

Deep Blue: RDP Compromise and Meterpreter Incident Investigation


Interactive Threat Hunting • Windows Log Analysis • DeepBlueCLI Project

Project Overview

This investigation confirmed that a Windows workstation was compromised via an internet-facing RDP service, leading to the deployment of a Meterpreter payload and the creation of persistence mechanisms.

Tools Used:

- DeepBlueCLI (PowerShell)
- Event Viewer
- Command Line Interface (CLI)




Evidence Collected

- Security.evtx – Windows Security Log
 - System.evtx – Windows System Log
-

Step 1: Log Loading and Filtering

Security Log:


- Loaded Security.evtx in Event Viewer.
- Applied filter:
 - **Event Levels:** Critical, Warning, Verbose, Error, Information
 - **Event ID:** 4688 (Process Creation)



Step 2: Threat Hunting & Key Findings


Finding 1: Malicious Executable Download

- **Malicious File:** serviceupdate.exe
- **Execution Time:** 10:48:14 AM, 10 April 2021
- **Executed By:** Mike Smith
- **Event ID:** 4688
- **MITRE Mapping:**
 - Execution: T1059 (Command and Scripting Interpreter)
 - Remote Access: T1071 (Application Layer Protocol)




Finding 2: Meterpreter Activity

- **Evidence of Meterpreter:**
- **Detected Time:** 10:48:14 AM, 10 April 2021
- **Tool Used:** DeepBlueCLI
- **MITRE Mapping:**
 - Command and Control: T1071
 - Exploit Public-Facing Application: T1190



Finding 3: Suspicious Service Creation

- **Service Name:** rztbn
- **Event Log:** System.evtx
- **MITRE Mapping:**
 - Persistence: T1543.003 (Create or Modify System Process: Windows Service)




Finding 4: Persistence Account Creation

- **Command Executed:**

```
net user ServiceAct /add
```

- **Timeframe:** Between 11:25 AM and 11:40 AM, 10 April 2021
- **Event Log:** Security.evtx



Local Groups Added:

- Administrators
- Remote Desktop Users
- **MITRE Mapping:**
 - Create Account: T1136.001 (Local Account)
 - Privilege Escalation: T1078.003 (Local Accounts)

Investigation: Deep Left: 11:31 minutes

Full Screen Clipboard Details Questions Report Issue

Event Viewer

File Action View Help

Event Viewer (Local)

- Custom Views
- Windows Logs
- Applications and Services Logs
- Security
- Subscriptions

Security Number of events: 1,674

Filtered Log file://C:/Users/IE10WIN7/Desktop/Investigation/Security.evtx Levels: Critical, Error, Warning, Information, Verbose; Source: Event ID: 4688 Date Range: From 4/10/2021 11:25:00 AM to 4/10/2021 11:40:00 AM. Number of events: 56

Level	Date and Time	Source	Event ID	Task Category
Information	4/10/2021 11:29:35 AM	Microsoft Windows security	4688	Process Creation
Information	4/10/2021 11:29:23 AM	Microsoft Windows security	4688	Process Creation
Information	4/10/2021 11:29:13 AM	Microsoft Windows security	4688	Process Creation
Information	4/10/2021 11:29:15 AM	Microsoft Windows security	4688	Process Creation
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Information	4/10/2021 11:28:46 AM	Microsoft Windows security	4688	Process Creation
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Information	4/10/2021 11:28:30 AM	Microsoft Windows security	4688	Process Creation
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Information	4/10/2021 11:28:30 AM	Microsoft Windows security	4688	Process Creation
Information	4/10/2021 11:28:14 AM	Microsoft Windows security	4688	Process Creation

Event 4688, Microsoft Windows security auditing.

General Details

A new process has been created.

Subject:

- Security ID: S-1-5-21-1718914295-90950446-1177810406-1008
- Account Name: Mike Daniels
- Account Domain: IE10WIN7
- Logon ID: 0x1FAA75

Process Information:

- New Process ID: 0x2fc
- New Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
- Token Elevation Type: TokenElevationTypeFull (2)
- Creator Process ID: 0x9fc
- Process Command Line: net localgroup administrators ServiceAct /add

Token Elevation Type indicates the type of token that was assigned to the new process in accordance with User Account Control policy.

Type 1 is a full token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. A full token is only used if User Account Control is disabled or if the user is the built-in Administrator account or a service account.

Type 2 is an elevated token with no privileges removed or groups disabled. An elevated token is used when User Account Control is enabled and the user chooses to start the program using Run as administrator. An elevated token is also

Log Name: Security

Source: Microsoft Windows security Logged: 4/10/2021 11:29:23 AM

Event ID: 4688 Task Category: Process Creation

Level: Information Keywords: Audit Success

User: N/A Computer: IE10WIN7

OpCode: Info

More Information: [Event Log Online Help](#)

Actions

- Security
- Open Saved Log...
- Create Custom View...
- Import Custom View...
- Filter Current Log...
- Clear Filter
- Properties
- Find...
- Save Filtered Log File As...
- Save Filter to Custom View...
- View
- Delete
- Rename
- Refresh
- Help

Event 4688, Microsoft Windows security auditing.

- Event Properties
- Save Selected Events...
- Copy
- Refresh
- Help

10:19 PM 4/11/2023

Investigation: Deep Left: 11:12 minutes

Full Screen Clipboard Details Questions Report Issue

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- New Process Name: C:\Windows\System32\cmd.exe
- Token Elevation Type: TokenElevationTypeFull (2)
- Creator Process ID: 0x9fc
- Process Command Line: net localgroup "Remote Desktop Users" ServiceAct /add

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10:19 PM 4/11/2023

Timeline of Attack

Time	Event Description	Log Source	MITRE Technique
10:48:14 AM	serviceupdate.exe executed by Mike Smith	Security.evtx	T1059
10:48:14 AM	Meterpreter likely deployed	Security.evtx	T1071
~11:30 AM	Backdoor account created: serviceact	Security.evtx	T1136.001
~11:35 AM	Account added to Administrators & RDP groups	Security.evtx	T1078.003
~11:36 AM	Suspicious service created: rztbn	System.evtx	T1543.003

Defense Recommendations

- **Disable public-facing RDP or restrict access via VPN.**
- **Enforce Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) for all remote logins.**
- **Continuously monitor Event IDs:**
 - 4688 (Process Creation)
 - 4624 (Successful Login)
 - Service creation events
- **Proactively hunt with DeepBlueCLI to detect abnormal PowerShell and Meterpreter activity.**

Final Reflection

This hands-on investigation solidified my skills in:

- ✓ Windows Event Log analysis
- ✓ DeepBlueCLI threat hunting
- ✓ Timeline-based incident reconstruction
- ✓ Practical MITRE ATT&CK mapping

Pro Tip: Cross-check all logs using CLI and DeepBlueCLI to ensure no artifacts are overlooked. A layered approach is key to catching stealthy attacker behaviors.
