

Finiteness in Cubical Type Theory

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We study five different notions of finiteness in Cubical Type Theory and prove the relationship between them. In particular we show that any totally ordered Kuratowski finite type is manifestly Bishop finite.

We also prove closure properties for each finite type, and classify them topos-theoretically. This includes a proof that the category of decidable Kuratowski finite sets (also called the category of cardinal finite sets) form a Π -pretopos.

We then develop a parallel classification for the countably infinite types, as well as a proof of the countability of A^* for a countable type A .

We formalise our work in Cubical Agda, where we implement a library for proof search (including combinators for level-polymorphic fully generic currying). Through this library we demonstrate a number of uses for the computational content of the univalence axiom, including searching for and synthesising functions. We use this library for proof search to develop a verified algorithm to solve the countdown problem.

Additional Key Words and Phrases: Agda, Homotopy Type Theory, Cubical Type Theory, Dependent Types, Finiteness, Topos, Kuratowski finite

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1 INTRODUCTION

We are interested in constructive notions of finiteness, formalised in Cubical Type Theory [Cohen et al. 2016]. In this paper we will explore five such notions of finiteness, including their categorical interpretation, and use them to build a simple proof-search library facilitated in a fundamental way by univalence. Along the way we will use the Countdown problem [Hutton 2002] as an example, and provide a program which produces verified solutions to the puzzle. We will also briefly examine countability, and demonstrate its parallels and differences with finiteness.

1.1 The Varieties of Finiteness

In Section 2 we will explore a number of different predicates for finiteness. In contrast to classical finiteness, in a constructive setting there are many predicates which all have some claim to being the formal interpretation of “finiteness” [Coquand and Spiwack 2010]. The particular predicates we are interested in are organised in Figure 1: each arrow in the diagram represents a proof that one predicate can be derived from another. Each arrow in Figure 1 corresponds to a proof of implication: cardinal finiteness, for instance, with a strict total order, implies split enumerability (Theorem 8).

These finiteness predicates differ along two main axes: informativeness, and restrictiveness. More “informative” predicates have proofs which contain extraneous information other than the finiteness of the underlying type: a proof of split enumerability (Section 2.1), for instance, comes with a strict total order on the underlying type.

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Fig. 1. Classification of finiteness predicates according to whether they are discrete (imply decidable equality) and whether they imply a total order.

The “restrictiveness” of a predicate refers to how many types it admits into its notion of “finite”. There are strictly more Kuratowski finite (Section 2.5) types than there are Cardinally finite (Section 2.3).

Proofs coming with extra information is a common theme in constructive mathematics: often this extra information is in the form of an algorithm which can do something useful related to the proof itself. Indeed, our proofs of finiteness here will provide an algorithm to solve the countdown puzzle. Occasionally, however, the extra information is undesirable: we may want to assert the existence of some value $x : A$ which satisfies a predicate P without revealing *which* A we’re referring to. More concretely, we will need in this paper to prove that two types are in bijection without specifying a particular bijection. This facility is provided by Homotopy Type Theory [Univalent Foundations Program 2013] in the form of propositional truncation, and it is what allows us to prove the bulk of propositions in this paper.

For each predicate we will also prove its closure properties (i.e. that the product of two finite sets is finite). The most significant of these closure proofs is that of closure under Π (dependent functions) (Theorem 15).

1.2 Toposes and Finite Sets

In Section 3, we will explore the categorical interpretation of decidable Kuratowski finite sets. The motivation here is partially a practical one: by the end of this work we will have provided a library for proof search over finite types, and the “language” of a topos is a reasonable choice for a principled language for constructing proofs of finiteness in the style of QuickCheck [Claessen and Hughes 2011] generators.

Theoretically speaking, showing that sets in Homotopy Type Theory form a topos (with some caveats) is an important step in characterising the categorical implications of Homotopy Type Theory, first proven in [Rijke and Spitters 2015]. Our work is a formalisation of this result (and the first such formalisation that we are aware of). The proof that decidable Kuratowski finite sets form a Π -pretopos is additional to that.

1.3 Countability Predicates

After the finite predicates, we will briefly look at the infinite countable types, and classify them in a parallel way to the finite predicates (Section 5). We will see that we lose closure under function arrows, but we gain it under the Kleene star (Theorem 25).

1.4 Search

All of our work is formalised in Cubical Agda [Vezzosi et al. 2019]: as a result, the constructive interpretation of each proof is actually a program which can be run on a computer. In finiteness in particular, these programs are particularly useful for exhaustive search.

We will use the countdown problem as a running example throughout the paper: we will show how to prove that any given puzzle has a finite number of solutions, and from that we will show how to enumerate those solutions, thereby solving the puzzle in a verified way.

In Section 4 we will package up the “search” aspect of finiteness into a library for proof search: similar libraries have been built in [Frumin et al. 2018] and [Firsov and Uustalu 2015]. Our library differs from those in three important ways: firstly, it is strictly more powerful, as it allows for search over function types. Secondly, finiteness proofs also provide equivalence proofs to any other finite type: this allows transport of proofs between types of the same cardinality. Finally, through generic programming we provide a simple syntax for stating properties which mimics that of QuickCheck. We also ground the library in the theoretical notions of omniscience.

1.5 Countdown

The Countdown problem [Hutton 2002] is a well-known puzzle in functional programming (which was apparently turned into a TV show). As a running example in this paper, we will produce a verified program which lists all solutions to a given countdown puzzle: here we will briefly explain the game and our strategy for solving it.

The idea behind countdown is simple: given a list of numbers, contestants must construct an arithmetic expression (using a small set of functions) using some or all of the numbers, to reach some target. Here’s an example puzzle:

1	3	7	10	25	50
765					

(Target)

We’ll allow the use of $+$, $-$, \times , and \div . The answer is at the bottom of this page¹.

Our strategy for finding solutions to a given puzzle is to describe precisely the type of solutions to a puzzle, and then show that that type is finite. So what is a “solution” to a countdown puzzle? Broadly, it has two parts:

A Transformation from a list of numbers to an expression.

A Predicate showing that the expression is valid and evaluates to the target.

The first part is described in Figure 2.

This transformation has four steps. First (Fig. 2a) we have to pick which numbers we include in our solution. We will need to show there are finitely many ways to filter n numbers.

Secondly (Fig. 2b) we have to permute the chosen numbers. The representation for a permutation is a little trickier to envision: proving that it’s finite is trickier still. We will need to rely on some of the more involved lemmas later on for this problem.

¹Answer: $3 \times (50 - (10 \times 7 - 25))$


```

197   record  $\Sigma$  (A : Type a) (B : A  $\rightarrow$  Type b) : Type (a  $\sqcup$  b) where
198     constructor  $\rightarrow$ ,_
199     field
200       fst : A
201       snd : B fst
202
203   (4)

```

We will use different notations to refer to this type depending on the setting. The following four expressions all denote the same type:

$$\Sigma A B \quad (5) \quad \Sigma [x : A] B x \quad (6) \quad \exists [x] B x \quad (7) \quad \exists B \quad (8)$$

The non-dependent product is a special instance of the dependent. We denote a simple pair of types A and B as $A \times B$.

Definition 4 (Dependent Product). Dependent products (dependent functions) use the Π symbol. The three following expressions all denote the same type:

$$\Pi A B \quad (9) \quad (x : A) \rightarrow B x \quad (10) \quad \forall x \rightarrow B x \quad (11)$$

Non-dependent functions are denoted with the arrow (\rightarrow).

At this point, as a quick example, we can define the first of our objects for the countdown transformation: the vector of Booleans for selection. A vector is relatively simple to define: a vector of zero elements is simply a unit, a vector of $n + 1$ elements is the product of an element and a vector of n elements.

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{Vec} &: \text{Type } a \rightarrow \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \text{Type } a \\
 \text{Vec } A \text{ zero} &= \top \\
 \text{Vec } A (\text{suc } n) &= A \times \text{Vec } A n
 \end{aligned}
 \quad (12)$$

From this we can see that a vector of n Booleans has the type $\text{Vec Bool } n$

Finally, there is one last thing we must define before moving on to the finiteness predicates: paths.

Definition 5 (Path Types). The equality type (which we denote with \equiv) in CuTT is the type of Paths². The nature and internal structure of Paths is complex and central to how Cubical Type Theory “implements” Homotopy Type Theory, but those details are not relevant to us here. Instead, we only need to know that univalence holds for paths, and path types do indeed compute in Cubical Agda.

2 FINITENESS PREDICATES

In this section, we will define and briefly describe each of the five predicates in Figure 1. We will also explain *why* there are five separate predicates: how can it be the case that so many different things describe “finiteness”? As we will see, some predicates are too informative (they tell us more about the underlying type other than it just being finite), or too restrictive (they don’t allow certain finite types to be classified as finite). These diversions won’t be dead-ends, however: the final predicate we will land on as the “correct” (or, more accurately, most useful) notion of finiteness will be built out of all of the others.

²Actually, CuTT does have an identity type with similar semantics to the identity type in MLTT. We do not use this type anywhere in our work, however, so we will not consider it here.

2.1 Split Enumerability

We will start with a simple notion of finiteness, called split enumerability. This predicate is perhaps the first definition of “finite” that someone might come up with (it’s certainly the most common in dependently-typed programming): put simply, a split enumerable type is a type for which all of its elements can be listed.

Definition 6 (Split Enumerable Set). To say that some type A is split enumerable is to say that there is a list $support : List(A)$ such that any value $x : A$ is in $support$.

$$\mathcal{E}! A = \Sigma[support : List A] ((x : A) \rightarrow x \in support) \quad (13)$$

We call the first component of this pair the “support” list, and the second component the “cover” proof. An equivalent version of this predicate was called `Listable` in [Firsov and Ustalu 2015].

This predicate is simple and useful, but we will see later on how it is perhaps a little imprecise. Before we dive in to exploring the predicate itself, though, we will need to explain some of the terms we used in its definition.

2.1.1 What is a List? In this paper we prefer a slightly unusual definition for the type of lists:

$$List = [\mathbb{N}, Fin] \quad (14)$$

This is the definition for a *container* (Definition 7): effectively, the above definition says that “Lists are a datatype whose shape is given by the natural numbers, and which can be indexed by numbers smaller than its shape”.

If that seems needlessly complex, don’t worry: this definition is precisely equivalent to the usual inductive one.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{data } List (A : Type a) : Type a \text{ where} \\ [] : List A \\ _::_ : A \rightarrow List A \rightarrow List A \end{aligned} \quad (15)$$

And this isn’t some kind of hand-waving equivalence, either: since we are working in HoTT, we can (and do) prove that the two types are equal, allowing us to use one or the other depending on whichever is more convenient, and `subst` in the other representation without loss of generality. That said, defining lists as containers will reveal several interesting connections and proofs about split enumerability and the other predicates, so for the remainder of the paper whenever we say `List` we will mean Equation 14.

Before we get to those interesting proofs, though, there are some other things that need defining. `Fin`, for instance: `Fin n` is the type of natural numbers smaller than n . Its definition relies on a type for disjoint union, \uplus .

$$\begin{aligned} \text{data } _ \uplus _ (A : Type a) (B : Type b) \\ : Type (a \ell b) \text{ where} \\ \text{inl} : A \rightarrow A \uplus B \\ \text{inr} : B \rightarrow A \uplus B \end{aligned} \quad (16)$$

And containers themselves, of course. Containers are a well-studied topic in dependent type theory, with a rich theory: we won’t dive in to that here.

Definition 7 (Containers). A container [Abbott et al. 2005] is a pair S, P where S is a type, the elements of which are called the *shapes* of the container, and P is a type family on S , where the

elements of $P(s)$ are called the *positions* of a container. We “interpret” a container into a functor defined like so:

$$\llbracket S, P \rrbracket X = \Sigma [s : S] (P s \rightarrow X) \quad (18)$$

The definition of container is a little abstract: it is instructive to think of it more concretely for the case of lists. The container representing finite lists is a pair of a natural number n representing the length (or “shape”) of the list, and a function $\text{Fin } n \rightarrow A$, representing the indexing function into the list.

One of the nice things about containers is it gives us a generic way to define “membership”:

$$x \in xs = \text{fiber} (\text{snd } xs) x \quad (19) \quad \text{fiber} : (A \rightarrow B) \rightarrow B \rightarrow \text{Type } _ \quad (20)$$

$$\text{fiber } f y = \exists [x] (f x \equiv y)$$

Here we’re using the homotopy-theory notion of a *fiber* to define membership: a fiber for some function f and some point y in its codomain is a value x and a proof that $f x \equiv y$. Membership also makes more sense when described concretely in terms of lists: $x \in xs$ means “there is an index into xs such that the index points at an item equal to x ”.

2.1.2 Split Surjections. Now that we have our terms defined, let’s look a little at how split enumerability relates to more traditional, classical notions of finiteness. In a classical setting we likely wouldn’t mention “lists” or the like, and would instead define finiteness based on the existence of some injection or surjection, say a surjection from a finite prefix of the natural numbers. In HoTT, surjections (or, more precisely, *split* surjections [Univalent Foundations Program 2013, definition 4.6.1]), are defined like so:

$$\text{SplitSurjective } f = \forall y \rightarrow \text{fiber } f y \quad (21) \quad A \twoheadrightarrow! B = \Sigma (A \rightarrow B) \text{ SplitSurjective} \quad (22)$$

As it turns out, our definition of finiteness here is precisely the same as a surjection-based one, in quite a deep way!

Lemma 1. A proof of split enumerability is equivalent to a split surjection from a finite prefix of the natural numbers.

$$\mathcal{E}! A \Leftrightarrow \Sigma [n : \mathbb{N}] (\text{Fin } n \twoheadrightarrow! A) \quad (23)$$

PROOF. $\mathcal{E}! A$	$\equiv \langle \rangle$	Def. 6 ($\mathcal{E}!$)
$\Sigma [xs : \text{List } A] ((x : A) \rightarrow x \in xs)$	$\equiv \langle \rangle$	Eqn. 19 (\in)
$\Sigma [xs : \text{List } A] ((x : A) \rightarrow \text{fiber} (\text{snd } xs) x)$	$\equiv \langle \rangle$	Eqn. 21
$\Sigma [xs : \text{List } A] \text{SplitSurjective} (\text{snd } xs)$	$\equiv \langle \rangle$	Eqn. 14 (List)
$\Sigma [xs : \llbracket \mathbb{N}, \text{Fin} \rrbracket A] \text{SplitSurjective} (\text{snd } xs)$	$\equiv \langle \rangle$	Eqn. 18
$\Sigma [xs : \Sigma [n : \mathbb{N}] (\text{Fin } n \rightarrow A)] \text{SplitSurjective} (\text{snd } xs)$	$\equiv \langle \text{reassoc} \rangle$	Reassociation
$\Sigma [n : \mathbb{N}] \Sigma [f : (\text{Fin } n \rightarrow A)] \text{SplitSurjective } f$	$\equiv \langle \rangle$	Eqn. 22
$\Sigma [n : \mathbb{N}] (\text{Fin } n \twoheadrightarrow! A) \blacksquare$		

In the above proof syntax the $\equiv \langle \rangle$ connects lines which are definitionally equal, i.e. they are “obviously” equal from the type checker’s perspective. Clearly, only one line isn’t a definitional equality:

$$\text{reassoc} : \Sigma (\Sigma A B) C \Leftrightarrow \Sigma [x : A] \Sigma [y : B x] C (x, y) \quad (24)$$

This means that we could have in fact written the whole proof as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{split-enum-is-split-surj} : \mathcal{E}! A &\Leftrightarrow \Sigma[n : \mathbb{N}] (\text{Fin } n \twoheadrightarrow! A) \\ \text{split-enum-is-split-surj} &= \text{reassoc} \end{aligned} \quad (25)$$

The simplicity of this proof, by the way, is why we preferred the container-based definition of lists over the traditional one.

2.1.3 Instances. To actually show that a type A is finite amounts to constructing a term of type $\mathcal{E}! A$. For simple types like `Bool`, that is simple:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{E}!\langle 2 \rangle : \mathcal{E}! \text{Bool} \\ \mathcal{E}!\langle 2 \rangle .\text{fst} &= [\text{false} , \text{true}] \\ \mathcal{E}!\langle 2 \rangle .\text{snd } \text{false} &= 0 , \text{refl} \\ \mathcal{E}!\langle 2 \rangle .\text{snd } \text{true} &= 1 , \text{refl} \end{aligned} \quad (26)$$

As a slightly more complex example, consider the `Fin` type we've been using. Remember that split enumerability is in fact the same as a split surjection from `Fin` (Lemma 1): to show that `Fin` is split enumerable, then, we need only show that it has a split surjection from itself. We'll prove the following slightly more general statement:

$$\begin{aligned} \twoheadrightarrow! \text{-ident} : A &\twoheadrightarrow! A \\ \twoheadrightarrow! \text{-ident} .\text{fst} &= \text{id} \\ \twoheadrightarrow! \text{-ident} .\text{snd } y .\text{fst} &= y \\ \twoheadrightarrow! \text{-ident} .\text{snd } y .\text{snd } _ &= y \end{aligned} \quad (27)$$

2.1.4 Decidable Equality. One thing that characterises all split enumerable types is that they are all *discrete*, i.e. they have decidable equality.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Discrete } A &= (x \ y : A) \rightarrow \text{Dec } (x \equiv y) \\ \text{data Dec } (A : \text{Type } a) : \text{Type } a &\text{ where} \\ \text{yes} : A &\rightarrow \text{Dec } A \\ \text{no} : \neg A &\rightarrow \text{Dec } A \end{aligned} \quad (28) \quad (29)$$

We will see later that this has implications for the space of types we're dealing with, but for now it simply provides a useful function on split enumerable types.

Lemma 2. Split enumerability implies decidable equality.

PROOF. To prove that split enumerability implies decidable equality we'll take a quick detour through injections.

$$\text{Injective } f = \forall x \ y \rightarrow f x \equiv f y \rightarrow x \equiv y \quad (30) \quad A \twoheadrightarrow B = \Sigma[f : (A \rightarrow B)] \text{Injective } f \quad (31)$$

These are useful because we know that any type which injects into a discrete type is itself discrete:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Discrete-pull-inj} : A \twoheadrightarrow B &\rightarrow \text{Discrete } B \rightarrow \text{Discrete } A \\ \text{Discrete-pull-inj } (f, \text{inj}) \ _\text{2} _ &= \\ \text{case } (f x \text{ 2 } f y) \text{ of} & \\ \lambda \{ (\text{no } \neg p) \rightarrow \text{no } (\neg p \circ \text{cong } f) & \\ ; (\text{yes } p) \rightarrow \text{yes } (\text{inj } x \ y \ p) \} & \end{aligned} \quad (32)$$

All multicol agda code should probably be vertically centred like this

Don't know if this should be a lemma or just prose

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And we can turn a split surjection from A to B into an injection from B to A :

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{surj-to-inj} &: (A \twoheadrightarrow B) \rightarrow (B \hookrightarrow A) \\
 \text{surj-to-inj } (f, \text{surj}) &.\text{fst } x = \text{surj } x.\text{fst} \\
 \text{surj-to-inj } (f, \text{surj}) &.\text{snd } x \, y \, f^1 \langle x \rangle \equiv f^1 \langle y \rangle = \\
 &x \quad \equiv \langle \text{surj } x.\text{snd} \rangle \\
 f(\text{surj } x.\text{fst}) &\equiv \langle \text{cong } f \, f^1 \langle x \rangle \equiv f^1 \langle y \rangle \rangle \\
 f(\text{surj } y.\text{fst}) &\equiv \langle \text{surj } y.\text{snd} \rangle \\
 y &\blacksquare
 \end{aligned} \tag{33}$$

Yielding a simple proof that any type with a split surjection from a discrete type is itself discrete:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{Discrete-distrib-surj} &: (A \twoheadrightarrow B) \rightarrow \text{Discrete } A \rightarrow \text{Discrete } B \\
 \text{Discrete-distrib-surj} &= \text{Discrete-pull-inj} \circ \text{surj-to-inj}
 \end{aligned} \tag{34}$$

Since split enumerability is really just a split surjection from Fin , and since we know that Fin is discrete, the overall proof resolves quite simply:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \mathcal{E}! \Rightarrow \text{Discrete} &: \mathcal{E}! A \rightarrow \text{Discrete } A \\
 \mathcal{E}! \Rightarrow \text{Discrete} &= \text{flip } \text{Discrete-distrib-surj } \text{discreteFin} \\
 &\circ \text{snd} \\
 &\circ \mathcal{E}! \Leftrightarrow \text{Fin} \twoheadrightarrow! .\text{fun}
 \end{aligned} \tag{35}$$

2.2 Manifest Bishop Finiteness

We mentioned in the introduction that occasionally in constructive mathematics proofs will contain “too much” information. With split enumerability we can see an instance of this. Consider the following proof of the finiteness of bool :

$$\begin{aligned}
 \mathcal{E}! \langle 2 \rangle &: \mathcal{E}! \text{Bool} \\
 \mathcal{E}! \langle 2 \rangle &.\text{fst} = [\text{false}, \text{true}, \text{false}] \\
 \mathcal{E}! \langle 2 \rangle &.\text{snd } \text{false} = 0, \text{refl} \\
 \mathcal{E}! \langle 2 \rangle &.\text{snd } \text{true} = 1, \text{refl}
 \end{aligned} \tag{36}$$

There is an extra false at the end of the support list. There’s nothing terribly wrong with that: it is still a valid proof of finiteness, after all, but it does mean that this proof has some extra information which we didn’t necessarily intend to encode.

There is “slop” in the type of split enumerability: there are more distinct values than there are *usefully* distinct values. To reconcile this, we will disallow duplicates in the support list.

This is where manifest Bishop finiteness comes in: this is a definition of finiteness quite similar to split enumerability in other regards, except that it does not allow for duplicates in the support list.

How exactly to prohibit duplicates is the next question. One approach might be to change the definition of List , or introduce a new type NoDupeList , and use it in the predicate instead. However, this would mean we lose access to the functions we have defined on lists, and we have to change the definition of \in as well.

There is a much simpler and more elegant solution: we insist that every *membership proof* must be unique. This would disallow a definition of $\mathcal{E}! \text{Bool}$ with duplicates, as there are multiple values which inhabit the type $\text{false} \in [\text{false}, \text{true}, \text{false}]$. It also allows us to keep most of the split enumerability definition unchanged, just adding a condition to the returned membership proof in the cover proof.

To specify that a value must exist uniquely in HoTT we can use the concept of a *contraction* [Univalent Foundations Program 2013, definition 3.11.1].

$$\text{isContr } A = \Sigma[x : A] \forall y \rightarrow x \equiv y \quad (37)$$

A contraction is a type with the least possible amount of information: it represents the tautologies. All contractions are isomorphic to \top .

By saying that a proof of membership is a contraction, we are saying that it must be *unique*.

$$x \in! xs = \text{isContr } (x \in xs) \quad (38)$$

Now a proof of $x \in! xs$ means that x is not just in xs , but it appears there *only once*.

With this we can define manifest Bishop finiteness:

Definition 8 (Manifest Bishop Finiteness). A type is manifest Bishop finite if there exists a list which contains each value in the type once.

$$\mathcal{B} A = \Sigma[\text{support} : \text{List } A] ((x : A) \rightarrow x \in! \text{support}) \quad (39)$$

The only difference between manifest Bishop finiteness and split enumerability is the membership term: here we require unique membership ($\in!$), rather than simple membership (\in).

We use the word “manifest” here to distinguish from another common interpretation of Bishop finiteness, which we have called cardinal finiteness in this paper: this version of the proof is “manifest” because we have a concrete, non-truncated list of the elements in the proof.

2.2.1 The Relationship Between Manifest Bishop Finiteness and Split Enumerability. While manifest Bishop finiteness might seem stronger than split enumerability, it turns out this is not the case. Both predicates imply the other.

Going from manifest Bishop finiteness is relatively straightforward: to construct a proof of split enumerability from one of manifest Bishop finiteness, it suffices to convert a proof of $x \in! xs$ to one of $x \in xs$, for all x and xs . Since $\in!$ is defined as a contraction of \in , such a conversion is simply the `fst` function.

Going the other direction takes significantly more work.

Lemma 3. Any split enumerable set is manifest Bishop finite.

We will only sketch the proof here: the “unique membership” condition in \mathcal{B} means that we are not permitted duplicates in the support list. The first step in the proof, then, is to filter those duplicates out from the support list of the $\mathcal{E}!$ proof: we can do this using the decidable equality provided by $\mathcal{E}!$ (lemma 35). From there, we need to show that the membership proof carries over appropriately.

We have now proved that every manifestly Bishop finite type is split enumerable, and vice versa. While the types are not *equivalent* (there are more split enumerable proofs than there are manifest Bishop finite proofs), they are of equal power.

2.2.2 From Manifest Bishop Finiteness to Equivalence. We have seen that split enumerability was in fact a split-surjection in disguise. We will now see that manifest Bishop finiteness is in fact an *equivalence* in disguise. We define equivalences as contractible maps [Univalent Foundations Program 2013, definition 4.4.1]:

$$\text{isEquiv } f = \forall y \rightarrow \text{isContr } (\text{fiber } f y) \quad (40) \quad A \simeq B = \Sigma[f : (A \rightarrow B)] \text{isEquiv } f \quad (41)$$

Lemma 4. Manifest bishop finiteness is equivalent to an equivalence to a finite prefix of the natural numbers.

$$\mathcal{B} A \Leftrightarrow \exists [n] (\text{Fin } n \simeq A) \quad (42)$$

PROOF.	$\mathcal{B} A$	$\equiv \langle \rangle$	Def. 8 (\mathcal{B})
	$\Sigma [xs : \text{List } A] ((x : A) \rightarrow x \in! xs)$	$\equiv \langle \rangle$	Eqn. 38 ($\in!$)
	$\Sigma [xs : \text{List } A] ((x : A) \rightarrow \text{isContr } (x \in xs))$	$\equiv \langle \rangle$	Eqn. 19 (\in)
	$\Sigma [xs : \text{List } A] ((x : A) \rightarrow \text{isContr } (\text{fiber } (\text{snd } xs) x))$	$\equiv \langle \rangle$	Eqn. 40
	$\Sigma [xs : \text{List } A] \text{isEquiv } (\text{snd } xs)$	$\equiv \langle \rangle$	Eqn. 14 (List)
	$\Sigma [xs : [\mathbb{N}, \text{Fin}] A] \text{isEquiv } (\text{snd } xs)$	$\equiv \langle \rangle$	Eqn. 18
	$\Sigma [xs : \Sigma [n : \mathbb{N}] (\text{Fin } n \rightarrow A)] \text{isEquiv } (\text{snd } xs)$	$\equiv \langle \text{reassoc} \rangle$	Reassociation
	$\Sigma [n : \mathbb{N}] \Sigma [f : (\text{Fin } n \rightarrow A)] \text{isEquiv } f$	$\equiv \langle \rangle$	Eqn. 41
	$\exists [n] (\text{Fin } n \simeq A)$	\blacksquare	

This proof is almost identical to the proof for lemma 1: it reveals that enumeration-based finiteness predicates are simply another perspective on relation-based ones.

As we are working in CuTT, a proof of equivalence between two types gives us the ability to *transport* proofs from one type to the other. This is extremely powerful, as we will see.

2.3 Cardinal Finiteness

While we have removed some of the unnecessary information from our finiteness predicates, one piece still remains. The two following proofs are both valid proofs of the finiteness of `Bool`, and both do not include any duplicates:

$\mathcal{E}!\langle 2 \rangle : \mathcal{E}! \text{Bool}$	$\mathcal{E}!\langle 2 \rangle' : \mathcal{E}! \text{Bool}$
$\mathcal{E}!\langle 2 \rangle .\text{fst} = [\text{false}, \text{true}]$	$\mathcal{E}!\langle 2 \rangle' .\text{fst} = [\text{true}, \text{false}]$
$\mathcal{E}!\langle 2 \rangle .\text{snd } \text{false} = 0, \text{refl}$	$\mathcal{E}!\langle 2 \rangle' .\text{snd } \text{false} = 1, \text{refl}$
$\mathcal{E}!\langle 2 \rangle .\text{snd } \text{true} = 1, \text{refl}$	$\mathcal{E}!\langle 2 \rangle' .\text{snd } \text{true} = 0, \text{refl}$

Clearly they're not the same though: the order of their support lists differs. Each finiteness predicate so far has contained an *ordering* of the underlying type. For our purposes, this is too much information: it means that when constructing the “category of finite sets” later on, instead of each type having one canonical representative, it will have $n!$, where n is the cardinality of the type³.

What we want is a proof of finiteness that is a proposition.

$$\text{isProp } A = (x \ y : A) \rightarrow x \equiv y \quad (43)$$

The mere propositions are one homotopy level higher than the contractions (Equation 37), the types for which all values are equal to some value. They represent the types for which all values are equal, or, the types isomorphic to \perp or \top . You can also define propositions in terms of the contractions: propositions are the types whose paths are contractions. Soon (Equation 56) we will see the next homotopy level, which are defined in terms of the propositions.

Despite now knowing the precise property we want our finiteness predicate to have, we're not much closer to achieving it. To remedy the problem, we will use the following type:

³We actually do get a category (a groupoid, even) from manifest Bishop finiteness [Yorgey 2014]: it's the groupoid of finite sets equipped with a linear order, whose morphisms are order-preserving bijections. We do not explore this particular construction in any detail.

```

540      data ||_| (A : Type a) : Type a where
541          |_| : A → || A ||
542          squash : (x y : || A ||) → x ≡ y
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```

This is a *higher inductive type*. Normal inductive types have *point* constructors: constructors which construct values of the type. The first constructor here (`|_|`), or the constructor `true` for `Bool`, are both “point” constructors.

What makes this type higher inductive is that it also has *path* constructors: constructors which add new equalities to the type. The `squash` constructor here says that all elements of `|| A ||` are equal, regardless of what `A` is. In this way it allows us to propositionally truncate types, turning information-containing proofs into mere propositions. Put another way, a proof of type `|| A ||` is a proof that some `A` exists, without revealing *which* `A`.

To actually use values of this type we have the following two eliminators:

```

555      rec : isProp B →
556          (A → B) →
557          || A || → B
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```

$$(45)$$

```

555      rec→set : isSet B →
556          (f : A → B) →
557          (∀ x y → f x ≡ f y) →
558          || A || → B
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```

$$(46)$$

While these are not the only eliminators available for `|| A ||`, they are the only ones we will use in this paper. The first says we can eliminate into any proposition: interestingly, this allows us to define a monad instance for `||_|`, meaning we can use things like `do`-notation. The second says we can eliminate into a set as long as the function we use doesn’t care about which value it’s given: formally, `f` in this example has to be “coherently constant” [Kraus 2015].

With this, we can define cardinal finiteness:

Definition 9 (Cardinal Finiteness). A type `A` is cardinally finite if there exists a propositionally truncated proof that `A` is manifest Bishop finite or equivalent to a finite prefix of the natural numbers.

$$\mathcal{C} A = || \mathcal{B} A || \quad (47)$$

2.3.1 Deriving Uniquely-Determined Quantities. At first glance, it might seem that we lose any useful properties we could derive from `B`. Luckily, this is not the case: we will show here how to use the eliminators from propositional truncation (Equations 45 and 46) to use to of our already-proven derivations from `B` on `C`.

The following two lemmas are proven in [Yorgey 2014] (Proposition 2.4.9 and 2.4.10, respectively), in much the same way as we have done here. Our contribution for this section is simply the formalisation.

Lemma 5. Given a cardinally finite type, we can derive the type’s cardinality, as well as a propositionally truncated proof of equivalence with `Fins` of the same cardinality.

$$\text{cardinality-is-unique} : \mathcal{C} A \rightarrow \exists[n] || \text{Fin } n \simeq A || \quad (48)$$

PROOF. The high-level overview of our proof is as follows:

$$\text{cardinality-is-unique} = \text{rec} \rightarrow \text{set} \text{ card-isSet } \text{alg} \text{ const-alg} \circ \|\text{map}\| \mathcal{B} \Rightarrow \text{Fin} \simeq \quad (49)$$

It is the composition of two operations: first, with $\|\text{map}\|$, we change the truncated proof of manifest bishop finiteness to a proof of equivalence with fin .

Then we use the eliminator from Equation 46 with three parameters. The first simply proves that that the output is a set:

$$\text{card-isSet} : \text{isSet} (\exists [n] \parallel \text{Fin } n \simeq A \parallel) \quad (50)$$

The second is the function we apply to the truncated value:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{alg} : \Sigma [n : \mathbb{N}] (\text{Fin } n \simeq A) &\rightarrow \Sigma [n : \mathbb{N}] \parallel \text{Fin } n \simeq A \parallel \\ \text{alg} (n, f \simeq A) &= n, \mid f \simeq A \mid \end{aligned} \quad (51)$$

And the third is a proof that that function is itself coherently constant:

$$\text{const-alg} : (x \ y : \exists [n] (\text{Fin } n \simeq A)) \rightarrow \text{alg } x \equiv \text{alg } y \quad (52)$$

The tricky part of the proof is const-alg : here we need to show that alg returns the same value no matter its input. That output is a pair, the first component of which is the cardinality, and the second the truncated equivalence proof. The truncated proofs in the output are trivially equal by the truncation, so our obligation now has been reduced to:

$$\frac{(n : \mathbb{N}) \quad (p : \text{Fin } n \simeq A) \quad (m : \mathbb{N}) \quad (q : \text{Fin } m \simeq A)}{n \equiv m} \quad (53)$$

Given univalence we have $\text{Fin } n \equiv \text{Fin } m$, and the rest of our task is to prove:

$$\frac{\text{Fin } n \equiv \text{Fin } m}{n \equiv m} \quad (54)$$

This is a well-known chestnut in dependently-typed programming, and one that has a surprisingly tricky and complex proof. We do not include it here, since it has already been explored elsewhere, but it is present in our formalisation. ■

Another proof that carries over from manifest Bishop finiteness is decidable equality. This demonstrates an interesting aspect of propositional truncation: it can contain computational information. That is in contrast to other ways to “truncate” types: $\neg\neg P$, for instance, is a way to provide a “proof” of P without revealing anything about P in MLTT. No matter how much we prove that a function from P doesn’t care about which P it got, though, we can never extract any kind of algorithm or computation from $\neg\neg P$.

Here we’ll briefly show how to extract “computation” from under a propositional truncation.

Lemma 6. Any cardinal-finite set has decidable equality.

PROOF. We can extract plenty of computation from under propositional truncation as long as we prove the thing we’re extracting is a proposition (Equation 45). Our task, in other words, is to prove the following:

$$\text{isProp } (\text{Discrete } A) \quad (55)$$

To show that this type is a proposition we must show that any two given members of the type are equal, i.e. we are given two proofs of decidable equality on A and we must show that they are equal. Remember that $\text{Discrete } A$ is a function of two arguments returning a Dec of whether those two arguments are equal or not. By function extensionality, to prove that that is a proposition we

Is this true? It certainly seems true...

ref for whenever this definition was

have to prove that $\text{Dec } (x \equiv y)$ is a proposition. This proof requires that we show that the payload of each of the constructors (**yes** and **no**) are propositions. **no**'s payload is $x \equiv y \rightarrow \perp$, which is a proposition because \perp is a proposition.

yes is a little more interesting: its payload is $x \equiv y$. How can we prove that the path between x and y is a proposition? It turns out that there is a class of types for which all paths are propositions: the *sets*.

$$\text{isSet } A = (x \ y : A) \rightarrow \text{isProp } (x \equiv y) \quad (56)$$

This is the next homotopy level up from the propositions (Equation 43). More importantly, there is an important theorem relating to sets which *also* relates to decidable equality: Hedberg's theorem [Hedberg 1998].

Theorem 7 (Hedberg's Theorem). Any type with decidable equality is a set.

And of course we know that A here has decidable equality: we were just given two proofs of that fact at the beginning of this proof! ■

2.3.2 Restrictiveness. So far our explorations into finiteness predicates have pushed us in the direction of "less informative": however, as mentioned in the introduction, we can *also* ask how *restrictive* certain predicates are. Since split enumerability and manifest Bishop finiteness imply each other we know that there can be no type which satisfies one but not the other. We also know that manifest Bishop finiteness implies cardinal finiteness, but we do *not* have a function in the other direction:

$$\mathcal{C} A \rightarrow \mathcal{B} A \quad (57)$$

So the question arises naturally: is there a cardinally finite type which is *not* manifest Bishop finite?

It turns out the answer is no! We can prove the following statement:

$$\neg \langle \mathcal{C} \cap \mathcal{B}^c \rangle : \neg \Sigma [A : \text{Type } a] \mathcal{C} A \times \neg \mathcal{B} A \quad (58)$$

We use the fact that \perp is itself a proposition to eliminate from under the truncation.

$$\neg \langle \mathcal{C} \cap \mathcal{B}^c \rangle (_ , c , \neg b) = \text{rec isProp } \perp \neg b \ c \quad (59)$$

This tells us that manifest bishop finiteness, cardinal finiteness, and split enumerability all refer to the same class of types.

2.3.3 Going from Cardinal Finiteness to Manifest Bishop Finiteness. We know of course that we can convert any proof of manifest Bishop finiteness to a proof of Cardinal finiteness: it's just the truncation function $|_|$. It's the other direction which presents a difficulty:

Theorem 8. Any cardinal finite type with a total order is Bishop finite.

The proof for this particular theorem is quite involved in the formalisation, so we only give its sketch here.

Our strategy will be to *sort* the support list of the proof for Bishop finiteness, and then prove that the sorting function is coherently constant, thereby satisfying the eliminator in Equation 46. We need to show, in other words, that sorting two support lists from proofs of manifest Bishop finiteness on the same type with the same order always returns the same result. The sort we use is a standard insertion sort:

$\text{insert} : E \rightarrow \text{List } E \rightarrow \text{List } E$
 $\text{insert } x [] = x :: []$
 $\text{insert } x (y :: xs) \text{ with } x \leq? y \quad (60) \quad \text{sort} : \text{List } E \rightarrow \text{List } E$
 $\dots \mid \text{inl } x \leq y = x :: y :: xs \quad \text{sort} = \text{foldr insert } [] \quad (61)$
 $\dots \mid \text{inr } y \leq x = y :: \text{insert } x xs$

And we prove that `sort` produces a list which is sorted, and a permutation of its input.

$\text{sort-sorts} : \forall xs \rightarrow \text{Sorted } (\text{sort } xs) \quad (62) \quad \text{sort-perm} : \forall xs \rightarrow \text{sort } xs \rightsquigarrow xs \quad (63)$

We've introduced permutations here: we take their definition from [Danielsson 2012]. Two lists are permutations of each other if their membership proofs are all equivalent.

$xs \rightsquigarrow ys = \forall x \rightarrow (x \in xs) \Leftrightarrow (x \in ys) \quad (64)$

This definition fits particularly well for two reasons: first, it is defined on containers generically, which fits well with our finiteness predicates. Secondly, it is extremely straightforward to show that the support lists of any two proofs of manifest Bishop finiteness must be permutations of each other:

$\text{perm-}\mathcal{B} : (xs \ ys : \mathcal{B} \ A) \rightarrow xs.\text{fst} \rightsquigarrow ys.\text{fst}$
 $\text{perm-}\mathcal{B} \ xs \ ys \ x.\text{fun } _ = ys.\text{snd } x.\text{fst}$
 $\text{perm-}\mathcal{B} \ xs \ ys \ x.\text{inv } _ = xs.\text{snd } x.\text{fst} \quad (65)$
 $\text{perm-}\mathcal{B} \ xs \ ys \ x.\text{rightInv} = ys.\text{snd } x.\text{snd}$
 $\text{perm-}\mathcal{B} \ xs \ ys \ x.\text{leftInv} = xs.\text{snd } x.\text{snd}$

Almost all of the pieces are in place now: we know that the support lists of all proofs of $\mathcal{B} \ A$ are permutations of each other, and we know that `sort` returns a sorted permutation of its input. The final piece of the puzzle is the following:

$\text{sorted-perm-eq} : \forall xs \ ys \rightarrow \text{Sorted } xs \rightarrow \text{Sorted } ys \rightarrow xs \rightsquigarrow ys \rightarrow xs \equiv ys \quad (66)$

If two sorted lists are both permutations of each other they must be equal. Connecting up all the pieces we get the following:

$\text{perm-invar} : \forall xs \ ys \rightarrow xs \rightsquigarrow ys \rightarrow \text{sort } xs \equiv \text{sort } ys \quad (67)$

Because we know that all support lists of $\mathcal{B} \ A$ are permutations of each other this is enough to prove that `sort` is coherently constant, and therefore can eliminate from within a truncation. The second component of the output pair (the cover proof) follows quite naturally from the definition of permutations.

2.4 Manifest Enumerability

We have now explored quite far in the direction of restricting information: indeed, cardinal finiteness, a mere proposition, has the minimal amount of information a predicate can have. What we haven't seen, however, is a predicate with a different domain to the others. Since manifest Bishop finiteness and split enumerability have equal strength, and since we've shown that there is no type which is cardinal finite but not manifest Bishop finite, we haven't explored any of the "restrictiveness" axis from Figure 1.

What we're looking for is a type which is in some sense finite, but doesn't conform to any of the predicates we've seen so far. The *circle* is such a type:

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here

$\text{data } S^1 : \text{Type}_0 \text{ where}$
 $\text{base} : S^1$
 $\text{loop} : \text{base} \equiv \text{base}$
(68)

The thing that this type has which precludes it from being, say, split enumerable, is its *higher homotopy structure*.

So far we have seen three levels of homotopy structure: the contractions (Equation 37), the propositions (Equation 43), and the sets (Equation 56). You may have noticed the pattern that each new level is generated by saying its paths are members of the previous level; if we apply that pattern again, we get to the next homotopy level: the groupoids.

$\text{isGroupoid } A = (x \ y : A) \rightarrow \text{isSet } (x \equiv y)$ (69)

These types do not necessarily have unique identity proofs: there is more than one value which can inhabit the type $x \equiv y$. The circle is one of the simplest examples of non-set groupoids: the constructor `loop` is the extra path in the type which isn't the identity path.

We now need to recall two facts: first, Hedberg's theorem tells us that every discrete type is a set. Second, every finiteness predicate we've seen thus far implies decidable equality. From this it's clear that all of the previous predicates are restricted to sets, and can't include types like the circle.

But the type certainly *seems* finite! In order to explore the "restrictiveness" axis in Figure 1, then, we'll need to construct a predicate which admits the circle. Manifest enumerability is one such predicate.

Definition 10 (Manifest Enumerability). Manifest enumerability is an enumeration predicate like Bishop finiteness or split enumerability with the only difference being a propositionally truncated membership proof.

$\mathcal{E} A = \Sigma[\text{support} : \text{List } A] ((x : A) \rightarrow \parallel x \in \text{support} \parallel)$ (70)

It might not be immediately clear why this definition of enumerability allows the circle to conform while the others do not. The crux of the issue was that the cover proofs of the previous definitions didn't just tell us that some element was in the support list, they told us *where* it was in the support list. From the position we were able to derive decidable equality: that position is precisely what's hidden in manifest enumerability.

And indeed this means that the circle is manifestly enumerable.

$\mathcal{E}\langle S^1 \rangle : \mathcal{E} S^1$
 $\mathcal{E}\langle S^1 \rangle . \text{fst} = [\text{base}]$
 $\mathcal{E}\langle S^1 \rangle . \text{snd base} = | 0, \text{refl} |$
 $\mathcal{E}\langle S^1 \rangle . \text{snd } (\text{loop } i) = \text{squash } | 0, (\lambda j \rightarrow \text{loop } (i \wedge j)) | | 0, (\lambda j \rightarrow \text{loop } (i \vee \sim j)) | i$
(71)

2.4.1 Surjections. We already saw that split enumerability was the listed form of a split surjection: what we didn't explain was why the word "split" was placed before surjection. In the presence of higher homotopies than sets, split surjections are actually *not* a satisfactory definition of surjection. And we are most certainly in the presence of higher homotopies: just moments ago we were introduced to the circle. In these cases, the following definition of surjections is preferred [Univalent Foundations Program 2013, definition 4.6.1]:

$$\text{Surjective } f = \forall y \rightarrow \|\text{fiber } f y\| \quad (72)$$

$$A \rightarrow B = \Sigma (A \rightarrow B) \text{ Surjective} \quad (73)$$

Much in the same way that split enumerability were split surjections, our new predicate of manifest enumerability corresponds to the proper surjections.

Lemma 9. Manifest enumerability is equivalent to a surjection from a finite prefix of the natural numbers.

$$\mathcal{E}(A) \simeq \Sigma(n : \mathbb{N}), (\text{Fin } n \twoheadrightarrow A) \quad (74)$$

PROOF.

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{E}(A) &\simeq \Sigma(xs : \text{List}(A)), \Pi(x : A), \|x \in xs\| && \text{def. 6 } (\mathcal{E}) \\ &\simeq \Sigma(xs : \text{List}(A)), \Pi(x : A), \|\text{fib}_{\text{snd}(xs)}(x)\| && \text{eqn. 19 } (\in) \\ &\simeq \Sigma(xs : \text{List}(A)), \text{surj}(\text{snd}(xs)) && \text{eqn. 72 } (\text{surj}) \\ &\simeq \Sigma(xs : \llbracket \mathbb{N}, \text{Fin} \rrbracket(A)), \text{surj}(\text{snd}(xs)) && \text{def. 14 } (\text{List}) \\ &\simeq \Sigma(xs : \Sigma(n : \mathbb{N}), \Pi(i : \text{Fin } n), A), \text{surj}(\text{snd}(xs)) && \text{eqn. 18 } (\llbracket \cdot \rrbracket) \\ &\simeq \Sigma(n : \mathbb{N}), \Sigma(f : \text{Fin } n \twoheadrightarrow A), \text{surj}(f) && \text{Reassociation of } \Sigma \\ &\simeq \Sigma(n : \mathbb{N}), (\text{Fin } n \twoheadrightarrow A) && \text{eqn. 73 } (\twoheadrightarrow) \blacksquare \end{aligned}$$

2.4.2 Relation To Split Enumerability. It is trivially easy to construct a proof that any split enumerable type is manifest enumerable: we simply truncate the membership proof. Going the other way is more difficult, as we need to extract the membership proof from under a truncation. We do know what we need, however: the key difference between manifest enumerability and split enumerability is that the latter implied decidable equality. So that's the missing piece we should require in order to go from one to the other:

Lemma 10. A manifestly enumerable type with decidable equality is split enumerable.

Now that we know what extra bit of information we are allowed use in this proof, the path forward becomes a little more clear. In terms of the actual conversion function, the support list will stay the same, and only the return type of the cover proof needs to change: from $\|x \in xs\|$ to $x \in xs$.

That can be accomplished with the help of the following function:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{recompute} &: \text{Dec } A \rightarrow \|A\| \rightarrow A \\ \text{recompute } (\text{yes } p) &= p \\ \text{recompute } (\text{no } \neg p) &= \perp\text{-elim } (\text{rec isProp}\perp \neg p p) \end{aligned} \quad (75)$$

Given a decision procedure for some type, and a propositionally truncated value of that type, we can construct an element of the type.

In the case of $x \in xs$ we can construct a decision procedure for membership of a list, since we already have decidable equality on the elements of the list, proving our obligation.

2.5 Kuratowski Finiteness

The one big missing definition of finiteness to cover is *Kuratowski* finiteness. While it's quite important, it's also quite different from the definitions we've seen so far. It starts with an encoding of the free join semilattice.

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intro

Definition 11 (Free Join Semilattice). $\mathcal{K}(A)$ is the free join semilattice, or, alternatively, the type of Kuratowski-finite subsets of A .

```

data  $\mathcal{K}(A : \text{Type } a) : \text{Type } a$  where
  [] :  $\mathcal{K} A$ 
  _::_ :  $A \rightarrow \mathcal{K} A \rightarrow \mathcal{K} A$ 
  com :  $\forall x y xs \rightarrow x :: y :: xs \equiv y :: x :: xs$ 
  dup :  $\forall x xs \rightarrow x :: x :: xs \equiv x :: xs$ 
  trunc : isSet ( $\mathcal{K} A$ )

```

(76)

We define it as a HIT. The first two constructors are point constructors, giving ways to create values of type $\mathcal{K}(A)$. They are also recognisable as the two constructors for finite lists, a type which represents the free monoid.

The next two constructors add extra paths to the type: equations that usage of the type must obey. These extra paths turn the free monoid into the free *commutative* (com) *idempotent* (dup) monoid.

The final constructor enforces that the type $\mathcal{K}(A)$ must be a set.

The Kuratowski finite subset is a free join semilattice (or, equivalently, a free commutative idempotent monoid). More prosaically, \mathcal{K} is the abstract data type for finite sets, as defined in the Boom hierarchy [Boom 1981; Bunkenburg 1994]. However, rather than just being a specification, \mathcal{K} is fully usable as a data type in its own right, thanks to HITs.

Other definitions of \mathcal{K} exist (such as the one in [Frumin et al. 2018]) which make the fact that \mathcal{K} is the free join semilattice more obvious. We have included such a definition in our formalisation, and proven it equivalent to the one above.

Next, we need a way to say that an entire type is Kuratowski finite. For that, we will need to define membership of \mathcal{K} .

Definition 12 (Membership of \mathcal{K}). Membership is defined by pattern-matching on \mathcal{K} . The two point constructors are handled like so:

$$\begin{aligned}
 x \in [] &:= \perp; \\
 x \in y :: ys &:= \|x \equiv y \uplus x \in ys\|;
 \end{aligned}$$
(77)

The com and dup constructors are handled by proving that the truncated form of \uplus is itself commutative and idempotent. The type of propositions is itself a set, satisfying the trunc constructor.

Finally, we have enough background to define Kuratowski finiteness.

Definition 13 (Kuratowski Finiteness).

$$\mathcal{K}^f A = \Sigma[xs : \mathcal{K} A] ((x : A) \rightarrow x \in xs)$$
(78)

We also have the following two lemmas, proven in both [Frumin et al. 2018] and our formalisation.

Lemma 11. \mathcal{K}^f is a mere proposition.

Lemma 12. This circle S^1 is Kuratowski finite.

2.5.1 Relation to Cardinal Finiteness.

Lemma 13. Cardinal finiteness is equivalent to Kuratowski finiteness over a discrete set.

$$C(A) \simeq \mathcal{K}^f(A) \times \text{Discrete}(A) \quad (79)$$

This proof is constructed by providing a pair of functions: one from $C(A)$ to $\mathcal{K}^f(A) \times \text{Discrete}(A)$, and one the other way. This pair implies an equivalence, because both source and target are propositions. The actual functions themselves are proven in our formalisation, as well as in [Frumin et al. 2018].

3 TOPOS

In this section we will examine the categorical interpretation of finite sets. In particular, we will prove that decidable Kuratowski finite types form a Π -pretopos. A lot of the work for this proof has been done already: in Theorem 13 we saw that Kuratowski finite types were equivalent to Cardinally finite types. We will use the latter definition implementation-wise from now on, as it is slightly easier to work with: CuTT's transport means we can do this without loss of generality.

3.1 Categories in HoTT

3.2 Closure

3.2.1 Split Enumerability Closure. Now that we have a suitable definition of finiteness, we will next prove that some things are finite. With the most basic simple types out of the way, the obvious next choice is the (non-dependent) sums and products: \uplus and \times . Both of these types can be constructed from the *dependent* sum, however, so that is the type we will prove finite. From that we can derive a much wider array of finiteness proofs.

Lemma 14. Split enumerability is closed under Σ .

$$\frac{\mathcal{E}! A \quad (x : A) \rightarrow \mathcal{E}!(U x)}{\mathcal{E}!(\Sigma [x:A] U x)} \quad (80)$$

PROOF. Let A be a type which is split enumerable, and U be a type family over A which is split enumerable at every point. Formally, we have the following proofs:

$$\mathcal{E}!_A : \mathcal{E}!(A) \quad (81)$$

$$\mathcal{E}!_U : \Pi(x : A), \mathcal{E}!(U(x)) \quad (82)$$

Our task is to construct a proof of type:

$$\mathcal{E}!(\Sigma(x : A), U(x)) \quad (83)$$

This proof itself is composed of two components:

$$\text{support} : \text{List}(\Sigma(x : A), U(x)) \quad (84)$$

$$\text{cover} : \Pi(x : \Sigma(y : A), U(y)), x \in \text{support} \quad (85)$$

To construct the support list, we apply the function $\mathcal{E}!_U$ to every element in the support list of $\mathcal{E}!_A$, extract the support lists from the resulting finiteness proofs, and concatenate them.

To prove that this support list does in fact cover the entirety of the type $\Sigma A U$, we note that any element of type $\Sigma A U$ must have a first component in the support list of $\mathcal{E}!_A$, and its second component must be in the result of applying $\mathcal{E}!_U$ to that first element (since that support list contains every element of type $U(x)$). Therefore, the pair itself must be in our constructed support list. ■

This is just the closure bits pulled over from the finiteness predicates section. They need to be re-worked to fit in here.

Convert to Agda

This pattern of applying a function to each element in a list and concatenating the result is of course well-known in functional programming, and is in fact the pattern that makes lists a monad. While this insight isn't strictly relevant to our work here, it does mean the implementation of this function can use Agda's `do` notation, resulting in the following extremely clean implementation:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{sup-}\Sigma &: \text{List } A \rightarrow \\
 &((x : A) \rightarrow \text{List } (U \ x)) \rightarrow \\
 &\text{List } (\Sigma \ A \ U) \\
 \text{sup-}\Sigma \ xs \ ys &= \text{do } x \leftarrow xs \\
 &\quad y \leftarrow ys \ x \\
 &\quad [\ x, \ y \]
 \end{aligned} \tag{86}$$

We now have two components we'll need for the proof that the countdown transformation is finite. The component we'll look at is step 2c: selection of the operators. We'll first need a type representing the operators available to us.

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{data Op} &: \text{Type}_0 \text{ where} \\
 +', \times', -, \div' &: \text{Op}
 \end{aligned} \tag{87}$$

Proving that this type is finite takes much the same form as the proof of finiteness for `bool`.

$$\begin{aligned}
 \mathcal{E}!(\text{Op}) &: \mathcal{E}! \text{ Op} \\
 \mathcal{E}!(\text{Op}) .\text{fst} &= +' :: \times' :: -' :: \div' :: [] \\
 \mathcal{E}!(\text{Op}) .\text{snd } +' &= 0, \text{ refl} \\
 \mathcal{E}!(\text{Op}) .\text{snd } \times' &= 1, \text{ refl} \\
 \mathcal{E}!(\text{Op}) .\text{snd } -' &= 2, \text{ refl} \\
 \mathcal{E}!(\text{Op}) .\text{snd } \div' &= 3, \text{ refl}
 \end{aligned} \tag{88}$$

Next, we will need to build a proof of finiteness for vectors of length n . This uses the proof of finiteness for Σ .

$$\begin{aligned}
 \mathcal{E}!(\text{Vec}) &: \mathcal{E}! \ A \rightarrow \mathcal{E}! (\text{Vec } A \ n) \\
 \mathcal{E}!(\text{Vec}) \ \{n = \text{zero}\} \ \mathcal{E}!(A) &= \mathcal{E}!(\text{PolyT}) \\
 \mathcal{E}!(\text{Vec}) \ \{n = \text{suc } n\} \ \mathcal{E}!(A) &= \mathcal{E}!(A) \times \mathcal{E}!(\text{Vec } A \ n)
 \end{aligned} \tag{89}$$

3.2.2 Manifest Bishop Closure Under Π . The glaring omission from our closure proofs under type formers so far has been the Π type: we have not proved closure under functions, dependent or otherwise. In MLTT, this is of course not provable: since all of the finiteness predicates we have seen so far imply decidable equality, and since we don't have any kind of decidable equality on functions in MLTT, we know that we won't be able to show that any kind of function is finite; even one like `Bool \rightarrow Bool`.

CuTT is not so restricted. Since we have things like function extensionality and transport, we can indeed prove the finiteness of function types. Our proof here makes use directly of the univalence axiom, and makes use furthermore of all the previous closure proofs. We will prove this closure on split enumerability, rather than on manifest Bishop finiteness, as it requires slightly less legwork in the proof itself, but of course we can derive the proof on manifest Bishop finiteness in a few lines.

Theorem 15. Split enumerability is closed under dependent functions. (Π -types).

$$\frac{\mathcal{E}!(A) \quad \Pi(x : A), \mathcal{E}!(U(x))}{\mathcal{E}!(\Pi(x : A), U(x))} \tag{90}$$

PROOF. Let A be a split enumerable type, and U be a type family from A , which is split enumerable over all points of A .

As A is split enumerable, we know that it is also manifestly Bishop finite (lemma 3), and consequently we know $A \simeq \text{Fin } n$, for some n (lemma 4). We can therefore replace all occurrences of A with $\text{Fin } n$, changing our goal to:

$$\frac{\mathcal{E}!(\text{Fin } n) \quad \Pi(x : \text{Fin } n), \mathcal{E}!(U(x))}{\mathcal{E}!(\Pi(x : \text{Fin } n), U(x))} \quad (91)$$

We then define the type of n -tuples over some type family $T : \text{Fin } n \rightarrow \text{Type}$.

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Tuple}(0, T) &:= \top \\ \text{Tuple}(n+1, T) &:= T(0) \times \text{Tuple}(n, T \circ \text{suc}) \end{aligned} \quad (92)$$

We can show that this type is equivalent to functions (proven in our formalisation):

$$\Pi(x : \text{Fin } n), U(x) \simeq \text{Tuple}(n, U) \quad (93)$$

And therefore we can simplify again our goal to the following:

$$\frac{\mathcal{E}!(\text{Fin } n) \quad \Pi(x : \text{Fin } n), \mathcal{E}!(U(x))}{\mathcal{E}!(\text{Tuple}(n, U))} \quad (94)$$

We can prove this goal by showing that $\text{Tuple}(n, U)$ is split enumerable: it is made up of finitely many products of points of U , which are themselves split enumerable, and \top , which is also split enumerable. Lemma 14 shows us that the product of finitely many split enumerable types is itself split enumerable, proving our goal. ■

This proof can again give us insight into how to prove finiteness of our countdown transformation. In the first step (Fig. 2a), we need to select some numbers from an input list: this can be described with a function of type $\text{Fin } n \rightarrow \text{Bool}$, from indices in the original list into whether we keep the values or not. We now know that we can prove functions finite without difficulty: in this case, we can do it even more simply by proving that an n -tuple of booleans is finite.

3.2.3 Closure on Cardinal Finiteness. Since we don't have a function of type $C(A) \rightarrow \mathcal{B}(A)$, closure proofs on \mathcal{B} do not transfer over to C trivially (unlike with $\mathcal{E}!$ and \mathcal{B}). The cases for \perp , \top , and Bool are simple to adapt: we can just propositionally truncate their Bishop finiteness proof.

Non-dependent operators like \times , \wr , and \rightarrow are also relatively straightforward: since $\|\cdot\|$ forms a monad, we can apply n -ary functions to values inside it, combining them together.

The fact that $\|\cdot\|$ forms a monad means that we can lift n -ary functions like the following:

$$\begin{aligned} _|\times|_ : \mathcal{B} A \rightarrow \mathcal{B} B \rightarrow \mathcal{B} (A \times B) \\ \text{Into a truncated context:} \\ _||\times||_ : \mathcal{C} A \rightarrow \mathcal{C} B \rightarrow \mathcal{C} (A \times B) \end{aligned} \quad (95)$$

$\text{xs } ||\times|| \text{ ys} = \text{do}$

$x \leftarrow \text{xs}$

$y \leftarrow \text{ys}$

$| x | \times | y |$

Unfortunately, for the dependent type formers like Σ and Π , the same trick does not work. We have closure proofs like:

$$\frac{\mathcal{B}(A) \quad \Pi(x : A), \mathcal{B}(U(x))}{\mathcal{B}(\Pi A U)} \quad (96)$$

If we apply the monadic truncation trick we can derive closure proofs like the following:

$$\frac{\|\mathcal{B}(A)\| \quad \|\Pi(x : A), \mathcal{B}(U(x))\|}{\|\mathcal{B}(\Pi A U)\|} \quad (97)$$

However our *desired* closure proof is the following:

$$\frac{\|\mathcal{B}(A)\| \quad \Pi(x : A), \|\mathcal{B}(U(x))\|}{\|\mathcal{B}(\Pi A U)\|} \quad (98)$$

They don't match!

The solution would be to find a function of the following type:

$$(\Pi(x : A), \|\mathcal{B}(U(x))\|) \rightarrow \|\Pi(x : A), \mathcal{B}(U(x))\| \quad (99)$$

However we might be disheartened at realising that this is a required goal: the above equation is *extremely* similar to the axiom of choice!

Definition 14 (Axiom of Choice). In HoTT, the axiom of choice is commonly defined as follows [Univalent Foundations Program 2013, lemma 3.8.2]. For any set A , and a type family U which is a set at all the points of A , the following function exists:

$$(\Pi(x : A), \|U(x)\|) \rightarrow \|\Pi(x : A), U(x)\| \quad (100)$$

Luckily the axiom of choice *does* hold for cardinally finite types, allowing us to prove the following:

Lemma 16.

$$C(A) \rightarrow (\Pi(x : A), \|U(x)\|) \rightarrow \|\Pi(x : A), U(x)\| \quad (101)$$

PROOF. Let A be a cardinally finite type, U be a type family on A , and f be a dependent function of type $\Pi(x : A), \|U(x)\|$.

First, since our goal is itself propositionally truncated, we have access to values under truncations: put another way, in the context of proving our goal, we can rely on the fact that A is manifestly Bishop finite. Using the same technique as we did in lemma 15, we can switch from working with dependent functions from A to n -tuples, where n is the cardinality of A . This changes our goal to the following:

$$\mathbf{Tuple}(n, \|\cdot\| \circ U) \rightarrow \|\mathbf{Tuple}(n, U)\| \quad (102)$$

Since $\|\cdot\|$ is closed under finite products, this function exists (in fact, using the fact that $\|\cdot\|$ forms a monad, we can recognise this function as `sequenceA` from the `Traversable` class in Haskell). ■

This gets us all of the necessary closure proofs on C .

3.3 The Absence of the Subobject Classifier

$$\begin{aligned} \text{filter-subobject} : \\ & (\forall x \rightarrow \text{isProp } (P x)) \rightarrow \\ & (\forall x \rightarrow \text{Dec } (P x)) \rightarrow \\ & \mathcal{E}! A \rightarrow \\ & \mathcal{E}! (\Sigma[x : A] P x) \end{aligned} \quad (103)$$

3.4 Closure

For the first three closure proofs, we only consider split enumerability: as it is the strongest of the finiteness predicates, we can derive the other closure proofs from it.

3.5 The Category of Finite Sets

HoTT and CuTT seem to be especially suitable settings for formalisations of category theory. The univalence axiom in particular allows us to treat categorical isomorphisms as equalities, saving us from the dreaded “setoid hell”.

We follow [Univalent Foundations Program 2013, chapter 9] in its treatment of categories in HoTT, and in its proof that sets do indeed form a category. We will first briefly go through the construction of the category *Set*, as it differs slightly from the usual method in type theory.

First, the type of objects and arrows:

$$\text{Obj}_{\text{Set}} := \Sigma(x : \text{Type}), \text{isSet}(x) \quad (104)$$

$$\text{Hom}_{\text{Set}}(x, y) := \text{fst}(x) \rightarrow \text{fst}(y) \quad (105)$$

As the type of objects makes clear, we have already departed slightly from the simpler $\text{Obj}_{\text{Set}} := \text{Type}$ way of doing things: of course we have to, as HoTT allows non-set types. Furthermore, after proving the usual associativity and identity laws for composition (which are definitionally true in this case), we must further show $\text{isSet}(\text{Hom}_{\text{Set}}(x, y))$; even then we only have a precategory.

To show that *Set* is a category, we must show that categorical isomorphisms are equivalent to equivalences. In a sense, we must give a univalence rule for the category we are working in.

We have provided formal proofs that *Set* does indeed form a category, and the following:

Theorem 17 (The Category of Finite Sets). Finite sets form a category in HoTT when defined like so:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Obj}_{\text{FinSet}} &:= \Sigma(x : \text{Type}), C(x) \\ \text{Hom}_{\text{FinSet}}(x, y) &:= \text{fst}(x) \rightarrow \text{fst}(y) \end{aligned} \quad (106)$$

3.6 The Π -pretopos of Finite Sets

For this proof, we follow again the proof that *Set* forms a ΠW -pretopos from [Univalent Foundations Program 2013, chapter 10] and [Rijke and Spitters 2015]. The difference here is that clearly we do not have access to *W*-types, as they would permit infinitary structures.

We first must show that *Set* has an initial object and finite, disjoint sums, which are stable under pullback. We also must show that *Set* is a regular category with effective quotients. We now have a pretopos: the presence of Π types make it a Π -pretopos.

We have proven the above statements for both *Set* and *FinSet*. As far as we know, this is the first formalisation of either.

Theorem 18. The category of finite sets, *FinSet*, forms a Π -pretopos.

4 SEARCH

A common theme in dependently-typed programming is that proofs of interesting theoretical things may actually correspond to useful algorithms in some way related to that thing. Finiteness is one such case: if we have a proof that a type *A* is finite, we should be able to search through all the elements of that type in a systematic, automated way.

As it happens, this kind of search is a very common method of proof automation in dependently-typed languages like Agda. Proofs of statements like “the following function is associative”

```

1128      _&_ : Bool → Bool → Bool
1129      false & false = false
1130      false & true  = false
1131      true  & false = false
1132      true  & true  = true

```

(107)

can be tedious: the associativity proof in particular would take $2^3 = 8$ cases. This is unacceptable! There are only finitely many cases to examine, after all, and we're *already* on a computer: why not automate it? A proof that `Bool` is finite can get us much of the way to a library to do just that.

Similar automation machinery can be leveraged to provide search algorithms for certain “logic programming”-esque problems. Using the machinery we will describe in this section, though, when the program says it finds a solution to some problem that solution will be accompanied by a formal *proof* of its correctness.

In this section, we will describe the theoretical underpinning and implementation of a library for proof search over finite domains, based on the finiteness predicates we have introduced already. The library will be able to prove statements like the proof of associativity above, as well as more complex statements. As a running example for a “more complex statement” we will use the countdown problem, which we have been using throughout: we will demonstrate how to construct a prover for the existence of, or absence of, a solution to a given countdown puzzle.

The API for writing searches over finite domains comes from the language of the Π -pretopos: with it we will show how to compose QuickCheck-like generators for proof search, with the addition of some automation machinery that allows us to prove things like the associativity in a couple of lines:

$$\begin{aligned}
 \wedge\text{-assoc} &: \forall x y z \rightarrow (x \wedge y) \wedge z \equiv x \wedge (y \wedge z) \\
 \wedge\text{-assoc} &= \forall \zeta^n 3 \lambda x y z \rightarrow (x \wedge y) \wedge z \stackrel{2}{\equiv} x \wedge (y \wedge z)
 \end{aligned}$$
(108)

We have already, in previous sections, explored the theoretical implications of Cubical Type Theory on our formalisation. With this library for proof search, however, we will see two distinct practical applications which would simply not be possible without computational univalence. First and foremost: our proofs of finiteness, constructed with the API we will describe, have all the power of full equalities. Put another way any proof over a finite type A can be lifted to any other type with the same cardinality. Secondly our proof search can range over functions: we could, for instance, have asked the prover to find if *any* function over `Bool` is associative, and if so return it to us.

$$\begin{aligned}
 \text{some-assoc} &: \Sigma [f : (\text{Bool} \rightarrow \text{Bool} \rightarrow \text{Bool})] \forall x y z \rightarrow f(f x y) z \equiv f x (f y z) \\
 \text{some-assoc} &= \exists \zeta^n 1 \lambda f \rightarrow \forall ?^n 3 \lambda x y z \rightarrow f(f x y) z \stackrel{2}{\equiv} f x (f y z)
 \end{aligned}$$
(109)

The usefulness of which is dubious, but we will see a more interesting application soon.

4.1 Proof Automation And Search Techniques

For this prover we will not resort to reflection or similar techniques: instead, we will trick the type checker to do our automation for us. This is a relatively common technique, although not so much outside of Agda, so we will briefly explain it here.

To understand the technique we should first notice that some proof automation *already* happens in Agda, like the following:

```

1172      obvious : true & false ≡ false
1173      obvious = refl

```

(110)

The type checker does not require us to manually explain each step of evaluation of: `true & false`.

These examples so far are pretty focused on the bool associativity example. I'm not sure I can think of a good way to put countdown in instead: will we try switch? Or will we keep the bool for this short bit?

While it's not a particularly impressive example of automation, it does nonetheless demonstrate a principle we will exploit: closed terms will compute to a normal form if they're needed to type check. The type checker will perform β -reduction as much as it can.

So our task is to rewrite proof obligations like the one in Equation 108 into ones which can reduce completely. As it turns out, we have already described the type of proofs which can “reduce completely”: *decidable* proofs. If we have a decision procedure over some proposition P we can run that decision during type checking, because the decision procedure itself is a proof that the decision will terminate. In code, we capture this idea with the following pair of functions:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Is-True} : \text{Dec } A \rightarrow \text{Type}_0 & & \text{from-true} : (\text{decision} : \text{Dec } A) \rightarrow \\ \text{Is-True } (\text{inl } _) = \top & & \{ _ : \text{Is-True } \text{decision} \} \rightarrow A \quad (112) \\ \text{Is-True } (\text{inr } _) = \perp & & \text{from-true } (\text{inl } x) = x \end{aligned} \quad (111)$$

The first is a function which derives a type from whether a decision is successful or not. This function is important because if we use the output of this type at any point we will effectively force the unifier to run the decision computation. The second takes—as an implicit argument—an inhabitant of the type generated from the first, and uses it to prove that the decision can only be true, and the extracts the resulting proof from that decision. All in all, we can use it like this:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{extremely-obvious} : \text{true} \neq \text{false} \\ \text{extremely-obvious} = \text{from-true } (!(\text{true} \stackrel{?}{=} \text{false})) \end{aligned} \quad (113)$$

This technique will allow us to automatically compute any decidable predicate.

4.2 Omniscience

So we now know what is needed of us for proof automation: we need to take our proofs and make them decidable. In particular, we need to be able to “lift” decidability back over a function arrow. For instance, given x , y , and z we already have $\text{Dec } ((x \wedge y) \wedge z \equiv x \wedge (y \wedge z))$ (because equality over booleans is decidable). In order to turn this into a proof that \wedge is associative we need $\text{Dec } (\forall x \ y \ z \rightarrow (x \wedge y) \wedge z \equiv x \wedge (y \wedge z))$. The ability to do this is described formally by the notion of “Exhaustibility”.

Definition 15 (Exhaustibility). We say a type A is exhaustible if, for any decidable predicate P on A , the universal quantification of the predicate is decidable.

$$\text{Exhaustible } p \ A = \forall \{P : A \rightarrow \text{Type } p\} \rightarrow ((x : A) \rightarrow \text{Dec } (P \ x)) \rightarrow \text{Dec } ((x : A) \rightarrow P \ x) \quad (114)$$

This property of **Bool** would allow us to automate the proof of associativity, but it is in fact not strong enough to find individual representatives of a type which support some property. For that we need the more well-known, but related, property of *omniscience*.

Definition 16 (Limited Principle of Omniscience). For any type A and predicate P on A , the limited principle of omniscience [Myhill 1972] is as follows:

$$\text{Omniscient } p \ A = \forall \{P : A \rightarrow \text{Type } p\} \rightarrow ((x : A) \rightarrow \text{Dec } (P \ x)) \rightarrow \text{Dec } (\Sigma [x : A] P \ x) \quad (115)$$

In other words, for any decidable predicate the existential quantification of that predicate is also decidable.

Because we're constructive, only a select few types are omniscient: finite types, for instance (the law of the excluded middle implies that all types are omniscient, meaning that all types are omniscient classically). Perhaps surprisingly, it is not *only* finite types which are exhaustible. Certain infinite types can be exhaustible [Escardo 2007], but an exploration of that is beyond the scope of this work.

Omniscience and exhaustibility are not interchangeable: every omniscient type is exhaustible, but the converse is not true. Conceptually, omniscience needs some kind of ordering on the underlying type. This is because omniscience returns a candidate satisfying the given predicate: there is no requirement, though, that only one element in the underlying type satisfies the decidable predicate. As a result, omniscience needs some way to choose among all possible candidates: this is the "order" we are referring to. This is also the same "order" that we referred to when talking about the finiteness predicates: all ordered predicates (in Figure 1) imply omniscience, whereas the unordered predicates only imply exhaustibility.

Lemma 19. Omniscience implies exhaustibility

PROOF. ■

Lemma 20. If exhaustibility implies omniscience, then the axiom of choice holds

PROOF. ■

And the relation to the finiteness predicates is straightforward: all of the finiteness predicates we have seen imply exhaustibility, and all of the ordered finiteness predicates imply omniscience. We can prove this by showing exhaustibility and omniscience for the weakest candidate of finiteness predicates.

Lemma 21. Kuratowski finiteness implies exhaustibility

Lemma 22. Manifest enumerability implies omniscience

Finally, we can get around the order requirement for prop-valued predicates for omniscience.

Lemma 23. Omniscience and exhaustibility coincide for prop-valued predicates.

4.3 Countdown

We have already introduced and described countdown: in this section, we will fill in the remaining parts of the solver, glue the pieces together, and show how the finiteness proofs can assist us to write the solver.

4.3.1 Finite Permutations. The first step of the transformation we will represent as a finite object is a *permutation*: once we choose the numbers we're going to use for the candidate for the solution, we have to order them in some way.

Our first attempt at representing permutations might look something like this:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Perm} &: \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \text{Type}_0 \\ \text{Perm } n &= \text{Fin } n \rightarrow \text{Fin } n \end{aligned} \tag{116}$$

the idea is that $\text{Perm } n$ represents a permutation of n things, as a function from positions to positions. Unfortunately such a simple answer won't work: there are no restrictions on the operation of the function, so it could (for instance), send more than one input position into the same output.

What we actually need is not just a function between positions, but an *isomorphism* between them. In types:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Perm} &: \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \text{Type}_0 \\ \text{Perm } n &= \text{Isomorphism } (\text{Fin } n) (\text{Fin } n) \end{aligned} \quad (117)$$

Where an isomorphism is defined as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Isomorphism} &: \text{Type } a \rightarrow \text{Type } b \rightarrow \text{Type } (a \ell \sqcup b) \\ \text{Isomorphism } A B &= \Sigma [f : (A \rightarrow B)] \Sigma [g : (B \rightarrow A)] (f \circ g \equiv \text{id}) \times (g \circ f \equiv \text{id}) \end{aligned} \quad (118)$$

While it may look complex, this term is actually composed of individual components we've already proven finite. First we have $\text{Fin } n \rightarrow \text{Fin } n$: functions between finite types are, as we know, finite (Theorem 15). We take a pair of them: pairs of finite things are *also* finite (Lemma 14). To get the next two components we can filter to the subobject: this requires these predicates to be decidable. We will construct a term of the following type:

$$\text{Dec } (f \circ g \equiv \text{id}) \quad (119)$$

So can we construct such a term? Yes!

We basically need to construct decidable equality for functions between $\text{Fin } n$ s: of course, this decidable equality is provided by the fact that such functions are themselves finite.

All in all we can now prove that the isomorphism, and by extension the permutation, is finite:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{iso-finite} &: \mathcal{B} A \rightarrow \\ &\mathcal{B} B \rightarrow \\ &\mathcal{B} (\Sigma [f, g : (A \rightarrow B) \times (B \rightarrow A)] \\ &\quad ((f.g.\text{fst} \circ f.g.\text{snd} \equiv \text{id}) \times \\ &\quad (f.g.\text{snd} \circ f.g.\text{fst} \equiv \text{id}))) \\ \text{iso-finite } \mathcal{B}\langle A \rangle \mathcal{B}\langle B \rangle &= \\ \text{filter} & \\ (\lambda _ \rightarrow \text{isPropEqs}) & \\ (\lambda \{ (f, g) \rightarrow (f \circ g) \stackrel{z^B}{=} \text{id} \ \&\& \ (g \circ f) \stackrel{z^A}{=} \text{id} \}) & \\ ((\mathcal{B}\langle A \rangle \mapsto \mathcal{B}\langle B \rangle) \times | (\mathcal{B}\langle B \rangle \mapsto \mathcal{B}\langle A \rangle)) & \end{aligned} \quad (120)$$

Unfortunately this implementation is too slow to be useful. As nice and declarative as it is, fundamentally it builds a list of all possible pairs of functions between $\text{Fin } n$ and itself (an operation which takes in the neighbourhood of $O(n^n)$ time), and then tests each for equality (which is likely worse than $O(n^2)$ time). We will instead use a factoriadic encoding: this is a relatively simple encoding of permutations which will reduce our time to a blazing fast $O(n!)$. It is expressed in Agda as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \text{Perm} &: \mathbb{N} \rightarrow \text{Type}_0 \\ \text{Perm } \text{zero} &= \top \\ \text{Perm } (\text{suc } n) &= \text{Fin } (\text{suc } n) \times \text{Perm } n \end{aligned} \quad (121)$$

It is a vector of positions, each represented with a Fin . Each position can only refer to the length of the tail of the list at that point: this prevents two input positions mapping to the same output point, which was the problem with the naive encoding we had previously. And it also has a relatively simple proof of finiteness:

$$\begin{aligned} \mathcal{E}!\langle \text{Perm} \rangle &: \mathcal{E}!\langle \text{Perm } n \rangle \\ \mathcal{E}!\langle \text{Perm} \rangle \{n = \text{zero}\} &= \mathcal{E}!\langle \top \rangle \\ \mathcal{E}!\langle \text{Perm} \rangle \{n = \text{suc } n\} &= \mathcal{E}!\langle \text{Fin} \rangle \times | \mathcal{E}!\langle \text{Perm} \rangle \end{aligned} \quad (122)$$

Should this isomorphism definition be put earlier in the intro with the equivalences etc?

Need to do filter subobject in topos section

4.3.2 *Parenthesising*. Our next step is figuring out a way to encode the parenthesisation of the expression (Fig. 2d). At this point of the transformation, we already have our numbers picked out, we have ordered them a certain way, and we have also selected the operators we're interested in. We have, in other words, the following:

$$3 \times 7 \times 50 - 10 - 25 \quad (123)$$

Without parentheses, however, (or a religious adherence to BOMDAS) this expression is still ambiguous.

$$3 \times ((7 \times (50 - 10)) - 25) = 765 \quad (124)$$

$$(((3 \times 7) \times 50) - 10) - 25 = 1015 \quad (125)$$

The different ways to parenthesise the expression result in different outputs of evaluation.

So what data type encapsulates the “different ways to parenthesise” a given expression? That's what we will figure out in this section, and what we will prove finite.

One way to approach the problem is with a binary tree. A binary tree with n leaves corresponds in a straightforward way to a parenthesisation of n numbers (Fig. 2d). This doesn't get us much closer to a finiteness proof, however: for that we will need to rely on *Dyck* words.

Definition 17 (Dyck words). A Dyck word is a string of balanced parentheses. In Agda, we can express it as the following:

```
data Dyck : ℕ → ℕ → Type₀ where
  done : Dyck zero zero
  ⟨_ : Dyck (suc n) m → Dyck n (suc m)
  ⟩_ : Dyck n m → Dyck (suc n) m
```

A fully balanced string of n parentheses has the type `Dyck zero n`. Here are some example strings:

$$\begin{array}{ll} _ : \text{Dyck } 0 \ 2 & _ : \text{Dyck } 0 \ 3 \\ _ = \langle \rangle \langle \rangle \text{ done} & _ = \langle \rangle \langle \langle \rangle \rangle \text{ done} \end{array} \quad (127) \quad (128)$$

The first parameter on the type represents the amount of unbalanced closing parens, for instance:

$$\begin{array}{l} _ : \text{Dyck } 1 \ 2 \\ _ = \rangle \langle \rangle \langle \rangle \text{ done} \end{array} \quad (129)$$

Already Dyck words look easier to prove finite than straight binary trees, but for that proof to be useful we'll have to relate Dyck words and binary trees somehow. As it happens, Dyck words of length $2n$ are isomorphic to binary trees with $n - 1$ leaves, but we only need to show this relation in one direction: from Dyck to binary tree. To demonstrate the algorithm we'll use a simple tree definition:

```
data Tree : Type₀ where
  leaf : Tree
  *_ : Tree → Tree → Tree
```

The algorithm itself is quite similar to stack-based parsing algorithms.

```

1373   dyck→tree : Dyck zero n → Tree
1374   dyck→tree d = go d (leaf , _)
1375   where
1376   go : Dyck n m → Vec Tree (suc n) → Tree
1377   go (< d) ts      = go d (leaf , ts)
1378   go (> d) (t1 , t2 , ts) = go d (t2 * t1 , ts)
1379   go done (t , _)   = t
1380

```

(131)

4.3.3 Filtering to Correct Expressions.

4.3.4 Putting It All Together.

4.4 Automating Proofs

One use for above constructions is the automation of certain proofs. In [Firsov and Uustalu 2015], which uses a similar approach to ours, the **Pauli** group is used as an example.

```
data Pauli : Type0 where X Y Z I : Pauli
```

As **Pauli** has 4 constructors, n -ary functions on **Pauli** may require up to 4^n cases, making even simple proofs prohibitively verbose.

The alternative is to derive the things we need from omniscience, itself derived from a finiteness predicate. For proof search, the procedure is a well-known one in Agda [Devriese and Piessens 2011]: we ask for the result of a decision procedure as an *instance argument*, which will demand computation during typechecking. Our addition to this technique is a way to handle multiple arguments based on fully level-polymorphic dependent currying and uncurrying, building on [Allais 2019].

```
assoc-· : ∀ x y z → (x · y) · z ≡ x · (y · z)
```

```
assoc-· = ∀zn 3 λ x y z → (x · y) · z ≐ x · (y · z)
```

Finally, we can derive decidable equality on functions over finite types. We can also use functions in our proof search. Here, for instance, is an automated procedure which finds the **not** function on **Bool**, given a specification.

```
not-spec : Σ[ f : (Bool → Bool) ] (f ∘ f ≡ id) × (f ≠ id)
```

```
not-spec = ∃fn 1 λ f → (f ∘ f ≐ id) && ! (f ≐ id)
```

5 COUNTABLY INFINITE TYPES

In the previous sections we saw different flavours of finiteness which were really just different flavours of relations to **Fin**. In this section we will see that we can construct a similar classification of relations to \mathbb{N} , in the form of the countably infinite types.

5.1 Two Countable Types

The two types for countability we will consider are analogous to split enumerability and cardinal finiteness. The change will be a simple one: we will swap out lists for streams.

Definition 18 (Streams).

$$\mathbf{Stream}(A) := (\mathbb{N} \rightarrow A) \simeq \llbracket \top, \text{const}(\mathbb{N}) \rrbracket \quad (132)$$

Definition 19 (Split Countability).

$$\aleph_0!(A) := \Sigma(xs : \mathbf{Stream}(A)), \Pi(x : A), x \in xs \quad (133)$$

This type is definitionally equal to its surjection equivalent $(\mathbb{N} \twoheadrightarrow! A)$. We construct the unordered, propositional version of the predicate in much the same way as we constructed cardinal finiteness.




Fig. 3. Two possible products for the sets $[1 \dots 5]$ and $[a \dots e]$

Definition 20 (Countability).

$$\aleph_0(A) := \|\aleph_0!(A)\| \quad (134)$$

From both of these types we can derive decidable equality.

Lemma 24. Any countable type has decidable equality.

5.2 Closure

We know that countable infinity is not closed under the exponential (function arrow), so the only closure we need to prove is Σ to cover all of what's left.

Theorem 25. Split countability is closed under Σ .

We know that countable infinity is not closed under the exponential (function arrow), so the only closure we need to prove is Σ to cover all of what's left. To do this we have to take a slightly different approach to the functions we defined before. Figure 3 illustrates the reason why: previously, we used the depth-first product pairing for each support list. This diverges if the first list is infinite, never exploring anything other than the first element in the second list. Instead, we use here the cantor pairing function, which performs a breadth-first search of the pairings of both lists.

Finally, while we have lost certain closure proofs by allowing for infinite types, we also *gain* some: in particular the Kleene star.

Theorem 26. Split countability is closed under Kleene star.

$$\aleph_0!(A) \rightarrow \aleph_0!(\text{List}(A)) \quad (135)$$

Again, this proof requires a particular pattern to ensure productivity. The pattern here builds an intermediate stream \mathcal{KV} of non-empty lists from the input support stream xs , which is subsequently flattened.

$$\mathcal{KV}_i := \left[[xs_{j-1} \mid j \in js] \mid js \in \text{List}(\mathbb{N}); \text{sum}(js) = i; 0 \notin js \right] \quad (136)$$

6 RELATED WORK

Homotopy Type Theory. [Univalent Foundations Program 2013]

Cubical Type Theory. [Cohen et al. 2016]

Cubical Agda. [Vezzosi et al. 2019]

Constructive Finiteness.

- First paper on the topic, defines 4 notions of finiteness (split enumerability, there called enumerated, bounded, Noetherian, streamless): [Coquand and Spiwack 2010]
- More exploration of Noetherianness [Firsov et al. 2016]
- More exploration of streamless sets [Parmann 2015] (in particular closure under product).
- Paper exploring programming with finite sets for e.g. proof search [Firsov and Uustalu 2015] (basically only enumerable sets though, only in MLTT)
- Finite sets in Homotopy Type Theory, especially Kuratowski [Frumin et al. 2018] (but no finite function arrows).
- Kuratowski's original paper on finiteness [Kuratowski 1920].
- [Smolka and Stark 2016].

Sets/Toposes.

- Paper that sets in HoTT form a topos (under certain conditions etc) [Rijke and Spitters 2015]. This paper is adapted into a chapter in the HoTT book.
- Category theory in cubical Agda [Iversen 2018].
- Topos from cardinal finite [Henry 2018].
- Category of finite sets [Solov'ev 1983].

Species.

- Brent Yorgey's thesis [Yorgey 2014].
- [Uzkay 2008]

Exhaustability.

- Definition of limited principle of omniscience: [Myhill 1972].
- [Escardo 2008]
- [Escardo 2007]
- [Escardó 2013]

Propositional Truncation algo. [Kraus 2015]*Countdown.*

- [Hutton 2002]
- [Bird and Mu 2005]
- [Bird and Hinze 2003]

Generate and Test.

- [Claessen and Hughes 2011]
- [Runciman et al. 2008]
- [O'Connor 2016]
- (for the generator syntax) [Allais 2019].

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