### **Kerberoasting Investigation Report**

**Analyst:** Aarush Nepali **Date:** July 14, 2025

**Environment:** Kali Linux, Splunk (local instance)

**Log Source:** Converted Windows Event Logs (.evtx to JSON)

Primary Data Location: /home/kali/Downloads/Triage/converted/

# **Objective**

To analyze Windows Security logs for indicators of a **Kerberoasting attack**. Kerberoasting typically involves Event ID 4769, where a Ticket Granting Service (TGS) ticket is requested for a service account with RC4 encryption (e.g., 0x17, 0x18).


## **Process Summary**


### 1. Initial Setup and Conversion


- Original .evtx files located in /home/kali/Downloads/Triage/eventlogs/
- Converted to JSON using a Python script (via python-evtx).
- Converted files saved in: /home/kali/Downloads/Triage/converted/

## 2. Splunk Ingestion

- Files ingested into Splunk under sourcetype: json-2
- Total events











## 3. Search Methodology for Kerberoasting


- Targeted Event ID: 4769 (TGS requests)
- Fields of interest:
  - ServiceName
  - TicketEncryptionType
  - TargetUserName




















# **Findings**

#### 1. Event ID 4769 Results

- A total of 16 events were identified with Event ID 4769.
- All events had ServiceName="krbtgt" (indicating standard TGS requests for the Kerberos Ticket Granting Ticket service).
- **No events** used TicketEncryptionType=0x00000017 or 0x00000018, which are indicative of RC4 encryption vulnerable to Kerberoasting.

#### 2. Accounts Involved

- Accounts observed in TargetUserName:
  - Administrator
  - o alonzo.spire
  - DC01\$@FORELA.LOCAL
- Notably, no suspicious service accounts (like svc\_\*) were targeted.

### 3. IP Address Analysis

- Some TGS requests came from loopback (::1) and local internal IP (::ffff:172.17.79.129).
- These are not suspicious in isolation within lab/test environments.

### Conclusion

After detailed analysis of Event ID 4769 logs and related fields:

No evidence of a Kerberoasting attack was found in the dataset.

All service ticket requests observed were for krbtgt, using AES encryption types (e.g., 0x12). There were no abnormal service names or RC4 encryption patterns.

### Recommendations

- If testing Kerberoasting detection, ingest known simulated attack data.
- Consider enabling detection rules that alert on:
  - ServiceName != krbtgt
  - TicketEncryptionType IN (0x17, 0x18)
- Maintain robust audit log ingestion from Domain Controllers.