

IP Core Protection using Voltage-Controlled Side-Channel Receivers

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
RUB

IP Protection on FPGAs

```
(cell yy (generic)
  (interfaceC viewType netlist)
  (interfaceC viewType netlist)
  (port CLEAR (direction INPUT))
  (port CLOCK (direction INPUT)) ... )
  (contents
    (instance I_36_1 (viewRef view) (cellRef dff_4)))
    (instance (rename I_36_3 "I$") (viewRef view) (cellRef addsub_4))
  ...
  (net CLEAR
    (joined
      (portRef CLEAR)
      (portRef (CLEAR))
      (joinRef (instanceRef I_36_1)))
      (portRef assc (instanceRef I_36_3))))
```



Netlist

Bitstream



- How to detect illegally used cores *in the field*?
 - Challenges
 - Bitstreams are encrypted
 - IP cores are parts of larger systems

IP Protection using Side-Channels




Verification

- Measure the power consumption
- Correlate the known LFSR sequence to the measurement

(Becker et al., 2010)


Our Contribution

- Establish an input side channel to individual IP Cores using voltage modulation
- (Sun et al., 2011) used temperature (several bits/s)



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Voltage-Based Side-Channel Receivers




1 Supply voltage control

- 3 Voltage levels: V_{reset} , V_0 , V_1 (V_2 is not used)

2 Detection of changes in supply voltage



- Ring oscillator sampled by a fixed clock
- Relative threshold to find rising and falling edges
- Manchester coding

IP Protection




- Embed an SC-receiver into each protected IP core
- Send commands to protected IP cores

Verification




- 1** Send a core-dependent **secret codeword**
- 2** Send commands, observe the behavior of the chip:
 - Turn off the core
 - Set output data to zeros
 - Return to normal operation
 - Deselect core
- 3** If the behavior is unusual then stop, else goto step 2

Experimental Setup



A Proof-of-Concept Implementation



- Digilent board with a Spartan 3 (XC3S200) FPGA¹
- 50MHz external clock
- Voltage control by a breadboard circuit
- Voltage levels $V_{reset} = 0V$, $V_0 = 2.8V$, $V_1 = 3.2V$
- Transmission rate 2.4 KBits/s
- 32-Bit codewords

¹<http://store.digilentinc.com/spartan-3-board-retired/>

The Price to Pay

Codeword size (bits)	N. of slices
32	49
64	70
80	81
128	111

- Need to try several codewords (in the worst case all)
- Cannot measure once and try them all just on the data
- Cores without clock cannot be protected
- More recent work on SASEBO-GII board²
 - Spartan 3 FPGA for control
 - Virtex 5 (XC5VLX50) FPGA for measurements
 - *Same breadboard circuit didn't work* (voltage regulator)

²<http://satoh.cs.uec.ac.jp/SASEBO/en/board/sasebo-g2.html>

Summary and Future Work

- Voltage-controlled side-channel receiver on FPGAs
 - IP protection of individual cores
 - Strong proof of IP ownership
- Other applications
 - Hardware trojans triggered by a codeword
 - Protection against counterfeits
- Future work
 - Testing other FPGAs and boards
 - Addressing voltage regulators
 - Two-way side-channel communication

References

- Becker, G., Kasper, M., Moradi, A., and Paar, C. (2010). Side-channel based watermarks for integrated circuits. In *Hardware-Oriented Security and Trust (HOST), 2010 IEEE International Symposium on*, pages 30–35.
- Sun, J., Bittner, R., and Eguro, K. (2011). FPGA side-channel receivers. In *Proceedings of the 19th ACM/SIGDA International Symposium on Field Programmable Gate Arrays*, FPGA '11, pages 267–276, New York, NY, USA. ACM.