




# SECURITY AUDIT REPORT



for project: **Foundation**

by auditor: **Odd Sequence**

issued: **29 December 2022**

# ONE-PAGER

## ABOUT

### PROJECT

Name	Foundation Drop
Description	Foundation Drop contracts aim to build NFT collection, dropping, and selling.

### AUDITOR

Team	Odd Sequence
Specialists	Two specialists

### TASK

Scope links	Github page: - page <a href="#">[link]</a> - commit b4e1dc6a9a434d576cb8f74676e7dbb65da cc98d <a href="#">[link]</a>
Scope Description	Smart-contracts Transaction flow Connections with external contracts
Not-in-Scope	FETH.sol PercentSplitETH.sol FoundationTreasury.sol mocks/*  Best-Practice code remarks Standardized libraries Gas efficiency (if not dangerous)
Networks	EVM networks
Languages	Solidity
Deployment env.	Hardhat framework project
Timeline	bughunting: 11.08.2022 - 15.08.2022
To Do	To find some vulnerabilities of the code in the Scope, that will be possible to find given the time and efforts of specialists
Done	The auditor has found some vulnerabilities. They are described in the report as "Findings". The report does not cover all vulnerabilities possible.
Terms	Auditors received a reward from Code4rena after the Rigor Finance contest on Code4rena. Auditors reported findings to Code4rena and received acceptance for some of them.

## FINDINGS

### 2 findings

MEDIUM acknowledged	NFTDropMarket.sol accept any NFT contracts for sales, take money from buyers, but don't check NFTs were minted
MEDIUM acknowledged	Input [limitperAccount] in NFTDropMarket.createFixedPriceSale() is easily avoidable in one transaction

1/2  
MEDIUM

@  
NFTDropMarket.sol

Acknowledged

NFTDropMarket.sol accepts any NFT contracts for sales, takes money from buyers, but doesn't check NFTs were minted

#### Description

In the <https://os.foundation.app/docs/creator-tools/drop> we can outline that:

1. Any NFT can be added to the sale, not only deployed by the NFTCollectionFactory (NFTDropMarket.createFixedPriceSale() is correct here, it accept any NFT, at least those implementing INFTDropCollectionMint interface)
2. The market itself is "A collection primitive for delegated minting"  
So it is the market's role to arrange minting for payments.

NFTDropMarket perfectly takes payments from buyers, but does not check if the mint is successful after the payment. Mints will be ok if NFT contracts are deployed through NFTCollectionFactory.sol, but for malicious NFT it is not a guarantee.

Check for the interface implemented is not enough.

#### @ NFTDropMarketFixedPriceSale.sol, lines 118-157 and lines 170-219

```
function createFixedPriceSale(
    address nftContract,
    uint80 price,
    uint16 limitPerAccount
) external {

    // Confirm the drop collection is supported
    if (!nftContract.supportsInterface(type(INFTDropCollectionMint).interfaceId)) {
        revert NFTDropMarketFixedPriceSale_Must_Support_Collection_Mint_Interface();
    }
    if (INFTDropCollectionMint(nftContract).numberOfTokensAvailableToMint() == 0) {
        revert NFTDropMarketFixedPriceSale_Must_Not_Be_Sold_Out();
    }

    // Use the AccessControl interface to confirm the msg.sender has permissions to list.
    if (!IAccessControl(nftContract).hasRole(DEFAULT_ADMIN_ROLE, msg.sender)) {
        revert NFTDropMarketFixedPriceSale_Only_Callable_By_Collection_Owner();
    }
    // And that this contract has permission to mint.
    if (!IAccessControl(nftContract).hasRole(MINTER_ROLE, address(this))) {
        revert NFTDropMarketFixedPriceSale_Mint_Permission_Required();
    }

    // Validate input params.
    if (limitPerAccount == 0) {
        revert NFTDropMarketFixedPriceSale_Limit_Per_Account_Must_Be_Set();
    }
    // Any price is supported, including 0.

    // Confirm this collection has not already been listed.
    FixedPriceSaleConfig storage saleConfig = nftContractToFixedPriceSaleConfig[nftContract];
    if (saleConfig.seller != payable(0)) {
        revert NFTDropMarketFixedPriceSale_Must_Not_Have_Pending_Sale();
    }

    // Save the sale details.
    saleConfig.seller = payable(msg.sender);
    saleConfig.price = price;
    saleConfig.limitPerAccount = limitPerAccount;
    emit CreateFixedPriceSale(nftContract, saleConfig.seller, saleConfig.price,
    saleConfig.limitPerAccount);
}
...

function mintFromFixedPriceSale(
    address nftContract,
    uint16 count,
    address payable buyReferrer
) external payable returns (uint256 firstTokenId) {

    // Validate input params.
```

	<pre> if (count == 0) {     revert NFTDropMarketFixedPriceSale_Must_Buy_At_Least_One_Token(); }  FixedPriceSaleConfig memory saleConfig = nftContractToFixedPriceSaleConfig[nftContract];  // Confirm that the buyer will not exceed the limit specified after minting. if (IERC721(nftContract).balanceOf(msg.sender) + count &gt; saleConfig.limitPerAccount) {     if (saleConfig.limitPerAccount == 0) {         // Provide a more targeted error if the collection has not been listed.         revert NFTDropMarketFixedPriceSale_Must_Have_Sale_In_Progress();     }     revert NFTDropMarketFixedPriceSale_Cannot_Buy_More_Than_Limit(saleConfig.limitPerAccount); }  // Calculate the total cost, considering the `count` requested. uint256 mintCost; unchecked {     // Can not overflow as 2^80 * 2^16 == 2^96 max which fits in 256 bits.     mintCost = uint256(saleConfig.price) * count; }  // The sale price is immutable so the buyer is aware of how much they will be paying when their tx is broadcasted. if (msg.value &gt; mintCost) {     // Since price is known ahead of time, if too much ETH is sent then something went wrong.     revert NFTDropMarketFixedPriceSale_Too_Much_Value_Provided(mintCost); } // Withdraw from the user's available FETH balance if insufficient msg.value was included. _tryUseFETHBalance(mintCost, false);  // Mint the NFTs. firstTokenId = INFTDropCollectionMint(nftContract).mintCountTo(count, msg.sender);  // Distribute revenue from this sale. (uint256 totalFees, uint256 creatorRev, ) = _distributeFunds(     nftContract,     firstTokenId,     saleConfig.seller,     mintCost,     buyReferrer );  emit MintFromFixedPriceDrop(nftContract, msg.sender, firstTokenId, count, totalFees, creatorRev); } </pre> <p><b>Lines</b></p> <p><a href="#">[link]</a>, <a href="#">[link]</a></p> <p><b>Exploit Scenario</b></p> <p><code>NFTDropMarket</code> function only checks that the NFT implements <code>INFTDropCollectionMint</code> interface. But for malicious NFT contracts, there are still too many options to write something bad - like mining 0 NFTs, after taking payments on <code>NFTDropMarket</code>.</p> <p>So the steps are:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>- Add malicious NFT contract to sale, through <code>NFTDropMarket.createFixedPriceSale()</code></li> <li>- It is listed</li> <li>- When buyers trigger <code>NFTDropMarket.mintFromFixedPriceSale()</code>, ETH is taken perfectly from buyers, then distributed, but a malicious NFT contract can react as it desires, like not minting NFTs.</li> </ul> <p><b>Recommendation</b></p> <p>In <code>NFTDropMarket.mintFromFixedPriceSale()</code> check that the mint happened (like <code>balanceOf</code> check, or anything else). Or consider additional checks when adding NFTs to sales in <code>NFTDropMarket.createFixedPriceSale()</code></p>
<p>2/2 MEDIUM</p> <p>@ <code>NFTDropMarket.sol</code></p> <p>Acknowledged</p>	<p><b>Input</b> <code>[limitperAccount]</code> in <code>NFTDropMarket.createFixedPriceSale()</code> is easily avoidable in one transaction</p> <p><b>Description</b></p> <p>It is designed to cap one buy per account by <code>limitperAccount</code> configured when sale is created.</p> <p>It should revert with <code>NFTDropMarketFixedPriceSale_Cannot_Buy_More_Than_Limit()</code> if <code>(IERC721(nftContract).balanceOf(msg.sender) + count &gt; saleConfig.limitPerAccount)</code></p> <p>Thus to pass this check <code>IERC721(nftContract).balanceOf(msg.sender)</code> should be minimized. It is very easy to do in one transaction, if a buyer is a smart-contract (buy-&gt;transfer-&gt;buy-&gt;transfer)</p> <p>As a result, anyone can buy as much NFT as he wishes, even all the collection. But the seller expects that the limit works.</p>

@ NFTDropMarketFixedPriceSale.sol, lines 170-219

```
function mintFromFixedPriceSale(
    address nftContract,
    uint16 count,
    address payable buyReferrer
) external payable returns (uint256 firstTokenId) {

    // Validate input params.
    if (count == 0) {
        revert NFTDropMarketFixedPriceSale_Must_Buy_At_Least_One_Token();
    }

    FixedPriceSaleConfig memory saleConfig = nftContractToFixedPriceSaleConfig[nftContract];

    // Confirm that the buyer will not exceed the limit specified after minting.
    if (IERC721(nftContract).balanceOf(msg.sender) + count > saleConfig.limitPerAccount) {
        if (saleConfig.limitPerAccount == 0) {
            // Provide a more targeted error if the collection has not been listed.
            revert NFTDropMarketFixedPriceSale_Must_Have_Sale_In_Progress();
        }
        revert NFTDropMarketFixedPriceSale_Cannot_Buy_More_Than_Limit(saleConfig.limitPerAccount);
    }

    // Calculate the total cost, considering the `count` requested.
    uint256 mintCost;
    unchecked {
        // Can not overflow as  $2^{80} * 2^{16} == 2^{96}$  max which fits in 256 bits.
        mintCost = uint256(saleConfig.price) * count;
    }

    // The sale price is immutable so the buyer is aware of how much they will be paying when their tx
    is broadcasted.
    if (msg.value > mintCost) {
        // Since price is known ahead of time, if too much ETH is sent then something went wrong.
        revert NFTDropMarketFixedPriceSale_Too_Much_Value_Provided(mintCost);
    }
    // Withdraw from the user's available FETH balance if insufficient msg.value was included.
    _tryUseFETHBalance(mintCost, false);

    // Mint the NFTs.
    firstTokenId = INFTDropCollectionMint(nftContract).mintCountTo(count, msg.sender);

    // Distribute revenue from this sale.
    (uint256 totalFees, uint256 creatorRev, ) = _distributeFunds(
        nftContract,
        firstTokenId,
        saleConfig.seller,
        mintCost,
        buyReferrer
    );

    emit MintFromFixedPriceDrop(nftContract, msg.sender, firstTokenId, count, totalFees, creatorRev);
}
```

#### Lines

[\[link\]](#)

#### Exploit Scenario

Steps - in one transaction from a smart-contract:

1. Buy one
  2. Transfer this one somewhere
  3. Buy new one
  4. Transfer again
- ...and so one
- n. Transfer all to the one EOA

Result - as many tokens per one account as desired.

#### Recommendation

Options:

- delete this input, accept that it is not possible to limit buys per user
- only EOA should buy
- block sales if tx.origin does not change
- block transfers when sale is on
- something more smart, it is many options possible

## CODE IN THE SCOPE

### GITHUB

Link	<a href="https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-08-foundation/tree/b4e1dc6a9a434d576cb8f74676e7dbb65dacc98d">https://github.com/code-423n4/2022-08-foundation/tree/b4e1dc6a9a434d576cb8f74676e7dbb65dacc98d</a>
Contracts	NFTCollectionFactory.sol NFTCollection.sol NFTDropCollection.sol NFTDropMarket.sol

## FINDINGS STATUS

### MEDIUM

1/1	Acknowledged
2/2	Acknowledged

## REPORT CHANGELOG

The first version of findings can be checked via this links:

[code-423n4/2022-08-foundation-findings/issues/237](#)  
[code-423n4/2022-08-foundation-findings/issues/263](#)

The later versions are published on Odd Sequence Github page, where changes can be tracked:  
<https://github.com/oddsequence>

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