reproduction in the post-1974 generations, who depend upon collective memory alone for reconstructing the trauma. We argue that the "1974" cultural trauma commemorated in the suffering caused by the island's forced division has left indelible marks on the Greek Cypriot identity but at the same time, it has become the only lens through which Greek Cypriots refract their current concerns and future aspirations.

Constructing "1974" as Cultural Drama

As a *carrier group*, the collectivity of Greek Cypriots identifies "1974" as the affliction that permanently stigmatized their identity. Beyond the violence and deaths, the trauma of 1974 is interpreted as the drama of being a Greek Cypriot in the various permutations of an unstable national identity—Greek Cypriot, Cypriot, Turkish Cypriot—and the categorical uncertainty they ensue. On the one hand, 1974 emphasized the Greekness of the Greek Cypriot label through the perennial and largely mythologized Greek/Turkish opposition. On the other hand, it implicitly forced Greek Cypriots to focus on the Cypriotness of their identity by permanently giving up on the idea of union with Greece (*enosis*) and emphasizing instead the integrity and unity of the Republic of Cyprus which includes both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. The *nature of the pain* is routinely expressed as the pain of loss of ancestral homes (villages and family properties) and the uprooting caused by the forceful population movement of some 180,000 Greek Cypriots. Greek Cypriots *relate the victims of the trauma to a wider audience* by appealing to the violation of rights such as the right to property and the right of return. Given that refugees and relatives of missing or 'disappeared' persons are international categories, the cultural trauma of 1974 is constructed to be relatable at the human, not simply the ethnic level. The *attribution of responsibility* begins with locating Turkey as the state responsible for a military intervention that went beyond its constitutional right to protect Turkish Cypriots and instead occupied the northern part of the Republic of Cyprus.

This paper does not detail the historical and political developments that led to the construction of "1974" as a cultural trauma for Greek Cypriots, nor is our discussion is going to address the successful employment of the trauma narrative in various international institutional arenas—such as the UN, world press, the EU—in order to have this narrative gain wide international acceptance and nearly global legitimacy. Our aim is to examine its construction *within* the Greek Cypriot community itself, focusing in particular on everyday practices as well as institutional rituals and ceremonies that sustain its emotional impact for the past 35 years. Therefore, perhaps the first issue that needs to be tackled with regarding the applicability of cultural trauma theory in a case of inter-communal ethnic conflict such as Cyprus is to address the moral relativism implicit in the multitude of accounts that stress the extent to which each side's national narrative is implicated in the reproduction of memories (for example, Papadakis, 2003, 1998, 1993; Anastasiou, 2002; Cockburn, 2004; Cassia, 2006). That is, Greek Cypriots' suffering in the context of the 1974 invasion is traditionally contrasted to the inter-communal fights of 1963-64 and the suffering of Turkish Cypriots who were isolated into ethnic enclaves until the 1974 invasion when they resettled in the territory that was self-declared as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in 1983.

In fact, to the extent that cultural trauma is a key element in a group's master narrative its articulation is intertwined with the master narrative itself (Alexander, 2004). Narrativization itself then carries important repercussions for constructing a view of history, of group conflict and of the Other that can lead to the politics of mutual suspicion and to an increase in the possibility of future conflict (Rydgren, 2007). In essence such interpretations adopt an

instrumentalist view of culture, whereby symbolic struggles are merely an extension of real world power conflicts (Bourdieu, 1989; 1990).

From our viewpoint, however culture is constitutive and not simply instrumental to social life – and as such, there is simply no strict counterpart of "1974" in the experience of the Turkish Cypriot community. That should not be misleadingly interpreted as a negation of their suffering. It is a mere extension of the *gradual* nature of inter-communal separation for the Turkish Cypriots (versus its *abrupt* and *sudden* nature for the Greek Cypriots). It is also an extension of the fact that the establishment and commemorative rituals of the post-1983 TRNC cannot be viewed in strict correspondence to the post-1974 Republic of Cyprus. This is because of the different demographic developments in the post-1974 Greek and Turkish parts of the island: While in the Greek-Cypriot controlled Republic of Cyprus nativism has played a major role in determining citizenship, in the Turkish-Cypriot controlled TRNC more than 160,000 Turks from mainland Turkey were resettled, altering the demographic composition of its citizens[193]. To understand the specificity of cultural trauma, it is necessary to point out that, just like numerous other post-colonial societies, Cyprus is characterized by strong *nativism* (Anderson, 1991). Colonially constructed categories of "native Cypriots" operated as a means of re-inscribing the peasants' connections with their kinship groups – which to this date remain the main reference group among the island's natives – as well as with their original village (Loizos, 1975, 1981; Loizos and Papataxiarchis, 1991; Attalides, 1976)**.**

Finally, the major reason for applying cultural trauma theory in the case of "1974" is that Greek Cypriots did not have to interpret this event as cultural trauma – but as the inevitable consequence of the application of Greek and Turkish nationalist claims over the island. Dual partition was a possible outcome of the Cyprus issue even before the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960, and therefore in theory it would have been possible to interpret "1974" as the natural conclusion of this process. Therefore, our approach seeks to problematize "1974" and to view its construction as a process – and not as the result of a single event. Needless to say, the constructed nature of cultural trauma does not imply its fictionality—in the sense of the fantastic or imagined—neither does it foreclose the notion of an event that predictably results in pain and suffering. It emphasizes, however, the importance of attending to the socially mediated processes that translate suffering into a collective cultural trauma, the proportions of which extend beyond individual experience.

This means that suffering which is not personally experienced can be deeply traumatizing for the next generation or that violence and death can be interpreted as heroic and triumphant instead of traumatic. In the case of Cyprus, 1974 is not a cultural trauma for Turkish Cypriots who were also displaced from their towns and villages in the southern part of the island and relocated in the northern part of the island. Instead, the sense of displacement and relocation has given birth to a cultural trauma felt not only by those Greek Cypriots who personally experienced the events, but, as we shall show, even for Greek Cypriots born into families of internally displaced persons[194] (referred to in Greek as "refugee" families [*prosfyges*]). From

[193] According to the Republic of Cyprus Press and Information Office (PIO) the Turkish Cypriot population is estimated at 88,100 and settlers from Turkey at 162,000 (more information at http://www.moi.gov.cy/moi/pio/pio.nsf/a_problem_en/a_problem_en?OpenDocument). The official position of the TRNC does not differentiate between native Turkish Cypriots and settlers from Turkey (more information at http://www.trncinfo.com/eng/index.htm).

[194] According to the 1951 Geneva Convention and the 1967 Protocol those not forced to leave their country are described as 'internally displaced' people and not refugees. Given that the UNHCR describes their condition as a

a Greek Cypriot perspective, Turkish Cypriots could have identified with the trauma of 1974 because they were also displaced and suffered losses. Turkish Cypriot narratives, however, follow a different timeline that emphasizes the suffering caused in the 1963-64 inter-communal conflict that confined them in enclaves under constant fear of persecution (Papadakis, 2003; Bryant, 2008).

To understand this development, "1974" must be analyzed as a "horrendous event" (Alexander, 2004a) that stands as a rupture in time or, in the president's opening quote, as an event that overturned the "smooth course of time". Cultural traumas treat the painful historical event as a happening 'out-of-time' (Alexander, 2004b: 226). That suggests the trauma's unpredictable character as well as the inability to view the event as part of the ordinary course of time. For Greek Cypriots, the break from ordinary time and the rootlessness of their experience are two of the main factors that contributed to looking upon the events of 1974 as a cultural trauma. Both of these are directly attributed to forced relocation and a perceived break with tradition. We begin, therefore, by detailing the two major characteristics of the "1974" cultural trauma: the experience of *uprootedness* and the vision of a mythical *day of return*.

The metaphor of *uprootedness* is pervasive in the refugees' narratives of loss, denoting both the literal supplantation of a largely rural and agrarian population, as well as the centrality of the land in configuring identity (Loizos, 1981). As Bryant (2002) has argued, kinship with the land partakes of religious imagery in Cyprus and it represents another element of the metaphorical familial connections of nationalism that naturalize the relationship between the people and the nation. However, 1974 did not simply deprive refugees from homes, fields and orange groves; it also unsettled deep-seated cultural constructions of time and continuity that are uniquely exemplified in the agrarian rhythms of the land. This rupture in time, therefore, was both historical and cultural, with the use of chronology advancing the traumatic event into a symbol while signifying its magnitude in relation to the post-1974 epoch. Although we realize that 1974 does not carry the same international cultural capital as 9/11, our purposeful use of it in the title echoes its cultural significance in constructing a horrendous event that was beyond comparison with any other disastrous event in the island's history. In turn, Greek Cypriot narratives foster a nostalgic view toward the pre-modern pre-1974 status quo that leads to a nearly messianic expectation of restoring the lost grace of that era as part of the future. As Bryant (2008) notes, this is a point of divergence between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot readings of the past: while for Turkish Cypriot readings history reached a turning point in 1974, for Greek Cypriot readings, history remains to achieve its closure in the future – as part of a final settlement of the Cyprus issue.

The question of the unpredictability of 1974 as a horrendous event is also important in constructing it as cultural trauma. On the one hand, Greek Cypriot narratives of history often present 1974 as the epitome of the island's inescapable destiny in being successively occupied by different peoples (Christou, 2007). On the other hand, the question of responsibility or the issue of 'who started it' (see Smelser, 2004) can expose deep ideological rifts in the Greek Cypriot

---

'refugee-like situation' (see Zetter, 1994) the term refugee—along with its connotations of social status and identity—has prevailed in Greek discourse. The Greek Cypriot refugees' plight has been aptly documented – including the documentary "Attilas 1974" by internationally renowned director Mihalis Kakogiannis, a native of Cyprus.

political landscape (Mavratsas, 1997; Papadakis, 1993; 1998). But in dominant commemorations of 1974, events are presented as a shock, as something that could not have been predicted or contained. Thus, the brutality of the *uprootedness* is established in its departure from the normal course of history, regardless of the political events that could have served as a warning. The president's reference to the 'treacherous coup' that preceded the Turkish invasion alludes to a controversial causality in which the military coup that overthrew the Greek government was linked to Greek Cypriot extremists' attempt against the Cyprus president's life which then precipitated the invasion events.

Furthermore, the longing for the *day of return* functions as a response to the suffering caused by the sudden uprooting and maintains a positive vision for the future. Despite tangible signs of adaptation in their new social and economic structures of exile, aided not only by various social provisions such as housing and health care but also by a largely supportive population of co-ethnics in the south, Greek Cypriot refugees have always maintained the hope that one day they will be allowed to return just as they were unexpectedly forced to leave (Loizos and Constantinou, 2007). Even after decades of 'protracted exile' this deep belief in the 'myth of return' (Zetter, 1999) is guided by a sense of inconceivable injustice perpetrated upon them and a metaphysical faith in divine justice.

For example, the Rotary Club of Nicosia – Salamis, one of the Rotary clubs of the island founded by internally displaced professionals from the city of Famagusta (currently in the occupied part) has enshrined the longing for a day of return in the prayer that precedes each club meeting:

> *Oh God, our Lord,*
> *We pray you bless this meeting and strengthen us in our deeds of love and benevolence. Also, our Lord, we ask you to deliver speedily our beloved country Cyprus from the sufferings of foreign aggression and grant that its indigenous population live in peace and security, praising thy holy name.*[195]

This yearning for the *day of return* is also evident in the discursive shifts in the post-1974 Greek Cypriot political rhetoric. Since the early 19th century Greek Cypriots had expressed a desire for *enosis* (union with Greece) which later prompted the corresponding Turkish Cypriot demand for *taksim* (partition) of the island. After 1974, however, the *enosis* demand was abandoned and any lingering sentiments for *enosis* that had been officially or unofficially expressed by Greek Cypriots were effectively silenced (Mavratsas, 1996, 1997; Attalides, 1979; Markides, 1977; Stamatakis, 1991). This was followed by the vision of a unified island where Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots would live in harmony. However, this supposedly harmonic pre-1974 reality clearly differs from the Turkish Cypriot experience which was punctuated by isolation. Regardless, Greek Cypriots abandoned the *enosis* vision in order to construct this mythical *day of return* that will heal the "1974" cultural trauma.

Furthermore, this myth of return is galvanized by the idealization of the pre-1974 period as the paradise of simple and blissful life (Zetter, 1994, 1999; Dikomitis 2004; Loizos, 1981). Greek Cypriot refugees—and, to a certain extend, all Greek Cypriots—describe the occupied

[195] http://www.rotary-cyprus.org/~nic-salamis/, retrieved March 25, 2009. The city of Famagusta (Ammochostos in Greek) used to be the largest city in pre-1974 Cyprus. Since the invasion, its Greek Cypriot inhabitants were displaced mainly to Nicosia, Larnaca and Limassol. The old part of the city was sealed off by the Turkish forces, and the city has become a ghost town.

areas as the most beautiful, scenic and picturesque part of the island. Just like it is not appropriate to speak ill of the dead, Greek Cypriots refrain from saying anything negative about the areas under occupation or even remembering negative occasions in those areas; except, of course, from the events of 1974. Nothing compares to a refugee's occupied home: everything before 1974 was good, everything after, is bad (Loizos and Constantinou, 2007). This has burdened the idea of return with unrealistic expectations. As Zetter (1999: 6) has pointed out: "What is mythologized, is what has been left behind and what, it is hoped, return will accomplish—the belief that 'home', both as a material and symbolic entity, can be restored as it was before exile".

The mythological status of a 'day of return' that would uplift the rootlessness of modernity has also contributed to the elevation of those "left behind" (that is, those who did not leave their houses in order to move to the southern part of the island) into a special symbolic status. These are referred to as "enclaved" *[englovismenoi]* Greek Cypriots who have become emblems of the resistance against uprooting. Their everyday struggle is commended and commemorated officially by the state and unofficially in the media and other sites of cultural production. Appealing to the European Court of Human Rights, the Republic of Cyprus government achieved a vote which condemned Turkey for 14 violations of the European Convention of Human rights, 7 of which refer to the living conditions of the "enclaved" Greek Cypriots (*Cyprus Versus Turkey*, application no.25781/94, May 10 2001).

Into the Mundane: Everyday Rituals of "1974"

Cultural traumas are established with the identification of a horrendous event and solidified through commemorative practices that transform the event into personal and collective memory. In this section we aim to show how this trauma is experienced through the discursive, representational and institutional practices that established the commemoration of those events not simply as an *annual ritual* but as *an everyday routine* that ritualizes the very act of remembering the trauma. In a multitude of sites that range from official ones – such the Republic of Cyprus' educational system or state legislation– to unofficial ones – such as the refugee associations and kinship groups – the trauma of 1974 has been constructed not as a historical event but as a present day trauma that derives its urgency from an unresolved political problem.

The Greek Cypriot educational system has significantly contributed to the ritualization and routinization of "1974" through the cross-curricular goal of the "I don't forget" *(Den Ksechno)* objective. The slogan "I don't forget" was originally created by writer and advertising director Nikos Dimou, on the very day of the Turkish military intervention in 1974. Succinct and solemn, and accompanied by a visual image of a bleeding island (see image below), it became the symbol of the invasion trauma (see http://www.ndimou.gr/kypros_gr.asp). It has been since duplicated in numerous official and unofficial sites both in Greece and the Republic of Cyprus as a visual representation of commemoration and resistance and it is by far the most successful visual image that has enshrined the notion of "1974" as a trauma at the level of popular culture.

The presence of the 'I don't forget' logo in schools complements a cross-course educational goal of transferring the traumatic memory of "1974" to the new generation. Whereas there is no particular course devoted to the 1974 events, the whole curriculum, from kindergarten to the last year of Lyceum (ages 4-17) is infused with references to the problem of occupation. A familiar ritual in Greek Cypriot schools every September is the decoration of classrooms with landscape pictures of the northern occupied areas of the island and the distribution of student workbooks that feature these locations on the cover. The phrase "I don't forget and I struggle" is inscribed prominently on classroom boards as teachers hang the pictures on the walls and identify on the Cyprus map the location of northern occupied villages and cities. The principals' welcoming remarks and the Minister's address to all students that is read on the first school assembly invariably include references to the problem of occupation in Cyprus and the desire to return to these areas and reunify the island. For example, in 2006 the Minister wrote: "In these difficult conditions of the 21st century world, our homeland is waging its own struggle to achieve, through peaceful means, the liberation of our occupied areas that have been under the foot of the Turkish Attila [Turkish army] for the past 32 years."[196] In 2008 the Minister's address included similar remarks: "Unfortunately, this new school year finds Cyprus divided by occupation. I hope that this will be the last year." [197]

Educators seize every opportunity to bring up references to the problem of occupation, whether talking about Arbor Week—references to the natural resources of the occupied part—or Easter Week—the occupation of Cyprus compared to Christ's persecution and crucifixion. The "I don't forget" objective is registered as the primary goal 'under emphasis' every new school year and it saturates all aspects of the curriculum by functioning not as a distant historical event but as a current cultural issue that has touched the lives of all Greek Cypriots. Essay competitions and art exhibits regularly call students to narrate and illustrate the suffering of 1974: students write about the beauty of the occupied villages and the pain and longing of refugees; they draw picturesque landscapes of the areas they have not visited and portray the suffering of the mothers of the missing persons.

The focus of this curricular goal is decidedly emotional rather than anything related to the specific events preceding or following the 1974 Turkish invasion. In fact, teachers avoid any references to episodes around the Turkish invasion that may taint this monochromatic view of history and they steer clear of any references to 'dangerous memories' that may challenge the view that Greek Cypriots were the absolute victims of the island's recent history (Christou, 2007). School fieldwork studies have documented the nature of the "I don't forget" curriculum that narrates suffering only from a Greek Cypriot perspective and serves to maintain stark contrasts between 'Us' and 'Others' (Spyrou, 2001; 2002; Philippou, 2005; Christou, 2006). This construction of the absolute evil and the absolute victim is a necessary step in the assembly of a tragic narrative that becomes an iconic event of suffering for a social group (Alexander, 2004b).

Thus, "1974" is educationally re-enacted as a cultural trauma through narrative, aesthetic and religious performances that routinize an exceptional event into an everyday recurrent experience for all Greek Cypriots. It could be argued that the "I don't forget" objective is a paradoxical, if not an impossible goal: It demands that new generations identify with the memory and the suffering of events not personally experienced. But it is precisely this paradox that makes "1974" an exemplary cultural trauma – for it has to a large extent succeeded in imparting its

[196] From http://www.schools.ac.cy/dde/circular/data/Doc5039.pdf, retrieved April 10, 2009
[197] From http://www.schools.ac.cy/dde/circular/data/Doc7390.pdf, retrieved April 10, 2009

emotional impact to younger generations. Even though students' reactions to the "I don't forget" curriculum can range from a sense of obligation to the concern that the larger society is not identified with the trauma anymore, the younger generation reflects on "1974" with a sense of sacred responsibility (Christou, 2006). As Alexander (2004a) argues, cultural traumas allow members of the wider public to participate in other people's pain and thus, create new avenues of social incorporation. This can also be seen in the transformation of the phrase from "I don't forget" in the 1970s and 1980s, to the most recent (1990s) "I don't forget and I struggle" or even in some cases "I know, I don't forget and I struggle"; clearly aimed at creating a clearer sense of identification with the cultural trauma.

The trauma of 1974 is evoked not only in the commemoration of the day of the 1974 invasion; a day that is commemorated by Greek Cypriot authorities as a sad anniversary and by Turkish Cypriot authorities as a day of deliverance, complete with a military parade and with the participation of state dignitaries from mainland Turkey. Rather, the presence of the 1974 trauma is strong and colors *all anniversaries* as such. A case in point is the celebration of March 25 – the anniversary of Greek independence that is promptly celebrated by Greek Cypriots as a celebration that marks their symbolic inclusion into the Greek nation. March 25 is both a religious and a secular national holiday for the day is also Annunciation Day in the Greek Orthodox calendar. It was originally selected to coincide with the anniversary of the 1821 Greek revolution for its potent symbolic character: the birth of Christ is but a metaphor for the birth of modern Greece (see Roudometof, 2005). What is of particular significance in the Cypriot context though and what marks off this celebration in Cyprus – as opposed to mainland Greece – is its strong connection to a *day of return* to the lost homelands. In March 25 2009, for example, in one of the speeches delivered in one of the churches of the Nicosia metropolitan area, the priest made explicit and clear-cut references to "1974". "We must endure" he said, "and keep our faith to God in order to go through these difficult times." Hope of return to "our ancestral homelands" should not be abandoned, and the faithful should hold fast to their belief that, with the help of God, this will be accomplished. [198] What is important here is evocation of such a *day of return* in the context of a completely unrelated national holiday – a striking connection gone unnoticed by Greek Cypriots but immediately visible to non-natives.

The same belief is manifested in the University of Cyprus' commemorations of March 25. Typical commemorative celebrations conclude with the signing of the Cretan folk song "Pote tha Kanei xasteria" (Πότε θα κάμει ξαστεριά). The folk song has gone through a native adaptation whereby its original place names have been replaced by references to the refugees' regions – Kerynia, the mountain of Pentadaktylus, Mofru and so on. In its reinterpretation the song goes as this:

«Πότε θα κάνει ξαστεριά,
πότε θα φλεβαρίσει,
να κατεβώ στον Όλυμπο,
στην έμορφη Κερύνεια
στη Μόρφου και στη Μεσαριά,
σ' όλη την Καρπασία
να δω τον Πενταδάκτυλο
να μου χαμογελάει..
Πότε θα κάνει ξαστεριά...»

[198] The quotes are based on participant observation by one of the authors.

How long till clear sky
How long until February comes around
To walk down from (Mt.) Olympus
To the beautiful Kerynia
To Morfu and Mesaria
To all of Karpasia
To see Pentadaktylus
Smile to me
How long till clear sky. . . [199]

Hence, in the context of a celebration unrelated to "1974" as such the event resurfaces in all its potency: Not only is the event forcefully altering the nature of the occasion in the Cypriot context (versus the March 25 celebrations within the Greek state) but it becomes the dominant point of reference in local discourse.

The cultural trauma of 1974 can further be identified in everyday rituals that attempt to symbolically reconstruct the lost home in the context of temporary refugee housing. When Greek Cypriot refugees fled from their homes in July and August of 1974 many believed that the military intervention would be temporary given that Turkey had attempted to intervene in Cyprus already since the 1960s. So, most refugees did not pack any belongings as they believed that they would return home in a matter of days. But when they narrate their experiences many years and decades after the event, Greek Cypriot refugees begin their stories by emphasizing the sudden and unforeseen displacement that forced them to leave without taking anything with them: "We left with nothing, just what we were wearing" is a common opening line. The meaning of 'nothing' in this phrase implies that the body is left exposed because of its dislocation from its context. According to Connerton (1989) the body is the main vehicle of habitual memory because through ritual bodily performances the collective shared history is transformed into a deeply personal experience. In this way, commemorative rituals exercise a bodily discipline that re-inscribes the event through the "mnemonics of the body" (Connerton, 1989: 9).

The refugees' rituals, therefore, often attempt to re-contextualize the body in the foreign environment: they build an identical fireplace as the one they had "back home" or plant an orange tree in their small backyard to take care of it as they used to do before becoming refugees. The refugees reclaim their lost past through everyday routines that maintain the traditional social bonds of the pre-1974 life (Zetter, 1999). These punctuate everyday conversations of Greek Cypriots and their stories are inevitably always connected to the cultural trauma of 1974. The reminders can be as mundane as the aroma of oranges—which, refugees are quick to say that they do not taste the same as the ones they grew back home—or as generalized as the bitterness of being the world's forgotten victims of human rights violations. Through these discursive and bodily performances of recollecting & symbolically reconstituting the occupied home and land, refugees and their families routinely evoke the horrendous event of 1974 and make it part of the routine of everyday life on the island.

Following the immediate events of the summer of 1974, and when it became apparent that return would not be easily achieved, a large number of refugee associations were established in the south—generally one association for every village or city. Not only do these associations

[199] Translation by the authors. There are numerous variants of this folk song. Within Greece, it is often related to hardcore Greek nationalist circles.

draw attention to the centrality of kinship structure and place of origin as cultural markers of membership, but they also serve the purpose of creating a geographical reference point to the lost land. All such communities have established refugee associations in the Greek-controlled post-1974 Republic of Cyprus. Their function is to keep the dispersed population in touch through religious and national celebrations, thereby maintaining a sense of origin and preventing dissolution of the original village unit. Refugees regularly attend the weddings and funerals of co-villagers wherever they may be taking place in the southern part of the island. Death notices in the newspaper, tombstones and wedding invitations always identify the family's origin in the occupied part followed by their current, 'temporary' residence (Zetter, 1994).

Furthermore, the post-1974 designation and institutionalization of the refugee label has created the conditions for the universalization of the refugees´ loss and the possibility that all Greek Cypriots could identify with the pain of uprootedness. That is, official legislation enacted on September 19, 1974 (Ministry Council decision 13.503) [200] specifies that a "refugee" is a person who before and up to July 1974 permanently resided in an area that is currently under Turkish occupation. The decision was amended in 1995 to include those who owned land and property in the occupied part even if their permanent residence at the time of the invasion was in the areas that remained under the control of the Republic of Cyprus. The legislation—accompanied by the bureaucracy of refugee identification cards and related documentation—has offered to refugees specific advantages such as, access to low cost government housing estates, financial aid for building a house or purchasing an apartment and renting allowances. Their status is inherited patrimonially—but not matrimonially—thereby reassuring the continued construction of generations of refugees for several decades after the event. Intermarriage further reassures that the refugee status is diffused throughout the Greek Cypriot community, and therefore its existence becomes part of the fabric of all Greek Cypriots—even for those who were not personally affected.

The *nature of the victim* is therefore not limited to the individuals directly affected by the invasion but is relayed as the generalized Greek Cypriot victim of Turkish military aggression. The president's opening quote comes from a speech given on Saint Charalambos' celebration—the patron saint of the occupied village of Kontea—that the Kontea refugees organized to commemorate the religious day. The president addressed the refugees by connecting the religious commemoration to the commemoration of 1974 and the struggle for solution to the Cyprus issue: "Today," he said, "Kontea celebrates its patron Saint Charalambos. But, the President went on, "Kontea also honors her children who were killed during the tragedy of 1974. […] Kontea does not forget and, in the endless bitterness of refugeehood and uprooting, it resists, it hopes and it anticipates."

It is plain that even after decades of "protracted exile" there is a strong sense of inconceivable injustice perpetrated upon the natives. This sense of injustice is coupled with a metaphysical faith in the possibility of divine justice to foster a deep-seeded belief in the 'myth of return' (Zetter, 1999). To understand *why* 1974 has been encoded as such a pervasive cultural trauma it is necessary to refer to the radical social, political and economic transformations of the second half of the 20th century. Following transition from British colonial status to the 1960 founding of the Republic of Cyprus, the island's economy functioned, for the first time, under the status of an independent state and slowly began to expand its agricultural and tourism sectors.

[200] More at http://www.mfa.gov.cy/mfa/mfa2006.nsf/All/5C42EAB55AEA9A5EC22571B0003E0AF5?OpenDocument, retrieved April 16, 2009.

The 1963-1974 interethnic conflicts and the Turkish Cypriots' withdrawal from the government fostered uncertainty but also increased the socio-economic gap between the two groups, with Greek Cypriots advancing more than Turkish Cypriots (Kedourie, 2005). The major and abrupt setback was the 1974 events that brought all major functions of the economy to a halt. Nicosia's airport, the only airport on the island at the time, was caught in the buffer zone between the two sides while a third of the population lost its entire livelihood means and the tourist industry's major hubs came under Turkish military occupation. For Greek Cypriots, this bode a future of dark economic times but with a steady stream of foreign aid the economy in the South recovered at an unprecedented rate during the 1980s—a development that has been dubbed as 'The Cyprus Miracle' (Christodoulou 1992). It is important to emphasize, however, that this was not the fate of the northern part of the island inhabited by Turkish Cypriots. The lack of an internationally recognized status caused the economy to suffer and development has been at a much slower rate. As a result, for Greek Cypriots who experienced these wild swings of personal and social misfortune, the pre-1974 reality has been the subject of romanticized post-1974 reconstructions and of the nostalgia expressed for a tradition unfettered by the problems and complications of the post-1974 modernization

Trauma Transmission: Facing the Challenges of Time

The intergenerational dynamics that weave narratives of loss and suffering in the context of the family are important sites in the construction of the 1974 cultural trauma. Cultural trauma theory examines the practices of collective memory production and transference to the next generation. Influenced by Durkheim's argument on the centrality of social and group realities that provide resonance and authority to collective representations (Fowler, 2005), Halbwachs' (1941/1992) groundbreaking work on collective memory posed that we recall, recognize and localize our memories in a societal context. An essential aspect of social solidarity, collective memory is located in the interrelations of groups such as the family or the social class. [201]

For Halbwachs the interests, concerns and problems of the present also shape collective memory. Greek Cypriot refugees' stories about the occupied part have been a perpetual connection between the past and the present. Second generation refugees, that is, those born to refugee families after 1974, grew up exposed to vivid accounts of the lost land and have adopted, to a large extend, a refugee identity (Hadjiyanni, 2002). First generation refugees have always expressed their collective anxiety for the erosion of the memory of the occupied land and they see their stories as a way to maintain alive the desire for return. These family narratives mediate symbolically between the past and the present and create meanings that connect parents and children (Hinchman and Hinchman, 1997). The telling of traumatic stories is a way of structuring

[201] The interdisciplinary surge of interest in memory studies is fueled both by events that have generated a 'commemorative fever' in the 1980s and 1990s but also by the booming of cultural artifacts (film, photography, internet media, artificial memory storage) that facilitate the collective processes of bringing the past into the present (Misztal, 2003). Huyssen (2003) argues that whereas 20th century nation states sought to monumentalize national history, today we witness a fascination with the processes of remembering and forgetting. Utopian visions of the future, the staple of the first half of the 20th century, have given way to the appeal of the past and what he calls a 'hypertrophy of memory'. This is evident in the rise of visual cultures of documenting and commemorating the past as well as architectural creations that monumentalize cultural traumas. For an overview of recent perspectives, see Roudometof (2007).

experience and producing meaning out of disparate or incomprehensible events (Ricoeur, 1988). Children of refugee families 'remember' the occupied part and identify with their parents' pain:

> *I saw a dream that Cyprus was, I saw the shape of Cyprus in the form of trees. […] And my mother told me that maybe when I was younger and I was listening about it all the time, I created a picture of it in my mind, so it wasn't a dream. But I believed that I saw it. I feel very strongly that I saw it. And my mother told me that this place was on route to Apostolos Andreas.* Nasia, 15 years old
> *During the summer when I see the orange trees, I remember the oranges of Ammochostos. Ore when we have the flower festival in Larnaca, I remember that we used to have the same in Ammochostos.* Maria, 16 years old
> *In our family gatherings, we talk about the invasion. And I hear how [my father] talks about the people who are lost and the people who were killed and I see him cry. And that's when you think, 'Why did they do this to us?' And no one cares about it. […] He talks about Kerynia where they sent all the soldiers and lined them up. It's difficult to know that you may lose your husband or your father or your child, your son.* Eleni, 16 years old[202]

Nasia, Maria and Eleni have never been to Apostolos Andreas or Famagusta (Ammochostos) or Kerynia but their 'memories' of the occupied areas sound as vivid as any personal account can be. In the first narrative, the dream is a surreal account of an experience that has not taken place and it symbolizes the metaphorical dream of return even if the return will only be a first experience for Nasia. The younger generation of refugees has internalized these memories to the extent that the word 'remember' is used in a way that collapses the limits between personal and collective memory. As these narratives saturate everyday family encounters, the younger generation is left with a heavy legacy of memory and the burden to realize the mythical return. Nevertheless, the second generation's emotional connection with their occupied homes is less identified with the idealization of the past and more with the idealization of a future where the restoration of the human rights of property and freedom of movement can finally materialize (Zetter, 1999).

On the other hand, the post-1974 economic realities on the island have conditioned different kinds of expectations for the new generation of Greek Cypriots. Cyprus became a member of the European Union in 2004, in an awkward agreement that recognizes suspension of EU law in the northern part of the island currently not under the control of the Republic of Cyprus. The 35-year-old shift from refugee tents to a booming economy is met with a collective Greek Cypriot pride for the hard-working ethic that paid off. Nevertheless, the new comforts became an uncomfortable reality that contradicts the need to maintain the 'fighting spirit' for a solution to the Cyprus problem (Christou, 2006). The younger generation exemplifies a materialist turn that, for the older generation, is at odds with the existential need to preserve this 'fighting spirit':

> *The new generation… grew up with more luxuries. They didn't go through the experience of being a refugee. They didn't have the experience of living in a tent and have the tent leak during the winter and you don't know where to sleep. We spent two months in a bus and we were sleeping on the seats—from my grandfather to the*

[202] Excerpts from interviews with children of refugee families, Christou (2002).

> *youngest child—two months! We are another generation. We went through this hardship. But… these kids are used to luxury and so they get used to easy money. And the parents give money too easily because they were deprived of it growing up.*[203]

The younger generation, therefore, is constructed as the promise of the nation and as a potential obstacle in maintaining the fight for return. In this sense, the cultural trauma depends on the strength of the intergenerational dynamic that sustains it. As already discussed in the previous section, the refugee family has been an important site for the commemoration and generational transference of the refugee trauma.

And yet, when compared to the generation that actually experienced coexistence with Turkish Cypriots, the younger Greek Cypriot generation is more inclined to show a preference for separation (for statistics, see Webster, 2005; Georgiades, 2007). The same generational pattern was also observed in the 2004 Annan Plan referendum with higher rates of negative Greek Cypriot votes by those born after 1974 compared to the previous generation (Webster, 2005). This was a paradox to many observers, as the evidence overturned simplistic accounts of collective conflict predicated upon personal animosity. From within the lenses of cultural trauma theory, though, the result simply registers the successful routinization and reproduction of "1974" as a cultural trauma. For the reader of the preceding pages, it should *not* come as a surprise that those who lack personal remembrance of the pre-1974 reality will be the least inclined toward inter-communal coexistence. How and under what circumstances can the "1974" trauma be left behind?

The normative implications generated by the routinization of the "1974" cultural trauma can also be seen in the events that challenge its educational primacy. For example, an August 2008 circular by the Ministry of Education identified the first goal of the new school year as follows: "The cultivation of a culture of peaceful coexistence, mutual respect and collaboration between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots with the goal of removing occupation and reuniting our homeland and our people."[204] For the first time since 1974, the Ministry's leadership outlined the vision of an educational system that nurtures a culture of reconciliation between the two main communities on the island; a goal that should be expected, especially given the fact that re-unification has been the explicit and expressed political goal of the Greek Cypriot community as well as the official position of the Republic of Cyprus. The circular however, caused heated reactions by teachers' unions which claimed that the already burdened curriculum cannot support an additional goal that may be difficult to implement. The elementary school teachers' union POED said that schools should not be forced to visit Turkish Cypriot institutions in the north and argued—as the head of POED claimed in an interview for a Greek television channel[205]—that such actions can 'confuse' 8-year-old children and hurt teachers' and parents' 'sensitivities'.

In an open letter to teachers the union pointed out that given the 'realities' in Cyprus, "the goal of 'I know, I don't forget and I struggle' remains a permanent objective under emphasis, to underscore the struggle of our educational system to liberate and reunite our homeland." Irony and blatant contradictions aside, it is important to note the language of emotional appeal—confusion, sensibilities—that registers a resistance to desecrate the cultural trauma by diluting its

[203] Excerpt from interview with a refugee mother (Christou, 2002).
[204] From http://www.schools.ac.cy/dde/circular/data/Doc7387.pdf retrieved April 17, 2009.
[205] The full 15 minute report on "Cyprus History Lessons" by Sky News can be found at http://www.skai.gr/master_avod.php?id=115439&cid=61569&bc=61569&lsc=1, retrieved March 29, 2009.

emotional strength. It also illustrates the compulsory return to the trauma drama (Alexander, 2004b) which emphasizes the possibility that "1974" or any cultural trauma could happen again.

In April 2003, the Turkish Cypriot leadership, under mounting popular pressure from the declining economic situation in the north, decided to lift the ban on movement across the Green Line. This meant that, for the first time in 29 years, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots would be able to visit the areas that were largely inaccessible to them. This almost surprising turn of events challenged not only existing understandings of the political will of the other side but also the supposedly shared comprehension of terms such as 'state' and 'authority' (Demetriou, 2007). Some cynical comments by Greek Cypriots in the early days contended that the Turkish Cypriot leadership's shrewd move served to politically elevate the appearance of 'good will' for a solution to the Cyprus problem while creating the conditions for Greek Cypriots to swallow the reality of division and thus eliminate the problem itself. The idea was that Greek Cypriots facing their dilapidated houses or entering them as visitors of new (Turkish) owners will give up on the hope of return and reunification of the island.

Crossing the Green line to visit the hitherto inaccessible northern part of the island was subject to a variety of interpretations. For some, outright refusal was the only dignified response because Turkish Cypriot authorities forced all those who wish to cross to display their ID papers. This turned natives into "tourists" to their own land (Dikomitis, 2005). Others, though, were moved more by material considerations, opting to cross the Green line in search of cheaper goods and services. To these two diametrically opposed interpretations, it is necessary to add a third and perhaps more widespread interpretation of crossing. For many Greek Cypriot refugees, crossing the buffer zone became an act of pilgrimage (Dikomitis, 2004. 2005). As Dikomitis (2004) points out, the refugees literally *moved* the earth by collecting water and soil to take back with them. Their visits to the occupied areas became a ritual of visiting their house, the church and the cemetery. They collected soil from the graves and anointed themselves with the water running at the center of the village. Parents came with children who have never seen their ancestral lands and who were told repeatedly of these lost territories.

Crossing the Green line entailed elements of sacralization of these territories which in turn maintained the mythologization of the island's occupied part. These visits were also short lived experiments that did not confirm expectations for a widening inter-communal relationship. Over time, the number of visits dropped significantly: Once visited, the promised lands of the north returned to their mythological status as an imaginary *topos* for Greek Cypriots.

This imaginary *topos* is not located solely in a different *space* but also in a different *time*. For example, in a newspaper article[206] titled 'Mores and Customs of Christmas and New Year: Nostalgia for Tradition' (December 27, 2009), a Greek Cypriot woman details the making of traditional sweets and the Christmas family rituals of the past. The woman and her husband reminisce the days when these customs were authentically practiced, when people were pure enough to appreciate their significance and poor enough to be grateful for a pair of pants and a piece of warm pastry. The opening lines set the narrative in the context of 'traditional grandmothers' of Paralimni who 'reminisce their childhood years and the festive days in Rizokarpaso, Varosi and Kerynia'. Without naming them as such, the article is situated in the nostalgia of older refugee women for the past—a pre-1974 past, rife with tradition and the virtues of simple life. The article ends with the following words:

[206] *Politis* newspaper, 27 December, 2009 at http://www.politis-news.com/cgibin/hweb?-A=843521&-V=archive&-w=HΘH@KAI@EΘIMA@&-P

> *Ms Androula, on the other hand, feels that as faithfully as she tries to preserve these customs she can never be as happy as she used to be in Karpasi* [occupied area]. *'I believe that refugeehood has left a bitterness inside us and it is difficult for us to be joyful and carefree like the old days', says Ms Androula expressing her grievance and wishing that warmth and peace can return to people's hearts, in a Cyprus that is free and reunited.*

Just like the president's talk professed a break from 'age-old habits and folkloric traditions' caused by the invasion, the article assembles a narrative of double-coded loss where the refugees' memories of the occupied part are the memories of tradition. Thus, the 1974 events are recounted as a break from tradition, the loss of innocence and the pain of losing both a home and a heaven of pure, authentic life. In this way, the occupied areas become a time capsule that holds not only the answer to happiness but also the solution to the crisis of identity, signified by the endangered traditions. Ms Androula laments the inability of the new generation to appreciate the laboring process of home-baked goods or the significance of a simple gift made with love. Even though she follows these customs with 'religious piety' in order to transfer tradition to her children and grandchildren, she also feels that in the current context of consumerism and material abundance it is difficult for anyone to experience the spirit of the good old days.

Conclusions

This paper begins with the assumption that the events of 1974 possess the potential but not the proof that their experience would be traumatizing. In other words, the cultural trauma of 1974 cannot be objectively deduced from an equation of suffering but it has to be understood through the social processes that construct an event as traumatic not only for the present but also for future generations. As we explain, there is no escape from "1974" in Cyprus even though the manifestations of its commemoration differ depending on which side of the buffer zone one is located. For Greek Cypriots who live in the southern part of the island, "1974" is a haunting cultural trauma that is impossible to ignore whereas for Turkish Cypriots the events of 1974 have concluded the process of inter-communal separation (see Bryant, 2008). In this paper, our objective has been confined to discussing the specificity of the Greek Cypriot cultural trauma.

We argued that for Greek Cypriots "1974" is a horrendous event that stands outside the scope of normal time. The articulation of the 1974 cultural trauma through the experience of *uprootedness* and the vision of a *day of return* is embodied in specific groups that have become emblematic of the trauma – these include the refugees, the missing persons and the "enclaved" in the north As ultimate symbols of the trauma drama, these groups have become collective agents of the trauma process (Alexander, 2004a) by bearing the burden of narrating the pain and thus by inviting members of the wider Greek Cypriot community to identify with them. By functioning as metaphors for return (Cassia, 2005) they register the emotional trauma through their liminal states of uprootedness, homelessness and dis-embodiment. Thus, they reiterate the exceptionality of the 1974 event even as they become the everyday, mundane symbols of it.

In the paper's second part, we further sought to illustrate how "1974" is reproduced, evoked, represented in everyday rituals, in practices unrelated and seemingly far removed from politics. In so doing we aimed to offer examples where trauma is experienced at the very level of the mundane –where cultural trauma theory's applicability has been questioned (Spillman,

2005). In this level, we see the routinization of trauma or its falling back into the background of social life. Its manifestations however continue to punctuate everyday conversations, practices and thoughts: Everything, from a presidential address to the watering of orange trees or the discursive and bodily practices and institutional routines (such as IDs and financial aid) that enshrine and reproduce the "refugee" label operate as constant reminders of the cultural trauma of "1974" on a daily basis. As such, these reminders become part of everyday routine, ritual and the taken – for – granted cultural *milieu* of the Republic of Cyprus. The identification of the post-1974 military occupation of part of the island with the loss of folkways and tradition in general universalizes the trauma beyond the loss of property and mirrors the two processes as one. As the occupied areas become emblematic of tradition, the invasion of 1974 is narrated as the invasion of modernity that unsettled people, mores and fundamental identity values. The pain of loss and the desire for return are, therefore, a cultural urgency for return to tradition.

But the trauma's hold is not restricted to the generation of those who have personally experienced the events of the summer of 1974. It extends to the totality of Greek Cypriots and most importantly to those who have been born after 1974 or who were too young to have personal memories of the events. Notwithstanding the religious undertones of a 'fall from Eden' the "return of the trauma narrative" is located in intergenerational dynamics that can only be understood as an all-consuming cultural framework, which refracts all societal changes in the prism of 1974. If life before the invasion is mythologized, the post-1974 context is vilified as national degeneration. For the older generation of Greek Cypriots "modern" is what came after 1974 and is what threatens the memory of tradition and fuels the desire of return.

While seemingly routine, the cultural trauma's intergenerational transmission remains contested and consequential. In fact, in the second and third sections of this paper, we argued that the focus of official remembrance – under the "I don't forget" slogan – has contributed to an extensive absorption into the collectivity's own suffering, even to the detriment of endorsing the goal of coexistence with the Turkish Cypriots in a future re-unified Cyprus. For the younger generations experience the trauma unconnected to personal memory and simply as a cultural construct, whereby its resolution can be sought only in a future settlement that would fulfill the Greek Cypriot national objectives. The emotional burden of the cultural trauma for Greek Cypriots, therefore, is so extensive that it raises the community's expectations of what would constitute an acceptable solution to island's political troubles. We dare say that any successful solution of the Cyprus issue would need to offer not only practical solutions for dealing with the island's problems of political governance but it would also need to heal the Greek Cypriots´ cultural trauma by restoring that community's "fall from grace".

References

Alexander, Jeffrey C. (2004a). "Toward a theory of cultural trauma." In Jeffrey C. Alexander, Eyerman, R., Giesen, B., Smelser, N.J., and Sztompka, R. (Eds.) *Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity*, pp. 1-30. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Alexander, Jeffrey C. (2004b). "On the social construction of moral universals: the 'Holocaust' from war crime to trauma drama." In Jeffrey C. Alexander, Eyerman, R., Giesen, B., Smelser, N.J., and Sztompka, R. (Eds.) *Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity*, pp. 196-263. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Anastasiou, Harry (2002). Communication across conflict lines: The case of ethnically divided Cyprus. *Journal of Peace Research*, 39 (5): 581-596.

Anderson, Benedict (1991) *Imagined Communities.* London: Verso (2nd edition).
Attalides, Michael (1976). Forms of peasant incorporation in Cyprus during the last century. *Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences*, 268: 363-378.
Attalides, Michael (1979) *Cyprus: Nationalism and International Politics*. Edinburgh: Q Press.
Bourdieu, Pierre (1989) "Social Space and Symbolic Power" *Sociological Theory* 7 (1) [Spring]: 14-25.
Bourdieu, Pierre (1990) *The Logic of Practice*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Bryant, Rebecca (2002). The purity of spirit and the power of blood: a comparative perspective on nation, kinship and gender in Cyprus. *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, 8: 509-530.
Bryant, Rebecca (2008). Writing the Catastrophe: Nostalgia and Its Histories in Cyprus. *Journal of Modern Greek Studies* 26 (2): 399-422
Cassia, Paul Sant (2005). *Bodies of Evidence: Burial, Memory and the Recovery of Missing Persons in Cyprus*. New York: Berghahn Books.
Cassia, Paul Sant (2006). "Guarding each other's dead, mourning one's own: The problem of missing persons and missing pasts in Cyprus." *South European Society and Politics*, 11 (1): 111-128.
Christodoulou, Demetrios (1992). *Inside the Cyprus Miracle: The labours of an embattled mini-economy.* Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press (Minnesota Mediterranean and East European Monographs).
Christou, Miranda (2006). "A Double Imagination: Memory and Education in Cyprus," *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*, 24 (2): 285-306
Christou, Miranda (2007). "The Language of Patriotism: Sacred History and Dangerous Memories," *British Journal of Sociology of Education*, 28 (6): 709-722.
Cockburn, Cynthia (2004). *The Line: Women, Partition and the Gender Order in Cyprus*. New York: Zed Books.
Connerton, Paul (1989). *How Societies Remember*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Demetriou, Olga (2006). "Freedom Square: The unspoken reunification of a divided city." *Hagar: Studies in Culture, Polity and Identities*, 7 (1): 55-77.
Demetriou, Olga (2007). "To cross or not to cross? Subjectivization and the absent state in Cyprus." *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute*, 13: 987-1006.
Dikomitis, Lisa (2004). "A *moving* field: Greek Cypriot refugees returning 'home'." *Durham Anthropology Journal*, 12 (1): 7-20.
Dikomitis, Lisa (2005) "Three Readings of a Border: Greek Cypriots Crossing the Green Line in Cyprus," *Anthropology Today* 21 October (5): 7-12
Fowler, Bridget (2005). "Collective Memory and Forgetting: Components for a Study of Obituaries." *Theory, Culture & Society*, 22 (6): 53-72.
Georgiades, Savvas D. (2007). "Public attitudes towards peace: The Greek Cypriot position." *Journal of Peace Research*, 44 (5): 573-586.
Hadjiyanni, Tasoulla (2002). *The Making of a Refugee: Children Adopting Refugee Identity in Cyprus.* Westport, Connecticut: Praeger.
Halbwachs, Maurice ([1941] 1992). *On Collective Memory*. Translation Lewis A. Coser. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Hinchman, Lewis P. and Sandra K. Hinchman (1997) "Introduction." In L. P. Hinchman and S. K. Hinchman (Eds.) *Memory, Identity, Community: The Idea of Narrative in the Human Sciences*, Pp. iii–xxxii. Albany: State University of New York Press.

Huyssen, Andreas (2003) *Present Pasts: Urban Palimpsests and the Politics of Memory*. California: Stanford University Press.

Kedourie, Elie (2005) "The Cyprus Problem and Its Solution," *Middle Eastern Studies* (41) 5 [September]: 649-660

Loizos, Peter (1975). *The Greek Gift: Politics in a Cypriot Village*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Loizos, Peter (1981). *The Heart Grown Bitter: A Chronicle of Cypriot War Refugees*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Loizos, Peter & Costas Constantinou (2007). "Hearts as well as Minds: Wellbeing and Illness among Greek Cypriot Refugees." *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 20 (1): 86-107.

Loizos, Peter & Evthymios Papataxiarchis (Eds.) (1991). *Contested Identities: Gender and Kinship in Modern Greece*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Markides, Kyriakos (1977) *The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Mavratsas, Ceasar V. (1996). "Approaches to Nationalism: Basic Theoretical Considerations in the Study of the Greek Cypriot Case and a Historical Overview." *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora* 22: 77-102.

Mavratsas, Ceasar V. (1997). "The Ideological Contest between Greek-Cypriot nationalism and Cypriotism 1974-1995: Politics, Social Memory and Identity." *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 20: 717-737.

Misztal, Barbara A. (2003). *Theories of Social Remembering*. Maidenhead, Philadelphia: Open University Press.

Papadakis, Yiannis (1993). The Politics of Memory and Forgetting in Cyprus. *Journal of Mediterranean Studies*, 3: 139-154.

Papadakis, Yiannis (1998). "Greek Cypriot narratives of history and collective identity: nationalism as a contested process." *American Ethnologist* 25(2): 149-165.

Papadakis, Yiannis (2003). "Nation, narrative and commemoration: Political ritual in divided Cyprus." *History and Anthropology*, 14 (3): 253-270.

Philippou, Stavroula (2005). ''Constructing National and European Identities: The Case of Greek-Cypriot Children.'' *Educational Studies* 31 (3): 293–315.

Ricoeur, Paul (1988) *Time and Narrative*. Vol. 3. Trans. Kathleen Blamey and David Pellauer. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.

Rydgren, Jens (2007) "The Power of the Past: A Contribution to a Cognitive Sociology of Ethnic Conflict," *Sociological Theory* (25) 3: 225-44

Roudometof, Victor (2005) "National Commemorations in the Balkans," pp. 35-59 in Michael Geisler (ed.), *National Symbols, Fractured Identities: Contesting the National Narrative* Hanover: University Press of New England.

Roudometof, Victor (2007) "Collective Memory and Cultural Politics: An Introduction," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* (35) 1: 1-16

Smelser, Neil, J. (2004). "September 11, 2001, as Cultural Trauma." In Jeffrey C. Alexander, Eyerman, R., Giesen, B., Smelser, N.J., and Sztompka, R. (Eds.) *Cultural Trauma and Collective Identity*, pp. 264-282. Berkeley: University of California Press.

Spillman, Lyn (2005) "Is the ´Strong Program' Strong Enough?" *Culture: Newsletter of the Sociology of Culture Section of the American Sociological Association* (19) 2: 1, 4-6.

Spyrou, Spyros (2001). "Those on the other side: ethnic identity and imagination in Greek-Cypriot children's lives," in: H. Schwartzman (Ed.) *Children and anthropology: perspectives for the 21st century*, pp. 167–185. Westport, CT, and London: Bergin & Garvey.

Spyrou, Spyros (2002). "Images of 'the other': 'the Turk' in Greek-Cypriot children's imaginations." *Race, Ethnicity and Education,* 5 (3): 255–271.

Stamatakis, Nikos A. (1991). "History and Nationalism: The Cultural Reconstruction of the Modern Greek Cypriot Identity." *The Cyprus Review* 3 (1): 59-86.

Webster, Craig (2005). "Division or unification in Cyprus? The role of demographics, attitudes, and party inclination on Greek Cypriot preferences for a solution to the Cyprus problem." *Ethnopolitics*, 4 (3):299-309.

Zetter, Roger (1994). "The Greek Cypriot Refugees: Perceptions of Return under Conditions of Protracted Exile." *International Migration Review*, 28: 307-322.

Zetter, Roger (1999). "Reconceptualizing the Myth of Return: Continuity and Transition Amongst the Greek-Cypriot Refugees of 1974." *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 12 (1): 1-22.

Ivana Spasić

THE TRAUMA OF KOSOVO IN SERBIAN NATIONAL NARRATIVES

A story about stories

On the face of it, this is a perfect case of cultural trauma. If asked what distinguishes them as a nation, most Serbs would tell you it is the memory of the Battle of Kosovo, fought between the Serbian army and the forces of Ottoman Turks in 1389. Serbs lost the battle, and their prince was killed. The event marked the collapse of the medieval Serbian state and beginning of the long Ottoman domination. The Kosovo *sore*, *wound* or *pain*, as it is usually called in the "stories Serbs tell themselves about themselves" (Živković 2001a), that is, the aggrieved but proud feeling of tragedy, death and loss engendered by remembrance of the Kosovo catastrophe 600 years ago is generally held to be the foundation of Serbian identity, part of the very essence of being a Serb. Yet I will not start from the assertion that Kosovo as trauma is central to Serbianness, because this is precisely what needs to be examined. I will primarily be interested in how this claim has come to look so self-evident.

"Kosovo" in Serbian national narratives is not a story of a thing, a place, or an event but, more than anything else, a story about stories. It is then appropriate to begin with two sets of statements, illustrating two broad types of accounts that purport to explain the link between Serbs and the symbolism of Kosovo.[207]

I

> "The Battle of Kosovo is the symbol and mark of Serbian history. ... For the Serbian people, Kosovo is the imprint of its identity, the key through which to understand the message of its entire history, the banner of national freedom." (Bogdanović 2006: 410)
>
> "That one event has imprinted itself indelibly on the Serbian soul forever. ... It is a simple matter of fact that, whenever Serbs are faced with events of great historical importance, they invariably turn to the one source of strength and inspiration – the Kosovo mystique." (Mihailovich 1991: 141)
>
> „It is on the tragic myth of a heroic sacrifice and the choice of the eternal life in the heavenly kingdom that the moral philosophy of the Serbian people has rested all the way to modern times. The ethic and spiritual principles of the Kosovo commitment were the foundation of the spiritual life of the entire Serbian people." (Palavestra 1991: 23)
>
> "Kosovo is many diverse things to different living Serbs, but they all have it in their blood. They are born with it. ... The question of why it is in Serbian blood is never meant to be answered – it is a transcendental phenomenon." (Dragnich and Todorovich 1984: 4)
>
> "For centuries it has been as essential ingredient in the historical consciousness of the Serbian people. ... On the six hundredth anniversary of their nation's Golgotha, Serbian people around the world pause to reflect once again on the meaning and impact of a medieval battle which shaped their destiny" (Emmert 1990: 142)

[207] The following quotations are all taken from the broadly scholarly genre of writings which, whether academic or more popular, claim a basic factual accuracy and adherence to a methodology. This for the moment excludes journalistic, poetic, and overtly propagandistic texts, which will be taken up later on.