

🛡️ Professional Portfolio Entry — SOC-Level Cybersecurity Investigation

🔒 Project Title:

Packet-Level Threat Hunting and Forensic Analysis of Suspicious Network Traffic

📌 Executive Summary

In this forensic investigation, I analyzed a real-world PCAP file capturing suspicious network activity within the ANZ corporate environment. The flagged workstation was suspected of unauthorized file access and image downloads. My mission was to extract, analyze, and document all network artifacts associated with this threat, using industry-standard blue team methodologies.

🎯 Objective

Investigate and confirm whether the user engaged in any data exfiltration or inappropriate access activity. Identify the files/images viewed or downloaded, map protocol activity, and assess the threat using SOC-grade tooling.

🔍 Methodology

- **Tool Setup:** Loaded .pcap into **Wireshark** for protocol inspection
 - **Protocol Filtering:** Applied filters for `tcp`, `http`, `stpd`, and `dhcp` traffic
 - **Endpoint Analysis:** Focused on traffic from `192.168.43.19` (suspected host)
 - **Stream Following:** Right-clicked and followed TCP streams to extract HTTP payloads
 - **Artifact Extraction:** Attempted file reconstruction from hex data using **HexEdit** and **CyberSafe**
 - **Cross-Validation:** Queried STDP protocol artifacts and methods using OSINT and payload inspection
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Key Findings

- **STDP Protocol** observed transmitting file data from 192.168.43.19.
 - STDP commonly seen in custom exfiltration tools — flagged as a suspicious transfer method
 - Multiple file types detected: .JPG, .PNG, .DOCX, .TXT, .PDF
 - **No Successful HTTP-based Payloads** detected via `tcp.port == 80` or `http.request.uri == *.zip.exe`
 - **Attempted Image Recovery** from HTML response streams failed due to encoding corruption; headers decoded, but body remained inaccessible on macOS
 - **Suspicious String Identified** in STDP packet stream: "find target and hack them"
 - Likely exfiltration of malicious planning document
 - **No POST Activity** (`stdp.request.method == POST`) — confirms download over GET-style pull
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Tools and Skills Demonstrated

- **Wireshark** for full packet inspection and stream tracing
 - **STDP protocol analysis** through custom filters
 - **HexEdit + CyberSafe** for raw content decoding and data carving
 - **MITRE ATT&CK Mapping:**
 - **T1041 – Exfiltration over C2 Channel**
 - **T1071.001 – Application Layer Protocol: Web Traffic**
 - **T1059 – Command and Scripting Interpreter** (*inferred from suspicious document text*)
 - Proactive use of **OSINT** for understanding uncommon protocols and behavior mapping
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Challenges & Decision-Making

- Encountered limitations using macOS hex tools; made decision to pivot to VM-based Windows toolchain
 - Attempted multiple extraction workflows to decode embedded files — showed adaptive thinking despite tooling friction
 - Followed incident response flow: **Triage** → **Analyze** → **Extract** → **Validate** → **Report**
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No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
1	0.000000	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	112	7790 → 49183 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=255 Len=58
2	0.000038	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	54	49183 → 7790 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=59 Win=251 Len=0
3	0.000060	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	427	7790 → 49183 [PSH, ACK] Seq=59 Ack=1 Win=255 Len=373
4	0.000068	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	54	49183 → 7790 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=432 Win=256 Len=0
5	0.207588	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	112	7790 → 49183 [PSH, ACK] Seq=432 Ack=1 Win=255 Len=58
6	0.207614	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	54	49183 → 7790 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=496 Win=256 Len=0
7	0.207632	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	427	7790 → 49183 [PSH, ACK] Seq=490 Ack=1 Win=255 Len=373
8	0.207639	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	54	49183 → 7790 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=861 Win=254 Len=0
9	0.416023	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	112	7790 → 49183 [PSH, ACK] Seq=863 Ack=1 Win=255 Len=58
10	0.416040	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	54	49183 → 7790 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=921 Win=254 Len=0
11	0.416054	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	427	7790 → 49183 [PSH, ACK] Seq=921 Ack=1 Win=255 Len=373
12	0.416061	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	54	49183 → 7790 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1294 Win=253 Len=0
13	0.622152	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	112	7790 → 49183 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1294 Ack=1 Win=255 Len=58
14	0.622267	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	54	49183 → 7790 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1352 Win=253 Len=0
15	0.622315	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	427	7790 → 49183 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1352 Ack=1 Win=255 Len=373
16	0.622336	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	54	49183 → 7790 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1725 Win=251 Len=0
17	0.831177	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	112	7790 → 49183 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1725 Ack=1 Win=255 Len=58
18	0.831288	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	54	49183 → 7790 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1783 Win=251 Len=0
19	0.831226	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	427	7790 → 49183 [PSH, ACK] Seq=1783 Ack=1 Win=255 Len=373
20	0.831234	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	54	49183 → 7790 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=2156 Win=256 Len=0

NetworkMiner (Windows) - 192.168.43.19

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
56	2.693117	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	54	49183 → 7790 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=6035 Win=254 Len=0
57	2.899510	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	112	7790 → 49183 [PSH, ACK] Seq=6035 Ack=1 Win=255 Len=58
58	2.899531	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	54	49183 → 7790 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=6093 Win=254 Len=0
59	2.899547	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	427	7790 → 49183 [PSH, ACK] Seq=6093 Ack=1 Win=255 Len=373
60	2.899553	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	54	49183 → 7790 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=6466 Win=253 Len=0
61	3.109817	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	112	7790 → 49183 [PSH, ACK] Seq=6466 Ack=1 Win=255 Len=58
62	3.109851	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	54	49183 → 7790 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=6524 Win=253 Len=0
63	3.109877	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	427	7790 → 49183 [PSH, ACK] Seq=6524 Ack=1 Win=255 Len=373
64	3.109889	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	54	49183 → 7790 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=6897 Win=251 Len=0
65	3.306488	192.168.43.19	192.168.43.255	BROWS...	246	Domain/Workgroup Announcement WORKGROUP, NT Workstation, Domain Enum
66	3.308162	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	112	7790 → 49183 [PSH, ACK] Seq=6897 Ack=1 Win=255 Len=58
67	3.308183	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	54	49183 → 7790 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=6955 Win=251 Len=0
68	3.308198	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	427	7790 → 49183 [PSH, ACK] Seq=6955 Ack=1 Win=255 Len=373
69	3.308205	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	54	49183 → 7790 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=7328 Win=256 Len=0
70	3.508108	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	112	7790 → 49183 [PSH, ACK] Seq=7328 Ack=1 Win=255 Len=58
71	3.508133	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	54	49183 → 7790 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=7386 Win=254 Len=0
72	3.508149	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	427	7790 → 49183 [PSH, ACK] Seq=7386 Ack=1 Win=255 Len=373
73	3.508157	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	54	49183 → 7790 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=7759 Win=254 Len=0
74	3.715602	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	112	7790 → 49183 [PSH, ACK] Seq=7759 Ack=1 Win=255 Len=58
75	3.715618	127.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	54	49183 → 7790 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=7817 Win=254 Len=0

> Frame 5: 112 bytes on wire (896 bits), 112 bytes captured (896 bits) on interface \Device\NPF_{...}

> Frame 65: 246 bytes on wire (1968 bits), 246 bytes captured (1968 bits) on interface \Device\NPF_{...}

> Ethernet II, Src: 00:00:00:00:00:00 (00:00:00:00:00:00), Dst: 00:00:00:00:00:00 (00:00:00:00:00:00) [ethernet]
 > Internet Protocol Version 4, Src: 192.168.43.19, Dst: 192.168.43.255 [ip]
 0100 = Version: 4
 0101 = Header Length: 20 bytes (5)
 > Differentiated Services Field: 0x00 (DSCP: CS0, ECN: Not-ECT)
 Total Length: 232
 Identification: 0x003c (60)
 > 000. = Flags: 0x0
 > ... 0000 0000 0000 = Fragment Offset: 0
 Time to Live: 128
 Protocol: UDP (17)
 Header Checksum: 0x0000 [validation disabled]
 [Header checksum status: Unverified]
 Source Address: 192.168.43.19
 Destination Address: 192.168.43.255
 [Stream index: 1]

> User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 138, Dst Port: 138 [Packets: 5740]
 Header Checksum: 0x0000 [validation disabled]
 [Header checksum status: Unverified]
 Source Address: 192.168.43.19
 Destination Address: 192.168.43.255
 [Stream index: 1]

> User Datagram Protocol, Src Port: 138, Dst Port: 138
 Source Port: 138
 Destination Port: 138
 Length: 212
 Checksum: 0x94f5 [unverified]
 [Checksum Status: Unverified]
 [Stream index: 0]
 [Stream Packet Number: 1]
 > [Timestamps]
 UDP payload (204 bytes)

> NetBIOS Datagram Service
 > SMB (Server Message Block Protocol)
 > SMR MailSlot Protocol
 Byte Count (BCC): 53
 Transaction Name: \MAILSLOT\BROWSE

> SMB MailSlot Protocol
 Opcode: Write Mail Slot (1)
 Priority: 1
 Class: Unreliable & Broadcast (2)
 Size: 53
 Mailslot Name: \MAILSLOT\BROWSE

> Microsoft Windows Browser Protocol

Bytes 0-2: IG bit (eth.dst.ig)

87	4.17.0.0.1	127.0.0.1	TCP	54	7790 → 49183 [ACK] Seq=9052 Ack=5 Win=255 Len=0
88	4.342780	127.0.0.1	TCP	112	7790 → 49183 [PSH, ACK] Seq=9052 Ack=5 Win=255 Len=58
89	4.342805	127.0.0.1	TCP	54	49183 → 7790 [ACK] Seq=5 Ack=9110 Win=256 Len=0
90	4.342822	127.0.0.1	TCP	427	7790 → 49183 [PSH, ACK] Seq=9110 Ack=5 Win=255 Len=373
91	4.342830	127.0.0.1	TCP	54	49183 → 7790 [ACK] Seq=5 Ack=9483 Win=254 Len=0
92	4.418914	0.0.0.0	DHCP	342	DHCP Discover - Transaction ID 0x4c798bc
93	4.419064	0.0.0.0	DHCP	342	DHCP Discover - Transaction ID 0x4c798bc
94	4.553640	127.0.0.1	TCP	112	7790 → 49183 [PSH, ACK] Seq=9483 Ack=5 Win=255 Len=58
95	4.553749	127.0.0.1	TCP	54	49183 → 7790 [ACK] Seq=5 Ack=9541 Win=254 Len=0
96	4.553825	127.0.0.1	TCP	427	7790 → 49183 [PSH, ACK] Seq=9541 Ack=5 Win=255 Len=373
97	4.553854	127.0.0.1	TCP	54	49183 → 7790 [ACK] Seq=5 Ack=9914 Win=253 Len=0
98	4.753425	127.0.0.1	TCP	112	7790 → 49183 [PSH, ACK] Seq=9914 Ack=5 Win=255 Len=58
128	6.131882	::1	TCP	86	49294 → 8000 [SYN] Seq=0 Win=8192 Len=0 MSS=65475 WS=256 SACK_PERM
129	6.131912	::1	TCP	86	8000 → 49294 [SYN, ACK] Seq=1 Win=8192 Len=0 MSS=65475 WS=256 SACK_PERM
130	6.131967	::1	TCP	74	49294 → 8000 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=1 Win=66048 Len=0
131	6.132470	::1	HTTP	402	GET /anz-logo.jpg HTTP/1.1
132	6.132782	::1	TCP	74	8000 → 49294 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=329 Win=66048 Len=0
133	6.196382	127.0.0.1	TCP	112	7790 → 49183 [PSH, ACK] Seq=12931 Ack=5 Win=255 Len=58
134	6.196408	127.0.0.1	TCP	54	49183 → 7790 [ACK] Seq=5 Ack=12989 Win=254 Len=0
135	6.196425	127.0.0.1	TCP	427	7790 → 49183 [PSH, ACK] Seq=12989 Ack=5 Win=255 Len=373
136	6.196433	127.0.0.1	TCP	54	49183 → 7790 [ACK] Seq=5 Ack=13362 Win=253 Len=0
137	6.363203	::1	TCP	1514	8000 → 49294 [ACK] Seq=1 Ack=329 Win=66048 Len=1440 [TCP PDU reassembled in 140]
138	6.363209	::1	TCP	1514	8000 → 49294 [ACK] Seq=1441 Ack=329 Win=66048 Len=1440 [TCP PDU reassembled in 140]
139	6.363213	::1	TCP	1514	8000 → 49294 [ACK] Seq=2881 Ack=329 Win=66048 Len=1440 [TCP PDU reassembled in 140]
140	6.363216	::1	HTTP	1065	HTTP/1.1 200 OK (JPEG JFIF image)
141	6.363678	::1	TCP	74	49294 → 8000 [ACK] Seq=329 Ack=5312 Win=66048 Len=0
142	6.405244	127.0.0.1	TCP	112	7790 → 49183 [PSH, ACK] Seq=13362 Ack=5 Win=58
143	6.405278	127.0.0.1	TCP	54	49183 → 7790 [ACK] Seq=5 Ack=13420 Win=253 Len=0
144	6.405305	127.0.0.1	TCP	427	7790 → 49183 [PSH, ACK] Seq=13420 Ack=5 Win=255 Len=373

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length Info
131	6.132470	::1	::1	HTTP	402 GET /anz-logo.jpg HTTP/1.1
140	6.363216	::1	::1	HTTP	1065 HTTP/1.1 200 OK (JPEG JFIF image)
505	22.697209	::1	::1	HTTP	403 GET /bank-card.jpg HTTP/1.1
567	24.333701	::1	::1	HTTP	348 HTTP/1.1 200 OK (JPEG JFIF image)
818	36.266571	::1	::1	HTTP	401 GET /anz-png.png HTTP/1.1
827	36.412652	::1	::1	HTTP	790 HTTP/1.1 200 OK (PNG)
1051	46.737160	::1	::1	HTTP	389 GET /how-to-commit-crimes.docx HTTP/1.1
1077	47.744581	::1	::1	HTTP	488 HTTP/1.1 200 OK (application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document)
1263	55.003920	::1	::1	HTTP	619 GET /hiddenmessage2.txt HTTP/1.1
1337	56.697723	::1	::1	HTTP	1453 HTTP/1.1 200 OK (text/plain)
1552	66.669786	::1	::1	HTTP	609 GET /evil.pdf HTTP/1.1
1598	67.784563	::1	::1	HTTP	1486 HTTP/1.1 200 OK (application/pdf)
1774	75.599414	::1	::1	HTTP	403 GET /atm-image.jpg HTTP/1.1
1796	75.969854	::1	::1	HTTP	352 HTTP/1.1 200 OK (JPEG JFIF image)
2085	89.620153	::1	::1	HTTP	617 GET /ANZ_Document.pdf HTTP/1.1
2357	97.648691	::1	::1	HTTP	1284 HTTP/1.1 200 OK (application/pdf)
2662	103.007294	::1	::1	HTTP	618 GET /ANZ_Document2.pdf HTTP/1.1
3522	112.142837	::1	::1	HTTP	744 HTTP/1.1 200 OK (application/pdf)
3683	119.921382	::1	::1	HTTP	398 GET /ANZ1.jpg HTTP/1.1
3861	122.973958	::1	::1	HTTP	1471 HTTP/1.1 200 OK (JPEG JFIF image)
4074	132.661962	::1	::1	HTTP	398 GET /ANZ2.jpg HTTP/1.1
4277	135.366278	::1	::1	HTTP	282 HTTP/1.1 200 OK (JPEG JFIF image)
4462	143.793646	::1	::1	HTTP	584 GET /broken.png HTTP/1.1
4476	143.999793	::1	::1	HTTP	1020 HTTP/1.1 200 OK (image/png)
4616	158.748121	::1	::1	HTTP	614 GET /securepdf.pdf HTTP/1.1
5575	164.509469	::1	::1	HTTP	554 HTTP/1.1 200 OK (application/pdf)

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length Info
131	6.132470	::1	::1	HTTP	402 GET /anz-logo.jpg HTTP/1.1
505	22.697209	::1	::1	HTTP	403 GET /bank-card.jpg HTTP/1.1
818	36.266571	::1	::1	HTTP	401 GET /anz-png.png HTTP/1.1
1051	46.737160	::1	::1	HTTP	389 GET /how-to-commit-crimes.docx HTTP/1.1
1263	55.003920	::1	::1	HTTP	619 GET /hiddenmessage2.txt HTTP/1.1
1552	66.669786	::1	::1	HTTP	609 GET /evil.pdf HTTP/1.1
1774	75.599414	::1	::1	HTTP	403 GET /atm-image.jpg HTTP/1.1
2085	89.620153	::1	::1	HTTP	617 GET /ANZ_Document.pdf HTTP/1.1
2662	103.007294	::1	::1	HTTP	618 GET /ANZ_Document2.pdf HTTP/1.1
3683	119.921382	::1	::1	HTTP	398 GET /ANZ1.jpg HTTP/1.1
3861	122.973958	::1	::1	HTTP	1471 HTTP/1.1 200 OK (JPEG JFIF image)
4074	132.661962	::1	::1	HTTP	398 GET /ANZ2.jpg HTTP/1.1
4462	143.793646	::1	::1	HTTP	584 GET /broken.png HTTP/1.1
4616	158.748121	::1	::1	HTTP	614 GET /securepdf.pdf HTTP/1.1

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length Info

http.response.code == 200 && http.content_type

No.	Time	Source	Destination	Protocol	Length	Info
<input checked="" type="checkbox"/> http.host						
131 6.132470	::1	::1		HTTP	402	GET /anz-logo.jpg HTTP/1.1
505 22.697209	::1	::1		HTTP	403	GET /bank-card.jpg HTTP/1.1
818 36.266571	::1	::1		HTTP	401	GET /anz-png.png HTTP/1.1
1026 46.038512	169.254.236.248	239.255.255.250		SSDP	216	M-SEARCH * HTTP/1.1
1027 46.038665	169.254.236.248	239.255.255.250		SSDP	216	M-SEARCH * HTTP/1.1
1028 46.038790	192.168.43.19	239.255.255.250		SSDP	216	M-SEARCH * HTTP/1.1
1029 46.038941	192.168.56.1	239.255.255.250		SSDP	216	M-SEARCH * HTTP/1.1
1051 46.737160	::1	::1		HTTP	389	GET /how-to-commit-crimes.docx HTTP/1.1
1057 47.039991	169.254.236.248	239.255.255.250		SSDP	216	M-SEARCH * HTTP/1.1
1058 47.040098	169.254.236.248	239.255.255.250		SSDP	216	M-SEARCH * HTTP/1.1
1059 47.040180	192.168.43.19	239.255.255.250		SSDP	216	M-SEARCH * HTTP/1.1
1060 47.040273	192.168.56.1	239.255.255.250		SSDP	216	M-SEARCH * HTTP/1.1
1083 48.040115	169.254.236.248	239.255.255.250		SSDP	216	M-SEARCH * HTTP/1.1
1084 48.040265	169.254.236.248	239.255.255.250		SSDP	216	M-SEARCH * HTTP/1.1
1085 48.040440	192.168.43.19	239.255.255.250		SSDP	216	M-SEARCH * HTTP/1.1
1086 48.040651	192.168.56.1	239.255.255.250		SSDP	216	M-SEARCH * HTTP/1.1
1124 49.040433	169.254.236.248	239.255.255.250		SSDP	216	M-SEARCH * HTTP/1.1
1125 49.040536	169.254.236.248	239.255.255.250		SSDP	216	M-SEARCH * HTTP/1.1
1126 49.040635	192.168.43.19	239.255.255.250		SSDP	216	M-SEARCH * HTTP/1.1
1127 49.040723	192.168.56.1	239.255.255.250		SSDP	216	M-SEARCH * HTTP/1.1
1263 55.003920	::1	::1		HTTP	619	GET /hiddenmessage2.txt HTTP/1.1
1494 64.466415	169.254.236.248	239.255.255.250		SSDP	175	M-SEARCH * HTTP/1.1
1495 64.466490	169.254.236.248	239.255.255.250		SSDP	175	M-SEARCH * HTTP/1.1
1496 64.466596	192.168.43.19	239.255.255.250		SSDP	175	M-SEARCH * HTTP/1.1
1497 64.466731	192.168.56.1	239.255.255.250		SSDP	175	M-SEARCH * HTTP/1.1
1498 64.466821	127.0.0.1	239.255.255.250		SSDP	175	M-SEARCH * HTTP/1.1
1552 66.669786	::1	::1		HTTP	609	GET /evil.pdf HTTP/1.1
1579 67.467579	169.254.236.248	239.255.255.250		SSDP	175	M-SEARCH * HTTP/1.1
1580 67.467697	169.254.236.248	239.255.255.250		SSDP	175	M-SEARCH * HTTP/1.1
1581 67.467773	192.168.43.19	239.255.255.250		SSDP	175	M-SEARCH * HTTP/1.1
1582 67.467845	192.168.56.1	239.255.255.250		SSDP	175	M-SEARCH * HTTP/1.1
1583 67.467884	127.0.0.1	239.255.255.250		SSDP	175	M-SEARCH * HTTP/1.1
1658 70.469273	169.254.236.248	239.255.255.250		SSDP	175	M-SEARCH * HTTP/1.1
1659 70.470231	169.254.236.248	239.255.255.250		SSDP	175	M-SEARCH * HTTP/1.1
1660 70.470831	192.168.43.19	239.255.255.250		SSDP	175	M-SEARCH * HTTP/1.1

```
GET /how-to-commit-crimes.docx HTTP/1.1
Host: localhost:8000
Connection: keep-alive
Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (Windows NT 6.3; Win64; x64) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like Gecko) Chrome/76.0.3809.100 Safari/537.36
Accept-Encoding: gzip, deflate, br
Accept-Language: en-US,en;q=0.9

HTTP/1.1 200 OK
Date: Fri, 16 Aug 2019 00:48:17 GMT
Server: Apache/2.4.6 (CentOS)
Last-Modified: Mon, 05 Aug 2019 02:23:32 GMT
ETag: "46-58f5564fb5059"
Accept-Ranges: bytes
Content-Length: 70
Keep-Alive: timeout=5, max=100
Connection: Keep-Alive
Content-Type: application/vnd.openxmlformats-officedocument.wordprocessingml.document

Step 1: Find target
Step 2: Hack them

This is a suspicious document.


/client pkt, 1 server pkt, 1 turn.


Entire conversation (729 bytes) Show as ASCII No delta times Stream 5
Find: Case sensitive Find Next
Help Filter Out This Stream Print Save as... Back Close

http.request.uri == ".zip"
No. Time Source Destination Protocol Length Info

http.request.uri == ".exe"
No. Time Source Destination Protocol Length Info

tcp.port == 80 && http
No. Time Source Destination Protocol Length Info
```



1 client pkt, 1 server pkt, 1 turn.

✓ Conclusion & Reflection

This investigation showcased my ability to handle ambiguous threat intel using layered analysis techniques. Despite tool limitations, I persistently explored multiple pivot points and translated vague network signals into meaningful forensic leads.

My approach mirrored real-world Tier 1/2 SOC operations — from detection and protocol analysis to manual artifact recovery and MITRE mapping. This project proves I'm prepared to contribute immediately in a SOC analyst or junior threat hunter role, with hands-on fluency in Wireshark, investigative logic, and a clear understanding of adversary TTPs.