Over the course of the decades, the narratives of the national trauma coalesced into two broad directions that cultural trauma theory would propose (Alexander et al 2004). The progressive narrative of amelioration is recognizable in the "bedrock of peace" discourse (*heiwa no ishizue*) that represents the vision that defeat is the reason why Japan enjoys peace and material prosperity today. This "fortunate fall" argument is used often in official speeches and commemorations, justifying and legitimating the sacrifices of the war dead, while at the same time, diverting attention away from the culpability of the state in starting and losing the war. The focus on assigning positive value to the personal sacrifices of the dead invokes an inescapable sense of indebtedness to them, while bracketing out the question of whether the war was fought for a legitimate cause. Thus, as long as those soldiers' and civilians' sacrifices are emphasized, the narrative frame is elastic enough to allow the war itself to be either condemned or ennobled. The rationale that the destruction was somehow a necessary condition to attain fruitful ends is a strained logic to be sure, but it nevertheless satisfies the strong desire for elevating and dignifying a colossal failure.

By contrast, the tragic narrative represents identification with suffering victims. In this narrative frame, the war wrought unimaginable tragedy to the people who had to "bear the unbearable and suffer the insufferable." The scale of violence and destruction in the total war is undisputable, and the only appropriate response as a nation is to make sure it will not happen again. Thus, those who were affected by this tragedy are duty bound to recount, warn, and prevent repeating the mistake. The war was wrong, but there is also sufficient elasticity here in assigning the blame to different agents and causes, from the Emperor and colonial aggression, to incompetent military strategists and self-serving Western powers. This narrative is often recognized as the "ravages of war" discourse (*sensô no sanka*) that sets a

premium on Japan's victimization in Hiroshima, Nagasaki, and indiscriminate air raids, and tends to cast war as an absolute evil.

In broad strokes, these narratives have helped to normalize the national trauma in the national consciousness, and over time, they have infused the Japanese collective identity with strong anti-war sentiments. These narratives have helped legitimate the sentiments of the "peaceful nation" discourse (*heiwa kokka*) that is based on Article 9 (the constitutional clause on the renunciation of war), and have served as a common platform for the nation – for the political left and right, from official discourse to kitchen talk, and across generations. This discourse of the peaceful nation strategically directs the search for new identity toward the future, not the past. A future-oriented identity discourse, then, effectively blurs moral categories and blunts moral judgments about the past events.

Past studies of Japan's war memory have often described the phenomenon in terms of its political conditions such as the left/right divide, or in essentialist terms such as shame/guilt cultures. Cultural trauma theory, however, by articulating the structure of discursive systems that emerge to normalize the cultural trauma in collective life, helps capture the complexity inherent in Japan's national experience that is not explained by the reductionistic, one-dimensional analyses. One such phenomenon that I explore in this paper is the response to the problem of public trust and national belonging after the total defeat. How could state power be trusted when it had let its people down badly, leading them to a disastrous war in a totalitarian society that repressed, censored, and destroyed individual lives? How could fellow citizens be trusted when they had supported enthusiastically or acquiesced meekly to the reckless Imperial ambitions? How could the

new democratic order be trusted when it was forced upon a people by their former enemies?

I argue that responses to this problem in Japan have bifurcated into progressive and tragic narratives of the war over time, and have influenced the formation of collective identity in postwar society. I also explore the social impact of this long-standing bifurcation which still yields no consensus today, and consider its role in blocking empathy for Asian victims beyond national borders.

THE NATIONAL TRAUMA OF WAR IN THE JAPANESE CASE

A cultural trauma occurs "when members of a collective feel they have been subjected to a horrendous event that leaves indelible marks upon their group consciousness, marking their memories forever and changing their future identity in fundamental and irrevocable ways" (Alexander 2004, 1). To fathom the scale of this "horrendous event" a brief outline of the scope of deaths inflicted in this case is in order. The total death toll of World War II is estimated at 60 million, of which one-third occurred in Asia (Weinberg 2005). During the Japanese invasions, from China to Indonesia, the Philippines and New Guinea, it is estimated that 20 million Asians died, not only from warfare but from civilian raids, plunder, rape, starvation, and torture (Fujiwara 2001). In Japan, civilian death – from the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, Nagasaki to air raids in numerous cities – totaled approximately 1 million. In China, the civilian death toll is said to be around 16 million. In the United States, total civilian dead was less than 2,000. In the Japanese military, one in every three soldiers died out of 6 million who were mobilized. The death rate (38%, 2.3 million dead) was higher than that of German soldiers (33%), and 19 times that of

American soldiers (2%)(Yui 2005, 261). Because Japanese soldiers fought across the vast expanse of the Asia-Pacific region from North China to the South Pacific where supply lines were broken off especially toward the end of the war, approximately 60-70% of them died not from warfare but from starvation, disease, and abandonment. To date, only half of their remains have been repatriated, while the rest remain scattered throughout the far reaches of the region. Given the prohibition on surrender, a relatively small percentage was taken prisoner, and the last of them returned in 1956. The repatriation of several million civilians and ex-soldiers took decades.

After unconditional surrender the U.S. Occupation (1945-52) followed, during which time the war crimes trials (The Tokyo Trial 1946-48; Class B and C war crimes trials 1946-51) punished mostly military men for the most egregious violation of war conventions. Nearly 6,000 men were prosecuted for war crimes, and almost 4,500 of them were convicted; twelve were executed as Class A war criminals, and 920 were executed as Class B and C war criminals. The Occupation also implemented blanket social, economic, and political reforms that amounted to a total inversion of the moral order, scrapping the social institutions of the totalitarian militarist state and its Shito ideology, and replacing them with Imperial democracy and liberal social reforms (Dower 1999).

THE CULTURAL TRAUMA OF DEFEAT AND ITS NARRATIVES OF COLLECTIVE IDENTITY

For Japan, defining a national identity over the past decades has been a difficult and challenging undertaking following the trauma of war, defeat, and foreign occupation. The country's attempts to re-establish a collective identity after such radical shifts in the social and moral order provoked urgent questions of trust and suspicion toward the discredited

state authority and the political culture that wrought those traumatic failures. Trust, suspicion and betrayal became important political moral emotions that underpinned the question of solidarity to build new social institutions and define a new collective identity after the disintegration of prewar society. Dirk Moses (2007b, 56) has argued in the case of Germany that only two options exist in such a case: people could either rally to *defend* the national culture or seek to *renovate* it. Japan faced a similar choice to facilitate its collective regeneration. Whether or not people were willing to invest their hope and fate again in the Japanese power elite to face the unpredictable changes proved to be the core ingredient that would shape the contours of political identity in subsequent years and decades.

Out of this process, there emerged two broad approaches for individuals to re-establish their relationship with state power. On the one hand there were those who emerged from the experience of social collapse with their sense of trust and belief in the nation more or less intact, who could still trust state leadership to guide the nation toward recovery with some sense of confidence. Others emerged embittered by the failures of Japan's wartime political authority with a sense of profound misgivings for the nation and sought to distance themselves from it. For them, defeat was an experience of liberation from the oppressive totalitarian state and authoritarian culture, and hence it made sense that they sought to rebuild a collective identity that was, in a sense, less absorbed in the "we" of the nation state.[350]

People thus responded differently according to their confidence in the nation's ability to move in the right direction, with some level of stability and predictability. This difference has come to characterize a great deal of postwar political culture, and it is today

evident in the opposing viewpoints on revising the peace constitution to allow greater options for the state to deploy the military, or on mandating patriotic education in public schools. In terms of cultural trauma theory, those two narratives differ in the symbolic weighting of pollution assigned to state power (Alexander 2004). One sees state authority as reliably promoting better life, and building stable social bonds and institutions. The other sees it as pursuing self-serving interests at the people's expense. While assuming different forms over the past decades, the opposition between trust and distrust continues to mark a deep social divide today. It ultimately represents alternate ways of giving meaning to citizenship and to maintaining group identity (Eyerman 2004).

These two broad orientations are associated with different levels of ontological security, and over time, they fashioned general narratives of trauma that I call "Bedrock of Peace" and "Ravages of War" narratives, which I outline below. Although they characterize general trends in right/left divides, they nevertheless do not classify neatly into those conventional categories. As Moses (2007b) showed in the case of Germany, the political emotions of trust in the state and political culture do not fit or coincide exactly with the conservative-progressive divide. For example, leading LDP statesmen of the wartime generation like Miyazawa Kiichi and Gotôda Masaharu staunchly defended the peace constitution throughout their long political careers. Likewise in the media, the national newspaper Yomiuri shinbun, usually a reliable supporter of the conservative LDP government, spearheaded the discourse on the culpability of wartime state leadership in a high profile project in the 2000s (Yomiuri Shinbun 2006a, 2006b). Thus the landscape of war memory is not always shaped according to political party lines.

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[350] My discussion here draws on Dirk Moses' analysis of the German case in his *German Intellectuals and the*

THE PROGRESSIVE NARRATIVES ON THE 'BEDROCK OF PEACE'

As scholars have pointed out, the desire to search for positive meaning after defeat in war through in a progressive narrative is often very powerful (Schivelbusch 2003; MacLeod 2008; Smith 2005). There are many examples of the urge to generate positive meaning in the aftermath of defeat in modern history, from the myth of the Lost Cause for the American Confederacy after the Civil War to the myth of the Fallen Soldier for German soldiers who died in World War I. The need to find redeeming worth in mass death is exceedingly powerful also among victors, as the well-known British rationalization of World War I as 'the war to end all wars' attests. Win or lose, with the benefit of hindsight, people have often strained contradictory logic to find 'meaning' in tragic slaughters, attempting to reconcile the violence with virtue: 'the soldiers killed to free people,' 'the bomb was dropped to save lives,' 'the war dead have brought peace,' 'the soldiers died to protect the future' and so on.

Japan's attempts to turn national failure into motivation for building a better future started immediately after the war in the 1940s as part of the efforts to come to terms with the enormity of its war dead. For example, public intellectuals like Nanbara Shigeru vowed in his tribute to the fallen that they had not died in vain as they would serve as the foundation upon which peace would be built in the future (Dower 1999, 489). Anxieties about the futility of sacrifice for the state are often subsumed in a narrative of hope called "the bedrock of peace" which has played a key role in reconstructing the meaning for the deaths and devastation in the collective imagination. By blending together narratives of

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Nazi Past, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007

tragedy and messages for peace, defeat can be made a palatable experience, like the fortunate fall where destruction is supposedly instrumental to bringing about something good. The deaths of those men were worthwhile because they prevented a situation that could have been worse. They did not die in vain, because their death enabled the defeat which ended the atrocious violence. Regardless of where and how they died, this narrative allows their deaths to be redefined as an act of courage, while relieving the guilt of the living. Japan's enormous attachment to the valor of the fallen has to be understood in this light (Takahashi 2005).

A discourse explicitly linking acts of sacrifice to achieving peace in a formula of national "progress" started to gain traction in national commemorations and national newspaper editorials in the 1960s, at a time that the ruling party LDP consolidated power and claimed to guide Japan toward "prosperity and affluence" that would ultimately make it the second largest economy in the world (Akazawa 2005; Nakano 2005). The understanding of "progress" here referred to a range of ideas: peace, prosperity, democracy, justice, and security that seemed to be preconditions for a society aspiring to a high standard of living without a state of war (Gluck 1993, 93; Igarashi 2000, 130-9). With such a broad and elastic definition of progress, the ameliorative narratives helped to unite, energize and integrate the populace in a time of rapid uncertain social change; they also suggested reassuringly that loyal sacrifice for the "greater good"– such as the national-state or a business corporation – would be amply rewarded.

Discourse of 'Meaningful Sacrifice': The Case of Battleship Yamato

Modernity has been characterized by the emergence of nation-states that can mobilize the passion of young men to die for the country on a massive scale (Anderson 1991). By mobilizing nationalist passion, a conscripted soldier in a modern war can believe "he is dying for something greater than himself, for something that will outlast his individual, perishable life in place of a greater, eternal vitality" (Rahimi 2006). If the tension between recognizing the violent destruction of war and seeking constructive meaning in mass death has remained virtually irreconcilable – especially in total wars that called up ordinary conscripts by the millions for the first time in modern history – it is especially acute for the vanquished who are haunted by military failure (Mosse 1990).

One of the best-known examples of discourse on sacrifice for the "greater good" in Japan is the story of battleship Yamato and its 3,000 crew who died in the sea southwest of Japan. This patriotic tale recounts the last moments of those navy men in the largest battleship ever built, used for a tactically meaningless suicide sortie only months before the defeat. One of its survivors Yoshida Mitsuru documented the tormented discussion among the young officers aboard who questioned the meaning of their impending death for a war that was certain to end in defeat. Yoshida recounts the now infamous phrase of Captain Usubuchi desperately seeking meaning in dying for the nation, moments before the ship sank under relentless bombardment by 700 American jet fighters. His tormented words reveal how he thought his impending death may be a sacrifice that would serve as an awakening, a rallying cry for a better national future.

> "Japan has paid too little attention to progress. We have been too finicky, too wedded to selfish ethics; we have forgotten true progress. How else can Japan be saved except by losing and coming to its senses? If Japan does not come to its senses now, when will it be saved?
> "We will lead the way. We will die as harbingers of Japan's new life. That's where our real satisfaction lies, isn't it?"(Yoshida 1985, 40)

What this twenty-one year old officer meant by "progress" here is vague enough so that it is possible to draw different meanings like peace, justice, and prosperity. It is also easy to fault the logical contradiction of a young man claiming to contribute to a future that he will not experience. Yet this contradictory logic is at the heart of the fluid idea of linking progress to sacrifice which enables the collective belief that Japan would rebound and recover. In Yoshida's rendering, the courage and discipline of the men facing certain death are emphasized, without blame or resentment directed toward the state leadership that ordered the tactically dubious "special attack" mission with no fuel to return home. Instead, Yoshida's account is a requiem for the dead, a tribute that facilitates and legitimates the idea that defeat was somehow a catalyst for progress. This story works as a popular tale because the protagonists hail from the Imperial Navy, the arm of the Japanese military on record for opposing the war against the United States. Far from being guilty war mongers, then, the protagonists are more readily cast as seekers of peace in war, and their stories are more easily framed in terms of opposition to militarism. This allows the narratives to align neatly with the search for innocence in these men who have committed no evil and died worthy deaths, preserved as part of national memory by subsequent generations. The protagonists are not killing machines but tragic heroes of a country going through a national catastrophe. The narrative conspicuously and studiously avoids blame, and refuses to assign responsibility for killing. Thus, critics have charged that the Yamato story all too eagerly seeks to banish evil and safeguard innocence, to mitigate accusations that the protagonists were perpetrators of war (Fukuma 2007, 56).

The nationalist appeal of this tale of "meaningful sacrifice" is obvious. The story of Yamato has been made into four films from 1953 to 2005, and has inspired numerous

fictive accounts (e.g. popular manga series Spaceship Yamato, Zipang, etc). Usubuchi's statement has been cited in language arts textbooks, and recounted in a variety of political speeches. As a patriotic symbol as popular as Paul Revere, 20,000 viewers of NHK television voted Usubuchi's statement among the top five favorites in a popular program called *That's When History Changed* (Sonotoki Rekishiga Ugoita) in 2007. Nevertheless, this wrenching tale of courage and hope never quite fulfills even those who survived the Yamato catastrophe like Yoshida, much less the veterans embittered by other cases of military ineffectiveness (Yoshida 1986, 2003a; Iida 2008). The patriotic narrative therefore does not easily convert into a new militaristic identity as critics fear, because Yoshida never leaves the confines of this immediate experience (Fukuma 2007).

For today's young audience watching the recent feature film on the Yamato tragedy of 60 years ago, the value of sacrificing one's life for the nation is not plainly obvious. Thus, after the 2005 premiere, a high school student posed a question about the meaning in dying for the nation to the young actors who played the officers:

> Student: "It's difficult for me to understand what it means to defend the country. What does it feel like? Is it scary?"
> Actor A: "Perhaps it's normal that we can't understand it."
> Actor B: "It's becoming more and more difficult to imagine the relationship between the individual and the state. We've grown up at a time when we don't know what that feels like. And it's scary to die. I wondered how people could love the country so much"(Tôei Production 2005.)[351]

With such new sensibilities, the "bedrock of peace" narrative has thus had to shift its meaning away from military valor. In the 2005 version, the officers do not emphasize that they are dying for the nation or the Emperor, but they do so more "to protect their family and loved ones."

[351] My translation

THE TRAGIC NARRATIVES ON THE RAVAGES OF WAR

If progress is to be understood as the state of postwar prosperity without war in the ameliorative narrative, then the atonement has been completed and the war dead have already been rewarded for their sacrifice. But if progress is to be understood in the sense of world peace, such an ideal has not been achieved, so the dead have not been rewarded and mourning continues (Akazawa 2005, 160). In the latter tragic narrative, the war was an act of intentional aggression, carried out by a handful of ignorant and incompetent military leaders. In contrast to the ameliorative narratives, the tragic "ravages of war" narratives were born out of a profound skepticism about state-defined "justice," and the notion that people ultimately died in vain for an unnecessary war. Recognizing the state's capacity for violence and immoral acts, this perspective profoundly questions the positive meaning of sacrifices (Akazawa 2005, 7-8.) The following two cases represent examples of those narratives.

Discourse on Perpetrator History: The Case of Ienaga Saburo

One of the most influential figures to shape the postwar discourse is historian Ienaga Saburo, a prolific scholar of war history and war responsibility, and a well-known plaintiff who waged the longest legal battle against the state over how to teach the national past. Motivated by a sense of remorse at having been a passive bystander during the war, Ienaga devoted himself to asserting the right to publish perpetrator history in school textbooks, staking the claim that the state had specific culpability and responsibility for the mistaken judgments and decisions regarding the entry into and conduct during the war

(Nozaki 2008, 154). His three lawsuits over the course of 32 years claimed the right to freedom of speech, and challenged the constitutionality of the textbook certification system by the Ministry of Education which demanded extensive revisions for Ienaga's textbooks. Importantly, the "speech" that he sought to protect in those lawsuits is the critical narrative of national history , especially the dark chapters of World War II, including the invasion of China, the rapes in China, the biological experiment Unit 731, the Nanjing Massacre, the civilian victimization in the Battle of Okinawa, and the forced labor of colonial subjects and POWs (Nozaki and Inokuchi 2000, 116).

Ienaga's narrative of war is unmistakably that of perpetrator history. He represented the viewpoint that the war was an illegal war of aggression in violation of international treaties, driven by Japan's economic and political ambitions to control north China, and it culminated in a 15 year conflict, starting from the Manchurian incident in 1931, the Marco Polo Incident in 1937, Pearl Harbor in 1941, the invasion of southeast and south Asia and the south Pacific, and ultimately ending in 1945. He does not spare the state:

> "… the fifteen-year war as an unrighteous, reckless war begun with unjust and improper goals and means by the Japanese state, and because starting the war and refusing to end the war in a timely fashion were both illegal and improper acts of the state…" (Ienaga 2001, 148)[352]

In turn, the Ministry certification officials sought changes in his draft texts countering that "Japan was not unilaterally bad," "Do not write bad things about Japan," "Eliminate the description that Japan caused suffering in China and Asia" (Nozaki 2008, 22).

[352] Original in "Jûgonen sensô ni yoru shi o dô kangaeru ka," Rekishi tokuhon (expanded issue, March 1979); in Ienaga Saburô shû, vol 12, p.260); translated by Richard Minear in Japan's Past, Japan's Future: One Historian's Odyssey. London: Rowman and Littlefield. p.148

As these disputes were publicized over time, Ienaga's lawsuits raised public awareness, and spurred citizens' movements to support his ongoing efforts. A favorable verdict for his second lawsuit emboldened other history textbook writers to increase their coverage of perpetrator history in the 1970s and 1980s. Following a dispute with South Korea and China in 1982, the Cabinet Secretary of the Japanese government announced that it will promote a more diplomatically sensitive framework to depict war in history textbooks. By 1993, another court challenge was underway by Takashima Nobuyoshi to continue the pressure on the state certification system that sought to reduce perpetrator narratives in textbooks (Aramaki 2003, 233; Takashima 2003). Beyond the education field, Ienaga's public defiance inspired peace movements, NGOs and citizens forum that sought a new collective identity based on ideas of freedom, democracy, peace, and rights of citizens (Nohira 2003; Yoshioka 2008).

Discourse on Obliterated Hiroshima: the Case of Barefoot Gen

Around the time when the second of Ienaga's suits was underway at the height of the Vietnam War, another anti-war citizen of the wartime generation began penning mortifying stories that would become one of the most iconic anti-war literature in postwar Japan. Nakazawa Keiji's semi-autobiographical comic *Barefoot Gen* (1973-87) offers a tragic narrative of the obliteration of Hiroshima, depicted as an intimate family portrayal of day-to-day survival after the atomic bomb. Interweaving personal history and world history, it tells the horrific effects of the nuclear blast and radiation with unmistakable rage, agony, grief, and despair. The graphic details of the atomic blast are depicted to maximum effect: charred bodies, people with torn skin hanging from their faces and limbs, eyeballs dangling

from their sockets and maggots hatching on corpses, heaps of burned dead bodies in the river and elsewhere all over the scorched flattened city. The tragic plot and logic are straightforward. Gen's father and sister died in the nuclear blast under the collapsed house, but Gen, his mother and brothers narrowly escaped. His mother was pregnant and gave birth to Gen's sister on the day of the blast amid the wreckage. Thereafter, for ten volumes, Gen survives hunger and poverty, loss of his mother and sister, humiliation and fear, illness and discrimination, and exploitation (Morris-Suzuki 2005, 160; Nakazawa 1994; Spiegelman 1994).

In *Gen*, the indictment of war's evil is unequivocal: the war was brought on recklessly and unnecessarily by the Japanese military and the Imperial state that heartlessly misled civilians to deathly destruction and suffering. All the suffering emanating from this disaster could have been prevented if only the war had been stopped earlier, if only the state had the sense to accept the Potsdam Declaration. *Gen*'s message is clear: authorities like the state, the military, the Emperor, the American military and American doctors are evil, and cannot be trusted (Dower 1999, 243-4, 248-9). Thus, even as the story progresses from obliteration to rebuilding life, it carries a bitter undertone, since nothing can really undo the permanent damage to people's lives and their bodies, and the culprits are not brought to justice. Although the story ends when Gen is a preteen, readers may sense that the radiation disease that claimed his mother and sister, the last of his surviving biological family, may also eventually catch up with Gen himself.

Widely used in schools and easily accessible, *Gen* is arguably the most influential and iconic war literature to reach successive postwar generations and shape popular consciousness in the past four decades. It is a vehicle for intergenerational transmission of

anti-war sentiments, and many attest to learning about Hiroshima first from *Gen* (Ito 2006, 152). It is available in all school libraries, shown in peace education class, broadcast in commercial television, and released in cinemas, It has been reprinted several times (1975, 1988, 1998, 2000, and 2001) and has sold 5 million copies, and has been translated in 11 languages (Fukuma 2006, 29). It has been made into an animation film, live action features, musical, and television broadcasts, the most recent of which shown as a two-part live action story in Fuji television in summer 2007 and earned a high rating of 19.3% (Fuji TV 2007). As a social equivalent of Anne Frank's story that mobilizes empathy and anger, its reinforcement effect works over the generational cycle: people read *Gen* in manga, then re-encounter it later in anime, then again as an adult on TV, and then watch it with their own children. The generational transmission has now reached the point that grandparents report watching *Gen* with their grandchildren (Fuji TV 2007). The message is emphatic: We must take control of our own lives, have the strength to say no to war and nuclear weapons, so as to never become such victims again (Dower 1999; Nakazawa 1994).

One of the most important ingredients for *Gen*'s enduring success is its ability to offer a clear alternative political identity in the father figure who serves as a spiritual backbone of the story, even though he dies at the beginning by the impact of the atomic bomb, crushed excruciatingly under the roof of his house. Gen's principled father, the source of Gen's strength, was a down-to-earth, clear thinking artist who saw the deception of the military and imperialist government for what it was, and was tortured for expressing his opposition to the war that brought nothing but suffering. Nakazawa was five when his own father was tortured for being critical of the war, and this greatly influenced his political views. This father is the antithesis of the common postwar excuse of the wartime

generation that "we were all deceived". Gen's father represents the possibilities of courage to fight, resist authority, and oppose the war (Napier 2001, 168).

Although *Barefoot Gen* is influential in encouraging people to learn about the destructive power of nuclear weapons, it rarely takes a look at the victimization for the whole war in larger perspective. No connection is made between the bomb and the 15 year war that preceded the blast even though Hiroshima was a military city (Yoshida 2006). Because of the overwhelming demand on empathy, the young audience who watched the 2007 television broadcast seem prevented from asking how the war came about, why the Americans did it, or why the Japanese military did not prevent it. Although they vow "never again," they don't say why or how (Fuji TV 2007). They gain no insight that much of invaded Asia welcomed the atomic bombs dropped on Japan at the time (Ônuma, 223), and that it is a tale that Korean audiences rejected (Yamanaka 2006).

Hence, *Gen* can unite people through their suffering but cannot inspire hope and progress to attain a nuclear free world. There is no universal agreement about the evil of US decision to obliterate Hiroshima and Nagasaki to win the war. The perpetrators of this tragedy were never brought to justice, and never will be. There is no promise that the obliteration will never happen again in a world where nuclear arms have multiplied throughout the Cold War. *Gen* remains an indictment of the Japanese government in the guise of victim narrative (Ueno & Narita 1999), and thus sets a constraint on the universalization of the Hiroshima story. There is no enduring hope in the messages that can bring closure to the resolve to "never again" wage war. Absolute pacifism finds no redemption because no justice is forthcoming to punish the perpetrators, and without such justice the claim for peace and antimilitarism rings hollow.

IDENTITY FORMATION AND PATHWAYS OF EMPATHY FOR THE "OTHER"

In defeat cultures where perpetrators and victims can be often made up of the same people, questioning the legitimacy of what is right and wrong has led to some contemplation of the shades of gray. Recognizing the need to conceptualize the perpetrators and victims not as oppositions but as embodied in the same side, some scholars of war memory have sought to clarify the messy amorphous middle zone. Aleida Assmann (2006) for example has attempted to connect the mutually contradictory frames of suffering and guilt in German memory by conceptualizing a structure of hierarchy in the discourse. In explaining the current shift in German memory that posits the polarity between a memory of German guilt and a memory of German suffering, she posits that various levels of heterogeneous memory can exist side by side if they are contained within a normative frame of generally accepted validity.

A search for a possible "empathetic" approach that still allows the postwar generations to condemn individual acts of perpetration for what they are, has been gaining some ground in World War II memory since the 2000s (LaCapra 2001). It attempts to identify intersecting dimensions of perpetrator and victim in soldiers by integrating the understanding of individual biographies with the structural conditions that transform individuals into savage killers. This complex approach to remembering the past represents a trend toward identifying and embracing a 'good-and-also-evil' narrative. In these narratives, authors locate and work through the experience of atrocious violence as itself a monumental trauma and in doing so, succeed in making accessible the mindset of the soldier-as-killing-machine. They attempt to move beyond the good versus evil split by

identifying the perpetrators as victims of military abuse, while, at the same time, condemning their actions as perpetrators. Looking for such connections and bridging contradictions requires disentangling distortions and finding ways of understanding complicated human action without being encumbered by the taboos that stifled dialogue in the past. These attempts can be seen as efforts to move beyond the impasse that is inherent in the defeat culture (Inoue 2005; Kurahashi 2002).

Many more transnational wars have now been fought since World War II: the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the Afghan War, the Gulf War, the War in Kosovo, and now the Iraq War. With wars that caused escalating civilian casualties, and used technologies that were ever more potent and destructive, the narrative of war and peace is in need of rethinking and reformulation for the post-Cold War 21st century. The distinction between the good war and the bad war is no longer clear-cut; the heroes and villains are no longer simply apparent; the moral codes begin to blur from black and white to shades of gray. There are many instances that call for the understanding of the gray zone (Levi 2004): the Jewish kapos who cooperated with the Nazis in concentration camps during the Holocaust, the Soviet liberators who raped scores of German women in the Third Reich's capital, American soldiers who destroyed whole villages with Vietnamese civilians, and today Iraqi prisoners detained and tortured in Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo. In these proliferating gray zones, the construction of moral frameworks of war is becoming more and more tenuous. If the social construction of a moral framework is based fundamentally on our ability to code the distinction between good and bad legitimately, it is the very legitimacy of those codes that is then called in question (Alexander 2003).

Given the proclivity of most people in the gray zone to see themselves as victims rather than perpetrators, and the tendency for most people to favor the interests of close relations with family and friends rather than empathize with abstract, distant victims, perhaps it is not surprising that the Japanese approaches– using both ameliorative and tragic narratives – did not shift the cognitive map from particularistic understandings of the war to a more universalistic picture at least until the 1980s. One approach to make such a shift might be to redefine the meaning of "progress" as Giesen (2004, 145) suggests, so that a new pattern of identity making that is not based on the horror of the past will become more attractive. In contemplating broader pathways of empathy for the new century, some psychologists' insights that those with higher national identification have lower sense of collective guilt for immoral historical events are useful (Doosje et al. 2004, 108). Constructing post-national collective understandings of the self that is identified with a supra-national community would call for a certain level of de-japanization of the Japanese, just as the construction of European identity required a certain level of de-germanization of Germans. In other words, a cosmopolitan national identity is the only way to unblock the pathway of empathy for the suffering of Asian victims.

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