

What do Landlords Do? The Political Economy of Urban Real Estate

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


Figure 1: Labor share vs. Housing and Non-Housing Capital Share

- from Rognlie (2015), calculated from Piketty & Zucman (2014). A note: income share going to housing also includes imputed rents to owner-occupied housing. It may be the case that including this on the labor side equalizes the outcome.

Detangling Land, Housing, and Rent

- Land prices included in housing costs for macroeconomic statistics → how to decompose?
- Land prices drive 87% of housing prices in the United States (Knoll et. al 2014) → how does this square with Glaeser et. al? (i.e., prices in excess of construction costs being driven by land values)
- Consider an increase in land value; total surplus value has not increased, but owner of land can command higher rents, and therefore a higher percentage of the social surplus → Ricardian outcome
 - The distinction between *wealth* aggregates and *productive capital* aggregates are not evident in national accounts! (Stiglitz 2015)

The Disappearance of Land from the Production Function

Why is Land Not Capital? Why Does It Matter?

- Land (as applied to real estate) is non-produced, non-reproducible, and non-depreciable → land values *appreciate*, rather than depreciate

The Henry George Hypothesis

- Once un-owned land is occupied, economic rent becomes determined by *locational* advantage (i.e., the “unearned increment”)
- Locational advantage in the urban context derives from access to: global networks, infrastructure, human capital
- As productivity increases, the ability of landlords to capture greater share of the surplus increases
 - Some questions: This does not quite seem to be the case after GFC– small landlords were wiped out just as badly as large landlords

