sup>

For the first time in nearly a century, Russia was at peace and no threat of general war seemed on the horizon. The breakup of the Soviet Union, the transformation of the Russian economy and the attempt to build a new polity created a dynamic and evolving environment, in which questions of military doctrine were now in the public domain and the subject of intense debate. Russia's road to a national army took place at a time when the Russian military elite was debating the consequences of the U.S.-led coalition's victory over the Iraqi Armed Forces in the liberation of Kuwait. The rapid and one-sided outcome of that conflict led to a sharp debate in Russia over the nature of the revolution in military affairs and what that meant for the forecasting of future war.<sup>71</sup>

In the following two decades, we have seen much of Russian, i.e., tsarist and Soviet, strategic culture assert itself in the Russian state's approach to regional stability and international security. Yeltsin and Putin's Russia both embraced the centrality of military doctrine in the formulation of national security policy. In both cases, the Russian state demonstrated a penchant for

<sup>70</sup> Stephen Blank and Jacob W. Kipp, eds., *The Soviet Military and the Future*, Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1992; and William E. Odom, *The Collapse of the Soviet Military*, New Haven, CT, Yale University Press, 1998). See also Jacob W. Kipp, 'The Uncertain Future of the Soviet Military, from Coup to Commonwealth: The Antecedents of National Armies', *European Security* 1(2) (Summer 1992), pp. 207–238.

<sup>71</sup> Jacob W. Kipp, 'The Soviet General Staff Looks at "Desert Storm": Through the Prism of Contemporary Politics', in Steven Blank and Jacob W. Kipp, eds., *The Soviet Military and the Future*, Westport, CT, Greenwood Press, 1992, pp. 115–144.

unilateral actions in regional crises and, after a brief flirtation with NATO, took to assuming that the United States and NATO were the chief challenges to Russian security in Eurasia. This did not preclude cooperation in counterterrorism and anti-piracy operations or common efforts to prevent nuclear proliferation among identified 'rogue' states. But the core of Russian strategic culture by the second decade of the 21st century focused on two threats: (1) information warfare (*informatsionnoe protivoborstvo*), which embraced information operations designed to destabilize the Russian state, society, and its allies; and (2) the application of advanced information technology to conventional warfighting in the form of precision-strikes and fires, and C4ISR as the keystone for network-centric warfare. In this regard, Russia is back into a model that Peter the Great, Dmitri Miliutin and Joseph Stalin would have recognized: catching up with the military innovations that transpired outside Russia in open societies where the exploitation of information across societies is the norm. In the past, Russia's rulers have sought to have the West's transformations without accepting a Western sociopolitical or economic model.

At the present time, as Putin's own experiment with a command market economy runs into problems, there is some reason to see Putin's embrace of an Asia-Pacific future for Russia as an indicator of a shift toward a Chinese model. In Asia, a weak Russia has to respond to a U.S. geostrategic pivot at a time when China seems willing to assert its role as a regional hegemon. For Putin's Russia, as I have written elsewhere, China is 'the threat that dare not speak its name.'<sup>72</sup> Russian demographic, economic and military weakness in East Siberia and the Russian Far East is so evident that only a massive transformation of the region holds any prospect for Russia sharing in a dawning Asian-Pacific century.<sup>73</sup>

Beginning with Evgenii Primakov, Russian foreign ministers have appreciated the utility of Sino-Russia balancing against U.S. hegemony in a unipolar world. Moscow feared such a bilateral arrangement would make Russia into a junior partner to Beijing. But Russia's political elite has been reassessing its efforts to use energy diplomacy to build a special relationship with Europe and has become more and more concerned with the instability in the international system. The Arab Spring brought this point home to Moscow as it unfolded and, in the process, brought more and more threats of military intervention in the region. Sino-Russian cooperation began as a tactical response to the Arab Spring, when Russia and China joined Brazil, India and Germany to abstain from the UN Security Council resolution authorizing military intervention in Libya in the spring of 2011. Since then, Russia

<sup>72</sup> Jacob W. Kipp, 'Russia's Nuclear Posture and the Threat That Dare Not Speak Its Name', in Stephen Black, ed., *Russian Nuclear Weapons: Past, Present and Future*, Carlisle Barracks, PA, U.S. Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute, 2011, pp. 459–504.

<sup>73</sup> Jacob W. Kipp, 'Whither Russia: Looking East and Ready to Embrace It', *Eurasia Daily Monitor* 9(91), 14 May 2012.

and China have used their vetoes to oppose military intervention in Syria. Western ire has focused most on Russia. However, as the crisis deepened and the Sino-Russian diplomatic cooperation continued over a key issue of international security, the very protractedness of the Syrian civil war turned what was possible tactical action into an operational arrangement with potentially great strategic consequences for Eurasia. The Sino-Russian position is not a matter of local influence, arms sales or even naval basing rights. It is founded on the shared perceptions in Beijing and Moscow that Syria represents precisely the dual threat posed by U.S.–NATO-led information warfare and the application of network-centric warfare to achieve political–military goals rapidly and decisively. Threats, however remote, continue to drive the Russian vision of future war, even if that vision is at best hazy and incomplete.