An Empirical Analysis of Monero Cross-Chain Traceability

Abraham Hinteregger^{1,2} Bernhard Haslhofer¹

¹Austrian Institute of Technology

²Vienna University of Technology

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
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
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Decoys are sampled from set of eligible outputs

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 - temporal distribution of mixins and real spending behavior didn't match - most recent input often the real one

Improvements to the protocol


- ZMR works like a chain reaction from an initial set of inputs without decoys.
 - Since 2016, the mandatory minimum ringsize has been increased
 - Minimum ringsizes + RingCT TX were effective
 - Ringsize $\equiv 11$ since last update
- Mixin sampling has been improved with different approaches
 - Triangular distribution
 - Recent zone: Force 25-50% recent outputs
 - Gamma distribution: Distribution based on empirical analysis

Contribution of this work

- Reevaluation of existing methods
 - Previous studies published shortly after introduction of RingCT
 - Changes to mixin sampling and ringsize in 09/2017 and 04/2018.
- Quantification of impact due to recent (Spring 2018)
 Monero hardforks
 - Monero Original: Continuation of Monero v6 (ASIC compatible)
 - MoneroV: Fork with some changes to emission curve

Currency hardforks


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


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- Monero prevents double spends with key images (unique identifier derived from spent output)
- If two rings on separate branches share a key image, they spend the same output.


Dataset & Method

- Exported Monero (XMR), MoneroV (XMV) and Monero Original (XMO) blockchain up to Aug. 31th, 2018.
- Employed Zero Mixin Removal & Intersection Removal
- Added fork data and applied cross chain analysis (+ZMR/IR)
- 4 Applied heuristics from [Kumar et al., 2017] and [Möser et al., 2018]:
 - Guess Newest Heuristic
 - Output Merging Heuristic
- **5** Evaluated accuracy with ground truth (where possible) with results from steps 3 (OMH see paper).

Traced Inputs



Guess Newest Heuristic



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
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 - 2 Mandatory ringsize of 7 enough to prevent chain reactions (11 is even better)

Data & source available:




References


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- Möser, M. et al. (2018). An Empirical Analysis of Traceability in the Monero Blockchain. PoPET, 2018(3):143–163, DOI:
 - 10.1515/popets-2018-0025.
- Van Saberhagen, N. (2013).
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
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
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
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
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





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
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





- TX4 has two inputs which reference a TXO from TX2
- OMH assumes that these outputs are real


Monero Activity







Output Merging Heuristic



Inputs/Outputs (per TX)

