



Title:

Reverse Engineering: Anti-Cracking Techniques

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Introduction

This paper is a guide into better understanding most of the approaches a reverse engineer can follow in order to achieve his goal. Additionally, it includes a number of advices on how to better protect your software against tracing its sensitive information, like serial key checks and authentication procedures. This paper is not about changing anyone's ideals; this paper is about people that believe that reverse engineering can create a safer world. So if you are not one of those individuals then stop reading, for this is not for you.

Note that this paper might not cover the wide range of techniques used by reverse engineers so if you feel that something is missing, please do not hesitate to email with your suggestions.

TODO

Subjects to cover:

- PE packers and crypt tools
- Online checks
- Malware analysis
- x64 reverse engineering
- Discovering and exploiting vulnerabilities

Any other suggestions are welcome. If you feel that you have something to contribute and/or offer, do not hesitate to email.

Reverse Engineering Tools

A number of reverse engineering tools are available over the net, a number of them are free and others need purchasing. Some of the most advanced disassembling and debugging tools out there are:

- OllyDBG [<http://www.ollydbg.de/>] (Version 2 expected soon)
- IDA Pro Disassembler and Debugger [<http://www.hex-rays.com/>]
- W32Dasm [<http://www.google.com>] (Old, but you will be amazed with some of its functions)
- SoftICE (Stopped being supported from April 2006)
- WinDbg [<http://www.microsoft.com/whdc/devtools/debugging/default.mspx>]

Additionally, a number of other tools can be used as well. The names of the tools and their description are listed below:

- PROTECTiON iD [<http://pid.gamecopyworld.com/>]
Used for scanning windows system executables for known packer/encryptor signatures and identifying the compiler of the program [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Executable_compression]
- Import REConstructor [<http://www.google.com/>]
Used for repairing damaged import table (IAT) of executables
- System Internals [<http://technet.microsoft.com/en-us/sysinternals/default.aspx>]
Programs like FileMon, RegMon can be used to monitor the program's behavior. An alternative approach to this is a sandbox that provides information for all program activities.



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Reverse Engineering Approaches

We will begin looking into the approaches a reverse engineer uses. The preferred debugger used in this section will be a modified version of OllyDBG, the original version will do as well.

Example Software


Program Name: Example.v1.0.exe (Serial Check)

Md5sum: 4c78179f07c33e0f9ec8f2b0509bd069


Compiler: Borland Delphi

Program Analysis

To begin with, we need to analyze the program functionality in order to determine our approach and better understand how it works.



As you can see, the program form is simple. The main functionality is a username and serial check. Our first step is to insert random data inside the Text boxes, click "Check" and observe the program response.



The result gives us a hint that before the serial check algorithm we should expect a function that checks if the Serial string length within the given boundaries by the programmer.


Next, we move to the stage of disassembling and debugging the application in order to gather more information regarding the way it works. What is going to follow is a number of approaches a reverse engineer might use and some suggestions on hardening your software.



Approach No1 (String References)

Step 1:

Right Click > Search for > All referenced text strings



Step 2:

As you can see, the message text string easily links to the dialog box. By double clicking on the string, you get transferred directly to the dialog procedure

```
00456F96 PUSH Example_.00456FA8
00456F98 PUSH Example_.00456FB0
00456F9C ASCII ".:ish:."
00456F9D ASCII "The Serial number you entered is too short or too long"
00456F9E ASCII ".:ish:.,0
00456F9F ASCII "r you entered is"
00456F00 ASCII " too short or to"
00456F01 ASCII "o long"
00456F02 PUSH Example_.00456FFC
00456F04 PUSH Example_.00457004
00456F0C ASCII ".:ish:."
00456F0D ASCII "The Serial number you entered is not valid"
00456F0E ASCII ".:ish:.,0
00456F0F ASCII "r you entered is"
00456F10 ASCII " not valid"
00456F11 PUSH Example_.00457044
00456F13 PUSH Example_.0045704C
00456F14 ASCII ".:ish:."
00456F15 ASCII "Thank You for registering."
```

Step 3:

Although the program Serial Check is coded with a level of difficulty, a reverse engineer with little experience can trace where this function is called and patch the program flow

```
00456F94 [ $ 68 90 PUSH 0
00456F96 . 68 B86F4500 PUSH Example_.00456FA8
00456F98 . 68 B86F4500 PUSH Example_.00456FB0
00456FA0 . 6A 00 PUSH 0
00456FA2 . E8 F9FCFAFF CALL <JMP.&user32.MessageBoxA>
00456FA7 [ C3 RETN
00456FA8 . 2E 3A 69 73 ASCII ".:ish:.,0
00456FB0 . 54 68 65 20 ASCII "The Serial number"
00456FC0 . 72 20 79 6F ASCII "r you entered is"
00456FD0 . 20 74 6F 6F ASCII " too short or to"
00456FE0 . 6F 20 6C 6F ASCII "o long",0
00456FE7 00 DB 00
```




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Step 4:

For now, we set a Label on the start of this function (for easier reference). We do that by:


Right Click > Label



And set a Label: "Long/Short Error"

Step 5:


As you can see at the bottom, this function is called from 3 different addresses which are fairly close to each other.



Step 6:

We trace back to the first occurred call (004571B7)

Right Click > Go to CALL from 004571B7





And we have successfully landed inside the serial check procedure algorithm

```
004571B7 . E8 08FDFFFF CALL <Example_.Long/Short_Error>
004571BC .> EB 6D JMP SHORT Example_.0045722B
004571BE > 8D55 EC LEA EDX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-14]
004571C1 . 8BC6 MOV EAX,ESI
004571C3 . E8 7412FBFF CALL Example_.0040843C
004571C8 . 8B45 EC MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-14]
004571CB . 8D40 FF LEA ECX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-1]
004571CE . BA 01000000 MOV EDX,1
004571D3 . E8 6CFDFFFF CALL Example_.00456F44
004571D8 . 807D FF 31 CMP BYTE PTR SS:[EBP-1],31
004571DC .> 74 07 JE SHORT Example_.004571E5
004571DE . E8 B1FDFFFF CALL <Example_.Long/Short_Error>
004571E3 .> EB 46 JMP SHORT Example_.0045722B
004571E5 > 8D55 E8 LEA EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-18]
004571E8 . 8BC6 MOV EAX,ESI
004571EA . E8 4D12FBFF CALL Example_.0040843C
004571EF . 8B45 E8 MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-18]
004571F2 . 8D40 FF LEA ECX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-1]
004571F5 . BA 02000000 MOV EDX,2
004571FA . E8 45FDFFFF CALL Example_.00456F44
004571FF . 8D45 E4 LEA EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-1C]
00457202 . 0FB655 FF MOVZX EDX,BYTE PTR SS:[EBP-1]
00457206 . E8 25D6FAFF CALL Example_.00404830
0045720B . 8B55 E4 MOV EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-1C]
0045720E . 8B83 6803000 MOV EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+368]
00457214 . E8 CB19FEFF CALL Example_.00438BE4
00457219 . 807D FF 34 CMP BYTE PTR SS:[EBP-1],34
0045721D .> 74 07 JF SHORT Example_.00457226
```

Suggestions (Approach No1)

In order to avoid tracing sensitive program functions through looking up string references, a programmer could follow the steps:

- Store strings in global variables or better inside arrays and then reference to them when needed.

Pseudo Code Example:

```
array[] myMsges = {'The Serial number you entered is too short or too long',
                    'The Serial number you entered is not valid',
                    'Thank You for registering.'}

//Code omitted

function registrationCheck():

    if(invalid_length) then
        sendMessage(myMsges[0])

    if(invalid_serial) then
        sendMessage(myMsges[1])

    if(valid_serial) then
        sendMessage(myMsges[2])
```

Additionally, the programmer could encrypt the strings inside the array and decrypt them when they are needed (there is no need for an advanced encryption, just a simple algorithm)



//This can be done separately.

//Let's assume that the result of this code will be: 'dkg\$2 kF2 gkfoaplk'

```
string thank_you = 'Thank You for registering'
```

```
for(each letter in thank_you) do  
add_5_to_ascii_value(letter)  
print thank_you
```

```
//program serial check  
If(valid_serial) then  
sendMessage(decrypt('dkg$2 kF2 gkfoaplk'))
```

- Store strings inside a file or registry


Approach No2 (Breakpoint on windows API)

In this approach we will make use of a breakpoint on MessageBoxA API. Some programs might use MessageBoxW, MessageBoxExA or MessageBoxExW.

Step 1:

(Using Ollydbg's Command Bar plug-in)


Type in "bp MessageBoxA" and then Hit enter



(Using Ollydbg's Names window)

Press Alt+E to switch to "Executable Modules" list > Select your executable and click Ctrl+N > Find

MessageBoxA > Right Click > "Toggle breakpoint on import"





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Step 2:

Run the program > Insert random data > Press Check

Now you break at MessageBoxA API inside User32

7E450702	8BFF	MOV EDI, EDI
7E450704	55	PUSH EBP
7E450705	8BEC	MOV EBP, ESP
7E450707	833D BC14477E	CMP DWORD PTR DS:[7E4714BC], 0
7E45070E	v 74 24	JE SHORT USER32.7E450734
7E450710	64:A1 18000000	MOV EAX, DWORD PTR FS:[18]
7E450716	6A 00	PUSH 0
7E450718	FF70 24	PUSH DWORD PTR DS:[EAX+24]
7E45071B	68 241B477E	PUSH USER32.7E471B24
7E450720	FF15 C412417E	CALL DWORD PTR DS:[<&KERNEL32.Interlock>.kernel32.In]
7E450726	85C0	TEST EAX, EAX
7E450728	v 75 0A	JNZ SHORT USER32.7E450734
7E45072A	C705 201B477E	MOV DWORD PTR DS:[7E471B20], 1
7E450734	6A 00	PUSH 0
7E450736	FF75 14	PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+14]
7E450739	FF75 10	PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+10]
7E45073C	FF75 0C	PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+C]
7E45073F	FF75 08	PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8]
7E450742	E8 20000000	CALL USER32.MessageBoxExA
7E450747	5D	POP EBP
7E450748	C2 1000	RETN 16
7E45074B	90	NOP
7E45074C	90	NOP
7E45074D	90	NOP
7E45074E	90	NOP

Step 3:

Execute program until return (Ctrl+F9 or F8 until the end)

7E450736	FF75 14	PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+14]
7E450739	FF75 10	PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+10]
7E45073C	FF75 0C	PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+C]
7E45073F	FF75 08	PUSH DWORD PTR SS:[EBP+8]
7E450742	E8 20000000	CALL USER32.MessageBoxExA
7E450747	5D	POP EBP
7E450748	C2 1000	RETN 16
7E45074B	90	NOP
7E45074C	90	NOP
7E45074D	90	NOP
7E45074E	90	NOP

Step 4:

Step outside the function (F8)

00456F94	\$ 6A 00	PUSH 0	Style = MB
00456F96	- 68 A86F4500	PUSH Example_.00456FA8	Title = ""
00456F98	- 68 B06F4500	PUSH Example_.00456FB0	Text = "Th
00456FA0	- 6A 00	PUSH 0	nOwner = N
00456FA2	E8 F9FCFAFF	CALL <JMP.&user32.MessageBoxA>	
00456FA7	L C3	RETN	
00456FA8	- 2E 3A 69 73	ASCII ".:ish:.",0	
00456FB0	- 54 68 65 20	ASCII "The Serial number"	
00456FC0	- 72 20 79 6F	ASCII "r you entered is"	
00456FD0	- 20 74 6F 6F	ASCII " too short or to"	
00456FE0	- 6F 20 6C 6F	ASCII "n long".,0	

As you can see we ended up in the same place we did in Approach No1, Step 3.

Suggestions (Approach No2)

In order to avoid tracing your program through setting breakpoints using API breakpoints a programmer should limit their uses. Code your programs with the minimum of API calls; create your own message boxes instead of using API's.



Approach No3 (Stack Tracing)

Another interesting approach a reverse engineer can use is “stack tracing”. Stack tracing, is the technique of tracing back your steps through the stack.

When the “CALL <procedure>” instruction is executed by the CPU, the value of the Instruction Pointer (EIP), plus the number of bytes until the next instruction, is pushed inside the stack. When the procedure finishes and the “RETN” instruction is reached the processor pops the value from the stack and returns to the previous function.

Let's assume:

Offset	Opcode
1	PUSH 0
2	CALL 0xF
3	TEST EAX,EAX

When “CALL 0xF” runs, the value of offset 3 is pushed inside the stack

Offset	Opcode
F	MOV EAX,1
10	RETN
11	NOP

When RETN runs the value of offset 3 POPs from the stack and placed into EIP

Step 1:

Run the program > Enter random data > Click Confirm > Pause the program



Step 2:

Open the “Call stack” window





There are a number of functions calling each other. The function we can use to trace into the main program registration routine is MessageBoxExA but that is not efficient. We need to see what calls that function.

Address	Stack	Procedure / arguments	Called from
0012F06C	7E419408	Includes ntdll.KiFastSystemCallRet	USER32.7E419406
0012F070	7E42E2B2	USER32.WaitMessage	USER32.7E42E2B0
0012F0A4	7E42636F	USER32.7E42E123	USER32.7E42636A
0012F0CC	7E43A93E	USER32.7E4262B9	USER32.7E43A939
0012F38C	7E43A2A4	USER32.SoftModalMessageBox	USER32.7E43A29F
0012F4DC	7E46634D	USER32.7E43A12F	USER32.7E466348
0012F534	7E4663F2	USER32.MessageBoxTimeoutW	USER32.7E4663ED
0012F568	7E45078F	? USER32.MessageBoxTimeoutA	USER32.7E45078A
0012F588	7E450747	? USER32.MessageBoxExA	USER32.7E450742
0012F58C	00000000	hOwner = NULL	
0012F590	00456FB0	Text = "The Serial number you ente	
0012F594	00456FA8	Title = ".:ish:."	
0012F598	00000000	Style = MB_OK MB_APPLMOD	
0012F59C	00000000	LanguageID = 0 (LANG_NEUTRAL)	

Step 3:

Right Click > Follow address in stack

0012F534	7E4663F2	USER32.MessageBoxTimeoutW	USER32.7E4663ED
0012F568	7E45078F	? USER32.MessageBoxTimeoutA	USER32.7E45078A
0012F588	7E450747	? USER32.MessageBoxExA	
0012F58C	00000000	hOwner = NULL	
0012F590	00456FB0	Text = "The Serial number you ente	
0012F594	00456FA8	Title = ".:ish:."	
0012F598	00000000	Style = MB_OK MB_APPLMOD	
0012F59C	00000000	LanguageID = 0 (LANG_NEU	

Actualize
Hide arguments Space

Follow address in stack
Show procedure Enter
Show call
Execute to return F4

Step 4:

7E450747	RETURN to USER32.7E450747 from USER32.MessageBoxExA
00000000	
00456FB0	ASCII "The Serial number you entered is too short or too long"
00456FA8	ASCII ".:ish:."
00000000	
0012F5EC	
00456FA7	Example_.00456FA7
00000000	
00456FB0	ASCII "The Serial number you entered is too short or too long"
00456FA8	ASCII ".:ish:."
00000000	
004571E3	RETURN to Example_.004571E3 from <Example_.Long/Short Error>
0012F930	Pointer to next SEH record
00457253	SE handler
0012F5EC	
00429804	Example_.00429804
00A58420	
00000000	
00A75078	
00000000	

RETURN to USER32.7E450747 from USER32.MessageBoxExA

It is obvious that USER32.7E450747 is MessageBoxA

(If you don't know why, look at the code inside user32.dll)



Therefore the function we look for is located at:

Example_.00456FA7 (highlighted above)

```

00456F94  $ 6A 00    PUSH 0
00456F96  [ 68 A86F4500 PUSH Example_.00456FA8
00456F9B  : 68 B06F4500 PUSH Example_.00456FB0
00456FA0  [ 6A 00    PUSH 0
00456FA2  E8 F9FCFAFF CALL <JMP.&user32.MessageBoxA>
00456FA7 L. C3      RETN
00456FA8  . 2E 3A 69 73 ASCII ".:ish:.",0
00456FB0  . 54 68 65 20 ASCII "The Serial number"
00456FC0  . 72 20 79 6F ASCII "r you entered is"
00456FD0  . 20 74 6F 6F ASCII " too short or to"
00456FEF  . 6E 20 8C 6F ASCII "n long".A

```

Suggestions (Approach No3)

Avoiding stack tracing is a hard technique. One might argue that we could do so by replacing all the sensitive procedure “CALL” and “RETN” instructions inside your program with “JMP”. This is called “Binary Code Obfuscation”.

Code Obfuscation is the technique of transforming the original program binary code thus rendering it unreadable and harder to analyze by static disassembly. Although this confuses reverse engineers, it doesn't protect the software; it only delays the code analysis.

The basic idea behind CO is to combine Data and Code sections. Additionally, obfuscation replaces the following OPCODES in order to avoid disassembly and stack tracing:

- Replace of CALL with PUSH, POP, RET and JMP. And replace JMP with PUSH and RET.
- For example:

Original Code:
PUSH 0
CALL 7E450747

Obfuscated Code:
PUSH 0
PUSH EIP + <bytes to next instruction>
JMP 7E450747

Original Code:
MOV EBX,1
RETN

Obfuscated Code:
POP EAX
JMP EAX

Original Code:
JMP 00456F94

Obfuscated Code:
PUSH 00456F94
RETN

- Replace JMP branches with conditional branches (e.g.: JE, JNZ, JL) that are always satisfied. Additionally, this way you can confuse reversers and lead them to a junk code section.

Original Code:
JMP 00456F94

Obfuscated Code:
MOV EAX, 1
CMP EAX, 0
JE <JUNK_CODE>
JNE 00456F94

- Add partial instructions at unreachable areas.



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- Avoid using direct references to offsets (e.g.: JMP 00456F94). Use simple calculations to obfuscate that offset and then call it. For example:

```
MOV EAX, 00456000      ; EAX = 00456000
ADD EAX, 00000F94      ; EAX = 00456F94
JMP EAX                ; JMP 00456F94
```

Binary Code Patching:

As you can see from Approach No1, Step 6:

The screenshot shows a debugger interface with assembly code. The code is heavily annotated with yellow boxes highlighting various instructions. The annotations include:

- CALL <Example_.Long/Short_Error>
- JMP SHORT Example_.0045722B
- LEA EDX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-14]
- MOV EAX, ESI
- CALL Example_.0040843C
- MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-14]
- LEA ECX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-1]
- MOV EDX, 1
- CALL Example_.00456F44
- CMP BYTE PTR SS:[EBP-1], 31
- JE SHORT Example_.004571E5
- CALL <Example_.Long/Short_Error>
- JMP SHORT Example_.0045722B
- LEA EDX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-18]
- MOV EAX, ESI
- CALL Example_.0040843C
- MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-18]
- LEA ECX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-1]
- MOV EDX, 2
- CALL Example_.00456F44
- LEA EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-1C]
- MOVZX EDX, BYTE PTR SS:[EBP-1]
- E8 25D6FAFF CALL Example_.00404830
- MOV EDX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-1C]
- MOV EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+368]
- MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-11], 34
- CMP BYTE PTR SS:[EBP-11], 34
- JF SHORT Example_.0045722B

This is the actual algorithm that determines whenever the serial code inserted is valid or not and informs the user of his “mistake” to properly validate his registration.

There is a number of ways reversers use in order to successfully patch the code and control its flow. Before we do that, we have to analyze the actual code and understand where our actual goal lies at.



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Step 1:

Scroll up and set a breakpoint near or at the function start (To set a breakpoint select the instruction you would like to break on and then press F2) > Run the program

```

00457148 : 53          PUSH EBP
00457149 : 8BEC        MOV EBP,ESP
0045714B : 33C9        XOR ECX,ECX
0045714D : 51          PUSH ECX
0045714E : 51          PUSH ECX
0045714F : 51          PUSH ECX
00457150 : 51          PUSH ECX
00457151 : 51          PUSH ECX
00457152 : 51          PUSH ECX
00457153 : 51          PUSH ECX
00457154 : 53          PUSH EBX
00457155 : 56          PUSH ESI
00457156 : 8B08        MOV EBX,EAX
00457158 : 33C0        XOR EAX,EAX
0045715A : 55          PUSH EBP
0045715B : 68 53724500 PUSH Example_.00457253
00457160 : 64:FF30      PUSH DWORD PTR FS:[EAX]
00457163 : 64:8920      MOV DWORD PTR FS:[EAX],ESP
00457166 : 8D55 F8      LEA EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-8]
00457169 : 8B83 6C030000 MOV EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+36C]
0045716F : E8 401AFEFF  CALL Example_.00438BB4
00457174 : 8B55 F8      MOV EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-8]
00457177 : B8 04E54500  MOU EDX,DWORD PTR Example_.0045E5A4
0045717C : E8 1BD5FAFF  CALL Example_.0040469C
00457181 : 8D55 F4      LEA EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-C]
00457184 : 8B83 70030000 MOV EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+370]
00457188 : E8 251AFEFF  CALL Example_.00438BB4

```

Step 2:

Step each instruction and try to understand what this code is for.

As you can see in the images below, the CALL instruction at offset 0045716F returns the pointer of the string given by the user inside the "Username:" text box.

Code Section:

```

00457160 : 64:FF30      PUSH DWORD PTR FS:[EAX]
00457163 : 64:8920      MOV DWORD PTR FS:[EAX],ESP
00457166 : 8D55 F8      LEA EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-8]
00457169 : 8B83 6C030000 MOV EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+36C]
0045716F : E8 401AFEFF  CALL Example_.00438BB4
00457174 : 8B55 F8      MOV EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-8]
00457177 : B8 A4E54500  MOU EAX,Example_.0045E5A4
0045717C : E8 1BD5FAFF  CALL Example_.0040469C
00457181 : 8D55 F4      LEA EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-C]
00457184 : 8B83 70030000 MOV EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+370]
00457188 : E8 251AFEFF  CALL Example_.00438BB4

```

Current Instruction:

```

00457163 : E8 2CE0FFFF  CALL Example_.00456F44

```

Stack SS:[0012F5E4]=00C2C788, (ASCII "ishtus")
EDX=00140608

Address	Hex dump	ASCII
00459000	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 8D 40 00 F4 EF 40 00	...@.rn@.
00459010	E0 03 41 00 08 F3 40 00 3C F6 40 00 5C FD 40 00	o@A:s@.<@.z@.

Stack:

0012F5E0	00000000
0012F5E4	00C2C788 ASCII "ishtus"
0012F5E8	00000000
0012F5EC	0012F730
0012F5F0	0043A702 RETURN to Example_.0043A702
0012F5F4	00C08420
0012F5F8	00429827 RETURN to Example_.00429827 from Example_.0043A698
0012F5FC	0012F78C
0012F600	00429925 RETURN to Example_.00429925 from Example_.00403A30
0012F604	00C08420
0012F608	0043A1F9 RETURN to Example_.0043A1F9



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The following CALL instruction at offset 0045718F returns the pointer of the string given by the user inside the "Serial:" text box.

Code Section:

0045717C	.	E8 1B05FAFF	CALL Example_.0040469C
00457181	.	8D55 F4	LEA EDX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-C]
00457184	.	8B83 70030000	MOV EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+370]
0045718A	.	E8 251AFFF	CALL Example_.00438BB4
0045718F	.	8B55 F4	MOV EDX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-C]
00457192	.	B8 A8E54500	MOV EAX, Example_.0045E5A8
00457197	.	E8 00D5FAFF	CALL Example_.0040469C
0045719C	.	A1 A8E54500	MOV EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[45E5A8]
004571A1	.	8945 F0	MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-10], EAX
004571A4	.	8B45 F0	MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-10]
004571A7	.	85C0	TEST EAX, EAX

Current Instruction:

004571C2	.	B8 0123456789	MOV EDX, 1
004571D3	.	E8 6C00FFFF	CALL Example_.00456F44

Stack SS:[0012F5E0]=00C2C7A0, (ASCII "0123456789")
EDX=00140608

Address	Hex dump	ASCII
00459000	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 8D 40 00 F4 EF 40 00@.r0@.
00459010	E0 03 41 00 08 F3 40 00 3C F6 40 00 5C FD 40 00	@@A.@@.@@.@@.@@.

Stack:

0012F5E0	0012F5E0	Pointer to next SCN record
0012F5C0	00457253	SE handler
0012F5C4	0012F5EC	
0012F5C8	00429804	Example_.00429804
0012F5CC	00C08420	
0012F5D0	00000000	
0012F5D4	00000000	
0012F5D8	00000000	
0012F5DC	00000000	
0012F5E0	00C2C7A0	ASCII "0123456789"
0012F5E4	00C2C788	ASCII "ishtus"
0012F5E8	00000000	

The following code loads the serial number given by the user into EAX, then checks if it is equal to null.

Apparently the value pointed by 0045E5A8 (see offset 0045719C) is the given serial ASCII value which eventually is loaded into EAX at offset 004571A4.

```
If (EAX == null) {
//do something
}
```

00457181	.	8D55 F4	LEA EDX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-C]
00457184	.	8B83 70030000	MOV EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+370]
0045718A	.	E8 251AFFF	CALL Example_.00438BB4
0045718F	.	8B55 F4	MOV EDX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-C]
00457192	.	B8 A8E54500	MOV EAX, Example_.0045E5A8
00457197	.	E8 00D5FAFF	CALL Example_.0040469C
0045719C	.	A1 A8E54500	MOV EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[45E5A8]
004571A1	.	8945 F0	MOV DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-10], EAX
004571A4	.	8B45 F0	MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-10]
004571A7	.	85C0	TEST EAX, EAX
004571A9	.	74 05	JE SHORT Example_.004571B0



Registers Window:

Registers (FPU)	
EAX	00C2C7A0 ASCII "0123456789"
ECX	00000002
EDX	00000000
EBX	00BE7180
ESP	0012F5BC
EBP	0012F5EC
ESI	00429804 Example_.00429804
EDI	0012F78C
EIP	004571A9 Example_.004571A9

As you can see there is another length check. This time ESI holds the current length of our serial (in our case its 0xA Hexadecimal = 10 Decimal) which is compared with the hexadecimal number 0x01 which is equal to decimal 1. If the length of our serial is equal to one, then “Long/Short Error” is called (see Approach No1, Step 4)

Code Section:

. 83FE 01	CMP ESI, 1
.~ 75 07	JNZ SHORT Example_.004571BE
. E8 D8FDFFFF	CALL <Example_.Long/Short_Error>
. EB 60	JMP SHORT Example_.0045722B
> 8D55 EC	LEA EDX DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-14]
. 8BC6	MOV EAX, ESI
. E8 7412FBFF	CALL Example_.0040843C
. 8B45 EC	MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-14]
. 8D4D FF	LEA ECX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-1]
. BA 01000000	MOV EDX, 1
. E8 6CFDFFFF	CALL Example_.00456F44

Registers Window:

Registers (FPU)	
EAX	0000000A
ECX	00000002
EDX	00000000
EBX	00BE7180
ESP	0012F5BC
EBP	0012F5EC
ESI	0000000A
EDI	0012F78C
EIP	004571B5 Example_.004571B5

The following highlighted code compares the first string character from the serial decimal length (10) with the ASCII value 0x31, which is equal to “1”. For those who are wondering how the length was converted into an ASCII string you can follow the call at the offset 004571C3 then have a look at the following loop:

```

0040840D |> /31D2    /XOR EDX,EDX
0040840F |. |F7F1    |DIV ECX
00408411 |. |4E      |DEC ESI
00408412 |. |80C2 30 |ADD DL,30
00408415 |. |80FA 3A |CMP DL,3A
00408418 |. |72 03    |JB SHORT Example_.0040841D
0040841A |. |80C2 07 |ADD DL,7
0040841D |>|8816    |MOV BYTE PTR DS:[ESI],DL
0040841F |. |09C0    |OR EAX,EAX
00408421 |.^75 EA    |JNZ SHORT Example_.0040840D

```

0040840D	. 31D2	XOR EDX,EDX
0040840F	. F7F1	DIV ECX
00408411	. 4E	DEC ESI
00408412	. 80C2 30	ADD DL,30
00408415	. 80FA 3A	CMP DL,3A
00408418	.~ 72 03	JB SHORT Example_.0040841D
0040841A	. 80C2 07	ADD DL,7
0040841D	> 8816	MOV BYTE PTR DS:[ESI],DL
0040841F	. 09C0	OR EAX,EAX
00408421	.^ 75 EA	JNZ SHORT Example_.0040840D
00408423	59	POP ECX



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Code Section:

004571B7	. E8 08FDFFFF	CALL <Example_.Long/Short_Error>
004571BC	.> EB 60	JMP SHORT Example_.0045722B
004571BE	> 8D55 EC	LEA EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-14]
004571C1	. 8BC6	MOV EAX,ESI
004571C3	. E8 7412FBFF	CALL Example_.0040843C
004571C8	. 8B45 EC	MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-14]
004571CB	. 8D40 FF	LEA ECX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-1]
004571CE	. BA 01000000	MOV EDX,1
004571D3	. E8 6CFDFFFF	CALL Example_.00456F44
004571D8	.> 8070 FF 31	CMP BYTE PTR SS:[EBP-1],?J
004571DC	.> 74 07	JE SHORT Example_.004571E5

Current Operation:

0045722E	. 59	POP ECX									
0045722F	. 59	POP ECX									
Stack SS:[0012F5EB]=31 ('1')											
<table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th>Address</th> <th>Hex dump</th> <th>ASCII</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>00459000</td> <td>00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 8D 40 00 F4 EF 40 00</td> <td>.....@.m@.</td> </tr> <tr> <td>00459010</td> <td>E0 02 41 00 02 F2 48 00 2C F6 48 00 5C FB 48 00</td> <td>~o@.a@.c@.s@.</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>			Address	Hex dump	ASCII	00459000	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 8D 40 00 F4 EF 40 00@.m@.	00459010	E0 02 41 00 02 F2 48 00 2C F6 48 00 5C FB 48 00	~o@.a@.c@.s@.
Address	Hex dump	ASCII									
00459000	00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 8D 40 00 F4 EF 40 00@.m@.									
00459010	E0 02 41 00 02 F2 48 00 2C F6 48 00 5C FB 48 00	~o@.a@.c@.s@.									

The following does the same thing like above, but for the second number. In this case, the second number must be equal to 0x34 ASCII ("4").

004571FF	. 8D45 E4	LEA EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-1C]
00457202	. 0FB655 FF	MOVZX EDX,BYTE PTR SS:[EBP-1]
00457206	. E8 25D6FAFF	CALL Example_.00404830
0045720B	. 8B55 E4	MOV EDX,DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-1C]
0045720E	. 8B83 68030000	MOV EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+368]
00457214	. E8 CB19FEFF	CALL Example_.00438BE4
00457219	.> 8070 FF 34	CMP BYTE PTR SS:[EBP-1],?4
0045721D	.> 74 07	JE SHORT Example_.00457226
0045721F	. E8 70FDFFFF	CALL <Example_.Long/Short_Error>
00457224	.> EB 05	JMP SHORT Example_.0045722B
00457226	.> E8 3DFFFFFF	CALL Example_.00457068

So the code of this program until now should look like this:

```
char first = getChar(length,1,?); //Get first character
if (first != '1') {
    char second = getChar(length,2,?); //Get second character
    if(second != '4') {
        //continue with serial check
    }
    else {
        sendLongShortError();
    }
}
else {
    sendLongShortError();
}
```

Note: the character "?" shows an unknown value which most likely is the data type the returned value is stored in. (Delphi compiler).

Most likely, the serial number you inserted does not have the valid length of 14 characters. Therefore you can press F9 and type the serial again.



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Step 3:

Follow the call at offset 00457226 (by pressing F7) as shown in the image below

```
0045720E . 8B83 68030000 MOV EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+368]
00457214 . E8 CB19FEFF CALL Example_.00438BE4
00457219 . 807D FF 34 CMP BYTE PTR SS:[EBP-1], 34
0045721D .~ 74 07 JE SHORT Example_.00457226
0045721F . E8 70FDFFFF CALL <Example_.Long/Short_Error>
00457224 .~ EB 05 JMP SHORT Example_.0045722B
00457226 > E8 30FEFFFF CALL Example_.00457068
0045722B > 33C0 XOR EAX,EAX
0045722D . 5A POP EDX
0045722E . 59 POP ECX
0045722F . 59 POP ECX
```

Step 4:

Let's have a look at the code below

```
00457068 /$ 53 PUSH EBX
00457069 |. 56 PUSH ESI
0045706A |. 57 PUSH EDI
0045706B |. 55 PUSH EBP
0045706C |. 83C4 F8 ADD ESP,-8
0045706F |. BB 01000000 MOV EBX,1
00457074 |. BE ACE54500 MOV ESI,Example_.0045E5AC
00457079 > 8BCE /MOV ECX,ESI
0045707B |. 8BD3 |MOV EDX,EBX
0045707D |. A1 A8E54500 |MOV EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[45E5A8]
00457082 |. E8 BDFFEFF CALL Example_.00456F44
00457087 |. 43 |INC EBX
00457088 |. 46 |INC ESI
00457089 |. 83FB 0F |CMP EBX,0F
0045708C |.^ 75 EB \JNZ SHORT Example_.00457079
0045708E |. A1 A4E54500 MOV EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[45E5A4]
00457093 |. 894424 04 MOV DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+4],EAX
00457097 |. 8B4424 04 MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[ESP+4]
0045709B |. 85C0 TEST EAX,EAX
0045709D |. 74 05 JE SHORT Example_.004570A4
0045709F |. 83E8 04 SUB EAX,4
004570A2 |. 8B00 MOV EAX,DWORD PTR DS:[EAX]
004570A4 > 85C0 TEST EAX,EAX
004570A6 |. 7E 16 JLE SHORT Example_.004570BE
004570A8 |. BB 01000000 MOV EBX,1
004570AD > 8B15 A4E54500 /MOV EDX,DWORD PTR DS:[45E5A4]
004570B3 |. 0FB6541A FF |MOVZX EDX,BYTE PTR DS:[EDX+EBX-1]
004570B8 |. 03EA |ADD EBP,EDX
004570BA |. 43 |INC EBX
004570BB |. 48 |DEC EAX
004570BC |.^ 75 EF \JNZ SHORT Example_.004570AD
004570BE > BB 0E000000 MOV EBX,0E
004570C3 |. B8 ACE54500 MOV EAX,Example_.0045E5AC
004570C8 |. BA BCE54500 MOV EDX,Example_.0045E5BC
004570CD > 0FB608 /MOVZX ECX,BYTE PTR DS:[EAX]
004570D0 |. 890A |MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EDX],ECX
004570D2 |. 83C2 04 |ADD EDX,4
004570D5 |. 40 |INC EAX
004570D6 |. 4B |DEC EBX
004570D7 |.^ 75 F4 \JNZ SHORT Example_.004570CD
004570D9 > 803D ACE54500> /CMP BYTE PTR DS:[45E5AC],7B
004570E0 |. 74 07 |JE SHORT Example_.004570E9
004570E2 |. BF 01000000 |MOV EDI,1
004570E7 |. EB 46 |JMP SHORT Example_.0045712F
004570E9 > 8BC5 |MOV EAX,EBP
```



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004570EB . B9 0A000000	MOV ECX,0A
004570F0 . 99	CDQ
004570F1 . F7F9	DIV ECX
004570F3 . 0FB605 ADE545>	MOVZX EAX,BYTE PTR DS:[45E5AD]
004570FA . 3BD0	CMP EDX,EAX
004570FC . 75 06	JNZ SHORT Example_.00457104
004570FE . 830424 02	ADD DWORD PTR SS:[ESP],2
00457102 . EB 2B	JMP SHORT Example_.0045712F
00457104 > BB 0C000000	MOV EBX,0C
00457109 . BE ADE54500	MOV ESI,Example_.0045E5AD
0045710E > 0FB606	MOVZX EAX,BYTE PTR DS:[ESI]
00457111 . B9 0A000000	MOV ECX,0A
00457116 . 33D2	XOR EDX,EDX
00457118 . F7F1	DIV ECX
0045711A . 8BCA	MOV ECX,EDX
0045711C . 83F9 0E	CMP ECX,0E
0045711F . 73 0A	JNB SHORT Example_.0045712B
00457121 . 83F9 01	CMP ECX,1
00457124 . 76 05	JBE SHORT Example_.0045712B
00457126 . E8 05FFFFFF	CALL <Example_.thank you>
0045712B > 46	INC ESI
0045712C . 4B	DEC EBX
0045712D .^ 75 DF	JNZ SHORT Example_.0045710E
0045712F > 83FF 01	CMP EDI,1
00457132 .^ 75 A5	JNZ SHORT Example_.004570D9
00457134 . 8B0424	MOV EAX,DWORD PTR SS:[ESP]
00457137 . 83E8 02	SUB EAX,2
0045713A . 75 05	JNZ SHORT Example_.00457141
0045713C . E8 A7FEFFFF	CALL <Example_.invalid number>
00457141 > 59	POP ECX
00457142 . 5A	POP EDX
00457143 . 5D	POP EBP
00457144 . 5F	POP EDI
00457145 . 5E	POP ESI
00457146 . 5B	POP EBX
00457147 \. C3	RETN

This code runs the actual serial checking. As you can see when you analyze the code while debugging, there is a number of jumps that lead you away from the desired call, which is located at offset 0045713C. Usually there are a number of approaches towards reaching your desired result. Those involve patching, analyzing, reconstructing or even ripping (the assembly) the code. In this software there are a limited number of approaches. As you can see, the above code only deals with checking the serial key and invoking the appropriate message to inform the user for his success or failure to validate his user/serial identity.

The following approaches might not apply in the real world, but they provide a basic and simple idea on how reversers work.



Approach No1 (Branch Patching)

One way of patching the program flow is by modifying the conditional branches.

There are a number of places where the serial validation algorithm determines that the serial given by the user is invalid. Those are:

Check No1:

As shown in the binary analysis above, the function converts the serial length into a string ASCII data type then takes the first letter and compares it with the hex value 0x31 which is equal to ASCII character '1'

A simple patch can be placed by:

Double click on the opcode at offset 004571DC >
replace “JE SHORT 004571E5”
with “JMP SHORT 004571E5”

Therefore then the CALL at 004571DE is never called

04571D3	.	E8 6CF0FFFF	CALL Example_.00456F44
04571D8	:	8070 FF 31	CMP BYTE PTR SS:[EBP-1], 31
04571DC	.~	74 07	JE SHORT Example_.004571E5
04571DE	.	E8 B1FDFFFF	CALL <Example_.Long/Short_Error>
04571E3	.~	EB 46	JMP SHORT Example_.0045722B
04571E5	>	8D55 E8	LEA EDX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-18]
04571E8	.	8BC6	MOV EAX, ESI
04571EA	.	E8 4D12FBFF	CALL Example_.0040843C
04571EF	.	8B45 E8	MOV EAX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-18]
04571F2		8D4D FF	LEA ECX, DWORD PTR SS:[EBP-1]
04571F5		BA 02000000	MOV EDX, 2

Check No2:

Apply the same with the conditional jump at offset 0045721D

0045720E	.	8B83 68030001	MOV EAX, DWORD PTR DS:[EBX+368]
00457214	:	E8 CB19FEFF	CALL Example_.00438BE4
00457219	.	8070 FF 34	CMP BYTE PTR SS:[EBP-1], 34
0045721D	.~	74 07	JE SHORT Example_.00457226
0045721F	.	E8 70FDFFFF	CALL <Example_.Long/Short_Error>
00457224	.~	EB 05	JMP SHORT Example_.0045722B
00457226	>	E8 3DFFFFFF	CALL Example_.00457068
0045722B	>	33C0	XOR EAX, EAX
0045722D	.	5A	POP EDX
0045722E	:	59	POP ECX
0045722F	.	59	POP ECX

Therefore, the code in Step2, Binary code patching changes into:

```
char first = getChar(length,1,?); //Get first character
if(true) { //This is always true
    char second = getChar(length,2,?); //Get second character
    if(true) { //This is always true
        //continue with serial check
    }
    else {
        sendLongShortError(); //This is never called
    }
}
else {
    sendLongShortError(); //This is never called
}
```



Check No3:

Also patch that conditional jump into an unconditional jump (JMP)

004570D7	:	75 F4	JNZ SHORT Example_.004570CD
004570D9	>	803D ACE54500	CMP BYTE PTR DS:[45E5AC], 7B
004570E0	~	74 07	JE SHORT Example_.004570E9
004570E2	.	BF 01000000	MOV EDI, 1
004570E7	.	EB 46	JMR SHORT Example_.0045712F
004570E9	>	8BC5	MOV EAX, EBX
004570EB	.	B9 0A000000	MOV ECX, 0A
004570F0	.	99	CDQ
004570F1	.	F7F9	IDIV ECX
004570F3	.	0FB605 ADE541	MOVZX EAX, BYTE PTR DS:[45E5AD]
004570FA	.	3B00	CMP EDX, EAX

In general, that should do it. Although there are a few bugs, I believe you understood the basic idea behind it.

Approach No2 (Replace functions)

A simpler approach is to alter the error message functions and point them at the success function. As shown below:

00456F91	:	5D	POP EBP
00456F92	:	C3	RETN
00456F93	:	90	NOP
00456F94	~	E9 97000000	JMP <Example_.thank you>
00456F99	.	90	NOP
00456F9A	.	90	NOP
00456F9B	.	68 B06F4500	PUSH Example_.00456FB0
00456FA0	.	6A 00	PUSH 0
00456FA2	.	E8 F9FCFAFF	CALL <JMP.&user32.MessageBoxA>
00456FA7	.	C3	RETN
00456FA8	.	2E 3A 69 73	ASCII ".:ish:.",0
00456FB0	.	54 68 65 20	ASCII "The Serial numbe"
00456FC0	.	72 20 79 6F	ASCII "r you entered is"
00456FD0	.	20 74 6F 6F	ASCII " too short or to"
00456FE0	.	6F 20 6C 6F	ASCII "o long",0
00456FE7	.	00	DB 00
00456FE8	~	EB 46	JMP SHORT <Example_.thank you>
00456FEA	.	68 EC6F4500	PUSH Example_.00456FFC
00456FEF	.	68 04704500	PUSH Example_.00457004
00456FF4	.	6A 00	PUSH 0
00456FF6	.	E8 A5FCFAFF	CALL <JMP.&user32.MessageBoxA>
00456FFB	.	C3	RETN
00456FFC	.	2E 3A 69 73	ASCII ".:ish:.",0
00457004	.	54 68 65 20	ASCII "The Serial numbe"
00457014	.	72 20 79 6F	ASCII "r you entered is"
00457024	.	20 6E 6F 74	ASCII " not valid",0
0045702F	.	00	DB 00
00457030	\$	6A 00	PUSH 0
00457032	.	68 44704500	PUSH Example_.00457044
00457037	.	68 4C704500	PUSH Example_.0045704C
0045703C	.	6A 00	PUSH 0
0045703E	.	E8 5DFCFAFF	CALL <JMP.&user32.MessageBoxA>
00457043	.	C3	RETN
00457044	.	2E 3A 69 73	ASCII ".:ish:.",0
0045704C	.	54 68 61 6E	ASCII "Thank You for re"
0045705C	.	67 69 73 74	ASCII "gistering.",0
00457067	.	00	DB 00
00457068	\$	53	PUSH EBX
00457069	.	56	PUSH ESI
0045706A	.	57	PUSH EDI
0045706B	.	55	PUSH EBP
0045706C	.	83C4 F8	ADD ESP, -8
0045706F	.	BB 01000000	MOU EBX, 1
00457074	.	BE ACE54500	MOV ESI, Example_.0045E5AC
00457079	>	8BCF	CMOV ECX, ESI

ASCII "012



Note: This will most likely not work if you, as a coder, are smart enough not to put everything inside one function.

Serial Generating

(known as *keygening*)

In this category, a “cracker” analyzes the program code and reconstructs the registration algorithm in such a way that instead of determining that the inserted serial is correct, it generates a correct serial key that will always be valid (without taking into consideration any external constraints). Some of the techniques used for constructing/reconstructing *Serial Generating* algorithms are:

Code Reconstructing

The careful analysis of an algorithm (usually by debugging) in order to understand the behavior of a function or set of functions in such a way that a reverser can transform the low-level assembly into a higher level programming language code (like C, C++, or as high as .NET and Java)

For example:

Low-level:

```
004570AD |> /MOV EDX,DWORD PTR DS:[45E5A4] ; Load username string in EDX
004570B3 | |MOVZX EDX, BYTE PTR DS:[EDX+EBX-1] ; Get letter in position EBX-1 (in each loop the pointer is incr by 1)
004570B8 |. |ADD EBP,EDX ; Add the hexadecimal ASCII value of the letter in EBP (UserCount)
004570BA |. |INC EBX ; Increase the pointer (EBX)
004570BB |. |DEC EAX ; Decrease the loop counter
004570BC |.^ \JNZ SHORT Example_.004570AD ; Stop branching only when the loop counter reaches zero(0)
004570BE |> MOV EBX,0E
004570C3 |. MOV EAX,Example_.0045E5AC
004570C8 |. MOV EDX,Example_.0045E5BC
004570CD |> /MOVZX ECX, BYTE PTR DS:[EAX] ; Get the ASCII char stored in memory at EAX (Serial string pointer)
004570D0 |. |MOV DWORD PTR DS:[EDX],ECX ; Store it an array of integer (see next operation)?
004570D2 |. |ADD EDX,4 ; Move 4 bytes to the right => An array of 32bit Integer values
004570D5 |. |INC EAX ; Move memory pointer one(1) byte to the right
004570D6 |. |DEC EBX ; Decrease loop counter
004570D7 |.^ \JNZ SHORT Example_.004570CD ; Stop branching when loop counter reaches zero(0)
004570D9 |> CMP BYTE PTR DS:[45E5AC],7B ; Compare first character from the ASCII value with 0x7B ( "{" )
//Code omitted
```

High-Level (Java)

```
String username = getUsername();
int sum = 0;
for(int i = 0;i < username.length(); i++) {
    sum += username.charAt(i);
}

String serial = getSerial();
int[] array = new int[255];
if(serial.length()<=255) { //Well, Java is safe but we don't need exceptions popping around.
    for(int i = 0;i < serial.length(); i++) {
        array[i] = serial.charAt(i);
    }
}
```



```
If(serial.charAt(0) == '{') {  
    //Code omitted
```

Code Ripping

This is the use of various techniques to copy the binary code of a program into another program or embed it inside a higher programming language that support direct assembly coding. This had nothing to do with *Code Reconstructing* since in *Code Ripping* the effort and time spend on debugging is reduced significantly.

For Example:

Low-level:

```
004570AD |> /MOV EDX,DWORD PTR DS:[45E5A4] ; Load username string in EDX  
004570B3 | MOVZX EDX,BYTE PTR DS:[EDX+EBX-1] ; Get letter in position EBX-1 (in each loop the pointer is incr by 1)  
004570B8 |. JADD EBP,EDX ; Add the hexadecimal ASCII value of the letter in EBP (UserCount)  
004570BA |. INC EBX ; Increase the pointer (EBX)  
004570BB |. IDEC EAX ; Decrease the loop counter  
004570BC |.^ JNZ SHORT Example_.004570AD ; Stop branching only when the loop counter reaches zero(0)  
004570BE |> MOV EBX,0E  
004570C3 |. MOV EAX,Example_.0045E5AC  
004570C8 |. MOV EDX,Example_.0045E5BC  
004570CD |> /MOVZX ECX,BYTE PTR DS:[EAX] ; Get the ASCII char stored in memory at EAX (Serial string pointer)  
004570D0 |. JMOV DWORD PTR DS:[EDX],ECX ; Store it an array of integer (see next operation)?  
004570D2 |. JADD EDX,4 ; Move 4 bytes to the right => An array of 32bit Integer values  
004570D5 |. INC EAX ; Move memory pointer one(1) byte to the right  
004570D6 |. IDEC EBX ; Decrease loop counter  
004570D7 |.^ JNZ SHORT Example_.004570CD ; Stop branching when loop counter reaches zero(0)  
004570D9 |> CMP BYTE PTR DS:[45E5AC],7B ; Compare first character from the ASCII value with 0x7B ( "{" )  
//Code omitted
```

High Level Rip:

```
//Code omitted  
getUsername(username);  
getPassword(password);  
user_length := length(username);  
pass_length := length(password);  
asm  
    @loop1:  
        MOV EAX,user_length  
        MOV EBX,1  
        MOV EDX,&username  
        MOVZX EDX,BYTE [EDX+EBX-1]  
        ADD EBP,EDX  
        INC EBX  
        DEC EAX  
        JNZ @loop1  
  
    //Code omitted
```

```
end;
```



the hacking & security community

ACTIVISTAS
ESTADOUNIDENSES

Other

The use of licensing services could increase the risks of reverse engineering and keygenning. I am neither against implementing 3rd party components into your software nor do I believe they are a security risk. What renders them a security risk is the weak implementation and the lack of time spent understanding that software.