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README.md
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README.md

shortname: 10/AUTH
name: On-chain Access Control
type: Standard
status: Raw
editors: Ahmed Ali <ahmed@oceanprotocol.com>,
         Samer Sallam <samer@oceanprotocol.com>,
         Fang Gong <fang@oceanprotocol.com>,
         Sebastian Gerske  <sebastian@oceanprotocol.com>,
         Aitor Argomaniz <aitor@oceanprotocol.com>,
contributors: Ahmed Ali <ahmed@oceanprotocol.com>, 
              Samer Sallam <samer@oceanprotocol.com>
              Dimitri De Jonghe <dimi@oceanprotocol.com>

DISCLAIMER: THIS IS A WORK IN PROGRESS

Table of Contents

On Chain Access Control

This document describes the Ocean's On-Chain Access Control: the main requirements, functions, components and implementation details.

Change Process

This document is governed by the 2/COSS (COSS).

Language

The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 [RFC2119] [RFC8174] when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.

Motivation

The goal of this document is to provide technical details about on-chain access control for Ocean Protocol.

In the Ocean network, entities, individuals and organizations face the challenge of effectively managing their resources on-chain. With the advent of outsourcing data, the need for verifiable access control through public blockchains is dramatically increasing.

Design Requirements

Ocean's on-chain access control SHOULD provide the following responsibilities:

  • Verifiable On-Chain Access Control.
  • Accountability (bad actors abusing the system)
  • Ease of integration and backward compatibility with existing authentication frameworks
  • Unlinkability and anonymity of users' transaction
  • Expose on & off-chain interfaces for access control

Introduction

In this section, we list key technologies that will be used as building blocks in order to develop on-chain based access control for ocean. You can skip this introductory part if you already familiar with Json Web Token, Json Resource Descriptor, and OAuth 2.0 Flow.

Json Web Token

Json Web Token (JWT) is used to represent claims securely between parties. It could be stored on local storage. It uses Open Standard RFC7519. The key point is that every token is digitally signed by the issuer (resource owner) using different supported schemes such as RSA, ECDSA, HMAC. The json is stored in an encoded form such as Base64URL where it is easy to be verified by the authorization server. The JWT is fully compatible with OAuth 2.0 standard.

Use Cases

The primary use cases we are tackling initially are authorization, and the information exchange of claims. Authorization could be conducted in the case that a user is authenticated, with a resource owner including this token for each request sent to the client. Also, the token could be used for information exchange where JWT uses pub/priv key pairs to sign claims as shown below.

JWT Structure:

JWT structure includes three components:

  • Header:

This part includes the name of the hashing algorithm and the type of token itself. It includes the name of the hashing algorithm due to the wide range of hashing algorithms, so we don't know which one exactly will be used by the authorization server.

{
  "alg": "HS256", // hashing algorithm
  "typ": "JWT"   // type of the token
}
  • Payload:

This part includes all claims that the authorization server will provide for access in the future. There are three types of claims. The first one is a Registered Claim . It is not a mandatory, but it is preferably included. A Registered Claim's section has the following items:

- "iss" (Issuer) Claim
- "sub" (Subject) Claim
- "aud" (Audience) Claim
- "exp" (Expiration Time) Claim
- "nbf" (Not Before) Claim
- "iat" (Issued At) Claim
- "jti" (JWT ID) Claim

The second type of claim is called Public Claim, which is basically any claim that could be either registered in IANA "JSON Web Token Claims" registry or any other public name, but it must be a collision resistant name.

Finally, the last type of claim is a Private Claim where any claim could be used by the Consumer and Supplier (shared between parties).

An example for payload:

{
  "sub": "1234567890",
  "name": "John Smith",
  "admin": true
}
  • Signature:

A Signature is a verifiable way for the authorization server to prove that it signed the token. The Signature includes the header and payload as shown below:

HMACSHA256(
  base64UrlEncode(header) + "." +
  base64UrlEncode(payload),
  secret)

For instance, the below figure shows how to add more claims such as Cross-site request forgery or CSRF token. This token is meant to be used by the server in order to trust only requests that have a specific token. For example if an attacker tricked a victim into using a fake login page, the server will only accept the request if this login page has a token issued by its web framework.

csrf

For more information check out this article introduction to JWT.

Json Resource Descriptor

Json Resource Descriptor or JRD is a standard which is based on Extensible Resource Descriptor. It has been used as a metadata description for resources on the web where a discovery service such as WebFinger could be used to return public information published about an account, organization, or entity. JRD has the following components:

  • expires
  • subject
  • aliases
  • properties
  • links

An example for JRD:

{
  "subject" : "acct:jsmith@myapp.com",
  "properties" :
  {
    "http://myapp.com/ns/name" : "John E. Smith"
  },
  "links" :
  [
    {
      "rel" : "http://webfinger.net/rel/profile-page",
      "href" : "http://www.myapp.com/people/jsmith/"
    },
    {
      "rel" : "http://myapp.com/rel/blog",
      "type" : "text/html",
      "href" : "http://www.myapp.com/people/paulej/blog/",
      "titles" :
      {
        "en-us" : "John Smith's Blog"
      }
    }
  ]
}

You can find more details about JRD RFC6415.

OAuth 2.0 Flow

The following Figure describes the flow of OAuth 2.0:

Oauth Flow

source: Protocol flow

OAuth Actors & Components:

The following is a list of the actors and components necessary for the provisioning of OAuth:

  • Client: Any app or service the resource owner (as a user) wants to grant for access to private information.
  • Authorization Server: The server that will generate the access token for client.
  • Authorization Grant: Granting of permission.
  • Access Token: The token that will be used for the client to gain access.
  • Scope: The scope includes what type of data client will be able to access i.e. profile, contacts.
  • Resource Owner: Anyone who has the right to share the data.
  • Resource Server: Where the actual data is stored or held.
  • Redirect URI: The link that the authorization server uses to send the authorization code to the client.
  • Consent: The message you get from the authorization server.
  • Front Channel: This channel runs in the browser level.
  • Back Channel: This is a more secure channel where communication will be between the authorization server and client in order to share the access token.

Find here more information about the OAuth2.0 terminology.

OAuth 2.0 protocol is not designed for Authentication, but mainly for Authorization. It provides a a delegated authorization mechanism in which a client (myapp.com) could have access to private information, such as a contacts list, by delegating the authorization method to another third party called the Authorization Server. The Authorization Server will then return a consent to the resource owner in order to get acceptance/rejection of the request. If accepted, the Authorization Server will use the redirect URL to send the authorization code. The client will then use the authorization code to get the access token through the back channel.

Key Technologies

This survey below provides a list of projects that provide on- and off-chain identity management. We are planning to use this list (though it is not exhaustive) to inform our decision making process on what to leverage within Ocean. The following table lists some of them:

identity projects

For more information check out this List of Blockchain based Identity Management systems.

You can find the curated list of these projects here keytechnologies.md. It has a detailed description about Jolocom IMS, Blockstack IMS, Permissioned Blocks, Consensys UPort, DID Project, Kimono Secret Sharing, Secret Store Parity, and WebID OIDC

Access Control Components

This section shows the key components that will be used to build the Access Control method(s) in Ccean. As shown in the below figure, the current scenario for Ccean's Access Control is trying to provide an analogous solution to similar, traditional Access Control systems:

oauth-ocean

With traditional access control mechanisms, one of the most popular Web standards is OAuth2.0. It is used as a means of authorization delegation in modern applications. On the other hand, a blockchain does not have the third party (trusted party) which can operate as an authorization authority. However, smart contracts act as a single source of truth. In Ocean's case, the access control contract currently uses Web3 on top of the Ethereum blockchain, instead of using the HTTP/HTTPS protocol.

Resource

The Ocean Resource uses something similar to the Json Resource Descriptor or JRD object. It is based on Key/Value pairs that include the following sections:

- Subject
- Properties
- Expiration

For instance the below json is a sample resource description:

{
  "subject" : "resource_id@provider_address",
  "properties" :
  {
    "name" : "1000Genome_dataset_snp_genotyping",
    "links": {
          "dataset1" : "ftp://ftp.1000genomes.ebi.ac.uk/vol1/ftp/sample1.tree",
          "dataset2" : "ftp://ftp.1000genomes.ebi.ac.uk/vol1/ftp/sample2.tree"
    },
    "size": "OPTIONAL",
    "endpoint": "https://myprovider.com/service/endpoints",
    "description": "resource description",
    "sla": "service level agreement reference",
    "permissions": {
            "read": true,
            "write": false,
            "create": false,
            "update": false,
            "delete": false
    },
    "medata": "metadata reference in marketplace",
    "response_type": "expected response type (singed url, ssh keys, OTP, etc)"
  },
  "expires": "date in seconds"
}

And the Resource Identifier is hash(JRD) = 2BEDD341F1851A9C9DE53F1A1A9CBA5AABC9BE299734886316868FE139E3033B . Also, notice endpoint that enables the user to discover public information about the resource publisher/supplier and how to consume it. You will find here more information about entity discovery details from Google Entity OpenID.

Resource Consent

Resource Consent represents a signed commitment by the resource owner in order to deliver access in the future. The consent itself should be public for everyone to verify, in the future, that this consent is hashed and signed by the resource owner. It includes the following data:

- Resource Id
- Policies and Permissions
- Service Level Agreement
- Availability 
- Current Timestamp (in seconds)
- Expiration Time (in seconds)
- Discoverable link (this is for internal authorization server configuration)
- Timeout (defined by access control contract).

The Policy should be mentioned in the metadata. The Policy might include more advanced features such as updating asset metadata, modifying permissions and privilege grants.

The idea behind Resource Consent is to provide a resource owner with the ability to accept/reject based on its resource capacity planning.

An example for access policy:

{
  "id": "${PROVIDER_PUBLIC_ADDRESS_HASH}policies:${CONSUMER_PUBLIC_ADDRESS_HASH}",
  "subjects": [
    "${PROMISE_ID}${CONSUMER_PUBLIC_ADDRESS_HASH}"
  ],
  "effect": "allow",
  "resources": [
    "${RESOURCE_ID}"
  ],
  "actions": [
    "READ"
  ]
}

Justified Purchase Receipt

Once the user has a resource consent, the user is then able to get a Justified Purchase Receipt. This receipt includes:

- Receipt ID: receipt number
- From: consumer address hash
- Amount: amount of locked tokens
- Locked: True
- To: resource owner address hash
- Sig: consumer signature (signing this purchase receipt)
- Resource_id: Resource identifier
- Promise: Resource promise
- Date: timestamp
- AccessExpireDate: timestamp + expire in seconds

This receipt is issued by the Ocean's Market contract which implements the escrow payment mechanism in Ocean Protocol.

Request Identifier

Request Identifier is a unique identifier for each resource request. This identifier is generated by Ocean access control contract. The identifier is generated using the information below:

- Resource id
- Consumer address 
- Provider address
- Consumer temp public key 

The Ocean's Access Control Contract will send this request identifier to the resource owner, which, in turn, will generate the JWT, as the JWT has the request identifier claim.

JWT Token

The Json Web Token, as mentioned before, is used as a means of representing claims securely between parties. For instance, the below json shows an example of a JWT issued by a resource owner for particular consumer.

//Header
{
  "alg": "HS256",
  "typ": "JWT"
},
//Payload
{
  "iss": "resourceowner.com",
  "sub": "WorldCupDatasetForAnalysis",
  "iat": 1516239022,
  "exp": 1526790800,
  "consumer_pubkey": "Consumer Public Key",
  "temp_pubkey": "Temp. Public Key for Encryption",
  "request_id":"Request Identifier",
  "consent_hash":"Consent Hash",
  "resource_id": "Resource Identifier",
  "timeout": "Timeout comming from AUTH contract",
  "response_type": "Signed_URL",
  "resource_server_plugin": "Azure",
  "service_endpoint": "<myserver>/cosume/",
  "nonce": "<token_hex(32)>",
},
//Signature
HMACSHA256(
  base64UrlEncode(header) + "." +
  base64UrlEncode(payload),
  Resource_owner_secret
)

And the encoded version of JWT:

eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJpc3MiOiJyZXNvdXJjZW93bmVyLmNvbSIsInN1YiI6Ildvc
mxkQ3VwRGF0YXNldEZvckFuYWx5c2lzIiwiaWF0IjoxNTE2MjM5MDIyLCJleHAiOjE1MjY3OTA4MDAsImNvbnN
fcHVia2V5IjoiMHhmYjkwMjhiNTk0MDFhMjAwZmY4MmZhNTUwYTI5MmNlMGFiMmVlZWVjIiwiY2hhbGxlbmdlX
2lkIjoiYzk5OGQ0OTA2ZjUxZWUwNjc3YWVkYTE4MjhjZmNmMTcxYzg4YmRjNmQzNWNhZiIsInBlcm1pc3Npb25
zIjp7InJlYWQiOnRydWUsIndyaXRlIjpmYWxzZX19.R96vtPzTQ59qc2YR9f_uMonxuF2c5bU3ftPHm6k9HP8

You can see that the parts are separated by dot(.). Check out this section for more details about Json Web Token. Also, notice that the JWT contains two important claims: the first is the consumer public key; the second is the request identifier issued by Ocean Access Control contract: "cons_pubkey", "request_id" . These claims state that the Authorization Server (off-chain server) is aware of what is happening on-chain. There is absolutely no way to deny it!

Service Level Agreement

An Ocean Service Level Agreement is a publicly accessible and immutable agreement that includes a detailed description of the service quality, availability, responsibilities, etc. The supplier imports an immutable IPFS hash reference for the SLA in the commitment.

Commitment

In order for a commitment to be authentic, it should include an encrypted JWT (committed by the Supplier) and purchase receipt (committed by Consumer). The current implementation puts the JWT in an encrypted form on-chain which will be changed to be more secure pattern in the next release implementation.

Temp Encryption Keys

A temporary keypair is meant to be used as a cryptographically secure tool in order to share secrets (ie. JWT) between parties. It is generated on the fly by the Consumer Ocean client. Even if an attacker managed to steal the temp private key (i.e. by brute-forcing keys using weak encryption schemes) in order to reveal the JWT, the resource owner (Supplier) will only accept signed JWT by the consumer (stored in the Commitment).

Generate and Revoke Keypairs

Generating temporary keypairs should include the revocation certificates where the expiration date of these keys will be the same as AccessExpireDate field in Resource Consent. As a consumer you should never share private keys or revocation certificates to any one. In the case that a private key is compromised, the revocation certificate should be used to revoke the key. At this time, if the encrypted JWT is not committed, the Consumer can revoke the whole contract and refund the payment by calling revoke function.

Finalized Purchase Receipt

This receipt is the same justified purchase receipt except it should be signed by the two parties: the Resource Owner and Consumer. It will be issued as proof for delivery, where the Consumer and Provider commits to the delivery of the resource. This final state of access control triggers the Ocean market contract to pay back the Resource Owner. The market contract then issues the finalized receipt once the delivery of the resource is consumed. This requires that the Provider deliver a signed message by the Consumer (sign(enc(JWT)by_consumer) in order to release the payment.

Access Control Flow

The following steps describe the Access Control Workflow:

proposal

The flow is composed of three phases:

  • Request Resource phase
  • Consent and Commit phase
  • Delivery and Verification phase

Phase 1: Request Resource

In this phase, the Consumer and Provider work on generating the initial agreement as follows:

  • Consumer generates temp public/private keys, then calls an initialAccessRequest which in turn emits an event RequestAccessConsent.
  • The Provider will listen to this event and generate the corresponding resource consent.

Phase 2: Commit Phase

  • This phase implements the provider commitment by calling CommitAccessRequest including the final resource consent.
  • The Consumer listens to CommitmentConsent Event which indicates the acceptance of the Provider for delivering the resource. Consequently, the Consumer will call sendPayment in the market contract in order to issue a justified purchase receipt.
  • Finally, The Provider listens to ConsumerCommitedPayment in order deliver the access tokens.

Phase 3: Delivery Phase

  • The Provider generates and encrypts jwt using the Consumer's temp public key and sends it back to the consumer by calling deliverAccessToken.

  • The Consumer will be signalled by listening to PublishEncryptedAccessToken event. Next, the Consumer will
    decrypt jwt and make a call consumeResource off-chain to the Provider using discovery url.

  • The Provider should receive signedEncJWT, verify the signed message and JWT, and then generate a response based on the response type and the internal resource server, returning the expected output.

  • Finally, the Provider sends signedEncJWT as a proof-of-access to Auth.sol in order to verify the delivery of the access token by calling verifyAccessTokenDelivery, from which the contract will verify the signed message and send a release payment signal to the market.sol contract.

Interfaces

Access Control Contract

pragma solidity 0.4.24;

import '../OceanMarket.sol';


contract OceanAuth {

    // marketplace global variables
    OceanMarket private market;

    // Sevice level agreement published on immutable storage
    struct AccessAgreement {
        string accessAgreementRef;  // reference link or i.e IPFS hash
        string accessAgreementType; // type such as PDF/DOC/JSON/XML file.
    }

    // consent (initial agreement) provides details about the service availability given by the provider.
    struct Consent {
        bytes32 resourceId;                   // resource id
        string permissions;                 // comma sparated permissions in one string
        AccessAgreement accessAgreement;
        bool isAvailable;                     // availability of the resource
        uint256 startDate;                  // in seconds
        uint256 expirationDate;                     // in seconds
        string discovery;                   // this is for authorization server configuration in the provider side
        uint256 timeout;                    // if the consumer didn't receive verified claim from the provider within timeout
        // the consumer can cancel the request and refund the payment from market contract
    }

    struct AccessControlRequest {
        address consumer;
        address provider;
        bytes32 resourceId;
        Consent consent;
        string tempPubKey; // temp public key for access token encryption
        bytes encryptedAccessToken;
        AccessStatus status; // Requested, Committed, Delivered, Revoked
    }

    mapping(bytes32 => AccessControlRequest) private accessControlRequests;
    enum AccessStatus {Requested, Committed, Delivered, Revoked}
    
    // @modifiers and access control
    modifier isAccessRequested(bytes32 id) {
        require(accessControlRequests[id].status == AccessStatus.Requested, 'Status not requested.');
        _;
    }
    modifier isAccessCommitted(bytes32 id) {
        require(accessControlRequests[id].status == AccessStatus.Committed, 'Status not Committed.');
        _;
    }
    modifier onlyProvider(bytes32 id) {
        require(accessControlRequests[id].provider == msg.sender, 'Sender is not Provider.');
        _;
    }
    modifier onlyConsumer(bytes32 id) {
        require(accessControlRequests[id].consumer == msg.sender, 'Sender is not consumer.');
        _;
    }

    // @events
    event AccessConsentRequested(bytes32 _id, address _consumer, address _provider, bytes32 _resourceId, uint _timeout, string _pubKey);
    event AccessRequestCommitted(bytes32 _id, uint256 _expirationDate, string _discovery, string _permissions, string _accessAgreementRef);
    event AccessRequestRejected(address _consumer, address _provider, bytes32 _id);
    event AccessRequestRevoked(address _consumer, address _provider, bytes32 _id);
    event EncryptedTokenPublished(bytes32 _id, bytes _encryptedAccessToken);
    event AccessRequestDelivered(address _consumer, address _provider, bytes32 _id);

    //
    constructor(address _marketAddress) public {
       
    }

    // 1. Access Request Phase
    function initiateAccessRequest(bytes32 resourceId, 
                                   address provider, 
                                   string pubKey, 
                                   uint256 timeout) 
    public returns (bool)     {
      
    }

    // 2. commit phase
    function commitAccessRequest(bytes32 id, 
                                 bool isAvailable, 
                                 uint256 expirationDate, 
                                 string discovery, 
                                 string permissions, 
                                 string accessAgreementRef, 
                                 string accessAgreementType)
    public onlyProvider(id) 
    isAccessRequested(id) 
    returns (bool) {
       
    }

    function cancelAccessRequest(bytes32 id) public isAccessCommitted(id) onlyConsumer(id) {
       
    }

    // 3. Delivery phase
    
    function deliverAccessToken(bytes32 id, 
                                bytes encryptedAccessToken) 
    public onlyProvider(id) 
    isAccessCommitted(id) 
    returns (bool) {
        
    }
     

    // provider uses this function to verify the signature comes from the consumer
    function verifySignature(address _addr, 
                             bytes32 msgHash, 
                             uint8 v, 
                             bytes32 r, 
                             bytes32 s) 
    public pure returns (bool) {
        
    }

    // provider verify the access token is delivered to consumer and request for payment
    function verifyAccessTokenDelivery(bytes32 id, 
                                       address _addr, 
                                       bytes32 msgHash, 
                                       uint8 v, 
                                       bytes32 r, 
                                       bytes32 s) 
    public 
    onlyProvider(id) 
    isAccessCommitted(id) 
    returns (bool) {
       
    }

    // verify status of access request
    function verifyCommitted(bytes32 id, 
                             uint256 status) 
    public view returns (bool) {
        
    }

}
    

Market Contract

   struct Payment {
        address sender;       // consumer or anyone else would like to make the payment (automatically set to be msg.sender)
        address receiver;     // provider or anyone (set by the sender of funds)
        PaymentState state;   // payment state
        uint256 amount;       // amount of tokens to be transferred
        uint256 date;         // timestamp of the payment event (in sec.)
        uint256 expiration;   // consumer may request refund after expiration timestamp (in sec.)
    }
    
    enum PaymentState {Locked, Released, Refunded}
    mapping(bytes32 => Payment) mPayments;  // mapping from id to associated payment struct
    
    // @events
    event PaymentReceived(bytes32 indexed _paymentId, address indexed _receiver, uint256 _amount, uint256 _expire);
    event PaymentReleased(bytes32 indexed _paymentId, address indexed _receiver);
    event PaymentRefunded(bytes32 indexed _paymentId, address indexed _sender);


    // @modifiers
    modifier isLocked(bytes32 _paymentId) {
        require(mPayments[_paymentId].state == PaymentState.Locked, 'State is not Locked');
        _;
    }
    modifier isAuthContract() {
        require(msg.sender == authAddress, 'Sender is not authorization contract.');
        _;
    }

    
    constructor(address _tokenAddress, address _tcrAddress) public {
      
    }

    
    // the sender makes payment
    /* solium-disable-next-line */
    function sendPayment(bytes32 _paymentId, 
                         address _receiver, 
                         uint256 _amount, 
                         uint256 _expire) 
    public 
    validAddress(msg.sender) 
    returns (bool) {
        ...
    }

     // the consumer release payment to receiver
    function releasePayment(bytes32 _paymentId) 
    public isLocked(_paymentId) 
    isAuthContract() returns (bool) {
       ...
    }

    // refund payment
    function refundPayment(bytes32 _paymentId) 
    public isLocked(_paymentId) 
    isAuthContract() returns (bool) {
        ...
    }

    // utitlity function - verify the payment
    function verifyPaymentReceived(bytes32 _paymentId) 
    public view returns (bool) {
        ...
    }

Threat Models

This section lists the expected threat models for Access Control. The current threat models exclude the problem of data integrity in terms of data quality and validation (this is intended to be handled by service integrity proofs and curation markets). However there are some expected attacks to be discussed:

Censorship Attacks

Usually, smart contracts in public blockchains expose all the transactions to be publicly verifiable. This will allow any attacker to correlate the generated transactions in order to track the consumer's activity. So, in order to preserve the consumer's privacy, it may be necessary to include one of the following technologies in the Access Control Layer:

  • Zero Knowledge Proofs: such as ZKSNARK (it needs trusted setup), ZKSTARK, and BulletProofs. We can see the potential behind zero knowledge based proofs especially when it comes to confidential transactions. For more information about implementation, please see BulletProofs-lib, LibSTARK.
  • Generalized State Channels: This idea was introduced in Bitcoin. It calls for payment channel to be used for micropayments. In general, a state channel is way to outsource the state transition where the state is locked using a multisig contract, then outsourced to an off-chain channel (where the transaction processing will be done), and finally unlocked by updating the state on-chain. There are currently two main research branches that are investigating more advanced techniques: Counterfactual: Generalized State Channels and Pisa: Arbitration Outsourcing for State Channels.

Fake and Delayed Access

The following type of attack was inspired by Dimi's research guide for ocean. It includes different byzantine based attacks on the Access Control Layer. For example, access delay might be a result of different scenarios:

  • If the consumer was granted an access to any arbitrary resource, but he never made the request. At this time, a resource owner has the right to revoke access after AccessExpireDate where it is already predefined in the resource. For more info checkout justified purchase receipt. You can find more details about different case scenarios

delayed attacks

  • If the Consumer is unable to get access to the resource, it should deliver the AccessErrorMessage that was received from resource owner, at which point the resource owner has to provide the signed JWT from the consumer, that will be considered as proof that a consumer already tried to access. However, this access token's validity may be in question, requiring that we will run OceanWittnessVerificationGame (Future Work). The same thing could happen in case of fake access. This type of attack should include Skin-in-the-game strategies in order to maintain committed approach by both the Consumer(s) and Supplier(s).

Replay Like Attack

In this attack we have two scenarios. The first scenario could happen if the Consumer tries to leak the signed JWT token to an adversary where they can run a replay attack and consume the resource twice. To handle this, First, the resource owner should signal the Ocean ACL contract, that he got the signed token (first time) and accept only one request (which is the first request) and report a replay attack to Ocean ACL contract.

replay attack

The second scenario is one in which the resource owner (Supplier) gets the signed token and sends it back to another adversary. In this case, we have two potential attacks. First, if the consumer received the reject message from the resource owner, the Consumer should report this to Ocean ACL contract. In the second case, if the Consumer did not receive a reject message and was able to consume the resource, then leaking signed token to adversary at this point does not make logical sense.

References